Yes, according t the credo of Ray Martinez. But nobody is obligated to
take your idiosyncratic word use serious, or accept your blatantly self
contradictory theory of linguistics.
Logic is indeed part of the study of language and the way it structures
our reasoning. This was the case for Aristotle, who separated logic,
which he discusses in the Prior Analytics, from the specific study of
nature (which he discusses in Physics) and the general study of nature
(which he discusses in his metaphysics). Unsurprisingly, the "principle
of identity" that you misquote all the time is not in his book on logic,
but on metaphysics, to wit Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, Part 4.
What ties logic and reality together, in Aristotle's system, are the
posterior analytics, but there too a separation of labour is maintained
You find this separation of labour even clearer in the earlier studies
on logic in India, where Panini was first ad foremost a grammarian, and
only secondly founder of a logical system.
The restriction of logic to the study of the formal properties of
language-based reasoning is maintained throughout Western history, you
find it expressed explicitly first in the stoics (who actively poke fun
at the "sophists" who sometimes for illicit reason confuse them) and
then in its first formal treatment in William of Occams Summa Logicae
-especially in Book 1 that deals with "terms" and introduces the
distinctions you'd find in a modern semiotic treaty.
As I said before, you really should get yourself an introduction to
Logic for dummies, all that stuff will be in the first chapter, it would
mean you embarrass yourself slightly less.
> So if a sentence written in an empirical context contains a contradiction then the contradiction means the sentence cannot be true as written because the words in the sentence represent material entities, which cannot contradict.
Yup, and nobody disputes that.
> You've never been able to understand this basic fact native to Aristotelian epistemology because your thinking has long been poisoned by anti-reality epistemologies known as Skepticism and Naturalism.
None of this has anything to do with realism vs non-realism, and the
separation of labour between logic, physics, metaphysics and
epistemology is accepted by realists and non-realists alike.
>Logic in short is about what can or cannot exist; words or terms, as arranged in sentences, attempt to convey reality, not terms or word
s absent referents in your warped understanding.
The only person whose understanding is warped, and out of line with the
way these terms in question have been used by logicians, linguists and
philosophers ever since Aristotle the latest.
Logic describes the formal properties of the most important tool we have
to reason about and discuss the world - our language. That does not
entail any commitment to the relation between language and external
reality, one way or the other, and is compatible with pretty much any
form of realism or non-realism. It simply studies a different phenomenon.
>John Harshman once told me the word cat is not the material thing.
And he is mostly right. The word "cat" can sometimes be a material
thing. In that case we talk about the specific ink molecules on a piece
of paper, or the specific sound wave someone made in a talk. Linguists
and logicians call this, following the terminology suggested by Peirce
in 1909, the word token.
We talk about this e.g. when we want to ensure that a document is
authentic, and say things like: "a chemical test of the document has
shown that the word cat was inserted long after the rest of the text was
written."
In most context though, we talk about the word type rather than the word
token , as in ""Cat" is a word of the English language". In that use,
the one that matters most to linguists and logicians, the word is indeed
not a material thing but an abstract object.
None of that the least disputed, and as I said first made fully explicit
by Panini in fourth century BC India, then independently by William of
Occam, and in its modern form and terminology by Sanders Peirce, de
Saussure and G W Frege. But pretty much any introductory text to logic
and linguistics will tell you the same thing.
> So when I say your understanding is warped I'm using you to represent many educated persons.
Not just many. Pretty much all
>John's statement reveals detached or anti-reality thinking.
Nope, just a necessary discernment between different things, one that is
common usage in the relevant disciplines and indeed beyond
> Everyone well knows the word cat is not the material thing; rather, the word cat represents or identifies a material thing that is well known to exist. In John's "thinking" the word and referent are separate; in logical reality they are not, they are one thing known as a cat which is a noun.
Only your first sentence directly contradicts the second - which is the
source of your confusion, and as so often it is difficult to say if it
is merely your bad writing style, concerning of the technical meaning of
terms, or about the substance of what you write (or all of the above)
Yes to the first, the word cat is indeed not (normally) the material
thing, but only represents or identifies it. And precisely because of
that John is of course right, word and referent are separate entities,
linked by a relation )that of "representing" or "referring to".
That's something realists and non-realists happily agree on, they only
differ in the nature of that "representation relation", what it entails,
and what exactly the referents are.
So no, the cat is not a noun, rather, cats are refereed to by the word
"cat", which is a noun.
If word and referent were the same thing as you claim them to be, you
immediately get utterly nonsensical results:
The word "cat" entered the English language in 700 AC or thereabouts.
But there were of course cats long before that. But by your logic,we
could infer that cats only started ot exist in 700
"Cat", "Mao" and "Katze" are obviously different words, but they all
refer to cats. By your strange logic, there are either no different
languages, or there are different four legged entities in the world, one
for each language (the exact opposite of objectivism btw)
>
> Succinctly said: The meaning of a noun falsifies your statement seen above----that's how easy it is to refute.
Which statement? And no, far from falsifying anything, that sentence
doesn't make any sense, grammatically speaking
>Sadly, like John, you don't know what a noun is.
Well, possibly true, but for reasons other than you might think.
"Noun", just like "verb", "adjective" or "prefix" is simply a group of
grammatical entities, that is things that form a syntactic class. So far
so easy. More difficult is to determine what the members of this group
have in common.
Sometimes (and mostly in older textbooks), nouns are defined
semantically, as words that refer to objects like persons, places,
things, events, substances, qualities, quantities etc etc.
The advantage is that this definition is largely language-independent.
The disadvantage is that it is pretty much empty - the "etc" does a lot
of work here and can include pretty much anything. It is also, as Ray
Jackendorf notes, simply begs the question:
"For instance, to choose about the simplest possible correlation, it is
frequently asserted that nouns name “things,” such as houses,horses,
doctors, and tables; hence the category Noun can be derived directly
from( or directly correlated with) semantics. But what about earthquakes
and concerts and wars, values and weights and costs, famines and
droughts, redness and fairness, days and millennia, functions and
purposes, craftsmanship, perfection, enjoyment, and finesse? The kinds
of entities that these nouns denote bear no resemblance to concrete
objects. To assert that they must have something in common semantically
with concrete nouns merely begs the question" (R Jackendorf, Foundations
of language, OUP 2002 p. 124)
There are worse problems, e.g. things like this: "He gave up smoking for
the sake of his children". In this sentence, "sake" is grammatically
clearly a noun, yet it is unclear what sort of object it refers to. (for
a full discussion there is a very good entry on "reference" by Reimer,
Marga and Michaelson, Eliot, "Reference", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/reference/>.
So most linguists define "Noun" through the formal syntactic and
morphological properties, e.g. in the case of nouns "can be combined
with a determiner" or " can serve as the subject of a verb".
The disadvantage of this approach is that it is language specific, so
how you identify nouns in English will differ from Russian e.g. (as
Russian does not have a definite determiner)
As a result, some simply combine the two approaches, e.g. in the
definition used by the Merriam Webster dictionary:
"any member of a class of words that typically can be combined with
determiners (see determiner b) to serve as the subject of a verb, can be
interpreted as singular or plural, can be replaced with a pronoun, and
refer to an entity, quality, state, action, or concept".
Not ideal and in danger of combining the disadvantage of both approaches.
So what nouns really are is actually quite difficult to say, and debated
controversially in linguistics, but that has nothing t do with your
kindergarten ideas about them.
>You can't retain its meaning in your thought because, like I said, you have long been poisoned by anti-reality epistemologies known as Skepticism and Naturalism.
>
Nope. Nothing here has anything to do with realism vs anti-realism, that
is just all standard linguistical analysis which is uncontested between
the two fields.