Indian Logic and Ontology

[N. Ganesan]

http://www.ontology.co/biblio/indian-philosophy-biblio-one.htm

 

Selected Bibliography on Indian Logic and Ontology. First Part: A - L

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Aklujkar Ajok. "The Word Is the World: Nondualism in Indian Philosophy of Language." Philosophy East and West 51, no. 4 (2001): 452-473.
   "The meanings in which the word 'word' can be taken, the interpretations that the relevant meanings would necessitate of the 'word-equals-world' thesis, and the extent to which Bhartrhari can be said to be aware of or receptive to these interpretations are considered. The observation that more than one interpretation would have been acceptable to Bhartrhari naturally leads to a discussion of his notion of truth, his perspectivism, and his understanding of the nature of philosophizing as an activity in which language pays a basic role and epistemology and ontology are interdependent. The difference of Bhartrhari's thinking from that of the Vedantins of Sankara's tradition is identified, and a brief comment on the history of vivarta and parinama as philosophical terms is offered."
2. Arnold Daniel. "Intrinsic Validity Reconsidered: A Sympathetic Study of the Mimamsaka Inversion of Buddhist Epistemology." Journal of Indian Philosophy 29 (2001): 589-675.
   
3. ———. "Of Intrinsic Validity. A Study on the Relevance of Purva Mimamsa." Philosophy East and West 51, no. 1 (2001): 26-53.
   
4. Balcerowicz Piotr. "The Logical Structure of the Naya Method of the Jainas." Journal of Indian Philosophy 29 (2001): 379-403.
   
5. Bandyopadhyay Nandita. "The Concept of Contradiction in Indian Logic and Epistemology." Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988): 225-246.
   "The article seeks to introduce to the students of philosophy the concept of contradiction in Indian philosophy. contradiction and contrariety fall under the common class of opposition called "Virodha". the former means "pervasion of mutual negation by two predicates," the latter means "pervasibility of two predicates by their mutual negation." Vontradiction is a purely logical relation, while contrariety is semilogical. The author suggests that contradiction and contrariety should better be called, respectively, "absolute contradiction" and "relative contradiction", both being based on contradiction of identity. Some formidable Indian philosophers argue that contradiction (including contrariety) is a purely logical category, for contradiction of facts is impossible."
6. Banerjee Hiranmoy. "On a Mistranslation of the Terms 'Visesya' and 'Prakara'." Philosophy East and West 22, no. 1 (1972): 93-96.
   "The translation of the Nyaya terms, 'Visesya' and 'Prakara' as 'subject' and 'predicate' is mistaken. This mistake is the progenitor of the philosophical mistake that a particular can possibly be a predicate. In 'ram is possessed of a stick', the stick is the 'Prakara', but being possessed of a stick is the predicate. This inclusion of relation in the predicate is alleged to lead to an infinite regress, for the predicate's relation to the subject should be included in it ad infinitum. There is, however, a tie and not a relation between the subject and the predicate. A relation, being a universal, is a prediate of particulars whereas a tie binds together entities of heterogeneous types."
7. Barlingay Surendra Sheodas. A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic. Delhi: National Publishing House, 1965.
   
8. Barua Beninadhab. A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1921.
   Reprinted: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.
9. Berriedale Keith Arthur. Indian Logic and Atomism: An Exposition of the Nyaya and Vaicesika Systems. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921.
   Reprinted: New York, Greenwood Press, 1968 and New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1977.
10. Bharadwaja Vijay K. "Implication and Entailment in Navya-Nyaya Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (1987): 149-154.
    "It is argued against the claim that there exist in the concept of "Vyapti" and "Paramarsa" the two notions of implication and entailment in the Navya-Nyaya logic. Also, it is suggested that the "Pancavayava-Vakya" form of "Anumana" does not represent the deductive model of inference."
11. ———. Form and Validity in Indian Logic. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1990.
    
12. Bhattacharya Chandidas. "Can There Be Empirical Evidence for General Truth?". Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (1987): 333-347.
    
13. Bhattacharya Kamaleswar. "A Note on Formalism in Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy 29 (2001): 17-23.
    
14. Bhattacharyya Sibajiban. "Daniel H. H. Ingalls on Indian Logic." Philosophy East and West 5, no. 2 (1955): 155-162.
    
15. Bhattacharyya Krishnachandra. Studies in Philosophy. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956.
    Two volumes edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya
16. Bhattacharyya Sibajiban. "The Nyaya-Vaisesika Doctrine of Qualities." Philosophy East and West 11, no. 3 (1961): 143-151.
    
17. ———. "Some Features of Navya-Nyaya Logic." Philosophy East and West 24, no. 3 (1974): 329-342.
    "Navya-Nyaya developed a technical (non-symbolic) language tied to a realistic ontology, but this became the language of all serious discourse in India -- of all philosophies, grammar, law, medicine. The problem is primarily to explain how this was possible. The answer suggested is that Navya-Nyaya developed a language for 'describing' cognitions by stating not merely the objects recognized, but also the 'mode of cognition of the object'. This necessitated the development of special concepts like the concept of limitor (Avacchedaka). in ontology, Navya-Nyaya made extensive use of Occam's razor to decide which abstract terms stood for abstract entities, and which, though abstract grammatically, still denoted entities identifiable as concrete objects."
18. ———. "Some Features of the Technical Language of Navya-Nyaya." Philosophy East and West 40, no. 2 (1990): 129-149.
    "The technical language of Navya-Nyaya uses concepts like limitor, determiner, etc., to deal with sentences expressing cognition like perception, inference, memory, belief, doubt, supposition. As such sentences are not extensional, Navya-Nyaya distinguishes between what is cognised and the mode under which what is cognised is cognised. Limitor, in the technical language, determines the mode of cognition and is also used to express quantity of cognition, universality, particularity, etc. The concept of determiner is used to show what predicate is asserted of what subject in the same cognition."
19. Bhattacharyya Hari Mohan. Jaina Logic and Epistemology. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co, 1994.
    
20. Biardeau Madeleine. Thèorie De La Connaissance Et Philosophie De La Parole Dans Le Brahmanisme Classique. Paris: Mouton & Co., 1964.
    
21. Bilimoria Purusottama. ""Jnana" and "Prama": The Logic of Knowing. A Critical Appraisal." Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (1985): 73-102.
    "The thrust of this paper is to investigate the relative difference between "Jnana" and "Prama", two crucial concepts in Indian epistemology, since more recent treatment of them would seem to be confused. Utilizing the framework developed by Nyaya and Advaita, it is argued that the former describes a wide range of cognitive processes, such as 'cognition', 'judgment', 'remembering', 'doubting', etc., while the latter defines the bounds of cognition in respect of its truth-value. A theory of knowledge is developed that accounts for the rise of 'true' knowledge in terms of the 'psyche-activity' involved and the set of criteria ("Pramanya") that renders a "Jnana" as a "Prama". The intensional structure of such a judgment, it is argued, involves a complex qualified-qualifier relation in conformity with the property-content relation of the objective correlate."
22. Bossche Frank van den. "Existence and Non-Existence in Haribhadra Suri's Anekanta-Jaya-Pataka." Journal of Indian Philosophy 23 (1995): 429-468.
    "In part I of the article the author explains how the problem of negation has led the Jains to accept non-existence as well as existence as constituents or 'Dharmas' of every real object in the world and to formulate the first dialectical principle of the "Anekanta-vada" doctrine: 'Sad-asad-rupam vastu' or 'every real object possesses a mode as an existent and as a nonexistent'. In part II of the article the author explains, using mereology as a logical tool, how Haribhadra Suri defends the Jain viewpoint in his 'Anekanta-jaya-pataka'."
23. Bronkhorst Johannes. "The Peacock's Egg: Bhartrhari on Language and Reality." Philosophy East and West 51, no. 4 (2001): 474-491.
    "Bhartrhari was not only a clever and well-informed philosopher but also a conservative Brahmin who maintained his own tradition's superiority against the philosophies developed in his time. He exploited a problem that occupied all his philosophical contemporaries to promote his own ideas, in which the Veda played a central role. Bhartrhari and his thought are situated in their philosophical context. As it turns out, he dealt with issues that others had dealt with before him in India and suggested solutions to existing problems. Indeed it becomes clear that he was both a philosopher who dealt with current problems and challenges and a traditionalist who used the philosophical debate of his time to gain respectability for his own Vedic tradition."
24. Butzenberger Klaus. "On Doubting What There Is Not: The Doctrine of Doubt and the Reference of Terms in Indian Grammar, Logic and Philosophy of Language." Journal of Indian Philosophy 24 (1996): 363-406.
    
25. Cardona George. "Paraphrase and Sentence Analysis: Some Indian Views." Journal of Indian Philosophy 3 (1975): 259-281.
    
26. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar. "The Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Universals." Journal of Indian Philosophy 3 (1975): 363-382.
    "The paper consists in three parts. The first part gives an exposition of the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory that universals are real entities distinct from and independent of the particulars to which they may be related. Various arguments for the theory are stated. The distinctive features of the theory are brought out by way of comparison and contrast with the views of Aristotle and Plato in particular. The second part discusses some objections to the theory. The third part explains the so called 'preventive conditions for universals' together with their bearings on recent philosophical developments."
27. ———. "Some Comparisons between Frege's Logic and Navya-Nyaya Logic." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (1976): 554-563.
    "This paper consists of three parts. The first part deals with Frege's distinction between sense and reference of proper names and a similar distinction in Navya-Nyaya logic. In the second part we have compared Frege's definition of number to the Navya-Nyaya definition of number. In the third part we have shown how the study of the so-called 'restrictive conditions for universals' in Navya-Nyaya logic anticipated some of the developments of modern set theory."
28. ———. "The Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Negative Entities." Journal of Indian Philosophy 6 (1978): 129-144.
    "The paper consists in three parts. The first part criticizes the attempt of some major Indian and Western philosophers like Plato, Cook Wilson, the Buddhists, the Prabhakaras, etc., to dispense with negative entities and builds up the case for them. The second part is devoted to their classification and contains additional arguments in favour of negative entities of particular kinds. The third part discusses some problems of a specialized nature such as the criteria for distinguishing one negative entity from another."
29. Chakrabarti Chandana, and Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar. "Toward Dualism: The Nyaya-Vaisesika Way." Philosophy East and West 41, no. 4 (1981): 477-492.
    
30. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar. "Some Remarks on Indian Theories of Truth." Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1985): 339-356.
    "Some of the points sought to be established are (1) an overly pragmatic reading of the concept of truth in Indian philosophy should be avoided; (2) notions similar to that of knowledge as justified true belief and to the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths are found in Indian philosophy; (3) confirmation of truth through an inferential process, when properly analyzed, does not lead to an infinite regress and that (4) in some cases truth is known immediately."
31. Chakrabarti Arindam. "On Knowing by Being Told." Philosophy East and West 42, no. 3 (1992): 421-439.
    
32. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar. Definition and Induction. A Historical and Comparative Study. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995.
    
33. Chakrabarti Arindam. Denying Existence. The Logic, Epistemology and Pragmatics of Negative Existentials and Fictional Discourse. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
    See the Appendix: "The problem of the nonexistent in Indian philosophy of logic and language" pp. 211-245.
34. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar. Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind. The Nyaya Dualist Tradiiton. Albany: Sate University of New York Press, 1999.
    
35. Chakrabarti Arindam. "Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvilkalpaka Perception from Nyaya." Philosophy East and West 50, no. 1 (2000): 1-8.
    "Besides seeing a rabbit or seeing that the rabbit is grayish, do we also sometimes see barely just the particular animal (not as an animal or as anything) or the feature rabbitness or grayness? Such bare, non-verbalizable perception is called "indeterminate perception" (nirvikalpaka pratyaksa) in Nyaya. Standard Nyaya postulates such pre-predicative bare perception in order to honor the rule that awareness of a qualified entity must be caused by awareness of the qualifier. After connecting this issue with the Western debate concerning the "myth of the given," seven distinct arguments are presented showing that the very notion of such indeterminate perception is epistemically otiose and that the Nyaya theory of perception is better off without it."
36. ———. "Reply to Stephen Phillips." Philosophy East and West 51, no. 1 (2001): 114-115.
    
37. Chakraborti Mihir K., Lowe Benedikt, Mitra Madhabendra Nath, and Sarukkai Sundar, eds. Logic, Navya-Nyaya and Applications. Homage to Bimal Krishna Matilal. London: College Publications, 2008.
    
38. Chapple Christopher Key. "Sources for the Study of Jaina Philosophy: A Bibliographic Essay." Philosophy East and West 50, no. 3 (2000): 408-411.
    "Primary titles in the area of Jaina philosophy are identified, focusing on English-language materials published in the Twentieth century. Included is a brief survey of individual books and book series, with more extensive commentary on two important books published within the past five years: Nathmal Tatia's translation of Umasvati's "Tattvarthasutra" (that which is) and Nagin J. Shah's translation of Nyayavijayaju's "Jaina Darsana" (Jaina philosophy and religion)."
39. Chatterjee Satischandra. The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge. A Critical Study of Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1939.
    Reprinted 1950, 1965 and 1978.
40. Chatterjee Satischandra, and Datta Dhirendramohan. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1939.
    Seventh edition 1968
41. Coward Harold G., and Kunjunni Raja K., eds. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 5. The Philosophy of the Grammarians. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990.
    
42. Cox Collett. "From Category to Ontology: The Changing Role of Dharma in Sarvastivada Abhidharma." Journal of Indian Philosophy 32 (2004): 543-597.
    
43. Dasgupta Surendranath. A History of Indian Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922.
    Five volumes.
    Reprinted Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.
44. Dasgupta Probal. "Modern Indian Work at the Logic-Linguistics Boundary." Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 (1981): 217-225.
    "The mainstream Western logico-linguistic assumption that wh-words ("who", "when",...) in constituent questions manifest a wh-quantifier reflects features of Western languages, which position wh-words clause-initially. Languages like Sanskrit, Hindi, and Bangla form indefinite expressions systematically by adding an existential element to interrogative K-words, suggesting that K expresses a variable and not a quantifier. Further probing indicates that existential and universal quantifiers are based respectively on free and bound variables. Independent linguistic arguments show that these proposals work better than the quantifier theory of questions even for Western languages. Frege and Felix Cohen have, on logical grounds, already argued for a variable theory."
45. Dasgupta Surendranath. Philosophical Essays. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982.
    
46. Daye Douglas Dunsmore. "Circularity in the Inductive Justification of Formal Arguments (Tarka) in the Twelfth-Century Indian Jaina Logic." Philosophy East and West 29, no. 2 (1979): 177-188.
    
47. Dixit Krishna Kumar. Jaina Ontology. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1971.
    
48. ———. "Indian Logic. Its Problems as Treated by Its Schools." Vaishali (Muzaffarpur): Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology, and Ahimsa, 1975.
    
49. Dravid Raja Ram. The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972.
    Second revised edition 2001.
50. Faddegon Barend. The Vaiçesika-System, Described with the Help of the Oldest Texts. Amsterdam: J. Muller, 1918.
    Rreprinted Wiesbaden, M. Sändig, 1969.
51. Franco Eli, and Preisendanz Karin, eds. Beyond Orientalism. The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997.
    
52. Frauwallner Erich. "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie für das indologische Institut der Universität Wien 5 (1961): 125-148.
    
53. ———. History of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973.
    Introduction by Leo Gabriel. Translated from the original German (1953) by V. M. Bedekar.
    Two volumes: 1. The philosophy of the Veda and of the Epic. The Buddha and the Jina. The Samkhya and the classical Yoga-system.. 2. The nature-philosophical Schools and the Vaisesika system. The system of the Jaina. The Materialism.
54. Ganeri Jonardon. "The Hindu Syllogism: Nineteenth-Century Perceptions of Indian Logical Thought." Philosophy East and West 46, no. 1 (1986): 1-16.
    "Following H. T. Colebrooke's 1824 'discovery' of the Hindu syllogism, his term for the five-step inference schema in the Nyaya-Sutra, European logicians and historians of philosophy demonstrated considerable interest in Indian logical thought. This is in marked contrast with later historians of philosophy, and also with Indian nationalist and neo-Hindu thinkers like Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan, who downgraded Indian rationalist traditions in favor of 'spiritualist' or 'speculative' texts. This article traces the role of these later thinkers in the origins of the myth that Indian thought is spiritual and a-rational. The extent to which Nineteenth-century European philosophers were aware of Colebrooke's 'discovery' is documented, and then their criticisms of the Hindu syllogism and its defense by orientalists like Ballantyne and Muller are examined."
55. ———. "Vyadi and the Realist Theory of Meaning." Journal of Indian Philosophy 23 (1995): 403-428.
    "Vyadi, a celebrated Indian linguist, endorses a version of the realist theory of meaning, that the meaning of a word is the object for which it stands. As applied to generic nominals like "(the) cow", Vyadi's thesis faced two much rehearsed objections: 1) if, for each token utterance, a separate meaning rule must be given, then the number of such rules will be "limitless", and the word will be radically homonymous; 2) if only some finite set is given, use of the word to refer outside this set will be "aberrant". These arguments significantly resemble certain Davidsonian constraints on a theory of meaning. The application of Vyadi's theory to proper names is also examined."
56. ———. "Meaning and Reference in Classical India." Journal of Indian Philosophy 24 (1996): 1-19.
    "In another paper, I discussed the grammarian Vyadi's realist' theory of meaning, and showed how its failure to distinguish between the concepts of meaning' and reference' laid open his theory to a series of powerful objections. Later grammarians and Naiyayikas were forced to seek new, more sophisticated, accounts of the semantics of proper names and nominals, and in doing so introduced important innovations in the theory of meaning. I would like in this paper to discuss the contributions of these authors, especially to our understanding of the relation between the meaning of a term and its reference, and to the semantics of context-sensitive expressions."
57. ———. Semantic Powers. Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.
    
58. ———. Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason. New York: Routledge, 2001.
    
59. ———, ed. Indian Logic. A Reader. Richmond: Curzon, 2001.
    
60. ———. "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Case-Based Reasoning." Journal of Indian Philosophy 31 (2003): 33-45.
    
61. Gangopadhyay Mrinal Kanti. "The Concept of Upadhi in Nyaya Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1971): 146-166.
    
62. ———. Indian Logic in Its Sources. On Validity of Inference. New Delhi: Munhsiram Monoharlal, 1984.
    
63. Gerow Edwin. "Language and Symbol in Indian Semiotics." Philosophy East and West 34, no. 3 (1984): 245-260.
    
64. Gillon Brendan S. "Negative Facts and Knowledge of Negative Facts." In Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 128-149. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.
    "Negative facts have perplexed Western philosophers ever since the time of Plato.' But the philosophers of Europe and America have not been the only philosophers to have been perplexed by them; classical Indian philosophers too have pondered their nature. My interest here is to explore how the reflections of these classical Indian philosophers, transposed into the contemporary philosophical idiom, might enrich current metaphysical thinking about negative facts; and what I shall conclude is that at least one of these philosophers has a view of negative facts and knowledge of them, which, when so transposed, is very plausible indeed.
    I shall begin by asking the fundamental ontological question of whether or not negative facts exist and then sketch various replies which European and American philosophers have given to it. Since these replies have not led to any decisive answer to the question, I shall then ask two other questions: the more specific ontological question of whether or not absences-surely paradigmatic examples of negative facts-exist; and the related epistemological question of what is known when the absence of something is said to be known. Answers to these questions comprise an important part of classical Indian philosophy; and I shall outline their answers to them, concluding that the most plausible answers to these questions are those of Jayanta Bhatta, who maintained that absences do indeed exist and that they are known not only by inference but also by perception."
65. Glashoff Klaus. "On Stanislaw Schayer's Research on Nyaya." Journal of Indian Philosophy 32 (2004): 295-319.
    
66. Gokhale Pradeep P. "The Terms Padartha and Prameya in the Context of Nyayasutra." Philosophy East and West 32, no. 2 (1982): 207-211.
    "In this paper an attempt has been made to show that the Vaisesika concept of "padartha" as 'a type of object in this world' is not properly applicable to the sixteen terms mentioned by Gautama in Nyaya-Sutra III. Traditionally "artha" (in Gautama's list of "prameyas") was identified with "padartha" of Vaisesika's. But identification of Gautama's "prameya" or "artha" with Vaisesika "padartha" is misleading. The sixteen terms of Nyaya are also not 'categories' in the technical sense. Gautama's definition of 'padartha' has linguistic import rather than ontological."
67. ———. Inference and Fallacies in Ancient Indian Logic: With Special Reference to Nyaya Buddhism. New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992.
    
68. Gopalan Subramania. Outlines of Jainism. New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Private, 1973.
    
69. Gradinarov Plamen. Phenomenology and Indian Epistemology: Studies in Naya-Vaisesika Transcendental Logic and Atomism. New Delhi: Ajanta Books International, 1990.
    
70. Grimes John. A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy. Sanskrit Terms Defined in English. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.
    New and revised edition 1996.
71. Guha Dinesh Chandra. Navya Nyaya System of Logic. (Some Basic Theories and Techniques). Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan, 1968.
    Second revised edition with the title: Navya Nyaya System of logic: theories and techniques, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.
72. Gupta Bina. "Are "Hetvabhasas" Formal Fallacies?". Journal of Indian Philosophy 8 (1980): 135-147.
    "The first part of the paper examines the "Hetvabhasas" of the Nyaya school. The second part analyzes the differences between Indian and Western conceptions of fallacy and deals with the question whether the Indian account of the "Hetvabhasas" is totally devoid of the notion of formal fallacy as it is understood in the West. I have suggested that though the "completed" Nyaya inference includes the properties of formal validity, the notion of "Hetvabhasa" presents only the necessary conditions for satisfactorily completing such an inferential process. Thus, while the Nyaya inference adequately accounts for the validity of the final "product" of inference, the Nyaya "Hetvabhasas" account for the inferential process leading up to a sound product of inference."
73. Halbfass Wilhelm. India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988.
    Translation of: Indien und Europa. Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung - Stuttgart, Schwabe, 1981.
74. ———. On Being and What There Is. Classical Vaisesika and the History of Indian Ontology. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.
    
75. Hamilton Sue. Indian Philosophy. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
    
76. Ho Chien Hsing. "How Not to Avoid Speaking -- "a Free Exposition of Dignaga's Apoha Doctrine"." Journal of Indian Philosophy 24 (1996): 541-562.
    
77. Houben Jan E.M. "Language and Thought in the Sanskrit Tradition." In History of the Language Sciences. An International Handbook on the Evolution of the Study of Language from the Beginnings to the Present, edited by Auroux, Sylvain, Koerner, E.F.K., Niederehe, Hans-Josef and Versteegh, Kees. 146-156. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000.
    Vol. 1
78. ———. "The Establishment of Sanskrit Tradition." In History of the Language Sciences. An International Handbook on the Evolution of the Study of Language from the Beginnings to the Present. Vol. I, edited by Auroux, Sylvain, Koerner, E.F.K., Niederehe, Hans-Josef and Versteegh, Kees. 113-157. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000.
    
79. Ingalls Daniel Henry Holmes. Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.
    
80. ———. "A Reply to Bhattacharya." Philosophy East and West 5, no. 2 (1955): 163-166.
    
81. Jha Vashishtha Narayan. Relations in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992.
    
82. Jha Ujjwala. Mimamsa Philosophy of Language. Delhi: SRI Satguru Publications, 2002.
    
83. Joshi N.V. Indian Philosophy: From the Ontological Point of View. Bombay: Somalya Publications, 1977.
    
84. Joshi Rasik Vihari. Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1979.
    
85. Joshi S.D. "Syntactic and Semantic Devices in the Astadhyayi of Panini." Journal of Indian Philosophy 29 (2001): 155-167.
    
86. Kellner Birgit. "Negation - Failure or Success? Remarks on an Allegedly Characteristic Trait of Dharmakirti's Anupalabdhi-Theory." Journal of Indian Philosophy 29 (2001): 495-517.
    
87. King Richard. An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
    
88. Kunjunni Raja K. Indian Theories of Meaning. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1969.
    
89. Larson Gerald James. "The Format of Technical Philosophical Writing in Ancient India: Inadequacies of Conventional Translations." Philosophy East and West 30, no. 3 (1980): 375-380.
    
90. Larson Gerald James, and Bhattacharya Ram Shankar, eds. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 4. Samkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987.
    

RELATED PAGES

Ancient Indian Logic and Ontology. A Survey of Modern Research

Selected Bibliography on Indian Logic and Ontology:

Second Part: M - Z

Indian Logicians

Index of the Section "Bibliographical Study Guides"

Selected Bibliography on Ancient Indian Logicians

BIBLIOGRAPHY (under construction)

1. Alackapally Sebastian. Being and Meaning. Reality and Language in Bhartrhari and Heidegger. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2002.
   Contents: Foreword. General introduction. Philosophical background of Bhartrhari and Heidegger: Bhartrhari: the grammarian philosopher. Heidegger: the philosopher of being and language. 1. Sabdatattva: the ultimate reality; 2. Sabdatattva: the Sphota of language; 3. Heidegger's concept of reality; 4. Language: the saying of being; General conclusion; Being and language in Bhartrhari and Heidegger: a synthesis; Glossary; Appendix; Bibliography. Index.
   "Being and Meaning is a comparative study of the concepts of being and language in Bhartrhari and Martin Heidegger, emphasising the universality of their thinking. Language in Bhartrhari's vision is the medium of the self-expression for the ultimate reality ( Sabdatattva). In Heidegger's thinking language is the original utterance ( sage) which being speaks to man. Being expresses itself in language, and phenomena in the world occur simultaneously with the occurrence of language. Bhartrhari and Heidegger lead one to the belonging togetherness of being and being beyond all conceptualizing, transcending the bounds of orient and occident."
2. Bandyopadhyay Nandita. Definition of Valid Knowledge. Pramalaksana in Gangesa's Tattvacintamani. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1989.
   Vol. I: Opponents position (Purvapaksa)
3. Bapat Lata S. Buddhist Logic. A Fresh Study of Dharmakirti's Philosophy. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1989.
   
4. Bharadwaj Krishna Datta. The Philosophy of Ramanuja. New Delhi: Sir Shankar Lall Charitable Trust Society, 1958.
   
5. Bhartrhari. Vakyapadiya Brahmakanda Avec La Vrtti De Harivrsabha. Paris: Éditions E. de Boccard, 1964.
   Traduction, introduction et notes par Madelein Biardeau
6. Bhattacharya Bhaswati. "The Concept of Existence and Nagarjuna's Doctrine of Sunyata." Journal of Indian Philosophy 7 (1979): 337-344.
   
7. Bhattacharyya Sibajiban. Gangesa's Theory of Indeterminate Perception. Nirvikalpakavada, Part 1. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1993.
   
8. ———. Gangesa's Theory of Indeterminate Perception. Nirvikalpakavada, Part 2. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996.
   
9. ———. "Gadadhara's Theory of Meaning of Pronouns." In Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 16-31. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.
   "In order to explain Gadadhara's theory of meaning of pronouns, it is necessary first to briefly state his theory of word meaning. In Indian philosophy in general and in Navya-nyaya in particular, theories of meaning of sentences are regarded as a part of theories of origin of true cognition. Hence in discussing theories of meaning, Indian philosophical systems almost exclusively consider how a hearer acquires information second-hand from what a speaker tells him. Indian theories of meaning refer to the speaker's intention only in so far as it is necessary for the hearer to cognize truly what the speaker says.
   According to Navya-nyaya, a word means an object only under a mode of presentation. Anyone who knows the meaning of the word knows the object under this mode on hearing, remembering, or otherwise cognizing, the word. The problem of meaning of words is the problem of explaining how the hearer knows the object under the particular mode.
   The mode of presentation of an object, according to Navya-nyaya, must be a property of the object. A property is anything which may be said to be in the object. According to Navya-nyaya, this is the case if and only if what is to be regarded as a property of an object is related to the object by an occurrence-exacting relation. Anything related to an object by such a relation will be its property."
10. Bronkhorst Johannes. "On the History of Paninian Grammar in the Early Centuries Following Patanjali." Journal of Indian Philosophy 11 (1983): 357-412.
    "Virtually no literature of the Paninian School of grammar has survived belonging to the period after Patanjali (2nd century b.C.?) and before Bhartrhari (5th century a. D). Some verses in Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya deal with this time, but they allow of different interpretations. A close study of certain indications pertaining to this period reveals that Panini's grammar and its appendixes were modified to an unknown extent and that Patanjali's Mahabhasya was studied but not taken as the final authority, as it was later."
11. Cardona George. "Some Principles of Panini's Grammar." Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1970): 40-74.
    
12. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar. The Logic of Gotama. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977.
    
13. Chakrabarty Debasish. "Kanada's Vaisesika Sutra: A Translation." In Signs and Signification. Vol. Ii, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni. 311-336. New Delhi: Bahri Publications, 2000.
    
14. Coward Harold. "Time (Kala) in Bhartrhari's "Vakyapadiya".". Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (1982): 277-287.
    "Behind the discussion of the levels of language in the Vakyapadiya is Bhartrhari's notion of the dynamic limiting function of time (Kalasakti). After setting forth the absolute nature of Brahman as the one eternal essence of word and consciousness Bhartrhari then introduces the notion of time as the power or means by which this one unchanging Absolute (Sabdatattva--Brahman) manifests itself as the dynamic diversity mankind experiences as creation. Time is the creative power of Brahman."
15. ———. "Derrida and Bhartrhari' Vakyapadiya on the Origin of Language." Philosophy East and West 40 (1990): 3-16.
    
16. ———. ""Speech Versus Writing" in Derrida and Bhartrhari." Philosophy East and West 41, no. 2 (1991): 141-162.
    "This study identifies points of formal and substantive contact between Derrida and traditional Indian thought. Reading Bhartrhari with Derrida highlights the error of previous interpretations that have read the Vakyapadiya through Advaitic eyes. it also highlights Bhartrhari's accommodation of Buddhist stress on individual experience while retaining an orthodox grounding in Vedic dharma, now reinterpreted as sabdatattva. Derrida, however, challenges Bhartrhari's notion of pratibha or "pure" mystical perception. The study calls into question current suggestions that Derrida can be understood as a Madhyamikan Buddhist -- for this analysis shows him to agree with Bhartrhari on exactly those points which separate Bhartrhari and Nagarjuna."
17. Dreyfus Georges B.J. Recognizing Reality. Dharmakirti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1997.
    
18. Dunne John D. Foundations of Dharmakirti's Philosophy. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004.
    
19. Gangopadhyay Mrinalkanti. "Gangesa on the Means for the Ascertainment of Invariable Concomitance." Journal of Indian Philosophy 3 (1975): 167-208.
    "The article is an exposition of the Vyaptigrahopaya (means for the ascertainment of invariable concomitance) section of the Tattvacintamani, the famous NavyaNyaya work of Gangesa. The Sanskrit original, given in transliteration, is divided into nineteen short texts. Texts 1-15 give the Prabhakara position: invariable concomitance is not ascertained through 'repeated observation', but through 'single observation'. texts 16-18 give Gangesa's refutation of the Prabhakara. Text 19 gives Gangesa's own position: the cause for the ascertainment of invariable concomitance is the perception of the coexistence of the probans with the probandum along with the absence of cognition concerning the irregularity of the probans."
20. Goekoop Cornelis. The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintamani. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1967.
    Gangesa's Anumitinirupana and Vyaptivada, with Introduction, translation, and commentary.
21. Hayes Richard Philip. "Dignaga's Views on Reasoning (Svarthanumana).". Journal of Indian Philosophy 8 (1980): 219-277.
    "This paper presents the views of the Sixth century Indian Buddhist epistemologist Dignaga on the reliability of reasoning in the acquisition of knowledge. In stating the necessary conditions for reliability in inference, Dignaga outlined an elementary logic of classes that served as the foundation for all later extensional logics in India. The first part of the paper presents an overview of Dignaga's epistemology, followed by a more detailed discussion of his presentation of the test of validity in reasoning. The second part comprises an annotated translation of a previously untranslated passage from Dignaga's principal work."
22. ———. Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988.
    
23. Herzberger Hans Georg. "Bhartrhari's Paradox." Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 (1981): 1-17.
    "The thesis that some things cannot be named was characteristic of certain Schools of traditional Indian philosophy. The problem we call 'Bhartrhari's paradox' arises from efforts to verify this thesis by positive instances. We examine Bhartrhari's position on the unnameability thesis in general and on the more particular thesis that the naming relation itself is unnameable. We then show how this more particular thesis is entailed by the set-theoretical proposition that no relation can be one of its own relata. Finally we generalize the set-theoretical argument and embed it within the paradox with which we began."
24. Houben Jan E.M. "Bhartrhari's Solution to the Liar and Some Other Paradoxes." Journal of Indian Philosophy 23 (1995): 381-401.
    "In a passage in the Vakyapadiya which should be of special interest to logicians and semanticists, the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari (India, 5th century c.e.) deals with paradoxes of negation, self-reference and truth (including the so-called 'Liar paradox'). The strategy of Russell and others attempting to establish a perfect formal language was to try to preclude their occurrence. The more recent trend to accept them as paradoxes has stimulated interesting developments in semantics, formal logic and related areas. Bhartrhari, however, presents the key to a solution based on the way intention, reference, and negation work in everyday language and communication."
25. Iwata Takashi. "An Interpretation of Dharmakrti's Svabhava-Hetu." Journal of Indian Philosophy 31 (2003): 61-87.
    
26. Jha V.N. The Logic of the Intermediate Causal Link. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1986.
    Containing the sanskrit text of the Apurvavada of the Sabdakhanda of the Tattvacintamani of Gangesa with English translation and introduction.
27. Kalupahana D.J. "Dinnaga's Theory of Immaterialism." Philosophy East and West 20 (1970): 121-128.
    
28. Kapoor Kapil. "Reality and Its Representation: The Verbal Image in Idian Thought and Bhartrhari." In Signs and Signification. Vol. Ii, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni. 9-28. New Delhi: Bahri Publications, 2000.
    
29. Kiparsky Paul. "On Paninian Studies: A Reply to Cardona." Journal of Indian Philosophy 19 (1991): 331-367.
    
30. Matilal Bimal Krishna. "Gangesa on the Concept of Universal Property (Kevalanvoyin)." Philosophy East and West 18, no. 3 (1968): 151-161.
    
31. McDermott Charlene Senape A. "Mr. Ruegg on Ratnakirti." Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1972): 16-19.
    "This point-for-point response to Mr. D. S. Ruegg's criticisms of my "An Eleventh century Buddhist logic of 'exists'" is at the same time an argument for a true interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophers and indologists."
32. Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Gangesa's Theory of Truth. Containing the Text of Gangesa's Pramanya Jnapti Vada with an English Translation, Explanatory Notes, and an Introductory Essay. Santiniketan1966.
    Second revised edition: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1989
33. Murti Srimannarayana. Bhartrhari. The Grammarian. Sahitya Akademi, 1997.
    Contents: Date and Works of Bhartrhari; Language, Grammar and Culture; Scope and Scheme of the Vakyapadiya; Communicative and Analytic Language; Sentence; Indivisibility of Sentence; Theory of Sphota; Sentence Sense Pratibha Word; Intention of the Speaker; Referent of the Word; Substance and Universal; The Qualifier and the Qualificant; Basal and Contextual Referents; Negative Particle; Yugapadadhikaranavacana; Abhedaikatvasamkhya; Time Sabdadvaita Philosophy; Epilogue; Bibliography.
    
    "Bhartrhari, the celebrated grammarian philosopher, is believed to have lived in the 5th century. This monograph presents the linguistic and philosophical theories connecting the analysis of the sentence with the ultimate reality-Sabdabrahman. The linguistic principles dealt with here are applicable not only to Sanskrit but to any language. His magnum opus the Vakyapadiya, even though partly incomplete, is the only extant work comprehensively dealing with the linguistic features of the Sanskrit language and the philosophy of grammar. It contains three kandas-Brahma-kanda or Agama-kanda, Vakya-Kanda and Prakirna-Kanda. The first two kandas together consist of 635 slokas, and deal with the Sabdabrahman, the creation of the world, jiva, world and language. The Prakirna-kanda running into 1300 slokas, divided into 14 sections called samuddesas, deals with the linguistic categories and semantic speculations prevalent in the Indian grammatical tradition. The other extant works of Bhartrhari are his fragmentary commentary of the Mahabhasya of Patanjali and auto-commentary on the kandas I and II of the Vakyapadiya."
34. Ogawa Hideyo. "Bhartrhari on A.1.1.68." Journal of Indian Philosophy 29 (2001): 531-543.
    
35. Parsons Terence. "Bhartrhari on What Cannot Be Said." Philosophy East and West 51, no. 4 (2001): 525-534.
    " Bhartrhari claims that certain things cannot be signified - -for example, the signification relation itself. Hans and Radhika Herzberger assert that Bhartrhari's claim about signification can be validated by an appeal to twentieth-century results in set theory. This appeal is unpersuasive in establishing this view, but arguments akin to the semantic paradoxes (such as the "liar" paradox) come much closer. Unfortunately, these arguments are equally telling against another of his views: that the thatness of the signification relation can be signified. Bhartrhari also claims that the relation of inherence cannot be signified -- a quite different view that is not borne out by twentieth-century results. Finally, further research is needed to investigate what Bhartrhari's own reasons might have been for these views."
36. Patnaik Tandra. Sabda. A Study of Bhartrhari's Philosophy of Language. New delhi: D. K. Prrintworld, 1994.
    
37. Phillips Stephen H. "Gangesa on Characterizing Veridical Awareness." Journal of Indian Philosophy 21 (1993): 107-168.
    "Within the context of a causal theory of knowledge, Gangesa, the revolutionary 14th-century Indian logician and epistemologists, considers and reflects about twenty-five definitions of knowledge (in his view, "veridical awareness," "Prama"), and accepts about eight, with one in particular acquiring the status of Plato's "justified true belief" for all later epistemologists (writing in Sanskrit) to the present. This article is an annotated translation, introducing technical notions of Gangesa's system (in particular for an audience of non-Sanskritist philosophers). The notes provide some historical context but are devoted chiefly to the question of the success of the project."
38. ———. "From Gangesa's Tattvacintamani: Discourse on Perceptual Presentation of Something as Other Than What It Is." Journal of Indian Philosophy 28 (2000): 567-650.
    "Classical Indian theory of perceptual illusion is refined by Gangesa (c. 1325) in this translation (with explanation) of an important section of his masterwork, "Jewel of reflection on the truth (about epistemology)". Illusion is a single cognition of an entity as qualified by a qualifier that is fused by memory into current perception. This view is challenged by various adversaries (mainly Mimansaka but also Buddhist and Vedantic). Examples agreed to are of people making false statements on the basis of perceptual evidence, e.g., "this is silver," when an object in front is really mother-of-pearl. One rival camp sees the unsuccessful effort to pick up silver as flowing from a failure to cognize of a certain sort, not from a perceptual misrepresentation. Gangesa devotes (successful) effort to refuting this and other views, his overall strategy being that though his view faces difficulties they are much less severe than those faced by the alternatives."
39. Prasad Rajendra. Dharmakirti's Theory of Inference. Revaluation and Reconstruction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
    
40. Ruegg Seyfort. "On Ratnakirti." Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1971): 300-309.
    
41. Subramania Iyer K.A. Bhartrhari. A Study of the Vakyapadiya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries. Poona: Deccan College, 2007.
    
42. Sudhakar Jatavallabhula. Bhartrhari's Ontology. 1999.
    
43. Tillemans Tom J.F. Scripture, Logic , Language. Essays on Dharmakirti and His Tibetan Successors. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999.
    
44. Wolf George. "The Importance of Panini for the Development of the Science of Meaning." In Signs and Signification. Vol. Ii, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni. 29-40. New Delhi: Bahri Publications, 2000.

 

Matilal Bimal Krishna. "Indian Theories of Knowledge and Truth." Philosophy East and West 18 (1968): 321-333.

3. ———. The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation. The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-Nyaya Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
   
4. ———. "Reference and Existence in Nyaya and Buddhist Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1970): 83-108.
   "This Nyaya-Buddhist controversy over the empty subject term may well recall to a modern mind the Meinong-Russell controversy about 'existence' and 'denotation'. The Nyaya and the Buddhist logicians worried over the logical and the epistemological problem connected with the issue. The Nyaya interpreted "the rabbit's horn" not as a singular term but as a predicate complex attributing 'hornness' to something that belonged to the rabbit. "The rabbit's horn does not exist" ascribes the absence of hornness to something belonging to a rabbit, and is true. This analysis is closer to Russell's theory of description. The Buddhist, on the other hand, is prepared to allow some sort of 'fictional existence' to "the rabbit's horn" which is perhaps not very different from Meinong's 'theory of objects'. In epistemology the Nyaya believed that any object of cognition (which is expressible in words) must be either real or analyzable into constituents which are ultimately identifiable with some real entity or other. Only a complex object can be fictional. The Buddhists, however, hold that the objects of erroneous cognition are fictional."
5. ———. Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.
   Second revised edition with a new preface by Jonardon Ganeri and the additions and changes made by Matilal in his personal copy: Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.
6. ———. "A Note on the Nyaya Fallacy Sadhyasama and Petitio Principii." Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1974): 211-224.
   "When H. N. Randle (in 1930) interpreted 'sadhyasama' as petitio principii, he made a mistake. Unfortunately, many scholars accepted randle's interpretation. It has been shown that Randle was wrong about this interpretation. 'Sadhyasama' can be correctly translated as a fallacy of being in the same predicament with yet-to-be-proven proposition. Petitio is a different fallacy, as it has been described by Aristotle. Some general comments have been made on the notion of fallacy, and on the distinction between 'formal' and 'non-formal' fallacies."
7. ———. "Causality in the Nyaya-Vaisesika School." Philosophy East and West 25, no. 1 (1975): 41-48.
   "The meaning of "cause" is much wider in some Indian philosophical schools than in the West. the Buddhist terms, "hetu" and "pratyaya", cover an unusual variety of causal notions. The Vaisesika notion of cause is said to be closer to commonsense. A causal substrate in this system approximates the notion of "material" cause in Aristotle, but the "non-substantial" cause is a unique notion in this system. The Nyaya critique of causation (in Udayana) can be profitably compared and contrasted with that of David Hume. It has been further argued in the paper that Mill was a poor defender of Hume against Reid, and that the Navya-Nyaya analysis of the 'unconditionality' criterion was slightly better than that of Mill."
8. ———. Nyaya-Vaisesika. Wiesbaden: O. Harrasowitz, 1977.
   A history of Indian literature: vol. 6, II.
9. ———. "Ontological Problems in Nyaya, Buddhism and Jainism: A Comparative Analysis." Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (1977): 91-105.
   "The Nyaya-Vaisesika believed that we can achieve a satisfactory explanation of 'what there is' if we can analyse and classify the concrete objects of our experience into 'substance', 'quality' and 'action'. The Buddhist thought reality to be in perpetual flux and thus the objects of experience are synthetic and analysable into what they called "dharmas". The Jainas compromised by saying that reality is 'many-sided', both substantial (when we take the Nyaya point of view) and ever fluctuating (when we take the Buddhist position). In Whiteheadean terms, it is a combination of 'process' and 'reality'. A comparison, in some details, of these three Schools is attempted in the paper."
10. ———. "Error and Truth. Classical Indian Theories." Philosophy East and West 31, no. 2 (1981): 215-224.
    "Classical Indian theories of error are discussed to show their relevance to the philosophical problems of the Cartesian epistemologists in general and the British empiricists in particular. The concept of "alambana" and "pratibhasa" as discussed by the Ssautrantika-Yogacara School is explained and the views of the "sense-data" philosophers are discussed in this connection."
11. ———. Logic, Language and Reality. An Introduction to Indian Philosophical Studies. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985.
    
12. Matilal Bimal Krishna, and Shaw Jaysankar Lal, eds. Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective. Exploratory Essays in Current Theories and Classical Indian Theories of Meaning and Reference. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985.
    
13. Matilal Bimal Krishna. Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
    
14. ———. The Word and the World. India's Contribution to the Study of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
    
15. Matilal Bimal Krishna, and Chakrabarti Arindam, eds. Knowing from Words. Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994.
    
16. Matilal Bimal Krishna. The Character of Logic in India. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.
    Edited by Jonardon Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari
17. ———. Mind, Language, and World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
    Edited by Jonardon Ganeri
18. McCrea Lawrence. "The Hierarchical Organization of Language in Mimansa Interpretive Theory." Journal of Indian Philosophy 28 (2000): 429-459.
    
19. Mehta Mohan Lal. Outlines of Jaina Philosophy. The Essential of Jaina Ontology, Epistemology and Ethics. Bangalore: Jain Mission Society, 1954.
    
20. Mejor Marek. "Contribution of Polish Scholars to the Study of Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy 31 (2003): 9-20.
    
21. Misra Ganewar. Language, Reality, and Analysis. Essays on Indian Philosophy. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990.
    
22. Mohanty Jitendra Nath. "Reflections on the Nyaya Theory of Aavayavipratyaksa." Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1961): 30-41.
    
23. ———. "Indian Theories of Truth: Thoughts on Their Common Framework." Philosophy East and West 30, no. 4 (1980): 439-451.
    "The peculiar features of Indian theories of truth, according to this paper, are: (I) a theory of cognitive occurrent; (II) absence of a theory of meaning as distinct from reference; (III) a consequent position that avoids the extremes of logicism and psychologism; (IV) a restricted theory of necessary truths, a fallibilism with regard to empirical truths and infallibilism with regard to moral truths; (V) a close connection between cognitive enterprise and practice; and (VI) reliance on reflective analysis of the cognitive situation."
24. ———. "Understanding Some Ontological Differences in Indian Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy 8 (1980): 205-218.
    "Taking up the pluralistic realism of Nyaya Vaisesika and monistic idealism of Advaita Vedanta, the paper enquires into the origins of this ontological difference. While the theory of "Pramanas" (or theory of knowledge) was used to certify the ontology, the epistemology itself was incorporated into the ontology. No absolute point of beginning is available for a system, both the systems claim to give accounts of ordinary language and ordinary experience. The search for an extra-systemic evidence is frustrating."
25. ———. "Pramanya and Workability -- Response to Potter." Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984): 329-338.
    
26. ———. "On Matilal's Understanding of Indian Philosophy." Philosophy East and West 42, no. 3 (1992): 397-406.
    
27. ———. Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought. An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
    
28. ———. Classical Indian Philosophy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.
    From the Preface: "This is a book that I always wanted to write, but the project had to be postponed up until this stage in my life. Having learned Indian philosophy under two great Sanskrit Pandits -- the late Mm. Yogendranâth Tarkavedântatirtha and the late Pandit Ananta Kumar Tarkatirtha -- I wanted to convey to Western scholars something of the education I had received. Hopefully, I have succeeded in doing so in some measure. There are gaps that I would like to fill, and there are topics on which I would like to elaborate, should there be an opportunity to do so in the future. For the present, I am glad to be able to send this manuscript to the press."
    
    Contents: Preface IX; 1. Indian philosophy: a historical overview 1; Part 1: Theory of knowledge (Pramana Sastra) 2. Theory of knowledge (Pramana-Theory) 11; Part 2: Metaphysics (Prameya Sastra) 3. The Categories (Padharta-s) 41; 4. the Self (Atman) 59; 5. Central metaphysical issues 73; Part 3: Philosophy of politics, law and morals (Dharma Sastras) 6. State, society, and law 95; 7. Moral philosophy 105; Part 4: Religion and art: 8. Philosophy of religion 125; 9. Aesthetics of Rasasasta 133; Part 5: Beyond the Pramana-Prameya distinction 10. Beyond the Pramana-Prameya distinction 141; Appendix 1: A note on Navya-Nyaya analysis of cognition 147; Appendix 2: Some general features of the Indian theories of knowledge 149; Appendix 3: The classical Darsanas (Systems) 153; Appendix 4: Glossary of important Sanskrit terms 159; Bibliography 167; Index 175; About the Author 181.
29. ———. Explorations in Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
    Two volumes: 1. Indian philosophy; 2. Western philosophy
30. Mohanty Jitendra Nath, Saha S.R., Chatterjee Amita, Sarkar Tushar Kanti, and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya. "Indian Logic." In The Development of Modern Logic, edited by Haaparanta, Leila. 903-961. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
    
31. Mukherjea A.K. "The Definition of Pervasion ("Vyapti") in Navya-Nyaya." Journal of Indian Philosophy 4 (1976): 1-50.
    
32. Mullick Mohini. "Implication and Entailment in Navya-Nyaya Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy 4 (1976): 127-134.
    "My attempt is to produce some evidence to show that the notions of implication and entailment are clearly distinguished in Navya-Nyaya logic. This is done by examining the nature of the Navya-Nyaya syllogism and showing that the Naiyayikas were aware of various definitions of material implication but rejected them as definitions of vyapti (implication), not because they led to inferential paradoxes but to semantic ones; they in fact never confused implication with entailment. The entailment relation is contained in their notion of "paramarsa" and appears as the last premise in the argument which immediately precedes and thus 'causes' the conclusion."
33. Nicholson Hugh R. "Specifying the Nature of Substance in Aristotle and Indian Philosophy." Philosophy East and West 54, no. 4 (2004): 533-554.
    "Aristotle struggles with two basic tensions in his understanding of reality or substance that have parallels in Indian metaphysical speculation. The first of these tensions, between the understanding of reality as the underlying substrate (to hupokeimenon) and as the individual "this" (tode ti), finds a parallel in the concept of dravya in Patanjali's Mahâbhasya. The second tension, between the understanding of reality as the individual this and as the intelligible essence of the individual this (to ti en einai), corresponds to an ambiguity in the concept of vastu in Kumarila's Slokavarttika."
34. Nieuwendijk Arthur. "Semantics and Comparative Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy 20 (1992): 377-418.
    "The paper takes up the question as to which logical framework is most suitable for a formal interpretation of Navya-Nyaya logic. It is claimed that, for this purpose, the framework offered by extensional first-order predicate logic is inadequate. This claim is established by discussing three well-known difficulties: the interpretation of the notion of Jnana, the question whether contraposition is a law of NavyaNyaya logic, and the interpretation of the Navya-Nyaya scheme of inference. Next, the interrelatedness of these difficulties is pointed out, and, carrying through the analysis, it is examined whether situation semantics offers a suitable alternative framework."
35. Oetke Claus. "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Non-Monotonic Reasoning." Journal of Indian Philosophy 24 (1996): 447-539.
    "The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the most ancient varieties of "Indian logic" are significantly related to theories associated with the term "non-monotonc logic" in so far as they try to account for reasoning relying on the ability to use general rules subject to exceptions and indicate a conception of context-dependent validity implying that valid inferences or arguments can lose this status in the context of additional information. On that background it is possible to give a theoretical justification for a number of features of Indian theories of inference which previously appeared theoretically ill motivated and which were often explained by historical coincidences."
36. ———. "Indian Logic and Indian Syllogism." Indo-Iranian Journal 46, no. 1 (2003): 53-69.
    
37. Padmarajiah Y.J. A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge. Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1963.
    
38. Pandey Sangam Lal. Pre-Samkara Advaita Philosophy. Allahabad: Darshan Peeth, 1974.
    Second edition 1983
39. Pandeya Ram Chandra. The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1963.
    
40. Perrett Roy W. "Self-Refutation in Indian Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy 12, no. 3 (1984): 237-264.
    
41. ———. "A Note on the Navya-Nyaya Account of Number." Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (1985): 227-234.
    "I maintain (contra Ingalls) that the Navya-Nyaya account of number as a property of classes should be understood intensionally, not extensionally. Such a theory is closer to Frege's earlier views than to Russell's and also has certain advantages over Russell's theory. However it seems that Navya-Nyaya cannot provide a criterion of identity for such intrinsically intensional properties; and this difficulty is particularly important for Navya-Nyaya, given its epistemological and metaphysical realism."
42. ———. "Is Whatever Exists Knowable and Nameable?". Philosophy East and West 49, no. 4 (1999): 401-414.
    "Naiyayikas are fond of a slogan, which often appears as a kind of motto in their texts: "Whatever exists is knowable and nameable". What does this mean? Is it true? The first part of this essay offers a brief explication of this important Nyaya thesis; the second part argues that, given certain plausible assumptions, the thesis is demonstrably false."
43. ———, ed. Indian Philosophy. A Collection of Readings. Vol. I. Epistemology. New York: Garland, 2001.
    Vol. 1: Epistemology; Vol.2: Logic and philosophy of language; Vol. 3: Metaphysics; Vol. 4: Philosophy of religion; 5. Theory of value.
    
    "Volume 1: Epistemology is concerned with the nature and scope of Indian pramâna theory, i.e. that part of Indian philosophy concerned with the nature and sources of knowledge. Indian philosophers developed a causal theory of knowledge and acknowledged the existence of a number of valid ways of knowing, including perception, inference and testimony. The Indian Pramâna theorists thus discussed many issues that have also occupied Western epistemologists, often offering importantly different perspectives on these matters. They also sometimes addressed various interesting questions about knowledge that are unfamiliar to Western epistemologists.
    The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of epistemological topics like the means of knowledge, realism and anti-realism, truth, knowledge of knowledge, illusion and perceptual error, knowability, testimony, scepticism and doubt."
44. ———, ed. Indian Philosophy. A Collection of Readings. Vol. Ii. Philosophy of Language. New York: Garland, 2001.
    "Volume 2: Logic and Philosophy of Language is concerned with those parts of Indian pramana theory that Western philosophers would count as logic and philosophy of language. Indian philosophers and linguists were much concerned with philosophical issues to do with language, especially with theories of meaning, while the Indian logicians developed both a formalised canonical inference schema and a theory of fallacies. The logic of the standard Indian inferential model is deductive, but the premises are arrived at inductively. The later Navya-Nyaya logicians went on to develop too a powerful technical language, an intentional logic of cognitions, which became the language of all serious discourse in India.
    The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of topics in logic and the philosophy of language like the nature of inference, negation, necessity, counterfactual reasoning, many-valued logics, theory of meaning, reference and existence, compositionality and contextualism, the sense-reference distinction, and the nature of the signification relation."
45. ———, ed. Indian Philosophy. A Collection of Readings. Vol. Iii. Metaphysics. New York: Garland, 2001.
    "Volume 3: Metaphysics is concerned with the complement to pramana theory, i.e. prameya theory. Whereas the pramanas are the means of knowledge, the prameyas are the knowables, cognisable entities that constitute the world. With respect to the number and kinds of such entities, there was a very wide variety of opinion among classical Indian philosophers - including variants of monism, dualism and pluralism about both entities and kinds. Many metaphysical topics were debated, but two of the most important were causation and the nature of the self. The competing theories offered about these two issues also raised other questions about the metaphysics of wholes and parts, substances and properties, and universals and particulars.
    The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of topics in metaphysics like ontology, constructionalism, universals, negative facts, mereology, causation, relations, freedom and determinism, and theories of the self."
46. Perszyk Kenneth J. "'Virtue Is Not Blue': Navya-Nyaya and Some Western Views." Journal of Indian Philosophy 11 (1983): 325-338.
    "The primary aim is to construct, within the Navya-Nyaya system, an analysis of sentences such as 'virtue is not blue', which they would claim are meaningful. There is a discussion of their important distinction between meaningful sentences and sentences which generate or have the ability to generate a cognition, and their concept of negation. The secondary aim is to compare their analysis with certain Western philosophers, especially those who follow the theory of types."
47. ———. "The Nyaya and Russell on Empty Terms." Philosophy East and West 34, no. 2 (1984): 131-146.
    "The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the Navya-Nyaya school of Indian philosophy determines the truth or falsity of a sentence which contains an empty term, and to point out some similarities and differences between its method of analysis and truth-value determinations of such sentences and that of Bertrand Russell."
48. ———. "Negative Entities and Negative Facts in Navya-Nyaya." Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984): 265-276.
    "The purpose of this article is to discuss the Navya-Nyaya's thesis that absence is an ontological category, which is to say that there are negative entities, and its corollary that there are negative facts. The Nyaya resists all attempts to eliminate negative facts in favour of positive facts. In addition, we see that no atomic sentence can have a negative subject-term."
49. Phillips Stephen H. Classical Indian Metaphysics. Refutation of Realism and the Emergence of "New Logic". Chicago: Open Court, 1995.
    
50. ———. "There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyaya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa." Philosophy East and West 51, no. 1 (2001): 104-113.
    "As part of its direct realism in the epistemology of perception, classical Indian Nyaya posits indeterminate perception where a qualifier is grasped immediately without being grasped as qualifying its qualificandum, the thing whose property it is. Contemporary philosopher, Arindam Chakrabarti, argued in Philosophy East and West 50, no. 1 (January 2000) that Nyaya would best eschew such "indeterminate perception." This paper offers a defense drawing on the classical texts. It is explained in particular that while there is no claim of direct, apperceptive evidence for raw perception, there is an argument that ties up all verbalizable cognition, including verbalizable perception, as having the qualifier it presents as available through previous experience. But with a first-time perception of something as, say, a cow, the cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could not possibly provide the qualifier, cowhood, and the best candidate seems its perception in the raw."
51. Phillips Stephen H., and Chakrabarti Arindam. Epistemology of Perception: Gangesa's Tattvacintamani, Jewel of Reflection on the Truth /About Epistemology). The Perception Chapter (Prataksa-Khanda). New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2004.
    Transliterated text, translation, and philosophical commentary.
52. Potter Karl H. "Are the Vaisesika "Gunas" Qualities?". Philosophy East and West 4, no. 3 (1954): 259-264.
    
53. ———. Presuppositions of India's Philosophies. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963.
    
54. ———, ed. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 1. Bibliography. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.
    Second revised edition 1983; Third revised edition 1995.
55. ———. "On the Realistic Proclivities of Navya-Nyaya as Explicated by Bhattacharyya." Philosophy East and West 24, no. 3 (1974): 343-347.
    
56. ———. "Some Thoughts on the Nyaya Conception of Meaning." Journal of Indian Philosophy 3 (1975): 209-216.
    
57. ———, ed. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 2. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology. The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaisesika up to Gangesa. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977.
    Second edition 1995.
58. ———, ed. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 3. Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara and His Pupils. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981.
    
59. ———. "Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?". Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984): 307-328.
    "I endeavor to show that J. N. Mohanty's claim of incommensurability among Indian epistemological theories is based on a justified true belief account of knowledge; that "Pramanya" doesn't mean truth but rather workability; that Indian theories of knowledge are not predicated on noncognitivism in values as Western ones are; that the claim incommensurability among Indian epistemological theories is a result of imposing on them shortcomings in contemporary Western ways of thinking."
60. Potter Karl H., and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, eds. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 6. Indian Philosophical Analysis. Nyaya-Vaisesika from Gangesa to Raghunatha Siromani. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993.
    
61. Potter Karl H., Buswell Robert Jr., Jaini Padmanabh S., and Ross Reat Noble, eds. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 7. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1996.
    
62. Potter Karl H., ed. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 8. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
    
63. ———, ed. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 9. Buddhist Philosophy from 350 to 600 A.D. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2003.
    
64. Pradyot Kumar Mukhopadhyay. Indian Realism. A Rigorous Descriptive Metaphysics. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi, 1984.
    
65. Prasad Jwala. History of Indian Epistemology. Delhi: Munshiram Monoharlal, 1958.
    
66. Prasad K.S., ed. The Philosophy of Language in Classical Indian Tradition. New Delhi: Decent Books, 2002.
    
67. Prets Ernst. "Futile and False Rejoinders, Sophistical Arguments and Early Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy 29 (2001): 545-558.
    
68. Radhakrishnan Sarvepalli, and Moore Charles A., eds. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
    
69. Raja Kunhan C. Some Fundamental Problems in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1960.
    
70. Ranade Ramachandra Dattatraya. A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy Being a Systematic Introduction to Indian Metaphysics. Oriental Book Agency: Oriental Book Agency, 1926.
    
71. Randle Herbert Niel. Indian Logic in the Early Schools. A Study of the Nyayadarsana in Its Relation to the Early Logic of Other Schools. London: Oxford University Press, 1930.
    Reprinted New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1976.
72. Rao K.L.Seshagiri. "On Truth: A Hindu Perspective." Philosophy East and West 20, no. 4 (1970): 377-382.
    "The article shows how the Hindu tradition and specially Vedanta has come to express its own experience of truth. It views the problem of truth ontologically: ultimate truth cannot be 'known' like a finite object; it is in fact the 'knower' himself, Atman, the unconditioned being. Both absolutistic and theistic interpretations of Atman/Brahman are considered. It concludes: truth is spiritual reality, being of our being and the meaning of all finite existence."
73. Rastogi Maharaj Narain. The Theories of Implication in Indian and Western Philosophy. A Critical Study. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1983.
    Foreword by Irving M. Copi
74. Ratnakirti Dhirendra Sharma. The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic. The Hague: Mouton, 1969.
    
75. Reyna Ruth. Dictionary of Oriental Philosophy. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1984.
    
76. Riga Peter J. "On Truth: A Catholic Perspective." Philosophy East and West 20 (1970): 369-376.
    
77. Sastri Kuppuswami. A Primer of Indian Logic According to Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha. Mylapore: The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, 1932.
    Second edition 1951; Third edition 1961; Fourth edition 1998
78. Sastri Pothukuchi Subrahmanya. Indian Idealism. Epistemology and Ontology. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1975.
    
79. Scharf Peter M. The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Philosophy. Grammar, Nyaya and Mimamsa. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1996.
    
80. Schuster Nancy. "Inference in the Vaisesikasutras." Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1972): 341-386.
    "Conflicting statements appear in the Vaisesikasutras about how knowledge of imperceptible entities is attained. Passages from the Sutras are compared with the Samkhya Sastitantra, the Nyayasutras, Nyayabhasya, and other early texts. Impact of the Sastitantra on Vaisesikasutras and Nyayabhasya was strong. Contradictions within Vaisesikasutras reveal the compilers' grappling with the Samkhya theory over a period of time. Bias in favor of direct perception dominates the Vaisesika text."
81. Seshagiri Rao K.L. "On Truth: A Hindu Perspective." Philosophy East and West 20 (1970): 377-382.
    
82. Sharma Chandradhar. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. London: Rider & Company, 1960.
    
83. Shastri Gaurinath Bhattacharyya. The Philosophy of Word and Meaning. Some Indian Approaches with Special Reference to the Philosophy of Bhartrhari. Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959.
    
84. Shastri Dharmendra Nath. Critique of Indian Realism. A Study of the Conflict between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist Dignaga School. Agra: Agra University, 1964.
    
85. ———. The Philosophy of Nyaya Vaisesika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignaga School (a Critique of Indian Realism). Delhi: Bharatiya Vidy Prakashan, 1976.
    Third edition 1997.
86. Shaw Jaysankar Lal. "The Nyaya on Existence, Knowability and Nameability." Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (1978): 255-266.
    "One of the aims of this paper is to discuss the different senses of the term 'existence' as used by the Nyaya philosophers. This discussion leads us to a discussion on absence or negation and its role in logic. A discussion on empty terms has also been introduced in this context. According to the Nyaya, existence, knowability and nameability are considered as universal properties. The distinction between these universal properties has been discussed in this context. I have also discussed the question whether the Nyaya has used redundant terms in designating the same imposed property by using three different terms. A distinction between different senses of the term 'property' has also been discussed in this context."
87. ———. "The Nyaya on Cognition and Negation." Journal of Indian Philosophy 8 (1980): 279-302.
    "The aim of this paper is to discuss the Nyaya concept of negation and the different types of negation. This discussion involves a discussion of the Nyaya concept of cognition, relation and meaning. The Nyaya has drawn a distinction between qualificative and non-qualificative cognition. A qualificative cognition can be represented by the form "arb". The Nyaya concept of negation cannot be said to be a term-negation, or a sentence-negation, or a propositional function negation. The conclusion is that the Nyaya concept of negation does not correspond to any Western concept of negation."
88. ———. "Universal Sentences: Russell, Wittgenstein, Prior, and the Nyaya." Journal of Indian Philosophy 19 (1991): 103-119.
    "The aim of this paper is to discuss I) whether the following sentences have the same meaning, II) whether they have the same truth-value, III) whether there is some assertion common to all of them, and IV) if there is some such assertion, whether it can be defined. 1) all men are mortal, 2) whoever is a man is mortal, 3) wherever there is humanity, then there is mortality, 4) if anyone is a man, then he is mortal, 5) if humanity is present somewhere, then mortality is also present there."
89. ———. "Conditions for Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence: The Nyaya and the Advaita Vedanta." Journal of Indian Philosophy 28 (2000): 273-293.
    
90. ———. Some Logical Problems Concerning Existence. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 2003.
    
91. ———. The Nyaya on Meaning: A Commentary on Pandit Visvabandhu. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 2003.
    
92. Siderits Mark. "The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14 (1987): 331-355.
    
93. ———. Indian Philosophy of Language. Studies in Selected Issues. Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
    
94. Sinha Jadunath. Indian Realism. London: Kegan Paul, 1938.
    Reprint: Dehli, Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
95. ———. A History of Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House, 1952.
    Two volumes: 1952-1956.
96. Smart Ninian. Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964.
    Reprinted: Atlantic Highland, Humanities Press, 1976; Second revised edition: Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1992.
97. Staal Frits. "The Concept of 'Paksa' in Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1973): 156-165.
    "The customary assumption that the Indian concepts of hetu, sadhya and paksa correspond to the Aristotelian middle, major and minor terms, respectively, is incorrect. The concept of paksa is used ambiguously in Indian logic, where it denotes either the term whose property is the sadhya, or the relation between that term and the sadhya. Another ambiguity of the Sanskrit originals, between paksa as used and paksa as mentioned, is resolved in a Chinese translation."
98. ———. "The Concept of Metalanguage and Its Indian Background." Journal of Indian Philosophy 3 (1975): 315-354.
    "In Indian culture the concept of metalanguage originated early in the context of linguistics and speculations on language; in the West, late in the context of logic. This is related to the grammatical character of Indian culture and the mathematical character of Western culture. Connections are made between metalinguistic notions and technical, in particular poetic and ritual languages; Mantras; the origin of phonetic writing; communication and metacommunication among animals and men; and the origin of language."
99. ———. Universals. Studies in Indian Logic and Linguistics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
    
100. Taber John A. "The Theory of the Sentence in Purva Mimansa and Western Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy 17 (1989): 407-430.
     "The Mimansa school of Indian philosophy developed two distinct theories of the relation of the meaning of a sentence to the meanings of the words that comprise it, the Anvitabhidhana or "qualified designation" theory and the Abhihitanvaya or "designated relation" theory. Both of these theories, I attempt to show, turn on the observation that the meanings of individual words change in different sentences. I go on to suggest that an appreciation of this fact can lead to a solution of the problem, first raised by Frege, of the change of meaning of terms in intensional contexts."
101. ———. "Is Indian Logic Nonmonotonic?". Philosophy East and West 54, no. 2 (2004): 143-170.
     "Claus Oetke, in his ''Ancient Indian logic as a theory of non-monotonic reasoning,'' presents a sweeping new interpretation of the early history of Indian logic. His main proposal is that Indian logic up until Dharmakirti was nonmonotonic in character-similar to some of the newer logics that have been explored in the field of Artificial Intelligence, such as default logic, which abandon deductive validity as a requirement for formally acceptable arguments; Dharmakirti, he suggests, was the first to consider that a good argument should be one for which it is not possible for the property
     identified as the ''reason'' (hetu) to occur without the property to be proved (sadhya) -- a requirement akin to deductive validity. Oetke's approach is challenged here, arguing that from the very beginning in India something like monotonic, that is, deductively valid, reasoning was the ideal or norm, but that the conception of that ideal was continually refined, in that the criteria for determining when it is realized were progressively sharpened"
102. Tachikawa Musashi. "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1971): 111-145.
     "This article consists of four parts: explanations of basic technical terms as an introduction, a translation of the Nyayapravesa, notes to the translation, and a romanized text based upon Dhruva's edition. This work is Samkarasvamin's introduction to Dignaga's logic, and deals with means of proof, fallacious means of proof, means of refutation, perception, inference, fallacious perception and fallacious inference."
103. Tarkatirtha Visvabandhu. "The Nyaya on the Meaning of Some Words." Journal of Indian Philosophy 20 (1991): 41-88.
     Translated by Jaysankar Las Shaw.
     "The aim of this paper is to discuss the views of Nyaya philosophers on meaning. This paper deals with the meaning and reference of proper names, and general terms. It also deals with the meanings of homonymous expressions, and discusses the question whether demonstrative pronouns are homonymous terms. Different uses of personal pronouns have been mentioned. The section on the quantifier 'all' deals with different uses of it. Similarly, the section on interrogative pronoun deals with as many as seven uses of an interrogative pronoun. This paper ends with the discussion of the meaning of a sentence."
104. Tiwari Heeraman. "One and Many: The Early Naiyayikas and the Problem of Universals." Journal of Indian Philosophy 22 (1994): 137-170.
     "The problem of universals in Indian philosophy is as old as c. 400 b. C. In his great work, Astadhyayi, the grammarian Panini introduced the problem of universals while discussing the meaning of a noun. Later, the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems of Indian philosophy discussed the universals in great detail. The present article deals with the early Nyaya view of universals. The article is divided in two parts: one gives a brief general introduction to the problem; the other contains a fresh translation of the Nyaya-Sutras 2.2.58-70 and Vatsyayana's commentary on them. The translation is also supplied with discussions and analysis. The article tries to demonstrate that the Nyaya system extends the debate about word and meaning which was inaugurated by early Sanskrit grammarian (viz., Panini, Patanjali etc.)."
105. Tripathi R.K. "The Central Problem of Indian Metaphysics." Philosophy East and West 19, no. 1 (1969): 39-43.
     "The main argument of my article is to show that the question regarding the metaphysical status of relation is the central problem of Indian metaphysics as it is this that determines the nature of the major systems. four possible alternatives have been discussed: a) relation is as real as the terms (pluralistic realism like the Nyaya etc.), b) the terms are real but the relation (between Prakrti and Purusa) is false (Samkhya dualism), c) the falsity of relation means the falsity of one of the terms also (Advaita Vedanta and Vijnanavada), d) the falsity of relation entails the falsity not only of one term but of both the terms (Madhyamika). I have treated the relation between identity and difference as most basic."
106. Umesha Mishra. History of Indian Philosophy. Allahabad: Tirabhukti Publications, 1957.
     
107. Vattanky John. "The Referent of Words: Universal or Individual, the Controversies between Mimansakas and Naiyayikas." Journal of Indian Philosophy (1993): 51-78.
     "One of the most important problems discussed in Nyaya philosophy of language is whether words denote an individual or a universal. On this point there are basically two schools of thought which oppose one another, i.e., the Mimansakas and the Naiyayikas. The texts of Muktavali, Dinakari and Ramarudri dealing with this topic give a brilliant summary of the long drawn out conflict between the two Schools. The authors of these texts established the Nyaya position that the denotative function of words is in the individual as qualified by the universal and the present essay examines these arguments and counterarguments."
108. ———. Nyaya Philosophy of Language. Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of Upamana and Sabda Sections of Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1995.
     
109. ———. A System of Indian Logic: The Nyaya Theory of Inference. Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of the Anumana Section of Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
     "Nyaya is the most rational and logical of all the classical Indian philosophical systems. In the study of Nyaya philosophy, Karikavali with its commentary Muktavali, both by Visvanatha Nyayapancanana, with the commentaries Dinakari and Ramarudri, have been of decisive significance for the last few centuries as advanced introductions to this subject. The present work concentrates on inference (anumana) in Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari, carefully divided into significant units according to the subject, and translates and interprets them. Its commentary makes use of the primary interpretation in Sanskrit contained especially in the Ramarudri and Subodhini. The book begins with the Sanskrit texts of Karikavali and Muktavali; followed by English translation of these texts. Next is given the Sanskrit text of Dinakari which comments on the first two texts, followed by its English translation. Lastly, the book contains a commentary on all the texts included."
110. Vidyabhusana Satis Chandra. History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic. Calcutta1909.
     Reprint: New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Coropration, 1977.
111. ———. A History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediæval and Modern Schools). Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1921.
     Reprint: Dehli, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2002.
112. Wada Toshihiro. "The Analytical Method of Navya-Nyaya." Journal of Indian Philosophy 29 (2001): 519-530.
     
113. Wayman Alex. "Two Traditions of India -- Truth and Silence." Philosophy East and West 24 (1974): 389-403.
     
114. Williams Paul. "Indian Philosophy." In Philosophy 2. Further through the Subject, edited by Grayling, Anthony C., 793-847. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
     
115. Zilberman David B. The Birth of Meaning in Hindu Thought. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1988.
     Edited by Robert S. Cohen.
116. ———. "Analogy in Indian and Western Philosophical Thought." edited by Gourko, Helena and Cohen, Robert S. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006.
     
117. Zimmermann Francis. "Le Sens Des Mots Selon Les Logiciens (L'analyse Du Padartha)." Histoire Épistemologie Langage 20 (1998): 53-62.
     "A comparison between the analysis of padârtha (the object of the word) by the Nyâya tradition and the Theory of Incorporais by Stoicism leads us to significantly modify the metaterminology in use among the sanskritists who specialize in the interpretation of Ancient Logic texts. Specifically, if we make use of the philosophical and grammatical terminology that we have inherited from the Stoicians in order to translate and comment Nyâyasûtra II. 2.58-69, which deal with padârtha, we not only recognize the hierarchy «letter-syllable-word-utterance» that pervaded the whole structure of ancient grammar, but at the same time we bring to light the realistic and vitalistic ontology (we might call it a physiology of notions) which was the framework within which the grammatical theory was evolved."