The next ECPR Standing Group in Political Theory seminar will take place on Wednesday 14 January at 17.0-18.0 CET (16. 0 – 17.0 GMT).
‘Hushing-up: A Social Epistemic Practice for Overcoming Partisan Ignorance’ Aaron Gray (Georgetown University)
Much work in feminist social epistemology shares the basic assumption that ignorance generated by silencing (and related phenomena) is undesirable. While true in many contexts, I depart from that consensus, introducing and offering a philosophical account of
a social epistemic practice that I term ‘hushing-up.’ This practice has emerged organically in response and in resistance to sectarian bigotry in Northern Ireland (NI), and contributes to post-conflict transitions away from social and political polarisation
and its derivative harms to individuals and collectives. In spaces where hushing-up is deployed, ignorance of peoples’ community background is intentionally cultivated as a strategy in opposition to bigotry, while bigoted or sectarian displays incur social
costs. Positioning hushing-up against existing accounts of political ignorance, and contributing to the idea of an epistemology of ignorance, I distinguish between performative partisanship (involving ignorance driven by social rewards for showing group allegiance)
and pressured partisanship (involving ignorance driven by the avoidance of social sanctions for displaying indicators of disloyalty to a group). On the account I defend, shifts in social norms are central to addressing some forms of harmful ignorance. I argue
that hushing-up succeeds in doing this in two ways: first, by reducing the rationality of pressured partisanship by providing alternative social support to that provided in polarised social spaces such that the cost of dissent is lowered; and secondly, by
disincentivising performative partisanship through increasing the difficulty of identifying targets and ensuring that bigoted displays are met with disapproval in spaces where that norm is in force.
All are welcome to join. You need to be registered with ECPR (this is free) and then go to My ECPR > My Events > Event Name. The Zoom link for the seminar will appear about 15 minutes before the session. There is a guide to accessing online ECPR sessions here.
The paper has very recently been published in Synthese, and can be accessed here (https://rdcu.be/eSKXc) or downloaded here:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-025-05333-8).
Future Seminars in 2025-26
11 February Henry Krahn (Frankfurt) Protest as Holding Others Accountable
11 March Dorota Mokrosinska (Leiden) On Political Activism by Journalists: Objectivity, Neutrality and the Fiduciary Role of the Media
15 April Federica Liveriero (Pavia) Democratic Backsliding and the Breach of Trust among Citizens: How to Avoid a Vicious Circle
Jonathan Seglow for the ECPR Political Theory Standing Group.
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The next ECPR Standing Group in Political Theory seminar will take place on Wednesday 11 March at 17.0-18.0 CET (16. 0 – 17.0 GMT).
On Political Activism by Journalists. Objectivity, Neutrality and the Fiduciary Role of the News Media, Dorota Mokrosinska, Leiden University
Abstract. In 2023, BBC sports presenter Gary Lineker was suspended for breaching neutrality and objectivity of the public broadcaster after criticizing the UK government’s immigration policy on his personal Twitter account. In 2017, BBC science presenter Adam Rutherford was reprimanded for tweeting criticism of climate-sceptic Labour MP Graham Stringer. In 1989, Linda Greenhouse, the New York Times Supreme Court reporter, was criticized by editors for participating in a pro-choice protest, seen as compromising the paper’s neutrality. These responses reflect the guidelines by media ethics codes that prohibit journalists’ political activism on the grounds that it undermines objectivity, the profession’s core principle. Objectivity, understood as a commitment to truth-seeking, has been equated with neutrality: the idea that journalists should not commit to a view, should give equal weight to all sides of a contentious issue, and avoid value judgments. On this view, political activism signals a commitment to a view; expressing a commitment to a view undermines neutrality, hence, objectivity.
This paper challenges the prohibition of political activism by journalists and develops its qualified defense. It focuses on public news media (news and current affairs programs), excluding forms of journalism not bound by neutrality (op-eds or polemical content). After briefly considering whether journalists’ off-duty political activism can be defended as a matter of their right to privacy, I turn to the conceptual relationship between objectivity, neutrality, and political activism. I argue that neutrality has been wrongly conflated with objectivity. The requirement of objectivity is motivated by the news media’s political role in democratic society, specifically, its unique position in staging the platform for political communication. To clarify this role, I bring together recent work in democratic theory and fiduciary political theory to propose a new account of the political role of the media. I argue that the media stand in a fiduciary relationship to the public in virtue of de facto discretionary power they exercise over public’s critical interest: the maintenance of well-ordered political communication. Objectivity is a fiduciary duty the news media acquire in this capacity. As a condition for well-ordered political communication, objectivity is informed by epistemic and democratic values. From this perspective, the news media should not remain neutral, for example, between truth and falsehood or between discrimination and equality.
If the news media cannot and should not be neutral, even if they must be objective, then the argument against political activism by journalists collapses. This opens the door to reconsider its permissibility. I argue that political activism by journalists can be a legitimate way of fulfilling their fiduciary duties. My defense of the permissibility of political activism is qualified. I propose an alternative justification for journalistic neutrality that does not rely on objectivity. This sets limits on the permissibility of political activism.
Final Seminar in 2025-26
15 April Federica Liveriero (Pavia) Democratic Backsliding and the Breach of Trust among Citizens: How to Avoid a Vicious Circle
Jonathan Seglow for the ECPR Political Theory Standing Group.
This email, its contents and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee and may contain confidential information. In certain circumstances, it may also be subject to legal privilege. Any unauthorised use, disclosure, or copying is not permitted. If you have received this email in error, please notify us and immediately and permanently delete it. Any views or opinions expressed in personal emails are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of Royal Holloway, University of London. It is your responsibility to ensure that this email and any attachments are virus free.