And nothing I say contradicts this. It still means that if you do
philosophy rather than history of philosophy (and only Hegelians think
that's the same thing) you need to engage with the contemporary
discussion, not (just) with his original exposition.
But you also confuse science and history of science, so I suppose that's
par for the course with you
>
>>
>> I gave you above some of the most influential thinkers who published
>> their main ideas before Rand wrote the "Introduction" - see if you find
>> any of them cited. Dummett wrote his highly influential "Realism" paper
>> in 1963 - ten years before the Introduction
>>
>> And if one were to read it as an exercise in Kant analysis, sorry, then
>> her scholarship is equally lacking. There is no engagement with
>> contemporary Kant scholarship, instead she quotes some pretty random
>> 18th and early 18th century commentators.
>>
>
> You haven't read Rand, if you had you wouldn't have said what you said.
Well, I read her "Introduction to Objectivist philosophy"and "Philosophy
who needs it". But I'd be the first to admit that it was some time ago
and not very carefully, it soon bored me to death.
But as you are the resident expert,it should be easy for you to prove me
wrong - just cite 5 or so references in the above works where she
engages with contemporary (at the time of her writing, of course) Kant
scholarship, say a few references to articles form the main
philosophical journals, or the most influential monographs of the time,
say Henry Allison's influential defence of Kant, or T K Seung's analysis
of his oeuvre, Dieter Henrich's bang-on point book on Objecitvity and
Identity in Kant.Or Paul Guyer's. OK the latter's influential book on
knowledge claims in Kant is arguably after the Introduction was
published, but his numerous articles that prepared that work span three
decades But I'm not fuzzy, any evidence of engagement with the
scholarly literature of the 1970s will do.
So you assert - but as usual fail to substantiate it. Maybe you can e.g.
explain how in your informed view Quine's criticism of the
synthetic/analytic distinction, which precedes Rand's by 30 years or so,
does not show, contra Rand, that realism is dependent upon that
distinction.
Eh what? I did not say that you separated pain and suffering from
certainty, quite on the contrary, I said that pain and suffering are
accepted as certain also by non-realists, and hence the worst possible
example you could come up with
> Moreover, if one thing is known to exist with absolute certainty then the list becomes infinite.
A statement that amply demonstrates your total ignorance of the
philosophical discussion.
Almost all non-realists accept that some things can be known with
certainty. All non-realists that are also foundationalists (which
includes Descartes, Kant and the empiricists) typically try to rebuild
the totality if our knowledge on these secure foundations - the
Cartesian cogito, the Kantian categories or observation reports with the
empiricists.
There is simply no way that you can get simply from one type of certain
knowledge to an infinity of equally certain knowledge, which is what all
their efforts demonstrate, or we would not have this discussion. Rand to
her credit knew this and therefore chooses another strategy to build her
theory.
> I could have picked any thing, including air or an extinct animal species. I picked pain and suffering because it graphically shows the sheer lunacy of non-realist thinking. And when I spoke of pain and suffering I was mainly talking about external pain and suffering as experienced by others, not by myself.
You might have been "thinking" about it, but you were most certainly not
"talking" about it. You simply mentioned pain, which in the
philosophical discussion on certainty always mean subjectively
experienced pain. If yo meant something else, you should have said so, I
can;t read your mind.
>The fact that you saw the need to defend uncertainty in this context via the internal claim and everything else you said shows the degree of reality denial practiced by deniers of certainty.
That sentence makes no sense. I did not defend uncertainty with the
internal claim, I pointed out the fact that non-realists generally agree
that internal pain can be known with certainty.
> Pain is known to exist with absolute certainty, those who deny make no sense because the example is rhetorical. Like I said non-realists don't deserve any respect whatsoever. You're starstruck by reputation and credentials which renders your entire defense to be the invalid-argument-from-authority.
Let's add "argument from authority" to the list of words you
misunderstand. First, no, I did not make an argument from authority,
they are of the form "X is true because an authority says so". Instead,
I mentioned authorities, because they are a relevant data for the
argument that I (and not an authority) did make: that is that Rand was
ignored because she was unaware of what the experts in the field had
been discussing, and hence did not realize that everything she said that
was correct was not only not original, but things realists and
non-realists agreed on.
To give evidence for this claim you have indeed to mention authorities,
but it does not turn it into something with the structure of an argument
from authority.
Furthermore, arguments from authority are only fallacious if the
authority cited is not in a "position to know" - otherwise it is simply
an argument from expert opinion which is perfectly valid, and used as
such
e.g.in every court trial where you have expert evidence.
>
> And deniers hypocritically invoke existence of pain and suffering to reject the existence of the biblical God. Despite their denials, which are throwaway, they are most certain, living their lives as convinced Atheists.
And that again shows nicely that you don't understand what (most)
non-realists are arguing (but you share that with Rand, so it's not
entirely your fault, you just follow once again the wrong authority)
As I said, non-realists, whether theists or atheists, do not deny
existence of pain, quite on the contrary, they used historically the
utter certainty with which we can judge at least our own pain as one
argument why exactly we can't know much else.
As for pain of others, what non-realists argue is not that we can't know
that pain exists, in general. Pain and pleasure both play important
roles in the philosophy of action in Kant and Hume, e.g. Rather, that
in every specific instance,our judgement if a specific person is in pain
now might be mistaken. And most realists agree with that, at least if
they are reasonable - if not, you'd have to deny that malingering or
false criminal accusations happen, ever, or the medical evidence just
how varied pain experience and expression can be across individuals.
The next mistake you make is to infer that if something can't be known
with absolute certainty, all knowledge claims are equally valid, which
is not what most non-realists would claim, and most certainly not
Descartians, Kantians or empiricists. Rather, different claims come
with different degrees of confidence (and that too is something most
reasonable realists agree with) That is perfectly sufficient to act as
guide for our actions and rational decisions. So an atheistic
non-realist does not need to have absolute certainty that pain (in
others) exist, just that there is strong evidence for the position,
which would make it in turn equally strong evidence against the
proposition of a tri-omni deity.
That holds for epistemological non-realism, and even ore so for
ontological non-realism. Kant and modern Kantians do not argue that what
we experience is an illusion (that's just Rand's careless misreading)
let alone that the phenomenal world doesn't matter. He simply says that
to be human means to experience the world in specific ways which we
can't transcend (that would be metaphysics of the 2. order). But because
as humans, we can't but experience the world in this way, and we all do
it in the same way (which ensures objectivity of knowledge claims), this
also does not matter.
With other words, for all practical purposes, there is no real
difference between non-realists and realists, not when it comes to
evaluating which claims are more convincing than others, not when it
comes ot make rational decision on what course of action to take or what
claims to believe.
Which is exactly why most epistemologists these days embrace a form of
"quietism", arguing that all forms of non-obviously absurd realism and
non-ralism ultimately converge.
>
> Ray
>