Re: [uscv-voting_activists] EPIC Audits First Public Election to useScantagrity Voting System (Takoma Park, MD)

[Kathy Dopp]

Lisa,

I actually do not think that the voter can check the count accuracy at
all, just allegedly if his/her own ballot is cast correctly, and not
even that directly, just by checking that some code that appears on a
paper stub that the voter takes with him/her is the same code on the
online ballot record.

To me the entire system is bizarre and I still do not understand why
several computer scientists and mathematicians are supporting it. How
do I know that just because the same code pops up on a web site, that
my votes were accurately recorded? I think that this system requires
a huge amount of blind trust on the part of voters, but I have not
studied all its details like Doug Jones or Ron Rivest have.

Doug Jones says that all the ballot choices are also listed on the
same web site so that voters can download the entire list and count
them to check the totals, but that would not necessarily ensure me
that they are exactly the same ballots that voters cast or that voters
were allowed to indirectly check were included.

I guess the system works because the program is all open source and so
anyone is allowed to download all the encrypted ballots and run the
program on a web site that let's voters verify and counts the ballots.
However the system still depends on two things:

1. the ballot definition file being uncorrupted, and
2. the right set of ballots being given (without any extras) to all
the open source gurus at these volunteer web sites

It *may* be a big improvement over the DRE system and Doug Jones says
that it produces hand-countable paper ballots too, although my
original understanding was that the paper ballots also require a
ballot definition decoder to manually count because the candidates'
names are not printed on them and different ballots have the
candidates' names in different orders.

I don't begin to have time to study the system right now. It *may* be
OK, but I have serious doubts and don't see the need for such a
high-tech voting system. I could be wrong.

Cheers,

Kathy

On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 11:56 PM, Lisa Pease <lpe...@gte.net> wrote:
> And what happens if the voter finds their vote was counted incorrectly? Is
> it just changed? If one was counted incorrectly, might there not be others
> that no one checked?
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: uscv-voting_ac...@mailman.xmission.com
> [mailto:uscv-voting_ac...@mailman.xmission.com] On Behalf Of
> Kathy Dopp
> Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2009 1:46 AM
> To: ElectionIntegrity digest subscribers;
> uscv-votin...@mailman.xmission.com
> Subject: [uscv-voting_activists] EPIC Audits First Public Election to
> useScantagrity Voting System (Takoma Park, MD)
>
> Notice several things in this article below:
>
> Takoma Park, MD is the home of  the organization Fair Vote who pushed
> through IRV there and presumably supported the adoption of Chaum's
> electronic-ballot voting system
>
> The voter can do a "a post-voting verification of the capture of their
> ballots for the tabulation phase of the election"
>
> However, if the voter can verify his/her cast choices online, then
> what is to prevent vote-buying?  If the voter cannot verify his/her
> cast choices then how does the voter *know* that the e-ballot is
> displayed correctly on-line?  Even if the voter sees his/her e-ballot
> displayed correctly on-line, how does the voter know that the same
> ballot was included in the vote tally?
>
> There is apparently not provided a way for the voters to check that
> *all* other votes have been cast correctly.
>
> There is not a way for the voters to know if *all* the ballots were
> cast and counted correctly.
>
> Therefore, even if *all* voters checked and found an online matching
> ballot, there is no way provided to know that the same set of ballots
> was used to tally the election results.
>
> This system depends on the security of a web site that allegedly
> serves up the exact same set of ballots that were used to tally the
> results, and were all tallied correctly even though the system does
> not provide a way for anyone to check that this is the case.
>
> This system depends for its accurate functioning on the security of a
> complex ballot definition file that the voters are provided no way to
> oversee the security of, and which if manipulated can be used to alter
> the winners of the election.
>
> This, again, is the system supported by Fair Vote for counting IRV/STV
> ballots. IRV/STV is a method that even if votes were on
> humanly-readable paper ballots (unlike in Takoma Park) and even if the
> ballots were secured and images of every ballot were publicly posted
> and the images were audited for accuracy, could not be counted
> manually by most people because the counting method is so complex,
> especially for the single transferable voting method where fractions
> of fractions of votes are transferred.
>
> This article below does not describe a publicly verifiable
> post-election audit of the accuracy of election outcomes of the type
> that I've been recommending. It seems that it does provide another
> song and dance that may fool some members of the public into thinking
> that a post-election check of the election outcome accuracy has been
> done.
>
> Correct me if I'm wrong anyone.
>
> =======================================================================
> [5] EPIC Audits First Public Election to use Scantagrity Voting System
> =======================================================================
> The city of Takoma Park Maryland's Clerk of Elections sought EPIC's
> assistance in conducting a manual audit of their November 3, 2009
> election. The city chose the Scantagrity voting system for its biannual
> election for mayor and city council. Scantagrity is an original concept
> developed by David Chaum and has been refined for use in elections
> through the collaboration of Ron Rivest, MIT and Poorvi Vora, Computing
> Science Department at George Washington University.
>
> Scantagrity's implementation for the Takoma Park election allowed
> voters the option of performing a post-voting verification of the
> capture of their ballots for the tabulation phase of the election.
> Takoma Park voters also had the option of second chance voting, which
> allowed the selection of primary and secondary choice for the public
> offices on Tuesday's ballot.
>
> This marked the first time in the U.S. that voters had the option to
> check that their private votes are correctly recorded and included in
> the election results. Selections on each ballot used unique codes for
> each possible selection on the ballot. The codes correspond to the
> ballot number. It is important to note, however, that ballots are not
> associated with a specific voter. Poll book registration logging of
> voters participating in the election was separate from the issuance of
> ballots to voters.
>
> Voters were given ballots in a privacy sleeve. They then voted using
> optical scan ballots behind privacy screens, which allowed voters the
> option of noting the codes and ballot numbers on a form they could take
> with them. Voters then deposited completed ballots into one of two
> scanners. Later, voters could verify that their ballot was included in
> the final results by going to the City Election Office's web site and
> entering the ballot number. The process was not as accessible for
> unassisted voting for persons vision related disabilities, when
> compared with touch screen voting systems. However, the ability of
> voters with a wide range of disability challenges were able to vote
> independently, or with little assistance with their privacy sleeve
> enclosed ballot's insertion in the scanner.
>
> EPIC was asked to randomly select ballots from the choice of ballots
> provided to voters from each of the 6 wards. Over 1600 Takoma Park
> voters participated in the election. The audit ballots were selected
> at varying times throughout the Election Day, under the supervision of
> election officials. Takoma Park elections officials voided each audit
> ballot and marked ballots stubs to indicate that they were part of the
> manual audit. Then EPIC processed each manual audit ballot by revealing
> all possible selections for each ballot, then a copy of the original
> manual audit ballot was made. The original ballots were placed in a
> spoiled manual audit ballot envelope held by another election official
> stationed in the polling location. Each ballot copy was then endorsed
> by the Chief Election Judge, which will aid in authentication of the
> copies when they are submitted to the City Clerk's office. The manual
> audit ballots and their selections will be verified and the results
> reported to the Takoma Park Clerk's office.
>
> Scantagrity:
>   http://www.scantegrity.org/
>
> Links: Takoma Park Election's Office:
>   http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/clerk/election/2009/index.html
>
> Takoma Ballot verification Web page:
>   http://scantegrity.org/takoma/checkcodes
>
> EPIC's Voting Privacy Page:
>   http://epic.org/privacy/voting/
>
>
> --
>
> Kathy Dopp
>
> Town of Colonie, NY 12304
> phone 518-952-4030
> cell 518-505-0220
>
> http://utahcountvotes.org
> http://electionmathematics.org
> http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/
>
> Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting - 18 Flaws and 4 Benefits
> http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFla
> ws.pdf
>
> Voters Have Reason to Worry
> http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf
>
> Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling
> http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf
>
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>
>
>



--

Kathy Dopp

Town of Colonie, NY 12304
phone 518-952-4030
cell 518-505-0220

http://utahcountvotes.org
http://electionmathematics.org
http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/

Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting - 18 Flaws and 4 Benefits
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling
http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf