NATGRID rejoinder to report in Asian Age 04 August 2014

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Raminder Singh

Aug 4, 2014, 7:02:53 AM8/4/14
to humjanenge, ncpri, indiaresists

NATGRID rejoinder to report in Asian Age 04082014

04 Aug, 2014 / By NATGRID

The NATGRID clarifies the reports appearing in Asian Age, New Delhi on 04 August 2014, titled as Banks refuse National Intelligence Grid access to consumer data which was issued without contacting NATGRID. Similar reports have appeared in other media.

It is hereby informed to the general public that NATGRID had never approached RBI seeking direct access to databases containing retail banking records of any Indian depositor with scheduled banks. NATGRID, as a responsible agency, is well aware of the legislative environment governing depositor confidentiality and banking secrecy.

It is further clarified that the agencies like Reserve Bank of India are already required to monitor and regulate criminal, terrorist and money-laundering financial activity as part of their own statutory mandates. NATGRID is a tool for these agencies to utilise for carrying out their activities and is fully compliant with the existing legislative framework.

The report is mischievous and obviously issued on behalf of vested interests.

On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:47 PM, Sarbajit Roy <> wrote:
You may also be interested in this link

National Intelligence Grid NATGRID

Natgrid, also u/s 24, finally seems to have some kind of a website.

After IB got Raghu Raman removed (he had also privately alleged that IB's Sandhu and Rajiv Mathur were responsible for 26/11 intelligence failures), it seems that Namo sarkar wants to give the impression that NATGRID is being relegated out of MHA and into the backwaters of CDAC before it is terminated (with extreme prejudice)
, whereas its actually racing ahead with Israeli assistance and Aadhar linkages.

On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 3:11 PM, Venkatesh Nayak <> wrote:
Dear all,
The Department of Personnel (DoPT) has quietly made two minor changes in the 2nd Schedule of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act). Entries 7 and 8 in the 2nd Schedule read as 'Aviation Research Centre' (ARC) and 'Special Frontier Force' (SFF) until recently. The amendment clarifies their link to their parent organisation by adding the phrase "of the Cabinet Secretariat" against these names. No other change has bee incorporated in the RTI Act. Readers will remember that organisations notified under Section 24 read with the Schedule 2 of the RTI Act do not have an obligation to disclose information other than those pertaining to allegations of corruption or allegations of human rights violation.

Interestingly, when the RTI Act was gazetted it had some typos. One of them related to Entry 8 which read 'Special Prontier Force'. Now with the latest amendment this typo has been corrected. There is at least one more typo in the RTI Act as notified in the Gazette. I invite readers to spot it.

The ARC and the SFF do not have dedicated websites. Except for a mention about their inclusion in the list of notified organisations under Schedule 2 of the RTI Act in reply to a query in the Lok Sabha in 2005, no other question has been asked about these organisations in Parliament during the last 15 years. According to the 2012-2013 Annual Report of the Central Information Commission the Cabinet Secretariat is said to have rejected only 18 RTI applications under Section 24. It is not clear whether ARC and SFF received any RTI applications at all last year.

When one looks up the budget document relating to the demand for grants presented by the Cabinet Secretariat, there is no mention of the outlay for either ARC or SFF in them. Perhaps it remains hidden under the total expenditure estimate for the head - 'Police' under the Home Ministry's segment at Rs. 59,903 crores for the year 2013-14.

According to a private website run by some volunteers, SFF is said to have been raised at the end of the Indo-China war in 1962, primarily consisting of Tibetan refugees. They are said to have lost several personnel in the Indo-Pak war of 1971. SFF personnel are alleged to have participated in Operation Blusestar to flush out militants from the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar. The headquarters of SFF is said to be based in Chakrata, Uttarakhand.

According to a Wikipedia entry ARC undertakes aerial surveillance operations, monitoring borders, collection of signal intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT).  It was also established in the aftermath of the Indo-China war in 1962. As the Chief of R&AW is also said to be the head of ARC, its headquarters may also be at the sercetive premises of R&AW somewhere in New Delhi. 

The Naresh Chandra Task Force on national security set up a few years ago is reported to have recommended merging ARC with the Cabinet Secretariat's other secretive intelligence wing- R&AW. The report of this Task Force has not been made public. I was also denied access to even the recommendations of this report under the RTI Act soon after the report was submitted to the Government.

DoPT OM about Single Window System for Seeking Sanction for Prosecuting officers of the IAS and Group 'A' Services
The DoPT has circulated an Office Memorandum about the procedure for seeking sanction for prosecuting officers of the Indian Administrative Service and all services under Group 'A', particularly when they are performing functions in connection with the affairs of a State Government (2nd attachment). Accused officers may be prosecuted for offences of corruption or other offences specified under the Indian Penal Code. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code require the appropriate Government's sanction before any accused officer can be prosecuted for offences committed while purportedly performing official duties. The OM make sit mandatory for CBI and other investigating/prosecuting agencies to send the views of the competent administrative authority in the State Government while sending the case file to the DoPT. A check list of documents and information to be attached are also provided at the end of the OM. A list of Group 'A' Services under the Central Government sourced form the 10th Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission is attached (3rd attachment). Perhaps these procedures will apply to officers of the Indian Police and Indian Forest Services although they are categorised as All India Services.

The only exception is that no such sanction is required for prosecuting retired IAS officers for the offences referred to above.

Kindly circulate this email widely.

In order to access our previous email alerts on RTI and related issues please click on:  You will find the links at the top of this web page. If you do not wish to receive these email alerts please send an email to this address indicating your refusal.

Venkatesh Nayak
Programme Coordinator
Access to Information Programme
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
B-117, 1st Floor, Sarvodaya Enclave
New Delhi- 110 017
Tel: +91-11-43120201/ 43180215

“Information is a source of learning. But unless it is organized, processed, and available to the right people in a format for decision making, it is a burden, not a benefit.”
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Sarbajit Roy

Aug 4, 2014, 7:29:27 AM8/4/14
to indiaresists, humjanenge
Dear Raminder

The genesis of this is linked to the turf war in IB which wants to become the FBI and NSA of India, and BJP wants to use it as a massive tool to curtail human rights and throttle democracy. IB wants either NATGRID to be killed off or to be brought under it exclusively. These reports, and there will be many in the days to come, are part of this turf war, for each heavyweight BJP Minister wants NATGRID under their control for political spying on their party rivals.

The first culprit in this is the present Chief Information Commissioner of India - Rajiv Mathur ex-Director-General of IB.

It simply boggles the mind that such an incompetent and anti-disclosure person, whose criminal incompetence resulted in deaths of hundreds of Mumbaikars during 26/11 by Pakistanis and made India an international laughing stock, was rewarded by being appointed as Information Commissioner, and is now Chief Information Commissioner. This fellow is so anti-disclosure that he would not allow videography of a highly controversial RTI hearing before him where NCPRI co-convenor Veeresh Malik requested for the same.

The NATGRID issue is very simple.

Regulators like RBI, MCA, SEBI , DG-ITAX etc have each and every statutory power to access databases of entities under them. These infos are presently not "shared" with each other.

NATGRID is only a tool developed by CDAC (with considerable Israeli help) to securely convey transaction requests from each such regulator to each each other.

So if DGITAX wants access to airline flight manifest of say Emirates Flight XYZ on dd-mm-yyyy, then the authorised person of DGITAX on NATGRID will post the request on NATGRID which will forward it to Min.Of.Civil.Aviation which will access it from Emirates and send it back. All this in real time. It is like DOPT's online RTI system, only much much faster. DGITAX already has all powers to summon this information from MoCA or the airlines

So there is no direct access of NATGRID to the data / databases.

In fact NATGRID does not know what it is being transmitted through it, and has no way of decrypting it as it does not have the PRIVATE "keys" of DGITAX or MoCA.

NATGRID also does not store any data. All transactions records are automatically logged for 20 years and cannot be deleted under any circumstances.

Disclosure: I have some special knowledge / CoI on this topic.


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