[PHILOS-L] April H. Bailey (University of Edinburgh); Nicholas DiMaggio (University of Chicago, Booth), Of minds and men (Online talk, Dec 11)

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Dec 5, 2024, 7:29:22 PM12/5/24
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This is a talk in a session of the Winter 2024-25 Season of UK XPHI online. 

 

Dec 11, 16-18 UTC+0

 

  • April H. Bailey (University of Edinburgh); Nicholas DiMaggio (University of Chicago, Booth), Of minds and men
    Abstract: Prior work finds that seemingly generic and gender-inclusive concepts such as ‘person’ and ‘humanity’ elicit male bias in practice. When prompted to think of an example of a person, people are more likely to generate men than women. In the present work, we tested whether male bias might also emerge about an even more fundamental concept, that of a ‘mind.’ We found evidence that entities perceived to have more complex minds were also more likely to be gendered as male than female. We found this about human entities that varied in perceived mind as well as about non-human animal entities.

 

The sessions are online on Teams. To attend, please email to register to receive the links to the Teams meetings (james...@manchester.ac.uk).

 

A CFP for the summer season of the workshop (April-July) will be circulated in due course. In case of interest, contact james...@manchester.ac.uk or e.fi...@uea.ac.uk

 

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The UK XPHI online series focuses on work-in-progress in experimental philosophy. We particularly aim to be a forum for research from UK-based and UK-linked colleagues. It is organised by James Andow (Manchester) and Eugen Fischer (UEA).  Here is the full programme for our Winter 2024-25 season.

 

Oct 9, 16-18 UTC+1, Keynote talk

 

  • Shaun Nichols (Cornell), The PSR and the folk metaphysics of explanation

 

Nov 13, 16-18 UTC+0

 

  • Monica Ding (KCL), Non-factive Understanding: Evidence from English, Cantonese, and Mandarin
  • María Alejandra Petino Zappala  (German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Germany); Phuc Nguyen (German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Germany); Andrea Quint (German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Germany); Nora Heinzelmann (Institut für Philosophie, FAU Erlangen), Digital interventions to boost vaccination intention: a report

 

Dec 11, 16-18 UTC+0

 

  • Elis Jones (Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research) , The problem of baselining: philosophy, history, and coral reef science
  • April H. Bailey (University of Edinburgh); Nicholas DiMaggio (University of Chicago, Booth), Of minds and men

Jan 8, 16-18 UTC+0

 

  • Ajinkya Deshmukh (The University of Manchester); Frederique Janssen-Lauret (The University of Manchester), Reincarnation and anti-essentialism: An argument against the essentiality of material origins
  • Ethan Landes (Kent); Justin Sytsma (Victoria University of Wellington), LLM Simulated Data: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

 

Feb 12, 16-18 UTC+0

 

  • Elzė Sigutė Mikalonytė (University of Cambridge);  Jasmina Stevanov (University of Cambridge); Ryan P. Doran (University of Cambridge); Katherine A. Symons (University of Cambridge); and Simone Schnall (University of Cambridge), Transformed by Beauty: Exploring the Influence of Aesthetic Appreciation on Abstract Thinking
  • Poppy Mankowitz (University of Bristol) , Experimenting with ‘good’

 

Mar 12, 16-18 UTC+0

 

  • Kathryn Francis (University of Leeds); Maria Ioannidou (University of Bradford); Matti Wilks (University of Edinburgh), Does dietary identity influence moral anthropocentrism?
  • Jonathan Lewis (University of Manchester); James Toomey (University of Iowa); Ivar Hannikainen (University of Granada); Brian D. Earp (National University of Singapore), Normative authority, epistemic access, and the true self

 

 

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