[PHILOS-L] Next Talk of "Monthly Phenomenology": Lorenza D’Angelo (Pompeu Fabra University)

[Hamid Taieb]

CAUTION: This email originated outside of the University. Do not click links unless you can verify the source of this email and know the content is safe. Check sender address, hover over URLs, and don't open suspicious email attachments.

 

––––––

Announcement of the next talk of the series:

MONTHLY PHENOMENOLOGY

An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology

Description: This series of talks gathers together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind. It establishes a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed will stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights in recent debates in analytic philosophy.

Schedule: The talks will take place once a month on a Friday from October to May. Time: 10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT/GMT+1, 4:15pm CET. Talks last 90 minutes, including a 45 minutes Q&A.

Participation: Talks are held on zoom. To participate, please send an email to hamid...@hu-berlin.de with the heading "Registration Monthly Phenomenology". A zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk.

Programme:

**Next talk**

Lorenza D’Angelo (Pompeu Fabra University)

Pleasure, Pain and Introspection

Friday, 6 March 2026

10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET

Abstract: This talk advances a phenomenological account of the nature of pleasure and pain. In §1, I ask whether there are any experiential features unifying all pleasure and all pain, and, if so, whether we can introspect them. In §2, I defend the view that any pleasure is such in virtue of the fact that it feels good (it has a conscious positive valence) while any suffering is such in virtue of the fact that it feels bad (it has a conscious negative valence). In §3, I argue that these experiential features are non-sensory. My argument draws on recent work in the philosophy of mind: I first explain what conditions must be met in order for a mental feature to count as sensory, and I then show that valence does not meet these conditions. In §4, I draw some conclusions concerning introspection.

**Upcoming talks**

Mohammed Saleh Zarepour (University of Manchester)

The Flying Man and the Transparency of (Self-)Knowledge

3 April 2026

Sebastian Watzl (University of Oslo)

Attention Norms and Frames. On the Social Organisation of Experience

8 May 2026

**Past talks**

Francesca Forlè (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele)

Embodied Affectivity. A Phenomenological Account of the Connection between Affective Phenomena and Bodily Expressions

24 October 2025

James Kinkaid (Bilkent University)

Husserlian Idealism and the Identity Theory of Truth

28 November 2025

Maryam Ebrahimi Dinani (University of Neuchâtel)

Adolf Reinach's Theory of Social Acts: Illuminating Debates on Joint and Collective Intentionality

5 December 2025

Pascale Roure (Yildiz Technical University) and Emre Şan (University of Istanbul 29 Mayis)

Phenomenology in Turkey

16 January 2026

Benoit Guilielmo (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Exploring the Essence of Bullshitting through Early Phenomenology (Kolnai and Hildebrand)

20 February 2026

Convenors:

Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva)

Marta Jorba (Pompeu Fabra University)

Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)

Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)

Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (Philipps University Marburg)

Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research

––––––

Philos-L "The Liverpool List" is run by the Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/philosophy/philos-l/ Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html. Recent posts can also be read in a Facebook group: https://www.facebook.com/PhilosL/ Follow the list on Twitter @PhilosL. Follow the Department of Philosophy @LiverpoolPhilos To sign off the list send a blank message to philos-l-unsub...@liverpool.ac.uk.