martinsf
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to Bristol Sustainability Network
Bearing in mind the debate here about feed-in tariffs, this is a theme
of the current BERR (Government ) Renewable energy strategy
consultation [closing date September 26th].
Read this paper from our local Institute Of Physics/
environmentalresearchweb by Professor Elliott of the Open University
about how the curreent system in the Uk does not work.
Talking Point
Sep 2, 2008
UK renewables – how not to do it
Quota-based systems are not as good as feed-in tariffs at promoting
renewable energy, and may even have provoked public opposition, says
David Elliott
The UK has probably the best overall renewable energy potential of any
country in the European Union (EU) – conservative estimates indicate
that up to 67% of the country's electricity supply could in theory be
renewable by 2050 (see table 1). And yet at present the nation trails
behind almost every other EU country in the renewables league tables
and in terms of targets for the future.
This is still the case even if we remove hydropower, which is the main
renewable source of electricity for some of the EU leaders (see table
2). When we look at total energy – electricity, fuel and heat – the
situation is even more dramatic. In 2005 only Malta and Luxembourg had
lower renewables contributions and the UK's still-to-be-confirmed 15%
target for 2020 is amongst the lowest of the EU targets (table 3).
Competitive pricing
So what might explain this poor showing? The UK has adopted a
competitive market approach to simulating the take-up of renewables.
This is based on a renewables obligation (RO) on energy suppliers.
Introduced in 2002, the obligation is expanded in stages to a target
or quota of 10% of the suppliers' electricity by 2010, 15% by 2015 and
up to 20% by 2020.
Within this framework, prices are determined by the competitive
market. Incentives are provided by the ability to trade in the
Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) that are allocated for each
eligible megawatt hour (MWh) of renewable energy supplied.
The extra cost of meeting the RO is passed on to electricity
consumers. By 2006 this had amounted to around £500m. It is expected
to reach around £1bn by 2010, adding 5.7% to average consumers'
electricity bills above 1990 levels. The RO system was actually
devised so as to avoid adding too much to consumers' bills by the
inclusion of a "buy out" price, initially set at 3 p/kWh. This allows
supply companies to escape their RO by paying, in effect, a fine; the
revenue from the "fine" is distributed to companies who do comply. The
buy-out price also sets a ceiling for how much extra companies will
pay for renewable energy. If green energy costs more than 3 p/kWh than
the price of conventional energy, then it is cheaper to pay the buy-
out fine, or to buy in ROCs from companies who have an excess, thus
creating a market for ROCs.
Within this arrangement, it is up to each company to decide how to
meet the targets/quotas. Given the competitive market framework, they
have naturally chosen the cheapest options – initially sewage gas and
landfill gas, but increasingly wind power. Opportunities for
significant further expansion of the waste-biogas options are
relatively limited but, even so, wind projects are still in the
minority. For example, wind only supplied around 20% of the
electricity traded in the RO system by 2005, although this will change
when and if larger on-land and offshore projects come online.
Winds of change
The relatively slow progress of wind power and the other renewables in
the UK seems mainly to be the result of the highly competitive market
created by the RO arrangements. In particular, under the RO system
there is no certainty as to the future value of the ROCs, which makes
it hard to get investment capital at reasonable interest rates for new
projects. Those projects that have gone ahead have had to charge
higher prices to balance the uncertainty about future income. Given
that one of the ostensible aims of the RO was to ensure that capacity
was built with low prices, something has clearly gone amiss.
By comparison, Germany and many other EU countries have adopted a
direct subsidy, guaranteed price approach, which has proven to be far
more successful than the competitive price/quota system. For example,
by 2004 the UK had only managed to install about 600 MW of wind
generation capacity, while Germany had installed over 12,000 MW – more
than 20 times more. And this in a country with much lower average wind
speeds than the UK.
How was this done? Germany's system, initially called the "Renewable
Energy Feed-in Tariff" (REFIT), provided a guaranteed fixed price for
renewables. The supply companies have to buy in and pay fully for
every MWh of renewable energy offered. That created a secure
investment climate for expansion. As a result, not only has more
capacity been installed, but electricity prices have fallen below
those needed under the RO system.
For example, one comparison of EU wind projects showed that in 2003
the UK's RO was delivering electricity at 9.6 euro cents/kWh.
Meanwhile in Germany the REFIT scheme – or rather the revised version
adopted in the Energy Law of 2000 – was running at 6.6–8.8 euro cents/
kWh. The REFIT-type schemes in the Netherlands, France, Portugal,
Austria and Greece were also delivering at less than the RO. And the
figure for Spain, which is fast becoming a wind leader, was 6.4 euro
cents/kWh (Grotz and Fouquet 2005).
Despite REFIT involving many more wind projects, in areas with
generally much lower wind speeds than in the UK, the final extra cost
to consumers under the REFIT scheme has also not been excessive. For
example, the German Federal Environment Ministry has claimed that the
system only adds around 1.6 euros to the average consumer's monthly
electricity bill. Overall calculations show that the German system has
added around 3% to household electricity costs (Stern 2007).
What's more, in terms of overall project costs, the subsidy per kW of
installed capacity provided by Germany's REFIT may actually be around
30% lower than that delivered by the RO in the UK so far (Toke 2004).
Another study has suggested that this imbalance is likely to remain
the case over the medium term (Butler and Neuhoff 2004). The most
recent comparison, by UK consultants Ernst and Young, found that in
2005/6 the RO cost consumers 3.2 p/kWh, whereas in 2006 the German
Feed In Tariff only cost consumers 2.6 p/kWh (Ernst and Young 2008).
Promoting wind
The UK's poor performance has been compounded by planning disputes
over wind farms, some of which can be traced back to the competitive
market approach. Certainly there has been far less opposition to wind
in most of the rest of the EU. The competitive approach has meant that
companies have located projects in upland areas with high wind speeds,
where they will be more profitable but are often perceived as more
environmentally invasive. This is one reason for the local backlash
against wind projects, which has slowed deployment dramatically and
added to investment risk and cost (Elliott 2003).
Helping the backlash against wind is the fact that, under the RO, all
projects get one ROC/MWh regardless of their location. So wind farms
in good locations can get more subsidy than they need, soaking up
money that could have gone to other projects. Similarly, sewage gas
and landfill gas energy projects can also get more than they require.
UK energy regulator OFGEM has calculated the total excess payments
between 2002 and 2005 as £740m.
In contrast, the German feed-in tariff system avoids this problem as
prices are set at different levels for each type of technology and are
reduced in stages by a pre-set percentage "degression" formula. This
reflects the "learning curve" improvements expected as renewables
technology develops and the market expands. The UK government now
plans to introduce technology bands into the RO to try to reduce the
excess payment problem. But, although it has proposed reduced support
for sewage gas and landfall gas, on-land wind projects will still get
the same as before – 1 ROC per MWh.
Meanwhile, under the feed-in tariff, Germany has installed 22 GW of on-
land wind capacity to date. That compares in the UK to only about 2.2
GW of on-land wind, plus a mere 400 MW of offshore wind. These UK
offshore wind projects have had the benefit of direct state grant aid,
on top of the RO, in recognition of the fact that the RO did not
provide enough investment security.
The UK government nevertheless insists that the RO is the best way
ahead. To try to keep things moving, under the proposed new banding
arrangements future rounds of offshore wind development will get 1.5
ROCs/MWh. And the next set of promising technologies – wave and tidal
current projects – will get 2 ROCs/MWh. Whether this will be enough to
enable the UK to meet the 15% renewable energy by 2020 target is far
from clear.
What is clear is that the 18 EU countries that have adopted feed-in
tariffs have done much better than the UK. In 2005 France had a low
contribution from wind power. Since then it has adopted a feed-in
tariff and has now overtaken the UK for wind onshore electricity. The
same holds for other technologies. For example, Germany has installed
200 times more photovoltaic (PV) solar than the UK. There is talk of
considering a feed-in tariff in the UK just for micro-generation
projects such as PV solar, but the government remains adamant that the
RO will stay for bulk supply grid renewables. It's true that a change
over at this late stage would be disruptive, but surely that's not a
good enough reason to stay with an ineffective, inefficient and costly
approach?
Interestingly, with feed-in schemes proving so successful in the EU,
there is now pressure to adopt similar schemes in the US, at both
local and national level. California has already introduced one, so
has the province of Ontario in Canada, and there are proposals for
such a scheme in Australia. China has also seen pressure to adopt feed-
in tariffs as an alternative to the tendering process currently used
for most projects. It is argued that, if China is to reach its target
of getting 15% of its primary energy from renewables by 2020, then it
will have to adopt a feed-in tariff approach.
References
Butler, L and Neuhoff, K. 2004. Comparison of Feed in Tariff, Quota
and Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development. Cambridge
University, Department of Applied Economics.
Ernst and Young. 2008. Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness
Indices. Available online.
Elliott, D. 2003. Energy, Society and Environment. Routledge, London.
Grotz, C and Fouquet, D. 2005. Fixed prices work better. New Energy 2.
See also Grotz, C and Fouquet, D. 2005. Fixed Prices Work Better.
German Wind Energy Association. Available online.
Stern, N. 2007. The Economics of Climate Change. Review for HM
Treasury by Sir Nicholas Stern, Cambridge University Press.
Toke, D. 2004. Are green electricity certificates the way forward for
renewable energy? Paper to fourth International Conference on Business
and Sustainable Performance, Aalborg, Denmark.
About the author
David Elliott is professor of technology policy at the Open
University, UK. His main research interests relate to the development
of sustainable energy technologies, and in particular renewable energy-
based systems. He is co-director of the Energy and Environment
Research Unit and editor of the Renew newsletter. This talking point
is based in part on an article entitled "Choosing Technologies: is
wind really best?" published in the WREN annual report Renewable
Energy 2007–2008 (Sovereign Publishing Company, December 2007) and a
paper presented to the WREC X conference, Glasgow, July 2008.