[PhilPhys] The Center for Philosophy of Science's Upcoming Hybrid Talks
Center for Phil Sci
Annual Lecture Series – Felipe De Brigard- https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard
Friday, January 30 @ 3:30 EST
Attend in person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor)
Title: Remembering as Inverse Causal Inference
Abstract:
The causalism/simulationism debate has become central in contemporary philosophy of memory. Recently, however, I have suggested that the debate is largely ill conceived and have offered instead a particular view of memory reconstruction that, I think, can reconcile a causal and a simulationist view of remembering (De Brigard, 2023). The current paper seeks to elaborate on that suggestion by pursuing two aims. The first one is to clearly articulate why the debate between causalism and simulationism is ill conceived. The second aim is to show how the version of remembering I defend can provide an answer to the causal question that makes causation central to the nature of memory, but in a way that is different from how it features in the causalism/simulationism debate.
Can’t make it in-person?
Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95458080464 and YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
Tuesday, February 3rd @ 12:00 EST
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Title: Due Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of Inductive Risk
Abstract:
The gap argument from inductive risk asserts that the uncertainty of induction entails that scientists must decide or choose whether to accept an inductive conclusion as true, and such decisions ought to take into account the costs of error. This chapter argues that the gap argument is sound only if one makes substantial assumptions about the epistemology of inductive inference. These assumptions are tendentious and have been rejected by many gap-free accounts of induction. Using the HUD audit study of racial discrimination in the housing market as a case study, and combining Norton’s material theory of induction with Longino’s social epistemology and the epistemic principle of Inquisitive Due Diligence proposed by Khalifa, Millson, and Risjord, this chapter will sketch a gap-free account of induction. This account throws new light onto the phenomenon of inductive risk, showing how scientific inquiry can (and should) be epistemically cautious when the stakes are high without giving up impartiality.
Lunch Time Talk - Laura Gradowski - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/gradowski-laura/
Friday, February 6 @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Title: TBA
This talk will available online through the following:
Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91084235286 and YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
Lunch Time Talk - Kareem Khalifa - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/khalifa-kareem/
Tuesday, February 10 @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Abstract:
In science-and-values discussions, the value-free ideal (VFI) is sometimes glossed as the thesis that non-epistemic values’ influences on scientific reasoning are never legitimate. Although “influence” is a causal notion, discussions of the VFI have not engaged the vast literature on causal modeling. In this paper, I propose some useful ways in which causal models can be used to sharpen this variant of the VFI. Doing so reveals underappreciated burdens of proof in debates about the VFI.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226
Lunch Time Talk - David Thorstad - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/thorstad-david/
Friday, February 13 @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Framing effects are often taken as paradigmatic examples of human irrationality. The irrationality of framing effects is then used in debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions. I argue that many framing effects are procedurally rational in the sense that they result from rational processes of practical inquiry. I make this argument through case studies of category-based choice, list-based choice, and salience-driven decision making. I conclude by showing how the procedural rationality of framing effects can be used to resist framing-based debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions.
This talk will be available online:
Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96218362482
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg
Center for Phil Sci
Tuesday, February 3rd @ 12:00 EST
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Title: Due Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of Inductive Risk
Abstract:
The gap argument from inductive risk asserts that the uncertainty of induction entails that scientists must decide or choose whether to accept an inductive conclusion as true, and such decisions ought to take into account the costs of error. This chapter argues that the gap argument is sound only if one makes substantial assumptions about the epistemology of inductive inference. These assumptions are tendentious and have been rejected by many gap-free accounts of induction. Using the HUD audit study of racial discrimination in the housing market as a case study, and combining Norton’s material theory of induction with Longino’s social epistemology and the epistemic principle of Inquisitive Due Diligence proposed by Khalifa, Millson, and Risjord, this chapter will sketch a gap-free account of induction. This account throws new light onto the phenomenon of inductive risk, showing how scientific inquiry can (and should) be epistemically cautious when the stakes are high without giving up impartiality.
Lunch Time Talk - Laura Gradowski - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/gradowski-laura/
Friday, February 6 @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
According to lore, the Library of Alexandria was created to compile every manuscript its librarians could get their hands on. Science is not like that. It is a system of filters that limits what is acceptable and accessible. Science communicators have increasingly understood it to be their responsibility to guide science consumers towards trust in prevailing views by promulgating authoritative datasets that restrict what can be considered reasonable questions and disagreements. Databases, journals, conferences, and institutions keep gates narrow. Science aims for consensus, and pillories anything that isn’t deemed mainstream. But mainstream science includes many well-known biases, and is also prone to flawed or dubious practices. For example, recent work suggests data from clinical trials published in top journals is regularly flawed or faked. While the call for consensus is variously justified—for instance, on the basis of concern for public health—these arguments often underestimate the value of dissenting views and reflect the impact of political polarization. Yet efforts to create consensus archives continue. This talk presents a counterpoint. We have much to gain from an Alexandrian approach that emphasizes inclusion. We could create archives of science that reflect the full spectrum of views, including unpopular views, views of nonprofessionals and outsiders. What would such an archive look like? How would it work? These are the kinds of questions we should be asking. Here I motivate the Alexandrian approach and offer suggestions about its implementation.
Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91084235286 and YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
Lunch Time Talk - Kareem Khalifa - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/khalifa-kareem/
Tuesday, February 10 @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Abstract:
In science-and-values discussions, the value-free ideal (VFI) is sometimes glossed as the thesis that non-epistemic values’ influences on scientific reasoning are never legitimate. Although “influence” is a causal notion, discussions of the VFI have not engaged the vast literature on causal modeling. In this paper, I propose some useful ways in which causal models can be used to sharpen this variant of the VFI. Doing so reveals underappreciated burdens of proof in debates about the VFI.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226
Lunch Time Talk - David Thorstad - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/thorstad-david/
Friday, February 13 @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Framing effects are often taken as paradigmatic examples of human irrationality. The irrationality of framing effects is then used in debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions. I argue that many framing effects are procedurally rational in the sense that they result from rational processes of practical inquiry. I make this argument through case studies of category-based choice, list-based choice, and salience-driven decision making. I conclude by showing how the procedural rationality of framing effects can be used to resist framing-based debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions.
This talk will be available online:
Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96218362482
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg
Tuesday, February 17 @ Noon
Abstract:
The talk outlines a new answer to this question. The answer is based on 1) the structure of phase space pertaining to a roll of a symmetric die, as described by classical mechanics, 2) the notion that the die roll is not biased in favor any outcome, as a causal condition about the process of selecting a point in phase space, and 3) the Common Cause Principle. Remarkably, however, our answer nowhere refers to the notion of probability.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93544926182
Abstract:
Biologically, race is a fiction—but it is a fiction that has real social consequences. In What’s Real About Race? sociologist Rina Bliss unpacks how genetic and social research have perpetuated racial categories and stereotypes. How, Bliss asks, did categories of race emerge and get embedded in modern-day science? How did scientists begin misusing DNA collections and genetic research stratified by race? Are there ethical ways to consider race in scientific research? And the elephant in the room: what, if anything, is real about race? Bliss offers a new conceptual framework: race is not a genetic reality, but it is also not merely a social construct; it is a social reality with a stark impact on our life chances and health.
Can’t make it in-person?
Friday, February 27 @ Noon
This talk will be available online:
Center for Phil Sci
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Center for Phil Sci
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Center for Phil Sci via spsp-members
invites you to join us for our upcoming presentations. All of the lectures
will be live streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
*Lunch Time Talk - Mark Risjord* -
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/risjord-mark/
*Tuesday, February 3rd @ 12:00 EST *
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: Due Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of
Inductive RiskAbstract:*
The gap argument from inductive risk asserts that the uncertainty of
induction entails that scientists must decide or choose whether to accept
an inductive conclusion as true, and such decisions ought to take into
account the costs of error. This chapter argues that the gap argument is
sound only if one makes substantial assumptions about the epistemology of
inductive inference. These assumptions are tendentious and have been
rejected by many gap-free accounts of induction. Using the HUD audit study
of racial discrimination in the housing market as a case study, and
combining Norton’s material theory of induction with Longino’s social
epistemology and the epistemic principle of Inquisitive Due Diligence
proposed by Khalifa, Millson, and Risjord, this chapter will sketch a
gap-free account of induction. This account throws new light onto the
phenomenon of inductive risk, showing how scientific inquiry can (and
should) be epistemically cautious when the stakes are high without giving
up impartiality.
This talk will be available on Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93939687549
*Lunch Time Talk - Laura Gradowski* - <http://goog_772357827>
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/gradowski-laura/
*Friday, February 6 @ Noon*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: Datasets and dead assets: The missing archives of science*
*Abstract:*
*Lunch Time Talk - **Kareem Khalifa - *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/khalifa-kareem/
*Tuesday, February 10 @ Noon*Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th
floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
*Title: Causally Modeling the Value-Free Ideal **Abstract: *
In science-and-values discussions, the value-free ideal (VFI) is sometimes
glossed as the thesis that non-epistemic values’ influences on scientific
reasoning are never legitimate. Although “influence” is a causal notion,
discussions of the VFI have not engaged the vast literature on causal
modeling. In this paper, I propose some useful ways in which causal models
can be used to sharpen this variant of the VFI. Doing so reveals
underappreciated burdens of proof in debates about the VFI.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226>
*Lunch Time Talk - **David Thorstad - *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/thorstad-david/
*Friday, February 13 @ Noon*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: Procedurally Rational Framing Effects*
Abstract:
Framing effects are often taken as paradigmatic examples of human
irrationality. The irrationality of framing effects is then used in
debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions. I argue
that many framing effects are procedurally rational in the sense that they
result from rational processes of practical inquiry. I make this argument
through case studies of category-based choice, list-based choice, and
salience-driven decision making. I conclude by showing how the procedural
rationality of framing effects can be used to resist framing-based
debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions.
This talk will be available online:
Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96218362482
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg
*Lunch Time Talk - **Marton Gomori *-
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/gomori-marton/
*Tuesday, February 17 @ Noon*Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th
floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
*Title: * *Why do outcomes in a long series of rolls of a symmetric die
follow an approximately uniform distribution?*
*Abstract: *
The talk outlines a new answer to this question. The answer is based on 1)
the structure of phase space pertaining to a roll of a symmetric die, as
described by classical mechanics, 2) the notion that the die roll is not
biased in favor any outcome, as a causal condition about the process of
selecting a point in phase space, and 3) the Common Cause Principle.
Remarkably, however, our answer nowhere refers to the notion of probability.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226>https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93544926182
*Annual Lecture Series – Rina Bliss*-
https://sociology.rutgers.edu/people/faculty/core-department-faculty/core-department-faculty-member/1021-bliss-catherine
<https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard>
*Friday, January 30 @ 3:30 EST*
Attend in person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor)
*Title: **What’s Real About Race? Untangling Science, Genetics, and Society*
*Abstract:*
Biologically, race is a fiction—but it is a fiction that has real social
consequences. In *What’s Real About Race?* sociologist Rina Bliss unpacks
how genetic and social research have perpetuated racial categories and
stereotypes. How, Bliss asks, did categories of race emerge and get
embedded in modern-day science? How did scientists begin misusing DNA
collections and genetic research stratified by race? Are there ethical ways
to consider race in scientific research? And the elephant in the room:
what, if anything, is real about race? Bliss offers a new conceptual
framework: race is not a genetic reality, but it is also not merely a
social construct; it is a social reality with a stark impact on our life
chances and health.
Can’t make it in-person?
This talk will available online through the following:
Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94981603060 and YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
*Lunch Time Talk - **Marta Bielinska** - *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/bielinska-marta/
*Friday, February 27 @ Noon*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: **Is the Best System approach really best for scientific practice?*
*Abstract:*
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Center for Phil Sci
Meet Kareem Khalifa, Senior Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of Science. Kareem's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/0vPEDIEf5G8
Abstract:
In science-and-values discussions, the value-free ideal (VFI) is sometimes glossed as the thesis that non-epistemic values’ influences on scientific reasoning are never legitimate. Although “influence” is a causal notion, discussions of the VFI have not engaged the vast literature on causal modeling. In this paper, I propose some useful ways in which causal models can be used to sharpen this variant of the VFI. Doing so reveals underappreciated burdens of proof in debates about the VFI.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226
Meet David Thorstad, Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of Science. David's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/03tleb7EqKI
Friday, February 13 @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.Framing effects are often taken as paradigmatic examples of human irrationality. The irrationality of framing effects is then used in debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions. I argue that many framing effects are procedurally rational in the sense that they result from rational processes of practical inquiry. I make this argument through case studies of category-based choice, list-based choice, and salience-driven decision making. I conclude by showing how the procedural rationality of framing effects can be used to resist framing-based debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions.
This talk will be available online:
Tuesday, February 17 @ Noon
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Abstract:
The talk outlines a new answer to this question. The answer is based on 1) the structure of phase space pertaining to a roll of a symmetric die, as described by classical mechanics, 2) the notion that the die roll is not biased in favor any outcome, as a causal condition about the process of selecting a point in phase space, and 3) the Common Cause Principle. Remarkably, however, our answer nowhere refers to the notion of probability.
This talk will be available online: Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93544926182
Title:
Biologically, race is a fiction—but it is a fiction that has real social consequences. In What’s Real About Race? sociologist Rina Bliss unpacks how genetic and social research have perpetuated racial categories and stereotypes. How, Bliss asks, did categories of race emerge and get embedded in modern-day science? How did scientists begin misusing DNA collections and genetic research stratified by race? Are there ethical ways to consider race in scientific research? And the elephant in the room: what, if anything, is real about race? Bliss offers a new conceptual framework: race is not a genetic reality, but it is also not merely a social construct; it is a social reality with a stark impact on our life chances and health.
Can’t make it in-person?
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
Center for Phil Sci via spsp-members
invites you to join us for our upcoming presentations. All of the lectures
will be live streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
*Lunch Time Talk - **Kareem Khalifa - *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/khalifa-kareem/
Meet Kareem Khalifa, Senior Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of
Science. Kareem's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/0vPEDIEf5G8
*Tuesday, February 10 @ Noon*Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th
floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
*Title: Causally Modeling the Value-Free Ideal **Abstract: *
In science-and-values discussions, the value-free ideal (VFI) is sometimes
glossed as the thesis that non-epistemic values’ influences on scientific
reasoning are never legitimate. Although “influence” is a causal notion,
discussions of the VFI have not engaged the vast literature on causal
modeling. In this paper, I propose some useful ways in which causal models
can be used to sharpen this variant of the VFI. Doing so reveals
underappreciated burdens of proof in debates about the VFI.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226>
*Lunch Time Talk - **David Thorstad - *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/thorstad-david/
Meet David Thorstad, Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of
Science. David's 5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/03tleb7EqKI
*Friday, February 13 @ Noon*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: Procedurally Rational Framing Effects*
*Abstract:*
Framing effects are often taken as paradigmatic examples of human
irrationality. The irrationality of framing effects is then used in
debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions. I argue
that many framing effects are procedurally rational in the sense that they
result from rational processes of practical inquiry. I make this argument
through case studies of category-based choice, list-based choice, and
salience-driven decision making. I conclude by showing how the procedural
rationality of framing effects can be used to resist framing-based
debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions.
This talk will be available online:
Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96218362482 and YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg
*Lunch Time Talk - **Marton Gomori *-
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/gomori-marton/
*Tuesday, February 17 @ Noon*Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th
floor of the Cathedral of Learning.
*Title: * *Why do outcomes in a long series of rolls of a symmetric die
follow an approximately uniform distribution?*
*Abstract: *
The talk outlines a new answer to this question. The answer is based on 1)
the structure of phase space pertaining to a roll of a symmetric die, as
described by classical mechanics, 2) the notion that the die roll is not
biased in favor any outcome, as a causal condition about the process of
selecting a point in phase space, and 3) the Common Cause Principle.
Remarkably, however, our answer nowhere refers to the notion of probability.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226>https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93544926182
*Annual Lecture Series – Rina Bliss*-
https://sociology.rutgers.edu/people/faculty/core-department-faculty/core-department-faculty-member/1021-bliss-catherine
<https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard>
*Friday, February 20 @ 3:30 EST*Attend in person in room 1008 in the
Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor)
*Title: **What’s Real About Race? Untangling Science, Genetics, and Society*
*Abstract:*
Biologically, race is a fiction—but it is a fiction that has real social
consequences. In *What’s Real About Race?* sociologist Rina Bliss unpacks
how genetic and social research have perpetuated racial categories and
stereotypes. How, Bliss asks, did categories of race emerge and get
embedded in modern-day science? How did scientists begin misusing DNA
collections and genetic research stratified by race? Are there ethical ways
to consider race in scientific research? And the elephant in the room:
what, if anything, is real about race? Bliss offers a new conceptual
framework: race is not a genetic reality, but it is also not merely a
social construct; it is a social reality with a stark impact on our life
chances and health.
Can’t make it in-person?
This talk will available online through Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94981603060
*Lunch Time Talk - **Marta Bielinska** - *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/bielinska-marta/
Meet Marta Bielinska, Postdoctoral Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of
Science. Marta's 5 Minute Video:
https://youtu.be/8OY-Iid0OAw?si=HWqcv23YAgw510p5
*Friday, February 27 @ Noon*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
*Title: **Is the Best System approach really best for scientific practice?*
*Abstract:*
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