OK, that is a tricky one. It is true that Reynolds, and also subsequent
discussions of polygamy, do not frame the issue as a free speech issue.
There are some good reasons for this and many bad ones, given how the
defendants framed their claim (One problem for me is that I consider the
reasoning in Reynolds about as odious as that in Dred Scott, and it is
rather scandalous that SCOTUS keeps citing a precedent that had racism
written all over it from start to finish. There can be good reasons not
to recognize polygamous marriages, but you won't find them there). One
issue why Reynolds is free exercise only, and not also free speech, is
that plaintiffs claimed they really were married, not just in the eyes
of their god but in the eyes of the law - so on their reasoning, the
state was not just wrong for prosecuting their behavior, it was also
wrong for not recognizing polygamous marriages as marriages. Now at the
time, this was a necessary strategy, because adultery laws were still
actively enforced at the time. So they could not just say: "we only live
together as our religion requires us to" because that would involve a
non-speech conduct - having sex with the persons they were living with -
that was criminal at the time. So that gets a non-speech issue bang into
the centre, and that can only be dealt with through a direct free
exercise claim. The second, not quite so god reason, is the persistent
conflation of fraudulent bigamy with religious polygamy, a problem the
US law inherited from the common law which never was quite clear on what
the issue really was (or rather, it was quite clear in what it said that
the issue was fraudulent misrepresentation, just that in practice it was
applied in cases such as religious polygamy where this simply does not
apply) So if the defendant had framed it as a free speech issue, the
problem would have been to argue that their speech was not fraudulent
misrepresentation, which is not protected speech. So the plaintiffs in
Reynolds had to frame it in terms of free exercise only.
Reynolds then spawned Davis v Beason, and here it is even more
difficult to see why this was not (also) a free speech issue . At stake
was swearing of a mandatory anti-bigamy oath, and if that isn't a free
(forced) speech issue, I don't know what is. Furthermore, the oath
prescribed certain activities which in turn are exercise of speech,i.e.
" to advice on" or "counsel for" polygamy (as opposed to engaging in
it). That all this should have been seen (also) as a free speech issue
is a point made e.b. by Martha Nussbaum (Liberty of Conscience: In
Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality)
Now, I guess that the reasons why this was again framed as a free
exercise issue only are historical- religious oath in England had been
the chosen way to establish a state church and destroy dissent, it was
just that experience that had triggered the free exercise and
non-establishment clauses, so it may have seemed natural to put it under
that header, and at the time there was little to gain by arguing the
free speech side.
Fast forward to the present. Common law marriages have all but
disappeared, criminal prosecutions for adultery either abolished
altogether or remain unenforced, so the two historical reasons to frame
polygamy as a free exercise issue have become moot. Furthermore, in the
meantime there was Employment Division v. Smith, and the recognition of
the concept of a "hybrid right". In essence, the Court argued that a
religious motivation can exempt a person from a neutral, generally
applicable law provided that both the right of free exercise along with
some other right is involved.
So suddenly there is an incentive to frame polygamy also as a free
speech issue - and low and behold, this is what we find in Brown v.
Buhman (still under appeal, I think) It's an interesting decision,
extremely well researched and well worth reading. The judge, in finding
for Brown, argues that at least under the facts of this case, the only
thing that separates Brown's conduct from legally harmless adultery is
the "way he presents their relation" to the outside world, that is
speech. It therefore creates a Hybrid Right under Smith where free
speech and free exercise become essentially entangled.
Now, that is how I read Hemidactylus point: Many manifestations of free
exercise of religion will be speech acts (that follows from the symbolic
nature of much religious activity) Speech acts are still speech, just
not "only" descriptive speech. If I say "I do" at a wedding, I do not
(just) express an opinion about my mental state, I perform an activity
with legal consequences. That is essentially the insight by Austin and
Searle. Every time we say something, we do two things - we commit a
locutionary act (the physical utterance with its syntactic and semantic
meaning) and an illocutionary act - the pragmatic "illocutionary
force" of the utterance, as a socially valid verbal action.
If you draw the distinction like this, all verbal behaviour is always
also speech and thus free speech issues potentially involved. But in
law, we often want to distinguish special types of illucutionary acts as
being "different" and thus fall under a different legal regime. Certain
threats are the prime example: "Give me your money or I kill you" is not
a prediction that I want to share with you FYI, it is a specific type of
speech act regulated by criminal law. Still speech, just not protected
speech.
The aw does not follow linguistic categories here in a neat or
systematic way. But from a linguistic perspective, we commonly
distinguish different illucutionary acts (copied for convinience from
wikipedia)
assertives = speech acts that commit a speaker to the truth of the
expressed proposition, e.g. reciting a creed
directives = speech acts that are to cause the hearer to take a
particular action, e.g. requests, commands and advice
commissives = speech acts that commit a speaker to some future action,
e.g. promises and oaths
expressives = speech acts that express the speaker's attitudes and
emotions towards the proposition, e.g. congratulations, excuses and thanks
declaratives = speech acts that change the reality in accord with the
proposition of the declaration, e.g. baptisms, pronouncing someone
guilty or pronouncing someone husband and wife
Assetives and expressives are the paradigmatic "free speech territory"
Declaratives are the ones most likely to be governed through something
else. With directives and comissives, it depends.