*** 6/18/26 - Lawfare - The Memorandum of Understanding with Iran will end the U.S.-Iran conflict without ending the war + text of memorandum
Buzz Sawyer
by Iran and the United States to end their 110-day-long war. Around the same time, President
Donald Trump signed the agreement, ahead of a previously scheduled ceremony that is still
slated to be held in Switzerland tomorrow.
The text of the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States
of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran” is brief, and only an interim agreement while
the United States and Iran now enter a 60-day negotiation for a “final deal,” which the
memorandum refers to repeatedly. But the 1,009 words agreed to by Washington and
Tehran are remarkable for what they say about the U.S.-Iran relationship, the important issues
it leaves out, the supposed final deal to come, and the many ways this flimsy arrangement might unravel.
The Memorandum of Understanding with Iran will end the U.S.-Iran conflict without ending the war.
On June 17, the New York Times obtained the memorandum of understanding negotiated by Iran and the United States to end their 110-day-long war. Around the same time, President Donald Trump signed the agreement, ahead of a previously scheduled ceremony that is still slated to be held in Switzerland tomorrow.
The text of the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran” is brief, and only an interim agreement while the United States and Iran now enter a 60-day negotiation for a “final deal,” which the memorandum refers to repeatedly. But the 1,009 words agreed to by Washington and Tehran are remarkable for what they say about the U.S.-Iran relationship, the important issues it leaves out, the supposed final deal to come, and the many ways this flimsy arrangement might unravel.
What Is in the Memorandum?
Memoranda of Understanding are agreements between states that are less formal than treaties. They are generally not legally binding under international law, and states typically treat them as non-binding under their own domestic laws. Under the terms of this memorandum, the United States and Iran make several mutual commitments. This includes the termination of the war, with special attention to the fighting in Lebanon. Iran has claimed that the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah since March has constituted a front in the same war launched by the U.S. and Israel on Iran on Feb. 28, and has previously pressed for the ceasefire to be extended to include Lebanon. While Israel and Hezbollah have continued to exchange fire, the United States has pressured Israel, which was not party to the negotiations, to accept this framing. Israel’s reluctance has prompted significant tensions between President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The memorandum reinforces the conceptualization of the conflict as one war that spans the region.
With the implementation of the memorandum, the United States and Iran have committed to maintaining the “status quo” for the duration of the negotiations of a final deal, identifying three aspects of the current situation. Iran will “maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program”—an easy promise to make when much of its nuclear material is under a literal mountain of rubble and mines. The United States, meanwhile, will not issue any new sanctions on Iran or deploy additional military forces to the Persian Gulf.
Both states have also agreed to lift their tit-for-tat blockades of the Strait of Hormuz, but the memorandum stipulates different conditions for each country. The United States is obligated to begin lifting its blockade, and to have completed this operation within 30 days. Iran is also given a 30-day window to remove “technical and military obstacles” to commercial shipping. But Iran has only agreed to allow free passage of the strait for the next 60 days; beyond that, the memorandum leaves open the possibility that Iran, in coordination with Oman, will extract tolls (or “fees”) from ships, as Iranian officials have discussed. The memorandum’s language that such “future administration and maritime services” will be implemented “in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz” will be a point of contention going forward. Tehran is likely to point out that committing to “discussion” is very different from requiring the Arab Gulf states’ consent to increasing their trade costs and impinging on their sovereignty, while the United States can point to “applicable international law” to challenge any attempt to charge for passage of a natural waterway.
The memorandum also provides a guide for the next round of negotiations. Much of these talks will focus on Iran’s nuclear program. The memorandum indicates that U.S. and Iranian officials have already agreed that Iran will give up some or all of its highly enriched uranium, either through dilution or another means, but other issues remain undecided—including the critical issue of whether Iran will retain some domestic enrichment capacity and, if so, what that may be and how it would be monitored.
If a final deal is reached, the United States has already committed to lift sanctions on Iran. Not just nuclear sanctions or U.S. sanctions, but seemingly all sanctions: “The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, I.A.E.A. [International Atomic Energy Agency] Board of Governors resolutions, and all unilateral U.S. sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final deal.” This would ostensibly include sanctions targeting Iran’s support for proxies, sponsorship of state terrorism, missile program, and human rights violations. And as a down payment on this sanctions relief, the United States has agreed to immediately waive the sanctions on Iran’s oil industry, allowing it to begin exporting its economic lifeline. The United States is also providing Iran with immediate access to its funds frozen in international accounts—estimated to be about $24 billion.
But that’s not all. The United States has also dangled additional carrots for Iran conditional on a final agreement being reached. There’s a huge economic incentive, in the form of a $300 billion fund “for the reconstruction and economic development” of Iran—to be supplied by the United States and its “regional partners.” There is also a promise of a U.S. military drawdown. While the “status quo” of U.S. forces is frozen during the talks, a final deal will trigger a 30-day clock for the United States “to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” How many forces and how far is not specified; Iran may believe this could include U.S. troops based in the Persian Gulf.
The terms resemble the maximalist demands proposed by Iranian negotiators more than two months ago: an end to the war, including in Lebanon; Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz; a pathway to end all sanctions on the country; reparations, now rebranded as reconstruction and development funding. It even leaves the door open for Iran’s goals of retaining a nuclear enrichment capacity and obligating a U.S. drawdown in the region. U.S. demands to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program will be the subject of the next phase of talks, and other U.S. points for negotiation—for example, regarding Iran’s missile program and support for regional proxies—have been dropped.
Just what were Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff doing for the past two months? The timing of the memorandum may be significant; it was reached just when oil experts had warned that diminishing petroleum reserves would cause gas prices to spike drastically. In the game of economic chicken being waged over the strait, the United States swerved first.
What Is Not in the Deal
The agreement is as striking for what it leaves out as what it includes. For starters, there is no enforcement mechanism. The memorandum states that “an executive mechanism will be established to monitor the successful implementation of this M.O.U. and the future compliance of the final deal,” but negotiating monitoring and enforcement just for what has already been agreed could take 60 days or more.
Several of the Trump administration’s purported war aims are also absent. The Trump administration’s most consistently stated objective for the war has been to “obliterate Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and production capability.” The memorandum makes no mention of Iran’s missile capacity, which it used to target U.S. military bases and partner countries during the conflict and which U.S. intelligence indicates is largely intact. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated Thursday that its missile program is non-negotiable—which is not a new position, as the missile program was also left aside during the negotiations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), sometimes referred to as the “Iran Nuclear Deal.” Trump seems to have accepted this, telling reporters on Wednesday that “if other countries have them, it's a little bit unfair for them not to have some.”
The Trump administration had also claimed that the war would end Iran’s “support for terrorist proxies,” and in April Trump told CBS News that he had received commitments that Iran would cease its support to Hamas and Hezbollah. This was always a maximalist goal—the “Axis of Resistance,” diminished though it may be, is the central feature of Iran’s security strategy and one that Tehran was unlikely to concede. Instead, Iran’s support for Hezbollah is reaffirmed in the memorandum by the condition of a ceasefire in Lebanon. Additionally, the sanctions relief and development fund repeat what critics of the JCPOA described as one of the deal’s major failings—the provision of malleable funding that could be redirected to Iran’s partners around the region.
Though the Trump administration slowly dropped regime change from its messaging, it was one of the initial goals of the war. On the first day of the war, Trump told the Iranian public that the theocratic regime would be destroyed and “yours to take.” Reporting has indicated that, though U.S. intelligence suggested that the regime was unlikely to collapse and that instability would further empower the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, U.S. and Israeli officials were hoping to install … someone—maybe an Iranian Delcy Rodríguez, who was accidentally caught in the initial salvo of the war, or Reza Pahlavi, or even political chameleon, hardliner-turned-NCAA basketball fan Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Instead, Trump said this week that he had “never cared about regime change” and that the succession that Ali Khamenei and the IRGC had planned before the war had brought to power a new leadership comprising “strong people, smart people” who are “nice to deal with.”
The regime will remain, protected by a prohibition on political meddling written into the memorandum. In fact, it will be more secure under the terms of the deal. For years, the biggest threat to the regime has been the country’s domestic economic crisis, precipitated by the international sanctions regime. By lifting oil sanctions, unfreezing funds, and promising windfall development funding, the memorandum is providing the regime the financial security to reinforce the foundations of its control of Iranian state and society.
Spoilers
Both the United States and Iran want to end the war and have strong incentives to reach an agreement, but the final deal outlined in the memorandum will not happen—not in 60 days, not in a year. The structure isn’t sound; the ambiguities in the text are unbridgeable gaps between the U.S. and Iranian positions, and it is weighed down by commitments from other actors—Israel, the Arab Gulf states, Hezbollah, and Congress—that were not party to the negotiations.
It may fail on its first condition, a ceasefire that extends to Lebanon. Israel has not agreed to end any part of its war with Iran and its regional partners, and Netanyahu said Thursday that Israeli forces will continue to occupy southern Lebanon, continuing a conflict that he has argued is essential for Israel’s security and that remains popular with the Israeli public. The more the United States demands that Netanyahu accede to the terms it has set, the more incentive he has to continue the conflict to demonstrate his policy independence—especially as he prepares for elections later this year. Even before the agreement was announced, critics to his right and left were already using the negotiations and Netanyahu’s relationship with Trump as a political cudgel. Netanyahu is signaling that he will not accept the agreement, and has already demonstrated that he is willing to violate ceasefires even if it means risking more Iranian missile and drone strikes.
There is also the issue of the $300 billion reconstruction fund that is unlikely to find donors. If a final deal is contingent on this pot of money being filled by the United States and its “regional partners,” it will never be signed. Trump stressed on Wednesday that the United States would not be contributing, so who are these unspecified partners? The Arab Gulf states, after being targeted by Iranian missile and drone strikes and having their oil rents slowed to a trickle by Iran’s blockade, will not pony up for a protection racket that they had no say in negotiating. (Saudi Arabia, the Gulf bellwether, is cutting back on spending.) The Trump administration has little leverage to pressure the Gulf states to spend their disposable income rebuilding their regional adversary. It cannot even offer these states deterrent deployments of U.S. forces without undermining negotiations with Iran because a final deal must also, under the terms of the memorandum, include a drawdown of U.S. troops “from the proximity of” Iran.
Finally, the deal might fall apart under pressure from Trump’s own domestic allies. The memorandum not only violates many congressional Iran hawks’ red lines, it would be literally illegal to implement without congressional approval. As Jack Goldsmith and Congressional Research Service analysts Jennifer Elsea and Thomas Clayton immediately pointed out, the administration is running up against the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, a bipartisan bill passed by Congress in 2015 in response to the Obama administration’s decision to sign the JCPOA as an executive agreement rather than as a treaty that would be reviewed and ratified (or scuttled) by the Senate. The law subjects all future agreements on Iran’s nuclear program to congressional review and prevents the president from lifting sanctions without a legislative process. Several Republicans have already expressed their opposition to the terms of the memorandum and direction of future negotiations, and INARA will give them tools to pressure the administration.
Speaking to the New York Times’ Ross Douthat, Vice President J.D. Vance challenged critics, “If you think this is a bad deal: What is your alternative?” The alternative would have been not to launch a war the Trump administration was not willing to prosecute to achieve its objectives, and instead accept the lengthy breakout period for Iran’s nuclear program created by the strikes in June 2025 and let Iran’s regime decay and delegitimize itself as its regional partners diminished and the government massacred protesters to cling to control. But that is a bell that cannot be unrung. Now, Vance describes the U.S. options as limited. If not this deal, then “[w]e could drop more bombs. We could destroy more of their country. We could kill the current iteration of their leadership. We know where all of them are. All of those things could happen.”
They still might when this deal falls apart. More likely, though, is that the Trump administration’s attention will drift. Some element of the U.S.-Iran ceasefire will limp along under the “status quo” conditions set by the memorandum, bought with sanctions relief and safe passage for commercial shipping. The conflict may flare up again until the stasis can be restored—for instance, if Iran begins imposing tolls on ships transiting the strait. But for the most part, the conflict will probably proceed without the United States. The memorandum signals that the next phase of the war will be between Israel and Iran; the Trump administration wants to be counted out. This is a better outcome than the war escalating again, but a disaster nonetheless.
A Look at the Text of the Agreement Between the United States and Iran
New York Times reporters annotated the agreement, which a senior official disclosed on Wednesday.
By The New York Times
A senior U.S. official disclosed what the official said was the full text of the deal between the United States and Iran to cease hostilities, open the Strait of Hormuz and start nuclear talks.
The text of the agreement, as read out loud on a conference call with reporters on Wednesday, is below. The official spoke on condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the White House.
Reporters from The New York Times have annotated the memorandum of understanding with analysis of the underlying issues.
Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have jointly agreed in good faith on such-and-such a date on the following.
Paragraph 1
The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their allies in the current war by signing this M.O.U. declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other, and to refrain [from] the threat or use of force against each other and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The final deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and other provisions of this paragraph.
The references to Lebanon here amount to remarkable rejections by the United States of Israel’s concerns about the threat posed by Hezbollah, the Iran-aligned militia group based in Lebanon. Israel has signaled it does not feel bound by any Lebanon-related agreements in the U.S.-Iran talks. But the language will give Iran the means to pressure President Trump over any future Israeli attacks in Lebanon, and over Israel’s occupation of what it calls a “security zone” in the country’s south.
— Anton Troianovski
Paragraph 2
The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.
This might seem like boilerplate, but each country has been accused of attempting to meddle in the other’s internal affairs, often violently. Mr. Trump openly called for protesters to overthrow the Iranian regime, and Iranian agents have been accused of attempting to assassinate the U.S. president.
— Luke Broadwater
Paragraph 3
The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran commit to negotiating and achieving the final deal in maximum 60 days extendable with mutual consent.
This is a very short timeline. U.S. officials quietly acknowledge a final deal may not be achievable in this period, especially when compared to lengthy previous negotiations with Iran. But the ambitious time frame would place a potential final deal ahead of the U.S. midterm elections, which could help the president as his domestic popularity slides.
— Luke Broadwater
Paragraph 4
Immediately upon the signing of this M.O.U., the United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and will fully end the naval blockade within 30 days. During this period, the traffic of vessels will be in proportion to the numbers of prewar traffic being restored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal.
By removing the blockade, the United States is freeing Iran to export again from its ports — and to have goods delivered to the country as well. That is a critical, immediate win for the Iranians, whose exports go overwhelmingly to China. Once the revenue starts flowing in again, Iran’s immediate economic crisis will be relieved. But the United States will also lose a key element of leverage in the nuclear negotiations, which means the Iranians may have every incentive to dig in and let the 60-day negotiation stretch to months or years.
— David E. Sanger
Paragraph 5
Upon the signing of this M.O.U., the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.
The key line here is “no charge for 60 days only.” After that, Iran may be able to impose “fees,” which it never did before the war. In other words, the days of free passage may be over. That would violate one of the key standards described by Secretary of State Marco Rubio: that commerce return to prewar conditions.
— David E. Sanger
Paragraph 6
The United States of America undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least U.S.D. 300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mechanism for the implementation of this plan will be finalized as part of a final deal within 60 days. All required licenses, waivers and permissions needed for the relevant financial transactions will be granted by the United States of America.
Mr. Trump on Wednesday insisted that the United States would not invest in the potential $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran. But he appeared to leave open the possibility that Persian Gulf states could provide the money. It is a sensitive political issue for the president, given his constant criticism of President Barack Obama for shipping $1.7 billion in cash to Iran as part of the 2015 nuclear deal that Mr. Trump exited.
— Anton Troianovski
Paragraph 7
The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, I.A.E.A. Board of Governors resolutions, and all unilateral U.S. sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final deal. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America acknowledge the critical importance of the sanctions termination issue above mentioned, and express their intentions to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.
Relief from crushing economic sanctions may be the only thing that can persuade Iran to surrender its nuclear program. This was the basis for the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which traded sanctions relief for strict caps on Iran’s nuclear activity. Those caps were limited to a maximum of 15 years, however, and Mr. Trump says he wants much longer — or even permanent — constraints on Tehran's nuclear program. A big challenge from here will be determining the “agreed-upon schedule” that establishes what sanctions the United States will remove, and when, as Iran fulfills its nuclear commitments. That will likely mean a gradual process in which the two mistrustful sides take alternating incremental steps.
— Michael Crowley
Paragraph 8
The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled, enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the schedule mentioned in Paragraph 7, with the minimum methodology to be down-blending on site under the supervision of the I.A.E.A. The two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear needs, based on the statutory framework being agreed upon in the final deal. The final deal will confirm the provisions of this paragraph. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran acknowledge the critical importance of the nuclear issues above mentioned, and express their intention to immediately address these issues in the negotiation in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.
This is the only paragraph of the agreement that deals directly with the nuclear program — the core cause of the war — and thus is perhaps the most important. As expected, it is vague on all the main points of contention. As the word “reaffirms” suggests, there is nothing new about Iran’s promise never to seek or buy a nuclear weapon. It first made that commitment in 1970, when it ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it repeated it in the opening paragraphs of the 2015 agreement with the Obama administration.
The paragraph requires Iran to “down-blend” — essentially dilute — the approximately 11 tons of enriched nuclear material in its possession, including 970 pounds that are enriched to 60 percent, just short of bomb grade. But it does not require Iran to give up that material and ship it out of the country. Iran has resisted calls to surrender the stockpile. But it did exactly that in 2015, when under the Obama deal it sent about 97 percent of Iran’s stockpile at the time to Russia.
That leaves a huge number of issues to be resolved in the next negotiation: whether Iran will keep the nuclear material, whether it will have to shutter all of its major nuclear facilities, whether it will be allowed to continue enriching new material, or suspend that work for something between 13 and 20 years. In a phone interview on Sunday, Mr. Trump said that Iran would also agree to a new, far stronger inspection regime. But that too needs to be negotiated. The reference to “Iran’s nuclear needs” refers to Iran’s insistence on retaining nuclear capability for peaceful, energy-generating needs — a way of keeping its nuclear potential alive.
— David E. Sanger
Paragraph 9
Pending the final deal, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree to maintain the status quo. The Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program, and the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions, and will not deploy additional forces in the region.
This clause is an important way to establish a clear base line for negotiations. It limits the most obvious ways the United States and Iran could continue jockeying for advantage in an effort to pressure the other side to make additional concessions. For Iran, maintaining the “status quo” of its nuclear program amounts to leaving its bombed nuclear facilities in ruins and its uranium entombed beneath the rubble of air strikes.
— Michael Crowley
Paragraph 10
The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this M.O.U., and until the termination of sanctions, U.S. Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.
This clause in particular has triggered alarm among Iran hawks, who have asked why Mr. Trump would even partially relax sanctions on Iran’s oil industry, seemingly as a reward for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. The United States would be “trading away its most durable economic lever before the hard part of the negotiation has even started,” wrote Miad Maleki, a senior fellow at the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
— Michael Crowley
Paragraph 11`
The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this M.O.U. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. Such funds, whether retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly.
As written, the Iranians get access to their frozen funds — $24 billion or more — “upon the implementation of this M.O.U.” That suggests the money could start flowing very soon, before the follow-on agreement is negotiated. The proviso that they can be released to “any ultimate beneficiary” designated by Iran’s central bank is critical, because it could be read to mean Iranian military or intelligence officials or business entities on terrorist or sanctions lists could be among the beneficiaries.
— David E. Sanger
Paragraph 12
The United States of America and Islamic Republic of Iran agree that an executive mechanism will be established to monitor the successful implementation of this M.O.U. and the future compliance of the final deal.
Finalizing how a deal will be enforced is perhaps the most important part of any agreement. A U.S. official said the Americans want to make sure all Iranian commitments are “verifiable.”
— Luke Broadwater
Paragraph 13
After signing this M.O.U. and subject to the beginning of the implementation of Paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of this M.O.U., and the continuing implementation of these measures, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will start negotiations regarding the final deal exclusively on the other paragraphs.
This paragraph is a good indication of how solid or tentative the various parts of the agreement are, and underscores how Iran’s nuclear program will be the primary focus of further negotiations.
— Luke Broadwater
Paragraph 14
The final deal will be endorsed by a binding U.N.S.C. resolution.
The future agreement would get the imprimatur of the United Nations Security Council, as Mr. Trump’s Gaza deal did last year. But given the gulf that still separates the Iran and U.S. positions on nuclear issues, some analysts doubt this day will ever come. The agreement makes no reference to Mr. Trump’s responsibility to refer whatever final agreement emerges to Congress.
— Anton Troianovski and David E. Sanger
version of this article appears in print on June 18, 2026, Section A, Page 6 of the New York edition with the headline: Text of Agreement Between Washington and Tehran. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe