Evolution of discussing consciously experiencing.

[someone]

What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing? In other words why did we not evolve to speak about things the way you would have expected a zombie to?

[Tim Anderson]

Zombies don't evolve, by the commonly accepted definitions of evolution and zombie.

[someone]

On Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 11:15:03 AM UTC+1, Tim Anderson wrote:
> Zombies don't evolve, by the commonly accepted definitions of evolution and zombie.

I am referring to philosophical zombies. If you do not understand the question, then perhaps leave it to people that do, or ask for clarification. So for I will ask the group again, what is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing?

If you are not sure of what I mean by consciously experiencing perhaps read this NY Times article by the philosopher Galen Strawson.

https://richarddawkins.net/2016/05/consciousness-isnt-a-mystery-its-matter/

[Kalkidas]

On 9/25/2016 1:50 AM, someone wrote:
> What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing? In other words why did we not evolve to speak about things the way you would have expected a zombie to?

Good question. If we are just biochemistry, why do we have ideas about
things other than biochemistry?

[jillery]

Of course, we are not just chemistry. That's a childish caricature of
the argument.
--
This space is intentionally not blank.

[Mark Isaak]

I don't understand your problem. You speak *exactly* as I would expect
a zombie to speak.

--
Mark Isaak eciton (at) curioustaxonomy (dot) net
"The evil that is in the world always comes of ignorance, and good
intentions may do as much harm as malevolence, if they lack
understanding." - Albert Camus, _The Plague_

[SortingItOut]

On Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 3:55:03 AM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing? In other words why did we not evolve to speak about things the way you would have expected a zombie to?

Humans are conscious beings, not zombies. It follows that we would discuss things as conscious beings would, not like zombies would.

If you're asking why evolution resulted in conscious human beings instead of zombies, the answer is the same as for hypothetical, non-existent being: evolution simply didn't take that path.

[Burkhard]

if we are not apples, why do we have ideas about apples?

[Robert Camp]

This is the kind of unintelligible question that could only be asked by
someone with his head wedged in an ideological box of his own
construction. Your limited access to reality severely constrains your
ability to think about and discuss these issues.

[Burkhard]

someone wrote:
> What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing? In other words why did we not evolve to speak about things the way you would have expected a zombie to?
>

Several possible reasons.

Eating raw brains of other humans significantly increases the risk of
Kuru, an incurable degenerative neurological disorder caused by the
transmission of spongiform encephalopathy. Zombiism is therefore
storngly selected against, which is why we did not evolve into zombies,
and therefore don't talk like them either.

Secondly, driven by the overwhelming need to feed that replaces all
other urges, and being pot ugly, they also face pressures through
sexual selection.

Finally, again, the constant urge to feed at the exclusion of anything
else also means zombies aren't eusocial (no joint brood care,
overlapping generations with a colony of adults in charge, and division
of labour) resulted in no or minimal communication skills (essentially,
"urrrrgh" so even if we had evolved into zombies, we would not "speak
like them" because they don't speak.

In summary, we do not talk like zombies because
a) we are no zombies
and
b) zombies don't talk

both for good evolutionary reasons.

[someone]

On Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 9:55:03 AM UTC+1, someone wrote:
> What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing? In other words why did we not evolve to speak about things the way you would have expected a zombie to?

Is the excuse of the talk.origins atheist members (for not supplying an answer) that they do not understand the question?

[Bill Rogers]

On Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 4:55:03 AM UTC-4, someone wrote:
> What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing? In other words why did we not evolve to speak about things the way you would have expected a zombie to?

But we did evolve to speak about things exactly the way philosophical zombies do, because, by hypothesis, zombies behave exactly like we do, and speech is behavior.

[Kalkidas]

See, it's a hard question to answer isn't it?

[Burkhard]

Well, depends - it is if and only if you accept the assumption that
having ideas about something you are not is difficult.

Me, I'm with the Oracle of Delphi on this - knowing yourself is the
really tricky thing, the rest is comparatively easy

[Kalkidas]

On 9/26/2016 6:15 AM, Burkhard wrote:
> Kalkidas wrote:
>> On 9/25/2016 2:40 PM, Burkhard wrote:
>>> Kalkidas wrote:
>>>> On 9/25/2016 1:50 AM, someone wrote:
>>>>> What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously
>>>>> experiencing? In other words why did we not evolve to speak about
>>>>> things the way you would have expected a zombie to?
>>>>
>>>> Good question. If we are just biochemistry, why do we have ideas about
>>>> things other than biochemistry?
>>>>
>>> if we are not apples, why do we have ideas about apples?
>>
>> See, it's a hard question to answer isn't it?
>>

> one

> Well, depends - it is if and only if you accept the assumption that
> having ideas about something you are not is difficult.
>
> Me, I'm with the Oracle of Delphi on this - knowing yourself is the
> really tricky thing, the rest is comparatively easy

Well, knowing oneself is definitely harder than knowing biochemistry.
Which seems to indicate that the self is not reducible to biochemistry.

[Robert Camp]

It is? "Definitely"? I'd like to know how you quantified that.

> Which seems to indicate that the self is not reducible to biochemistry.

If it "seems to" indicate anything, I'd say it's that knowing one's self
is likely hindered by being oneself. There would seem to be frame of
reference limitations.

[Bob Casanova]

On Mon, 26 Sep 2016 05:15:55 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Kalkidas <e...@joes.pub>:

Not really; it need only be shown that it's inane, which
Burkhard did.
--

Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov

[Kalkidas]

On 9/26/2016 10:15 AM, Robert Camp wrote:
> On 9/26/16 9:19 AM, Kalkidas wrote:
>> On 9/26/2016 6:15 AM, Burkhard wrote:
>>> Kalkidas wrote:
>>>> On 9/25/2016 2:40 PM, Burkhard wrote:
>>>>> Kalkidas wrote:
>>>>>> On 9/25/2016 1:50 AM, someone wrote:
>>>>>>> What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously
>>>>>>> experiencing? In other words why did we not evolve to speak about
>>>>>>> things the way you would have expected a zombie to?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Good question. If we are just biochemistry, why do we have ideas
>>>>>> about
>>>>>> things other than biochemistry?
>>>>>>
>>>>> if we are not apples, why do we have ideas about apples?
>>>>
>>>> See, it's a hard question to answer isn't it?
>>>>
>>> one
>>> Well, depends - it is if and only if you accept the assumption that
>>> having ideas about something you are not is difficult.
>>>
>>> Me, I'm with the Oracle of Delphi on this - knowing yourself is the
>>> really tricky thing, the rest is comparatively easy
>>
>> Well, knowing oneself is definitely harder than knowing biochemistry.
>
> It is? "Definitely"? I'd like to know how you quantified that.

By the sheer number of competent biochemists who never become competent
spiritual teachers.

[Robert Camp]

(Okay, since we're not taking this seriously I'll play along) - How many
"competent spiritual leaders" do you suppose become competent
biochemists? Also, how have you determined that knowing oneself is
equivalent with being a competent spiritual leader? (My reading of the
landscape suggests that those two things may in fact be mutually exclusive.)

[Kalkidas]

Very few, because there are many more competent biochemists than there
are competent spiritual teachers. That is more evidence of the
difficulty of acquiring self-knowledge, and the relative ease of
acquiring material knowledge.

(Also note that I said spiritual "teacher" not "leader". There are even
fewer competent spiritual leaders than there are spiritual teachers,
although both must be self-realized.)

> Also, how have you determined that knowing oneself is
> equivalent with being a competent spiritual leader? (My reading of the
> landscape suggests that those two things may in fact be mutually
> exclusive.)

Are you invoking the hackneyed -- and false -- cliche that "those who
know don't speak and those who speak don't know..."?

Of course, phony gurus and fake gods abound. They should definitely not
speak or teach anyone. But if knowing oneself has great value, as has
been claimed throughout the ages, then those who have achieved it really
ought to speak about how they did it in order to help others achieve it.

[Robert Camp]

I'm sorry, I played along with this mishegoss for one post but that's
all I can manage. Too many personal definitions, invalid premises,
illogical connections and assumed conclusions for my taste.

[someone]

But the philosophical zombie seems to me to be a parody of a common physicalist position, showing the absurdity of it, as why would the zombie talk about consciously experiencing if it was not consciously experiencing. I would not expect it to, and I assumed I would not be alone in that, as I assume the absurdity of something not consciously experiencing evolving to talk about qualia. Them evolving to communicate with each other and talk about objects and their features etc., that seems fine, but talking about qualia for example does not.

You can imagine the zombies in a physical universe in which the physical is different from how the physical is imagined to be in this one. A physical substrate which does not consciously experience, but which follows the same laws of physics. So if you had the explanation for why in that universe the zombies would evolve to talk about qualia then you would have the explanation for why humans did in this universe. I am assuming the atheists do not have an explanation but are avoiding admitting it.

[Bill Rogers]

On Monday, September 26, 2016 at 9:05:03 PM UTC-4, someone wrote:
> On Monday, September 26, 2016 at 11:50:02 AM UTC+1, Bill Rogers wrote:
> > On Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 4:55:03 AM UTC-4, someone wrote:
> > > What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing? In other words why did we not evolve to speak about things the way you would have expected a zombie to?
> >
> > But we did evolve to speak about things exactly the way philosophical zombies do, because, by hypothesis, zombies behave exactly like we do, and speech is behavior.
>
> But the philosophical zombie seems to me to be a parody of a common physicalist position, showing the absurdity of it, as why would the zombie talk about consciously experiencing if it was not consciously experiencing. I would not expect it to, and I assumed I would not be alone in that, as I assume the absurdity of something not consciously experiencing evolving to talk about qualia. Them evolving to communicate with each other and talk about objects and their features etc., that seems fine, but talking about qualia for example does not.
>

A philosophical zombie cannot be a parody of a physicalist position, because a physicalist position says that philosophical zombies cannot exist. Talking about qualia seems fine to this physicalist; qualia are something physical happening in the brain.

> You can imagine the zombies in a physical universe in which the physical is different from how the physical is imagined to be in this one. A physical substrate which does not consciously experience, but which follows the same laws of physics. So if you had the explanation for why in that universe the zombies would evolve to talk about qualia then you would have the explanation for why humans did in this universe. I am assuming the atheists do not have an explanation but are avoiding admitting it.

By bringing philosophical zombies into the discussion you inevitably introduce the assumption that consciousness is non-physical. Everybody you've argued with here has told you that. You are beating your head against a wall.

You keep trying to show that "physicalism" is self-contradictory; but you keep doing it by introducing non-physicalist assumptions (try to hide them as you like) into your description of what physicalism is. Nobody's hiding from your excellent argument; it's just circular. Period.

Now, you can certainly make an argument that physicalism is wrong. You can argue that it fails to capture the most important elements of experience. You can make a Berklian idealist argument that says that the only thing we have direct access to are our sensations and ideas and that we have no evidence that there are real physical things out there. You can claim that physicalism has no way to approach the hard problem of consciousness. I disagree with those arguments but, unlike yours, they are at least not circular.

When everybody you argue with tells you your argument is circular and poorly articulated one explanation might be that they are all afraid of the devastating challenge you are posing to their world view. But it might also be the case that your argument is circular and poorly articulated.

[raven1]

On Sun, 25 Sep 2016 07:18:21 -0700 (PDT), someone
<glenn....@googlemail.com> wrote:

>On Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 11:15:03 AM UTC+1, Tim Anderson wrote:
>> Zombies don't evolve, by the commonly accepted definitions of evolution and zombie.
>
>I am referring to philosophical zombies. If you do not understand the question, then perhaps leave it to people that do, or ask for clarification.

One problem there: you apparently think "clarification" is a synonym
for "obfuscation".

[Bob Casanova]

On Tue, 27 Sep 2016 08:48:37 -0400, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by raven1
<quotht...@nevermore.com>:

Noticed that, did you?

[Mark Isaak]

On 9/26/16 2:23 PM, Kalkidas wrote:

> [snip]

It seems to me that the set of people who know oneself would include all
members of 12-step groups who have sincerely completed step 4. Just as
a rough estimate (based on AA, the largest such group, having an
estimated 2 million members), that is well over 500,000. I suspect at
least that may more have done the equivalent of a 4th step without the
formal structure.

How many competent biochemists are there in the world?

[someone]

(Re-posting as for some reason it posted before I was finished writing) I wrote that the zombie could be imagined to be in a different universe physically different from the way this one is imagined to be. That is not incompatible with physicalism, and nor is it circular. But those on the group need not desperately cling to the idea of zombies being incompatible with physicalism (an argument which only works when the zombies are considered to be physically identical, and the ones I was imagining would not be), you could just answer the "What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing?" question. No need for those on the group to try to run from that either by defining consciously experiencing to refer to a different feature of reality than I am referring to. Sure you could do, but if you need to resort to that then you may as well admit that you have no answer to intelligent design arguments. When I use the term "consciously experiencing) I am referring to the feature that Galen Strawson refers to as consciousness in this NY Times article: https://richarddawkins.net/2016/05/consciousness-isnt-a-mystery-its-matter/
So there is the article that refers to the feature, and the question is:

"What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing?"

(Presumably not every atheist on the group cannot manage to understand what is being asked)

(btw if there are any intelligent design proponents on this news group, just notice how weak they are on this issue)

[Kalkidas]

I doubt that step 4 is absolutely necessary for giving up alcohol or
drugs. It is possible then that many people have completed 12 step
programs without really becoming self-realized.

>
> How many competent biochemists are there in the world?

Good question. But every university on the planet teaches it. How many
teach self-realization?

[jillery]

Too many.

[someone]

On Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 5:55:03 PM UTC+1, Kalkidas wrote:
> On 9/25/2016 1:50 AM, someone wrote:
> > What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing? In other words why did we not evolve to speak about things the way you would have expected a zombie to?
>
> Good question. If we are just biochemistry, why do we have ideas about
> things other than biochemistry?

I had not replied to this, as I assumed this answer was just a joke. That was because I had assumed that the advantage of being able to communicate about the objects that are imagined to exist in the physical world or discussing the computations the system made about its environment would be pretty obvious ("..if we plant the seeds now, we should have a crop by the summer" etc.). I am referring to discussions of qualia, or philosophical zombies or the feature that Galen Strawson is referring to as consciousness in this article, https://richarddawkins.net/2016/05/consciousness-isnt-a-mystery-its-matter/ as opposed to communicating how eliminativists could be expected to.

[paul.i...@gmail.com]

"Someone" wrote...

> I wrote that the zombie could be imagined to be in a
> different universe physically different from the way
> this one is imagined to be.

So, this totally imaginary philosophical zombie can be
imagined to be in a totally imaginary universe? How is
this going to tell us anything about the real,
non-imaginary universe...?

[paul.i...@gmail.com]

"Someone" wrote...

> I wrote that the zombie could be imagined to be in a
> different universe physically different from the way
> this one is imagined to be.

[someone]

It was just being used to clarify what feature was being referenced by the term consciously experiencing. So the atheists did not get all confused (as they seem to do a lot, resorting to inappropriately using arguments they had learnt during their indoctrination) while trying to answer the question: "What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing?"

[Kalkidas]

I wouldn't expect a philosophical zombie to speak at all. To whom would
it speak? Other philosophical zombies? But none of them have
consciousness or qualia, so what would they talk about? It would at best
be a data readout. But then as before, who would read it?

[someone]

But if the laws of physics were the same in the alternate universe, why would you expect the philosophical zombies to have evolved to behave any differently? It seems to me that you would need to be able to explain why the philosophical zombies would evolve to talk about consciousness in order to answer the question "What is the story behind the evolution of discussing consciously experiencing?"

[scienceci...@gmail.com]

Someone wrote,

>What is the story behind the >evolution of discussing
>consciously experiencing? In
>other words why did we not
>evolve to speak about things
>the way you would have
>expected a zombie to?

Your questions have some bearing on the evolution toward psychologism in human history. But now psychology
is being replaced by neuroscience which would seem to indicate we are evolving away from subjective points of view, including speculative points of view, as a concern for a patient's existential condition.

A medical doctor may ask the patient, "how are you doing?" There will be a subjective point of view given by the patient. But another doctor will ask that doctor, "how is your patient doing?" And the answer will be, "vitals and blood tests are such and such". So the sets of numbers indicate the existential condition as a range in which the physician links to the patient's point of view. There is a normal range of the vitals and the blood tests and if any one marker deviates from this range, the physician may order more tests to diagnose a possible problem. Certainly this is a beneficial behavior we have developed and because the patient has limited qualia (interoceptive sensationing) the physican's objective blood work is more important.

The existential condition led us to science and to the benefit of it (physicalism) rather than subjective speculative ideas; because we have learned physical things end our existence, not speculative logic. "If I do not think, therefore, I am not" is existentially invalid. Philosophical discussions turned more toward the existential rather than the speculative. The philosophy of science is now what philosophy is about. Historically speaking this turn happened at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Speculative logic as a proof for existence (metaphysics) ended. The more one argues that consciousness is not potentially a physical process the weaker the philosophical argument becomes.

The threat to us by physical things is what evolved in relationship to the known universe and from that the need to understand the objective relationships are a priority. This is true of logic, but only in terms of linking it to something ontical. But speculative logic not linked to public phenomena or interoceptive sensationing goes nowhere in benefits compared to science. So when speculative science is the issue we want some sort of link to an objective proof.

Linking all this to evolution is important because we want to understand the details of objective formations of living things. Existentialistic aguments precede speculative logical arguments.

Change is one existential condition that we are faced with that can be more of a concern for us. There is a host of forces and elements, which we can study that may help us redeem a life for an individual. Change is and has been a philosophical question for centuries. Why deviation, abnormality, and mortality happen in the existential condition is not certain when we may wish it to be speculatively designed, normal, and immortal; but we know that logic and language not connected to what is the given existential domain is open to sheer speculation that must be decidedly weak when that logic or language itself cannot be consciously experiencing itself. There is no interoception of it. So we are left with conceptual language which may only portend a physics of it. That is not an existential argument.
That is because linguistic symbols by themselves in relationship to nothing in the world, will not be a connection to existence taking place. That is to say they are not even ontical, let alone, ontological. The ontical always preceeds the ontological. They are merely, speculative. Of the three sets: speculative (no-thing) logic, ontical observation without logic, and the ontologic, the last two are in the greater set of existence which maintains a greater meaning toward our arguments. Using the existence of things discovered, not the logic of things "uncovered" is the greater argument than the arguments that do not.

SC RED

[someone]

On Sunday, October 2, 2016 at 6:04:53 PM UTC+1, scienceci...@gmail.com wrote:
> Someone wrote,
> >What is the story behind the >evolution of discussing
> >consciously experiencing? In
> >other words why did we not
> >evolve to speak about things
> >the way you would have
> >expected a zombie to?
>
> Your questions have some bearing on the evolution toward psychologism in human history. But now psychology
> is being replaced by neuroscience which would seem to indicate we are evolving away from subjective points of view, including speculative points of view, as a concern for a patient's existential condition.
>
> A medical doctor may ask the patient, "how are you doing?" There will be a subjective point of view given by the patient. But another doctor will ask that doctor, "how is your patient doing?" And the answer will be, "vitals and blood tests are such and such". So the sets of numbers indicate the existential condition as a range in which the physician links to the patient's point of view. There is a normal range of the vitals and the blood tests and if any one marker deviates from this range, the physician may order more tests to diagnose a possible problem. Certainly this is a beneficial behavior we have developed and because the patient has limited qualia (interoceptive sensationing) the physican's objective blood work is more important.
>
> The existential condition led us to science and to the benefit of it (physicalism) rather than subjective speculative ideas; because we have learned physical things end our existence, not speculative logic. "If I do not think, therefore, I am not" is existentially invalid. Philosophical discussions turned more toward the existential rather than the speculative. The philosophy of science is now what philosophy is about. Historically speaking this turn happened at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Speculative logic as a proof for existence (metaphysics) ended. The more one argues that consciousness is not potentially a physical process the weaker the philosophical argument becomes.
>

That last sentence is just an unsupported assertion.

> The threat to us by physical things is what evolved in relationship to the known universe and from that the need to understand the objective relationships are a priority. This is true of logic, but only in terms of linking it to something ontical. But speculative logic not linked to public phenomena or interoceptive sensationing goes nowhere in benefits compared to science. So when speculative science is the issue we want some sort of link to an objective proof.
>
> Linking all this to evolution is important because we want to understand the details of objective formations of living things. Existentialistic aguments precede speculative logical arguments.
>
> Change is one existential condition that we are faced with that can be more of a concern for us. There is a host of forces and elements, which we can study that may help us redeem a life for an individual. Change is and has been a philosophical question for centuries. Why deviation, abnormality, and mortality happen in the existential condition is not certain when we may wish it to be speculatively designed, normal, and immortal; but we know that logic and language not connected to what is the given existential domain is open to sheer speculation that must be decidedly weak when that logic or language itself cannot be consciously experiencing itself. There is no interoception of it. So we are left with conceptual language which may only portend a physics of it. That is not an existential argument.
> That is because linguistic symbols by themselves in relationship to nothing in the world, will not be a connection to existence taking place. That is to say they are not even ontical, let alone, ontological. The ontical always preceeds the ontological. They are merely, speculative. Of the three sets: speculative (no-thing) logic, ontical observation without logic, and the ontologic, the last two are in the greater set of existence which maintains a greater meaning toward our arguments. Using the existence of things discovered, not the logic of things "uncovered" is the greater argument than the arguments that do not.
>
> SC RED

If there was an attempt at an answer there, as opposed to smuggling in an unsupported assertion while making it seem like you knew what you were talking about, then I failed to notice. Perhaps you could explain your motive for the post, and how you thought it was related to the question?

[scienceci...@gmail.com]

Someone wrote,

>If there was an attempt at
>an answer there, as opposed
>to smuggling in an
>unsupported assertion while
>making it seem like you
>knew what you were talking
>about, then I failed to notice.
>Perhaps you could explain
>your motive for the post, and
>how you thought it was
>related to the question?

On this topic, I can try to sense "consciously experiencing" and assert from that. There is no consciously experiencing (interoceptive sensationing) of "consciously experiencing" itself. There is no interoception of it like there is of my body temperature. Apparently you have no knowledge of the school of philosophy that directed thinkers back to the things themselves and not the neo-Kantian jargon of things in themselves. Like it or not metaphysics ended at the beginning of the 20th century. Existential logic is more important than any logic that is not. Logic that does not start from things is a very very weak argument in philosophy today.

SC RED

[someone]

By consciously experiencing I mean that it is like something to be you. That definition started with Nagel in his paper "What it is like to be a bat" in 1974. Metaphysics did not end at the beginning of the 20th century, that is simply a false statement. Logical positivism could have been thought to not consider metaphysics, but that school of thought was pretty much abandoned, and eliminativism could have been thought to ingore the fact that it is like something to be a human being, but that too has been considered to be an absurd school of thought. There is no other evidence for us other than what has been consciously experienced, that is the reality of the situation, and reasoning based upon the one feature of reality that we know is not a weak position, indeed there is no stronger position that you can have.

[scienceci...@gmail.com]

someone wrote,
>- show quoted text -

>By consciously experiencing
>I mean that it is like
>something to be you.

Thank you for clarifying. By the rule of substitution:

>What is the story behind the >evolution of discussing
>consciously experiencing?

then becomes this:

>What is the story behind the >evolution of discussing

>something that is like
>something to be you?

I think that this is a topical question for theatrical artists to answer.

>That definition started with
>Nagel in his paper "What it is
>like to be a bat" in 1974. >Metaphysics did not end at
>the beginning of the 20th
>century, that is simply a
>false statement. Logical
>positivism could have been
>thought to not consider >metaphysics, but that school
>of thought was pretty much >abandoned, and
>eliminativism could have
>been thought to ingore the
>fact that it is like something
>to be a human being, but
>that too has been
>considered to be an absurd
>school of thought. There is
>no other evidence for us
>other than what has been >consciously experienced,
>that is the reality of the >situation, and reasoning
>based upon the one feature
>of reality that we know is not
>a weak position, indeed there
>is no stronger position that
>you can have.

I was not speaking about logical positivism or eliminativism. I was speaking about existential-phenomenology and to scientific-realism. The former ended metaphysics, the later is the future of solving the gaps of metaphysical western thinkers. It has nothing to do with solving gaps of theism or religion. It is about the western philosophical practices for a philosophy of science based on some naturalism and some mechanism.

SC RED

[someone]

On Monday, October 3, 2016 at 6:04:49 PM UTC+1, scienceci...@gmail.com wrote:
> someone wrote,
> >- show quoted text -
> >By consciously experiencing
> >I mean that it is like
> >something to be you.
>
> Thank you for clarifying. By the rule of substitution:
>
> >What is the story behind the >evolution of discussing
> >consciously experiencing?
>
> then becomes this:
>
> >What is the story behind the >evolution of discussing
> >something that is like
> >something to be you?
>

No, it would become: What is the story of the evolution of discussing that it is like to be you?

You seem to understand what phenomenology is, and phenomenology is the study of what is consciously experienced.

I am not sure how "Existential-phenomenology" differs from phenomenology, but presumably it is some branch, and the evidence for any argument in phenomenology is based on the proponent's conscious experiences which they assume are common.

Regarding scientific-realism from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ :

"Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively as forms of scientific antirealism."

Which shows that it is just a metaphysical position, and not one that is uncontested. Which shows that it was, as I mentioned in my last post, a false statement by you that "like it or not metaphysics ended at the beginning of the 20th century."

Furthermore the following argument shows that phenomenology is logically incompatible with the ontology suggested by the mainstream interpretation of science.

Mainstream physics interpretation: The universe is a physical one and within it is either fundamental matter elements (strings or particles) and fields, or just fields. Whichever it is, the contents participate in making up forms which consciously experience and forms which do not. A goal of physics is to represent within the physics model the features which directly influence how the fundamental matter elements or a field's likeness of them behave. Those features are the same regardless of whether the matter and/or fields are participating in the composition of forms which consciously experience or not. Therefore the laws of physics do not distinguish between whether the behaviour is taking place within a form which consciously experiences or not.

The problem: The problem with interpreting the evidence we have for reality like that can become apparent when considering when the matter elements(s) and/or field(s) participate in the non-consciously experiencing forms that it posits. What the conscious experience of such a form is like cannot be one of the features directly influencing the behaviour of any field and/or matter element of the form composition, because the form is not consciously experiencing, so there is no conscious experience to be like anything. So if the belief was correct that the direct influential features, that physics is being interpreted as attempting to model, were the same regardless of whether the field and/or matter element was participating in a consciously experiencing form or not, then what the conscious experience was like could not be logically thought to be one of the features directly influencing the behaviour of any field and/or matter element participating in a consciously experiencing form either.

There is no indirect influence which does not directly influence anything. But if what is consciously experienced is not directly influencing the behaviour of a single field or matter element as the belief has been shown above to imply, then what is it directly influencing (which is not a field or matter element) in order to influence the behaviour of our forms?

If what the conscious experience was like was theorised to have no potential direct influence over anything: It could not even be an indirect influence to your behaviour. That would imply that no
consciously experience could ever act as evidence, because to act as evidence it would have to have had direct influence of some kind. So what you consciously experience could not act as evidence that reality is one in which forms have been consciously experienced for example. If you believed that what you consciously experience is evidence to you that reality is one in which forms have been consciously experienced, then it is illogical to hold that belief whilst also holding believing a story which implies that what is consciously experienced has no potential direct influence on anything.

Also if one were to suggest that the fields and/or matter elements consciously experience (in a panpsychic view for example) and that that feature is what one or more of the physics variables refers to, then, it seems to me, that there would still be the issue that the behaviour would reduce to what it was like to be individual fields and/or matter elements, which would be different from what it was like to be a certain arrangement.

--------

It seems to me that the motive behind your nonsense claims is to cover up the inability of atheist evolutionary proponents to explain how their position is compatible with reality as we know it.

[scienceci...@gmail.com]

Someone wrote,
>- show quoted text<

>No, it would become: What is
>the story of the evolution of >discussing that it is like to be >you?
>You seem to understand
>what phenomenology is, and >phenomenology is the study
>of what is consciously
>experienced.

>- show quoted text<

>I am not sure how
>"Existential-phenomenology"
>differs from phenomenology,
>but presumably it is some
>branch, and the evidence for
>any argument in
>phenomenology is based on
>the proponent's conscious >experiences which they
>assume are common.

1). See: "Delimitaions, phenomenology and the end of metaphysics", second Expanded Edition John Salas. 1995.

2). As for "story of the evolution of discussing that it is like to be you?"--existentialism is gained by being you. It is not the "discussing to be you" which is what metaphysics tried to do. Existentialism is recurrent fom Greek thought. For example, Plato's "Republic", is where the undeveloped idea is found.

>Regarding scientific-realism >fromhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ :

>"Scientific realism is a >positive epistemic >attitude ...snip... described >by the sciences. This >epistemic attitude has >important metaphysical and >semantic dimensions, ..
>.. snip to point..

>Which shows that it is just a >metaphysical position, and
>not one that is uncontested.
>Which shows that it was, as
>I mentioned in my last post,
>a false statement by you
>that "like it or not
>metaphysics ended at the
>beginning of the 20th
>century."

See _Delimittions_1995. Beyond that book I argue the logic of conjunction: EP + SR is not false. The negation of metaphysics by EP necessitates it in the way I am using it in my SR posts.

>Furthermore the following
>argument shows that
>phenomenology is logically >incompatible with the
>ontology suggested by the >mainstream interpretation of >science.

>...snip...

I going with this contrary view instead:

"In my lectures on mirror neurons I often conclude by saying that our research should be called existential neuroscience. I say this because the themes raised by mirror neuron research map well onto the themes recurrent in existential phenomenology." P.266

"Mirroring People: The New Science of How We Connect with Others" 2009, By Marco Iacoboni. There is also the idea of using mirror neuronal science for making empathic robotics as well.

In summary, the main idea I would like you to think about is the limitation of logic in arguing about unobservable things. Take consciously experiencing for example. The more you argue for a "logic" of consciously experiencing, the more you loose touch with that "you" yourself. You are negating it. Rather than negate it, interocept it as forces of biophysical vitals. Here there is a knowledge of self by the sensationng of it as a physical thing in the world; and then in combination with science like a medical physician's test for example, a gradually better knowledge builds; so this "act" that starts as a translogic is so much better for you than metaphysics.

In closing, I wish you good health, with emphasis on getting to the good part of it.

SC RED

[someone]

I showed in the argument I gave you why believing in existential phenomenalism (EP) and scientific realism (SR) entails a contradiction, but you snipped it, and have made no attempt to refute the argument. I think you realise you were unable to refute the argument, and so are not capable of arguing that your position is not a nonsense. I state nonsense rather than false, because as I showed, it contains a contradiction. You cannot hold the position that you take an existential phenomenological approach to any enquiry about reality while also holding the position that what you consciously experience (which any existential phenomenological approach is based on) makes no difference to your behaviour. And the argument (which you snipped and ran from rather that honestly faced up to) shows that the mainstream scientific interpretation (that scientific realism suggests you believe in) implies that the evidence that the phenomenological approach is based on cannot be evidence. So EP claims it is evidence, but SR claims it is not, and so if you believe they are both right, you are just being illogical. I can understand you having not of realised it, but when shown it in an argument, to just snip it and run, is in my opinion a pitiful response (assuming you did not have some agenda for doing so).

> >Furthermore the following
> >argument shows that
> >phenomenology is logically >incompatible with the
> >ontology suggested by the >mainstream interpretation of >science.
>
> >...snip...
>
> I going with this contrary view instead:
>
> "In my lectures on mirror neurons I often conclude by saying that our research should be called existential neuroscience. I say this because the themes raised by mirror neuron research map well onto the themes recurrent in existential phenomenology." P.266
>
> "Mirroring People: The New Science of How We Connect with Others" 2009, By Marco Iacoboni. There is also the idea of using mirror neuronal science for making empathic robotics as well.
>
> In summary, the main idea I would like you to think about is the limitation of logic in arguing about unobservable things. Take consciously experiencing for example. The more you argue for a "logic" of consciously experiencing, the more you loose touch with that "you" yourself. You are negating it. Rather than negate it, interocept it as forces of biophysical vitals. Here there is a knowledge of self by the sensationng of it as a physical thing in the world; and then in combination with science like a medical physician's test for example, a gradually better knowledge builds; so this "act" that starts as a translogic is so much better for you than metaphysics.
>
> In closing, I wish you good health, with emphasis on getting to the good part of it.
>
> SC RED

So in the end you just snip and run, and do not offer any answer to the original question. I do not know what you mean by a "logic" of consciously experiencing. The argument just uses logic based on the fact that I am consciously experiencing.

Also the idea of "empathetic" robots entails a misuse of the word empathy. The robot would not be empathising as its behaviour would not be based on its feelings. As whether it was consciously experiencing or not would make no difference to its behaviour. And while a robot could know how another robot would behave for example, and people like Dennett might claim that there is no distinction between that and knowing what it would be like for the other robot, they would be wrong. There is a distinction, and here is another little argument that illustrates that:

In foot note 3 of Daniel Dennett's paper "What RoboMary Knows" https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/RoboMaryfinal.htm, Dennett notes:

---

Robinson (1993) also claims that I beg the question by not honouring a distinction he declares to exist between knowing "what one would say and how one would react" and knowing "what it is like." If there is such a distinction, it has not yet been articulated and defended, by Robinson or anybody else, so far as I know. If Mary knows everything about what she would say and how she would react, it is far from clear that she wouldn't know what it would be like.

---

In the paper Dennett imagines RoboMary as follows:

"1.RoboMary is a standard Mark 19 robot, except that she was brought on line without colour vision; her video cameras are black and white, but everything else in her hardware is equipped for colour vision, which is standard in the Mark 19."

Dennett then, it seems to me, considers that RoboMary would consciously experience red when in a similar situation to us experiencing red etc. At the very least, from his response to Robinson, it is clear that he is claiming that it has not been shown that if you know what it would say and how it would react, you would know what it was like for it. Dennett considers the following objection to his thought experiment:

"Robots don't have colour experiences! Robots don't have qualia. This scenario isn't remotely on the same topic as the story of Mary the colour scientist."

And gives the following response:

"I suspect that many will want to endorse this objection, but they really must restrain themselves, on pain of begging the question most blatantly. Contemporary materialism-at least in my version of it-cheerfully endorses the assertion that we are robots of a sort-made of robots made of robots. Thinking in terms of robots is a useful exercise, since it removes the excuse that we don't yet know enough about brains to say just what is going on that might be relevant, permitting a sort of woolly romanticism about the mysterious powers of brains to cloud our judgement. If materialism is true, it should be possible ("in principle!") to build a material thing-call it a robot brain-that does what a brain does, and hence instantiates the same theory of experience that we do. Those who rule out my scenario as irrelevant from the outset are not arguing for the falsity of materialism; they are assuming it, and just illustrating that assumption in their version of the Mary story. That might be interesting as social anthropology, but is unlikely to shed any light on the science of consciousness."

Here one might straight away claim that there is a distinction between knowing how a robot will behave and knowing whose theory was correct regarding robots. Two people could know how the robot would behave, but disagree about the correct theory regarding consciousness. You could think job done, why bother continuing. But one can go further.

Let us imagine that for each camera pixel the Mark 19's eye sockets have three 8-bit channels A, B and C which are used for the light intensity encodings. For the grey scale camera the A, B and C channel values will all be the same. But with the colour cameras what they will be will depend on the version. With RGB cameras channel A will transmit the encoded red intensity, channel B the encoded green intensity, and channel C the encoded blue intensity, but with BRG cameras channel A will transmit the blue intensity, channel B the red intensity, and channel C the green intensity.

Now consider three Mark 19 robots. Each of which is in a different brightly lit room, sitting in a chair, with all of its motors disabled, so it is unable to move any body parts including its cameras.

The first is in a white room with a red cube which its RGB cameras are looking at. These cameras are slightly unusual as they also wirelessly broadcast their signal.

The second is in a white room with a blue cube which its BRG cameras are looking at. These cameras are also slightly unusual as they also wirelessly broadcast their signal.

The third is in a room with no box, but what is plugged into its camera sockets is a receiver that switches between picking up the signals broadcast from the cameras in the first two rooms.

The processing would be the same in each case, as in each case the channel values for the box pixels (assuming no shading) would be channel A = 255, channel B = 0, channel C = 0. There seems to me to be no way for Dennett (or any other physicalist philosopher for that matter), being able to establish whether the Mark19 in the third room's experience of a box was closer to how they (the philosopher) consciously experiences a red or whether it was closer to how they would consciously experience a blue box. If any philosopher disagrees, then I for one would be interested in how they thought they could tell. If not, then there is another example of a distinction between knowing how something will behave, and knowing what it would be like (if it was thought to like anything at all) for a robot.

"Knock-down refutations are rare in philosophy, and unambiguous self-refutations are even rarer, for obvious reasons, but sometimes we get lucky. Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge. Then, like cartoon characters, they hang there in mid-air, until they notice what they have done and gravity takes over."

-Daniel Dennett

(I do not expect you to be able to refute it, but perhaps consider why you cannot).

[scienceci...@gmail.com]

Someone wrote,
>...You cannot hold the

>position that you take an >existential
>phenomenological approach
>to any enquiry about reality
>while also holding the
>position that what you
>consciously experience
>(which any existential >phenomenological approach
>is based on) makes no
>difference to your behaviour.

This is just saying I cannot profess a physicalist's position about reality at the same time as professing a point on the EP approach, and at the same time as that, not also be conscious, which then cannot make a difference on my behaviour. But I can do all the above because time is duration and duration is not absolutely fixed for the holdings to be at the same time.

>And the argument (which
>you snipped and ran from
>rather that honestly faced up
>to) shows that the
>mainstream scientific >interpretation (that scientific >realism suggests you believe
>in) implies that the evidence
>that the phenomenological
>approach is based on
>cannot be evidence. So EP
>claims it is evidence, but SR >claims it is not, and so if you >believe they are both right,
>you are just being illogical. I
>can understand you having
>not of realised it, but when
>shown it in an argument, to
>just snip it and run, is in my {opinion a pitiful response
>(assuming you did not have
>some agenda for doing so).

You are sounding like an attorney again.

You are confused about the conjunctive rule I referred to in the EP and SR relationship. It was on why metaphysics is eliminated from SR, but you are onto something which I forgot to fully relate to with a more important part of why all hints of metaphysics becomes eliminated. The EP method is required to return back to the EP step after the analysis (SR). Thus, the method does not rest on the epistemologic. One must go back to the thing itself again and not fixate on the SR of it. The requirement of EP starts with the thing in the world, which is an ontical observation (existence), then it moves to an epistemological analysis with logic/math, which is the SR step, and then it must return back to the thing from which the investigation originated, the thing itself, to confirm the ontological science of it. If this ontological step of the method results in the null hypothesis, by repeated EP <-> SR steps, it stands until any new ontical challenge comes along. Then that challenge must go through the steps again. So you were correct to point out that something was amiss with my stopping on SR, but the full circle back to the thing eliminates all metaphysics. That, btw is not a circular logic. It is a practice, like the one in medicine. The physician monitors a diagnosis.

Now onto your argument that I snipped see:

https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/talk.origins/YJGPNNhwp_s

The EP methodological critique of your argument would be: about the part that argues your text's outline between the forms and the qualia; which is, that their relationship will not change their behavior by one another because physicalism reduces things to a contiguous unity. If I got this right, you claim elemental matter cannot have more than one form, which would mean it is a unity. So why is that wrong?

The scientific EP method does not disconjunct the history of forms in the world that link. There is a non-contiguousness of the things themselves. So the argument that there cannot be both a one or many of the forms at the same time is incorrect. There can be both many forms and many elements that make them. Duration produces noncontiguos forms at the ontological step of the EP < - > SR discoveries. And that is why time must be part of this. And this is where evolution is found. There are forms that the EP <-> SR method has historically linked by the ontological observations. Also the things themselves described by EP <-> SR are immune from epistemic approaches alone. Evolution, not metaphysics is factored in the EP <-> SR method. You would have an argument if the EP method did stop at SR. But it does not and now I hope this has been clarified for you.

SC RED

[Peter Nyikos]

I think you are doing a fine job of answering people here, "someone," and
I think you would do well to reply to Robert Camp on his new thread,
"Doug Axe vs Doug Axe". He may be badly missing the point of the last
thing he quotes from Doug Axe, but I don't know enough about Doug
Axe to be sure.

On the other hand, I have a thickly annotated copy of _The Mind's I_,
by Daniel Dennett and Douglas Hofstadter. They cannot comprehend
either Nagel's thesis in "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" or Searle's
Chinese room thought experiment, and they are naively enthusiastic
about the sophistry of people who agree with them. The biggest redeeming
quality of that book is the inclusion of these two essays along with
some others by authors who understand qualia and phenomenology in
a way neither Dennett nor Hofstadter does.

Although I cannot spare the time to wade into this thread,
I can see you have a much more sensible view of things than Dennett,
and so I encourage you to stick with talk.origins. Maybe at some
future date we can exchange ideas at our leisure.

Peter Nyikos
Professor, Dept. of Mathematics -- standard disclaimer--
University of South Carolina
http://people.math.sc.edu/nyikos/

[someone]

On Thursday, October 6, 2016 at 2:29:41 AM UTC+1, scienceci...@gmail.com wrote:
> Someone wrote,
> >...You cannot hold the
> >position that you take an >existential
> >phenomenological approach
> >to any enquiry about reality
> >while also holding the
> >position that what you
> >consciously experience
> >(which any existential >phenomenological approach
> >is based on) makes no
> >difference to your behaviour.
>
> This is just saying I cannot profess a physicalist's position about reality at the same time as professing a point on the EP approach, and at the same time as that, not also be conscious, which then cannot make a difference on my behaviour. But I can do all the above because time is duration and duration is not absolutely fixed for the holdings to be at the same time.
>

No it is not saying that. It is saying that the Existential Phenomenology (EP) approach which uses what you consciously experience as evidence upon which to base its reasoning. But Scientific Realism (SR) implies that what you consciously experience cannot be used as evidence. This was explained in the argument I supplied, and you could not refute but just snipped. The point being is that they contradict each other. So it is illogical to believe both.

> >And the argument (which
> >you snipped and ran from
> >rather that honestly faced up
> >to) shows that the
> >mainstream scientific >interpretation (that scientific >realism suggests you believe
> >in) implies that the evidence
> >that the phenomenological
> >approach is based on
> >cannot be evidence. So EP
> >claims it is evidence, but SR >claims it is not, and so if you >believe they are both right,
> >you are just being illogical. I
> >can understand you having
> >not of realised it, but when
> >shown it in an argument, to
> >just snip it and run, is in my {opinion a pitiful response
> >(assuming you did not have
> >some agenda for doing so).
>
> You are sounding like an attorney again.
>
> You are confused about the conjunctive rule I referred to in the EP and SR relationship. It was on why metaphysics is eliminated from SR, but you are onto something which I forgot to fully relate to with a more important part of why all hints of metaphysics becomes eliminated.

Metaphysics is not eliminated from scientific realism. As I mentioned before, in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry for Scientific Realism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ it states (in the opening paragraph):

"Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science..."

>The EP method is required to return back to the EP step after the analysis (SR). Thus, the method does not rest on the epistemologic. One must go back to the thing itself again and not fixate on the SR of it. The requirement of EP starts with the thing in the world, which is an ontical observation (existence), then it moves to an epistemological analysis with logic/math, which is the SR step, and then it must return back to the thing from which the investigation originated, the thing itself, to confirm the ontological science of it. If this ontological step of the method results in the null hypothesis, by repeated EP <-> SR steps, it stands until any new ontical challenge comes along. Then that challenge must go through the steps again. So you were correct to point out that something was amiss with my stopping on SR, but the full circle back to the thing eliminates all metaphysics. That, btw is not a circular logic. It is a practice, like the one in medicine. The physician monitors a diagnosis.
>
> Now onto your argument that I snipped see:
>
> https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/talk.origins/YJGPNNhwp_s
>
> The EP methodological critique of your argument would be: about the part that argues your text's outline between the forms and the qualia; which is, that their relationship will not change their behavior by one another because physicalism reduces things to a contiguous unity. If I got this right, you claim elemental matter cannot have more than one form, which would mean it is a unity. So why is that wrong?
>

I assume you were referring to the first argument (I gave two), the link seems to be a link to the post I am replying to. And no the argument seems to have eluded you. Here is a simple version for you.

If

(1) all atoms in a form that does consciously experience, would behave the same if individually they had the same surroundings in a form which does not.

and

(2) The reasons for the behaviour would be the same in both cases.

then

(3) What the form was consciously experiencing is not a reason for any atomic behaviour.

because given (2) the reasons for each atom's behaviour are the same reasons as when in a form that is not consciously experiencing.

(1) and (2) are premises of scientific realism.

Anyway, I will end the conversation with you here, as what you are discussing has nothing to do with the original question. Changing the subject is not answering the question, all it might do is perhaps make a casual reader think that the question has been answered (that it was not that the talk.origins atheist did not have answer), and that the answer was being discussed, when it is not. If you did not have an agenda, then if you reply, could you not snip this paragraph.

[snip]

[Peter Nyikos]

I'm not familiar with the terms EP and SR. However, for several decades
now I have characterized the philosophy of Gilbert Ryle and many British
philosophers as "Third person realism," in which statements are relentlessly
interpreted behavioristically. Specifically, it has to do with externally
observable behavior. Thus, the existence of dreams is reinterpreted as
existence of reports that people make of their dreams on awakening.
Norman Malcolm specifically takes this attitude. And Anthony Flew seriously
doubts that the idea of anyone witnessing his own funeral is meaningful.
[Thus, not just false, but meaningless.]

As for Ryle, he avoids all mention of the brain all through _The Concept
of Mind_ except for one little comment which never hints at the role
of the brain in mental activities. Yet his whole book is devoted to the
demolishing the idea of a self separate from the "mental" activities
which he recasts completely in the form of external behavior visible
or audible to anyone in the same room!

This is what I call "third person realism." In what way does SR differ
from it?

>
> >The EP method is required to return back to the EP step after the analysis (SR). Thus, the method does not rest on the epistemologic. One must go back to the thing itself again and not fixate on the SR of it. The requirement of EP starts with the thing in the world, which is an ontical observation (existence), then it moves to an epistemological analysis with logic/math, which is the SR step, and then it must return back to the thing from which the investigation originated, the thing itself, to confirm the ontological science of it. If this ontological step of the method results in the null hypothesis, by repeated EP <-> SR steps, it stands until any new ontical challenge comes along. Then that challenge must go through the steps again. So you were correct to point out that something was amiss with my stopping on SR, but the full circle back to the thing eliminates all metaphysics. That, btw is not a circular logic. It is a practice, like the one in medicine. The physician monitors a diagnosis.

Looks like SR takes introspection seriously, which is something the
"third person realists" did not do except to redefine it, in what I have
read of their work.

> > Now onto your argument that I snipped see:
> >
> > https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/talk.origins/YJGPNNhwp_s
> >
> > The EP methodological critique of your argument would be: about the part that argues your text's outline between the forms and the qualia; which is, that their relationship will not change their behavior by one another because physicalism reduces things to a contiguous unity. If I got this right, you claim elemental matter cannot have more than one form, which would mean it is a unity. So why is that wrong?
> >
>
> I assume you were referring to the first argument (I gave two), the link seems to be a link to the post I am replying to. And no the argument seems to have eluded you. Here is a simple version for you.
>
> If
>
> (1) all atoms in a form that does consciously experience, would behave the same if individually they had the same surroundings in a form which does not.
>
> and
>
> (2) The reasons for the behaviour would be the same in both cases.
>
> then
>
> (3) What the form was consciously experiencing is not a reason for any atomic behaviour.
>
> because given (2) the reasons for each atom's behaviour are the same reasons as when in a form that is not consciously experiencing.
>
> (1) and (2) are premises of scientific realism.

Sounds almost like epiphenomenalism, which however assumes that the
same physical events will have the same effects on conscious experience.
IOW our bodies have some some physical properties that cause
conscious experience (including all its details, like the experience
of red to a non-color-blind person) but it's strictly a one-way street.

> Anyway, I will end the conversation with you here, as what you are discussing has nothing to do with the original question. Changing the subject is not answering the question, all it might do is perhaps make a casual reader think that the question has been answered (that it was not that the talk.origins atheist did not have answer), and that the answer was being discussed, when it is not. If you did not have an agenda, then if you reply, could you not snip this paragraph.

Well, your OP has to do with the conundrum of how we can talk about
conscious experience without that experienced having any effect
on our overt behavior -- including our reports of that conscious
experience. You added a new wrinkle to that conundrum, asking how
evolution could have produced this inexplicable facility in us.

Do I have that right so far? If so, I think I can squeeze out the time,
no later than a month from now, and possibly next week [so please don't
delay your answer too long!] to give you my thoughts on this.

Peter Nyikos
Professor, Dept. of Mathematics -- standard disclaimer--
University of South Carolina
http://people.math.sc.edu/nyikos/

nyikos "at" math.sc.edu

[someone]

I am not too familiar with it, but feel free to read the article (I have not read the whole thing myself, the first paragraph gave me all the information I needed for my prior remarks regarding it). From what I have read they are not necessarily eliminativists or behaviourists, however I am not sure that an eliminativist or behaviourist could not consider themselves a scientific realist.

> >
> > >The EP method is required to return back to the EP step after the analysis (SR). Thus, the method does not rest on the epistemologic. One must go back to the thing itself again and not fixate on the SR of it. The requirement of EP starts with the thing in the world, which is an ontical observation (existence), then it moves to an epistemological analysis with logic/math, which is the SR step, and then it must return back to the thing from which the investigation originated, the thing itself, to confirm the ontological science of it. If this ontological step of the method results in the null hypothesis, by repeated EP <-> SR steps, it stands until any new ontical challenge comes along. Then that challenge must go through the steps again. So you were correct to point out that something was amiss with my stopping on SR, but the full circle back to the thing eliminates all metaphysics. That, btw is not a circular logic. It is a practice, like the one in medicine. The physician monitors a diagnosis.
>
> Looks like SR takes introspection seriously, which is something the
> "third person realists" did not do except to redefine it, in what I have
> read of their work.
>
> > > Now onto your argument that I snipped see:
> > >
> > > https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/talk.origins/YJGPNNhwp_s
> > >
> > > The EP methodological critique of your argument would be: about the part that argues your text's outline between the forms and the qualia; which is, that their relationship will not change their behavior by one another because physicalism reduces things to a contiguous unity. If I got this right, you claim elemental matter cannot have more than one form, which would mean it is a unity. So why is that wrong?
> > >
> >
> > I assume you were referring to the first argument (I gave two), the link seems to be a link to the post I am replying to. And no the argument seems to have eluded you. Here is a simple version for you.
> >
> > If
> >
> > (1) all atoms in a form that does consciously experience, would behave the same if individually they had the same surroundings in a form which does not.
> >
> > and
> >
> > (2) The reasons for the behaviour would be the same in both cases.
> >
> > then
> >
> > (3) What the form was consciously experiencing is not a reason for any atomic behaviour.
> >
> > because given (2) the reasons for each atom's behaviour are the same reasons as when in a form that is not consciously experiencing.
> >
> > (1) and (2) are premises of scientific realism.
>
> Sounds almost like epiphenomenalism, which however assumes that the
> same physical events will have the same effects on conscious experience.
> IOW our bodies have some some physical properties that cause
> conscious experience (including all its details, like the experience
> of red to a non-color-blind person) but it's strictly a one-way street.
>

(3) is just the logical implication of (1) and (2), epiphenomenalism is not assumed. And (1) and (2) are just premises I believe are found in mainstream scientific interpretations of reality at the time of writing, that is why I suggest they are premises of scientific realism.

> > Anyway, I will end the conversation with you here, as what you are discussing has nothing to do with the original question. Changing the subject is not answering the question, all it might do is perhaps make a casual reader think that the question has been answered (that it was not that the talk.origins atheist did not have answer), and that the answer was being discussed, when it is not. If you did not have an agenda, then if you reply, could you not snip this paragraph.
>
> Well, your OP has to do with the conundrum of how we can talk about
> conscious experience without that experienced having any effect
> on our overt behavior -- including our reports of that conscious
> experience. You added a new wrinkle to that conundrum, asking how
> evolution could have produced this inexplicable facility in us.
>
> Do I have that right so far? If so, I think I can squeeze out the time,
> no later than a month from now, and possibly next week [so please don't
> delay your answer too long!] to give you my thoughts on this.
>

Well I do not assume that what we consciously experience cannot have any effect on our overt behaviour, but if the answer is to make assumptions (1) and (2) mentioned in the above argument, then (3) would be implied by the answer. So I do expect it to be implied if a mainstream scientific interpretation of reality is used. And I was expecting a mainstream scientific interpretation of reality to be used by the those arguing against intelligent design on the forum, as the talk origins page http://www.talkorigins.org/ it states:

"The primary reason for this archive's existence is to provide mainstream scientific responses to the many frequently asked questions (FAQs) that appear in the talk.origins newsgroup and the frequently rebutted assertions of those advocating intelligent design or other creationist pseudosciences. "

But if you feel the need to use a non-mainstream answer then that is ok, I would still be interested in reading it. If you use a mainstream scientific answer then because I would expect it to assume (1) and (2) and therefore imply (3), I would expect the story to also be applicable to an imagined physical universe which contains a physical of a different nature, one of which no configurations of it (even the human-like forms) consciously experience even though it follows the same laws of physics (a zombie-type universe).

Obviously I am not asking for why they might give labels to different internal states which give an indication to how they might be disposed to behave (such as "I am angry" etc.), what I am interested in is why they would discuss things such as qualia, and the hard problem of consciousness etc., that they have evidence it is not a zombie universe etc.

I look forward to reading your thoughts on it, especially so if you were going to make an attempt to provide an explanation, and especially if you were going to attempt to do so using a mainstream science interpretation of reality.

[scienceci...@gmail.com]

To Someone,
Quote:

The argument continues to elude me because I cannot think of it as real. As an existential-phenomenological scientific realist I can point out there are no phenomena in the world for these premises. The premises carry no ontological weight. For me, and my studies of the philosophy of science, there is a difference between metaphysics and ontology. Ontology ends the constraints of metaphysics. For example, the conscious form in your argument cannot interocept consciousness or atoms just as we cannot. Of course the nonconscious form does not interocept anything. Science has found the atoms, but not consciousness. Not yet. Realistic physicalists would either say there is only the mysterious attestation of those who say that they are conscious, or say that there is a potential for science to discover it. Many people here have said one or the other. But time will tell. Until that discovery, the 2 forms in your argument are no different in any way for the realist. They would be doppelgangers. EP and SR do not support doppelgangers as real forms according to any principles of realistic philosophy of science that I know. It supports the forms of twins as real. Therefore, premises (1) and (2) are not the epistemologic premises of scientific realism. You are wrong about that.

Can you present an argument that starts with premises related to public things in the world or why the way medical practice is currently done, which best exemplifies the brand of physicalism as EP <-> SR, is not the better application to your problem? Post it in the future if you do not want to talk about this anymore.

As for this:

>Metaphysics is not
>eliminated from scientific
>realism. As I mentioned
>before, in the Stanford >Encyclopedia entry for
>Scientific Realism

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/

>it states (in the opening >paragraph):
>"Scientific realism is a
>positive epistemic attitude
>towards the content of our
>best theories and models, >recommending belief in both >observable and
>unobservable aspects of the
>world described by the
>sciences. This epistemic
>attitude has important
>metaphysical and semantic >dimensions, and these
>various commitments are
>contested by a number of
>rival epistemologies of
>science..."

Most medical physicians would consider themselves realististic physicalists as the professional term of "physician" implies. If they can't find something physical to answer a patience's question, they do not make metaphysical guesses and use that to tell them. They use existential-logic better known as onto-logic because of physical uncovering. I characterize this as what scientific realism practices.

>Anyway, I will end the
>conversation with you here,
>as what you are discussing
>has nothing to do with the
>original question. Changing
>the subject is not answering

>the question...
>...snipped for room...
>...If you did not have an

>agenda, then if you reply,
>could you not snip this
>paragraph.

I snip for room. I hope this post has presented a better outline of why my responses answer the question. I did touch on evolution as something that starts from premises in the worlld. That is where your premises must start.

SC RED

[someone]

I think you have misunderstood that argument, as it has nothing to do with doppelgangers. I perhaps could have written it clearer.

Premise (1) is about *individual atoms*, and the surroundings mentioned are the surroundings of an individual atom. Let us consider a hydrogen atom for example. Premise (1) means that the chemistry of that hydrogen atom will be the same whether it is in a form that consciously experiences, or whether it is in a form that is not. So the expected chemical reactions of any atom in a form that is consciously experiencing would be the same in a lab if the atom's *direct* environment (the atoms or molecules surrounding it, temperature etc.) could be reproduced, even though the atoms used to reproduce it in a lab would not be regarded as being in a form that does consciously experience.

Premise (2) is just suggesting that the reasons for the chemical reactions would be the same, so that a chemist or physicist would not vary their explanation of why the chemical reaction happened depending on whether the chemical reaction happened in a consciously experiencing form, or whether it happens in a form that is not consciously experiencing. So a chemistry book for example does not give one explanation for why the chemistry occurs in a consciously experiencing form, and another for why it would occur in a form that is not consciously experiencing. Likewise a physics book.

I understand premise (1) and (2) to be premises of the mainstream scientific interpretation of reality that scientific realism endorses believing in. Which is why I suggest such a view contains those premises. I do however accept that if the mainstream scientific view changes then the account of reality endorsed by scientific realism would change.

If you can now understand the argument and understand why (3) is implied by it, you can perhaps understand why the concept of phenomenology is incompatible with such an interpretation of reality.

As a side issue, if a person was to claim that what was consciously experienced should not be considered as evidence regarding reality, then they would be rejecting all evidence of reality (including all scientific evidence).

> Can you present an argument that starts with premises related to public things in the world or why the way medical practice is currently done, which best exemplifies the brand of physicalism as EP <-> SR, is not the better application to your problem? Post it in the future if you do not want to talk about this anymore.
>
> As for this:
> >Metaphysics is not
> >eliminated from scientific
> >realism. As I mentioned
> >before, in the Stanford >Encyclopedia entry for
> >Scientific Realism
>
> >http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/
>
> >it states (in the opening >paragraph):
> >"Scientific realism is a
> >positive epistemic attitude
> >towards the content of our
> >best theories and models, >recommending belief in both >observable and
> >unobservable aspects of the
> >world described by the
> >sciences. This epistemic
> >attitude has important
> >metaphysical and semantic >dimensions, and these
> >various commitments are
> >contested by a number of
> >rival epistemologies of
> >science..."
>
> Most medical physicians would consider themselves realististic physicalists as the professional term of "physician" implies. If they can't find something physical to answer a patience's question, they do not make metaphysical guesses and use that to tell them. They use existential-logic better known as onto-logic because of physical uncovering. I characterize this as what scientific realism practices.
>

I agree that they would tend to assume the contemporary mainstream scientific interpretation of reality as endorsed by scientific realism. I also think that they know that they are consciously experiencing, and can tell that reality is not a zombie universe. What I assume they do not realise is that knowing the latter shows that their belief in the contemporary mainstream scientific interpretation of reality was a false belief. I have explained how you can tell in the arguments I have supplied.

[scienceci...@gmail.com]

That is not my understanding of the current mainstream scientific interpretation of reality. Scientific realism must start with the thing in the world. It is not the chemistry or physics books that bracket consciousness or its explanation of consciously experiencing. It is our own sensory lack that makes that bracketting happen. There are no exteroceptions or interoceptions of consciousness--only mysteroius attestations of it. Scientific realism is akin to the same old philosophical questions about the objects of sensation. The basic question is is it public, can it be discovered (uncovered) for public status?

Existential-phenomenonolgy, a modern version about public existence, demands this bracketting too. We must start with existential phenomena, not mysterious mind-stuff as phenomenology does without any existentialism of it . That is the difference between phenomenology and existential-phenomenology. Premise (1) and (2) are not public enough for a mainstream scientific interpretation of reality.

>As a side issue, if a person
>was to claim that what was >consciously experienced
>should not be considered as >evidence regarding reality,
>then they would be rejecting
>all evidence of reality
>(including all scientific
>evidence).

It would not follow that the mysterious attestations by some claiming consciousness, should out weigh those who attest there are no interoceptions of it as evidence of anything. Therefore, the mysterious argument would have no impact on justifying the inclusion of it in chemistry and physics books at this time.

Looks like we have two fundamentally different understandings about the philosophy of science as it pertains to realism.

SC RED

[someone]

The evidence for any phenomological reasoning is what is consciously experienced. If you did not realise that, or thought there was other evidence then just state it, and I will state whether that is the type of thing that counts as a conscious experience.

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology_(philosophy)

"Phenomenology (from Greek phainómenon "that which appears" and lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness. As a philosophical movement it was founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl ...

Phenomenology, in Husserl's conception, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection on and study of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. Phenomenology can be clearly differentiated from the Cartesian method of analysis which sees the world as objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another."

From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/

"Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view."

There is no interoception without consciously experiencing. Interoception entails consciously experiencing. Auditory experiences, visual experiences, or tactile experiences are all conscious experiences.

You can presumably tell based on the fact that you consciously experience you can tell that reality is not a zombie universe. So that you consciously experience is evidence (that it is not a zombie universe for starters). What evidence is there for the results of any scientific experiment other than what you consciously experience?

[scienceci...@gmail.com]

Someone wrote,

You are arguing for a false equation. Husserl's phenomenology is not
the same as the existential-phenomenology (EP) that I have referrenced as exemplified by existential neuroscience (Iacoboni) a few posts ago. Phenomenology has branched out and connected with a pro scientific realism (SR). Here is a reference about phenomenology's branching out into existentialism.

See Cambridge Dictionary of philosophy 2nd edition, 1999 Robert Audi p. 666,

"..while phenomenologists do share certain insights, the development of the movement has nevertheless been such that it is not possible to give a simple definition of what phenomenology is. The fact remains that there are many phenomenologists and many phenomenologies."

"... whereas Husserl conceives it (subjectivity) as a wordless monad, Heidegger and most later phenomenologists conceive it as 'being-in-the-world".

From
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology_(philosophy)

"From this angle, one's state of mind is an "effect" rather than a determinant of existence, including those aspects of existence that one is not conscious of."

The determinant of existence is the thing itself. Subjectivity must come from a "thing" for its ontical declaration. EP<->SR defines the logic from the ontic sets. From that comes ontology. Then by returning back to the thing and checking the thing in relation to this logic we get a non-metaphysical method.

We have a fundamental difference on what kind of phenomenology I am referencing for dovetailing into SR.

Let's be clear:
You argue that science should start with Husserl's
phenomenology by starting with subjective attestations, reduce that to a wordless mystery, then claim that should be in chemistry and physics books. I counter argue that it is existential phenomenology and scientific realism that should stay the course and continue its start from ontical things as the grounds for what scientists should include in chemistry and physics books.

You also argue that EP and SR are the wrong discussions or interpretations of reality. I counter ague that not starting with the ontical, results in no knowledge of ontology. SR produces a logic for this ontical evidence. It is by knowing this ontology we can discuss reality. This method is not traditionally a metaphysics like you argue. It is an ontology.

SC RED

[someone]

No you misunderstand. I am not arguing about Husserl position at all. Though it was used in a quote I used. But you ignored the more general quote from the more authoritative source. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The quote I gave from there came from the first sentence of the article http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/:

"Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view."

That is just a point that is general to the varieties of phenomenology. You can look at section 4 of the article http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/#4 and it gives an overview of varieties and indicates the type of considerations that could be considered phenomenology even if they do not go by that name. They all consider what the first-person point of view is like. Existential phenomenology is mentioned, so it is not as though it has not been considered. If the first-person perspective or conscious experience as I tend to refer to it, is not considered then the approach is not any sort of phenomenology. I accept that it can be stated that the ontology in existential phenomenological approach is assumed and is compatible with that suggested by scientific realism, and that in light of that the first-perspective be analysed. That does not alter the point that such a position entails a contradiction. A contradiction that I have pointed out. You seem to have thought that existential phenomenology does not involve consideration of what it is like to be the person using such an approach. If I have misunderstood, then please correct me.

[someone]

I had not noticed this reply, but had noticed your follow up one, and was looking back to see whether you were going to have the time to respond, as in the later post you suggested you might https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/YJGPNNhwp_s/OUr1zy-SAgAJ . I have looked at the Robert Camp post, but like you, I am not really sure what Doug Axe is basing his position in the second paragraph on either. Also while I agree that you can with common sense get to understand reality, I also think if you were trying to work it out it would be very easy to take a wrong turn. Just consider philosophers, they often take wrong turns, or follow a philosopher that has taken a wrong turn, and go on without realising it. I noticed that someone called Glenn had responded to that post, but thought I would mention that was not me (although my name is also Glenn). Did you think you would get the time to respond to the original post on the thread?