Finely tuned universe

[someone]

What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.

[erik simpson]

On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 10:00:03 AM UTC-7, someone wrote:
> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.

Do you mean the finely-tuned universe, or the finely-tuned arguments? There's
a difference. Only the latter is a certainty.

[Ernest Major]

On 13/03/2018 16:57, someone wrote:
> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.
>

It strikes me as circular.

1) We are the purpose of the universe.
2) If the universe was different it couldn't support us.
3) The chance of the universe being as it is is small.
4) Therefore the universe was created for us.

Other points are that very little of the universe is capable of
supporting life, which is not what one expects of a universe designed to
support life; and that the parameter space for fundamental constants is
unknown (so we can't say what the probability is).

Or were you referring to the speculation that the universe is
funed-tuned for producing black holes?

--
alias Ernest Major

[someone]

I mean the kind of arguments outlined in the Lewis and Barnes "A FORTUNATE UNIVERSE" book. I think you can view youtube for more info if you have not read the book, or are not sure. If you are still not clear let me know. They I think they could be categorised as "finely-tuned universe" arguments, but what counts as a "universe" depends upon definition.

[someone]

No, I was not referring to the speculation that the universe is finely-tuned for producing black holes, but was considering the debate that the group was set up to debate.

[Paul J Gans]

someone <glenn....@googlemail.com> wrote:
>What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.

Guess what? The place in which we live and thrive is a place where
life can live and thrive.

--
--- Paul J. Gans

[someone]

On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 5:35:05 PM UTC, Paul J Gans wrote:

> someone wrote:
> >What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.
>
> Guess what? The place in which we live and thrive is a place where
> life can live and thrive.
>
> --
> --- Paul J. Gans

I guess you are not aware of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.

[Bob Casanova]

On Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:57:13 -0700 (PDT), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by someone
<glenn....@googlemail.com>:

>What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.

Mostly that it's a red herring, since no one knows what the
possible ranges of values are, or even if it's possible for
those ranges to vary at all.

And even if they *can* vary, no one knows how many universes
may have come into existence, grown old and died before one
appeared in which some inhabitants 13+By later could ask
questions regarding the postulated, but undemonstrated,
"fine tuning".

Bottom line: Zero data; lots of conjectures available. Pick
the one which satisfies you. Or generate your own, but be
warned that it's probably already been thought of; people
are endlessly inventive in the absence of objective data.
--

Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov

[someone]

On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 6:00:03 PM UTC, Bob Casanova wrote:
> On Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:57:13 -0700 (PDT), the following
> appeared in talk.origins, posted by someone

>:
>
> >What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.
>
> Mostly that it's a red herring, since no one knows what the
> possible ranges of values are, or even if it's possible for
> those ranges to vary at all.
>
> And even if they *can* vary, no one knows how many universes
> may have come into existence, grown old and died before one
> appeared in which some inhabitants 13+By later could ask
> questions regarding the postulated, but undemonstrated,
> "fine tuning".
>
> Bottom line: Zero data; lots of conjectures available. Pick
> the one which satisfies you. Or generate your own, but be
> warned that it's probably already been thought of; people
> are endlessly inventive in the absence of objective data.
> --
>
> Bob C.
>
> "The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
> the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
> 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"
>
> - Isaac Asimov

I think that the idea is that with your theory vs the alternative being argued here, is that the scientific results would not have been expected given your theory (though they would given the other theory).

[Bill Rogers]

On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 1:00:03 PM UTC-4, someone wrote:
> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.

I think that it's obvious that the universe is finely tuned. How would it be possible otherwise for an alien on a distant planet in a distant galaxy, without prior contact with humans, to bio-engineer a human brain and then use it to run a display of fairy lights.

[JWS]

On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 12:00:03 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.

Some people think the universe was "fine tuned".
They should be able to answer:
What were the values of the constants before tuning?
How long was the universe "out-of-tune" before it was tuned?
What, exactly, was done to accomplish the tuning?
I think it would go a long way to show "fine-tuning" took place if
these questions could be answered. Thanks.

[Öö Tiib]

On Tuesday, 13 March 2018 19:00:03 UTC+2, someone wrote:
> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.

I think that we do not know origins and cause of our universe.
We can't measure how finely tuned it is because we do not know if
universes can be tuned nor the degrees of freedom that are available
nor if it can be retuned later again nor if there was or is anyone
capable to tune it and what their goals were or are.

So we are stuck here. Me saying that it wasn't finely tuned
because I don't know how it could be ... would be argumentum ad
incredulum. You saying that it was because I don't have any
counterarguments ... would be argumentum ad ignorantiam.
IOW, we don't know.

[Glenn]

"Paul J Gans" <gan...@panix.com> wrote in message news:p89238$j5f$1...@reader2.panix.com...

Is that a proper tautology?

[Mark Isaak]

On 3/13/18 9:57 AM, someone wrote:
> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.

Whether or not the universe is fine-tuned does not affect the
probability of life existing in the universe. At least, not once you
factor in the observation that there is someone in the universe asking
about fine-tuning.

--
Mark Isaak eciton (at) curioustaxonomy (dot) net
"Ignorance, allied with power, is the most ferocious enemy justice can
have." - James Baldwin

[Earle Jones]

On 2018-03-13 22:01:45 +0000, Mark Isaak said:

> On 3/13/18 9:57 AM, someone wrote:
>> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe
>> cosmological arguments.
>
>
> Whether or not the universe is fine-tuned does not affect the
> probability of life existing in the universe. At least, not once you
> factor in the observation that there is someone in the universe asking
> about fine-tuning.

*
This is Douglas Adams' comment on universal fine-tuning:

"In a way people are not unlike a puddle of rainwater that has
somehow come about self-awareness after a storm. The little puddle
would look up with wonder at the sky, might contemplate all the
things the pass him by and then eventually might come to think
about the pothole in which he rested.

"And what a remarkable hole it is," he might marvel. "How unlikely
it must be that I should come to rest in a hole that fits my exact
dimensions. Everywhere I have a divet, the hole juts out, and
everywhere I have a protrusion, this hole gives way just right.
Why, it seems so unlikely that this hole should come to be so
perfect for me, it must have been created especially FOR me!"

--Douglas Adams

earle
*

[RonO]

On 3/13/2018 11:57 AM, someone wrote:
> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.
>

You might have enough on the ball to come to a simple conclusion from
the reality that you live in.

The fine tuning argument has never amounted to any science worth calling
science. It has not spawned any productive research among real
scientists. No one can determine if any fine tuning was ever done at
any time.

With that in mind, what possible use could find tuning be to the ID
creationist scam debate?

Ron Okimoto

[Jonathan]

Can you say why?

I can...


Types and Forms of Emergence

http://old-classes.design4complexity.com/7701-S14/reading/critical-thinking/Types-and-Forms-of-Emergence.pdf





--

"To paraphrase the Buddha — Three things cannot be long hidden:
the sun; the moon; and the truth. ‬

~ Former FBI Director James Comey (12-1-17)


s

[Jonathan]

Everything in, and including, the universe evolves, and
evolutionary systems create the ideal conditions for
self organization and increasing complexity.

It should be no surprise at all that an evolving system
manages to settle of finely tuned 'ecosystems' that
spawn new creations like clouds spawn rain.


Self-organization
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Self-organization, also called spontaneous order (in the social
sciences), is a process where some form of overall order arises from
local interactions between parts of an initially disordered system. The
process is spontaneous, not needing control by any external agent. It is
often triggered by random fluctuations, amplified by positive feedback.
The resulting organization is wholly decentralized, distributed over all
the components of the system. As such, the organization is typically
robust and able to survive or self-repair substantial perturbation.
Chaos theory discusses self-organization in terms of islands of
predictability in a sea of chaotic unpredictability.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization#Physics

[Paul J Gans]

Are you aware of the arithmetic tuning of the universe. In our universe
two and three are five, not four or six as in other universes. Our
universe allows long division, others don't.

But things aren't perfect. Some of our numbers are irrational. We just
have to live with those.

[Paul J Gans]

Exactly!

[Bob Casanova]

On Tue, 13 Mar 2018 11:06:34 -0700 (PDT), the following

appeared in talk.origins, posted by someone

<glenn....@googlemail.com>:

>On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 6:00:03 PM UTC, Bob Casanova wrote:
>> On Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:57:13 -0700 (PDT), the following
>> appeared in talk.origins, posted by someone
>>:
>>
>> >What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.
>>
>> Mostly that it's a red herring, since no one knows what the
>> possible ranges of values are, or even if it's possible for
>> those ranges to vary at all.
>>
>> And even if they *can* vary, no one knows how many universes
>> may have come into existence, grown old and died before one
>> appeared in which some inhabitants 13+By later could ask
>> questions regarding the postulated, but undemonstrated,
>> "fine tuning".
>>
>> Bottom line: Zero data; lots of conjectures available. Pick
>> the one which satisfies you. Or generate your own, but be
>> warned that it's probably already been thought of; people
>> are endlessly inventive in the absence of objective data.

>I think that the idea is that with your theory vs the alternative being argued here, is that the scientific results would not have been expected given your theory (though they would given the other theory).

Since I have no theory (I'm not a cosmologist) I have no
idea what you may be referring to.

Suggestion: Read what I wrote and address *that*; if I'm not
mistaken that addresses the issue of "expected results"
(i.e., the observed values of the fundamental constants).

[Bob Casanova]

On Tue, 13 Mar 2018 12:50:08 -0700 (PDT), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by JWS
<jld...@skybeam.com>:

And let's not forget:

What are the possible values each "tuned" constant can
assume?

[Bob Casanova]

On Wed, 14 Mar 2018 15:08:35 +0000 (UTC), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by Paul J Gans
<gan...@panix.com>:

Newsflash: It's not just numbers which suffer from frequent
irrationality.

[JWS]

OK. Let's go one at a time:

What were the values of the constants before tuning?

Surely, there must be someone who can answer the first question.

[*Hemidactylus*]

Why can’t we live on the Sun or on the surface of Pluto? Why isn’t life
teeming everywhere and always? Why was spontaneous generation debunked by
Pasteur if the universe is so life friendly?

[erik simpson]

It is friendly. Just not to our sort of life.

[*Hemidactylus*]

You have to be in a Goldilocks zone for it. Could life evolve in a star? If
really fine tuned abiogenesis would be inevitable and ubiquitous. Harshman
made a similar point a while back and I have pondered it since.

[erik simpson]

Some sort of Goldilocks would seem necessary. Hard to see how any self-
organizing chains of chemical reactions could get started when everything's
completely ionized. Water? We can't easily imagine doing without it, but there
are exobiologists (!) who can imagine strange things (like life on Titan).

[Bob Casanova]

On Wed, 14 Mar 2018 16:31:28 -0700 (PDT), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by JWS
<jld...@skybeam.com>:

>On Wednesday, March 14, 2018 at 12:45:03 PM UTC-5, Bob Casanova wrote:
>> On Wed, 14 Mar 2018 15:08:35 +0000 (UTC), the following
>> appeared in talk.origins, posted by Paul J Gans
>> <gan...@panix.com>:
>>
>> >someone <glenn....@googlemail.com> wrote:
>> >>On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 5:35:05 PM UTC, Paul J Gans wrote:
>> >>> someone wrote:
>> >>> >What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.
>> >>>
>> >>> Guess what? The place in which we live and thrive is a place where
>> >>> life can live and thrive.
>> >>>
>> >>> --
>> >>> --- Paul J. Gans
>> >
>> >>I guess you are not aware of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.
>> >
>> >Are you aware of the arithmetic tuning of the universe. In our universe
>> >two and three are five, not four or six as in other universes. Our
>> >universe allows long division, others don't.
>> >
>> >But things aren't perfect. Some of our numbers are irrational. We just
>> >have to live with those.
>>
>> Newsflash: It's not just numbers which suffer from frequent
>> irrationality.

>OK. Let's go one at a time:
> What were the values of the constants before tuning?
>Surely, there must be someone who can answer the first question.

Pedant point: There wasn't even necessarily a "before"; the
tuning could have been part of the original design process.

Of course, both "design" and "fine tuned" are assumptions
with no objective evidence in support, but they don't seem
to consider that a problem.

And no, no one is likely to answer that question.

[JWS]

On Thursday, March 15, 2018 at 12:35:03 PM UTC-5, Bob Casanova wrote:
> On Wed, 14 Mar 2018 16:31:28 -0700 (PDT), the following
> appeared in talk.origins, posted by JWS
>

I knew that.
I just wanted to know if you knew that.

[Paul J Gans]

*Hemidactylus* <ecph...@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
>Paul J Gans <gan...@panix.com> wrote:
>> someone <glenn....@googlemail.com> wrote:
>>> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe
>>> cosmological arguments.
>>
>> Guess what? The place in which we live and thrive is a place where
>> life can live and thrive.
>>

>Why can???t we live on the Sun or on the surface of Pluto? Why isn???t life

>teeming everywhere and always? Why was spontaneous generation debunked by
>Pasteur if the universe is so life friendly?

Living and thriving does not mean living and thriving everywhere. There
is enough life in the top six inches of ordinary topsoil to satisfy
everyone except those of us too fastidious to live there.

So we have to put up with imperfections such as nor'easters and the
like.

[JWS]

Actually, no.
If I design a guitar, and give you the specs, drawings, and
text instructions you cannot tune that. It is a design that
exists on paper only. It cannot be tuned.
If you say the tuning is part part of the original design --
the universe just came out that way, well, anyone would probably
agree with that. That's just the way the universe is.
But creationists can't make that argument. They need a tuner. To
tune an out-of-tune universe.
So, can someone answer the question? (knowing full well that no one
can, but that's enough to nullify the claim of tuning.)

[someone]

On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 5:00:03 PM UTC, someone wrote:
> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.

It did not seem like many were familiar with the cosmological fine tuning argument, or if they were, that they were willing to address it. It tends to be around varying the physics constant values found in the equations, but not provided by them, rather than considering the laws themselves to be different.

Some clips from youtube that might help:

Leonard Susskind
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2cT4zZIHR3s

Martin Rees
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0zdXj6fSGY

Ted Talk by Brian Greene
(offering an explanation of the seeming fine tuning of the cosmic constant)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bf7BXwVeyWw


Also if one were to go for the naturalist multiverse response, one might want to also consider that our experience can be considered fine tuned. The naturalist position gives no reason to favour the experience we have, over no experience, or a flash of light every time a neuron fired, or if a representation, then a different one. Would a multiverse response be used again, e.g. that the experience was like a constant value, and that for each subset of the other constant values, there would be multiple "universes" each with a different experience type, such that it is not surprising that we are experiencing an experience that the theists deem as suitable for a spiritual being to base moral decisions upon (a flash of light every time a neuron fired would not have been suitable, nor an absence of experience).

[Haven't watched it all myself, but I assume they both overlook what we experience (and thus the experience fine tuning), but I thought this might be of interest to some on here if they have not seen it. The issue of cosmological fine tuning does come up. Anyway here is a link if anyone is interested it is Steven Weinberg discussing stuff with Richard Dawkins.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Q5AsHJJArg ]

[*Hemidactylus*]

someone <glenn....@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
[snip]

>
> Also if one were to go for the naturalist multiverse response, one might
> want to also consider that our experience can be considered fine tuned.
> The naturalist position gives no reason to favour the experience we have,
> over no experience, or a flash of light every time a neuron fired, or if
> a representation, then a different one.
>

Our experience is not a priori fine tuned. We are born with a brain biased
for sorts of environmental tuning and that’s a bunch of potential GIGO. We
did what we did to survive and reproduce when epistemic truth wasn’t as
important. The epistemic values of the enlightenment set us on a course of
better calibration with reality. We have jettisoned some garbage overboard
at least. Most of human history was in a benighted state. Some present day
folks want to return into the nebulous fog and avoid clarity.

[Bob Casanova]

On Thu, 15 Mar 2018 11:05:55 -0700 (PDT), the following

appeared in talk.origins, posted by JWS

<jld...@skybeam.com>:

It's been rather obvious for a while.

[erik simpson]

Lots of people (knowledgable and not) have speculated on fine-tuning. I believe
Steve Carlip has expressed it very clearly. The question of fine-tuning depends on knowing the range and distribution of possible values of the "tuning constants". We are at a very rudimentary point of such knowledge. That some
model cosmologies "predict" multiverses and such isn't determinative, since it's
currently unresolved how well these models correspond to reality.

[Bob Casanova]

On Thu, 15 Mar 2018 16:23:36 -0700 (PDT), the following

appeared in talk.origins, posted by JWS

<jld...@skybeam.com>:

Actually, it depends on the context, and the interpretation
of the meaning of "tuned". See below.

>If I design a guitar, and give you the specs, drawings, and
>text instructions you cannot tune that. It is a design that
>exists on paper only. It cannot be tuned.

No, but the shape of the soundbox and the placement of
frets, for only two examples, are part of the "tuning"
process; in this case, the tuning was done in the
trial-and-error process by which the basic design was
arrived at, and your particular variations on that basic
design comprise additional "tuning". When I design
(actually, "designed"; I've been retired since 2006) an
analog circuit, the tuning is done as part of the design
process, and unless I've screwed it up is not required after
*at most* the breadboard stage, although something like a
radio receiver may incorporate a means to further tune the
circuit for a particular purpose. But it *does* require a
designer; random selection and assembly of components, which
is the alternative to "tuning as part of design", simply
doesn't cut it.

IOW, "tuning" has more than one meaning, and I've seen
nothing which would restrict the "fine-tuned" assertion so
beloved of creationists to the sort you described.

>If you say the tuning is part part of the original design --
>the universe just came out that way, well, anyone would probably
>agree with that. That's just the way the universe is.
>But creationists can't make that argument. They need a tuner. To
>tune an out-of-tune universe.

I disagree; their argument works as well (or would, if it
had any validity) for the sort of tuning I described above
as for the sort you did; in both cases a designer is
required, which fulfills their requirement. Now if only they
could provide evidence that such a designer exists...

>So, can someone answer the question? (knowing full well that no one
>can, but that's enough to nullify the claim of tuning.)

As you noted above, no one in the "designer" camp seems
willing to take it on.

[Andre G. Isaak]

In article <e7fa3dba-883c-4152...@googlegroups.com>,

someone <glenn....@googlemail.com> wrote:

> On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 5:00:03 PM UTC, someone wrote:
> > What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe
> > cosmological arguments.
>
> It did not seem like many were familiar with the cosmological fine tuning
> argument, or if they were, that they were willing to address it. It tends to
> be around varying the physics constant values found in the equations, but not
> provided by them, rather than considering the laws themselves to be
> different.

I'm pretty sure most people here are familiar with the fine-tuning
argument since it comes up periodically.

The only honest approach to this is to claim that we simply do not know
why fundamental constants of physics have the values they have.
Consequently, we can't know if it would even be possible for them to
have different values. It may turn out to be the case that these values
fall out from the laws of physics in some as-of-yet unknown fashion, in
which case they *must* have the values which they have in much the same
way that (e.g.) pi must have the value it has.

However, if we assume that these values can vary and that some
'fine-tuner' was involved in setting there values, that doesn't give us
any insight into why said tuner wanted those values to be set the way
they are.

Currently, we really don't know how widespread life is in the universe,
but as far as we know the overwhelming majority of the universe appears
to be incredibly hostile to life, so whatever your hypothetical tuner
might have been interested in, it's highly unlikely that it was life.
More likely, life is simply some unexpected infestation which has arisen
in a few places which your tuner has either (a) opted to tolerate
insofar as it doesn't interfere with the main experiment (whatever that
might be) or (b) not gotten around to eradicating yet.

Andre

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail service.

[Bob Casanova]

On Sat, 17 Mar 2018 06:08:39 -0600, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by "Andre G. Isaak"
<agi...@gm.invalid>:

>In article <e7fa3dba-883c-4152...@googlegroups.com>,
> someone <glenn....@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 5:00:03 PM UTC, someone wrote:
>> > What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe
>> > cosmological arguments.
>>
>> It did not seem like many were familiar with the cosmological fine tuning
>> argument, or if they were, that they were willing to address it. It tends to
>> be around varying the physics constant values found in the equations, but not
>> provided by them, rather than considering the laws themselves to be
>> different.
>
>
>I'm pretty sure most people here are familiar with the fine-tuning
>argument since it comes up periodically.
>
>The only honest approach to this is to claim that we simply do not know
>why fundamental constants of physics have the values they have.
>Consequently, we can't know if it would even be possible for them to
>have different values. It may turn out to be the case that these values
>fall out from the laws of physics in some as-of-yet unknown fashion, in
>which case they *must* have the values which they have in much the same
>way that (e.g.) pi must have the value it has.

I pointed that out to him, and it was ignored.

>However, if we assume that these values can vary and that some
>'fine-tuner' was involved in setting there values, that doesn't give us
>any insight into why said tuner wanted those values to be set the way
>they are.
>
>Currently, we really don't know how widespread life is in the universe,
>but as far as we know the overwhelming majority of the universe appears
>to be incredibly hostile to life, so whatever your hypothetical tuner
>might have been interested in, it's highly unlikely that it was life.
>More likely, life is simply some unexpected infestation which has arisen
>in a few places which your tuner has either (a) opted to tolerate
>insofar as it doesn't interfere with the main experiment (whatever that
>might be) or (b) not gotten around to eradicating yet.

[someone]

On Friday, March 16, 2018 at 5:05:04 PM UTC, *Hemidactylus* wrote:

You seem to have missed the point, I am not referring to the configuration of the brain. I am talking about the experience that such configurations are correlated with. The naturalist position gives no reason why we should expect such configurations to give rise to any experience at all, or why the experience should not have been a flash of light every time a neuron fired, or if a representation, then a different one. Thus it relies on the experience just happening to be fine tuned to an experience which theists deem suitable for basing moral decisions on (no experience or a flash of light every time a neuron fired would not have been suitable).

[someone]

As far as I am aware no one else has brought up the fine tuning of the experience issue, and no one has dealt with it.

[Bill Rogers]

Or several people have brought it up, dealt with it, and been ignored by you.

There's a simple naturalist explanation for the "fine tuning of the experience issue." The brain evolved. Animals with brains do better if the firing of their neurons bears some relation to what's out there in the world. Those whose neurons fire in a way that represents the outside world accurately enough survive and breed. Those who neurons fire in a way that is unrelated to what's going on in the outside world get eaten, or walk off a cliff, or drown.

[Ernest Major]

When you started this thread you specifically referred to cosmological
fine-tuning arguments. There was no reason for anyone to bring up your
previous failed argument on other subjects. Are you practising a "bait
and switch"?

On your previous attempts to argue religion from consciousness you
failed the Turing Test. You'll have to do better if you want people to
engage with you, nevermind making a convincing argument.

--
alias Ernest Major

[Andre G. Isaak]

In article <47066685-9cd0-478c...@googlegroups.com>,

Basically what Bill said, but to flesh things out a little bit:

Your obsession with the possibility that we might have somehow
experienced things differently seems predicated on the false assumption
that what we experience and the outside world are somehow the same, but
that seems like a rather naive view.

I'd suggest that the qualia which we experience are essentially
arbitrary labels which the brain attaches to various stimuli. (By
'arbitrary' I simply mean that there's no necessary connection between
our experience of 'red' and (e.g) 700 nm light waves.) What's important
is simply that our experience actually correlate in some consistent way
with some aspect of the outside world if it is to provide us with any
survival advantage. An organism which developed the experience of a
flashing light in response to a particular neuron firing would do just
fine provided it could process that information in some meaningful way.
If it experienced a flash whenever the temperature became to high, that
would be useful. If it simply experienced flashes at random, that
wouldn't be; and while it would be possible (I suppose) for some
organism to develop some 'experience' which was not meaningfully
correlated with the outside world, such a trait would provide no
selective advantage and thus would be highly unlikely to be passed on.

To give a more concrete example, let's consider the bat which you and
Nagel seem to be so fond of. I really have no idea whether a bat
perceives the sound used in echolocation in the same way that we
perceive sound (possibly with different pitches corresponding to the
distance of nearby objects) or whether they perceive this in the same
way that we perceive visual information (albeit with a much lower
resolution). From an evolutionary standpoint, the crucial point isn't
how echolocation is subjectively experienced; it's that echolocation
provides valuable information about the surroundings. How bats actually
experience things would simply be a matter of historical contingency --
i.e. the first innovation that came along and proved useful would be
selected for regardless of whether the experience was what we would
consider 'sound', 'vision', or something entirely different.

Evolution provides an adequate account of why experiences which provide
useful information will be passed on and those which don't won't be
passed on. There's no need whatsoever to posit 'fine-tuning' of the
experiences themselves.

[Paul J Gans]

I've found another amazing fine-tuning situation. And that is
the strength of the gravitational force on earch. If it were much
higher, we would not be able to stand and certainly not be able to
dance about. And a simple fall would kill us.

On the other hand if the gravitational force were much lower, we'd
be able to throw a stone quite a distance, leap tall buildings with
a single bound, and have digestive problems because of the inability
of gravity to keep our stomach contents from refluxing.

If this doesn't prove intelligent design, I don't no what will.

[someone]

See https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/3qMhoMuYP_8/sw0GIlPIAwAJ for a suitable reply.

"You seem to have missed the point, I am not referring to the configuration of the brain. I am talking about the experience that such configurations are correlated with. The naturalist position gives no reason why we should expect such configurations to give rise to any experience at all, or why the experience should not have been a flash of light every time a neuron fired, or if a representation, then a different one. Thus it relies on the experience just happening to be fine tuned to an experience which theists deem suitable for basing moral decisions on (no experience or a flash of light every time a neuron fired would not have been suitable)."

[someone]

On Monday, March 19, 2018 at 1:50:03 PM UTC, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
> In article <47066685-9cd0-478c...@googlegroups.com>,

I do not assume that in a naturalist view the outside world and the experience would be the same. Though for the purposes of this conversation I was assuming it supposes the existence of trees and animals etc.

Evolution does not offer any explanation of why certain chemical configurations would be experienced at all, or provide any expectation for what would be experienced if there were to be an experience, nor does it suggest evolutionary advantage to experiencing.

[Andre G. Isaak]

In article <c8168b45-f4ff-443c...@googlegroups.com>,

Nor does it attempt to -- that would be a problem for neurobiology, not
evolutionary biology.

> nor does it
> suggest evolutionary advantage to experiencing.

That's only because you hold the strange view that our conscious
experience does not effect our behaviour, a view not shared by the rest
of the world. Our experience provides us with information about the
outside world which provides us with all sorts of survival advantages
(e.g. awareness of nearby prey/predators, the ability to not crash into
walls or walk off cliffs, etc.)

[someone]

On Tuesday, March 20, 2018 at 11:00:03 AM UTC, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
> In article <c8168b45-f4ff-443c...@googlegroups.com>,

I hold no such view. I merely point out that from a naturalist position it makes no difference. As I have repeatedly pointed out in this thread:"The naturalist position gives no reason why we should expect such configurations to give rise to any experience at all, or why the experience should not have been a flash of light every time a neuron fired, or if a representation, then a different one. Thus it relies on the experience just happening to be fine tuned to an experience which theists deem suitable for basing moral decisions on (no experience or a flash of light every time a neuron fired would not have been suitable)."

From a naturalist position what a-priori reason would there be to expect human brain configurations to correlate to the experiences that they do (as opposed to no experience, or a flash of light each time a neuron fired, or some other representation for example)?

Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration not be thought sufficient provide the organism with type of survival advantages you mention, even if they were not experienced?

Even if you really did fail to comprehend the point I am making, surely the other naturalists on talk origins cannot all truthfully claim to.

[someone]

I should just correct myself there. It is more accurate to state state that I am not aware of any naturalist position that specifies how an evolutionary advantage is achieved by experiencing.

[Bill Rogers]

You've just been given examples by a couple of us. But you reject them because you think that "experience" is something other than a physical response happening in the brain. That's fine. Your position is inconsistent with physicalism/naturalism/materialism. No big deal.

[someone]

I do not assume that the experience is not a feature of a physical activity in the brain. That physical activity though would have many features, and you have offered advantages of features other than the feature of it experiencing (as physicalism/naturalism/materialism suggests). All physicalism/naturalism/materialism suggests is that any experience is a feature of at least some part the suggested physical. To refer to a feature that is thought by physicalists/naturalisst/materialists to be a feature of something physical is no incompatible with physicalism/naturalism/materialism.

The point is that like with naturalism not offering any a-priori expectations of physics constants which give rise to moral considerations (if there were no "multiverse"), neither does it offers an a-priori expectation for human brain configurations to correlate to the experiences that they do (as opposed to no experience, or a flash of light each time a neuron fired, or some other representation for example). So whereas the theory of theism can explain why there is an experience, and why it is not a flash of light, or some other representation for example; physicalism/naturalism/materialism relies on it reality just happening to be fine tuned to the theist expectation of an experience suitable to base moral choices on.

Do you concede that physicalism/naturalism/materialism offers no a-priori expectation for human brain configurations to correlate to the experiences that they do (as opposed to no experience, or a flash of light each time a neuron fired, or some other representation for example)?

[Bill Rogers]

No. I don't concede that.

[Andre G. Isaak]

In article <ba65b82c-5ff3-46f5...@googlegroups.com>,

You've made this claim in the past, and it was pointed out to you then
that your understanding of the physicalist/materialst position doesn't
even remotely resemble that of actual physicalists or materialists.

Physicalists believe that conscious experience is a physical phenomenon.
They also believe that it has direct effects on our behaviour and that a
conscious entity will behave very differently from a non-conscious one,
your position notwithstanding. Consciousness allows for much greater
flexibility in interacting with the environment and as such provides a
distinct advantage from an evolutionary standpoint.

Unfortunately, attempts to explain what physicalists *actually* believe
didn't get anywhere because you refused to abandon your socratic
approach in favour of actual discussion, and we ended up with thousands
of posts of you refusing to move forward unless everyone would agree to
various nonsensical claims about NAND gates. Since no one was willing to
agree to points that directly contradicted their actual views we never
actually got to whatever point it was that you were intending to make.

Andre

> As I have repeatedly pointed out in this thread:"The
> naturalist position gives no reason why we should expect such configurations
> to give rise to any experience at all, or why the experience should not have
> been a flash of light every time a neuron fired, or if a representation, then
> a different one. Thus it relies on the experience just happening to be fine
> tuned to an experience which theists deem suitable for basing moral decisions
> on (no experience or a flash of light every time a neuron fired would not
> have been suitable)."
>
> From a naturalist position what a-priori reason would there be to expect
> human brain configurations to correlate to the experiences that they do (as
> opposed to no experience, or a flash of light each time a neuron fired, or
> some other representation for example)?
>
> Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration not be thought
> sufficient provide the organism with type of survival advantages you mention,
> even if they were not experienced?
>
> Even if you really did fail to comprehend the point I am making, surely the
> other naturalists on talk origins cannot all truthfully claim to.
>

[someone]

Could you provide the a-priori reasoning from a physicalist/naturalist/materialist perspective for expecting the human brain configurations to correlate to the experiences that they do (as opposed to no experience, or a flash of light each time a neuron fired, or some other representation for example)?

[someone]

On Wednesday, March 21, 2018 at 6:20:04 PM UTC, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
> In article <ba65b82c-5ff3-46f5...@googlegroups.com>,

I noticed you did not answer my questions.

>
> > As I have repeatedly pointed out in this thread:"The
> > naturalist position gives no reason why we should expect such configurations
> > to give rise to any experience at all, or why the experience should not have
> > been a flash of light every time a neuron fired, or if a representation, then
> > a different one. Thus it relies on the experience just happening to be fine
> > tuned to an experience which theists deem suitable for basing moral decisions
> > on (no experience or a flash of light every time a neuron fired would not
> > have been suitable)."
> >
> > From a naturalist position what a-priori reason would there be to expect
> > human brain configurations to correlate to the experiences that they do (as
> > opposed to no experience, or a flash of light each time a neuron fired, or
> > some other representation for example)?
> >

The question in the paragraph directly above

> > Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration not be thought
> > sufficient provide the organism with type of survival advantages you mention,
> > even if they were not experienced?
> >

And the question in the paragraph directly above

[Andre G. Isaak]

In article <ca7b6613-1ca5-47a6...@googlegroups.com>,

I'm not sure why you specify an _a priori_ reason. Science generally
doesn't operate that way.

We don't currently have a full understanding of how consciousness arises
in the brain -- that, however, doesn't constitute an argument for a
non-materialist position; it simply means that we are dealing with an
area of research that's still in its infancy.

My own view is that some form of conscious experience is a *necessary*
consequence of any sort of information processing which is sufficiently
complex to provide not only a representation of the environment but also
of the individual within that environment along with the ability to
simulate various possible courses of action without necessarily actually
taking those courses of action -- i.e. a combination of both
representation and simulation.

Let me turn this around, though. What _a priori_ (or even _a
posteriori_) reasons would you offer for assuming that the same brain
configurations which you mention above *aren't* correlated with actual
experiences as opposed to no experience or random experience? I raise
this simply to point out that a question without a known (or
fully-known) answer doesn't constitute an argument against a position
unless you actually *do* have an answer for that question which
precludes a particular point of view.

>
> > > Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration not be thought
> > > sufficient provide the organism with type of survival advantages you
> > > mention,
> > > even if they were not experienced?
> > >
>
> And the question in the paragraph directly above

I'm sceptical that it would be possible to generate the same range of
behaviours *without* conscious experience.

But, for sake of argument lets assume this is in fact possible.
Evolution tends to pursue whichever course it first stumbles upon, and
unless there is some survival advantage associated with *not* having
conscious experiences, then there's not reason to assume evolution would
favour either of the approaches which you suggest above. If it developed
the 'experiencing' path first, there would be no reason for it to not
continue along this pathway even if other pathways had been available.

In general, 'why did we do X rather than Y' isn't a very good
evolutionary argument. All evolutionary theorists acknowledge the fact
that historical contingency plays an important role in natural history.

Andre

>
> > > Even if you really did fail to comprehend the point I am making, surely
> > > the
> > > other naturalists on talk origins cannot all truthfully claim to.
> > >
> >
> > --
> > To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
> > service.

[someone]

On Wednesday, March 21, 2018 at 8:15:03 PM UTC, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
> In article <ca7b6613-1ca5-47a6...@googlegroups.com>,

But materialism gives you no reason to expect a-priori the feature of experience to be as it is. If you had all the known laws of physics, they do not imply any experience at all.

It is similar to the cosmological fine tuning issue regarding the physics constants, though there the suggestion of a multiverse might help. With the experience though, suggesting that there could be a multiverse with different experiences corresponding to the configurations just brings up the issue of what difference in behaviour would be expected in a universe in which had the same laws and physics constants but no experience.

Analogous to what you are trying to do with the experience, you can claim that the physics constants are *necessarily* as they are measured to be, but that is just a claim of them necessarily being fine tuned while lacking any explanation for the claimed necessity.

> Let me turn this around, though. What _a priori_ (or even _a
> posteriori_) reasons would you offer for assuming that the same brain
> configurations which you mention above *aren't* correlated with actual
> experiences as opposed to no experience or random experience? I raise
> this simply to point out that a question without a known (or
> fully-known) answer doesn't constitute an argument against a position
> unless you actually *do* have an answer for that question which
> precludes a particular point of view.
>

Well from naturalist perspective if I knew the known laws of physics, and of the neural configurations, I would guess that the experience if any would be reducible to the experience or lack-of of the fundamental particles. At least there I could use the idea of reductionism.

From a theist perspective one could assume a-priori that the experience would be fit for purpose, i.e. suitable for basing moral judgements on (so the idea of no experience or flashes of light etc. could be ruled out a-priori).

> >
> > > > Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration not be thought
> > > > sufficient provide the organism with type of survival advantages you
> > > > mention,
> > > > even if they were not experienced?
> > > >
> >
> > And the question in the paragraph directly above
>
> I'm sceptical that it would be possible to generate the same range of
> behaviours *without* conscious experience.
>
> But, for sake of argument lets assume this is in fact possible.
> Evolution tends to pursue whichever course it first stumbles upon, and
> unless there is some survival advantage associated with *not* having
> conscious experiences, then there's not reason to assume evolution would
> favour either of the approaches which you suggest above. If it developed
> the 'experiencing' path first, there would be no reason for it to not
> continue along this pathway even if other pathways had been available.
>
> In general, 'why did we do X rather than Y' isn't a very good
> evolutionary argument. All evolutionary theorists acknowledge the fact
> that historical contingency plays an important role in natural history.
>

Unfortunately as happens so often, you replied as though you did not manage to comprehend the question. Typically you tend to blame me, but perhaps read the question again, and note that it is about a particular unspecified neural configuration. I assume here you did it on purpose, changing the issue from different experiences for a particular unspecified configuration, to different experiences for a set of behaviours achieved by different configurations. Not too subtle a shift. Though just in case you did not do it on purpose (I will leave the readers to make their own judgement on the matter) I will try to help. Imagine a person were to try a multiverse response analogous to that often given in to the cosmological fine tuning argument. The difference being that rather than the physics constants being imagined to be different in each "universe" the experience was imagined to be different. If you can manage to understand that, then perhaps try again with your answer, as it did not answer my question (I have explained why). I will reword it below for you to reflect the idea of the two experientially different "universes" in the aforementioned multiverse.

Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration in the "universe" in which there was no experience not be thought sufficient provide the organism with type of survival advantages you mention, even if they were not experienced?

[Note it is not a question about whether you believe such a multiverse could exist]

[Burkhard]

really not? They are quite common, I myself gave one on TO. Simple
really, but also interesting as a potential argument for property dualism.

Just take some of your co-thinkers to eat some rotten meat, put your
heads in boiling water, throw your children before a bus, and jump from
a high building. Record, while you can, if the experience is pleasant or
not.

Then a group of us as control sample eats some nicely done steak with
vegs, followed by a night of a-mazing sex (not with each other I mean,
but our partner of choice) , to spend the next day surrounded by our
happy family protecting them from dangers.

repeat over an extended period of time, 2 years say, and count the
offspring that both groups will have produced by then,

I think you might find that the group that did the things they
experienced as pleasurable will have more. so from an evolutionary
perspective, the ability to feel positive about things that are
beneficial (and hence motivated to do them) and repulsed by those that
aren't (and hence deterred to do them) makes perfect sense.

[someone]

There you are just suggesting that one group of people do things which are harmful to their form, and another group do not. You have not explained how the experience makes any difference to the chemistry. From a naturalist position what a-priori reasons would there be for expecting the activities you describe to be experienced at all?

[Burkhard]

I think I did. When I said "motivated to do x"

>From a naturalist position what a-priori reasons would there be for expecting the activities you describe to be experienced at all?

Why would I want or need any a priori reasons? Empirical sciences are a
posteriori. We observe that for evolutionary old behaviours, "being
pleasant" and "being advantageous" correlate, and "being unpleasant" and
"being disadvantageous" are negatively correlated.

We also observe that humans give explanations for their actions in terms
of expected pleasant or unpleasant experiences.

From these observations, we can build a model. In this model, pleasant
and unpleasant experiences act as causes (dispositively) for actions.
From this we can together with general evolutionary theory draw
predictions.

One is that people who lack the ability to experience unpleasant
sensations will be more likely to not have descendants. We can then
check this against the data - and lo and behold, people with e.g.
congenital analgesia tend not to live long.

[someone]

I do not even notice a mention of chemistry there, let alone how the chemical activity being experienced makes a difference.

Imagine the physics constant values were imagined spontaneously change in the universe. A physicist could explain the difference it would be expected to make to the chemistry of your brain. Could you do something similar and explain the difference you would be expecting it to make to the chemistry of your brain if the experiencing feature of the chemistry changed such that the same chemical arrangement of your brain was no longer experienced?

> >From a naturalist position what a-priori reasons would there be for expecting the activities you describe to be experienced at all?
>
> Why would I want or need any a priori reasons? Empirical sciences are a
> posteriori. We observe that for evolutionary old behaviours, "being
> pleasant" and "being advantageous" correlate, and "being unpleasant" and
> "being disadvantageous" are negatively correlated.
>
> We also observe that humans give explanations for their actions in terms
> of expected pleasant or unpleasant experiences.
>
> From these observations, we can build a model. In this model, pleasant
> and unpleasant experiences act as causes (dispositively) for actions.
> From this we can together with general evolutionary theory draw
> predictions.
>
> One is that people who lack the ability to experience unpleasant
> sensations will be more likely to not have descendants. We can then
> check this against the data - and lo and behold, people with e.g.
> congenital analgesia tend not to live long.
>

Science often works by a-priori reasoning. The a-priori reasoning leads to a-priori predictions which are then checked. And like with the physics constants and the possible cosmological fine tuning even when you know certain information, you can imagine that you did not and question whether your theory would have lead you to to have expected such results, or whether the results seem fine tuned given your theory.

The reason it is important is that science as a matter of best practise tends to favour theories which require less fine tuning.

Imagine for example a medical study where group A does not receive the drug, group B receives a placebo, and group C receives the drug. The a-priori expectation for the theory that the drug is ineffective would be that the recovery rate for group C would be around the recovery rate of group B. The a-priori expectation for the theory that the drug is effective would be that the recovery rate for group C would be significantly better than the recovery rate of group B. Even if it was known that the recovery rate for group C had been tested and the results were that the recovery rate was significantly better than for group B, that does not prevent us from realising that there was no a-priori reason to have expected that given the theory that the drug was ineffective. Such a theory would require fine tuning for such a theory. The theory that the drug was effective would not, and as a matter of best practise would be favoured.

With the physics constants the suggestion of a large enough multiverse with varying physics constant values does away with the fine tuning. Since the required values for complex chemistry and lifeforms would be expected to exist in one or more universes.

[Öö Tiib]

You are talking about so trivial and low level things from position of
you are ignorant therefore such knowledge does not exist.
Every kid understands that all your senses are not wired together
into visual perception so some sensed events result with flash of
light experience but others as pain in butt experience.

>
> From a naturalist position what a-priori reason would there
> be to expect human brain configurations to correlate to the
> experiences that they do (as opposed to no experience, or
> a flash of light each time a neuron fired, or some other
> representation for example)?

It is unclear what strange straw man you are building there?
https://healthjade.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/human-brain-anatomy.jpg
Does it look like apparatus that can't differentiate between
visual and other sensations?

>
> Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration
> not be thought sufficient provide the organism with type
> of survival advantages you mention, even if they were not
> experienced?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lkJk8_swbHE
Soon these have more survival advantages than most of
creationists.

> Even if you really did fail to comprehend the point I am
> making, surely the other naturalists on talk origins cannot
> all truthfully claim to.

Avoid experiments of sharp pain in butt expressing
itself as flash of light (despite it can be possible).

[someone]

The point is that naturalism provides no a-priori expectation of any experience, and if the physical was guessed to have the feature of being experienced, naturalism offers no a-priori expectation of what physical situations would correlate to what experiences. Maybe things would only experience over a certain temperature, so molecules in molten metal might experience light in proportion to temperature over a certain threshold, and so on. Note: I am discussing a-priori expectations here.

Furthermore as I have mentioned, I am not aware of any naturalist theory in which experiential features of the physical are posited as playing a role in physics.

> >
> > From a naturalist position what a-priori reason would there
> > be to expect human brain configurations to correlate to the
> > experiences that they do (as opposed to no experience, or
> > a flash of light each time a neuron fired, or some other
> > representation for example)?
>
> It is unclear what strange straw man you are building there?
> https://healthjade.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/human-brain-anatomy.jpg
> Does it look like apparatus that can't differentiate between
> visual and other sensations?
>
> >
> > Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration
> > not be thought sufficient provide the organism with type
> > of survival advantages you mention, even if they were not
> > experienced?
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lkJk8_swbHE
> Soon these have more survival advantages than most of
> creationists.
>
> > Even if you really did fail to comprehend the point I am
> > making, surely the other naturalists on talk origins cannot
> > all truthfully claim to.
>
> Avoid experiments of sharp pain in butt expressing
> itself as flash of light (despite it can be possible).

Your post seems to simply be one to suggest that you did not comprehend any of the points I was making, while avoiding answering the questions. I presume the motive is to start a long discussion where you feign ignorance and avoid answering questions so that the point is obscured and no one could be bothered to follow it because it would just be you feigning ignorance and avoiding questions. If I am wrong, then have a serious go at comprehending what was written, and a serious go at answering the questions. If those like you who argue against intelligent design are reduced to the type of tactics you seem to be employing, then I guess I won the argument.

[Burkhard]

Then I really can't help you. I'd say I expressed the idea as clear as
one possibly can

>
> Imagine the physics constant values were imagined spontaneously change in the universe. A physicist could explain the difference it would be expected to make to the chemistry of your brain.

I rather doubt that they could. You could artificially assume that the
change of one constant takes place in isolation and everything else
stays the same(highly artificial and most likely wrong) and on that
basis make some more or less educated guesses, but that's about it.
Possibly interesting thought experiments, possibly of interest for
philosophers, but at best a heuristic device for doing physics.

> Could you do something similar and explain the difference you would be expecting it to make to the chemistry of your brain if the experiencing feature of the chemistry changed such that the same chemical arrangement of your brain was no longer experienced?

No, I could not. But that does not particularly worry me either. We
observe the correlation between experiencing and brain chemistry, and
the absence of experiencing when the brain chemistry gets disrupted too
much. That's all I need for a pretty sound working hypothesis that they
are causally related.

It is also not really "something similar". It is rather the inverse of
the physics scenario that you described above. Now you are removing an
actually observed effect, and ask to speculate what causes need to be
removed so that this absence would be the result.

>
>> >From a naturalist position what a-priori reasons would there be for expecting the activities you describe to be experienced at all?
>>
>> Why would I want or need any a priori reasons? Empirical sciences are a
>> posteriori. We observe that for evolutionary old behaviours, "being
>> pleasant" and "being advantageous" correlate, and "being unpleasant" and
>> "being disadvantageous" are negatively correlated.
>>
>> We also observe that humans give explanations for their actions in terms
>> of expected pleasant or unpleasant experiences.
>>
>> From these observations, we can build a model. In this model, pleasant
>> and unpleasant experiences act as causes (dispositively) for actions.
>> From this we can together with general evolutionary theory draw
>> predictions.
>>
>> One is that people who lack the ability to experience unpleasant
>> sensations will be more likely to not have descendants. We can then
>> check this against the data - and lo and behold, people with e.g.
>> congenital analgesia tend not to live long.
>>
>
> Science often works by a-priori reasoning. The a-priori reasoning leads to a-priori predictions which are then checked. And like with the physics constants and the possible cosmological fine tuning even when you know certain information, you can imagine that you did not and question whether your theory would have lead you to to have expected such results, or whether the results seem fine tuned given your theory.

That seems to be a very non-standard way to use "a priori". And I don't
understand at all what this has to do with fine tuning.

>
> The reason it is important is that science as a matter of best practise tends to favour theories which require less fine tuning.

Not sure what you mean with that. If you mean: "science favours theories
that leave more degrees of freedom (in the technical sense of degrees of
freedom) I'd say it is simply wrong.

>
> Imagine for example a medical study where group A does not receive the drug, group B receives a placebo, and group C receives the drug. The a-priori expectation for the theory that the drug is ineffective would be that the recovery rate for group C would be around the recovery rate of group B.

As I said above, this is a non-standard use of a priori. You seem to
think more of posterior and prior probabilities, but even prior
probabilities are the result of past experience.

> The a-priori expectation for the theory that the drug is effective would be that the recovery rate for group C would be significantly better than the recovery rate of group B. Even if it was known that the recovery rate for group C had been tested and the results were that the recovery rate was significantly better than for group B, that does not prevent us from realising that there was no a-priori reason to have expected that given the theory that the drug was ineffective. Such a theory would require fine tuning for such a theory. The theory that the drug was effective would not, and as a matter of best practise would be favoured.

sorry, I don't understand this at all, in particular not how fine tuning
comes in.

[Ernest Major]

On 22/03/2018 13:19, Burkhard wrote:
> sorry, I don't understand this at all, in particular not how fine tuning
> comes in.

I think that he is using someone else's apologetics. I forget the name
so I can't refer you to the source.

As I recall, the argument goes along the lines of ...

If consciousness is epiphenomenal it is not causal, and hence there is
no naturalistic reason why conscious sensory perception should
correspond to reality. Therefore as conscious sensory perception
corresponds to reality it must have a separate origin. Therefore
mind-body dualism. Therefore his diety of choice.

I'd question the ontological axiom that epiphenomena are not causal. I'd
also question the axiom that conscious sensory phenomena correspond
exactly rather than approximately to reality.

--
alias Ernest Major

[Öö Tiib]

More plain wrong assertions. Most of psychology deals with sensory
information processing because it is on one hand simple and on other
hand most often damaged or mislead.

> Maybe things would only experience over a certain temperature,
> so molecules in molten metal might experience light in proportion
> to temperature over a certain threshold, and so on. Note: I am
> discussing a-priori expectations here.

A-priori means "from the earlier". So about what earlier you talk
here? Before birth? If birth then to what extent sensory expectations
are innate or trained later depends on how soon these are crucial
for survival of animal. The nestlings of birds that nest on ground
are capable of running, hiding and pecking within minutes after
hatching, apes of that age have trouble of focusing gaze but
kittens are blind and attempt to open eyes only week after birth
first time.
If you mean a-priori as "by magic" (like I strongly suspect) then
there are nothing magical in sensory information.

> Furthermore as I have mentioned, I am not aware of any
> naturalist theory in which experiential features of the
> physical are posited as playing a role in physics.

I can't parse what you say. Are you asking for naturalist
theory about telekinesis? Or what you mean "experiential
features play role in physics"?

>
> > >
> > > From a naturalist position what a-priori reason would there
> > > be to expect human brain configurations to correlate to the
> > > experiences that they do (as opposed to no experience, or
> > > a flash of light each time a neuron fired, or some other
> > > representation for example)?
> >
> > It is unclear what strange straw man you are building there?
> > https://healthjade.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/human-brain-anatomy.jpg
> > Does it look like apparatus that can't differentiate between
> > visual and other sensations?
> >
> > >
> > > Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration
> > > not be thought sufficient provide the organism with type
> > > of survival advantages you mention, even if they were not
> > > experienced?
> >
> > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lkJk8_swbHE
> > Soon these have more survival advantages than most of
> > creationists.
> >
> > > Even if you really did fail to comprehend the point I am
> > > making, surely the other naturalists on talk origins cannot
> > > all truthfully claim to.
> >
> > Avoid experiments of sharp pain in butt expressing
> > itself as flash of light (despite it can be possible).
>
> Your post seems to simply be one to suggest that you did not comprehend any of the points I was making, while avoiding answering the questions. I presume the motive is to start a long discussion where you feign ignorance and avoid answering questions so that the point is obscured and no one could be bothered to follow it because it would just be you feigning ignorance and avoiding questions. If I am wrong, then have a serious go at comprehending what was written, and a serious go at answering the questions. If those like you who argue against intelligent design are reduced to the type of tactics you seem to be employing, then I guess I won the argument.

You just assume something that you do not explain. Most
likely something somewhere is somehow magical again,
but you can't explain what it is. Then you reject any
attempts to discuss it with "you did not comprehend"
and then build some more lame straw men. So indeed
better declare victory. :D

[Andre G. Isaak]

In article <e95d1216-b8cd-4219...@googlegroups.com>,

We don't know all the laws of physics, which means we don't know what
all of the laws of physics imply.

I think you are conflating three entirely different concepts:

1. Physicalism is the view that all phenomena in the universe are
ultimately physical phenomena, and that a useful study of the universe
needn't posit non-physical causes.

2. Physicalism is *not* the view that all phenomena in the universe
should be accounted for simply in terms of the laws of physics. The name
for that position is 'methodological reductionism', and very few people,
physicalist or otherwise, subscribe to this position.

3. Physicalism is *not* the view that a complete understanding of the
fundamental laws of physics would give us the ability to fully predict
everything about everything. The name for that position is 'hubris', and
reasonable people don't subscribe to that view.

> It is similar to the cosmological fine tuning issue regarding the physics
> constants, though there the suggestion of a multiverse might help. With the
> experience though, suggesting that there could be a multiverse with different
> experiences corresponding to the configurations just brings up the issue of
> what difference in behaviour would be expected in a universe in which had the
> same laws and physics constants but no experience.
>
> Analogous to what you are trying to do with the experience, you can claim
> that the physics constants are *necessarily* as they are measured to be, but
> that is just a claim of them necessarily being fine tuned while lacking any
> explanation for the claimed necessity.

My position is that we *don't* live in a fine-tuned universe. Therefore
it doesn't require an account. AFAICT, fine-tuning arguments all reduce
to the incredibly banal claim that if the universe had been different,
then it would be different.

And I have absolutely no idea how cosmological fine-tuning or the
multiverse has anything to do with problems of consciousness.

> > Let me turn this around, though. What _a priori_ (or even _a
> > posteriori_) reasons would you offer for assuming that the same brain
> > configurations which you mention above *aren't* correlated with actual
> > experiences as opposed to no experience or random experience? I raise
> > this simply to point out that a question without a known (or
> > fully-known) answer doesn't constitute an argument against a position
> > unless you actually *do* have an answer for that question which
> > precludes a particular point of view.
> >
>
> Well from naturalist perspective if I knew the known laws of physics, and of
> the neural configurations, I would guess that the experience if any would be
> reducible to the experience or lack-of of the fundamental particles. At least
> there I could use the idea of reductionism.

That't not the physicalist position. Not even remotely.

> From a theist perspective one could assume a-priori that the experience would
> be fit for purpose,

How exactly does that constitute an 'a priori' claim?

> i.e. suitable for basing moral judgements on (so the idea
> of no experience or flashes of light etc. could be ruled out a-priori).

The question of how consciousness arises is completely unrelated to the
question of how moral judgement arises.

I can't make heads or tails of any of that.

> Not too subtle a shift. Though just in case you did not do it
> on purpose (I will leave the readers to make their own judgement on the
> matter) I will try to help. Imagine a person were to try a multiverse
> response analogous to that often given in to the cosmological fine tuning
> argument. The difference being that rather than the physics constants being
> imagined to be different in each "universe" the experience was imagined to be
> different.

That would constitute a wholesale denial of physicalism. You can't have
identical laws of physics and yet get different results. So what you are
proposing above is essentially a dualist position in which consciousness
is an independent, non-physical entity.

> If you can manage to understand that, then perhaps try again with
> your answer, as it did not answer my question (I have explained why). I will
> reword it below for you to reflect the idea of the two experientially
> different "universes" in the aforementioned multiverse.
>
> Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration in the "universe" in
> which there was no experience not be thought sufficient provide the organism
> with type of survival advantages you mention, even if they were not
> experienced?
>
> [Note it is not a question about whether you believe such a multiverse could
> exist]

It's not simply that I don't believe in them; it's that they are an
entirely incoherent notion. Asking me to entertain such a scenario is
equivalent to asking me to entertain a universe in which, for every X, X
implies not X. It simply can't be done.

[Burkhard]

Yes, I'd agree with that analysis - and an example for the type of
apologetics would be Plantinga. But none of this has to do with fine
tuning,the way that term is normally understood. Fine tuning is the
argument that even a small deviation from the values that some input
parameters have would result in catastrophic changes on the
"output"side. ("If the constant were just a bit more,then....")

But sensory perceptions precisely do not match to any such degree to the
external world (hence the discussion between realists and non-realists).
We can differ e.g. vastly in eyesight, ability to recognize patterns,
colour discrimination, pain perception etc etc and still function
adequately

[someone]

So you cannot even offer a guess of what the influence might be on the chemistry, but you feel that you have expressed your idea of what the influence might be on the chemistry "as clear as one possibly can". All you have done is make it clear that *you* cannot even *guess* what the influence would be on the chemistry. That were expecting me to be able to guess at what influence on the chemistry you were referring to when you yourself could not, is I think, slightly strange.

> It is also not really "something similar". It is rather the inverse of
> the physics scenario that you described above. Now you are removing an
> actually observed effect, and ask to speculate what causes need to be
> removed so that this absence would be the result.
>

I think they are analogous. A supposed physical feature being varied in a thought experiment to enable an illustration of the expected influence the change of the feature would have on the chemistry. It would be analogous to setting one of the constants to 0. If you wanted you could consider a different experience though, such as a flash of light every time a neuron flashed.

Though you write as though experiencing were an effect of certain chemical activity, rather than a cause. If simply an effect with no causal role then it simply has no influence on behaviour. If it is an effect with a causal role, then simply imagine the same activity that would have resulted in the effect, but assume there is no effect, and so its causal influence vanishes. Just explain how you were imagining the effect no longer happening, and so no longer causing whatever it effect it did would influence a single chemical reaction.

> >
> >> >From a naturalist position what a-priori reasons would there be for expecting the activities you describe to be experienced at all?
> >>
> >> Why would I want or need any a priori reasons? Empirical sciences are a
> >> posteriori. We observe that for evolutionary old behaviours, "being
> >> pleasant" and "being advantageous" correlate, and "being unpleasant" and
> >> "being disadvantageous" are negatively correlated.
> >>
> >> We also observe that humans give explanations for their actions in terms
> >> of expected pleasant or unpleasant experiences.
> >>
> >> From these observations, we can build a model. In this model, pleasant
> >> and unpleasant experiences act as causes (dispositively) for actions.
> >> From this we can together with general evolutionary theory draw
> >> predictions.
> >>
> >> One is that people who lack the ability to experience unpleasant
> >> sensations will be more likely to not have descendants. We can then
> >> check this against the data - and lo and behold, people with e.g.
> >> congenital analgesia tend not to live long.
> >>
> >
> > Science often works by a-priori reasoning. The a-priori reasoning leads to a-priori predictions which are then checked. And like with the physics constants and the possible cosmological fine tuning even when you know certain information, you can imagine that you did not and question whether your theory would have lead you to to have expected such results, or whether the results seem fine tuned given your theory.
>
> That seems to be a very non-standard way to use "a priori". And I don't
> understand at all what this has to do with fine tuning.
>
> >
> > The reason it is important is that science as a matter of best practise tends to favour theories which require less fine tuning.
>
> Not sure what you mean with that. If you mean: "science favours theories
> that leave more degrees of freedom (in the technical sense of degrees of
> freedom) I'd say it is simply wrong.
>

I never mentioned degrees of freedom. I mentioned fine tuning. Fine tuning I think refers to the contrast between a wide range of possibilities given a theory and a narrow range of a phenomenon or outcome. I have tended to use the term more loosely, considering the specialness of the result (which can involve expected probabilities) given range of results one could expect from the theory.

You can take it either way in the statement I made, either as strictly meant, or allowing expected probabilities. I do not think this is uncommon to include probability, in order to highlight the specialness of the outcome given the expectations given a theory. For example Gerraint Lewis and Luke Barnes in their book "A Fortunate Universe" have on page.282 written "The probabilites that are required to understand the fine-tuning of the universe of the universe for life are the probabilities of theory testing in science", and later on page 286 that "Our claim is that fine-tuning claims can be understaood in the context of objective Bayesianism, and that the difficulties faced in calculating the relevant probabilities are of the same kind as those faced in calculating the relevant probabilities are of the same kind as those faced in analysing any physical theory."

> >
> > Imagine for example a medical study where group A does not receive the drug, group B receives a placebo, and group C receives the drug. The a-priori expectation for the theory that the drug is ineffective would be that the recovery rate for group C would be around the recovery rate of group B.
>
> As I said above, this is a non-standard use of a priori. You seem to
> think more of posterior and prior probabilities, but even prior
> probabilities are the result of past experience.
>

There was no estimate of probability based on past events here, only the a-priori assumption that if the drug were ineffective that over a series of trials there would be no reason to expect the results to favour more recoveries in group B than group C. So if the amount of recoveries were not equal in a given trial it would be 50/50 which group had more.

> > The a-priori expectation for the theory that the drug is effective would be that the recovery rate for group C would be significantly better than the recovery rate of group B. Even if it was known that the recovery rate for group C had been tested and the results were that the recovery rate was significantly better than for group B, that does not prevent us from realising that there was no a-priori reason to have expected that given the theory that the drug was ineffective. Such a theory would require fine tuning for such a theory. The theory that the drug was effective would not, and as a matter of best practise would be favoured.
>
> sorry, I don't understand this at all, in particular not how fine tuning
> comes in.

Imagine there are 100 trials, and in all 100 of them group C had a greater recovery rate. Then while the theory that the drug was effective explains the result, it would be unexpected given the the theory the drug was ineffective given the a-priori reasoning that if it was ineffective and the number of recoveries in groups B and C were not even then which group had the greater number of recoveries for the trial would be 50/50. Because if we ignore outcomes when the trials could have been even, and just consider it 50/50 for each trial which group would have the greater number of recoveries then given the a-priori reasoning so far the probability such an outcome would be 1:2^100. Since the possibility of the recovery rates being equal was ignored, the probability for group C having a greater number of recoveries than group B would be lower than 50% (once it was no longer ignored) and therefore a-priori we could deduce that the expected probability for such an outcome would be < 1:2^100. And thus the outcome would appear very "fine-tuned" (or unlikely) given the theory that the drug was ineffective.

I could give another example where probability does not come into it if you like. Perhaps one like a burglar person putting in a 10 digit combination in correctly first time and comparing the theories that the burglar guessed it, and the theory that the burglar knew it (it being assumed that the burglar could enter the code without error).

Another example would be that since naturalism provides no a-priori expectation of any experience, if the physical was guessed to have the feature of being experienced, naturalism offers no a-priori expectation of what physical situations would correlate to what experiences. Such that there would be no reason to favour the expectation of the experience being as it is over the idea that things would only experience over a certain temperature, so molecules in molten metal might experience light in proportion to temperature over a certain threshold.

[someone]

I have not made that argument at all. Perhaps quote where you think I was making such an argument, or would that be difficult?

[someone]

On Thursday, March 22, 2018 at 5:05:04 PM UTC, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
> In article <e95d1216-b8cd-4219...@googlegroups.com>,

I have no problem with those three statements, but I do not think I have conflated them anywhere.

>
> > It is similar to the cosmological fine tuning issue regarding the physics
> > constants, though there the suggestion of a multiverse might help. With the
> > experience though, suggesting that there could be a multiverse with different
> > experiences corresponding to the configurations just brings up the issue of
> > what difference in behaviour would be expected in a universe in which had the
> > same laws and physics constants but no experience.
> >
> > Analogous to what you are trying to do with the experience, you can claim
> > that the physics constants are *necessarily* as they are measured to be, but
> > that is just a claim of them necessarily being fine tuned while lacking any
> > explanation for the claimed necessity.
>
> My position is that we *don't* live in a fine-tuned universe. Therefore
> it doesn't require an account. AFAICT, fine-tuning arguments all reduce
> to the incredibly banal claim that if the universe had been different,
> then it would be different.
>
> And I have absolutely no idea how cosmological fine-tuning or the
> multiverse has anything to do with problems of consciousness.
>

I think you misunderstand fine-tuning. It concerns theories, not reality. So imagine for example the case of a burglar that enters a 10 digit code correctly on the first attempt, and there are two theories. One that the burglar guessed, the other that the burglar knew the theory.

The theory that the burglar guessed is fine tuned because using a-priori reasoning there would have been no reason to favour one combination over the other, and the contrast between the wide range of possibilities (the possible combinations that the burglar might have entered) given the theory and the narrow range of a particular range of particular outcome (entering the correct combination) indicates fine tuning.

Whereas the theory that the burglar knows the combination provides a range of possibilities (assuming the burglar can enter it without error) that does not contrast widely with the range of outcomes (entering the correct combination).

Theories that require fine tuning tend not to be favoured when compared to theories that don't.

The relation between the physics constants and the cosmological fine tuning argument and the experience fine tuning argument, is that like physicalism not give reason to expect the physics constant values which allow complex chemistry and therefore life, whereas theism does (the universe being fit for purpose), physicalism does not give reason to expect the feature of experiencing, or the type of experience which could be deemed suitable for a spiritual being to base moral choices on, whereas theism does (the experience being fit for purpose).

Where they differ is that whereas with the physics constant values, the theory of a universe in which subsections have different value physics constant values and the fine tuning issue disappears; with the experience issue introducing a universe in which subsections have different physical activities experiencing different experiences also does away with the fine tuning issue, it does not let physicalism off the hook, because in their attempt to escape the issue the physicalists open up zombie universe type issues, such as what difference does the difference in experience make to behaviour.

> > > Let me turn this around, though. What _a priori_ (or even _a
> > > posteriori_) reasons would you offer for assuming that the same brain
> > > configurations which you mention above *aren't* correlated with actual
> > > experiences as opposed to no experience or random experience? I raise
> > > this simply to point out that a question without a known (or
> > > fully-known) answer doesn't constitute an argument against a position
> > > unless you actually *do* have an answer for that question which
> > > precludes a particular point of view.
> > >
> >
> > Well from naturalist perspective if I knew the known laws of physics, and of
> > the neural configurations, I would guess that the experience if any would be
> > reducible to the experience or lack-of of the fundamental particles. At least
> > there I could use the idea of reductionism.
>
> That't not the physicalist position. Not even remotely.

It would is an a-priori-esque guess compatible with physicalism.

>
> > From a theist perspective one could assume a-priori that the experience would
> > be fit for purpose,
>
> How exactly does that constitute an 'a priori' claim?

It is a claim using reasoning that could be used prior given the theory, prior to knowing the result.

>
> > i.e. suitable for basing moral judgements on (so the idea
> > of no experience or flashes of light etc. could be ruled out a-priori).
>
> The question of how consciousness arises is completely unrelated to the
> question of how moral judgement arises.
>

Given the theist theory, that we would be given an experience suitable for basing moral judgements on, certain possibilities could be ruled out a-priori.

The question was:
---

Would the chemical reactions of the neural configuration not be thought
sufficient provide the organism with type of survival advantages you mention, even if they were not experienced?

---

You responded talking about two differently configured neural arrangements. But that was not the question. It was about the neural arrangement you believe gives rise to experience, and asking you whether you were considering the chemical reactions of *that* configuration to not be sufficient to provide the organism with the type of survival advantages you mentioned, even if it was not experienced. As I recall if you do not go for the "misunderstanding and blaming me" approach, is to refuse to countenance such a possibility. Though if the multiverse approach is used to avoid the experiential fine tuning argument which I explained above is analogous to the cosmological fine tuning argument, then you make the claim of such "universes" yourself. So perhaps you could jump ahead and just answer rather than going through the usual misunderstandings and refusals to consider an answer.

[Andre G. Isaak]

In article <e9fbaf61-ed55-40d8...@googlegroups.com>,

Many of your arguments seem to suggest that physicalists are
reductionists and/or seek to predict things like consciousness from the
activity of atoms and molecules, neither of which are true.

The fact that the fundamental physical constants allow for complex
chemistry and therefore life is hardly evidence that those constants
have been 'tuned' with that goal in mind. As I previously pointed out,
the vast majority of the universe appears incredibly hostile to life; so
even if there were some 'fine-tuner' it would be rather hard to argue
that their goal was a life-friendly universe.

You may view it as being compatible with physicalism, but that's only
because you have a very inaccurate view of the physicalist position. If
you want to argue against a position, you should at least make a
reasonable attempt at understanding that position.

Consciousness is views as an emergent property. It's certainly not a
property of fundamental particles.

(this, btw, would be an example of you conflating the three things I
mentioned above).

What you're doing here is invoking a zombie scenario. As I have pointed
out to you in the past, philosophical zombies are a completely
incoherent notion unless one assumes some sort of dualism (which, of
course, the physicalist position you are asking about, does not)

This question is similar to asking whether iron would still be useful
for transporting oxygen if it wasn't red. Since 'redness' follows from
the physical characteristics of iron, you simply can't have iron without
having redness.

You example, however, is even less sensical than this: It's perfectly
possible to discuss iron's role in the transport of oxygen without
mentioning 'redness' since 'redness' isn't really the property we're
interested in (though of course evolution cannot select for its
oxygen-transporting role without also selecting its redness). In the
case of consciousness, however, consciousness *is* the actual property
that we are interested in.

> As I recall if you do not go for the
> "misunderstanding and blaming me" approach, is to refuse to countenance such
> a possibility. Though if the multiverse approach is used to avoid the
> experiential fine tuning argument which I explained above is analogous to the
> cosmological fine tuning argument, then you make the claim of such
> "universes" yourself.

I think you may be confusing me with someone else. Nowhere have I made
'multiverse' arguments about anything, nor will I ever make such
arguments.

If I ever talk about 'a universe in which x holds', it means I am
talking about a counterfactual, not that I am positing multiple
universes.

Andre

[Burkhard]

No, I expressed the answer to the question you posed, i.e. and I quote

"It is more accurate to state state that I am not aware of any
naturalist position that specifies how an evolutionary advantage is

achieved by experiencing." My explanation gives the evilutionary
advantage of experiencing. I don't need a discussion of chemistry for
that, that's a novel addition you made.

>All you have done is make it clear that *you* cannot even *guess* what the influence would be on the chemistry. That were expecting me to be able to guess at what influence on the chemistry you were referring to when you yourself could not, is I think, slightly strange.

I answered the question you originally posed. If you wanted to discuss
something else, that's indeed not my problem.

>
>
>> It is also not really "something similar". It is rather the inverse of
>> the physics scenario that you described above. Now you are removing an
>> actually observed effect, and ask to speculate what causes need to be
>> removed so that this absence would be the result.
>>
>
> I think they are analogous. A supposed physical feature being varied in a thought experiment to enable an illustration of the expected influence the change of the feature would have on the chemistry. It would be analogous to setting one of the constants to 0. If you wanted you could consider a different experience though, such as a flash of light every time a neuron flashed.

You are still inverting cause and effect. The physical constants cause
the universe as we know it, we can ask how it would look if they were
different. Our brain chemistry causes our experiences, so we could ask
how our experiences were if the chemistry would be radically different,
we could as, e.g. if neurons did not use electricity (neither, in my
view, very helpful or useful questions, but they would at least be
analogous)

>
> Though you write as though experiencing were an effect of certain chemical activity, rather than a cause. If simply an effect with no causal role then it simply has no influence on behaviour.

Why would that follow?

>If it is an effect with a causal role, then simply imagine the same activity that would have resulted in the effect, but assume there is no effect, and so its causal influence vanishes. Just explain how you were imagining the effect no longer happening, and so no longer causing whatever it effect it did would influence a single chemical reaction.

No idea what that would even mean

>
>
>>>
>>>> >From a naturalist position what a-priori reasons would there be for expecting the activities you describe to be experienced at all?
>>>>
>>>> Why would I want or need any a priori reasons? Empirical sciences are a
>>>> posteriori. We observe that for evolutionary old behaviours, "being
>>>> pleasant" and "being advantageous" correlate, and "being unpleasant" and
>>>> "being disadvantageous" are negatively correlated.
>>>>
>>>> We also observe that humans give explanations for their actions in terms
>>>> of expected pleasant or unpleasant experiences.
>>>>
>>>> From these observations, we can build a model. In this model, pleasant
>>>> and unpleasant experiences act as causes (dispositively) for actions.
>>>> From this we can together with general evolutionary theory draw
>>>> predictions.
>>>>
>>>> One is that people who lack the ability to experience unpleasant
>>>> sensations will be more likely to not have descendants. We can then
>>>> check this against the data - and lo and behold, people with e.g.
>>>> congenital analgesia tend not to live long.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Science often works by a-priori reasoning. The a-priori reasoning leads to a-priori predictions which are then checked. And like with the physics constants and the possible cosmological fine tuning even when you know certain information, you can imagine that you did not and question whether your theory would have lead you to to have expected such results, or whether the results seem fine tuned given your theory.
>>
>> That seems to be a very non-standard way to use "a priori". And I don't
>> understand at all what this has to do with fine tuning.
>>
>>>
>>> The reason it is important is that science as a matter of best practise tends to favour theories which require less fine tuning.
>>
>> Not sure what you mean with that. If you mean: "science favours theories
>> that leave more degrees of freedom (in the technical sense of degrees of
>> freedom) I'd say it is simply wrong.
>>
>
> I never mentioned degrees of freedom. I mentioned fine tuning. Fine tuning I think refers to the contrast between a wide range of possibilities given a theory and a narrow range of a phenomenon or outcome.

Yes, so the system has low degrees of freedom, under that theory.

>I have tended to use the term more loosely, considering the specialness of the result (which can involve expected probabilities) given range of results one could expect from the theory.
>
> You can take it either way in the statement I made, either as strictly meant, or allowing expected probabilities. I do not think this is uncommon to include probability, in order to highlight the specialness of the outcome given the expectations given a theory. For example Gerraint Lewis and Luke Barnes in their book "A Fortunate Universe" have on page.282 written "The probabilites that are required to understand the fine-tuning of the universe of the universe for life are the probabilities of theory testing in science", and later on page 286 that "Our claim is that fine-tuning claims can be understaood in the context of objective Bayesianism, and that the difficulties faced in calculating the relevant probabilities are of the same kind as those faced in calculating the relevant probabilities are of the same kind as those faced in analysing any physical theory."

My issue is not with the use of probabilities, but how you use the term
"fine tuning" and what you predicate if of. Normally it is predicated of
constants in the physical universe, but you seem at least sometimes to
predicate it of theories.

>
>
>>>
>>> Imagine for example a medical study where group A does not receive the drug, group B receives a placebo, and group C receives the drug. The a-priori expectation for the theory that the drug is ineffective would be that the recovery rate for group C would be around the recovery rate of group B.
>>
>> As I said above, this is a non-standard use of a priori. You seem to
>> think more of posterior and prior probabilities, but even prior
>> probabilities are the result of past experience.
>>
>
> There was no estimate of probability based on past events here, only the a-priori assumption that if the drug were ineffective that over a series of trials there would be no reason to expect the results to favour more recoveries in group B than group C. So if the amount of recoveries were not equal in a given trial it would be 50/50 which group had more.

Well, that's a priori in the sense that it is a tautology. Indeed, if
something is in-efficient it won't show effects, it's sort of part of
the word meaning of "effect".

But that is not a prediction of any specific theory. You could say that
it is an underlying methodological insight of all reasoning about the
world in general, and causal relations in particular.

>
>
>>> The a-priori expectation for the theory that the drug is effective would be that the recovery rate for group C would be significantly better than the recovery rate of group B.

A priori in the sense that it is a tautological restatement. For a drug
to be efficient simply means to have an effect, and that is to cure people.

>Even if it was known that the recovery rate for group C had been tested and the results were that the recovery rate was significantly better than for group B, that does not prevent us from realising that there was no a-priori reason to have expected that given the theory that the drug was ineffective.
>

No idea what that sentence means, seems impossible to parse.

>Such a theory would require fine tuning for such a theory.

That's again seems to be a non-standard use of fine tuning, and I have
no idea what it is supposed to mean. There would be a posteriori reasons
to expect that that specific drug was efficient/inefficient, based on
our general theory of biology and what we know about that drug.

And then there is the methodological insight (a priori if you will) that
the way to test a causal relation is to keep as many parameters as
possible constant while varying the one under interest, systematized
for the first time I'd say by John S. Mill way back in the days, in is
treatise on induction.

>The theory that the drug was effective would not, and as a matter of best practise would be favoured.

Can't quite parse the sentence. If you mean: If I find an effect E in
the presence of a factor X, and don't fin E in the absence of X, then I
have good reasons to believe that E causes X, then you are right.

>>
>> sorry, I don't understand this at all, in particular not how fine tuning
>> comes in.
>
> Imagine there are 100 trials, and in all 100 of them group C had a greater recovery rate. Then while the theory that the drug was effective explains the result, it would be unexpected given the the theory the drug was ineffective given the a-priori reasoning that if it was ineffective and the number of recoveries in groups B and C were not even then which group had the greater number of recoveries for the trial would be 50/50.

That's not really clarifying things, and the sentence remains close to
impossible to parse. What a priori reasoning tat it was ineffective?
Judgements about the efficiency, or lack of efficiency, of a specific
drug are a posteriori.

.Because if we ignore outcomes when the trials could have been even, and

just consider it 50/50 for each trial which group would have the greater
number of recoveries then given the a-priori reasoning so far the
probability such an outcome would be 1:2^100. Since the possibility of
the recovery rates being equal was ignored, the probability for group C
having a greater number of recoveries than group B would be lower than
50% (once it was no longer ignored) and therefore a-priori we could
deduce that the expected probability for such an outcome would be <
1:2^100. And thus the outcome would appear very "fine-tuned" (or
unlikely) given the theory that the drug was ineffective.

To the extend that I can make any sense of this (and I feel I'm rather
widely guessing about what you try to convey) is this just a somewhat
garbled version of Bayesian confirmation? As I said before, this is
normally expressed using the term prior and posterior probabilities
rather than a prior or a posteriori knowledge, while similar in some
respects, they are not quite the same thing.

>
> I could give another example where probability does not come into it if you like.

I have no problems with probabilities, I have problems with the way you
use some terms. And rather often with your syntax.

>Perhaps one like a burglar person putting in a 10 digit combination in correctly first time and comparing the theories that the burglar guessed it, and the theory that the burglar knew it (it being assumed that the burglar could enter the code without error).

For the first, I have a pretty precise number. For the second, I have a
lot of background information (a posteriori) about burglars, their modus
operandi, how information leaks etc to know that this sort of thing
happens a lot.

That tells me that betting on the second theory is probably more sound,
assuing no further evidence is collected.

>
> Another example would be that since naturalism provides no a-priori expectation of any experience, if the physical was guessed to have the feature of being experienced, naturalism offers no a-priori expectation of what physical situations would correlate to what experiences. Such that there would be no reason to favour the expectation of the experience being as it is over the idea that things would only experience over a certain temperature, so molecules in molten metal might experience light in proportion to temperature over a certain threshold.

I can't see the analogy between this and the burglary scenario.
Naturalism as such gives me neither reasons to expect or not to expect
experience. Since I already know that experience exists this is mood
anyway.

[someone]

On Saturday, March 24, 2018 at 10:55:05 AM UTC, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
> In article <e9fbaf61-ed55-40d8...@googlegroups.com>,

It is physics that is the reductionist enterprise (discovering the basic laws that can be used to explain the observations). Chemistry can sometimes be a convenient level to discuss issues.

It seems to me that you have a problem understanding my writing, and often I do rush replies, as there can be a few people to reply to, and so I do not spend too much time on each. On reflection this may have been a counterproductive approach. Anyway here I am going to quote from Gerraint Lewis and Luke Barnes' book "A Fortunate Universe" p.4:

"'Fine-tuning' is a metaphor, one that brings to mind an old radio dial set with dials that must be delicately set in order to listen to Norfolk Nights on Radio Norwich.... This metaphor unfortunately involves a guiding hand that sets dials, giving the impression that 'fine-tuned' means cleverly arranged or made for purpose by a fine-tuner. Whether such a fine-tuner of our Universe exists or not, this is not the sense in which we use the term. 'Fine-tuning is a technical term borrowed from physics, and refers to the contrast between a wide range of possibilities and a narrow range of a particular outcome or phenomenon. Similies and metaphors are perfectly acceptable in science - space expanding like an inflating balloon, for example - as long as we remember what they represent."

As I mentioned in a different post on this thread I have tended to use the term more loosely, considering the specialness of the result (which can involve expected probabilities) given range of results one could expect from the theory. It is not uncommon to include probability, in order to highlight the specialness of the outcome given the expectations given a theory. For example in the same book on page.282 it is written "The probabilites that are required to understand the fine-tuning of the universe of the universe for life are the probabilities of theory testing in science", and later on page 286 that "Our claim is that fine-tuning claims can be understaood in the context of objective Bayesianism, and that the difficulties faced in calculating the relevant probabilities are of the same kind as those faced in calculating the relevant probabilities are of the same kind as those faced in analysing any physical theory."

Another concept that you would need to be clear on is the recognition of the specialness of where range that is being "tuned into". For example in the burglar and the combinations I gave you last post and is currently still above, the correct combination is special in the range of combinations. Often fine tuning arguments highlight how one theory can explain with a-priori reasoning why the results are within the special range, while the fine-tuned theory does not.

So with the physics constants argument, the special range being considered is the parameter space that would be expected to result in complex chemistry.

With physicalism and the the physics constants fine tuning argument (without a multiverse) there would be no a-priori reason to have expected the parameter values we observe.

Similarly with the experience fine tuning argument, with physicalism there is no a-priori reason to expect the type of experience we experience.

Physicalism being compatible with reductionism does not imply physicalism entailing reductionism. As you give me the impression you mistakenly think. I had assumed reductionist explanations were favoured by physicists and also philosophers seeking an ontological explanation (including those that are physicalists).

Physicalism does not stipulate that experiencing is an emergent property (so some irony in your response there). It just states that reality is a physical one. Some physicalist theories of mind might guess at it being an emergent property (such as functionalism, identity theory, enactivism etc.) but others (such as panpsychism) do not.

[If you check https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ you might read "For its proponents panpsychism offers an attractive middle way between physicalism on the one hand and dualism on the other." and conclude that if someone is a panpsychist then they are not a physicalist. This is not the case however, consider Galen Strawson. If you can get his 1999 paper "Realistic Materialism Monism" you could perhaps read his view. If not, then you could at least read at http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.001.0001/acprof-9780199267422-chapter-3 that he argues for the position that any realistic — any truly serious - materialist must be a panpsychist.]

Regarding the conflating of the three things you mentioned earlier, the three are logically compatible, and arguably the 2nd and 3rd are deducible from the 1st as would be a 4th statement "Physicalism is *not* the claim that elephants are made of cheese."I do not think the 2nd, 3rd and 4th statement are the same as each other, or the same as the first, and I do not see where you think I have considered the three statements you made consider any of them to be saying the same thing.

If you were to define a philosophical zombie as being physically identical but not experiencing, then it would be incoherent. In the same way that it would be be incoherent to imagine two subsections of a universe which were physically identical and yet which had different physics constants.

*But* as can be seen from the video links I supplied earlier physicalist physicists do contemplate physical features varying throughout the universe. So you having two subsections of a universe which varied with respect to the certain physical features (such as the physical constants) is not incoherent given physicalism, as it does not entail any contradiction at all. That is because physicalism states that reality is a physical reality, and consequently any features that reality has are physical features. It does not stipulate that the features cannot vary.

So with physicalism, in the same way that the physics constants would be physical features, the experience would be a physical feature. And it is not incompatible with physicalism to imagine that feature varying any more than it is to imagine the physics constants varying. Because it involves no contradiction.

You mentioned the frequency of light reflected by hemoglobin. I assume that would be a logical consequence of what are considered to be the known laws of physics, that could be deduced a-priori. So to consider it to be different given the known laws of physics and the constant values would involve a logical contradiction. The experience is not something that is a logical consequence of the known laws of physics and the constant values and could not be reasoned a-apriori given physicalism. So to consider it to be different given the known laws of physics and constant values would not involve a logical contradiction.


Nevertheless you could believe it to be a similar situation, to the extent that you believe it to be a feature that cannot vary for some reason unknown to you. In the same way that someone else might pick one of the physics constants and believe that for some reason unknown to them it cannot be varied. But presumably neither of you would also be claiming infallibility, and so are capable of considering the possibility that you were wrong and considering the difference you would expect it to make if it could be.

> > As I recall if you do not go for the
> > "misunderstanding and blaming me" approach, is to refuse to countenance such
> > a possibility. Though if the multiverse approach is used to avoid the
> > experiential fine tuning argument which I explained above is analogous to the
> > cosmological fine tuning argument, then you make the claim of such
> > "universes" yourself.
>
> I think you may be confusing me with someone else. Nowhere have I made
> 'multiverse' arguments about anything, nor will I ever make such
> arguments.
>
> If I ever talk about 'a universe in which x holds', it means I am
> talking about a counterfactual, not that I am positing multiple
> universes.
>

I never stated that you did ever use a multiverse argument. Notice the "if...then" construction.

[someone]

In reply to your evolutionary explanation response I had written:

"There you are just suggesting that one group of people do things which are harmful to their form, and another group do not. You have not explained how the experience makes any difference to the chemistry."

To which you replied:
"I think I did. When I said 'motivated to do x'"

Which seemed to me to suggest that you thought you had explained how the experience makes a difference to the chemistry. Though later you went on to admit that you could not explain the difference you would be expecting it to make to the chemistry of your brain if the experiencing feature of the chemistry changed such that the same chemical arrangement of your brain was no longer experienced.

Is it that you feel that it would make some difference to the way the chemicals would react, but simply cannot guess what that difference would be?

Could you also just confirm whether you believe that if experiencing was an epiphenomenal feature it would not be an evolutionary advantage?

> >All you have done is make it clear that *you* cannot even *guess* what the influence would be on the chemistry. That were expecting me to be able to guess at what influence on the chemistry you were referring to when you yourself could not, is I think, slightly strange.
>
> I answered the question you originally posed. If you wanted to discuss
> something else, that's indeed not my problem.
>
> >
> >
> >> It is also not really "something similar". It is rather the inverse of
> >> the physics scenario that you described above. Now you are removing an
> >> actually observed effect, and ask to speculate what causes need to be
> >> removed so that this absence would be the result.
> >>
> >
> > I think they are analogous. A supposed physical feature being varied in a thought experiment to enable an illustration of the expected influence the change of the feature would have on the chemistry. It would be analogous to setting one of the constants to 0. If you wanted you could consider a different experience though, such as a flash of light every time a neuron flashed.
>
> You are still inverting cause and effect. The physical constants cause
> the universe as we know it, we can ask how it would look if they were
> different. Our brain chemistry causes our experiences, so we could ask
> how our experiences were if the chemistry would be radically different,
> we could as, e.g. if neurons did not use electricity (neither, in my
> view, very helpful or useful questions, but they would at least be
> analogous)

Well I was assuming that you were considering the experience and what it was like to play some causal role in order for it offer some evolutionary advantage. However from what you write I am not now able to distinguish your suggestion from a suggestion that experiencing is an epiphenomenal feature of reality. Obviously epiphenomenal features offer no evolutionary advantage.

Though whether you are suggesting experiencing is an epiphenomenal feature of reality or not there is nothing preventing you from considering what difference in behaviour if the feature was different. For example if the brain chemistry did not give rise to experience.

> >
> > Though you write as though experiencing were an effect of certain chemical activity, rather than a cause. If simply an effect with no causal role then it simply has no influence on behaviour.
>
> Why would that follow?
>

Because how in physicalist account would an epiphenomenal feature be influential?

I thought by degrees of freedom you were referring to the amount of independent variables, but you do not seem to be. Perhaps you could define what you mean, because what I wrote made no reference to the amount of independent variables referred to in the theory.

> >I have tended to use the term more loosely, considering the specialness of the result (which can involve expected probabilities) given range of results one could expect from the theory.
> >
> > You can take it either way in the statement I made, either as strictly meant, or allowing expected probabilities. I do not think this is uncommon to include probability, in order to highlight the specialness of the outcome given the expectations given a theory. For example Gerraint Lewis and Luke Barnes in their book "A Fortunate Universe" have on page.282 written "The probabilites that are required to understand the fine-tuning of the universe of the universe for life are the probabilities of theory testing in science", and later on page 286 that "Our claim is that fine-tuning claims can be understaood in the context of objective Bayesianism, and that the difficulties faced in calculating the relevant probabilities are of the same kind as those faced in calculating the relevant probabilities are of the same kind as those faced in analysing any physical theory."
>
> My issue is not with the use of probabilities, but how you use the term
> "fine tuning" and what you predicate if of. Normally it is predicated of
> constants in the physical universe, but you seem at least sometimes to
> predicate it of theories.
>
>

I explained what I meant by fine tuning. Perhaps read it again, and explain what part you do not understand. But just to help you (it is not a hard concept) I will supply a few more examples below and perhaps you could manage to get it. And/or you could perhaps check the video links I supplied and see if you can follow their conversation.

Example 1:

If there were a theory that ours was the only planet in the universe, then the Earth could seem fine tuned for life. If it was much closer then it would be too hot, if much further away then too cold. So with that theory the observed result would seem to be fine tuned.

But with the theory that there are lots of planets, then the Earth would not seem fine tuned for life. The theory could expect planets to vary in their proximity to stars and so it the result of a planet not being too far or too near to a star for life would not be unexpected given the theory (therefore not fine tuned).


Example 2:

A member of your family is going to be placed into a cubicle which is either of Type 1 or Type 2, and be shown a clock which will count down from 10 to 0 100 times. Each time it gets to 0 your family member is to say out loud a number of their choice between 1 and a 1,000,000. A Type 1 cubicle will a few seconds later state a random number between 1 and 1,000,000 and then go begin the next count down if there is one left to go. A Type 2 cubicle will behave in a similar fashion, except that rather than stating a random number, it will repeat the number your family member stated.

Imagine the member of your family was placed in the cubicle, and that each time the cubicle stated the same number as your family member.

With the theory that the box was a Type 1 cubicle, this result would appear fine tuned.

With the theory that the box was a Type 2 cubicle, the result would not appear fine tuned.

So I would assume that if there was an extreme penalty for failing to guess which cubicle type it was, or guessing it wrong, that you would go for the theory for which the result didn't appear fine tuned.


Notes on Examples 1 & 2:

Notice just because one theory would imply fine tuning, it doesn't mean another would.
Notice neither example was based on physics constants.

Also here is a quote regarding fine tuning just in case you are still having a problem in comprehending the concept. It is from Gerraint Lewis and Luke Barnes' book "A Fortunate Universe" p.4:
---

'Fine-tuning' is a metaphor, one that brings to mind an old radio dial set with dials that must be delicately set in order to listen to Norfolk Nights on Radio Norwich.... This metaphor unfortunately involves a guiding hand that sets dials, giving the impression that 'fine-tuned' means cleverly arranged or made for purpose by a fine-tuner. Whether such a fine-tuner of our Universe exists or not, this is not the sense in which we use the term. 'Fine-tuning is a technical term borrowed from physics, and refers to the contrast between a wide range of possibilities and a narrow range of a particular outcome or phenomenon. Similies and metaphors are perfectly acceptable in science - space expanding like an inflating balloon, for example - as long as we remember what they represent.

---

Regarding knowing the result it is like the Type 1 and Type 2 cubicle situation. You might know the result, but the issue is whether the result is fine tuned for one theory (naturalism) but not the other (theism).

The analogy between the burglar situation is that there is one theory which gives no reason to have expected the observed outcome (the burglar guessing and naturalism) and another theory which does (the inside information and theism).

[Andre G. Isaak]

In article <fd63372c-45a0-4360...@googlegroups.com>,

someone <glenn....@googlemail.com> wrote:

> On Saturday, March 24, 2018 at 10:55:05 AM UTC, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
> > In article <e9fbaf61-ed55-40d8...@googlegroups.com>,
> > someone wrote:
> >
> > > On Thursday, March 22, 2018 at 5:05:04 PM UTC, Andre G. Isaak wrote:

<snip>

> > > I have no problem with those three statements, but I do not think I have
> > > conflated them anywhere.
> >
> > Many of your arguments seem to suggest that physicalists are
> > reductionists and/or seek to predict things like consciousness from the
> > activity of atoms and molecules, neither of which are true.
> >
>
> It is physics that is the reductionist enterprise (discovering the basic laws
> that can be used to explain the observations). Chemistry can sometimes be a
> convenient level to discuss issues.

Physics isn't a reductionist enterprise. Physicists do look at
fundamental laws, but they certainly don't advocate discussing (e.g.)
Biomechanics in terms of atomic interactions or Macroeconomics in terms
of the fundamental forces. There's a big difference between the claim
that "these are the fundamental laws of nature" and "these are the laws
in terms of which everything should be explained". Reductionism refers
to the latter.

You seem to be entirely missing my point. If it were indeed possible for
the physical constants to vary (which I am not convinced of), *any* set
of values would result in a universe which contained certain things
which would not be possible if the values had been different. That means
that *every* universe could be argued to be fine-tuned, which to me
makes fine-tuning meaningless.

And "complex chemistry" is certainly not the only thing that could be
ruled out by a different set of values, so why should that (as opposed,
say, to black holes, or iron) be of particular interest?

That assumption would be incorrect.

> Physicalism does not stipulate that experiencing is an emergent property (so
> some irony in your response there). It just states that reality is a physical
> one.

Physicalism might not explicitly state this, but actual evidence
certainly points in that direction.

> Some physicalist theories of mind might guess at it being an emergent
> property (such as functionalism, identity theory, enactivism etc.) but others
> (such as panpsychism) do not.
>
> [If you check https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ you might read
> "For its proponents panpsychism offers an attractive middle way between
> physicalism on the one hand and dualism on the other." and conclude that if
> someone is a panpsychist then they are not a physicalist. This is not the
> case however, consider Galen Strawson. If you can get his 1999 paper
> "Realistic Materialism Monism" you could perhaps read his view. If not, then
> you could at least read at
> http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.001.000
> 1/acprof-9780199267422-chapter-3 that he argues for the position that any
> realistic — any truly serious - materialist must be a panpsychist.]

Galen Strawson might consider himself to be a physicalist, but pretty
much no one else in the world does. The last time you brought him up I
provided numerous references to back this up. Panpsychism is simply
*not* compatible with physicalism.

That's how they are normally defined.

> In the same way that it
> would be be incoherent to imagine two subsections of a universe which were
> physically identical and yet which had different physics constants.
>
> *But* as can be seen from the video links I supplied earlier

I don't do video links. Videos may be good for entertainment, but they
are an incredibly inefficient way of presenting information.

> physicalist
> physicists do contemplate physical features varying throughout the universe.
> So you having two subsections of a universe which varied with respect to the
> certain physical features (such as the physical constants) is not incoherent
> given physicalism, as it does not entail any contradiction at all. That is
> because physicalism states that reality is a physical reality, and
> consequently any features that reality has are physical features. It does not
> stipulate that the features cannot vary.
>
> So with physicalism, in the same way that the physics constants would be
> physical features, the experience would be a physical feature.

Except that chemistry, human behaviour, etc. are all ultimately
dependent on the same physical constants. Any change in these constants
would affect *all* of these things. The zombie scenario you are
suggesting posits a change which would leave all these other things
unaffected, but would alter or eliminate our experiences. The only way
to achieve that would be if 'experience' stemmed from some property
which failed to interact with any of the other physical constants, and
that, pretty much by definition, would involve treating experience as a
non-material phenomenon.

> And it is not
> incompatible with physicalism to imagine that feature varying any more than
> it is to imagine the physics constants varying. Because it involves no
> contradiction.
>
> You mentioned the frequency of light reflected by hemoglobin. I assume that
> would be a logical consequence of what are considered to be the known laws of
> physics, that could be deduced a-priori. So to consider it to be different
> given the known laws of physics and the constant values would involve a
> logical contradiction. The experience is not something that is a logical
> consequence of the known laws of physics

But physicalism asserts that this *is* a consequence of the laws of
physics just as the reflective properties of iron are a consequence of
those laws. IIRC, this was a major issue in our last exchange. You find
ways of trying to sneak dualist assumptions into your argument by
treating consciousness as being fundamentally different from everything
else. You may believe this to be true, but you can't rely on this claim
if physicalism is what you are attempting to argue against since you
would then be assuming your own conclusion.

> and the constant values and could
> not be reasoned a-apriori given physicalism. So to consider it to be
> different given the known laws of physics and constant values would not
> involve a logical contradiction.
>
>
> Nevertheless you could believe it to be a similar situation, to the extent
> that you believe it to be a feature that cannot vary for some reason unknown
> to you.

I've expressed doubt in the possibility that the physical constants can
very, but this is a somewhat different issue. What I'm claiming here is
that *if* it is possible for the fundamental constants to vary, that any
change in those constants is going to have effects on all aspects of the
universe. The behaviour of the universe stems from the *interaction* of
the fundamental laws of physics which depend on those constants. You
can't hypothesize a change in one of these constants to tweak some very
specific aspect of the universe.

For example, there is no possible way to change the laws of physics such
that iron had different spectral properties but everything else remained
the same. To change the color of iron, you'd need to change the energies
associated with various electron transitions, which is going to have
effects on the chemical as well as spectral properties of not only iron,
but of every other type of atom in the universe.

Similarly, trying to get around the argument that philosophical zombies
are incoherent by claiming these zombies exist in a different universe
with different constants involves a 'tweak' which is simply far too
specific to be seriously entertained.

<snip>

[someone]

On Wednesday, March 28, 2018 at 3:05:04 PM UTC+1, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
> In article <fd63372c-45a0-4360...@googlegroups.com>,

> someone wrote:
>
> > On Saturday, March 24, 2018 at 10:55:05 AM UTC, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
> > > In article <e9fbaf61-ed55-40d8...@googlegroups.com>,
> > > someone wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Thursday, March 22, 2018 at 5:05:04 PM UTC, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > I have no problem with those three statements, but I do not think I have
> > > > conflated them anywhere.
> > >
> > > Many of your arguments seem to suggest that physicalists are
> > > reductionists and/or seek to predict things like consciousness from the
> > > activity of atoms and molecules, neither of which are true.
> > >
> >
> > It is physics that is the reductionist enterprise (discovering the basic laws
> > that can be used to explain the observations). Chemistry can sometimes be a
> > convenient level to discuss issues.
>
> Physics isn't a reductionist enterprise. Physicists do look at
> fundamental laws, but they certainly don't advocate discussing (e.g.)
> Biomechanics in terms of atomic interactions or Macroeconomics in terms
> of the fundamental forces. There's a big difference between the claim
> that "these are the fundamental laws of nature" and "these are the laws
> in terms of which everything should be explained". Reductionism refers
> to the latter.
>

Biomechanics and Macroeconomics aren't physics.

You ignored the paragraph where I wrote:
'Another concept that you would need to be clear on is the recognition of the specialness of where range that is being "tuned into". For example in the burglar and the combinations I gave you last post and is currently still above, the correct combination is special in the range of combinations. Often fine tuning arguments highlight how one theory can explain with a-priori reasoning why the results are within the special range, while the fine-tuned theory does not.'

Regarding the black holes, I assume they are common in the physics constants parameter space so they are not of interest in distinguishing between theories. Iron on the other hand could be considered to be of interest, as the existence of iron would mean the existence of complex chemistry, which is the specialness most physicists concern themselves with when looking at the physics constant parameter space. The only naturalist argument I have heard of required which would expect iron is one that posits a "multiverse" of some sort. Else the naturalist theory would seem very fine tuned. Perhaps watch some of the videos I supplied or watch others.

I meant in their field of expertise. I assume your reply meant when they were talking about things like law or macroeconomics etc.

> > Physicalism does not stipulate that experiencing is an emergent property (so
> > some irony in your response there). It just states that reality is a physical
> > one.
>
> Physicalism might not explicitly state this, but actual evidence
> certainly points in that direction.
>

The evidence does not point to physicalism at all. The only evidence you have is what you have experienced, and physicalism offers no suggestion for a non-epiphenomenal experience influencing your forms behaviour (since the outcome of the influence would be dependent on the neural configuration and what has that information in a physicalist perspective?).

> > Some physicalist theories of mind might guess at it being an emergent
> > property (such as functionalism, identity theory, enactivism etc.) but others
> > (such as panpsychism) do not.
> >
> > [If you check https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ you might read
> > "For its proponents panpsychism offers an attractive middle way between
> > physicalism on the one hand and dualism on the other." and conclude that if
> > someone is a panpsychist then they are not a physicalist. This is not the
> > case however, consider Galen Strawson. If you can get his 1999 paper
> > "Realistic Materialism Monism" you could perhaps read his view. If not, then
> > you could at least read at
> > http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.001.000
> > 1/acprof-9780199267422-chapter-3 that he argues for the position that any
> > realistic — any truly serious - materialist must be a panpsychist.]
>
> Galen Strawson might consider himself to be a physicalist, but pretty
> much no one else in the world does. The last time you brought him up I
> provided numerous references to back this up. Panpsychism is simply
> *not* compatible with physicalism.
>

For panpsychic theories not to be compatible with physicalism they would have to posit something other than a physical reality, such as features or reality that were not physical features. The panpsychic theory put forward Strawson posits no such features, or anything other than the physical. I will just re-quote (because they were snipped in your reply) the first of the three quotes because it was about what you were considering physicalism to be, whereas the other were examples of you considering what physicalism was not.

"1. Physicalism is the view that all phenomena in the universe are ultimately physical phenomena, and that a useful study of the universe
needn't posit non-physical causes.

So what is your claim regarding Strawson's panpsychism being incompatible with (1)?

But not what I am suggesting (I never used the term philosophical zombie to describe what I was suggesting, you did).

> > In the same way that it
> > would be be incoherent to imagine two subsections of a universe which were
> > physically identical and yet which had different physics constants.
> >
> > *But* as can be seen from the video links I supplied earlier
>
> I don't do video links. Videos may be good for entertainment, but they
> are an incredibly inefficient way of presenting information.
>

??? Like video-ing lectures and offering them online is inefficient compared to being at the university and having to walk between each one and then wait for them to start.

> > physicalist
> > physicists do contemplate physical features varying throughout the universe.
> > So you having two subsections of a universe which varied with respect to the
> > certain physical features (such as the physical constants) is not incoherent
> > given physicalism, as it does not entail any contradiction at all. That is
> > because physicalism states that reality is a physical reality, and
> > consequently any features that reality has are physical features. It does not
> > stipulate that the features cannot vary.
> >
> > So with physicalism, in the same way that the physics constants would be
> > physical features, the experience would be a physical feature.
>
> Except that chemistry, human behaviour, etc. are all ultimately
> dependent on the same physical constants. Any change in these constants
> would affect *all* of these things. The zombie scenario you are
> suggesting posits a change which would leave all these other things
> unaffected, but would alter or eliminate our experiences. The only way
> to achieve that would be if 'experience' stemmed from some property
> which failed to interact with any of the other physical constants, and
> that, pretty much by definition, would involve treating experience as a
> non-material phenomenon.
>

I have never suggested a zombie scenario. A zombie scenario as commonly defined involves physically identical things. What I am referring to is scenarios where things are physically different because they differ in at least one physical feature.

> > And it is not
> > incompatible with physicalism to imagine that feature varying any more than
> > it is to imagine the physics constants varying. Because it involves no
> > contradiction.
> >
> > You mentioned the frequency of light reflected by hemoglobin. I assume that
> > would be a logical consequence of what are considered to be the known laws of
> > physics, that could be deduced a-priori. So to consider it to be different
> > given the known laws of physics and the constant values would involve a
> > logical contradiction. The experience is not something that is a logical
> > consequence of the known laws of physics
>
> But physicalism asserts that this *is* a consequence of the laws of
> physics just as the reflective properties of iron are a consequence of
> those laws. IIRC, this was a major issue in our last exchange. You find
> ways of trying to sneak dualist assumptions into your argument by
> treating consciousness as being fundamentally different from everything
> else. You may believe this to be true, but you can't rely on this claim
> if physicalism is what you are attempting to argue against since you
> would then be assuming your own conclusion.
>

Physicalism does not state that the experience is a logical consequence of the laws of physics. If you disagree give the logical argument for the implication.

I have not brought up dualism at all, and am not assuming that experiencing is any less of a physical feature than any one of the physics constant values. If you disagree just point out where I have, else stop lying.

I'll just replace the bit you snipped: "In the same way that someone else might pick one of the physics constants and believe that for some reason unknown to them it cannot be varied. But presumably neither of you would also be claiming infallibility, and so are capable of considering the possibility that you were wrong and considering the difference you would expect it to make if it could be. "

Were you claiming infallibility? If not then why not consider the possibility that you you were wrong and considering the difference you would expect it to make if it could be? Intellectual cowardice??

[Andre G. Isaak]

In article <d4380052-66b7-4df4...@googlegroups.com>,

I never claimed they were.

I believe you are wrong in this regard. My understanding of most of the
fine-tuning arguments is that they involve the claim that without the
physical constants in a very narrow range, the range of fundamental
particles we know of could not exist. That would preclude black holes as
much as it would preclude life (someone already brought this up, though
I forget who -- asking you if you were referring to the idea that the
universe was fine-tuned for black holes. I thought the remark simply
went over your head, but it appears you are working under some
misconceptions about the fine-tuning argument).

> Iron on the other hand could be considered to be of interest, as
> the existence of iron would mean the existence of complex chemistry,

So iron would only be of interest because it implies 'complex
chemistry'? Why is complex chemistry important? Why not 'complex
physics' or 'matter and energy' or 'neutrinos' or any other feature of
this universe?

What this really boils down to is the fact that life is important *to
you*, and you therefore ascribe to it some special status in the
universe, but the fine-tuning argument works equally well (i.e. poorly)
for any feature in the universe.

No. I meant that the assumption is incorrect.

Reductionist explanations involve attempting to account for things at
the lowest possible level.

Particle physicists might do this, but that's only because they are
actually looking at the lowest possible level.

On the other hand, a physicist investigating (e.g.) the aerodynamics of
flight or turbulent flow isn't going to even attempt to account for this
things in terms of the interaction of fundamental particles (which is
what methodological reductionism entails).

>
> > > Physicalism does not stipulate that experiencing is an emergent property
> > > (so
> > > some irony in your response there). It just states that reality is a
> > > physical
> > > one.
> >
> > Physicalism might not explicitly state this, but actual evidence
> > certainly points in that direction.
> >
>
> The evidence does not point to physicalism at all.

You misread my sentence. I am claiming that the evidence points to
experience being an emergent property.

The argument for physicalism itself is simply the success of material
explanations combined with the complete absence of evidence for
non-physical processes.

It's not merely my claim. It's pretty much every philosopher I've ever
discussed the issue with's claim.

However, it might be worthwhile to give a detailed explanation because
it might help dispel some of your apparent misconceptions about
physicalism.

Physicalism/Materialism is a form of monism. (n.b. I use the terms
'physicalism' and 'materialism' interchangeably. The only reason I stick
with 'physicalism' for the most part is because that is the term you
used in your prior visits to this group).

Monism is the claim that there exists only a single sort of 'substance'.

But what exactly constitutes a 'substance'? Clearly, iron and hydrogen
are different things, but they ultimately consist of electrons and
nucleons, so they are considered the same.

But electrons, protons, and neutrons are also clearly different things.
However, they are grouped together as matter by virtue of the shared
property of having mass.

What about energy, which would appear to be something very different
from matter? We currently speak of mass-energy, but even prior to
Einstein materialists ('physicalism', as a term, didn't exist back then)
would have considered this to be in the same realm as mass, etc.

Similarly, abstractions like velocity, distance, time, etc. are lumped
together with matter and energy as physical entities.

The reason for considering all of these seemingly disparate entities as
being 'of the same substance' is the fact that they all interact through
a single set of laws. If you take the full set of physical laws, all of
these things are referred to. And while there are physical laws which
may refer to only *some* of these things, all interactions between these
various properties are mediated by the exact same set of physical laws.

Panpsychism is essentially the view that all things in the universe are
endowed with 'mind', and through most of it's history proponents of this
view would have vehemently denied being materialists since 'mind' is the
canonical example of a 'substance' deemed non-material.

Stawson's (Galen, not Peter) panpsychism is essentially the same as
prior versions of panpsychism except that he describes 'mind' as a
*physical* property which all entities possess. The problem with this is
that despite this label he doesn't actually treat it as a physical
property. He doesn't ascribe to this property anything which would make
it subject to physical laws. It has no mass. It has no charge. It
neither exerts nor is acted upon by physical forces. In effect, it is
entirely *irrelevant* from the standpoint of the laws of physics. And
this means that he really *is* treating it as a non-physical property,
just as every other panpsychic has.

Strawson's entire premise is predicated on a fundamental mistake: he
believes that any property which we can ascribe to an entity has to
somehow percolate down to all of its parts. That's clearly not true of
other things (water may be liquid, but no one would claim it consists of
liquid electrons, protons and neutrons, or even of liquid molecules), so
why he is convinced this should be true of consciousness is beyond me.
No materialist I'm aware of would attribute consciousness to atoms or
molecules, or even to much more complex things like individual neurons.
Consciousness is an emergent property of the whole, not a property of
the individual parts.

But, based on past arguments from you, it was clearly the direction you
were heading.

> > > In the same way that it
> > > would be be incoherent to imagine two subsections of a universe which
> > > were
> > > physically identical and yet which had different physics constants.
> > >
> > > *But* as can be seen from the video links I supplied earlier
> >
> > I don't do video links. Videos may be good for entertainment, but they
> > are an incredibly inefficient way of presenting information.
> >
>
> ??? Like video-ing lectures and offering them online is inefficient compared
> to being at the university and having to walk between each one and then wait
> for them to start.

No, like watching videos is incredibly inefficient compared to reading
lecture notes or print publications. The transcript of a one-hour video,
complete with whatever visual aids are needed, can typically be read and
processed in under five minutes. Why spend an hour on it?

Moreover, scientists who make videos make them for laypeople.
Consequently, they tend to be lacking in technical detail. If a student
made a habit of referencing videos rather than articles I would be
singularly unimpressed.

I have seen science documentaries which I have enjoyed, but I watch
those for leisure, not for actual research purposes.

Except that they aren't really differing in a physical feature. You may
be calling it such, but you aren't treating it as such for the reasons I
outline above.

>
>
> > > And it is not
> > > incompatible with physicalism to imagine that feature varying any more
> > > than
> > > it is to imagine the physics constants varying. Because it involves no
> > > contradiction.
> > >
> > > You mentioned the frequency of light reflected by hemoglobin. I assume
> > > that
> > > would be a logical consequence of what are considered to be the known
> > > laws of
> > > physics, that could be deduced a-priori. So to consider it to be
> > > different
> > > given the known laws of physics and the constant values would involve a
> > > logical contradiction. The experience is not something that is a logical
> > > consequence of the known laws of physics
> >
> > But physicalism asserts that this *is* a consequence of the laws of
> > physics just as the reflective properties of iron are a consequence of
> > those laws. IIRC, this was a major issue in our last exchange. You find
> > ways of trying to sneak dualist assumptions into your argument by
> > treating consciousness as being fundamentally different from everything
> > else. You may believe this to be true, but you can't rely on this claim
> > if physicalism is what you are attempting to argue against since you
> > would then be assuming your own conclusion.
> >
>
> Physicalism does not state that the experience is a logical consequence of
> the laws of physics.

Physicalism doesn't claim we currently fully *understand* how
consciousness arises from physical laws. But yes, it does claim that
experience is a necessary consequence of those laws.

> If you disagree give the logical argument for the
> implication.

Premise: All phenomena are ultimately the result of physical
interactions (essentially the definition of materialism)

Premise: We experience things.

Conclusion: Experience must be the result of physical interactions.

> I have not brought up dualism at all, and am not assuming that experiencing
> is any less of a physical feature than any one of the physics constant
> values. If you disagree just point out where I have, else stop lying.

You have not specifically *referred* to dualism. But you are assuming it
simply by claiming that (e.g.) the color of iron is a consequence of
physical laws whereas consciousness is not. That's claiming that
consciousness is not material (just as was the case with Strawson, the
fact that you might label it as material is irrelevant if you aren't
actually treating it as such).

No one is claiming infallibility. The above was snipped because it
wasn't relevant (there you seem to be talking about the possibilities of
different constants varying. I personally am not convinced that this is
even possible, but I will gladly admit to being wrong given the
evidence. Above I am *assuming* said possibility, despite my scepticism
on this point. If I were as intransigent as you seem to imply, then I
would presumably have been unwilling to entertain this).

[JD Wolfe]

On 3/13/2018 3:50 PM, JWS wrote:

> On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 12:00:03 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
>> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.
>

> Some people think the universe was "fine tuned".
> They should be able to answer:
> What were the values of the constants before tuning?
> How long was the universe "out-of-tune" before it was tuned?
> What, exactly, was done to accomplish the tuning?
> I think it would go a long way to show "fine-tuning" took place if
> these questions could be answered. Thanks.
>
>
What is this "fine tuning" about?

[freon96]

It's a well known problem in cosmology, AKA, the flatness
problem. Check Wikipedia.

Bill

[Paul J Gans]

It is about the same as "Could we exist in a universe in which we
couldn't exist?"

--
--- Paul J. Gans

[Bob Casanova]

On Wed, 4 Apr 2018 21:03:18 -0400, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by JD Wolfe <"JD Wolfe"@gmail.com>:

It's the idea that the universe was specifically designed
for life-as-we-know-it, and ignores (or glosses over) the
fact that almost all of the observed universe is inimical to
life. Basically, it's a recasting of the belief that the
Earth is "special", and the universe was designed with the
Earth, and us, in mind.

There's a discussion of the idea here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuned_Universe

Note that no one (AFAIK; I could be wrong) has even
attempted to discover the possible ranges of the universal
constants in question, because at our current level of
knowledge we can't; it could even be that significant
variation would be impossible, making the question moot.
--

Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov

[someone]

On Thursday, April 5, 2018 at 6:10:03 PM UTC+1, Paul J Gans wrote:

No it is nothing like that.

[someone]

Have you actually read the wiki article you provide a link to? The reason I ask is that if you had I wonder why you characterised the issue as you did, as your summary is incorrect. Furthermore there are examples of the possible ranges given on the page. Check out the required Lambda ratio for example. If you needed more, perhaps check out youtube videos, or the book "A Fortunate Universe". Fine tuning arguments do not necessarily imply a tuner.

[Andre G. Isaak]

In article <42722894-a5af-48c6...@googlegroups.com>,

His summary is perfectly correct.

> Furthermore there are examples of the possible
> ranges given on the page. Check out the required Lambda ratio for example.

That doesn't give a possible range at all. All it does is speculates
that if Lambda weren't extremely small, no astronomical structures would
exist. It *doesn't* provide any evidence for a possible range of values
for Lambda. It's quite possible that Lambda can't vary at all, or that
if it could vary, it could only vary between 9.8^-123 and 1.1^-122 (both
of which probably count as extremely small).

The fine-tuning arguments presuppose that these constants can all vary
within a very wide range of values, and that's something for which we
simply have no evidence. Unless and until such as a time as we actually
have a better understanding of these values, speculating on them is
really quite pointless. We have empirical evidence that one, very
specific set of values is possible for the physical constants. We have
no empirical evidence that any other set of values is possible.

[someone]

On Thursday, April 5, 2018 at 8:05:04 PM UTC+1, Andre G. Isaak wrote:
> In article <42722894-a5af-48c6...@googlegroups.com>,

No it was not. The fine tuning argument of the cosmological constant values can be used to argue for the hypothesis that reality is a physical one in which there is a multiverse in which the constants vary over the hypothesis that reality is a physical one in which there is a universe in which the constants are constant throughout. Neither suggest design at all.

> > Furthermore there are examples of the possible
> > ranges given on the page. Check out the required Lambda ratio for example.
>
> That doesn't give a possible range at all. All it does is speculates
> that if Lambda weren't extremely small, no astronomical structures would
> exist. It *doesn't* provide any evidence for a possible range of values
> for Lambda. It's quite possible that Lambda can't vary at all, or that
> if it could vary, it could only vary between 9.8^-123 and 1.1^-122 (both
> of which probably count as extremely small).
>
> The fine-tuning arguments presuppose that these constants can all vary
> within a very wide range of values, and that's something for which we
> simply have no evidence. Unless and until such as a time as we actually
> have a better understanding of these values, speculating on them is
> really quite pointless. We have empirical evidence that one, very
> specific set of values is possible for the physical constants. We have
> no empirical evidence that any other set of values is possible.
>

With the Lambda example why would the critical energy density of the universe be expected to be larger than the dark energy value in a physical reality?

If there was no reason then I am not sure why one couldn't consider (in an objective bayesian inference assessment) it a 50/50 chance as to which was larger. In which case one could just consider the range for dark energy to critical energy density ratio being from 0 to 1 (so just up to the point where it is equal to it) and ignore the range where it is greater. Even then the proportion of the range that the result was would seem unexpected given objective bayesian inference. This would avoid needing to consider whether we could consider the dark energy being as great compared to the critical energy density of the universe as the critical energy density of the universe turned out to be compared to the dark energy.

[Bob Casanova]

On Thu, 5 Apr 2018 17:07:52 +0000 (UTC), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by Paul J Gans
<gan...@panix.com>:

Pretty much covers it, although I'd rephrase as "Why do we
exist in a universe in which we can exist?" A subtle
difference, to be sure...
--

[Bob Casanova]

On Thu, 5 Apr 2018 11:16:13 -0700 (PDT), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by someone
<glenn....@googlemail.com>:

>Have you actually read the wiki article you provide a link to?

Yes.

> The reason I ask is that if you had I wonder why you characterised the issue as you did, as your summary is incorrect.

No, it's not; all fine-tuning arguments reduce to arguments
from incredulity and/or ignorance, no matter how erudite the
language.

> Furthermore there are examples of the possible ranges given on the page.

You've missed the point that those "possible ranges" have no
evidence whatsoever in support; anyone can produce WAGs, bit
providing evidence that those WAGs could be valid is not
(yet) possible. And as also noted in the article, we don't
even know how many fundamental constants exist; Itrust you
see the relevance?

> Check out the required Lambda ratio for example. If you needed more, perhaps check out youtube videos, or the book "A Fortunate Universe". Fine tuning arguments do not necessarily imply a tuner.

If there's no tuner, there's no tuning, merely coincidence,
and the argument reduces to "It's unknown why the universe
exists as it does, but if it were different we wouldn't be
around to ask the question".

And no, I'm not really interested in pursuing this further
with you; multi-hundred-line exchanges give me a headache.
--

[Paul J Gans]

Of course it is. If the universe had different "settings", we'd not
be here to talk about it. The very fact that we are here means that
the "settings" are OK for us.

Perhaps you'd like this better:

"We couldn't exist in a universe in which we couldn't exist."

If that doesn't point out the circularity of the "finely tuned
argument, nothing will.

[Paul J Gans]

Bob Casanova <nos...@buzz.off> wrote:
>On Thu, 5 Apr 2018 17:07:52 +0000 (UTC), the following
>appeared in talk.origins, posted by Paul J Gans
><gan...@panix.com>:

>>JD Wolfe <"JD Wolfe"@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>On 3/13/2018 3:50 PM, JWS wrote:
>>>> On Tuesday, March 13, 2018 at 12:00:03 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
>>>>> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.
>>>>
>>>> Some people think the universe was "fine tuned".
>>>> They should be able to answer:
>>>> What were the values of the constants before tuning?
>>>> How long was the universe "out-of-tune" before it was tuned?
>>>> What, exactly, was done to accomplish the tuning?
>>>> I think it would go a long way to show "fine-tuning" took place if
>>>> these questions could be answered. Thanks.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>What is this "fine tuning" about?
>>
>>It is about the same as "Could we exist in a universe in which we
>>couldn't exist?"

>Pretty much covers it, although I'd rephrase as "Why do we
>exist in a universe in which we can exist?" A subtle
>difference, to be sure...

I'll take it. They won't.

[Bob Casanova]

On Fri, 6 Apr 2018 20:58:24 +0000 (UTC), the following

Of course not; the argument is basically one of the sort
"how many angels can dance on the point of a pin?";
essentially navel-gazing, with no hope of resolution, of the
sort that gives philosophy a bad, although undeserved in
general, name.

[someone]

On Friday, April 6, 2018 at 5:00:04 PM UTC+1, Bob Casanova wrote:
> On Thu, 5 Apr 2018 11:16:13 -0700 (PDT), the following

> appeared in talk.origins, posted by someone:

A point that I have already made on the thread is that the fine tuning argument of the cosmological constant values can be used to argue for the hypothesis that reality is a physical one in which there is a multiverse in which the constants vary over the hypothesis that reality is a physical one in which there is a universe in which the constants are constant throughout. Neither suggest design at all.

[someone]

On Friday, April 6, 2018 at 10:00:03 PM UTC+1, Paul J Gans wrote:

The point is *why* are we in a universe we can talk about?

So consider an analogous point of

*Why* are we on a planet that we can talk about. Can translate to why we are not too close not too far from our sun, not orbiting too many suns etc., the answer can be there are lots of suns, lots of planets, likely to be one in which our situation arose?

One Possible Answer: There are lots of planets and as such there would be some in which those that pose the question could exist, and we naturally existing on one of those planets is to be expected.

Regarding the universe, there is an issue, given the hypothesis that the physics constants are constant throughout it for example:

If ours was the only universe there would be the question:

*Why* are we in a universe which has complex chemistry?

One Possible (physicalist) Answer: There is only one universe, and that it seems we were just fortunate, because as far as we know we have no reason to have expected that result that one in which there was not. In fact given our current understanding it would be 1 in trillions example, so if you were going to bet on this you might want to explain how you were being rational rather than some indoctrinated cult members who thought that being in that cult meant they were clever.

Alternative (physicalist) Answer: There are lots of "universes" and as such there would be some in which those that pose the question could exist, and we naturally existing in one of those universes is to be expected.

Your answer did not distinguish between these alternatives, and could apply to the first alternative, but the fine tuning argument can be used to favour the second alternative over the first for example. So your characterisation was wrong because with you characterisation there was no distinction between the first and the second physicalist scenarios, but with the correct one there is.

Can you follow that?

[JWS]

Yeah... at a distance.

[someone]

Whooohoooo!

(I will try to improve (I assume you made an effort to get it). I am not looking to write something which you need a really close reading to understand, but there you needed to overcome grammatical obstacles, so thanks for the effort.)

[Bob Casanova]

On Sun, 8 Apr 2018 16:05:36 -0700 (PDT), the following

appeared in talk.origins, posted by someone

<glenn....@googlemail.com>:

Anyone can make any argument; the issue is evidence. And
while there is some in support of at least one version of
multiverse conjecture, it has nothing to do with fundamental
constant values. As noted above, we don't even know how many
fundamental constants exist, much less what their possible
ranges might be.

> Neither suggest design at all.

Of course they don't; my reference was to the arguments used
by IDists and other creationists that it *does* suggest
(actually, "prove", for the less rational ones) design.

Which, of course, has nothing to do with whether such
arguments are more than arguments from incredulity and/or
ignorance, which they aren't.

[Mark Isaak]

Out of 10,000 or more languages past and present, and out of an infinite
number of possible languages, you happened to choose to write your post
in modern-day English, a language that you can comprehend with some
facility. The odds against that happening are overwhelming! Why don't
you explore that amazing coincidence of fine-tuning?

--
Mark Isaak eciton (at) curioustaxonomy (dot) net
"Ignorance, allied with power, is the most ferocious enemy justice can
have." - James Baldwin

[Paul J Gans]

You simply don't get it. You are asking questions such as "why is
orange a color?" and "how come 4+2 = 6".

Let me give you a totally different slant on all this. Some folks seem
to think that a sentence that is gramatically correct must also be
logically correct.

"Why is orange a color" falls into that category. So do many "fine tuning"
arguments.

Try to understand that we do not have answers to all questions and also
try to grasp that not all true things can be proven to be true.

[Ron Dean]

On 3/13/2018 1:59 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
> On Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:57:13 -0700 (PDT), the following

> appeared in talk.origins, posted by someone

> <glenn....@googlemail.com>:

>
>> What do the "no design" people here make of the finely tuned universe cosmological arguments.
>

> Mostly that it's a red herring, since no one knows what the
> possible ranges of values are, or even if it's possible for
> those ranges to vary at all.
>
There are two options which comes to mind after the big bang:
1) There must have been fluctuation, disorder an randomness in the early
universe; the ranges must have been unconfined, unlimited, hence values
should have been random arbitrary, accidental and erratic.
2) The values were set, the value of each constant interdependent
and relevant to other constants each value selected to meet
a specific purpose.

>
> And even if they *can* vary, no one knows how many universes
> may have come into existence, grown old and died before one
> appeared in which some inhabitants 13+By later could ask
> questions regarding the postulated, but undemonstrated,
> "fine tuning".
>
> Bottom line: Zero data; lots of conjectures available. Pick
> the one which satisfies you. Or generate your own, but be
> warned that it's probably already been thought of; people
> are endlessly inventive in the absence of objective data.
>


--
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