[PHILOS-L] José Carlos Camillo - "Singular Thought and Episodic Memory" (BGTMC Zoom Talk, October 23rd, 12:15 CEST/18:15 Taiwan time)

[Jonathan Najenson]

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Dear colleagues,

On behalf of the Bochum-Grenoble-Taipei Memory Colloquium, I am pleased to announce the talk "Singular Thought and Episodic Memory" by José Carlos Camillo (University of Geneva) on Thursday, October 23rd (12:15 CEST/18:15 Taiwan time).

Please join the meetings on Zoom (http://www.zoom.us) with the details below. Registration is not necessary.

- link:
https://univ-grenoble-alpes-fr.zoom.us/j/92229286091?pwd=aGpnKzBSRm5GdTRNdHQ1cEFhREx3Zz09
- meeting ID: 922 2928 6091
- password: 864095

Abstract: Singular thought (or reference) refers to the capacity to single out entities or events among others—that is, to capture their numerical identity. Philosophers typically explain this capacity either in conceptual terms or in perceptual ones (De Carvalho, 2016). For example, Strawson (1959) argued that distinguishing two identical objects requires spatiotemporal concepts, while perceptual accounts claim that singular content arises from automatic processes of object individuation in the visual system (Green & Quilty-Dunn, 2021). Yet, perceptual approaches struggle to explain how agents distinguish between two objects with identical properties or re-identify them over time. To address this, some have proposed an intermediate view: abstract object representations in the prefrontal cortex support perceptual processes, thereby enabling both individuation and (re-)identification (De Carvalho & Newen, 2019). So far, however, most philosophical accounts of singular thought have neglected empirical research on episodic memory. Evidence shows that the hippocampus organizes event representations through spatiotemporal coordinates and binds object properties to these coordinates (Yonelinas, 2013; Eichenbaum, 2017; Ekstrom & Yonelinas, 2020). This suggests that objects can be represented as clusters of properties individuated by their spatiotemporal coordinates—without requiring an explicit concept of space and time. In light of this, I argue that episodic memory contributes to singular thought by automatically assigning objects unique spatiotemporal coordinates. Moreover, because the hippocampal system integrates temporally distant coordinates, it enables the reidentification of objects across time. In this way, episodic memory provides a naturalistic basis for singular thought that avoids reliance on conceptual schemes and sidesteps the limitations of purely perceptual accounts.

This virtual colloquium series focuses on topics in the philosophy of memory and related philosophical areas but also reaches out to philosophically interested researchers in the cognitive sciences. The colloquium is organized by the Centre for Philosophy of Memory at Université Grenoble Alpes (Kourken Michaelian and Denis Perrin), the Ruhr University Bochum (Markus Werning and Jonathan Najenson), and the Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition at National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University (Ying-Tung Lin and Chris McCarroll).

We look forward to seeing you.

On behalf of the organizers,
Jonathan Najenson 

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