[spsp-members] The Center for Philosophy of Science's Upcoming Hybrid Talks
Center for Phil Sci via spsp-members
invites you to join us for our upcoming presentations. All of the lectures
will be live streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
*Lunch Time Talk - **Christopher ChoGlueck* -
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/choglueck-chris/
Meet Christopher ChoGlueck, Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of
Science. Christopher's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/8F89ElOJbv4
<https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fyoutu.be%2F8F89ElOJbv4&data=05%7C02%7CSnodgrassC%40pitt.edu%7C1e366ede9c9e4892b64f08de73aa1f50%7C9ef9f489e0a04eeb87cc3a526112fd0d%7C1%7C0%7C639075371665029850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=CEbnGclhe%2Bx%2BpkqHyVM%2FuxMR51ssnhLDNiBhUTWoDgY%3D&reserved=0>
*Tuesday, March 3rd @ Noon*Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor
of the Cathedral of Learning.
*Title: *
* Male Birth Control: Why Is There Still No Pill for Men? And Would They
Even Use It? **Abstract: *
The birth control pill radically transformed our society over half a
century ago, yet side effects and health risks continue to burden women and
other people who can get pregnant. The current development of new male
contraceptives could usher in a new sexual order—but only if they ever make
it to market. This talk focuses on three questions about values in science,
reproductive ethics, and masculine identity: (1) Why is there still no pill
for men? (2) Why is male contraception an ethical priority? (3) Would
cisgender heterosexual men even use it? After elucidating how biases have
influenced contraceptive research, I offer a positive vision of manhood
decoupled from the ability to impregnate. Contrary to reactionary ideas in
the “manosphere,” I defend a new way for men and other sperm producers to
think about their swimmers, rooted in solidarity and shared responsibility
for reproductive risks.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226> https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95752018449
*Lunch Time Talk - * Margaret Farrell -
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/farrell-margaret/
Meet Margaret Farrell, Postdoctoral Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of
Science. Margaret's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/VLstiwC2kWc
<https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fyoutu.be%2FVLstiwC2kWc&data=05%7C02%7CSnodgrassC%40pitt.edu%7Cf62213ae1c16471afbc008de70bc0864%7C9ef9f489e0a04eeb87cc3a526112fd0d%7C1%7C0%7C639072150054270921%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Eh9cu5cj9lDygpYt9U6B978Jb%2BOu7QMalo1NaMMLpFU%3D&reserved=0>
*Friday, March 6th @ Noon*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: **Causal Properties of Narrative Explanations*
*Abstract:*
Some scientists give explanations that seem to have a narrative form. Such
explanations are especially prominent in the historical sciences, including
evolutionary history. In this talk, I propose a novel account of narrative
explanation that situates it within an interventionist account of causal
explanation, illustrated with an example from human evolutionary history.
In so doing, I account for why apparently narrative explanations have the
features that make them stand out to us as narrative. Certain features of
the explanatory context at hand and the properties of the causal
relationships involved explain why some causal explanations have narrative
features. Using my account, I propose strategies for evaluating narrative
explanations that are largely in line with explanatory standards employed
in other scientific contexts.
This talk will be available online:
Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91648526243
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91648526243> and YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg
*SPRING BREAK - March 9 - 13 NO TALKS*
*Lunch Time Talk - **Ákos Szegofi - *
https://philpeople.org/profiles/akos-szegofi
*Tuesday, March 17th @ Noon*Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th
floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
*Title: * *The misinformation-problem*
*Abstract: *
How dangerous is misinformation? What effects does it have on beliefs and
behavior, and how can we – should we? – defend against it? In recent years,
two schools of thought have emerged to address these questions, that I will
call “naivists” and “vigilantists.” The naivist school views misinformation
as extremely dangerous, arguing that humans are overly gullible and/or lazy
when evaluating communicated information, which makes them vulnerable to
deception. The solution is to enhance people’s cognitive abilities and
motivation. The vigilantist school holds that humans are epistemically
vigilant, misinformation is not a new problem, and the solutions proposed
by the naivist school have unintended consequences, such as decreasing
trust in democratic processes and triggering widespread technology panic.
My research seeks to bridge these two schools by demonstrating that
misinformation can be dangerous even if listeners are epistemically
vigilant and update their beliefs rationally. I empirically test two,
historically documented disinformation methods, then explore how modern
communication environments enabled their widespread usage. I conclude by
proposing structural solutions that focus on reshaping these environments,
allowing listeners to trust more, instead of becoming cynical.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: <http://goog_646225953>
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94008195871
*Annual Lecture Series – **Grünbaum Memorial Lecture – Wayne C. Myrvold* -
https://www.uwo.ca/philosophy/people/myrvold.html
*Friday, March 20th @ 3:30 EST*Attend in person in room 1008 in the
Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor)
*Title: * *No only to anti-realism”: Some skeptical thoughts on scientific
realism*
*Abstract:*
Debates about scientific realism and anti-realism have been a prominent
part of the landscape of philosophy of science for the past few decades,
which have seen a proliferation scientific realisms and anti-realisms.
Nearly 40 years ago, Howard Stein, from whom I borrow my title, added a
skeptical voice to these discussions, arguing that the issue between
scientific realists and its opponents had not been clearly drawn. This talk
takes up that skeptical thread. I will argue, first, for the modest
conclusion that we should believe whatever we have sufficiently good
evidence for. As this includes the existence of some things (including
atoms) that are not directly observable, this modest conclusion involves
rejection of any form of anti-realism that involves a prohibition against
accepting the existence of unobservable entities. A mere absence of a
prohibition, however, hardly deserves to be elevated into a philosophical
position, hence I don’t consider my view to be adding to the menagerie of
versions of “scientific realism.” I doubt that there is any defensible
position worthy of that name.
This talk will available online through Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96512686758
* Adolf Grünbaum Memorial Lecture*
Adolf Grünbaum was the first Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Pittsburgh from 1960, when he was hired away from Lehigh,
until his death in November 2018. He was the world preeminent philosopher
of physics of his generation, and he was instrumental in building
philosophy and philosophy of science at Pitt. Among other things, Adolf
founded the Center for Philosophy of Science in 1960, and remained its
director until 1978. Adolf also inaugurated the Annual Lecture Series in
1961, and so this is the 66th occurrence of this lecture series.
His works include very important books such as Philosophical Problems of
Space and Time (1963) and The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984). In
honor and memory of his legacy of prolific and profound contributions to
the field of philosophy, the Center has established an annual Adolf
Grünbaum Memorial Lecture thanks to a gift from his daughter Barbara
Grünbaum and her family. We are extremely grateful for this gift. We are
delighted that this year the Adolf Grünbaum memorial lecture will be given
by Professor Wayne Myrvold. To learn more about past speakers, use the link
here:
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/grunbaum-memorial-lecture/
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Center for Phil Sci
Abstract:
The birth control pill radically transformed our society over half a century ago, yet side effects and health risks continue to burden women and other people who can get pregnant. The current development of new male contraceptives could usher in a new sexual order—but only if they ever make it to market. This talk focuses on three questions about values in science, reproductive ethics, and masculine identity: (1) Why is there still no pill for men? (2) Why is male contraception an ethical priority? (3) Would cisgender heterosexual men even use it? After elucidating how biases have influenced contraceptive research, I offer a positive vision of manhood decoupled from the ability to impregnate. Contrary to reactionary ideas in the “manosphere,” I defend a new way for men and other sperm producers to think about their swimmers, rooted in solidarity and shared responsibility for reproductive risks.
Meet Margaret Farrell, Postdoctoral Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of Science. Margaret's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/VLstiwC2kWc
This talk will be available online:
SPRING BREAK - March 9 - 13 NO TALKS
Abstract:
How dangerous is misinformation? What effects does it have on beliefs and behavior, and how can we – should we? – defend against it? In recent years, two schools of thought have emerged to address these questions, that I will call “naivists” and “vigilantists.” The naivist school views misinformation as extremely dangerous, arguing that humans are overly gullible and/or lazy when evaluating communicated information, which makes them vulnerable to deception. The solution is to enhance people’s cognitive abilities and motivation. The vigilantist school holds that humans are epistemically vigilant, misinformation is not a new problem, and the solutions proposed by the naivist school have unintended consequences, such as decreasing trust in democratic processes and triggering widespread technology panic.
My research seeks to bridge these two schools by demonstrating that misinformation can be dangerous even if listeners are epistemically vigilant and update their beliefs rationally. I empirically test two, historically documented disinformation methods, then explore how modern communication environments enabled their widespread usage. I conclude by proposing structural solutions that focus on reshaping these environments, allowing listeners to trust more, instead of becoming cynical.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94008195871
Friday, March 20th @ 3:30 EST
Adolf Grünbaum was the first Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh from 1960, when he was hired away from Lehigh, until his death in November 2018. He was the world preeminent philosopher of physics of his generation, and he was instrumental in building philosophy and philosophy of science at Pitt. Among other things, Adolf founded the Center for Philosophy of Science in 1960, and remained its director until 1978. Adolf also inaugurated the Annual Lecture Series in 1961, and so this is the 66th occurrence of this lecture series.
His works include very important books such as Philosophical Problems of Space and Time (1963) and The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984). In honor and memory of his legacy of prolific and profound contributions to the field of philosophy, the Center has established an annual Adolf Grünbaum Memorial Lecture thanks to a gift from his daughter Barbara Grünbaum and her family. We are extremely grateful for this gift. We are delighted that this year the Adolf Grünbaum memorial lecture will be given by Professor Wayne Myrvold. To learn more about past speakers, use the link here: https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/grunbaum-memorial-lecture/
This email list is brought to you by HOPOS, the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science. In order to support the list and our other activities, please consider donating to https://subfill.uchicago.edu/JournalPubs/Donation.aspx?webpub=hop
For questions about HOPOS-g, email the list master Erich Reck: erich....@gmail.com
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Center for Phil Sci
Abstract:
The birth control pill radically transformed our society over half a century ago, yet side effects and health risks continue to burden women and other people who can get pregnant. The current development of new male contraceptives could usher in a new sexual order—but only if they ever make it to market. This talk focuses on three questions about values in science, reproductive ethics, and masculine identity: (1) Why is there still no pill for men? (2) Why is male contraception an ethical priority? (3) Would cisgender heterosexual men even use it? After elucidating how biases have influenced contraceptive research, I offer a positive vision of manhood decoupled from the ability to impregnate. Contrary to reactionary ideas in the “manosphere,” I defend a new way for men and other sperm producers to think about their swimmers, rooted in solidarity and shared responsibility for reproductive risks.
Meet Margaret Farrell, Postdoctoral Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of Science. Margaret's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/VLstiwC2kWc
This talk will be available online:
SPRING BREAK - March 9 - 13 NO TALKS
Abstract:
How dangerous is misinformation? What effects does it have on beliefs and behavior, and how can we – should we? – defend against it? In recent years, two schools of thought have emerged to address these questions, that I will call “naivists” and “vigilantists.” The naivist school views misinformation as extremely dangerous, arguing that humans are overly gullible and/or lazy when evaluating communicated information, which makes them vulnerable to deception. The solution is to enhance people’s cognitive abilities and motivation. The vigilantist school holds that humans are epistemically vigilant, misinformation is not a new problem, and the solutions proposed by the naivist school have unintended consequences, such as decreasing trust in democratic processes and triggering widespread technology panic.
My research seeks to bridge these two schools by demonstrating that misinformation can be dangerous even if listeners are epistemically vigilant and update their beliefs rationally. I empirically test two, historically documented disinformation methods, then explore how modern communication environments enabled their widespread usage. I conclude by proposing structural solutions that focus on reshaping these environments, allowing listeners to trust more, instead of becoming cynical.
Friday, March 20th @ 3:30 EST
Adolf Grünbaum was the first Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh from 1960, when he was hired away from Lehigh, until his death in November 2018. He was the world preeminent philosopher of physics of his generation, and he was instrumental in building philosophy and philosophy of science at Pitt. Among other things, Adolf founded the Center for Philosophy of Science in 1960, and remained its director until 1978. Adolf also inaugurated the Annual Lecture Series in 1961, and so this is the 66th occurrence of this lecture series.
His works include very important books such as Philosophical Problems of Space and Time (1963) and The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984). In honor and memory of his legacy of prolific and profound contributions to the field of philosophy, the Center has established an annual Adolf Grünbaum Memorial Lecture thanks to a gift from his daughter Barbara Grünbaum and her family. We are extremely grateful for this gift. We are delighted that this year the Adolf Grünbaum memorial lecture will be given by Professor Wayne Myrvold. To learn more about past speakers, use the link here: https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/grunbaum-memorial-lecture/
Philos-L "The Liverpool List" is run by the Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/philosophy/philos-l/ Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html. Recent posts can also be read in a Facebook group: https://www.facebook.com/PhilosL/ Follow the list on Twitter @PhilosL. Follow the Department of Philosophy @LiverpoolPhilos To sign off the list send a blank message to philos-l-unsub...@liverpool.ac.uk.
Center for Phil Sci
Adolf Grünbaum was the first Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh from 1960, when he was hired away from Lehigh, until his death in November 2018. He was the world preeminent philosopher of physics of his generation, and he was instrumental in building philosophy and philosophy of science at Pitt. Among other things, Adolf founded the Center for Philosophy of Science in 1960, and remained its director until 1978. Adolf also inaugurated the Annual Lecture Series in 1961, and so this is the 66th occurrence of this lecture series.
His works include very important books such as Philosophical Problems of Space and Time (1963) and The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984). In honor and memory of his legacy of prolific and profound contributions to the field of philosophy, the Center has established an annual Adolf Grünbaum Memorial Lecture thanks to a gift from his daughter Barbara Grünbaum and her family. We are extremely grateful for this gift. We are delighted that this year the Adolf Grünbaum memorial lecture will be given by Professor Wayne Myrvold. To learn more about past speakers, use the link here: https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/grunbaum-memorial-lecture/
This email list is brought to you by HOPOS, the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science. In order to support the list and our other activities, please consider donating to https://subfill.uchicago.edu/JournalPubs/Donation.aspx?webpub=hop
For questions about HOPOS-g, email the list master Erich Reck: erich....@gmail.com
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "hop...@vt.edu" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to hopos-g+u...@vt.edu.
Center for Phil Sci
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Abstract:
How dangerous is misinformation? What effects does it have on beliefs and behavior, and how can we – should we? – defend against it? In recent years, two schools of thought have emerged to address these questions, that I will call “naivists” and “vigilantists.” The naivist school views misinformation as extremely dangerous, arguing that humans are overly gullible and/or lazy when evaluating communicated information, which makes them vulnerable to deception. The solution is to enhance people’s cognitive abilities and motivation. The vigilantist school holds that humans are epistemically vigilant, misinformation is not a new problem, and the solutions proposed by the naivist school have unintended consequences, such as decreasing trust in democratic processes and triggering widespread technology panic.
My research seeks to bridge these two schools by demonstrating that misinformation can be dangerous even if listeners are epistemically vigilant and update their beliefs rationally. I empirically test two, historically documented disinformation methods, then explore how modern communication environments enabled their widespread usage. I conclude by proposing structural solutions that focus on reshaping these environments, allowing listeners to trust more, instead of becoming cynical.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94008195871
Friday, March 20th @ 3:30 EST
Attend in person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor)
Title: "No only to anti-realism”: Some skeptical thoughts on scientific realism
Debates about scientific realism and anti-realism have been a prominent part of the landscape of philosophy of science for the past few decades, which have seen a proliferation scientific realisms and anti-realisms. Nearly 40 years ago, Howard Stein, from whom I borrow my title, added a skeptical voice to these discussions, arguing that the issue between scientific realists and its opponents had not been clearly drawn. This talk takes up that skeptical thread. I will argue, first, for the modest conclusion that we should believe whatever we have sufficiently good evidence for. As this includes the existence of some things (including atoms) that are not directly observable, this modest conclusion involves rejection of any form of anti-realism that involves a prohibition against accepting the existence of unobservable entities. A mere absence of a prohibition, however, hardly deserves to be elevated into a philosophical position, hence I don’t consider my view to be adding to the menagerie of versions of “scientific realism.” I doubt that there is any defensible position worthy of that name.
Adolf Grünbaum was the first Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh from 1960, when he was hired away from Lehigh, until his death in November 2018. He was the world preeminent philosopher of physics of his generation, and he was instrumental in building philosophy and philosophy of science at Pitt. Among other things, Adolf founded the Center for Philosophy of Science in 1960, and remained its director until 1978. Adolf also inaugurated the Annual Lecture Series in 1961, and so this is the 66th occurrence of this lecture series.
His works include very important books such as Philosophical Problems of Space and Time (1963) and The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984). In honor and memory of his legacy of prolific and profound contributions to the field of philosophy, the Center has established an annual Adolf Grünbaum Memorial Lecture thanks to a gift from his daughter Barbara Grünbaum and her family. We are extremely grateful for this gift. We are delighted that this year the Adolf Grünbaum memorial lecture will be given by Professor Wayne Myrvold. To learn more about past speakers, use the link here: https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/grunbaum-memorial-lecture/
Lunch Time Talk - Laurenz Casser - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/casser-laurenz/
Meet Laurenz Casser, Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of Science. Laurenz's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/gC8MF64cOUE
Abstract:
In 1896, the Swedish physiologist Torsten Thunberg reported a curious discovery: when he touched a grid of alternating warm and cold brass pipes, the sensations of warmth and cold on his hand somehow ‘fused together’ into a ‘special sensation of heat’ — a sensation that many experimental subjects since then have described as painful. Since the 1990s, this so-called ‘thermal grill illusion’ (TGI) has become the conventional method of investigating ‘illusory pain’, and is said to hold important insights for our understanding of the bodily senses and clinical pain pathologies. However, what exactly these insights are meant to be remains largely unclear: indeed, after more than a century of scientific interest in Thunberg’s discovery, the sensory fusion he described is about as puzzling as ever. In this talk, I aim to articulate why the thermal grill illusion is a puzzle worth caring about, why it has been so difficult to solve, and what, if anything, we can learn from putting our hand on a grill.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99040150880
Title: Introducing A Wisdom Framework for Science in the 21st-century: The Idea of a Two-Track Scientific Community
Lunch Time Talk - Ken Aizawa - https://sasn.rutgers.edu/kenneth-aizawa
Tuesday, March 31st @ Noon
Attend in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Abstract:
A significant portion of philosophy of science might be thought of as the epistemology of science. It is epistemology with scientific examples. In this talk, I wish to focus on another part of the philosophy of science. I want to begin to think more concretely and explicitly about inquiry in science. Zetetic philosophy of science is, in the first instance, a shift from a focus on knowledge to a focus on inquiry, leaving aside whether scientific inquiry leads to knowledge. A key element here is a shift from focusing on the pairing of scientific realism and inference to the best explanation—which I take to be parts of the epistemology of science—to a focus on the pairing of zetetic scientific realism and abduction. This involves a shift from focusing on knowing that P to focusing on a different propositional attitude, namely, taking one’s self to have reasons to believe that P.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97559112250
This email list is brought to you by HOPOS, the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science. In order to support the list and our other activities, please consider donating to https://subfill.uchicago.edu/JournalPubs/Donation.aspx?webpub=hop
For questions about HOPOS-g, email the list master Erich Reck: erich....@gmail.com
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "hop...@vt.edu" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to hopos-g+u...@vt.edu.
Center for Phil Sci
Adolf Grünbaum was the first Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh from 1960, when he was hired away from Lehigh, until his death in November 2018. He was the world preeminent philosopher of physics of his generation, and he was instrumental in building philosophy and philosophy of science at Pitt. Among other things, Adolf founded the Center for Philosophy of Science in 1960, and remained its director until 1978. Adolf also inaugurated the Annual Lecture Series in 1961, and so this is the 66th occurrence of this lecture series.
His works include very important books such as Philosophical Problems of Space and Time (1963) and The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984). In honor and memory of his legacy of prolific and profound contributions to the field of philosophy, the Center has established an annual Adolf Grünbaum Memorial Lecture thanks to a gift from his daughter Barbara Grünbaum and her family. We are extremely grateful for this gift. We are delighted that this year the Adolf Grünbaum memorial lecture will be given by Professor Wayne Myrvold. To learn more about past speakers, use the link here: https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/grunbaum-memorial-lecture/
Philos-L "The Liverpool List" is run by the Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/philosophy/philos-l/ Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html. Recent posts can also be read in a Facebook group: https://www.facebook.com/PhilosL/ Follow the list on Twitter @PhilosL. Follow the Department of Philosophy @LiverpoolPhilos To sign off the list send a blank message to philos-l-unsub...@liverpool.ac.uk.
Center for Phil Sci
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Abstract:
How dangerous is misinformation? What effects does it have on beliefs and behavior, and how can we – should we? – defend against it? In recent years, two schools of thought have emerged to address these questions, that I will call “naivists” and “vigilantists.” The naivist school views misinformation as extremely dangerous, arguing that humans are overly gullible and/or lazy when evaluating communicated information, which makes them vulnerable to deception. The solution is to enhance people’s cognitive abilities and motivation. The vigilantist school holds that humans are epistemically vigilant, misinformation is not a new problem, and the solutions proposed by the naivist school have unintended consequences, such as decreasing trust in democratic processes and triggering widespread technology panic.
My research seeks to bridge these two schools by demonstrating that misinformation can be dangerous even if listeners are epistemically vigilant and update their beliefs rationally. I empirically test two, historically documented disinformation methods, then explore how modern communication environments enabled their widespread usage. I conclude by proposing structural solutions that focus on reshaping these environments, allowing listeners to trust more, instead of becoming cynical.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94008195871
Friday, March 20th @ 3:30 EST
Attend in person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor)
Title: "No only to anti-realism”: Some skeptical thoughts on scientific realism
Debates about scientific realism and anti-realism have been a prominent part of the landscape of philosophy of science for the past few decades, which have seen a proliferation scientific realisms and anti-realisms. Nearly 40 years ago, Howard Stein, from whom I borrow my title, added a skeptical voice to these discussions, arguing that the issue between scientific realists and its opponents had not been clearly drawn. This talk takes up that skeptical thread. I will argue, first, for the modest conclusion that we should believe whatever we have sufficiently good evidence for. As this includes the existence of some things (including atoms) that are not directly observable, this modest conclusion involves rejection of any form of anti-realism that involves a prohibition against accepting the existence of unobservable entities. A mere absence of a prohibition, however, hardly deserves to be elevated into a philosophical position, hence I don’t consider my view to be adding to the menagerie of versions of “scientific realism.” I doubt that there is any defensible position worthy of that name.
Adolf Grünbaum was the first Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh from 1960, when he was hired away from Lehigh, until his death in November 2018. He was the world preeminent philosopher of physics of his generation, and he was instrumental in building philosophy and philosophy of science at Pitt. Among other things, Adolf founded the Center for Philosophy of Science in 1960, and remained its director until 1978. Adolf also inaugurated the Annual Lecture Series in 1961, and so this is the 66th occurrence of this lecture series.
His works include very important books such as Philosophical Problems of Space and Time (1963) and The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984). In honor and memory of his legacy of prolific and profound contributions to the field of philosophy, the Center has established an annual Adolf Grünbaum Memorial Lecture thanks to a gift from his daughter Barbara Grünbaum and her family. We are extremely grateful for this gift. We are delighted that this year the Adolf Grünbaum memorial lecture will be given by Professor Wayne Myrvold. To learn more about past speakers, use the link here: https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/grunbaum-memorial-lecture/
Lunch Time Talk - Laurenz Casser - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/casser-laurenz/
Meet Laurenz Casser, Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of Science. Laurenz's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/gC8MF64cOUE
Abstract:
In 1896, the Swedish physiologist Torsten Thunberg reported a curious discovery: when he touched a grid of alternating warm and cold brass pipes, the sensations of warmth and cold on his hand somehow ‘fused together’ into a ‘special sensation of heat’ — a sensation that many experimental subjects since then have described as painful. Since the 1990s, this so-called ‘thermal grill illusion’ (TGI) has become the conventional method of investigating ‘illusory pain’, and is said to hold important insights for our understanding of the bodily senses and clinical pain pathologies. However, what exactly these insights are meant to be remains largely unclear: indeed, after more than a century of scientific interest in Thunberg’s discovery, the sensory fusion he described is about as puzzling as ever. In this talk, I aim to articulate why the thermal grill illusion is a puzzle worth caring about, why it has been so difficult to solve, and what, if anything, we can learn from putting our hand on a grill.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99040150880
Title: Introducing A Wisdom Framework for Science in the 21st-century: The Idea of a Two-Track Scientific Community
Lunch Time Talk - Ken Aizawa - https://sasn.rutgers.edu/kenneth-aizawa
Tuesday, March 31st @ Noon
Attend in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Abstract:
A significant portion of philosophy of science might be thought of as the epistemology of science. It is epistemology with scientific examples. In this talk, I wish to focus on another part of the philosophy of science. I want to begin to think more concretely and explicitly about inquiry in science. Zetetic philosophy of science is, in the first instance, a shift from a focus on knowledge to a focus on inquiry, leaving aside whether scientific inquiry leads to knowledge. A key element here is a shift from focusing on the pairing of scientific realism and inference to the best explanation—which I take to be parts of the epistemology of science—to a focus on the pairing of zetetic scientific realism and abduction. This involves a shift from focusing on knowing that P to focusing on a different propositional attitude, namely, taking one’s self to have reasons to believe that P.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97559112250
Center for Phil Sci via spsp-members
person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor) or visit our
live stream on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
The Annual Lecture Series, the Center’s oldest program, was established in
1960, the year when Adolf Grünbaum founded the Center. Each year
the series consists of six to eight lectures, about three quarters of which
are given by philosophers, historians, and scientists from other
universities.
https://www.uwo.ca/philosophy/people/myrvold.html
*Friday, March 20th @ 3:30 EST*
Attend in person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor)
*Title: "**No only to anti-realism”: Some skeptical thoughts on scientific
realism*
*Abstract:*
Debates about scientific realism and anti-realism have been a prominent
part of the landscape of philosophy of science for the past few decades,
which have seen a proliferation scientific realisms and anti-realisms.
Nearly 40 years ago, Howard Stein, from whom I borrow my title, added a
skeptical voice to these discussions, arguing that the issue between
scientific realists and its opponents had not been clearly drawn. This talk
takes up that skeptical thread. I will argue, first, for the modest
conclusion that we should believe whatever we have sufficiently good
evidence for. As this includes the existence of some things (including
atoms) that are not directly observable, this modest conclusion involves
rejection of any form of anti-realism that involves a prohibition against
accepting the existence of unobservable entities. A mere absence of a
prohibition, however, hardly deserves to be elevated into a philosophical
position, hence I don’t consider my view to be adding to the menagerie of
versions of “scientific realism.” I doubt that there is any defensible
position worthy of that name.
This talk will available online through Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96512686758
* Adolf Grünbaum Memorial Lecture*
Adolf Grünbaum was the first Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Pittsburgh from 1960, when he was hired away from Lehigh,
until his death in November 2018. He was the world preeminent philosopher
of physics of his generation, and he was instrumental in building
philosophy and philosophy of science at Pitt. Among other things, Adolf
founded the Center for Philosophy of Science in 1960, and remained its
director until 1978. Adolf also inaugurated the Annual Lecture Series in
1961, and so this is the 66th occurrence of this lecture series.
His works include very important books such as Philosophical Problems of
Space and Time (1963) and The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984). In
honor and memory of his legacy of prolific and profound contributions to
the field of philosophy, the Center has established an annual Adolf
Grünbaum Memorial Lecture thanks to a gift from his daughter Barbara
Grünbaum and her family. We are extremely grateful for this gift. We are
delighted that this year the Adolf Grünbaum memorial lecture will be given
by Professor Wayne Myrvold. To learn more about past speakers, use the link
here:
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/grunbaum-memorial-lecture/
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
Center for Phil Sci via spsp-members
invites you to join us for our upcoming presentations. All of the lectures
will be live streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
*Lunch Time Talk - **Ákos Szegofi - *
https://philpeople.org/profiles/akos-szegofi
*Tuesday, March 17th @ Noon*Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th
floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
*Title: * *The misinformation-problem*
*Abstract: *
How dangerous is misinformation? What effects does it have on beliefs and
behavior, and how can we – should we? – defend against it? In recent years,
two schools of thought have emerged to address these questions, that I will
call “naivists” and “vigilantists.” The naivist school views misinformation
as extremely dangerous, arguing that humans are overly gullible and/or lazy
when evaluating communicated information, which makes them vulnerable to
deception. The solution is to enhance people’s cognitive abilities and
motivation. The vigilantist school holds that humans are epistemically
vigilant, misinformation is not a new problem, and the solutions proposed
by the naivist school have unintended consequences, such as decreasing
trust in democratic processes and triggering widespread technology panic.
My research seeks to bridge these two schools by demonstrating that
misinformation can be dangerous even if listeners are epistemically
vigilant and update their beliefs rationally. I empirically test two,
historically documented disinformation methods, then explore how modern
communication environments enabled their widespread usage. I conclude by
proposing structural solutions that focus on reshaping these environments,
allowing listeners to trust more, instead of becoming cynical.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: <http://goog_646225953>
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94008195871
*Annual Lecture Series – **Grünbaum Memorial Lecture – Wayne C. Myrvold* -
https://www.uwo.ca/philosophy/people/myrvold.html
*Friday, March 20th @ 3:30 EST*Attend in person in room 1008 in the
Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor)
*Title: * "*No only to anti-realism”: Some skeptical thoughts on scientific
realism*
*Abstract:*
Debates about scientific realism and anti-realism have been a prominent
part of the landscape of philosophy of science for the past few decades,
which have seen a proliferation scientific realisms and anti-realisms.
Nearly 40 years ago, Howard Stein, from whom I borrow my title, added a
skeptical voice to these discussions, arguing that the issue between
scientific realists and its opponents had not been clearly drawn. This talk
takes up that skeptical thread. I will argue, first, for the modest
conclusion that we should believe whatever we have sufficiently good
evidence for. As this includes the existence of some things (including
atoms) that are not directly observable, this modest conclusion involves
rejection of any form of anti-realism that involves a prohibition against
accepting the existence of unobservable entities. A mere absence of a
prohibition, however, hardly deserves to be elevated into a philosophical
position, hence I don’t consider my view to be adding to the menagerie of
versions of “scientific realism.” I doubt that there is any defensible
position worthy of that name.
This talk will be available online through Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96512686758
* Adolf Grünbaum Memorial Lecture*
Adolf Grünbaum was the first Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Pittsburgh from 1960, when he was hired away from Lehigh,
until his death in November 2018. He was the world preeminent philosopher
of physics of his generation, and he was instrumental in building
philosophy and philosophy of science at Pitt. Among other things, Adolf
founded the Center for Philosophy of Science in 1960, and remained its
director until 1978. Adolf also inaugurated the Annual Lecture Series in
1961, and so this is the 66th occurrence of this lecture series.
His works include very important books such as Philosophical Problems of
Space and Time (1963) and The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984). In
honor and memory of his legacy of prolific and profound contributions to
the field of philosophy, the Center has established an annual Adolf
Grünbaum Memorial Lecture thanks to a gift from his daughter Barbara
Grünbaum and her family. We are extremely grateful for this gift. We are
delighted that this year the Adolf Grünbaum memorial lecture will be given
by Professor Wayne Myrvold. To learn more about past speakers, use the link
here:
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/grunbaum-memorial-lecture/
*Lunch Time Talk - **Laurenz Casser *- <http://goog_446078020>
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/casser-laurenz/
Meet Laurenz Casser, Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of
Science. Laurenz's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/gC8MF64cOUE
<https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fyoutu.be%2FgC8MF64cOUE&data=05%7C02%7CSnodgrassC%40pitt.edu%7C74b5056bd6d2419ddd6008de79609969%7C9ef9f489e0a04eeb87cc3a526112fd0d%7C1%7C0%7C639081652952657149%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=31RMSQAregS8paXeXyaYtzrxVrfOU%2Fb627acvgcuzVw%3D&reserved=0>
*Tuesday, March 24th @ Noon*Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th
floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
*Title: * Hot to the Touch and Chilled to the Bone
*Abstract: *
In 1896, the Swedish physiologist Torsten Thunberg reported a curious
discovery: when he touched a grid of alternating warm and cold brass pipes,
the sensations of warmth and cold on his hand somehow ‘fused together’ into
a ‘special sensation of heat’ — a sensation that many experimental subjects
since then have described as painful. Since the 1990s, this so-called
‘thermal grill illusion’ (TGI) has become the conventional method of
investigating ‘illusory pain’, and is said to hold important insights for
our understanding of the bodily senses and clinical pain pathologies.
However, what exactly these insights are meant to be remains largely
unclear: indeed, after more than a century of scientific interest in
Thunberg’s discovery, the sensory fusion he described is about as puzzling
as ever. In this talk, I aim to articulate why the thermal grill illusion
is a puzzle worth caring about, why it has been so difficult to solve, and
what, if anything, we can learn from putting our hand on a grill.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99040150880
*Featured Former Fellow** – Deepanwita Dasgupta*
*Friday, March 27th @ 12:00pm EST*
*Online Only* - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92652920133
*Title: * Introducing A Wisdom Framework for Science in the 21st-century:
The Idea of a Two-Track Scientific Community
*Abstract:*
This talk will be available online through Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92652920133
*Lunch Time Talk - **Ken Aizawa *- <http://goog_446078020/>
https://sasn.rutgers.edu/kenneth-aizawa
*Tuesday, March 31st @ Noon*
Attend in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: *Zetetic Philosophy of Science
*Abstract: *
A significant portion of philosophy of science might be thought of as the
epistemology of science. It is epistemology with scientific examples. In
this talk, I wish to focus on another part of the philosophy of science. I
want to begin to think more concretely and explicitly about inquiry in
science. Zetetic philosophy of science is, in the first instance, a shift
from a focus on knowledge to a focus on inquiry, leaving aside whether
scientific inquiry leads to knowledge. A key element here is a shift from
focusing on the pairing of scientific realism and inference to the best
explanation—which I take to be parts of the epistemology of science—to a
focus on the pairing of zetetic scientific realism and abduction. This
involves a shift from focusing on knowing that P to focusing on a different
propositional attitude, namely, taking one’s self to have reasons to
believe that P.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97559112250
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
Center for Phil Sci
Lunch Time Talk - Laurenz Casser - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/casser-laurenz/
Meet Laurenz Casser, Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of Science. Laurenz's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/gC8MF64cOUE
Tuesday, March 24th @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Title: Hot to the Touch and Chilled to the Bone
Abstract:
In 1896, the Swedish physiologist Torsten Thunberg reported a curious discovery: when he touched a grid of alternating warm and cold brass pipes, the sensations of warmth and cold on his hand somehow ‘fused together’ into a ‘special sensation of heat’ — a sensation that many experimental subjects since then have described as painful. Since the 1990s, this so-called ‘thermal grill illusion’ (TGI) has become the conventional method of investigating ‘illusory pain’, and is said to hold important insights for our understanding of the bodily senses and clinical pain pathologies. However, what exactly these insights are meant to be remains largely unclear: indeed, after more than a century of scientific interest in Thunberg’s discovery, the sensory fusion he described is about as puzzling as ever. In this talk, I aim to articulate why the thermal grill illusion is a puzzle worth caring about, why it has been so difficult to solve, and what, if anything, we can learn from putting our hand on a grill.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99040150880
Featured Former Fellow – Deepanwita Dasgupta
Friday, March 27th @ 12:00pm EST
Online Only - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92652920133
Title: Introducing A Wisdom Framework for Science in the 21st-century: The Idea of a Two-Track Scientific Community
Abstract:
In this talk, my task will be to show how wisdom, which is an integrated form of multi-level skills, could be incorporated into the research/ teaching practices of contemporary science with some good effects. Additionally, such wisdom can allow us to use our intellectual breakthroughs to serve our existential ends. Our science today is built on the idea of developing expertise in multiple narrow domains, which then would be scaled up to yield quick flows of innovations. While a science based on this kind of narrow expertise can bring us rapid flows of novel things, it can also lead us to a crisis of sustainability, commodification of research, and a slide towards inequality. To improve matters, I suggest that our narrow practices be scaffolded by a wider and more expansive practice that could function as scaffolds to our current sets of expertise. This combination of a faster and a slower track will allow us to address the blind spots that often lie embedded in our expertise and later gives rise to evidence-in-use problems. Setting up a link between these two tracks may be called wisdom, which we badly need today to engage with our current exponential technologies and their effects on us. This of course needs the inclusion of some new members into the peer community.
Adding a wisdom track in this way to our system can help us develop new sets of research questions, training procedures, or research protocols. It can thus allow us to explore our areas of ignorance. While there is much discussion about the Freudian kind of ignorance that makes us blind to various things, there is also a Socratic form of ignorance that can be used as a springboard for new ways of thinking. In true Socratic spirit then, I claim that this wisdom approach might help us in three specific areas – in gatekeeping decisions, building trust in science, and in setting up consiliences with other knowledge communities and their traditions.
This talk will be available online through Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92652920133
Lunch Time Talk - Ken Aizawa - https://sasn.rutgers.edu/kenneth-aizawa
Tuesday, March 31st @ Noon
Attend in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Title: Zetetic Philosophy of Science
Abstract:
A significant portion of philosophy of science might be thought of as the epistemology of science. It is epistemology with scientific examples. In this talk, I wish to focus on another part of the philosophy of science. I want to begin to think more concretely and explicitly about inquiry in science. Zetetic philosophy of science is, in the first instance, a shift from a focus on knowledge to a focus on inquiry, leaving aside whether scientific inquiry leads to knowledge. A key element here is a shift from focusing on the pairing of scientific realism and inference to the best explanation—which I take to be parts of the epistemology of science—to a focus on the pairing of zetetic scientific realism and abduction. This involves a shift from focusing on knowing that P to focusing on a different propositional attitude, namely, taking one’s self to have reasons to believe that P.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97559112250
Featured Former Fellow – Sherrilyn Roush - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/roush-sherrilyn/
Friday, April 3rd @ 12:00pm EST
Online Only - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552
Title: Should Newton’s Principia be retracted? “Good Science” and the Epistemology of Retraction
Abstract:
There is an epidemic of retractions of scientific journal articles; often, though not always, it is for fraud or misconduct. This obviously erodes public trust in our institutions of knowledge production. Inductive reasoning is non-monotonic, and, accordingly, good science is often legitimately overturned. These phenomena have a similar feel, so sharpening the distinction between them is imperative for the survival of trust in science. We can start with the observations that good science isn’t retracted, even when its conclusions are overturned – e.g., Newton’s Principia – and that falsehood of conclusions is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify retraction of a publication. I sketch an epistemic distinction between “good science” that is overturned and publications that should be retracted. Secondly, I provide some guidelines about when counting retractions in the track records of authors, reviewers, journals, publishers, and universities gives us evidence about how much to trust those vehicles in their future publications.
This talk will be available online through Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552
Lunch Time Talk - Sven Neth - https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/people/ant-74
Tuesday, April 7th @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Abstract:
The principle of indifference says that if you don’t know which possibility obtains, you should assign equal credences to all possibilities. There are different ways to make this precise, but even sophisticated versions of the principle of indifference fail to vindicate inductive reasoning. I illustrate this point by discussing Carnap’s work on the foundations of inductive logic and the No Free Lunch theorem from machine learning and draw some philosophical lessons.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92589572462
Lunch Time Talk - Simon DeDeo - https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/sds/people/faculty/simon-dedeo.html
Friday April 10th @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Abstract:
TBA
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97095624890
Center for Phil Sci
For questions about HOPOS-g, email the list master Erich Reck: erich....@gmail.com
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To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to hopos-g+u...@vt.edu.
Center for Phil Sci via spsp-members
invites you to join us for the last presentations of the semester. All of
the lectures will be live streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
*Lunch Time Talk - Laurenz Casser* -
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/casser-laurenz/
Meet Laurenz Casser, Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of
Science. Laurenz's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/gC8MF64cOUE
*Tuesday, March 24th @ Noo*n
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: Hot to the Touch and Chilled to the Bone*
Abstract:
In 1896, the Swedish physiologist Torsten Thunberg reported a curious
discovery: when he touched a grid of alternating warm and cold brass pipes,
the sensations of warmth and cold on his hand somehow ‘fused together’ into
a ‘special sensation of heat’ — a sensation that many experimental subjects
since then have described as painful. Since the 1990s, this so-called
‘thermal grill illusion’ (TGI) has become the conventional method of
investigating ‘illusory pain’, and is said to hold important insights for
our understanding of the bodily senses and clinical pain pathologies.
However, what exactly these insights are meant to be remains largely
unclear: indeed, after more than a century of scientific interest in
Thunberg’s discovery, the sensory fusion he described is about as puzzling
as ever. In this talk, I aim to articulate why the thermal grill illusion
is a puzzle worth caring about, why it has been so difficult to solve, and
what, if anything, we can learn from putting our hand on a grill.
*This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99040150880 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99040150880>*
*Featured Former Fellow – Deepanwita Dasgupta *
Friday, March 27th @ 12:00pm EST
*Online Only - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92652920133
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92652920133>*
*Title: Introducing A Wisdom Framework for Science in the 21st-century:
The Idea of a Two-Track Scientific Community*
*This talk will be available online through Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92652920133 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92652920133>*
*Lunch Time Talk - Ken Aizawa* - https://sasn.rutgers.edu/kenneth-aizawa
*Tuesday, March 31st @ Noon*
Attend in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: Zetetic Philosophy of Science*
*Abstract: *
A significant portion of philosophy of science might be thought of as the
epistemology of science. It is epistemology with scientific examples. In
this talk, I wish to focus on another part of the philosophy of science. I
want to begin to think more concretely and explicitly about inquiry in
science. Zetetic philosophy of science is, in the first instance, a shift
from a focus on knowledge to a focus on inquiry, leaving aside whether
scientific inquiry leads to knowledge. A key element here is a shift from
focusing on the pairing of scientific realism and inference to the best
explanation—which I take to be parts of the epistemology of science—to a
focus on the pairing of zetetic scientific realism and abduction. This
involves a shift from focusing on knowing that P to focusing on a different
propositional attitude, namely, taking one’s self to have reasons to
believe that P.
*This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97559112250 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97559112250>*
*Featured Former Fellow – Sherrilyn Roush *-
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/roush-sherrilyn/
Friday, April 3rd @ 12:00pm EST
*Online Only - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552>*
*Title: Should Newton’s Principia be retracted? “Good Science” and the
Epistemology of Retraction*
Abstract:
There is an epidemic of retractions of scientific journal articles; often,
though not always, it is for fraud or misconduct. This obviously erodes
public trust in our institutions of knowledge production. Inductive
reasoning is non-monotonic, and, accordingly, good science is often
legitimately overturned. These phenomena have a similar feel, so sharpening
the distinction between them is imperative for the survival of trust in
science. We can start with the observations that good science isn’t
retracted, even when its conclusions are overturned – e.g., Newton’s
Principia – and that falsehood of conclusions is neither necessary nor
sufficient to justify retraction of a publication. I sketch an epistemic
distinction between “good science” that is overturned and publications that
should be retracted. Secondly, I provide some guidelines about when
counting retractions in the track records of authors, reviewers, journals,
publishers, and universities gives us evidence about how much to trust
those vehicles in their future publications.
*This talk will be available online through Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552>*
*Lunch Time Talk - Sven Neth *-
https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/people/ant-74
*Tuesday, April 7th @ Noon*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: Induction and Indifference*
Abstract:
The principle of indifference says that if you don’t know which possibility
obtains, you should assign equal credences to all possibilities. There are
different ways to make this precise, but even sophisticated versions of the
principle of indifference fail to vindicate inductive reasoning. I
illustrate this point by discussing Carnap’s work on the foundations of
inductive logic and the No Free Lunch theorem from machine learning and
draw some philosophical lessons.
*This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92589572462 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92589572462>*
*Lunch Time Talk - Simon DeDeo - *
https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/sds/people/faculty/simon-dedeo.html
Friday April 10th @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
Title: TBA
Abstract:
TBA
*This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97095624890 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97095624890>*
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
Center for Phil Sci
Meet Laurenz Casser, Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of Science. Laurenz's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/gC8MF64cOUE
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
In 1896, the Swedish physiologist Torsten Thunberg reported a curious discovery: when he touched a grid of alternating warm and cold brass pipes, the sensations of warmth and cold on his hand somehow ‘fused together’ into a ‘special sensation of heat’ — a sensation that many experimental subjects since then have described as painful. Since the 1990s, this so-called ‘thermal grill illusion’ (TGI) has become the conventional method of investigating ‘illusory pain’, and is said to hold important insights for our understanding of the bodily senses and clinical pain pathologies. However, what exactly these insights are meant to be remains largely unclear: indeed, after more than a century of scientific interest in Thunberg’s discovery, the sensory fusion he described is about as puzzling as ever. In this talk, I aim to articulate why the thermal grill illusion is a puzzle worth caring about, why it has been so difficult to solve, and what, if anything, we can learn from putting our hand on a grill.
In this talk, my task will be to show how wisdom, which is an integrated form of multi-level skills, could be incorporated into the research/ teaching practices of contemporary science with some good effects. Additionally, such wisdom can allow us to use our intellectual breakthroughs to serve our existential ends. Our science today is built on the idea of developing expertise in multiple narrow domains, which then would be scaled up to yield quick flows of innovations. While a science based on this kind of narrow expertise can bring us rapid flows of novel things, it can also lead us to a crisis of sustainability, commodification of research, and a slide towards inequality. To improve matters, I suggest that our narrow practices be scaffolded by a wider and more expansive practice that could function as scaffolds to our current sets of expertise. This combination of a faster and a slower track will allow us to address the blind spots that often lie embedded in our expertise and later gives rise to evidence-in-use problems. Setting up a link between these two tracks may be called wisdom, which we badly need today to engage with our current exponential technologies and their effects on us. This of course needs the inclusion of some new members into the peer community.
Adding a wisdom track in this way to our system can help us develop new sets of research questions, training procedures, or research protocols. It can thus allow us to explore our areas of ignorance. While there is much discussion about the Freudian kind of ignorance that makes us blind to various things, there is also a Socratic form of ignorance that can be used as a springboard for new ways of thinking. In true Socratic spirit then, I claim that this wisdom approach might help us in three specific areas – in gatekeeping decisions, building trust in science, and in setting up consiliences with other knowledge communities and their traditions.
Abstract:
Featured Former Fellow – Sherrilyn Roush - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/roush-sherrilyn/
Friday, April 3rd @ 12:00pm EST
There is an epidemic of retractions of scientific journal articles; often, though not always, it is for fraud or misconduct. This obviously erodes public trust in our institutions of knowledge production. Inductive reasoning is non-monotonic, and, accordingly, good science is often legitimately overturned. These phenomena have a similar feel, so sharpening the distinction between them is imperative for the survival of trust in science. We can start with the observations that good science isn’t retracted, even when its conclusions are overturned – e.g., Newton’s Principia – and that falsehood of conclusions is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify retraction of a publication. I sketch an epistemic distinction between “good science” that is overturned and publications that should be retracted. Secondly, I provide some guidelines about when counting retractions in the track records of authors, reviewers, journals, publishers, and universities gives us evidence about how much to trust those vehicles in their future publications.
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Abstract:
The principle of indifference says that if you don’t know which possibility obtains, you should assign equal credences to all possibilities. There are different ways to make this precise, but even sophisticated versions of the principle of indifference fail to vindicate inductive reasoning. I illustrate this point by discussing Carnap’s work on the foundations of inductive logic and the No Free Lunch theorem from machine learning and draw some philosophical lessons.
Friday April 10th @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Title: TBA
Abstract:
TBA
Philos-L "The Liverpool List" is run by the Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/philosophy/philos-l/ Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html. Recent posts can also be read in a Facebook group: https://www.facebook.com/PhilosL/ Follow the list on Twitter @PhilosL. Follow the Department of Philosophy @LiverpoolPhilos To sign off the list send a blank message to philos-l-unsub...@liverpool.ac.uk.
Center for Phil Sci
Canceled -
Featured Former Fellow – Sherrilyn Roush - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/roush-sherrilyn/
Friday, April 3rd @ 12:00pm EST
Online Only - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552
Title: Should Newton’s Principia be retracted? “Good Science” and the Epistemology of Retraction
Abstract:
There is an epidemic of retractions of scientific journal articles; often, though not always, it is for fraud or misconduct. This obviously erodes public trust in our institutions of knowledge production. Inductive reasoning is non-monotonic, and, accordingly, good science is often legitimately overturned. These phenomena have a similar feel, so sharpening the distinction between them is imperative for the survival of trust in science. We can start with the observations that good science isn’t retracted, even when its conclusions are overturned – e.g., Newton’s Principia – and that falsehood of conclusions is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify retraction of a publication. I sketch an epistemic distinction between “good science” that is overturned and publications that should be retracted. Secondly, I provide some guidelines about when counting retractions in the track records of authors, reviewers, journals, publishers, and universities gives us evidence about how much to trust those vehicles in their future publications.
This talk will be available online through Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552
Lunch Time Talk - Sven Neth - https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/people/ant-74
Tuesday, April 7th @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Title: Induction and Indifference
Abstract:
The principle of indifference says that if you don’t know which possibility obtains, you should assign equal credences to all possibilities. There are different ways to make this precise, but even sophisticated versions of the principle of indifference fail to vindicate inductive reasoning. I illustrate this point by discussing Carnap’s work on the foundations of inductive logic and the No Free Lunch theorem from machine learning and draw some philosophical lessons.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92589572462
Center for Phil Sci
For questions about HOPOS-g, email the list master Erich Reck: erich....@gmail.com
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Center for Phil Sci
Philos-L "The Liverpool List" is run by the Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/philosophy/philos-l/ Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html. Recent posts can also be read in a Facebook group: https://www.facebook.com/PhilosL/ Follow the list on Twitter @PhilosL. Follow the Department of Philosophy @LiverpoolPhilos To sign off the list send a blank message to philos-l-unsub...@liverpool.ac.uk.
Center for Phil Sci via spsp-members
invites you to join us for the last presentations of the semester. All of
the lectures (except the Watch Party) will be live streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
*Lunch Time Talk - Ken Aizawa* -
*Canceled - Tuesday, March 31st @ Noon*
*Featured Former Fellow – Sherrilyn Roush *-
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/roush-sherrilyn/
Friday, April 3rd @ 12:00pm EST
*Online Only - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552>*
*Title: Should Newton’s Principia be retracted? “Good Science” and the
Epistemology of Retraction*
Abstract:
There is an epidemic of retractions of scientific journal articles; often,
though not always, it is for fraud or misconduct. This obviously erodes
public trust in our institutions of knowledge production. Inductive
reasoning is non-monotonic, and, accordingly, good science is often
legitimately overturned. These phenomena have a similar feel, so sharpening
the distinction between them is imperative for the survival of trust in
science. We can start with the observations that good science isn’t
retracted, even when its conclusions are overturned – e.g., Newton’s
Principia – and that falsehood of conclusions is neither necessary nor
sufficient to justify retraction of a publication. I sketch an epistemic
distinction between “good science” that is overturned and publications that
should be retracted. Secondly, I provide some guidelines about when
counting retractions in the track records of authors, reviewers, journals,
publishers, and universities gives us evidence about how much to trust
those vehicles in their future publications.
*This talk will be available online through Zoom:
*Lunch Time Talk - Sven Neth *-
https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/people/ant-74
*Tuesday, April 7th @ Noon*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: Induction and Indifference*
Abstract:
The principle of indifference says that if you don’t know which possibility
obtains, you should assign equal credences to all possibilities. There are
different ways to make this precise, but even sophisticated versions of the
principle of indifference fail to vindicate inductive reasoning. I
illustrate this point by discussing Carnap’s work on the foundations of
inductive logic and the No Free Lunch theorem from machine learning and
draw some philosophical lessons.
*This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92589572462 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92589572462>*
*Watch Party* - *Edouard Machery *
https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/edouard-machery and *John Doris *
https://philosophy.cornell.edu/john-m-doris
*Thursday, April 9 @1:00pm EST*
Watch Party in The Center, room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning
*Symposium on Edouard Machery and John Doris’s book manuscript, Reasonable
Doubt: Should We Trust Science? *
The Center for Philosophy of Science will be hosting a watch party on
Thursday April 9 at 1:00pm to attend the online symposium at the Pacific
Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, held online (
https://www.apaonline.org/mpage/2026pacific). All are welcome to attend the
event and take part to the Q&A at the end of the online symposium. The
event will be streamed at the Center for Philosophy of Science. Cookies and
coffee will be provided.
Chair: Felipe Romero
Commentators: Cailin O’Connor (Irvine), Naomi Oreskes (Harvard), and
Michael Strevens (NYU)
Authors: Edouard Machery and John Doris
*In Reasonable Doubt: Should We Trust Science?*, Machery and Doris
challenge the common and plausible idea that science ought to be trusted.
Reviewing the large metascientific literature, they argue that to a
surprising degree scientific literatures at the frontier of science and, to
some extent, textbook science aren’t trustworthy, and they examine the
causes of this untrustworthiness. Often, science turns out to be an
unreliable process that typically fails because of human epistemic
limitations and the messiness of the world, but sometimes stumble, luckily,
onto true and explanatory theories. But if science cannot be trusted, it
cannot be ignored either, and Machery and Doris’s discussion leads us to
reinvent our epistemic relation to a process as messy and as human as
science.
*Lunch Time Talk - Simon DeDeo - *
https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/sds/people/faculty/simon-dedeo.html
Friday April 10th @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
Title: TBA
Abstract:
TBA
*This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97095624890 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97095624890>*
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Center for Phil Sci
Featured Former Fellow – Sherrilyn Roush - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/roush-sherrilyn/
Friday, April 3rd @ 12:00pm EST
Online Only - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552
Title: Should Newton’s Principia be retracted? “Good Science” and the Epistemology of Retraction
Abstract:
There is an epidemic of retractions of scientific journal articles; often, though not always, it is for fraud or misconduct. This obviously erodes public trust in our institutions of knowledge production. Inductive reasoning is non-monotonic, and, accordingly, good science is often legitimately overturned. These phenomena have a similar feel, so sharpening the distinction between them is imperative for the survival of trust in science. We can start with the observations that good science isn’t retracted, even when its conclusions are overturned – e.g., Newton’s Principia – and that falsehood of conclusions is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify retraction of a publication. I sketch an epistemic distinction between “good science” that is overturned and publications that should be retracted. Secondly, I provide some guidelines about when counting retractions in the track records of authors, reviewers, journals, publishers, and universities gives us evidence about how much to trust those vehicles in their future publications.
This talk will be available online through Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552
Lunch Time Talk - Sven Neth - https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/people/ant-74
Tuesday, April 7th @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Title: Induction and Indifference
Abstract:
The principle of indifference says that if you don’t know which possibility obtains, you should assign equal credences to all possibilities. There are different ways to make this precise, but even sophisticated versions of the principle of indifference fail to vindicate inductive reasoning. I illustrate this point by discussing Carnap’s work on the foundations of inductive logic and the No Free Lunch theorem from machine learning and draw some philosophical lessons.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92589572462
Center for Phil Sci
For questions about HOPOS-g, email the list master Erich Reck: erich....@gmail.com
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "hop...@vt.edu" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to hopos-g+u...@vt.edu.
Center for Phil Sci via spsp-members
invites you to join us for the last presentations of the semester. All of
the lectures will be live streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
*Featured Former Fellow – Sherrilyn Roush *-
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/roush-sherrilyn/
Friday, April 3rd @ 12:00pm EST
*Online Only - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94358264552>*
*Title: Should Newton’s Principia be retracted? “Good Science” and the
Epistemology of Retraction*
Abstract:
There is an epidemic of retractions of scientific journal articles; often,
though not always, it is for fraud or misconduct. This obviously erodes
public trust in our institutions of knowledge production. Inductive
reasoning is non-monotonic, and, accordingly, good science is often
legitimately overturned. These phenomena have a similar feel, so sharpening
the distinction between them is imperative for the survival of trust in
science. We can start with the observations that good science isn’t
retracted, even when its conclusions are overturned – e.g., Newton’s
Principia – and that falsehood of conclusions is neither necessary nor
sufficient to justify retraction of a publication. I sketch an epistemic
distinction between “good science” that is overturned and publications that
should be retracted. Secondly, I provide some guidelines about when
counting retractions in the track records of authors, reviewers, journals,
publishers, and universities gives us evidence about how much to trust
those vehicles in their future publications.
*This talk will be available online through Zoom:
*Lunch Time Talk - Sven Neth *-
https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/people/ant-74
*Tuesday, April 7th @ Noon*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: Induction and Indifference*
Abstract:
The principle of indifference says that if you don’t know which possibility
obtains, you should assign equal credences to all possibilities. There are
different ways to make this precise, but even sophisticated versions of the
principle of indifference fail to vindicate inductive reasoning. I
illustrate this point by discussing Carnap’s work on the foundations of
inductive logic and the No Free Lunch theorem from machine learning and
draw some philosophical lessons.
*This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92589572462 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92589572462>*
*Lunch Time Talk - Simon DeDeo - *
https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/sds/people/faculty/simon-dedeo.html
Carnegie Mellon University & the Santa Fe Institute
https://proofsandreasons.io
*Friday April 10th @ Noon*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: * * Alien Proofs*
* Abstract: *
It is now possible to write verifiably-correct proofs of sophisticated
mathematical theorems in computer programming languages such as Lean.
Coupled with recent developments in Generative Artificial Intelligence,
this means we are now able to explore, for the first time, the space of
mathematical proofs in ways that go beyond human intuition, capacity, and
patience, and to answer, in new ways and through empirical study, questions
that were previously the realm of science fiction and philosophical
speculation: how do humans carve the space of mathematics? What regions do
we leave unexplored and what lies beyond our ken? How do our cognitive
limitations constrain us or, conversely, lead us to explanatory and fertile
ground? I will present the first results from the Proofs and Reasons
Project, a multidisciplinary collaboration between philosophers, cognitive
scientists, mathematicians, and computer scientists. I will present the
first statistical studies of artificially-generated proofs, constructed
with, and without, human guidance; our first results on so-called
"ablation" studies that demonstrate the existence of what we refer to as
generative constraints; and the first results that probe the often
misaligned preferences of humans and machines in cyborg proofs. These
results challenge basic orthodoxies in the philosophy of mathematics, and
provide new problems for philosophers of science, mathematics, and AI.
Joint work with Zephyr Fan, Bálint Gyevnár, and Eamon Duede, supported by
Grant 63750 from the John Templeton Foundation.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97095624890
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Center for Phil Sci
Featured Former Fellow – Sherrilyn Roush - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/roush-sherrilyn/
Friday, April 3rd @ 12:00pm EST
There is an epidemic of retractions of scientific journal articles; often, though not always, it is for fraud or misconduct. This obviously erodes public trust in our institutions of knowledge production. Inductive reasoning is non-monotonic, and, accordingly, good science is often legitimately overturned. These phenomena have a similar feel, so sharpening the distinction between them is imperative for the survival of trust in science. We can start with the observations that good science isn’t retracted, even when its conclusions are overturned – e.g., Newton’s Principia – and that falsehood of conclusions is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify retraction of a publication. I sketch an epistemic distinction between “good science” that is overturned and publications that should be retracted. Secondly, I provide some guidelines about when counting retractions in the track records of authors, reviewers, journals, publishers, and universities gives us evidence about how much to trust those vehicles in their future publications.
Lunch Time Talk - Sven Neth - https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/people/ant-74
Tuesday, April 7th @ Noon
Abstract:
The principle of indifference says that if you don’t know which possibility obtains, you should assign equal credences to all possibilities. There are different ways to make this precise, but even sophisticated versions of the principle of indifference fail to vindicate inductive reasoning. I illustrate this point by discussing Carnap’s work on the foundations of inductive logic and the No Free Lunch theorem from machine learning and draw some philosophical lessons.
Philos-L "The Liverpool List" is run by the Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/philosophy/philos-l/ Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html. Recent posts can also be read in a Facebook group: https://www.facebook.com/PhilosL/ Follow the list on Twitter @PhilosL. Follow the Department of Philosophy @LiverpoolPhilos To sign off the list send a blank message to philos-l-unsub...@liverpool.ac.uk.