[PHILOS-L] 3rd CFP: Argumenta Special Issue on Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy

[Filippo Riscica]

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3rd CFP: Argumenta Special Issue on Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy

3rd Call for Papers — Argumenta 

Special Issue on Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy 

Guest Editors: Filippo Ferrari (Department of the Arts, University of Bologna), Filippo Riscica (Department of the Arts, University of Bologna)

Venue: Argumenta (the journal of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy — SIFA)

Background

Timothy Williamson’s Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy (OUP, 2024) presents new methodological challenges to philosophical debates. In this book, Williamson argues that, just as in the sciences, overfitting theories to data is a source of problems in philosophical theorizing. 

The concept of overfitting, originally developed in the context of empirical data analysis, reflects the principle that simpler models should be favoured over more complex ones to achieve greater predictive accuracy and generalisability. Heuristics are, roughly, cognitive shortcuts or rules of thumb that enable efficient problem-solving. Such heuristics may operate either automatically and subconsciously, or through deliberate reasoning. An extensive body of psychological research has explored their central role in human cognition and decision-making.

Philosophy employs intuitions as its data. However, these intuitions may be the result of mistaken judgements that are elicited by our reliance on heuristics. When we attempt to account for all intuitions, without considering that they may be the result of fallible heuristics, we may face overfitting issues. A clear symptom of overfitting in philosophy is the proliferation of additional conditions that make theories more complex, introduced primarily to accommodate intuitions elicited by special or anomalous cases. 

Williamson argues that we can find instances of overfitting in philosophy in many current debates concerning metaphysics, philosophical logic, and semantics. Given philosophy’s widespread reliance on intuitions, Williamson's methodological concerns are likely to have broader relevance across the discipline

Goals

In this Special Issue, we aim to advance the debate on overfitting and heuristics in philosophy. We welcome contributions that critically engage with this topic, either by addressing the specific cases considered by Williamson or by extending the discussion to new examples and other debates in philosophy.

The topics we are interested in include, but are not limited to, the following: 

Questions concerning overfitting and the principle of parsimony, such as

Does overfitting improve our understanding of the principle of parsimony? 

How can we make sense of overfitting as a statistical notion in the context of philosophy? 

Can formal modelling help clarify the degrees of freedom within philosophical theories?

Questions concerning philosophical idealizations and overfitting, such as

Can we achieve idealization without overfitting?

Is (a high degree of) idealization always valuable in all areas of philosophy?

Questions concerning heuristics and intuitions,

What is the role of heuristics and intuitions in philosophy?

Can we avoid intuitions that rely on heuristics? 

Confirmed Invited Contributors

• Alexander Bird (Cambridge)
  
• Igor Douven (CNRS – Paris)
  
• Matti Eklund (Uppsala)
• Alison Hills (Oxford)
  
• Mark Jago (Nottingham)
  
• Jennifer Nagel (Toronto)
  
• Jessica Pepp (Uppsala)
  
• Daniele Sgaravatti (Bologna)
  
• Timothy Williamson (Oxford)
  
• Alessandro Torza (Parma)

Important dates

Deadline for submission: September 30, 2025
Notification of acceptance: January 30, 2026

Word limit: about 8,000 and no more than 10,000 words. 

Submission Information: To submit your paper, please visit:

👉 https://www.argumenta.org/ojs/index.php/argumenta/about/submissions 

1. Register as a new user (or log in as a registered user)
2. Click on “Make a new submission.”
   
3. You will be redirected to the submission page.
   
4. On that page, locate the “Section” drop-down menu (near the top of the form).
   
5. From the menu, select: “Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy.”
   
6. Once selected, you can proceed with the rest of your submission.

Further information: filippo....@unibo.it; filippo....@unibo.it 

Dr. Filippo Riscica
Research Fellow
University of Bologna
Department of the Arts
filippo....@unibo.it
riscic...@gmail.com

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