China's smart cities and the future of geopolitics

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China's smart cities and the future of geopolitics

by Valentin Weber

https://lseideas.medium.com (May 10 2023)

In 1863 Samuel Butler wrote a seminal piece titled "Darwin among the
Machines". It is one of the first to recognize that machines might
become sentient one day. About 100 years later, George Dyson took
Butler's idea further in his book The Evolution of Global
Intelligence. {1} By that time the internet emerged and so had
artificial intelligence. Dyson takes this evolution as an occasion to
see the internet as a living being and posits that it contains a form
of intelligence that we cannot yet comprehend.

The builders of China's surveillance architecture - the Ministry of
Public Security and private companies - have also been fascinated by
the intelligence of interconnected devices. They started off
constructing intelligent buildings and later morphed them into smart
cities.{2} They then upgraded smart cities - urban environments with a
lot of sensors - to include a command center: the city brain, a
concept conceived by Alibaba chief technology officer Wang Jian.{3}

The city brain aggregates and analyses all data through AI-assisted
cloud computing and presents it in a visually appealing way for city
management staff, who are located in the digital cockpit (a room with
large screens).{4} The city brain could finally provide more
intelligence to cities, but not anywhere close to the artificial
general intelligence envisioned by Butler and Dyson.

The city brain follows the OODA loop concept created by John Boyd, a
US Air Force colonel who developed it to aid with decision-making
during combat situations. {5} Huawei cites the OODA loop in its smart
city concept and adjusts it to city-level decision-making, which
consists of the following features:

1. Observe: the system gathers traffic, healthcare, and video information;

2. Orient: information is transformed into valuable information;

3. Decide: warning, prediction, and prevention alerts are shown;

4. Act: the city brain suggests implementation options.

Feedback is continuously fed into the cycle to shorten the
decision-making time and improve the process.

The vision for the city brain has been influenced by party leaders,
academics, and industry. Xi Jinping visited the Hangzhou city brain
and noted that it is the key way to make cities smarter by using AI,
big data, and cloud computing.{6} State-led research institutions are
also ardently developing this concept. Liu Feng - dean of Yuanwang
Think Tank Digital Brain Research Institute and deputy director and
secretary-general of the Urban Brain Special Committee of the Chinese
Society of Command and Control - has been one of the key people behind
this concept.{7} Liu lays out a very geopolitical vision for the
digital brain:




The digital brain will gradually expand from the city brain, to the
provincial brain, national brain, and finally the [world digital brain
or a world digital nervous system]. The construction of the world's
digital brain will be the third important opportunity to establish the
world's technological ecological standards and systems after TCP/IP
and the World Wide Web.{8}

In other words, the first step for government and industry is to
connect various city brains into megalopolis brains, such as in the
Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and the Yangtze River Delta
urban agglomerations.{9} The next step would be to have all city
brains in China connected.

Although the vast majority of urban brains lie in China (500 cities
have announced that they are building city brains), the aim is also to
expand regionally and globally.{10} Alibaba's city brain has already
been exported to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.{11} Its prime purpose is to
raise the efficiency of traffic management in the Southeast Asian
city. The municipal, national, regional, and world digital brains are
and will be powered by the Beidou geospatial system, China's
alternative to GPS.{12} Chinese initiatives to push Beidou in
Southeast Asia and in the Middle East along the Silk Road are in line
with this goal.{13} The world digital brain will most probably be made
up of thousands of city brains, but it does not stop there. Smart
oceans and mountain ranges will likely feature just as importantly in
the world digital brain.{14} Data from underwater or mountain peaks
will feed into city brains. City authorities will want to know which
ships are coming into their port and receive alerts of incoming
vehicles that cross mountainous border controls.

The primary goal of the world digital brain is to serve as the
technological support structure for the community of common destiny,
which is a key Chinese foreign policy concept.{15} It posits that
Chinese wisdom can modernise the globe and that China ought to play a
central role in such an international order. With the city brain, the
community of common destiny will be transformed into a technological
community of common destiny.

Liu, one of the key thought leaders on the city brain, estimates that
the world digital brain will be built by 2045.{16} A major challenge
to this vision will be to interconnect technological standards present
in different world regions. National security considerations will
likely hamper Chinese city brain deployments in Europe and the United
States. Not to deploy Chinese city brains is a marker of local agency.
But even other countries and municipalities that do acquire city
brains have a moderate amount of agency: they do make the conscious
decision to buy Chinese gear.{17} One of the primary motivations for
Nairobi and Mombasa (both located in Kenya) to acquire Huawei's Safe
City technologies was to reduce crime rates in the city; whether this
has been achieved is disputed.{18} If local actors are unhappy with
certain equipment they can replace it with the non-Chinese
equivalent.{19}

However, local agency is curtailed no matter who the supplier is. This
is because most countries do not have the ability to secure systems
properly. Smart city systems are highly complex, which makes it
difficult for importing countries to scrutinise them. City brains -
the next evolutionary step of smart cities - are even more complex,
potentially incomprehensible, because of their extensive deployment of
artificial intelligence. Little appears to be done to increase the
auditability of those system. Therefore, it is difficult to know
exactly what the system is doing; municipalities might sometimes not
be aware where data relating to their city resides or who has access
to it.{20} With this lack of transparency, local agency over the
confidentiality and integrity of data is hampered.

Local agency over systems acquired is even more important if it
pertains to military systems, as those are at the core of national
security. Brain-like intelligence is not only being conceptualised in
the context of urban environments. The Chinese Institute of Command
and Control, a state-led organisation under the auspices of the
Ministry of Civil Affairs, emphasises the Military Command Brain in
addition to the Urban Governance Brain.{21}

The Institute - which focuses on eclectic subjects like intelligent
wargaming, swarm intelligence, aerospace security and the city brain -
explains the urban brain's value for the military brain:




It can be said that the confrontation of wars between countries in the
future will be reflected in ... [confrontations] between several
military brains. Based on the research progress of the urban brain, we
can combine various military elements into a brain-like combination to
form the structural diagram of the military brain.{22}

While the larger strategy of civil-military fusion in China is not yet
fully accomplished, due to a historical separation of the defence
sector from the private sector, civil-military overlap is visible in
the smart city private sector.{23} For example, Digihail creates high
resolution digital renderings of cities for Huawei as well as for the
military {24}, and has worked on visualisations of aerospace
battlefields.{25} To do this, Digihail fuses large-scale geographic
information data: it visualises attack surfaces, travel routes, and
deployment area of combatants; it creates a virtual display of the 3D
battlefield that covers land, air sea, and electronic warfare; and it
synchronises information flows from the different branches of the
military. Digihail provides a visual decision-making system that
integrates key personnel and vehicle monitoring. The company also
visualizes space attack and defence operations for the Chinese
military.{26}

As the digital twin products - being digital representations of
systems, cities, and geographical features - of Digihail show, the
military brain is about more than the ground level in urban
environments. It is about all domains of warfighting. Aerial maps,
nautical maps, space, and land maps feed into the digital brain. They
speak of one map command on the battlefield.{27} This is similar to
social governance in one screen that is hailed in China.{28} 'One
screen social governance' or 'one map command' will require a lot of
interlinking of systems. It will be interesting to see how the various
city brains will be interconnected in China and for what purpose. As
it currently stands, it appears that the interaction of various city
brains ensures that dwellers of one city can take advantage of the
same services in a neighbouring city as if it were their own.
Interlinking city brains might also allow for cross-regional
decision-making of municipal authorities. It might help to better
control flows of people or goods.

On a global scale, what would a world digital brain do? Where would
decisions be made and how would they be taken: in the municipal city
brains or national brains, or one that is being operated from China?
Whose interest would the world digital brain pursue? Whose
technological standards and algorithms will it be built on? What does
it mean if various military brains face each other? Will there ever be
a world military brain? Would it be based on the world's city brains,
the world's military brains, or both?

One question that underlies most of the above questions is: What is
the value for China of Chinese companies operating city brains abroad?
Presently a major benefit may be that it helps with spying. The
smarter the exported surveillance infrastructure becomes; the easier
spying becomes. In the early 2000s, Chinese as well as international
companies exported 'dumb' surveillance equipment.{29} CCTV cameras
could record but not analyse images. With time the equipment has
become smarter; exported cameras can now potentially identify a
Chinese dissident through facial recognition and track their daily
commutes, which might help the Chinese authorities with the abduction
of that person.{30} The more insight local authorities in Thailand
have, the more situational awareness China, or any other foreign
power, has if it taps into those data streams. In other words, the
smarter its exported surveillance infrastructure, the more influence
it can wield in those regions, since it has a privileged but not
exclusive capability to control its technology within a given
territory.{31}

In the medium-term, if Chinese territorial tensions with Malaysia, or
other regional states, ever led into open hostilities, the mapped
infrastructure and data streams of Alibaba's city brain in Kuala
Lumpur could potentially be integrated into the warfighting map of
Chinese fighter jets: pilots may find it easier to identify convoys of
cars that have been marked by the local city brain as important and
deserving protection, for example, government officials' cars.{32}
This may give them an advantage in urban warfare. What is more, if a
territory were conquered, it might be more easily governable, as
Chinese firms and officials are already familiar with the urban
governance management systems in place.

Smart cities in vital geographical locations

While deploying safe city solutions in Lahore, Pakistan (over 10
million inhabitants), or Kampala (Uganda's capital) could provide
useful intelligence insights for China, building smart cities in
coastal regions might be even more crucial for Beijing.{33} This is
because these smart cities are often located close to submarine cable
landing stations and vital naval channels. In addition to this, in
coastal and less developed locations it might be easier for China to
covertly project its power: through mobile maritime assets (fishing
vessels) or by gradually transforming newly built civilian (digital)
infrastructures into military ones. {34}

A few Chinese-planned coastal smart cities have come under special
scrutiny: Mauritius, Fuga Island (Philippines), and Daru (Papua New
Guinea). Due to security concerns and a fear of Chinese influence only
one out of three smart cities (Mauritius) has been built.{35}

In Mauritius India's external intelligence agency, the Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW), voiced concern.{36} India's fear related to the
Huawei-built Mauritius-Rodrigues Submarine Cable, landing in Baie
Jacotet (Mauritius).{37} This could allow China to tap into Indian and
Western communications going through the Indian Ocean.{38} France has
military bases on neighbouring Reunion, for instance.{39} Reunion is
connected to Mauritius through the SAFE undersea cable, which lands in
Baie Jacotet. In other words, Huawei did not only build what one day
may become the local digital brain - the Mauritius smart city - it
also built the world neural pathways (submarine cables) leading to
it.{40} This combination of infrastructure projects raised major
concerns, although it neither prevented Huawei from building a safe
city in Mauritius nor hampered its construction of the submarine sea
cables.{41}

Fuga island is yet another case of a Chinese smart city that has
stirred national security concerns.{42} The project proposed by Xiamen
Hongji Yongye Investment would cost $2 billion. Secretary Raul
Lambino, chief executive officer of the Philippine government-owned
corporation that manages Fuga Island, said of the proposed 'One Belt
One Road Fuga Island Smart City' that it does not pose any security
threat.{43} Captain Jonathan Zata of the Philippine Navy counterargued
that the adjacent strait and the nearby subsea cables are of strategic
importance to the Philippines.{44}

In addition to this, Fuga is located adjacent to the channel that
connects Taiwan and the Philippines. This channel is frequented by
both the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and US, as well as US-allied
navy ships that make their way from the Pacific into the South China
Sea. This maritime channel is also part of the first island chain,
extending from the Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, down to
the Philippine and Indonesian Islands.{45} The concept of the first
island chain was conceived by John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of
State (1953~1959).{46} It was later adapted by the PLA and features in
Chinese writing as a geographical location that the PLA ought to
control in order to assert its power regionally.{47} The first island
chain is also important in terms of submarine warfare, as the entity
that controls the adjacent islands knows when submarines enter or exit
the Pacific Ocean.{48}

Yet another smart city that Chinese developers aimed to build in a
critical location is Daru, Papua New Guinea.{49} The plans promised an
investment of $39 billion for commercial, industrial, residential, and
resort purposes.{50} Additionally, China's Ministry of Commerce backed
a $204 million heavy 'comprehensive multi-functional fishery
industrial park' on Daru.{51} While this project may appear benign,
Chinese fishing vessels have been suspected of carrying intelligence
collection equipment, engaging in projects relating to national
security and manned with militiamen.{52} In addition to this, Daru
hosts one of the landing stations of one of Papua New Guinea's
submarine cable networks: 'Kumul Domestic Submarine Cable System'.{53}
Tianjin-based HMN Tech laid the cables. In turn, the prospect of a
major Chinese-built city, which is wired with the latest surveillance
technologies, combined with the submarine cables that had already been
built by HMN Tech, raised major security concerns in Australia. These
concerns might have led to the Daru smart city project being
shelved.{54}

https://miro.medium.com/v2/resize:fit:1100/format:webp/1*plvJFo-6N5swEEe8m9Sg-Q.png
Figure 1. Selected foundations of the emerging world digital brain
within the geostrategic context.

Conclusion

In most of the world a bifurcation of the internet infrastructure will
not occur. Even if the US and the EU, as well as their allies are more
wary in acquiring Chinese smart city products. This can be seen in
India, which strongly relies on US suppliers: Bangalore (IBM) and
Vijayawada (Cisco) or in Valenciennes, France, where Huawei withdrew
its safe city engagement due to difficulties of operating in the
French market.{55} In Germany, Duisburg paused its smart city
cooperation with Huawei due to new security assessments by the German
federal government.{56}

In other countries, municipalities embrace Huawei safe cities and
deploy theirs alongisde Western suppliers' products. In Jakarta
(Indonesia), IBM is deploying its smart city solutions.{57} At the
same time, Indonesian authorities are exploring cooperation with
Huawei whose products could power the new smart capital,
Nusantara.{58} Also in Indonesia, Chinese company Inspur is providing
around one hundred servers to Pekalongan for its smart city
construction; in Bandung, Huawei has been key in building safe city
solutions.{59} This means that one city in a certain country could
rely on Chinese suppliers, while another decides to use alternative
non-Chinese suppliers. More considerable bifurcations of the
technological infrastructure may occur in Europe, the US, India, and
other countries which take a harsher stance towards Chinese
technologies being built into their critical infrastructure. In many
countries outside of this grouping, however, such a bifurcation of
suppliers relating to smart cities or digital brains will likely not
occur.

As of 2023 we are far away from an extensive bifurcation of the
internet or a world digital brain. But policymakers in democracies
should nevertheless take note of the thinking that is emerging in the
Chinese research community, industry, and party circles, as well as
the geostrategic nature of Chinese smart city construction projects
abroad. Democracies should also work toward drawing up initiatives
that promote privacy-friendly smart urban turnkey solutions that can
compete globally.{60} This will mean expanding research on privacy
enhancing technologies that can preserve individual privacy, while
simultaneously giving law enforcement tools to combat threats. As the
future of geopolitics lies in the smart city, so should strategic
thinking be focused on them.

Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Dahlia Peterson and
LSE IDEAS editors for commenting on earlier versions of this Strategic
Update.

Bibliography

1 George B. Dyson, Darwin among the Machines: The Evolution of Global
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2 Greg Walton, "China's Golden Shield Corporations and the Development
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3 Yongjin Ji, "Apostle Wang Jian: Urban Digitization and Urban Brain -
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4 Ji, "Apostle Wang Jian."

5 Huawei, "Huawei Intelligent Video & Data Analytics ICAN Evaluation
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6 Xinhuanet, "Xi Calls for Making Major Cities ‘Smarter,'" January 2020.

7 Feng Liu, "【CICC Original Analysis of the Basic Principles and
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11 Barbara Szewcow and Jonathan Andrews, "Kuala Lumpur to Build ‘City
Brain' With Alibaba Cloud," ITU Hub, April 2020.

12 City Brain Global Standards Study Group, "City Brain Global
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13 Stephen Chen, "Thailand Is Beidou Navigation Network's First
Overseas Client," South China Morning Post, April 2013; Valentin Weber
and Vasilis Ververis, "China's Surveillance State: A Global Project"
(Top10VPN, August 2021).

14 Shenzhen Smart Ocean Technology Co., Ltd, "Company Profile,"
accessed April 21, 2023; Ari Schneider, "The World's Highest and
Fastest Cell Service Could Have Geopolitical Implications," Slate,
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15 Liu, "WWNS-R"; Jacob Mardell, "The ‘Community of Common Destiny' in
Xi Jinping's New Era," October 2017.

16 Feng Liu, "Research Report on Urban Brain Construction Standards," 2022.

17 Iginio Gagliardone, "Chinese Digital Tech in Africa: Moral Panics
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18 Jonathan E. Hillman and Maesea McCalpin, "Watching Huawei's ‘Safe
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19 Justin Sherman, "What's the Deal with Huawei and This African Union
Headquarters Hack?," New America, May 2019.

20 Dan Strumpf and Waqar Gillani, "Huawei Accused in Suit of
Installing Data ‘Back Door' in Pakistan Project," WSJ, August 2021.

21 Chinese Institute of Command and Control, "The First City Brain
Series of Standards in My Country Was Officially Released," September
2022.

22 Liu, "【CICC Original 】 Analysis of the Basic Principles and
Strategic Significance of the Urban Brain."

23 Elsa B. Kania and Lorand Laskai, "Myths and Realities of China's
Military-Civil Fusion Strategy," CNAS, January 2021.

24 Digihail, "Aerospace and Military Industry: Successful Cases,"
accessed April 21, 2023. China's smart cities and the future of
geopolitics | Valentin Weber 13

25 Digihail, "Visualization of Battlefield Situation and Combat
Equipment," accessed April 21, 2023.

26 Digihail, "Aerospace and Military Industry: Successful Cases."

27 Digihail, "Field Posture and Combat Equipment Visualization,"
accessed April 21, 2023.

28 People's Daily, "Social Governance in One Screen (New Practice of
Grassroots Governance)," April 2020.

29 Huawei, "Huawei Intelligent Video & Data Analytics ICAN Evaluation
Criterion White Paper."

30 Tom Phillips and Oliver Holmes, "Activist Who Vanished in Thailand
Is Being Held in China, Says Wife," The Guardian, February 2016, sec.
World news.

31 Valentin Weber, "Making Sense of Technological Spheres of
Influence," Strategic Update (LSE IDEAS, April 2020).

32 BBC News, "South China Sea Dispute: Malaysia Accuses China of
Breaching Airspace," June 2021.

33 Huawei, "Improving Traffic Conditions in Lahore, Pakistan, with
Huawei's ITMS," accessed April 21, 2023; Elias Biryabarema, "Uganda's
Cash-Strapped Cops Spend $126 Million on Cctv From Huawei," Reuters,
August 2019, sec. World News.

34 Chuin-Wei Yap, "China's Fishing Fleet, the World's Largest, Drives
Beijing's Global Ambitions," WSJ, April 2021; Associated Press, "China
Has Fully Militarized Three Islands in South China Sea, US Admiral
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35 Roukaya Kasenally, "The Trappings of the Mauritius Safe City
Project | Hoover Institution The Trappings of the Mauritius Safe City
Project," January 2022.

36 India has close relations with Mauritius. 70% of Mauritian citizens
have Indian ancestry. See Kasenally.

37 Winston Chu, "PCCW Global, Mauritius Telecom and Huawei Marine
Partner to Build MARS Cable," Submarine Networks, March 2018.

38 Interestingly, India has been accused of having installed spying
equipment on Mauritius itself. See Nayanima Basu, "Mauritius
‘Snooping' Scandal - The ‘Moustache Man' From India in the Centre of
the Storm," ThePrint (blog), July 2022.

39 Xavier Vavasseur, "Indian Navy P-8I MPA in Reunion Island for
Combined Training with French Forces," Naval News (blog), March 2020.

40 While fiber optic cables and cellular networks were described as
the neural pathways of city brains in the thinking of Chinese
scientists, the logical conclusion of that is that the world neural
pathways consist of fiber optic cables on land and submarine cables on
the ocean seabed.

41 In 2020 Hengtong Group acquired 81% of Huawei Marine Networks,
which had which built the cables in Mauritius, and rebranded the "new"
company as HMN Tech. See HMN Tech, "Huawei Marine Networks Rebrands as
HMN Technologies," November 2020.

42 Kathrin Hille, "The Chinese Companies Trying to Buy Strategic
Islands," Financial Times, April 2022, sec. The Big Read.

43 Leander C. Domingo, "‘Chinese Venture on Fuga Not Risky' - Cagayan
Economic Zone Authority," Cagayan Economic Zone Authority, August
2019.

44 Domingo.

45 Andrew S Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, "Barriers, Springboards and
Benchmarks: China Conceptualizes the Pacific ‘Island Chains,'" The
China Quarterly, January 2016.

46 Erickson and Wuthnow.

47 Erickson and Wuthnow.

48 Erickson and Wuthnow. 14 LSE IDEAS Strategic Update | May 2023

49 Hille, "The Chinese Companies Trying to Buy Strategic Islands."

50 Rebecca Kuku, "PNG Says It Has Not Seen Proposal for Chinese-Built
City on Island 50KM From Australian Territory," The Guardian, February
2021, sec. World news.

51 Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, "Fujian
Zhonghong Fishery Company Will Invest in the Construction of the
‘Comprehensive Multifunctional Fishery Industrial Park' Project in
Papua New Guinea," November 2020.

52 Zoe Haver, "Unmasking China's Maritime Militia," Radio Free Asia, May 2021.

53 TeleGeography, "Submarine Cable Map," TeleGeography, accessed April 21, 2023.

54 Hille, "The Chinese Companies Trying to Buy Strategic Islands."

55 Mobility Outlook Bureau, "Honeywell Completes Phase One of
Bangalore Safe City Project," Mobility Outlook, March 2023; Cisco,
"Smartest Cities of the Future," June 2018; Privacy International,
"Huawei in Valenciennes: A Bad Romance," Privacy International,
November 2021.

56 Marc Latsch and Mike Michel, "Chinesischer Grosskonzern: Duisburger
Kooperation mit Huawei beendet - Bund pruft Fortsetzung," Rheinische
Post, November 2022

57 IBM, "Jakarta Smart City," accessed April 21, 2023.

58 Siti Sarifah Alia, "Indonesia Explores Cooperation with Huawei for
5G at New Capital," March 2022..

59 Antara News, "China's Inspur Supports Indonesia's Smart City
Construction," September 2013; Huawei, "Safe City: Bandung Indonesia,"
accessed April 21, 2023.

60 Gregory Walton and Valentin Weber, "AI for Urban Public Security:
Threats to European Security and Values," in Europe's Strategic
Technology Autonomy From China, ed. Tim Ruhlig (Digital Power China
Research Consortium, 2023).

_____

Dr Valentin Weber is Associate at LSE IDEAS. He is a Research Fellow
at the German Council on Foreign Relations and holds a PhD in cyber
security from the University of Oxford.

https://lseideas.medium.com/chinas-smart-cities-and-the-future-of-geopolitics-fe883ea2110a


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