[PHILOS-L] Online workshop Logic and Bounded Rationality, 25-27 Feb 2026
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Costanza Larese
Feb 23, 2026, 1:17:14 PM (14 hours ago) Feb 23
to PHIL...@listserv.liv.ac.uk
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Dear all,
We are pleased to invite you to attend the workshop Logic and Bounded Rationality, which will be held
entirely online on 25–27 February 2026.
The aim of this initiative is to bring together researchers from different fields interested in contributing to a systematic logical approach to bounded rationality and to launch a new
book
series with College Publications. Further details can be found on the
website.
All interested participants are warmly welcome.
Best regards,
Costanza Larese
Postdoctoral Researcher
LUCI Lab
Department of Philosophy
University of Milan
Description
The “cost of reasoning”, i.e., the cognitive or computational effort required by non-ideal, resource-bounded (human or artificial) agents in order to perform non-trivial inferences, is a crucial issue in philosophy, AI, economics and cognitive (neuro)science. Accounting for this fundamental variable in modelling real world reasoning and decision-making is one of the most important and difficult challenges in the theory of rationality. With this workshop, we are launching a book series for College Publications that, under the general title of “Logic and Bounded Rationality”, aims to create a community of researchers from several areas that wish to cooperate towards a systematic logical view of bounded rationality. A key stumbling block for any effort in this direction, is that a basic component of many reasoning and decision making tasks, namely deductive reasoning in propositional logic, is computationally hard. Hence, in the first volume of the series, Depth-bounded Reasoning. Volume 1: Classical Propositional Logic, Marcello D’Agostino, Dov Gabbay, Costanza Larese and Sanjay Modgil offer a novel view of classical propositional logic. They present an “informational semantics” for the classical operators whose proof-theoretical presentation is a system of classical natural deduction that, unlike Gentzen’s and Prawitz’s systems, yields a simple way of measuring the “depth” of an inference. This approach leads to defining, in a natural way, a sequence of tractable depth-bounded deduction systems. As recent applications in formal argumentation and non-monotonic reasoning suggest, this approach provides a plausible model for representing rational agents with increasing, albeit limited, computational resources.
The “cost of reasoning”, i.e., the cognitive or computational effort required by non-ideal, resource-bounded (human or artificial) agents in order to perform non-trivial inferences, is a crucial issue in philosophy, AI, economics and cognitive (neuro)science. Accounting for this fundamental variable in modelling real world reasoning and decision-making is one of the most important and difficult challenges in the theory of rationality. With this workshop, we are launching a book series for College Publications that, under the general title of “Logic and Bounded Rationality”, aims to create a community of researchers from several areas that wish to cooperate towards a systematic logical view of bounded rationality. A key stumbling block for any effort in this direction, is that a basic component of many reasoning and decision making tasks, namely deductive reasoning in propositional logic, is computationally hard. Hence, in the first volume of the series, Depth-bounded Reasoning. Volume 1: Classical Propositional Logic, Marcello D’Agostino, Dov Gabbay, Costanza Larese and Sanjay Modgil offer a novel view of classical propositional logic. They present an “informational semantics” for the classical operators whose proof-theoretical presentation is a system of classical natural deduction that, unlike Gentzen’s and Prawitz’s systems, yields a simple way of measuring the “depth” of an inference. This approach leads to defining, in a natural way, a sequence of tractable depth-bounded deduction systems. As recent applications in formal argumentation and non-monotonic reasoning suggest, this approach provides a plausible model for representing rational agents with increasing, albeit limited, computational resources.
Venue
Online (no registration required)
Microsoft Teams Meeting
Join at: https://teams.microsoft.com/meet/3900462525659?p=kegfw6K6F0fUvHx7gE
Meeting ID: 390 046 252 565 9
Passcode: j5zS3sP2
Online (no registration required)
Microsoft Teams Meeting
Join at: https://teams.microsoft.com/meet/3900462525659?p=kegfw6K6F0fUvHx7gE
Meeting ID: 390 046 252 565 9
Passcode: j5zS3sP2
Time
25–27 February 2026 (CET)
25–27 February 2026 (CET)
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