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Dominion Prime Ministers as War Leaders
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Stephen Graham
Jan 24, 2012, 5:23:43 PM1/24/12
to
We've talked a bit about the major leaders of World War Two of late. But
how well were the British Dominions served by their war leaders? What
about those dominions that changed leaders during the war?
Robert Menzies and John Curtin, Prime Ministers of Australia
Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada
Michael Savage and Peter Fraser, Prime Ministers of New Zealand
Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa
Menzies arguably ignored domestic politics too much compared to the
military situation, losing office in 1942.
King may have paid too much attention to local political considerations.
Savage unexpectedly died in 1940, bringing Fraser to office.
Hertzog's position on the war forced him from office at the outbreak of
war, bringing Smuts back to power. How important was this?
Thoughts?
how well were the British Dominions served by their war leaders? What
about those dominions that changed leaders during the war?
Robert Menzies and John Curtin, Prime Ministers of Australia
Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada
Michael Savage and Peter Fraser, Prime Ministers of New Zealand
Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa
Menzies arguably ignored domestic politics too much compared to the
military situation, losing office in 1942.
King may have paid too much attention to local political considerations.
Savage unexpectedly died in 1940, bringing Fraser to office.
Hertzog's position on the war forced him from office at the outbreak of
war, bringing Smuts back to power. How important was this?
Thoughts?
Don Phillipson
Jan 24, 2012, 7:44:23 PM1/24/12
to
"Stephen Graham" <gra...@speakeasy.net> wrote in message
news:9o8pb6...@mid.individual.net...
> We've talked a bit about the major leaders of World War Two of late. But
> how well were the British Dominions served by their war leaders?
Of course whole books have been written about the wartime
careers of each of these prime ministers . . .
Mackenzie King of Canada was in general a good wartime leader
and generally admired for a range of secondary or negative reasons:
1. He took no personal part in high strategy, as Borden had done
in WW1, probably rightly, protesting against unnecessary losses in
trench warfare, e.g. conventional attacks on targets convention
agreed were impossible. Borden and the Australian PM both supported
their generals' development of Canadian and Australians as
"shock troops." King would have hated this.
2. Mackenzie King was trusted by US Pres. F.D. Roosevelt
and thus could personally reduce the friction between British and
American top-level strategists, who often disagreed. (As a
political reward, Mackenzie King was allowed to appear in
photos with the top men at the Quebec Conferences on
high strategy, although he had no voice in that high strategy,
and did not want one.)
3. In the British tradition, Mackenzie King gave his trusted
ministers free rein, in particular C.D. Howe, wartime Minister
of Munitions and Supply. By the end of the war he fired both
his ministers of War (army) and Air because of their disagreement
with his personal policies for conscription (always sensitive, cf.
conscription riots in Quebec in WW1) which changed over time.
The Canadian army in NW Europe ran short of trained men
by Xmas 1944, just like the US army. (King also backed his
diplomats' enthusiasm for the UNO and other postwar plans.)
4. Some Canadians were ready to fight Hitler in 1939 but
Mackenzie King was not. He wanted to support Britain, but
hoped to do so on the cheap, making munitions supply and
the Commonwealth Air Training Plan Canada's main contribution,
rather than raw manpower as in WW1. In the end Canada under
Mackenzie King did both, building up the industrial infrastructure
as well as supplying plenty of combat forces.
5. Based on wartime experience (and a royal commission that
investigated unconstitutional emergency financial measures
during the Depression) Canada held a big political conference
after the war to propose continuation of wartime centralization
where it would be advantageous. The leading provinces of
Quebec and Ontario rejected most of these proposals (e.g. for
a postwar national Ministry of Reconstruction) so King
concurred (knowing politics is the art of the possible . . .)
(E.g. C.D. Howe's department planned in 1945 to formalize
a national database of research labs and manpower, as had
been successfully done in wartime by personal contacts (the
old boy network.) The project was abandoned by 1948
because neither industrial nor academic researchers were
willing to provide true data, both being simply afraid of their
employers' finding out. We do not even know if the data collected
1945-48 was falsely high or falsely low.)
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
news:9o8pb6...@mid.individual.net...
> We've talked a bit about the major leaders of World War Two of late. But
> how well were the British Dominions served by their war leaders?
careers of each of these prime ministers . . .
Mackenzie King of Canada was in general a good wartime leader
and generally admired for a range of secondary or negative reasons:
1. He took no personal part in high strategy, as Borden had done
in WW1, probably rightly, protesting against unnecessary losses in
trench warfare, e.g. conventional attacks on targets convention
agreed were impossible. Borden and the Australian PM both supported
their generals' development of Canadian and Australians as
"shock troops." King would have hated this.
2. Mackenzie King was trusted by US Pres. F.D. Roosevelt
and thus could personally reduce the friction between British and
American top-level strategists, who often disagreed. (As a
political reward, Mackenzie King was allowed to appear in
photos with the top men at the Quebec Conferences on
high strategy, although he had no voice in that high strategy,
and did not want one.)
3. In the British tradition, Mackenzie King gave his trusted
ministers free rein, in particular C.D. Howe, wartime Minister
of Munitions and Supply. By the end of the war he fired both
his ministers of War (army) and Air because of their disagreement
with his personal policies for conscription (always sensitive, cf.
conscription riots in Quebec in WW1) which changed over time.
The Canadian army in NW Europe ran short of trained men
by Xmas 1944, just like the US army. (King also backed his
diplomats' enthusiasm for the UNO and other postwar plans.)
4. Some Canadians were ready to fight Hitler in 1939 but
Mackenzie King was not. He wanted to support Britain, but
hoped to do so on the cheap, making munitions supply and
the Commonwealth Air Training Plan Canada's main contribution,
rather than raw manpower as in WW1. In the end Canada under
Mackenzie King did both, building up the industrial infrastructure
as well as supplying plenty of combat forces.
5. Based on wartime experience (and a royal commission that
investigated unconstitutional emergency financial measures
during the Depression) Canada held a big political conference
after the war to propose continuation of wartime centralization
where it would be advantageous. The leading provinces of
Quebec and Ontario rejected most of these proposals (e.g. for
a postwar national Ministry of Reconstruction) so King
concurred (knowing politics is the art of the possible . . .)
(E.g. C.D. Howe's department planned in 1945 to formalize
a national database of research labs and manpower, as had
been successfully done in wartime by personal contacts (the
old boy network.) The project was abandoned by 1948
because neither industrial nor academic researchers were
willing to provide true data, both being simply afraid of their
employers' finding out. We do not even know if the data collected
1945-48 was falsely high or falsely low.)
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Geoffrey Sinclair
Jan 25, 2012, 10:58:39 AM1/25/12
to
> We've talked a bit about the major leaders of World War Two of late. But
> how well were the British Dominions served by their war leaders? What
> about those dominions that changed leaders during the war?
>
> Robert Menzies and John Curtin, Prime Ministers of Australia
>
> how well were the British Dominions served by their war leaders? What
> about those dominions that changed leaders during the war?
>
> Robert Menzies and John Curtin, Prime Ministers of Australia
>
> Menzies arguably ignored domestic politics too much compared to the
> military situation, losing office in 1942.
In terms of the people involved it was a bit more complicated than that.
> military situation, losing office in 1942.
See below the URL. The wartime House of Representatives had 75
seats, the Senate 36. Elections in 1940 and 1943 produced significant
shifts in political power.
When war began Menzies was Prime Minister and the Government
was the United Australia Party with the support of the Country Party,
they entered a coalition in 1940. On 13 August 1940 an air crash
killed 3 Cabinet Ministers and the Chief of the General Staff. The
ministers were considered friends and supporters of Menzies.
The 21 September 1940 election produced a hung parliament which
made the Government reliant on 2 independents as the Labor Party
refused an offer of an all party government.
Menzies left Australia for England in January 1941, returning in May.
While in England he was involved in decisions about an expeditionary
force to Greece and argued for more resources for the defence of
Singapore. He was therefore at least party blamed when the Greek
campaign failed. And probably later about failing to gain more
resources to defend against Japan but as he was then out of office
the attacks would have been less news/history worthy.
Menzies in the 1930's gained a reputation as often the smartest person
in the room and being quite willing to let everybody know it. As a
result his personal support was not great. His attitude was also often
characterised as more British than Australian. The parliamentary
numbers, the Labor Party staying in opposition, his long absence, his
personality and the failure in Greece combined and he lost the support
of cabinet, resigning as Prime Minister in August 1941.
Essentially Menzies as a wartime leader had considerable political
constraints, baggage from pre war politics and the usual problems of
allied war leaders early, plenty of bad war news to cope with and
accept responsibility for. He was right about Singapore defences,
presided over the start of the change from peace to wartime economy,
including what weapons to build, Australia had little heavy industry,
also the decisions to raise an expeditionary force, the A.I.F., but
overall had little impact even in Australia. He was unable to stop
the political infighting on the conservative side of Australian politics
which impacted government effectiveness.
Of course Britain made the grand strategy decisions.
As a sideline Australia set up its first diplomatic missions in 1940,
7 January with the US, with R G Casey as head, he was seen as a
Menzies rival, and later on 18 August with Japan.
In October 1941 government changed when the independents
switched to supporting the Labor Party. This brought John Curtin
to power.
The 21 August 1943 election gave the Labor Party a majority,
indeed the most comprehensive victory in both chambers since
Federation in 1901.
Curtin died in office before the Pacific War ended so has achieved a
level of admiration reserved for people who die in such circumstances.
Politically constrained until the 1943 elections, he had to deal with
the Japanese attack and Douglas MacArthur. He fought hard for the
recall of the Australian infantry divisions from the Middle East, and
against diverting them to places like Burma, which meant there
were trained ground troops available for the New Guinea operations
in 1942. He also fought for equipment from the USA, things like
P-40s for the RAAF units sent to New Guinea.
Curtin formed an effective working relationship with MacArthur, and
made it clear a significant political shift had happened, the US was now
the one able to help Australia, replacing Britain. Given MacArthur's
position Curtin had little input about military operations.
Curtin had been an opponent of conscription in WWI but sent
conscripts to the front line in the islands north of Australia, an
emotional issue for the Labor Party. One that would revive a
generation later. The A.I.F. units, navy and air force were all
volunteer.
Curtin has generally been judged to have presided over a more
effective government than the one he replaced, is considered
correct in the crucial decisions he took in early 1942, worked with
MacArthur but had to accept MacArthur's method of warfare,
then died before the return of post war politics and the return to
peacetime economy. Australia did well in the 1942 to 1945
period, both economically and militarily, which Curtin deserves
some of the credit for, and the government some more, being a
junior partner though meant little input into major decisions and
little consequences if mistakes were made, as they inevitably
were. The government did not for example manage to stop the
waterside industrial warfare, including strikes at inconvenient
moments but did preside over significant increases in production
and then production changes caused by the shifting supply priorities.
Both Menzies (for his 1949 to 1965 period as Prime Minister)
and Curtin have achieved considerable levels of admiration
from their respective sides of politics.
http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/timeline/results.aspx
Robert Menzies 26 Apr 1939 12th Prime Minister, after he was elected
leader of the United Australia Party.
Arthur Fadden 29 Aug 1941 13th Prime Minister, Country Party, had
been Deputy Prime Minister to Menzies, who had been forced to resign
as United Australia Party leader.
John Curtin 07 Oct 1941 14th Prime Minister, Labor Party, was sworn in
as Prime Minister after the Fadden coalition government lost majority
support in the House of Representatives. Two independents decided the
Labor Party was the better option.
Francis Forde 06 Jul 1945, 15th Prime Minister, On the death of John
Curtin, deputy Prime Minister Frank Forde was sworn in until the federal
parliamentary Labor Party elected a new leader.
Ben Chifley 13 Jul 1945, 16th Prime Minister, was sworn in after being
chosen the day before as the new leader of the Labor Party. Won the
1946 election with a slightly reduced majority.
Robert Menzies 19 Dec 1949 became Prime Minister for the second time,
starting a 16-year term that set a record in Australian politics. The
Liberal/Country Party coalition had convincingly won the federal election
on 10 December.
Menzies helped found the Liberal Party, becoming its leader, essentially the
non Labor Party political organisations uniting, except for the Country
Party
which had been formed at the national level in 1920.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Don Phillipson
Jan 25, 2012, 4:17:58 PM1/25/12
to
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
news:Y5CdnWtcJdiKib3S...@westnet.com.au...
> Menzies left Australia for England in January 1941, returning in May.
> While in England he was involved in decisions about an expeditionary
> force to Greece and argued for more resources for the defence of
> Singapore. He was therefore at least party blamed when the Greek
> campaign failed. And probably later about failing to gain more
> resources to defend against Japan but as he was then out of office
> the attacks would have been less news/history worthy.
This was an important difference between Australian and Canadian
policy. In 1939, as recommended by top professional officers, the
Canadian government gave operational control of Canadian forces
overseas to the British high command (just as in WW1.)
Australia did the same but later in the war insisted on major
changes in deployment. This may have started because of Menzies'
desire when in England in 1941 to "contribute" to political and
strategic planning. After the battle of Tobruk (where Australians
fought perhaps the best) Australia insisted on their redeployment
nearer home and GS mentioned other government decisions
which Canada never attempted. (Notably, Canada replaced
its overseas top commander in Europe, Gen. MacNaughton,
at British request. when he was judged too old and erratic
although popular with the troops.)
For obvious reasons, throughout the war, Canada/US/UK
relations were very different from Australia/.US/UK relations.
Canada had industrial and strategic resources (from wheat
to uranium) on which the US and UK war effort depended,
while Australia did not -- thus could follow a strictly national
manpower policy. Correspondingly, Australia wanted a
political sphere of influence in the South Pacific while
Canada had no such overseas ambitions.
news:Y5CdnWtcJdiKib3S...@westnet.com.au...
> Menzies left Australia for England in January 1941, returning in May.
> While in England he was involved in decisions about an expeditionary
> force to Greece and argued for more resources for the defence of
> Singapore. He was therefore at least party blamed when the Greek
> campaign failed. And probably later about failing to gain more
> resources to defend against Japan but as he was then out of office
> the attacks would have been less news/history worthy.
policy. In 1939, as recommended by top professional officers, the
Canadian government gave operational control of Canadian forces
overseas to the British high command (just as in WW1.)
Australia did the same but later in the war insisted on major
changes in deployment. This may have started because of Menzies'
desire when in England in 1941 to "contribute" to political and
strategic planning. After the battle of Tobruk (where Australians
fought perhaps the best) Australia insisted on their redeployment
nearer home and GS mentioned other government decisions
which Canada never attempted. (Notably, Canada replaced
its overseas top commander in Europe, Gen. MacNaughton,
at British request. when he was judged too old and erratic
although popular with the troops.)
For obvious reasons, throughout the war, Canada/US/UK
relations were very different from Australia/.US/UK relations.
Canada had industrial and strategic resources (from wheat
to uranium) on which the US and UK war effort depended,
while Australia did not -- thus could follow a strictly national
manpower policy. Correspondingly, Australia wanted a
political sphere of influence in the South Pacific while
Canada had no such overseas ambitions.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Jan 26, 2012, 9:16:56 AM1/26/12
to
"Don Phillipson" <e9...@SPAMBLOCK.ncf.ca> wrote in message
news:jfpq7g$jg5$3...@speranza.aioe.org...
full corps HQ, with associated Corps Troops, and meant to fight
as a complete unit. Not as separate divisions. The war situation
meant that never happened.
> Australia did the same but later in the war insisted on major
> changes in deployment.
Yes.
> This may have started because of Menzies'
> desire when in England in 1941 to "contribute" to political and
> strategic planning.
No. Menzies certainly wanted to be a part of the senior war
leadership, but he was not the one to challenge overall British
strategy. By the time it really mattered to Australia he was
out of office.
The result of the Greek campaign was certainly not a good
recommendation for British Command. Note General Blamey
was nominally number 2 in the Middle East command structure
for a time as well as a leader in Greece.
> After the battle of Tobruk (where Australians
> fought perhaps the best) Australia insisted on their redeployment
> nearer home and GS mentioned other government decisions
> which Canada never attempted.
The Australian Government insisted on the withdrawal of the
9th division from Tobruk, which was largely done before
December 1941, despite misgivings of the Middle East
Command, on the basis the men needed relief after being in
the front line since April.. It actually meant for a time all 3
A.I.F. Middle East divisions and their corps HQ were largely
together. A major Australian political and military objective.
The fundamental reality was in early 1942 Australia had
minimal defences and was under direct threat in a way Canada
never was. I really doubt Canada would have continued the
1939 arrangements if Japan was operating land forces in the
islands around say Juneau, or the Queen Charlotte islands.
The way Churchill tried to have some of the Australian units
sent to Burma, and the decision to send some to Java, and to
leave others in Ceylon and the 9th Division in the Middle East
meant of the corps of troops in the Middle East about half
made it to Australia as part of the first repatriation. So the
Australians certainly did not receive all they wanted. Part
of the arrangement saw an extra US Army division sent to
Australia in "compensation".
> (Notably, Canada replaced
> its overseas top commander in Europe, Gen. MacNaughton,
> at British request. when he was judged too old and erratic
> although popular with the troops.)
And Blamey fired Australian commanders in New Guinea who
had earned MacArthur's displeasure, though Blamey was also
acting on his own ideas as well.
> For obvious reasons, throughout the war, Canada/US/UK
> relations were very different from Australia/.US/UK relations.
> Canada had industrial and strategic resources (from wheat
> to uranium) on which the US and UK war effort depended,
> while Australia did not -- thus could follow a strictly national
> manpower policy.
Australian reverse lend lease was around 90% of its lend lease,
supplying in particular food but also things like locally produced
small boats and ammunition. It made a big difference to the
combat ability of MacArthur's forces. Canadian aid to Australia
was about the same as the nett US aid, mainly training RAAF
aircrew in Canada.
Canadian supplies were larger than Australia's thanks to the
larger population, the proximity to the US and the early war
decision to push Canadian effort towards supplies, Australia
ended up the most heavily militarised of the western allies.
However Canadian production was effectively swamped
by that of America, so I really doubt it can be claimed the
US and UK depended on Canadian aid. Australian supplies
had the great advantage of being produced near the front line
during a world shipping shortage.
By the way pre war the top 3 wheat exporters, average over the
1934 to 1938 period were Canada, 175.4 million bushels,
Argentina 112.7, Australia 102.4.
Like Australia Canada found itself a junior member of an
alliance and that meant at times accepting decisions that were
considered bad.
> Correspondingly, Australia wanted a
> political sphere of influence in the South Pacific while
> Canada had no such overseas ambitions.
Australia already had a South Pacific sphere of influence and
was busy pushing the Japanese back out of it. That sphere
did not expand post war.
news:jfpq7g$jg5$3...@speranza.aioe.org...
> "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
> news:Y5CdnWtcJdiKib3S...@westnet.com.au...
>
>> Menzies left Australia for England in January 1941, returning in May.
>> While in England he was involved in decisions about an expeditionary
>> force to Greece and argued for more resources for the defence of
>> Singapore. He was therefore at least party blamed when the Greek
>> campaign failed. And probably later about failing to gain more
>> resources to defend against Japan but as he was then out of office
>> the attacks would have been less news/history worthy.
>
> This was an important difference between Australian and Canadian
> policy. In 1939, as recommended by top professional officers, the
> Canadian government gave operational control of Canadian forces
> overseas to the British high command (just as in WW1.)
One point about the A.I.F., it was to be 4 infantry divisions plus a
> news:Y5CdnWtcJdiKib3S...@westnet.com.au...
>
>> Menzies left Australia for England in January 1941, returning in May.
>> While in England he was involved in decisions about an expeditionary
>> force to Greece and argued for more resources for the defence of
>> Singapore. He was therefore at least party blamed when the Greek
>> campaign failed. And probably later about failing to gain more
>> resources to defend against Japan but as he was then out of office
>> the attacks would have been less news/history worthy.
>
> This was an important difference between Australian and Canadian
> policy. In 1939, as recommended by top professional officers, the
> Canadian government gave operational control of Canadian forces
> overseas to the British high command (just as in WW1.)
full corps HQ, with associated Corps Troops, and meant to fight
as a complete unit. Not as separate divisions. The war situation
meant that never happened.
> Australia did the same but later in the war insisted on major
> changes in deployment.
> This may have started because of Menzies'
> desire when in England in 1941 to "contribute" to political and
> strategic planning.
leadership, but he was not the one to challenge overall British
strategy. By the time it really mattered to Australia he was
out of office.
The result of the Greek campaign was certainly not a good
recommendation for British Command. Note General Blamey
was nominally number 2 in the Middle East command structure
for a time as well as a leader in Greece.
> After the battle of Tobruk (where Australians
> fought perhaps the best) Australia insisted on their redeployment
> nearer home and GS mentioned other government decisions
> which Canada never attempted.
9th division from Tobruk, which was largely done before
December 1941, despite misgivings of the Middle East
Command, on the basis the men needed relief after being in
the front line since April.. It actually meant for a time all 3
A.I.F. Middle East divisions and their corps HQ were largely
together. A major Australian political and military objective.
The fundamental reality was in early 1942 Australia had
minimal defences and was under direct threat in a way Canada
never was. I really doubt Canada would have continued the
1939 arrangements if Japan was operating land forces in the
islands around say Juneau, or the Queen Charlotte islands.
The way Churchill tried to have some of the Australian units
sent to Burma, and the decision to send some to Java, and to
leave others in Ceylon and the 9th Division in the Middle East
meant of the corps of troops in the Middle East about half
made it to Australia as part of the first repatriation. So the
Australians certainly did not receive all they wanted. Part
of the arrangement saw an extra US Army division sent to
Australia in "compensation".
> (Notably, Canada replaced
> its overseas top commander in Europe, Gen. MacNaughton,
> at British request. when he was judged too old and erratic
> although popular with the troops.)
had earned MacArthur's displeasure, though Blamey was also
acting on his own ideas as well.
> For obvious reasons, throughout the war, Canada/US/UK
> relations were very different from Australia/.US/UK relations.
> Canada had industrial and strategic resources (from wheat
> to uranium) on which the US and UK war effort depended,
> while Australia did not -- thus could follow a strictly national
> manpower policy.
supplying in particular food but also things like locally produced
small boats and ammunition. It made a big difference to the
combat ability of MacArthur's forces. Canadian aid to Australia
was about the same as the nett US aid, mainly training RAAF
aircrew in Canada.
Canadian supplies were larger than Australia's thanks to the
larger population, the proximity to the US and the early war
decision to push Canadian effort towards supplies, Australia
ended up the most heavily militarised of the western allies.
However Canadian production was effectively swamped
by that of America, so I really doubt it can be claimed the
US and UK depended on Canadian aid. Australian supplies
had the great advantage of being produced near the front line
during a world shipping shortage.
By the way pre war the top 3 wheat exporters, average over the
1934 to 1938 period were Canada, 175.4 million bushels,
Argentina 112.7, Australia 102.4.
Like Australia Canada found itself a junior member of an
alliance and that meant at times accepting decisions that were
considered bad.
> Correspondingly, Australia wanted a
> political sphere of influence in the South Pacific while
> Canada had no such overseas ambitions.
was busy pushing the Japanese back out of it. That sphere
did not expand post war.
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