Haiti: Building Back Better - and Beyond

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Comment from Joe Savitzky:
This is a very thorough document and should be useful to the Haiti program
of UPAT

Source: International Crisis Group
Date: 06 Feb 2010

Testimony by Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President, International Crisis
Group to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee hearing on
International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic
Affairs, and International Environmental Protection on Haiti's
Reconstruction: Smart Planning Moving Forward, 4 February
2010, Washington, DC

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, let me express my
appreciation for the opportunity to offer testimony today on
the immediate and long-term consequences of the earthquake in
Haiti – for its people, its democracy and its neighbours.

First, I want to express my condolences to the people of Haiti
for the enormous loss of human life – far more victims than in
any other natural disaster in the history of this hemisphere –
ever. We already know that some 150,000 people were killed,
200,000 were injured and one million more lost their homes.
After all the collapsed buildings are finally removed, this
earthquake may be among the three or four worst disasters ever
recorded anywhere on earth in terms of loss of life and
injury.

For many of us, there are faces and names we recall with a
deep sense of loss. I first went to Haiti in 1978 with then
Ambassador Andrew Young to raise concerns about human rights
abuses under the Duvalier dictatorship. With PAHO/WHO, USAID,
Peace Corps and now the Crisis Group, I have worked with
Haitians desperately trying to achieve a better future for
their families.

Second, let me express my deep sadness at the deaths of men
and women from the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH)
including its leaders Hedi Annabi, Luis da Costa, and Gerardo
LeChevallier, along with Philippe Dewez from the IDB, and all
of the others who were working with the government of
President René Préval to improve conditions in Haiti.

Finally, let me express my own enormous pride in the generous
response of citizens from this and other countries -- the
volunteer doctors, nurses, NGO's and search and rescue teams,
as well as the rapid and robust response from the Obama
Administration, particularly USAID, State and the U.S.
military, but also from Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, and
others in this hemisphere and France, the EU, Spain, China and
other countries outside the hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, the important questions that you posed with
respect to planning, managing and implementing Haiti's
reconstruction have been the subject of much discussion in
Port au Prince, at the Montreal donors preparatory session
last week, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, at the UN,
the EU, and the OAS. Many have looked at examples from the
past – the Tsunami in Southeast Asia, Hurricane Mitch in
Central America, post conflict reconstruction measures in
Kosovo, El Salvador and Liberia. Each of those experiences
offers lessons about relief and reconstruction, which have
already helped improve the relief measures in Haiti. For just
one example, Mitch taught USAID's OFDA that pre-positioning
basic supplies in Florida and the Caribbean could alleviate
the need for lengthy procurement procedures, and that
pre-approved agreements with the Southern Command could speed
transportation logistics.

All of those cases had several things in common:

- The victims never felt that relief was coming as fast as
they needed it;

- The transition from relief to reconstruction was neither
smooth nor untroubled;

- Maintaining international engagement and international
coordination was a constant struggle; and

- The challenge of ensuring that the host government was
strengthened rather than weakened was not fully met.

Given the magnitude of Haiti's destruction, the fragility of
its institutions before the quake and the depth of its
poverty, overcoming these challenges to effective
reconstruction will pose an even more daunting challenge to
Haiti and to the international community.

Mr. Chairman, the International Crisis Group has issued
fifteen reports about Haiti over the past five years. The most
recent, Saving the Environment, Preventing Instability and
Conflict (April 2009) was unfortunately all too prescient in
identifying the additional risks to stability and
complications in urban planning, construction, and
infrastructure design posed by Haiti's historical disregard
for the environment and vulnerability to natural disasters.

There is a mantra now that we must help Haiti to build back
better, to ensure that recovery and reconstruction leave Haiti
less vulnerable to the consequences of natural disasters. That
should be done. But it is also impossible to completely
eliminate Haiti's vulnerability given its incredibly hazardous
geologic and geographic location precariously positioned along
a ghastly seismic fault line, in the annual hurricane path
from Africa, and caught between the small plane and fast boat
cocaine routes from Colombia and Venezuela.

However, Haiti's vulnerability also stems from its failure to
overcome two centuries of bad governments, inequitable and
centralized political and economic power structures in Port au
Prince, and not-always-benign foreign interventions. Many
point to the billions in aid that Haiti received over the last
five decades and say it was all for naught, that there is no
hope today.

I argue the contrary. In June, I met with several government
representatives, including President Preval, and the former
and current prime minister. In December, I held discussions
with the late Hedi Annabi and others from the UN, IDB, WB and
the representatives from President Clinton's envoy office to
assess progress and examine the challenges for 2010. There
were concerns, of course, but there also was a degree of
optimism:

- Reforms were taking hold within the civilian police; in fact
a 2009 poll showed over 70 percent of the population approved
of their performance, a far cry from the past.

- The first glimmers of judicial reform in 50 years were seen
with the opening of an academy to train judges, and passage of
key laws to set merit-based standards and salaries for judges
and to establish a monitoring commission to vet existing
judges and provide professional assessment of their
performance.

- The first class of trained corrections officers had
graduated and a plan to build new and restructure older jails
was underway.

- The HOPE II legislation had boosted employment by close to
25,000 and recruitment by former President Clinton had brought
investors to Haiti. The transition from showy pledges to
actual capital investment projects underway, including on a
$55 m. Royal Caribbean Cruise expansion of the Labadee resort
and a new industrial park on the outskirts of Port au Prince,
thanks to a $25 m. commitment from George Soros, a member of
Crisis Group board of trustees.

- Haiti had a fully functioning legislature, which after
risking stability by ousting a competent prime minister
Michele Pierre Louis, at least demonstrated a marked readiness
to act by approving the new Prime Minister Jean-Max
Bellerives, his slate of ministers and their program in record
time, when the same process last spring took months.

- Haiti's budget for the current fiscal year -- contrary to
that of the United States -- was actually passed on time; the
previous budget had not been approved until eight months into
the fiscal year.

- In October, the United Nations extended its mandate for
another year and Latin American nations swiftly reaffirmed its
leadership, contributing some 4000 of MINUSTAH's 7000 formal
military members.

- For three years, the Preval administration had met its
fiscal targets, reduced inflation, and maintained a stable
monetary structure. Despite the devastation caused by four
consecutive storms in 2008 and the global economic crisis,
Haiti was one of two countries in the region to post positive
economic growth (2.4 percent) in 2009. The progress prompted
the IMF and World Bank to endorse the cancellation of $1.2
billion of Haiti's multilateral debt, more than half. The
earthquake not only justifies -- but truly demands – that the
last half of Haiti's debt be written off.

Despite myriad problems -- some self-inflicted -- the Preval
administration advanced these reforms in concert with
MINUSTAH. The administration sought to engage the business
community, opposing parties and civil society in developing a
common vision of the future. Preval had named five ad hoc
commissions, including some of his opponents and independent
scholars, to identify and develop recommendations on critical
issues, including the politically contentious issue of
constitutional reform.

With the leadership of the current Prime Minister Jean-Max
Bellerives, who was then minister of planning, the Preval
administration had also partnered with local communities and
multiple sectors with the support of the World Bank and UN to
formulate a national consensus for poverty reduction. The
result was a Haitian National Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper, which was also endorsed by donors. After the 2008
hurricanes, the strategy was developed to include a job
creation plan with a primary focus on jobs in rural
agriculture, decentralized tourism, and the factory apparel
industry. Donors gave their blessing to that program last
April.

Those plans and strategies give Haiti a huge advantage today
because they can serve as a foundation for reconstruction. In
addition, some of the ideas that could not be put forward
before the earthquake now can and must be considered for Haiti
to transform its future.

Starting with the premise that the first phase of Haiti's
reconstruction will require a decade, and the second, a
generation, I offer these suggestions for five principles of
successful reconstruction that could transform Haiti's
political institutions and economic options.

- Forge a new Haitian Social Compact for reconstruction. A
unified Haiti under its currently elected government – not any
superimposed protectorate – has to be in the lead on Haiti's
recovery if the effort is to be successful. Haiti's history
has been defined by a small economic elite who dominated
economic and political power until the 1990's, opposed tax
levels needed to finance adequate state services and, in many
cases, eluded their personal tax obligations as well. For
Haiti's recovery to succeed, the elite must share in the
sacrifice, especially since they will inevitably benefit from
any success. Changing that equation will require the kind of
inclusion that created the PRSP and drove a successful
national advocacy campaign for Hope and HOPE II.
Reconstruction has to be led by Haiti's elected government and
represent all of Haiti and have the participation of the
private sector. The full engagement of Haitian civil society –
like the process that underpinned the PRSP – also must be
generated. Communal leaders like those in NDI's Initiative
committees are also potential allies in this process. Upcoming
parliamentary elections have been postponed. The social
compact hopefully will find a way, endorsed by all, to agree
to hold the presidential, parliamentary and local elections
together next November, if humanly possible, with the
Constitutionally-mandated parliament remaining in office until
the newly elected members take office next January.

- Build a modern Haitian state. Haitian government has always
been starved for resources and its ministries have never been
able to keep up with growing public needs. The reconstruction
of Haiti must be aimed at transforming the country in a way
that leaves a modern functioning state able to sustain public
services and guarantee the rule of law. Modern communications,
information technology and management systems have bypassed
government ministries to some degree and denied them the
capacity to actually deliver fundamental services to regional
departments and municipalities. Modern data information,
communications systems, and planning and evaluation capacity
were all lacking in the ministries before their buildings were
destroyed. Rebuilding those ministries on modern terms is
essential to avoid Haiti becoming a failed state.

- Ensure economic and political decentralization. Ending
centralization of virtually all economic investment in the
capital is essential to reducing extreme poverty in its rural
departments, and to rebuilding Port au Prince. A growing
percentage of the capital's population, now estimated at close
to 400,000, has returned to families in their original
villages and towns, a third going to the Artibonite,
originally the heart of Haiti's rice farming. Now may be the
first time that Haiti's constitutional call for
decentralization can actually be attempted. If regional
economic development poles can be generated around the country
– for instance by implementing HOPE II in a way that
encourages the construction of industrial sites in other
departments with access to ports, such as Cape Haitien in the
North, Port-de-Paix in the North West and St. Marc in the
Artibonite – it will also help to stem the flow of migrants to
Port-au-Prince. That also will give the capital a better
chance for more rational reconstruction and avoid a
replication of the slum communities of the past.

- Use environmental protection and disaster preparedness
standards for all reconstruction projects. Haiti has gone from
a country with 80% forest cover centuries ago, to about 20% in
the 1940s, to two percent today. Its hillsides are mudslides
waiting to happen. Every reconstruction project should be
judged in part by whether it advances environmental
protection, and every construction project should be judged on
whether it incorporates both hurricane and earthquake
resistance elements.

- Guarantee massive, coordinated assistance. The U.S. and
international response must be bigger and better coordinated
than ever before. The U.S. has already committed nearly $400
million to relief, and hopefully it will show leadership in
formally committing to a decade-long reconstruction and
development plan at the upcoming March pledging conference at
the UN. While the detailed assessment of damage and
reconstruction costs have yet to be completed, early estimates
suggest the damage could go well beyond $10 billion. A broad
group of NGOs – including the International Crisis Group – has
recommended an early emergency supplemental of $3 billion as
essential to Haiti's recovery. The sooner it is approved, the
more likely other countries and institutions will seek a
matching commitment. To put this in some perspective, in this
hemisphere, the U.S. has pledged between 30-65 percent of the
reconstruction aid totals following natural disasters like
Hurricane Mitch or peace accords in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

For that effort to be successful, each key U.S. agency,
particularly USAID, State and DoD, must designate full-time
Haiti Reconstruction Coordinators. Ideally, the President
should name a single Haiti Reconstruction Coordinator to serve
as an overall U.S. government policy czar for Haiti
reconstruction and empower him or her with the necessary
authority to ensure an all-of-government response. That would
ensure a greater degree of overall strategic coordination,
guarantee inter-agency coherence and reduce potentially
counterproductive delays.

However, the United States also must commit by example to a
similar international coordinating reconstruction effort.
There is already a UN peacekeeping mission on the ground. Even
before the earthquake, the Secretary General's Special
Representative was unable to ensure that independent UN
agencies, within their competence, responded to the priorities
defined by the Security Council. That needed to be changed
earlier. Now it is absolutely essential. The UNSRSG also
should be the interlocutor with the Government of Haiti with
respect to security, rule of law and political reform and
coordinate all international reconstruction assistance. In
other areas, he or she should still co-chair along with the
Haitian Prime Minister or the designee of the President and
the Prime Minister, a technical and financial reconstruction
committee, that will have the authority to review projects
deemed contrary to the major objectives of the UN mandate and
the goals of the Haiti reconstruction and transformation plan.
Obviously the World Bank, IDB, US, EU, and others would sit on
the committee with the SRSG and the Haiti government. The
committee should be the mechanism of international
coordination and oversee progress toward implementing the
reconstruction plan and hopefully pressure each other to make
good on donor pledges.

In addition, a critical Haitian government-wide procurement
mechanism should be considered, in partnership with the
international community, to oversee large-scale infrastructure
projects proposed by Haiti for its transformation – from
planning to procurement to construction to completion.
Inclusion of measures of transparency and accountability in
that agency will be vital not only for donor satisfaction but
to avoid inevitable suspicion from Haitian constituencies as
well.

Let me suggest five priority areas where many of those
principles should be applied.

- First, for reconstruction to succeed, both security and the
rule of law are required. Reconstruction planning must
incorporate a clear and critical path toward the completion of
police, justice and prison reforms that were initiated before
the earthquake, and deploy them across the country.

Fortunately the presence of the UN peacekeeping mission – and
temporary U.S. military forces – guarantees the physical
stability of the state. The past has shown us that gangs in
Port-au-Prince are capable of quickly reorganizing. It appears
that is what is happening now in Cite Soleil and other areas,
where there are reports that criminals – many from among the
5000 prisoners who escaped the crumbled penitentiary – are
resuming their criminal armed activities. The UN peacekeeping
mission has been authorized for a reinforcement of 2000 more
troops and 1500 more police. They will need more police, to be
sure, well beyond 2011, while police stations are rebuilt and
equipped and the training of new police continues. To put it
in perspective – about 1000 of the 4000 police who worked in
Port-au-Prince have not shown up for work or are believed to
have died, although the large majority, despite their own
losses in many cases, are back on the streets.

The U.S. can also respond to President Preval's pleas for help
in fighting drug trafficking by boosting the interdiction
capability of the Haitian coast guard and the Haiti National
Police (HNP) on an on-going basis. The U.S. could also second
more Haitian-American police, prosecutors and judges to the UN
to assist Haiti in building its own justice infrastructure.

- Second, for reconstruction to succeed, Haiti must be
supported in building a nationwide system of free public
elementary and secondary education – not just in
Port-au-Prince but across every department. Before the quake,
nearly 40% of Haiti's children were not in school. Of those in
school, an estimated 80% were in private schools, most of
which were unregulated, offered poor quality education, and
charged exorbitant fees. The Haitian diaspora can offer unique
support, particularly with teacher training. Creole-speaking
former Peace Corps volunteers can play a role, and the Peace
Corps already is gathering a skills-data base to link into the
reconstruction effort. Supplemental funding to fund this
effort should be provided.

- This is also an opportunity to offer Haiti's young people a
chance to participate in their country's own recovery. The
concepts of AmeriCorps and the Civilian Conservation Corps
should be introduced to produce jobs for the unemployed that
contribute to Haiti's reconstruction.

- Third, renewing Haitian agriculture may be the best way to
keep the migrants from Port-au-Prince in their communities of
refugee. They must have access to credit and fertilizer,
assistance with marketing and perhaps even guaranteed prices
for their first harvest. If that occurs, the capacity of
Haitian farmers to once again be the major source of food for
the population, as it was before the 1970s, would be enhanced,
particularly with respect to rice. Before the 1970s, Haiti
produced nearly all of its rice. Once tariffs were removed,
its farmers could not compete with subsidized and large-scale
rice farmers in the U.S. and they nearly disappeared, as 70
percent of Haiti's rice is now imported. Haiti has shown that
it has the potential to meet modern marketing demands with
mango and coffee crops. When agriculture is linked to
environmental protection with protection of watersheds,
terracing and reforestation, there is a win-win outcome.

- Fourth, meeting Haiti's energy requirement will be essential
in any reconstruction environment and now may be the moment
when an historic shift away from charcoal – as fuel for
cooking and for small business energy generation – can be
achieved. It would not only remove the constant threat to the
nation's remaining forest cover, including in its national
parks, but also enable reforestation to have some chance for
success. This will require Haitian leadership with
international technical and financial support in a single,
unified program that subsidizes impoverished Haitians in
making the transfer. This is essential along with continued
reform of Haiti's electric utility, EDH.

- Finally, the Haitian Social Compact should clearly engage
the Haitian diaspora in the reconstruction effort. This could
include providing avenues for remittances for development,
with matching contributions by donors for community projects.
In addition, the same concept of direct transfer of resources
from a diaspora Haitian-American or Haitian-Canadian to a
family member – which now surpasses official development
assistance – should be used as a model for accelerating the
use of conditional cash transfers to the poor, with the sole
condition being that their children are immunized and attend
school. Using the Brazilian, Mexican and other models, an
income supplement can reach impoverished Haitian families when
they need it the most.

Helping Haiti recovery from this natural disaster constitutes
an obligation for every nation of this hemisphere and beyond.
It is not only the right thing to do in helping neighbours, it
is the only thing to do.







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