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FLEXISPY Spy Phone, Mobile Spy Ikee.B to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

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miguel9...@gmail.com

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Apr 14, 2016, 3:31:56 PM4/14/16
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Dr. (PhD) Miguel Á. Gallardo, Tel. +34 902998352 Fax: +34 902998379 apedan...@gmail.com
To the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) www.cita.es/fcc-complaint

I am a legal representative of Spanish association APEDANICA (Asociación para la Prevención y Estudio de Delitos, Abusos y Negligencias en Informática y Comunicaciones Avanzadas). APEDANICA already had the pleasure to enter into contact before with William Knowles-Kellett, Attorney, Investigations and Hearings Division, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission FCC for FOIA Request 2016-018 (Google massive wireless espionage). Now we can offer relevant additional official information with the certificate at www.cita.es/apedanica.pdf and Comisión Nacional de Mercados y Competencia CNMC ("FCC like" in Spain) published at
https://rgi.cnmc.es/gruposdeinteres/apedanica-asociacion-para-la-prevencion-y-estudio-de-delitos-abusos-y-negligencias

APEDANICA now ask for FCC attention to some very dangerous and maybe criminal oriented products as we explain (in Spanish) with several links that you and everybody can see at
Hiperenlaces en www.cita.es/flexispy y www.miguelgallardo.es/flexispy.pdf
Hiperenlaces en www.cita.es/spy-phone y www.miguelgallardo.es/spy-phone.pdf
Hiperenlaces en www.cita.es/mobile-spy y www.miguelgallardo.es/mobile-spy.pdf

As far as we know, after very careful search in FCC.GOV at the moment there is no reference of Spy Phone, Mobile Spy or FLEXISPY. However, it is possible to read about one of them at https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/TIP10-105-01.pdf
FlexiSpy is commercial spyware sold for up to $349.00 per year. Versions are available that work on most of the major smartphones, including Blackberry, Windows Mobile, iPhone, and Symbian-based devices. The following are some of the capabilities provided by the software: Listen to actual phone calls as they happen; Secretly read Short Message Service (SMS) texts, call logs, and emails; Listen to the phone surroundings (use as remote bugging device); View phone GPS location; Forward all email events to another inbox; Remotely control all phone functions via SMS; Accept or reject communication based on predetermined lists; and Evade detection during operation. FlexiSpy claims to help protect children and catch cheating spouses, but the implications of this type of software are far more serious. Imagine a stranger listening to every conversation, viewing every email and text message sent and received, or tracking an individual's every movement without his or her knowledge. FlexiSpy requires physical access to a target phone for installation; however, these same capabilities could be maliciously exploited by malware unknowingly installed by a mobile user.

In the same document we are learning about other products like "Ikee.B" reading this:
A recent and more nefarious example of mobile malware is the Ikee.B, the first iPhone worm created with distinct financial motivation. It searches for and forwards financially sensitive information stored on iPhones and attempts to coordinate the infected iPhones via a botnet command and control server.5 5 F-Secure. Worm:iPhoneOS/Ikee.B. 2009. Retrieved February 16, 2010 from http://www.f This worm only infects iPhones that have a secure shell (SSH) application installed to allow remote access to the device, have the root password configured as "alpine"--the factory default--and are "jailbroken." A jailbroken iPhone is one that has been configured to allow users to install applications that are not officially distributed by Apple. Although Ikee.B has limited growth potential, it provides a proof of concept that hackers can migrate the functionality typical to PC-based botnets to mobile devices. For example, a victim iPhone in Australia can be hacked from another iPhone located in Hungary and forced to exfiltrate its user's private data to a Lithuanian command and control server.

Ikee.B seems to be just a malware virus but Spy Phone, Mobile Spy or FLEXISPY are commercial products just for espionage purposes that anybody can buy with no control or restriction anywhere just paying with a credit card or paypal. All of them are improving the espionage performance and may develop hidden functionalities beyond advertised ones.

There are also very serious Police testimonies about FLEXISPY for instance at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-04-14HillTestimony.pdf
The Testimony of Detective Brian Hill Criminal Investigations Division Anoka County Sheriff's Office For the Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the Law United States Senate Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014 June 4, 2014... I worked with a victim a couple years ago where she suspected that her estranged boyfriend must have put some type of spyware on her phone. She stated that he would know things about private conversations that she had over the phone and in text messages. Also he would show up randomly at locations where she was. I did an exam of her phone and was unable to get a full data extraction off of the phone and unable to determine if there was any spyware. Later, she brought in her computer for me to look at and I was able to find that the program FlexiSPY was accessed on the computer. I was then able to show that the program was installed on her phone and was able to work with her to get a new phone and set up new email accounts on a safe computer.... After stealth cyberstalking has begun, regaining safety is a difficult and expensive process for victims. On top of the trauma of surviving domestic abuse, victims are economically and socially impacted. They often must buy new phones, computers, and other technological equipment to be rid of the stealth stalking apps - although there are never any guarantees. Additionally, as we all become more accustomed to using our phones to work, bank, text, email, access social media, search the internet, and pay bills, stealth cyberstalking not only financially impacts victims, but can serve as a tool to isolate victims from all of the functions and social connections their phones provide - including isolating them from being able to reach out to domestic violence advocates or law enforcement. If victims want to be rid of stealth stalking apps they must create new email accounts and change all passwords and security questions - although, again, there are never any guarantees. It is terrifying for victims to know that they will never really know if the stealth stalking apps are gone or if they will reappear after being removed. This means victims' privacy and peace of mind continue to be violated, often long after they have bought new phones or changed their passwords.

In Spain, FLEXISPY has been found in a Nokia smartphone now in a Criminal Court (Juzgado de Instrucción 11 de Madrid) and we have shown our expert witnessing interest as published at
www.cita.es/flexispy-juzgado and www.miguelgallardo.es/flexispy-juzgado.pdf

APEDANICA is looking for information and jurisprudence in any country and in any language about commercial products that can perform illegal task like Spy Phone, Mobile Spy or FLEXISPY.are already offering. Nobody seems to limit anyhow or to control what is sold just for mobile espionage purposes on ANDROID and APPLE IPHONE and other SMARTPHONES.

APEDANICA believes that the advertising information and references that can be found at www.flexispy.com www.spyphone.com and www.mobile-spy.com iamounts to a guilty plea for conspiracy to commit mobile smartphones espionage in order to initiate debarment proceedings by FCC and European Data Privacy authorities and rulemaking against smartphones espionage using uncontrolled commercial products as an illegal business if no FCC rules are enough to limit and control it in the United States of America and abroad..

APEDANICA is aware that it is not easy to contact Spy Phone, Mobile Spy or FLEXISPY legal representatives. The best way we suggested already to a Criminal Court of Law in Spain is to use the "website whois" information. FLEXISPY Internet server seems to be in Victoria, Mahe Seychelles, Mobile Spy in Jacksonville FL and Spy Phone in Wayne, NJ but it is not possible to find any legal representative in Spain or in any other European country, as far as we know.

APEDANICA shall be pleased to do our best co-operating with FCC attorneys in order to evidence malware as well as illegal business on any commercial product used for espionage.

APEDANICA request documented information about any FCC investigation on Spy Phone, Mobile Spy or FLEXISPY as well as any other commercial product that can perform the same kind of espionage under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) as soon as possible.

This complaint can be forwarded to any authority in any country and we keep this published at
www.cita.es/fcc-complaint and www.miguelgallardo.es/fcc-complaint.pdf (with digital sign)

Dr. (PhD) Miguel Á. Gallardo, Tel. +34 902998352 Fax: +34 902998379 apedan...@gmail.com
Asociación APEDANICA C/ Fernando Poo 16-6ºB E-28045 Madrid, SPAIN (ESPAÑA)
https://rgi.cnmc.es/gruposdeinteres/apedanica-asociacion-para-la-prevencion-y-estudio-de-delitos-abusos-y-negligencias
www.cita.es/apedanica.pdf
https://goo.gl/za0Aps
Dr. (PhD) Miguel Á. Gallardo, Tel. +34 902998352 Fax: +34 902998379 apedan...@gmail.com
To the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) www.cita.es/fcc-complaint

I am a legal representative of Spanish association APEDANICA (Asociación para la Prevención y Estudio de Delitos, Abusos y Negligencias en Informática y Comunicaciones Avanzadas). APEDANICA already had the pleasure to enter into contact before with William Knowles-Kellett, Attorney, Investigations and Hearings Division, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission FCC for FOIA Request 2016-018 (Google massive wireless espionage). Now we can offer relevant additional official information with the certificate at www.cita.es/apedanica.pdf and Comisión Nacional de Mercados y Competencia CNMC ("FCC like" in Spain) published at
https://rgi.cnmc.es/gruposdeinteres/apedanica-asociacion-para-la-prevencion-y-estudio-de-delitos-abusos-y-negligencias

APEDANICA now ask for FCC attention to some very dangerous and maybe criminal oriented products as we explain (in Spanish) with several links that you and everybody can see at
Hiperenlaces en www.cita.es/flexispy y www.miguelgallardo.es/flexispy.pdf
Hiperenlaces en www.cita.es/spy-phone y www.miguelgallardo.es/spy-phone.pdf
Hiperenlaces en www.cita.es/mobile-spy y www.miguelgallardo.es/mobile-spy.pdf

As far as we know, after very careful search in FCC.GOV at the moment there is no reference of Spy Phone, Mobile Spy or FLEXISPY. However, it is possible to read about one of them at https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/TIP10-105-01.pdf
FlexiSpy is commercial spyware sold for up to $349.00 per year. Versions are available that work on most of the major smartphones, including Blackberry, Windows Mobile, iPhone, and Symbian-based devices. The following are some of the capabilities provided by the software: Listen to actual phone calls as they happen; Secretly read Short Message Service (SMS) texts, call logs, and emails; Listen to the phone surroundings (use as remote bugging device); View phone GPS location; Forward all email events to another inbox; Remotely control all phone functions via SMS; Accept or reject communication based on predetermined lists; and Evade detection during operation. FlexiSpy claims to help protect children and catch cheating spouses, but the implications of this type of software are far more serious. Imagine a stranger listening to every conversation, viewing every email and text message sent and received, or tracking an individual's every movement without his or her knowledge. FlexiSpy requires physical access to a target phone for installation; however, these same capabilities could be maliciously exploited by malware unknowingly installed by a mobile user.

In the same document we are learning about other products like "Ikee.B" reading this:
A recent and more nefarious example of mobile malware is the Ikee.B, the first iPhone worm created with distinct financial motivation. It searches for and forwards financially sensitive information stored on iPhones and attempts to coordinate the infected iPhones via a botnet command and control server.5 5 F-Secure. Worm:iPhoneOS/Ikee.B. 2009. Retrieved February 16, 2010 from http://www.f This worm only infects iPhones that have a secure shell (SSH) application installed to allow remote access to the device, have the root password configured as "alpine"--the factory default--and are "jailbroken." A jailbroken iPhone is one that has been configured to allow users to install applications that are not officially distributed by Apple. Although Ikee.B has limited growth potential, it provides a proof of concept that hackers can migrate the functionality typical to PC-based botnets to mobile devices. For example, a victim iPhone in Australia can be hacked from another iPhone located in Hungary and forced to exfiltrate its user's private data to a Lithuanian command and control server.

Ikee.B seems to be just a malware virus but Spy Phone, Mobile Spy or FLEXISPY are commercial products just for espionage purposes that anybody can buy with no control or restriction anywhere just paying with a credit card or paypal. All of them are improving the espionage performance and may develop hidden functionalities beyond advertised ones.

There are also very serious Police testimonies about FLEXISPY for instance at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-04-14HillTestimony.pdf
The Testimony of Detective Brian Hill Criminal Investigations Division Anoka County Sheriff's Office For the Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the Law United States Senate Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014 June 4, 2014... I worked with a victim a couple years ago where she suspected that her estranged boyfriend must have put some type of spyware on her phone. She stated that he would know things about private conversations that she had over the phone and in text messages. Also he would show up randomly at locations where she was. I did an exam of her phone and was unable to get a full data extraction off of the phone and unable to determine if there was any spyware. Later, she brought in her computer for me to look at and I was able to find that the program FlexiSPY was accessed on the computer. I was then able to show that the program was installed on her phone and was able to work with her to get a new phone and set up new email accounts on a safe computer.... After stealth cyberstalking has begun, regaining safety is a difficult and expensive process for victims. On top of the trauma of surviving domestic abuse, victims are economically and socially impacted. They often must buy new phones, computers, and other technological equipment to be rid of the stealth stalking apps - although there are never any guarantees. Additionally, as we all become more accustomed to using our phones to work, bank, text, email, access social media, search the internet, and pay bills, stealth cyberstalking not only financially impacts victims, but can serve as a tool to isolate victims from all of the functions and social connections their phones provide - including isolating them from being able to reach out to domestic violence advocates or law enforcement. If victims want to be rid of stealth stalking apps they must create new email accounts and change all passwords and security questions - although, again, there are never any guarantees. It is terrifying for victims to know that they will never really know if the stealth stalking apps are gone or if they will reappear after being removed. This means victims' privacy and peace of mind continue to be violated, often long after they have bought new phones or changed their passwords.

In Spain, FLEXISPY has been found in a Nokia smartphone now in a Criminal Court (Juzgado de Instrucción 11 de Madrid) and we have shown our expert witnessing interest as published at
www.cita.es/flexispy-juzgado and www.miguelgallardo.es/flexispy-juzgado.pdf

APEDANICA is looking for information and jurisprudence in any country and in any language about commercial products that can perform illegal task like Spy Phone, Mobile Spy or FLEXISPY.are already offering. Nobody seems to limit anyhow or to control what is sold just for mobile espionage purposes on ANDROID and APPLE IPHONE and other SMARTPHONES.

APEDANICA believes that the advertising information and references that can be found at www.flexispy.com www.spyphone.com and www.mobile-spy.com iamounts to a guilty plea for conspiracy to commit mobile smartphones espionage in order to initiate debarment proceedings by FCC and European Data Privacy authorities and rulemaking against smartphones espionage using uncontrolled commercial products as an illegal business if no FCC rules are enough to limit and control it in the United States of America and abroad..

APEDANICA is aware that it is not easy to contact Spy Phone, Mobile Spy or FLEXISPY legal representatives. The best way we suggested already to a Criminal Court of Law in Spain is to use the "website whois" information. FLEXISPY Internet server seems to be in Victoria, Mahe Seychelles, Mobile Spy in Jacksonville FL and Spy Phone in Wayne, NJ but it is not possible to find any legal representative in Spain or in any other European country, as far as we know.

APEDANICA shall be pleased to do our best co-operating with FCC attorneys in order to evidence malware as well as illegal business on any commercial product used for espionage.

APEDANICA request documented information about any FCC investigation on Spy Phone, Mobile Spy or FLEXISPY as well as any other commercial product that can perform the same kind of espionage under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) as soon as possible.

This complaint can be forwarded to any authority in any country and we keep this published at
www.cita.es/fcc-complaint and www.miguelgallardo.es/fcc-complaint.pdf (with digital sign)

Dr. (PhD) Miguel Á. Gallardo, Tel. +34 902998352 Fax: +34 902998379 apedan...@gmail.com
Asociación APEDANICA C/ Fernando Poo 16-6ºB E-28045 Madrid, SPAIN (ESPAÑA)
https://rgi.cnmc.es/gruposdeinteres/apedanica-asociacion-para-la-prevencion-y-estudio-de-delitos-abusos-y-negligencias
www.cita.es/apedanica.pdf
https://goo.gl/za0Aps

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1z51MD5vuSXveWHuSS3LxUEtY6Nnf2j-Y-qih906ACSY/edit
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