On Nov 9, 8:27 pm, Shawn Lorenzana <
darthmandi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Friday, November 9, 2012 9:17:44 AM UTC-8, Burkhard wrote:
<snip>
>
> > Well, that is either trite or question begging. Theists will either
>
> > argue that sure, they did not claim otherwise, deities are
>
> > categorically different from other things. (and everyone of us accepts
>
> > certain things that can't be observed by senses - numbers e.g. or
>
> > "thoughts") Or they will claim that of course, you can observe god the
>
> > same way you observe your mother. You can see that tree, can't you? An
>
> > a form of "reasoning" then allows us to attribute consciousness to the
>
> > tree, and suddenly there are Dryads in your ontology. That is what you
>
> > find in the scientific literature on the evolution of religion, it is
>
> > the very same process that enabled us to attribute consciousness to
>
> > animate objects that also underpins the emergence of religion.
>
>The level of reasoning in any given person is attributed to
education, (whether what is learned is true or not), and >imagination
in that person.
>In order to say what is reasonable, the people having the
conversation has to agree on facts that the subject is about.
No idea what you mean with this., or how it relates to what I wrote.
>
> > Now you may claim that this attribution of intent to trees (or rocks,
>
> > or the entire planet) is wrong - as maybe, but it has nothing to do
>
> > with the issue of sense perception. The senses involved are the same
>
> > in both cases.
>
> I do apologize if my writing is not as clear as you like. I'll do my best to explain. What we observe in human behavior >tells us that there is a consciousness there. By observing the tree, we cannot infer a conscious being responsible for >it's existence.
On the basis of what perception precisely? Consciousness is not
observed but inferred. There are good reasons why after proper
investigation, we may decide trees are not conscious (and we may be
wrong of course) But you were arguing about sense perception only,
and on that level you;ll struggle to make your argument stick.
>This is a side point I made to a statement that doesn't have to do with my original post. It was just something I wrote >to someone elses statement.
>
> > > You got this part right and it confirms that you do agree about association.
>
> > No it doesn't. I was not speaking about associations. You have used
>
> > the term on occasions, but did not say enough for me to understand if
>
> > you mean it in the technical sense (and if so, which technical sense
>
> > as different cog sci and psychology schools use it quite differently),
>
> > or what role it is supposed to play in your argument. At this point,
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> > nobody here seems to have the foggiest idea what you are actually
>
> > arguing, and hence it is rather difficult to know if one agrees with
>
> > you or not.
>
> Ok. When I used the term Association, I'm writing about one of the laws of behavior that the subconscious part of >the brain follows. Example: If you hear a dinner bell every time before you eat dinner, when it's rung, you'll think that >it's time to eat whether there's food or not. You've associated the ringing of the bell as a summons to eat.
All right, that is simple Pavlovian conditioning. I'd avoid the term
"laws of association", as they are normally associated with
Aristotle's theory (he identified four laws of association) which then
became central in the 19th century associationist psychology which is
considered obsolete. The idea of conditioning is not normally
expressed in the forms of laws, "model" would probably fit better.
Not sure though how you think you get any traction from that. In a
typical conditioning setting, you get a conditional stimulus
(Pavolov's bell) followed by an unconditioned stimulus (the food)
which normally triggers and unconditioned response whch eventually (in
the original theory) is replaced by the conditioned response -
salivating when the bell rings . Note that this model is seen today as
obsolete, if salvageable. (e.g. R A Rescorla, Hierarchical
associative relations in Pavlovian conditioning and instrumental
training. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 1, 66-70)
Most importantly though, this is a model for _all_ learning, according
to this school in psychology, and typically requires an unconditioned
response as staring point. So in our setting, theists would associate
initially a response to the felt presence of God (say a strong desire
to confess) which later can be replaced by a conditioned response even
in the absence of God (say at Church) Somehow I doubt this is what you
try to argue.
>
>
> > >However, what I disagree about your statement is that you cannot perceive reality.
>
> > And where did I say that?
>
> Here, unless I misunerstood you: >So the _mere_ fact that sense perception and emotions are linked does not tell >you anything about the external reality of what you perceive.
Not just misunderstand, but the exact opposite from what I'm saying.
Perception of reality is possible _even if_ the perception is
intertwined with emotional responses, and _even if_ it also triggers a
feeling of well being.
>
> You are likely referring to insight. Let me know if this is the case.
>
>
> > > You can percieve. It's just that in some cases we're wrong. For the use of the information in situations that matter to us, we investigate. To understand that you were hit by a real rock, instead of a foam one, doesn't >take a whole lot of investigation.
>
> > So? Nothing I wrote disagrees with that. My point was that it is the
>
> > emotion we feel when being hit by a rock that confirms it is a rock.
>
> > your original claim, as written (and that may be very different from
>
> > what you mean) was to claim that the fact that theists have an
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> > emotional attachment to the concept of god implies that their claim to
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> > have a perception of god is wrong. The pain example shows that this is
>
> > simply an invalid inference. Emotional perceptions are not
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> > inconsistent with the correctness of what is perceived.
>
> Yes, I'll agree with this. The example I used is not in the same context. However, in either context, the law of association works the same way. The more I try to explain things, the more off track things can get.
>
> Closing clarification. The association of a theists emotional response to the words of a religious leader can be >percieved as gods presence. Example: If you've ever gone to church for any given amount of time, you would've likely >heard this kind of speech, "The spirit of the Lord is with us! I feel his presence in me! Do you feel the spirit of the lord!! >If not, just open your heart to JESUS and let him in! That's right!! Open your heart to him! He loves you! >Halleighlieuya!!! Praise God! Halleighlieghlieuya, Amen!" This being backed up by church music and people in the >audience can be impactful. One could say that they have "felt" the spirit of the Lord and he is real. If one can reason >that god does exist, that person can associate that "feeling" as god entering your body and filling you with his love! >This is manipulation.
Well, this describes the worship in a small subgroup of Christians,
which in turn are a small subgroup of theists - and not even they
would claim that this is a typical setting for the experience of God's
presence, so even if you coudl show that this manipulation happens, it
would not be sufficient to undermine generally the claim of theists
that they experience the presence of god.
Nor does the conditioning scheme of Pavlov fit your description above
- there you'd have to have also an unconditioned stimulus and
response. And since Pavlov describes a general theory of learning, it
would also be in principle be doubtful if you can on the back of it
construct an argument against heists - what you describe above e.g. is
from a "associationist" analysis indistinguishable from learning in
school that whenever we smell a certain smell after mixing two
elements, we smelled the wet sulfuric acid process.