Terra Incognita:
The Economics of a Shrinking World
Patrick Norrick
Northwestern University
August 10, 2026
from paper
Abstract
"As of 2026, humanity is likely below replacement fertility. That has never happened
before, not in wars
or pandemics. But the real surprise is that the fall has been
concentrated in low- and middle-income
countries and among poorer and less educated
women. We fit a single-factor model to 236 countries
since 1950: the common
component peaked in 1978, and what drives fertility down today are country
-specific
trends, 219 of them negative and not one leveling off. None of the commonly cited
mechanisms
can account for this pattern, so we offer a conjecture: modernity itself,
which makes a third child expensive
and childlessness cheap. Children come in
integers, so it takes very little to move a cohort’s fertility rate
from 1.8 to 1.3. And
nothing in an economy pushes fertility back to 2.1. We close with the main economic
consequences, in particular slow growth.
Keywords: fertility decline; demographic trans
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Three popular candidates to account for the fall in fertility are shifts in preferences and
social
norms, smartphones and their effect on in-person interaction, and rising housing prices.
It is too early to adjudicate among these. But, in our reading, smartphones accelerate the
change
in the TFR more than they cause it, and housing prices have an ambiguous effect because
they
make owners richer and renters poorer. We are left with shifts in preferences and social norms
more by elimination than by conviction.
Thus, we will conjecture a more speculative possibility: modernity itself. We live in a society
built
around large organizations and formal credentials, which makes a third child expensive and
childlessness
cheap, and that circumstance has created a mismatch between women’s position
outside the home
and men’s inside it. As modernity has spread everywhere, even to countries
with low income per capita,
fertility has also fallen everywhere.
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7 Concluding remarks
When one of us starts his undergraduate course on world economic history, he motivates the
semester
by arguing that history teaches us lessons about today’s economy. Unfortunately, that
is not true of population.
We are entering demographic terra incognita: we have never seen
TFRs as low as today’s.
Will they recover? We do not know. Based on the data available as we write these lines, our
best
guess is a small rebound from tempo effects, but, short of a large change in society, not
much more
unbalanced gender norms and toxic education systems. Latin America faces the
same gender problem
plus weak growth prospects, so we expect something around 1.2. Northern
Europe has more egalitarian
family structures and might hold near 1.5. The very religious societies are probably the only ones that
will sustain 1.8. Within countries, the higher-income
and more educated will have more children
than the lower-income and less educated.
These trends, if unchanged, will translate into large changes in world population and its
distribution,
both between and within countries. We may end up in a shrinking world where the
very rich nations have
the highest TFRs, and even those will be below replacement level.
All of this could change with AI or shifts in population composition. We will see. But on
the current
evidence, deep sub-replacement fertility is the “new new normal,” and unless we
find a way to reorganize
our societies, we had better learn to handle it as best we can. We do
not have a map. What we have
birth numbers, and those are sobering. In these waters, the
pretense of knowledge is the
most dangerous temptation