[10452] Journal of Third World Studies: Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992
Pascal Assaf
For seventeen years, Lebanon was tortured by incredibly complex internecine struggle that have cost the little country 150,000 lives and $14 billion of infrastructure damage. The fighting and alliances between the many militias was so complicated that they even exceeded the comprehension of the Lebanese themselves. The situation was further exacerbated by the presence of several foreign armies. In the end, Syria and its wily president, Hafez Assad, were the only winners; Israel and the P.L.O. emerged as losers, while Lebanon itself had survived, if no more.
These are the theses of Edgar O'Ballance, who has produced a tightly written and organized survey of the conflict, supplemented by an excellent chronology and a good set of maps to explain how this small and new country, with no modern independent history prior to this century, was torn apart by Muslim and Christian militias, the latter eventually rescued by an alliance with the Syrians. This alliance led Lebanon to emerge as a virtual Syrian protectorate with a continued presence of Israeli, Palestinian and Hezbollah militias. The interplay of competing organizations and near-feudal family tussles leads O'Ballance to conclude that "Machiavelli would have been out of his depth in this web" of intrigue and violence. (p. ix)
Lebanon inherited a balanced Christian/Muslim constitution from the French which was upset by the higher Muslim birth rate, and the presence of the Palestinians. A 1975 gunfight at a traffic stop between the Christian Falange and Palestinians exploded into sectarian violence which the Arab League strove unsuccessfully to end. Syria soon intervened, hoping to regain its former province. The Druse militia increasingly became the main Muslim force in Lebanon. By 1976, the regular Lebanese army was disintegrating. The Falange did not control all the Christian militias, some of whom opposed the Falange's willingness to work with the Syrians, who first intervened militarily in April, 1976. By 1977 assassinations were becoming common. Israel established links with a Christian militia group in south Lebanon and the Shiites formed their own militia, the powerful Amal. A disarmament accord failed when the PL.O. refused to join.
Some of the worst fighting in Lebanon occurred within the two main religious communities. A struggle between the Falange and the followers of the Franjieh family culminated in the assassination of part of Franjieh's family in 1978. This fratricidal behavior might have been disastrous had Israel not promised to protect the Christian community from destruction. United Nations efforts to stop some of the fighting in Lebanon were completely ineffective, its armed force becoming a target for attacks in 1979. By 1980-82 the Lebanese government was in a state of collapse as more than forty militias fought, bombed and assassinated, Sunni-Shi'a tensions rose due to the Iran-Iraq war, and 90,000 Israeli troops advanced on Beirut. After the Israeli withdrawal in September, 1982, the Lebanese managed to choose a new president, but he was assassinated 22 days later. Violence and chaos increased as Christian militias slaughtered refugees in two refugee camps, Muslims engaged in suicide bombings, and the Ayatollah Khomeini ordered Iranians to Lebanon to form the Hezbollah.
Negotiations in 1984 mostly failed, although a multi-religious cabinet was formed. Israel withdrew further from Lebanon but this brought no stability. A Christian coalition formed in April, 1985 to negotiate with Muslims failed when the Druse, committed to Muslim political superiority, refused. Muslim forces were no more united than Christian. Amal attacked the P.L.O.in 1985 and thereafter, nearly crippling Yasser Arafat in the process. An effort to unify Muslims into a single front did not prevent the Amal from attacking the Hezbollah as well, despite their shared Shi'a background. In 1988 the Christian general Michel Aoun formed a cabinet, meaning that Lebanon now had two governments. A cease fire between Aoun and his Christian enemies failed despite attempted intervention by the Maronite Patriarch. Aoun refused to recognize the national legislature's 1989 election of a new president, who was assassinated 17 days later anyway.
At this point Lebanon appeared doomed to perpetual warfare or partition. Surprisingly, this did not happen. Aoun was defeated by the Syrians and went into exile. The Gulf War led the United States to tactfully ignore further Syrian actions in Lebanon. The collapse of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, made Assad more anxious for good relations with the United States. In 1991, the war came to an end with the Treaty of Brotherhood (signed, appropriately, in Damascus) and the grant of a general amnesty. O'Ballance is surprisingly optimistic, noting a genuine "craving for peace" and Syria's successful disarmament of the militias. Syria virtually gained a protectorate but finally recognized Lebanon's independence. The Lebanese army survived, and Arab aid flowed in. Among the Lebanese, "[t]here were no outright winners... only survivors." (p. 223)
O'Ballance crams a lot into a short book, leaving no room for interpretations, explanations, or connections. The book reads as if it were compiled from newspaper headlines, with paragraphs sometimes containing references to events close in time but without other clear relationships. The reasons for the vicious fighting are not completely clear, but this may be attributable to the nature of the war. This was a war with few true heroes and many atrocities, often committed for narrow family gains rather than grand military objectives. At times the conflict resembles nothing so much as the "Castellamarese War" when New York's mafioso fought for control of organized crime in the 1920s. The Lebanese war produced little besides bloodshed and refugees. It is to be hoped that O'Ballance will supplement this excellent introduction to the conflict with more interpretive work to explain why the Lebanese labored so mightily to destroy each other - and themselves.
Copyright Association of Third World Studies, Inc. Spring 2001
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