who really started ww2 in the pacific?
Stuart McGraw
In America, it is taken for granted that the Pacific part
of the war was a war against Japanese aggression (at least
among my friends and everything I've read). However one
could view "Japanese aggression" as the same sort of
colonialism that was practiced by the western world for
centuries which Japan was copying, and western resistance
to Japanese colonialism as a resistance to additional
competition for Asia fueled by racism that would have
Japanese in the proper role of colonizees rather than
colonizers. In this view, war was unavoidable by Japan,
and America and Europe as responsible for it as Japan.
Can anyone give me a pointer to any books, authors, or
other material that consider this point of view?
(Please note that I am not advocating or disputing this
point of view, I just want to read more about it. I am
a computer geek and pretty illiterate about history in
general so I am looking for references that are not too
esoteric.)
Marlock
First of all, read J.P.Taylor. I think the name of the book is
"Reasons and causes of the Second World War".
Then the book "Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire" (can't
think of the name of the author, althoug very famous).
And finally, "The Great Pacific War", by Bywater.
In any case, in my opinion, the Japanese did not need any inspiration
in the european and american colonialism, from what I could gather,
in their opinion, the colonialism was justified, it was just that
the subjects who were conducting it were wrong, and it is for
Japan to take their place.
Regarding the actual attack on the Americans in December 1941, the
decision was made in the summer 1941 I think, on the meeting of
the Joint Chiefs of Army and Navy, when emperor Hirohito was
presented with the statistical data specifing the duration of
movability of the Japanese merchant and war fleets, taking into
a consideration the sanctions by the Westerners (Americans mainly).
The calculations were saying, if I remember correclty, that, unless
the Japanese acquire new sources of oil, rubber and other vital
material, in a peaceful environment, their fleet will run for 2
years max, and in a war time, for 6 months.
The Army chiefs were pushing for war, demanding that the Japanese
does not succumb to the West just like the rest of Asia did.
Hirohito approved the plan. The Navy was sceptical to say at least.
BTW, any book on Richard Sorge would do nicely as well, as he was
the mayor SSSR spy in Japan during the hostilities, acquiring vital
data for the Russian, amongst others, information on the attack on
the Americans, and not Russian in the north (therefore compleing
Stalin to trust Sorge (this time) and withdraw the Siberia troops,
a move that turned out to be crucial to the defence of Moscow that
winter).
Hope this gives u some incentive to ponder on this subject more,
one of my favourite WW2 subjects.
Greets!
GFH
You can start with Wikipedia. Start with Taiwan in the
early 1890s. You can follow leads back and forward to
get a feel of the Pacific at that time. Do not overlook
Korea. And the Russo-Japanese War. In other words,
Japan had been at war for about 50 years prior to WWII.
GFH
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> Recently, I was discussing Japan and WW2 with some friends,
> In America, it is taken for granted that the Pacific part
> of the war was a war against Japanese aggression (at least
> among my friends and everything I've read). However one
> could view "Japanese aggression" as the same sort of
> colonialism that was practiced by the western world for
> centuries which Japan was copying, and western resistance
> to Japanese colonialism as a resistance to additional
> competition for Asia fueled by racism that would have
> Japanese in the proper role of colonizees rather than
> colonizers. In this view, war was unavoidable by Japan,
> and America and Europe as responsible for it as Japan.
Here are a couple of things I wrote a while back
Wasn't Japan just defending herself when she attacked the US?
This line of reasoning seems to derive from arguments that Japan was being
"driven into a corner" by sanctions, and had no choice but to attack
the US. Meiji Japan was driven to emulate what it thought the West was
doing in every facet of society. They had observed, for example, that the
West was able to carve up China into "Spheres of Influence", and was able
to do from great distances, while they, the Japanese, had had limited
success in their previous attempts to dominate the Korean peninsula,
much less China. As part of the catch-up effort, she whole-heartedly
entered into the Imperialist game in Asia, being treated as an equal
(relative to her power) by the other powers. However, after World
War I, Japan failed to recognize a fundamental shift in the attitudes
of her former Imperial partners; they began a long, slow process of
disengaging themselves from their former Imperial areas, from their
colonies, in addition to outright stopping all expansions. Japan chose
to read this as a sign that the West had lost its power and resolve,
and that Japan was the rightful heir to Imperial mantle in Asia. With
the deaths of many of the idealistic leaders who had led Japan's rise
to international prominence, and the refusal of the US to intervene in
Asian affairs, in addition to the Bolshevik revolution and the stripping
of possessions from Germany, Britain found herself alone in dealing with
an increasingly aggressive Japan in the area. Having a keen grasp of the
obvious, she began a policy of acceding to Japanese hegemony in the area.
Japan continued a policy of acquiring territory for some grand, illusive
scheme of a "Greater Asia", subordinate and grateful to Japan. The
reality of this was that only a single possession, Manchuria, was
profitable to the Japanese, and the rest of the Empire turned out to
be a drain. This drain was greatly accelerated by Japan's invasion of
China proper in 1936. It was a war that Japan assumed would be ended in
"3 to 6 months"; at the time of Pearl Harbor, it had been going on for
5 years, at the cost of over half a million Japanese lives. The war put
a tremendous strain on Japan (and was in fact opposed by more radically
NATIONALISTIC elements, as taking away from the development of Japan's
other possessions), particularly in the areas of scrap metal and fuel.
Domestic consumption fell, consumer goods became scarce, and the use of
materiale for war purposes ate into Japan's domestic industry. This
cut further into her foreign reserves, exacerbating the economic
impact of the war. The war effort took on a life of its own, however,
and common sense was subordinated to it. Japan expanded into areas of
China and Indochina which had no strategic value to her, but put her
in a position to threaten British and Dutch possessions in the area;
possessions that both those Allied nations needed in order to continue
their fight against Hitler. At this point, the US stopped ignoring the
Japanese threat, and imposed a series of escalating sanctions on Japan,
cutting off her scrap metal, limitting and then cutting off her oil
(Japan imported most of both from the US.) While Japanese officials
realized that they had enough of each resource for Japan to do well IF
THE WAR IN CHINA STOPPED, they were powerless over the military they
were supposed to control. An abortive attack on Soviet positions in
Mongolia had placed Japan's focus firmly south, towards the possessions
of the US' future allies. For no reason anyone could articulate, Japan
felt she had to continue the war in China. To continue the war in China,
she had to have resources of oil and metal. To have these resources,
she must seize them, if others refused to sell them. In order to seize
them, she felt she had to attack and destroy the naval power of the US.
Thus, for a "3 to 6 month" operation in China in 1937, Japan would embark
on a war that would strip her of all the possessions and industries she
had acquired in 70 years.
> (Please note that I am not advocating or disputing this
> point of view, I just want to read more about it. I am
> a computer geek and pretty illiterate about history in
> general so I am looking for references that are not too
> esoteric.)
Feis, _The Road to Pearl Harbor_
Gilbert, _The Second World War_
Beasley, _Japanese Imperialism: 1894-1945_
Mike
Rich Rostrom
> Recently, I was discussing Japan and WW2 with some friends,
> In America, it is taken for granted that the Pacific part
Well, since the war began with Japanese
attacks on the U.S., what else was it?
> However one
> could view "Japanese aggression" as the same sort of
> colonialism that was practiced by the western world for
> centuries which Japan was copying...
_Tu quoque_ (you're another) is not a valid
defense of a crime.
> In this view, war was unavoidable by Japan...
Neither the U.S., nor the British Empire,
nor the Netherlands had fired a shot at
Japan. What they had done was refuse to
sell Japan oil, as long as Japan continued
its war against China.
The conquest of China was no way necessary
to Japan, _except_ in the minds of Japanese
militarists, who were emotionally committed
to the idea of conquest.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> Regarding the actual attack on the Americans in December 1941, the
> decision was made in the summer 1941 I think, on the meeting of
> the Joint Chiefs of Army and Navy, when emperor Hirohito was
> presented with the statistical data specifing the duration of
> movability of the Japanese merchant and war fleets, taking into
> a consideration the sanctions by the Westerners (Americans mainly).
I don't see a record of this being discussed at that time with Hirohito;
do you have a reference?
> The calculations were saying, if I remember correclty, that, unless
> the Japanese acquire new sources of oil, rubber and other vital
> material, in a peaceful environment, their fleet will run for 2
> years max, and in a war time, for 6 months.
Morison notes that Konoye was told, at the time, that Japan could be
completely independent within 6 months, utilizing oil in the Sakhalin,
Manchurian coal, and synthetics *IF* the Army stopped the war in China.
> The Army chiefs were pushing for war, demanding that the Japanese
> does not succumb to the West just like the rest of Asia did.
> Hirohito approved the plan. The Navy was sceptical to say at least.
Hirohito approved any plan presented him with unanimous approval. He did
not take part in the discussions.
And the Navy didn't like the war in China to begin with.
Mike
OWKtree
I think the book cited above might be John Toland's _The Rising Sun_
(Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945).
Written in 1971, but it's point-of-view is from the Japanese side and
based on Toland's interviews with surviving Japanese officers. Some
of the scholarship is definitely outdated, but the early chapters
(before Pearl Harbor) give a description of how the Japanese nation
painted itself into a corner due to a combination of extreme
nationalism, a governmental structure that essentially promised
control to the military, and a head of state who was expected to
"reign, but not rule".
_Kaigun : Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese
Navy, 1887-1941_ by Evans and Peattie is centered around the
development of the Japanese Navy, but it essentially also has to
explain government policy for the same period. That shows how naval
policy aimed towards mainly fighting China, then Russia, eventually
turned towards an potential, and then expected, war with the United
States. And Japan was fighting wars with China over territory that
far back (1880s).
As for a national policy considered "racist" and/or "imperialistic"
I've found the terms tossed around liberally at different nations and
for different time periods. And xenophobic reactions about other
cultural groups is definitely not limited to the Western nations. And
I'm also not sure at what point in history it became bad form to
conquer territory from other peoples.
- Kurt
WaltBJ
Prados, ISBN 1-5570-431-8. He discusses the historical events leading
up to WW2 and then teh Japanese decisions during WW2. Well worth
reading.
FWIW I bought my own copy, seeing as I was in Alaska when Pearl Harbor
was struck..
Walt BJ
Marlock
I completely disagree. Roosewelet and his administration were
pushing Japan into a war. For Japan, the capture and holding
of the ex-european colonies was a question of difference between
a true empire, or a colony. And Roosewelt was not willing to
allow a Japanese empire.
Japanese diplomacy did their best to reach an agreement with the
US government, but to avail.
I am NOT saying that each side war right, don't get me wrong there.
Marlock
> Marlock <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Regarding the actual attack on the Americans in December 1941, the
>> decision was made in the summer 1941 I think, on the meeting of
>> the Joint Chiefs of Army and Navy, when emperor Hirohito was
>> presented with the statistical data specifing the duration of
>> movability of the Japanese merchant and war fleets, taking into
>> a consideration the sanctions by the Westerners (Americans mainly).
>
> I don't see a record of this being discussed at that time with Hirohito;
> do you have a reference?
>
I think if you read any book on Richard Sorge, you will find it
there, it's the intel he collected prior to sending the info
back to Stalin.
Also, I think "Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire" discusses this.
>> The calculations were saying, if I remember correclty, that, unless
>> the Japanese acquire new sources of oil, rubber and other vital
>> material, in a peaceful environment, their fleet will run for 2
>> years max, and in a war time, for 6 months.
>
> Morison notes that Konoye was told, at the time, that Japan could be
> completely independent within 6 months, utilizing oil in the Sakhalin,
> Manchurian coal, and synthetics *IF* the Army stopped the war in China.
>
>> The Army chiefs were pushing for war, demanding that the Japanese
>> does not succumb to the West just like the rest of Asia did.
>> Hirohito approved the plan. The Navy was sceptical to say at least.
>
> Hirohito approved any plan presented him with unanimous approval. He did
> not take part in the discussions.
>
> And the Navy didn't like the war in China to begin with.
>
Agreed.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> I completely disagree. Roosewelet and his administration were
> pushing Japan into a war.
Completely wrong. The Japanese were pushing Japan into a war, and keeping
themselves from getting out of it. It was an act opposed by most of the
Japanese public, most Japanese politicians, and some of the more nationalist
groups. However, "policy" was set, in effect, by local officers and they
would then receive the support of the Army (and some Navy) factions in the
Tokyo government.
> For Japan, the capture and holding
> of the ex-european colonies was a question of difference between
> a true empire, or a colony.
Sorry, the above doesn't really make much sense; could you clarify.
> And Roosewelt was not willing to
> allow a Japanese empire.
The Japanese had an empire before FDR took office. It didn't bother him.
> Japanese diplomacy did their best to reach an agreement with the
> US government, but to avail.
They did nothing of the sort; the fact of the matter is that they had
nothing to negotiate. The US wanted Japan to withdraw from the Southern
Indochina area, which had zero strategic value for the war in China, or
to at least withdraw from the Tripartite Pact. Japan did neither. Too,
at the end of November, seeing no agreement in sight, the US proposed
a return to the ex-post ante of June 1941. Again, Japan refused.
> I am NOT saying that each side war right, don't get me wrong there.
VERY few times in history is there a distinct right side, and wrong side.
This is one of those times.
Mike
David H Thornley
>
> I completely disagree. Roosewelet and his administration were
> pushing Japan into a war.
Roosevelt was trying to avoid a war with Japan, preferring to
avoid war in the Pacific in order to concentrate on Europe,
where he did want to go to war at a suitable time. His
actions were trailing public opinion here, not leading it.
(Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor)
For Japan, the capture and holding
> of the ex-european colonies was a question of difference between
> a true empire, or a colony.
In other words, Japan was determined on a war of aggression.
Not too surprising they started some then.
They seemed rather demanding about the colonies, also. The
US sanctions that pushed the Japanese hardest were in response
to the Japanese conquest of southern Indochina, which had
no relation to the war in China, but was at least partly a
preparation to attack the Western powers.
And Roosewelt was not willing to
> allow a Japanese empire.
In what sense did Korea, Manchuria, and other places not
constitute an empire? Roosevelt didn't seem to care about
it. It was only after continued Japanese attacks and
atrocities in China (including the sinking of a USN
gunboat) did Roosevelt start to do anything.
> Japanese diplomacy did their best to reach an agreement with the
> US government, but to avail.
>
The US government was very willing to come to pretty much any
agreement that didn't involve US support of Japanese conquests
in China. Unfortunately, the Japanese demanded economic
support of their aggression, and there really was no room for
maneuver. Had the Japanese been willing to pull out of China
proper, and be content with an empire already as large as they
needed, there would have been no war.
There's another thing to consider. Japan attacked the Western
powers because the US was not continuing to sell Japan stuff like
oil and pig iron. According to Willmott (Pearl Harbor), the
Japanese were going to run out of cash sometime around Spring
1942. Obviously, the war in China wasn't going to be over
by then, and so the Japanese choices were going to be to
attack as they did historically or demand that the US
directly subsidize Japanese conquests against US interests.
What do you think the Japanese would have done then? Calling off
the China war would presumably be as impossible as it was in 1941.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > Marlock <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >> Regarding the actual attack on the Americans in December 1941, the
> >> decision was made in the summer 1941 I think, on the meeting of
> >> the Joint Chiefs of Army and Navy, when emperor Hirohito was
> >> presented with the statistical data specifing the duration of
> >> movability of the Japanese merchant and war fleets, taking into
> >> a consideration the sanctions by the Westerners (Americans mainly).
> >
> > I don't see a record of this being discussed at that time with Hirohito;
> > do you have a reference?
> >
> I think if you read any book on Richard Sorge, you will find it
> there, it's the intel he collected prior to sending the info
> back to Stalin.
> Also, I think "Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire" discusses this.
I checked both Toland's book and Feis'; I see no record of this. And
this would have been an odd time for the decision, as the Japanese were
still trying to negotiate a settlement with the US at that time and it
wasn't until late October/early November that the decision was made. Tojo,
in fact, knew little of the PH preparations until after he became
PM in October.
Mike
Don Phillipson
> I completely disagree. Roosewelet and his administration were
> pushing Japan into a war. For Japan, the capture and holding
> of the ex-european colonies was a question of difference between
> a true empire, or a colony. And Roosewelt was not willing to
> allow a Japanese empire.
This reminds us that long before Roosevelt came to power Japan
had defeated Russia and colonised Korea and Hainan (off South
China) and been approved by the League of Nations as "mandatory"
power ruling German's former "concession" in China and numerous
Pacific Ocean islands (e.g. Truk.) The Japanese empire expanded
long before 4 March 1933 when FDR took office.
> Japanese diplomacy did their best to reach an agreement with the
> US government, but to avail.
[Presumably Marlock means "no avail."]
The problem here is that Japan's "agreement" included at least
holding onto its gains in China, e.g. puppet state Manchukuo
(created 1932 after invasion in 1931). Japan captured Peking
(Beijing) and Shanghai (focus of US interests) in 1937, with
notorious brutality, and Tsingtao, Canton and Hankow in 1938,
thus controlled much of the Chinese seacoast. In the same
decade internal Japanese politics was characterized by
general militarization and selective assassination of public
figures believed "doves." It appears that Japanese envoys
in Washington in 1941 had no authority to agree to Japanese
withdrawal from any parts of China.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Padraigh ProAmerica
of our Fathers"; "Flyboys") that traces the roots of the war to the 1905
voyage by then Sec of War Taft to the Philiipnes, Japan, Korea and
China, and a series of secret agreements he negotiated that, in line
with the Law of Unintended Consequences, set in motion a series of
events that culminated in the war.
"You must be an intellectual to believe such nonsense. No ordinary man
could be such a fool."
George Orwell
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> There is a new book just out, "Imperial Voyage" by James Brady ("Flags
> of our Fathers"; "Flyboys") that traces the roots of the war to the 1905
> voyage by then Sec of War Taft to the Philiipnes, Japan, Korea and
> China, and a series of secret agreements he negotiated that, in line
> with the Law of Unintended Consequences, set in motion a series of
> events that culminated in the war.
Not sure one needs to invoke any such Law in this regard. One of the
arguments against taking the PI as a colony was that it would set us
against Japan in their own "Sphere of Influence". It was known that
Japan was going to expand, and this would likely bring the PI into their
sites.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> > Japanese diplomacy did their best to reach an agreement with the
> > US government, but to avail.
> The problem here is that Japan's "agreement" included at least
> holding onto its gains in China, e.g. puppet state Manchukuo
> (created 1932 after invasion in 1931). Japan captured Peking
So far as I am aware, the US had no real objection to the Japanese
retaining Manchuria.
> (Beijing) and Shanghai (focus of US interests) in 1937, with
> notorious brutality, and Tsingtao, Canton and Hankow in 1938,
> thus controlled much of the Chinese seacoast. In the same
> decade internal Japanese politics was characterized by
> general militarization and selective assassination of public
> figures believed "doves." It appears that Japanese envoys
> in Washington in 1941 had no authority to agree to Japanese
> withdrawal from any parts of China.
Here's where we get bogged down in the lunacies of Japan at the time.
Whatever authority they had, they had no ability to enforce any
agreement on their own troops, even had they been able to reach
agreement with the US.
Mike
Bill Shatzer
-snip-
> This reminds us that long before Roosevelt came to power Japan
> had defeated Russia and colonised Korea and Hainan (off South
> China)
I believe you're thinking of the island of Taiwan (Formosa) which was
ceded to Japan in 1895 following the first Sino-Japanese war.
Hainan was not occuppied by the Japanese until 1939, two years into the
second Sino-Japanese war and well after Rossevelt "came to power".
Marlock
>
> The problem here is that Japan's "agreement" included at least
> holding onto its gains in China, e.g. puppet state Manchukuo
> (created 1932 after invasion in 1931). Japan captured Peking
> (Beijing) and Shanghai (focus of US interests) in 1937, with
> notorious brutality, and Tsingtao, Canton and Hankow in 1938,
> thus controlled much of the Chinese seacoast. In the same
> decade internal Japanese politics was characterized by
> general militarization and selective assassination of public
> figures believed "doves." It appears that Japanese envoys
> in Washington in 1941 had no authority to agree to Japanese
> withdrawal from any parts of China.
This in NO WAY differs from anyyhing that any other great power
did at their time, including the US (native Americans).
Every great power had an era of militarilization, followed by
a determiniation of foreign policy that more then seldomly
included assasinations, creation of public states, invasions
etc.
So, simply to say that the Japan is a "bad" guy is just
over-simplification.
Japan did not go into China just for the fun of it. Their aim
was to secure territory, working force, resources... everything
that a big power needs, and everything that the big powers have
been doing all along. Romans, British, Americans, you name it!
It is true that the war in China was a devestatign drian of
resources, but you can not negate the fact the the Japanese
military planing so the take-over of the ex-european colonies as
a partial solution to that problem. And after the european states
began falling one after another in Europe, it was just a question
of time when someone takes over. Japan simply decide it was to
be first.
I do not differ Japan from anyother big power, or big-power-wannabe.
They made a big gamble, and lost. US gambled as well (some time ago),
but won.
And to claim that the US administration was a simply puppy trying
to keep the peace in the Pacific makes me laugh.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> I will start with this:
> > The problem here is that Japan's "agreement" included at least
> > holding onto its gains in China, e.g. puppet state Manchukuo
> > (created 1932 after invasion in 1931). Japan captured Peking
> > (Beijing) and Shanghai (focus of US interests) in 1937, with
> > notorious brutality, and Tsingtao, Canton and Hankow in 1938,
> > thus controlled much of the Chinese seacoast. In the same
> > decade internal Japanese politics was characterized by
> > general militarization and selective assassination of public
> > figures believed "doves." It appears that Japanese envoys
> > in Washington in 1941 had no authority to agree to Japanese
> > withdrawal from any parts of China.
> This in NO WAY differs from anyyhing that any other great power
> did at their time, including the US (native Americans).
It differs in 3 important ways;
1) the time of Imperial expansions had ended. When the Europeans were
pursuing such goals, Japan was (more or less) welcomed into the club.
Times had changed; Japan had not.
2) The aggression and assassinations were "bottom-up" in nature; the
government itself opposed them. However, the government was
essentially powerless to oppose the killing off of its own
members (until the 2/26/36 Incident). This meant that Japan was
essentially leaderless in dealing with the outside world, and the
least rational voice would as strong as the most.
3) Japan's actions took it into direct opposition to almost every
major power in the world at the same time. Most other nations
had the good sense to only take on one major power at the time.
> Every great power had an era of militarilization, followed by
Yes, and Japan's age of militarization was earlier.
> So, simply to say that the Japan is a "bad" guy is just
> over-simplification.
No, it really is quite accurate in this case.
> Japan did not go into China just for the fun of it. Their aim
> was to secure territory, working force, resources... everything
This is quite wrong; I suggest you read Beaseley's _Japanese Imperialism:
1894 - 1945_. Manchuria was their source of territory, "working force",
and resources. The China War was an overreaction to some border
skirmishes at the time.
It DRAINED her resources, not added to them. It DRAINED her manpower,
not added to them. It made her territory LESS secure, not more. It
was opposed by most Cabinet members and the Emperor, as well as
several right-wing groups, but continued unabated.
> that a big power needs, and everything that the big powers have
> been doing all along. Romans, British, Americans, you name it!
Again, see the 3 points above.
> It is true that the war in China was a devestatign drian of
> resources, but you can not negate the fact the the Japanese
> military planing so the take-over of the ex-european colonies as
> a partial solution to that problem. And after the european states
> began falling one after another in Europe, it was just a question
> of time when someone takes over. Japan simply decide it was to
> be first.
Sorry, this makes no sense at all syntactically. And Japan began
the war in China when Europe was at peace.
> I do not differ Japan from anyother big power, or big-power-wannabe.
Then you are wrong. It happens.
> And to claim that the US administration was a simply puppy trying
> to keep the peace in the Pacific makes me laugh.
Please provide us with an example of someone who has made that claim,
and we will all laugh. Otherwise, we suspect you are making things up.
Mike
Stuart McGraw
to thank everyone for the book recommendations.
I think I'll start with
Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945
because of his attempt at the Japanese perspective
and because I am not that interested in the European
side of the war. But I'll get to the others after
that. (I have enough recommendations to last for
quite a while. :-)
Marlock
> Please provide us with an example of someone who has made that claim,
> and we will all laugh. Otherwise, we suspect you are making things up.
>
> Mike
>
LOL, read J.P. Taylot, who unlike most scholars, has different
explanations to the causes of ww2.
Listen, I do not disagree with u in any way regarding what u r
saying about China, but I do believe that the Army high brass
was pushing to go into China, since it was the Japanese who
were responsible for the border incidents.
they wanted a lot, in a short time.
America wanted to crush Japan in one way or the other. War was a good
way. Plus, it will get their industry going. they NEEDED war.
and the more production it brings, the better.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> >
> > Please provide us with an example of someone who has made that claim,
> > and we will all laugh. Otherwise, we suspect you are making things up.
> LOL, read J.P. Taylot, who unlike most scholars, has different
> explanations to the causes of ww2.
So, Taylor sez the US only faught to keep the peace, or he is refuting
the argument?
> Listen, I do not disagree with u in any way regarding what u r
> saying about China, but I do believe that the Army high brass
> was pushing to go into China,
I suggest you read up on (among others) Colonel Tsuji Masanobu who once burned
down cat house where some of his superiors were "taking their leisure". He
is also implicated in promoting incidents against the Soviets resulting in
part in the Nomonhan debaucle. You can also read up on the 2/26/36 Incident,
and see the reaction of "the Army high brass".
>since it was the Japanese who
> were responsible for the border incidents.
Some Japanese initiated some incidents and some Chinese instigated others.
> America wanted to crush Japan in one way or the other. War was a good
No evidence of that at all. The US ignored an outright attack on a
flagged US vessel in 1937, as it ignored the intial incursion into
China. They acceded to the intial takeover by the Japanese of Northern
Indochina, and began most serious objections when Japan moved troops
into the Southern region of the area.
> way. Plus, it will get their industry going. they NEEDED war.
Sorry, again this is wrong; FDR wanted a European war, and didn't think
he had the resources to fight a 2 front war.
Mike
Stuart McGraw
>[...]
> Here are a couple of things I wrote a while back
>
> Wasn't Japan just defending herself when she attacked the US?
>
> This line of reasoning seems to derive from arguments that Japan was being
> "driven into a corner" by sanctions, and had no choice but to attack
> the US. Meiji Japan was driven to emulate what it thought the West was
> doing in every facet of society. They had observed, for example, that the
> West was able to carve up China into "Spheres of Influence", and was able
> to do from great distances, while they, the Japanese, had had limited
> success in their previous attempts to dominate the Korean peninsula,
> much less China. As part of the catch-up effort, she whole-heartedly
> entered into the Imperialist game in Asia, being treated as an equal
> (relative to her power) by the other powers. However, after World
> War I, Japan failed to recognize a fundamental shift in the attitudes
> of her former Imperial partners; they began a long, slow process of
> disengaging themselves from their former Imperial areas, from their
> colonies, in addition to outright stopping all expansions.
Is it surprising that Japan failed to recognize the start
of an anti-colonial movement? A circa-1980 Encyclopedia
Britannica article on Colonialism points out that the
inter-war years "mark the apex of colonial empires throughout
the world" and the League of Nations had just handed out
countries to the WW1 victors like pieces of pie.
Why, given the behavior of the western world that they'd
observed and studied would Japan believe assertions that,
"oh, colonialism is out now, we decided that it is wrong"?
> Japan chose
> to read this as a sign that the West had lost its power and resolve,
I am also curious about this as a high-school history
teacher friend frequently mentions it. I can understand
Japanese leaders saying this to their troops and even
their population as domestic propaganda, but did they
really believe it themselves? The reason I wonder is
that it seems like something we Americans would find
very appealing to believe. I can picture little Jimmie
on the playground saying, "yea, that bully Jake thought
he could push me around, but I socked him right in the
eye!"
>[...]
> The war effort took on a life of its own, however,
> and common sense was subordinated to it. Japan expanded into areas of
> China and Indochina which had no strategic value to her, but put her
> in a position to threaten British and Dutch possessions in the area;
> possessions that both those Allied nations needed in order to continue
> their fight against Hitler. At this point, the US stopped ignoring the
> Japanese threat, and imposed a series of escalating sanctions on Japan,
> cutting off her scrap metal, limitting and then cutting off her oil
> (Japan imported most of both from the US.) While Japanese officials
> realized that they had enough of each resource for Japan to do well IF
> THE WAR IN CHINA STOPPED,
Did they really realize this and was it really true?
ISTM that American and European antagonism towards Japan
has been going on for decades by then, with Japan being
criticized and threatened for doing what they saw as no
more than what the western powers had been doing much
longer. and that many in Japan might well have
felt that they were not yet strong enough to resist
the west (as evidenced for example by their being
forced to accept the unequal naval power limitations
treaty); that there would never be a better opportunity
for the expansion that they saw as necessary to become
stronger. That in the end things didn't work out
that way is obvious now but I wonder if it was so
obvious at the time? If it was obvious that she would
not be subjugated after the western powers finished
fighting in Europe and could turn to expansion in Asia
again, if she simply maintained the status-quo?
> they were powerless over the military they
> were supposed to control. An abortive attack on Soviet positions in
> Mongolia had placed Japan's focus firmly south, towards the possessions
> of the US' future allies. For no reason anyone could articulate, Japan
> felt she had to continue the war in China. To continue the war in China,
> she had to have resources of oil and metal. To have these resources,
> she must seize them, if others refused to sell them. In order to seize
> them, she felt she had to attack and destroy the naval power of the US.
>
> Thus, for a "3 to 6 month" operation in China in 1937, Japan would embark
> on a war that would strip her of all the possessions and industries she
> had acquired in 70 years.
Japan was certainly not the first or last nation to
discover that wars don't always go as predicted, and
can be much harder to get out off than to get into.
As an American, I am painfully aware of this and only
wish my country's leaders were too, a few years ago.
>> (Please note that I am not advocating or disputing this
>> point of view, I just want to read more about it. I am
>> a computer geek and pretty illiterate about history in
>> general so I am looking for references that are not too
>> esoteric.)
>
> Feis, _The Road to Pearl Harbor_
> Gilbert, _The Second World War_
> Beasley, _Japanese Imperialism: 1894-1945_
Thanks for the write up and the references!
David H Thornley
> I will start with this:
>
>> in Washington in 1941 had no authority to agree to Japanese
>> withdrawal from any parts of China.
>
> This in NO WAY differs from anyyhing that any other great power
> did at their time, including the US (native Americans).
Every great power was cognizant of diplomacy while expanding.
Most of them had had to alter their plans to deal with other
powers, and were willing to give back some of what they wanted
to achieve other goals.
Japan's attack into China was an exception here. Even when
it went horribly wrong, and Japan was losing the support it
desperately needed from other powers, the Japanese government
was unable to stop the hawks.
> So, simply to say that the Japan is a "bad" guy is just
> over-simplification.
>
If your point is that other powers had periods of expansion
that caused wars, you have some justification. If your point
is that the Japanese didn't cause the Pacific War, on the
grounds that other countries caused other wars, well, you're
missing something.
> Japan did not go into China just for the fun of it. Their aim
> was to secure territory, working force, resources...
And they were failing miserably at everything except territory,
and they didn't have all that great a control over the territory.
Frequently, they held some cities, and ran armed convoys between
them.
> It is true that the war in China was a devestatign drian of
> resources, but you can not negate the fact the the Japanese
> military planing so the take-over of the ex-european colonies as
> a partial solution to that problem.
To rephrase that, Japan drastically overextended itself in China,
but to make up for that they had a plan to make the war even bigger.
That doesn't make sense.
> And to claim that the US administration was a simply puppy trying
> to keep the peace in the Pacific makes me laugh.
>
The Roosevelt administration was trying to keep the peace in
the Pacific, and until the Japanese started their move
in the Pacific (by invading southern Indochina) tried to keep
things quiet and handled properly. If Roosevelt had wanted
war with Japan, he could have had one before Hitler invaded
Poland. Consider the sinking of the US gunboat Panay, and
the rape of Nanking.
This was of course due to pragmatic reasons, but it doesn't make
it any less true.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> On 12/04/2009 11:09 AM, mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> >[...]
> Is it surprising that Japan failed to recognize the start
> of an anti-colonial movement?
Yes;
> A circa-1980 Encyclopedia
> Britannica article on Colonialism points out that the
> inter-war years "mark the apex of colonial empires throughout
> the world" and the League of Nations had just handed out
> countries to the WW1 victors like pieces of pie.
However, the area of prime interest to Japan, China, saw a disengagement
of the colonial powers from the Treaty Port system, of which Japan
was an active part. Seeing her former co-imperialists begin a (slow)
withdrawal) from China, seeing the US formalize a schedule for
relinquishing the PI, and the beginnings of various nationalist
movements in the various colonies should have been strong signals.
At that's putting aside the disintegration of Tsarist Russia.
> Why, given the behavior of the western world that they'd
> observed and studied would Japan believe assertions that,
> "oh, colonialism is out now, we decided that it is wrong"?
> > Japan chose
> > to read this as a sign that the West had lost its power and resolve,
> I am also curious about this as a high-school history
> teacher friend frequently mentions it. I can understand
> Japanese leaders saying this to their troops and even
> their population as domestic propaganda, but did they
> really believe it themselves? The reason I wonder is
> that it seems like something we Americans would find
> very appealing to believe. I can picture little Jimmie
> on the playground saying, "yea, that bully Jake thought
> he could push me around, but I socked him right in the
> eye!"
The Tready Port system began to unravel when Britain proposed a system
to enforce tariffs in China proper, if the appropriate levies were not
reached. The US saw this as dangerously close to outright takeover
of the Chinese government. Germany was out of the picture as was
Tsarist Russia at this point. Only Britain was left to cooperate with
Japan (who was more than willing), and they saw the folly of going
this alone (or with only Japan as an ally.)
> > (Japan imported most of both from the US.) While Japanese officials
> > realized that they had enough of each resource for Japan to do well IF
> > THE WAR IN CHINA STOPPED,
> Did they really realize this and was it really true?
This is really true; Morrison has an actual cite, but Konoye (then PM)
was told this directly.
> ISTM that American and European antagonism towards Japan
> has been going on for decades by then, with Japan being
This is wrong; the Europeans and US were, in fact, quite cooperative
with Japan until the end of WWI. It was Britain's cooperation which
allowed Japan to attack Russia in 1904. The US (according to BF
Chamberlain) "had always been (Japan's) kindest benefactor". The
Western powers in general had cooperated with Japan in the above-mentioned
Imperial dissection of China.
> obvious at the time? If it was obvious that she would
> not be subjugated after the western powers finished
> fighting in Europe and could turn to expansion in Asia
> again, if she simply maintained the status-quo?
See above.
> > Thus, for a "3 to 6 month" operation in China in 1937, Japan would embark
> > on a war that would strip her of all the possessions and industries she
> > had acquired in 70 years.
> Japan was certainly not the first or last nation to
> discover that wars don't always go as predicted, and
> can be much harder to get out off than to get into.
No. However she is one of the few to embark on a war so pointedly contradictory
to her national security, and to actively antagonize almost every major global
and local power in the process.
> >> (Please note that I am not advocating or disputing this
> >> point of view, I just want to read more about it. I am
> >> a computer geek and pretty illiterate about history in
> >> general so I am looking for references that are not too
> >> esoteric.)
> >
> > Feis, _The Road to Pearl Harbor_
> > Gilbert, _The Second World War_
> > Beasley, _Japanese Imperialism: 1894-1945_
> Thanks for the write up and the references!
Beasley has the economics of the situation. Also, BF Chamberlain's _Japanese
Things_ has a great deal of "at the time" info regarding Japanese/Western
relations ca. 1904.
Mike
David H Thornley
>
> This is wrong; the Europeans and US were, in fact, quite cooperative
> with Japan until the end of WWI. It was Britain's cooperation which
> allowed Japan to attack Russia in 1904. The US (according to BF
> Chamberlain) "had always been (Japan's) kindest benefactor". The
However, US-Japanese relationships had been deteriorating. There
was the immigration act (ISTR in the 1920s) that forbade Japanese
immigration. It had no practical effect, since the Japanese quota
would have been very small, but was seen as a deliberate insult
in Japan. The publication of Yardley's "American Black Chamber"
was also a blow to relations, and I've read it sold more copies
in Japan than in the US.
US racism towards Japan was also growing. Consider the "Yellow
Journalism" of the time. The US public seems to have started
to favor and romanticize China instead of Japan. The US Navy
was explicitly designed to operate in the Pacific, not the
Atlantic, with Japan as the obvious enemy.
By 1941, I think it's fair to say that Japanese relations with
the US had been deteriorating for decades, although only barely.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
marloc...@gmail.com (Marlock) wrote:
> Japan did not go into China just for the fun of it. Their aim
> was to secure territory, working force, resources... everything
> that a big power needs,
Japan did not need to occupy China to get those. As already mentioned
Japan had got it's first colonies in the 1890s. Note none of the big
powers had actually tried to conquer China. They settled for trading
enclaves with the occasional war when the Chinese breached the terms of
the commercial treaties and or started killing foreigners. At no pint
was direct control considered either possible or a good thing, China was
simply to big and none of the big powers were prepared to let one of the
others have a monopoly there. I forget exactly when the US "Open Door"
policy started but IIRC it was before the Sino-Japanese war of 1895.
The diplomatic reaction to that war was an example of great powers
refusing to let China be carved up and resulted in the Russian-Japanese
war. Still by 1918 the Japanese had Taiwan, Korea and most of the
ex-German pacific colonies. Japan also obtained Korea and Manjuku at
some point well before the war in China started.
> And after the european states
> began falling one after another in Europe,
That did not affect control over colonies. The forces already there
were sufficient to maintain control. If Japan had made an alliance with
the UK it is highly possible that the Japanese could have occupied the
Vichy colonies without opposition. However the allies were not in a
position to supply raw materials the Oil and Rubber from the Pacific
were needed to supply the British war effort.
If Japan had been run with people as skilled as in 1900 at diplomacy
and power politics it could probably not only have sat the war out but
come up with territorial gains.
Ken Young
Marlock
> The Roosevelt administration was trying to keep the peace in
> the Pacific, and until the Japanese started their move
> in the Pacific (by invading southern Indochina) tried to keep
> things quiet and handled properly. If Roosevelt had wanted
> war with Japan, he could have had one before Hitler invaded
> Poland. Consider the sinking of the US gunboat Panay, and
> the rape of Nanking.
>
The Nanking was a horrible attrocity. But horrible attrocities
are means of almost every great power since, well, since we
record history.
Therefore, no matter how horrible that was, it wasn't worse
then, e.g., the dropping of two nuclear bombs over civilan targets.
Nobody has atacked the US for that...
So please...
William Black
Legitimate attack on a legitimate target.
--
William Black
"Any number under six"
The answer given by Englishman Richard Peeke when asked by the Duke of
Medina Sidonia how many Spanish sword and buckler men he could beat
single handed with a quarterstaff.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> >
> > This is wrong; the Europeans and US were, in fact, quite cooperative
> > with Japan until the end of WWI. It was Britain's cooperation which
> > allowed Japan to attack Russia in 1904. The US (according to BF
> > Chamberlain) "had always been (Japan's) kindest benefactor". The
> However, US-Japanese relationships had been deteriorating. There
> was the immigration act (ISTR in the 1920s) that forbade Japanese
Right, but that was a few decades after Chamberlain's works.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> David H Thornley wrote:
> > The Roosevelt administration was trying to keep the peace in
> > the Pacific, and until the Japanese started their move
> > in the Pacific (by invading southern Indochina) tried to keep
> > things quiet and handled properly. If Roosevelt had wanted
> > war with Japan, he could have had one before Hitler invaded
> > Poland. Consider the sinking of the US gunboat Panay, and
> > the rape of Nanking.
> >
> The Nanking was a horrible attrocity. But horrible attrocities
> are means of almost every great power since, well, since we
> record history.
Most were not photographed for display all over the world.
> Therefore, no matter how horrible that was, it wasn't worse
> then, e.g., the dropping of two nuclear bombs over civilan targets.
Sorry, but it was much worse; one was an attack on a surrendered,
defenseless population. The latter were bombings of military targets
with a large civilian base. The difference? One was completely in defiance of
all rules of war, the other, not.
> Nobody has atacked the US for that...
You have this backwards; the bombings came about, in part, BECAUSE OF an attack
on the US.
> So please...
Indeed.
Mike
Marlock
what r u referring to?
Marlock
> Marlock wrote:
>> David H Thornley wrote:
>>> The Roosevelt administration was trying to keep the peace in
>>> the Pacific, and until the Japanese started their move
>>> in the Pacific (by invading southern Indochina) tried to keep
>>> things quiet and handled properly. If Roosevelt had wanted
>>> war with Japan, he could have had one before Hitler invaded
>>> Poland. Consider the sinking of the US gunboat Panay, and
>>> the rape of Nanking.
>>>
>>
>> The Nanking was a horrible attrocity. But horrible attrocities
>> are means of almost every great power since, well, since we
>> record history.
>> Therefore, no matter how horrible that was, it wasn't worse
>> then, e.g., the dropping of two nuclear bombs over civilan targets.
>>
>> Nobody has atacked the US for that...
>
> Legitimate attack on a legitimate target.
>
>
this is a horrible, simplty horrible thing to say.
there is absolutely no legitimation, nor just cause, whatsoever.
just a bloody demonstration of power.
shameful act that will live in infamy!
Marlock
> Marlock <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> David H Thornley wrote:
>> > The Roosevelt administration was trying to keep the peace in
>> > the Pacific, and until the Japanese started their move
>> > in the Pacific (by invading southern Indochina) tried to keep
>> > things quiet and handled properly. If Roosevelt had wanted
>> > war with Japan, he could have had one before Hitler invaded
>> > Poland. Consider the sinking of the US gunboat Panay, and
>> > the rape of Nanking.
>> >
>
>> The Nanking was a horrible attrocity. But horrible attrocities
>> are means of almost every great power since, well, since we
>> record history.
>
> Most were not photographed for display all over the world.
>
>> Therefore, no matter how horrible that was, it wasn't worse
>> then, e.g., the dropping of two nuclear bombs over civilan targets.
>
> Sorry, but it was much worse; one was an attack on a surrendered,
> defenseless population. The latter were bombings of military targets
> with a large civilian base. The difference? One was completely in defiance
of
> all rules of war, the other, not.
where do u get ur history from? which military target that deserved
the attack of a A-bomb????
Two citizens, each a statined garizon in the middle of the town.
Marlock
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
>>
>> This is wrong; the Europeans and US were, in fact, quite cooperative
>> with Japan until the end of WWI. It was Britain's cooperation which
>> allowed Japan to attack Russia in 1904. The US (according to BF
>> Chamberlain) "had always been (Japan's) kindest benefactor". The
>
> However, US-Japanese relationships had been deteriorating. There
> was the immigration act (ISTR in the 1920s) that forbade Japanese
> immigration. It had no practical effect, since the Japanese quota
> would have been very small, but was seen as a deliberate insult
> in Japan. The publication of Yardley's "American Black Chamber"
> was also a blow to relations, and I've read it sold more copies
> in Japan than in the US.
>
> US racism towards Japan was also growing. Consider the "Yellow
> Journalism" of the time. The US public seems to have started
> to favor and romanticize China instead of Japan. The US Navy
> was explicitly designed to operate in the Pacific, not the
> Atlantic, with Japan as the obvious enemy.
>
> By 1941, I think it's fair to say that Japanese relations with
> the US had been deteriorating for decades, although only barely.
>
In addition, Bywater was able to predicted a large scale conflict
between the Japan and the US back in the mid 30ies. Read his book.
james
People who suggest such things surely haven't considered the
alternatives.
Look at the battle for Okinawa, a Japanese island. Look at the
American casualties. Look at the Japanses casualties, both military
and civilian.
Those ruling Japan (not Hirohito, the military elite) were not looking
to surrender.
Based on what they learned through the costly invasions of Iwo Jima
and Okinawa, its clear an invasion of Japan would have cost many more
times the casualties at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both in American and
Japanese lives.
Perhaps the second bomb could have waited, but we can play what if all
day, and neither of us will definitively know.
James
Don Phillipson
news:PM00047A3...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> >> The Nanking was a horrible attrocity. . . . But horrible attrocities
> >> are means of almost every great power since, well, since we
> >> record history.
> >> Therefore, no matter how horrible that was, it wasn't worse
> >> then, e.g., the dropping of two nuclear bombs over civilan targets.
> >
> > Legitimate attack on a legitimate target.
>
> this is a horrible, simplty horrible thing to say.
>
> there is absolutely no legitimation, nor just cause, whatsoever.
> just a bloody demonstration of power.
> shameful act that will live in infamy!
No one denies the military character of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki made them "legitimate" targets for bombing. Both
were ports, Hiroshima had significant army bases, Nagasaki
was the second or third most important IJN base, and both
were in the region of the proposed US invasion (Operation
Coronet, top US priority in Aug. 1945.)
After the fact, it seems likely more people died at
Dresden than at Hiroshima, i.e. the main strategic
innovation of the atomic bomb was in the economy
of its delivery, i.e. one aircraft dropping 10 or 20kt
(TNT equivalent) rather than thousands of aircraft.
What we know of Japanese plans for resistance
(e.g. arming civilians and women with spears, so
that they could die fighting) makes a cogent argument
that Japanese lives were spared by the atomic bomb.
But its main aim was to save US or Allied lives. In
August 1945 Japanese forces were killing approx.
5,000 people per day (most of them Chinese civilians)
and kamikaze aircraft were sinking about 6 USN
ships per week.
pbrom...@aol.com
> mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > The latter were bombings of military targets
> > with a large civilian base. The difference? One was completely in defiance
> of
> > all rules of war, the other, not.
>
> where do u get ur history from? which military target that deserved
> the attack of a A-bomb????
> Two citizens, each a statined garizon in the middle of the town.
Sir, I am wondering where you are getting your history. So much of
what you have written since you showed up is simply counter to
historical fact.
Hiroshima had been a growing and increasingly important military base
since the 1870's. It was a very important naval seaport. During the
wars with Korea, China, and Russia, it had been the main point of
departure for army forces being shipped overseas.
At the time of the atomic bombing, it was the main base supporting the
buildup for operation ketsu-go, the defense of Kyushu. It contained
about 40,000 military personnel. Defense production facilities were
distributed widely throughout the city as precaution against air
attacks. The air-defense system was also one of the best in all of
Japan. The bomb essentially wiped out the entire Japanese 2nd Army.
If this is not a legitimate military target, I don't know what would
be.
Please, just don't start quoting Tooze.
Lloyd Olson
news:PM00047A3...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
>
>
> there is absolutely no legitimation, nor just cause, whatsoever.
> just a bloody demonstration of power.
> shameful act that will live in infamy!
>
There was a war on. 4,000 allied solders dying each day in the Pacific
theater. 5,000 Chinese civilians dying each day. Not to mention Japan gave
orders to execute all allied POW's if mainland Japan were invaded. Japan was
not going to surrender.
What is shameful about ending the war sooner ? And saving a lot of lives,
including Japanese.
Conventional bombing would have gone on longer and cost way more lives.
Stuart McGraw
> Stuart McGraw <smcg...@frii.com> wrote:
>> On 12/04/2009 11:09 AM, mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
>> >[...]
>
>> Is it surprising that Japan failed to recognize the start
>> of an anti-colonial movement?
>
> Yes;
>> A circa-1980 Encyclopedia
>> Britannica article on Colonialism points out that the
>> inter-war years "mark the apex of colonial empires throughout
>> the world" and the League of Nations had just handed out
>> countries to the WW1 victors like pieces of pie.
>
> However, the area of prime interest to Japan, China, saw a disengagement
> of the colonial powers from the Treaty Port system, of which Japan
> was an active part. Seeing her former co-imperialists begin a (slow)
> withdrawal) from China, seeing the US formalize a schedule for
> relinquishing the PI, and the beginnings of various nationalist
> movements in the various colonies should have been strong signals.
The European powers had centuries of experience dealing
diplomatically and militarily with each other so I suppose
they could be expected to "read the handwriting" regarding the
falling out of favor of colonialism.
But could Japan be expected to? A Japan that had started
relations with the west barely 50 years before, whose culture
and world view was completely different, who didn't even have
any other asian powers to consult with since every other asian
country had been ripped apart by the west?
And that's even assuming they'd want to buy into a view
that was, "now that we have milked colonialism to our advantage
and you are just starting to, we decided it's bad and you
can't do it." This is a rather similar situation today when
many developed counties, who got that way using cheap hydrocarbon
energy, say to developing countries, "you can't do what we did.
because we decided it's bad". Is it any wonder the reaction
is similar?
>[...]
>> > (Japan imported most of both from the US.) While Japanese officials
>> > realized that they had enough of each resource for Japan to do well IF
>> > THE WAR IN CHINA STOPPED,
>
>> Did they really realize this and was it really true?
>
> This is really true; Morrison has an actual cite, but Konoye (then PM)
> was told this directly.
>
>> ISTM that American and European antagonism towards Japan
>> has been going on for decades by then, with Japan being
>
> This is wrong; the Europeans and US were, in fact, quite cooperative
> with Japan until the end of WWI. It was Britain's cooperation which
> allowed Japan to attack Russia in 1904. The US (according to BF
> Chamberlain) "had always been (Japan's) kindest benefactor". The
> Western powers in general had cooperated with Japan in the above-mentioned
> Imperial dissection of China.
France, Germany, and Russia forced Japan to give up the
concessions in China's Liaontung peninsula that she thought
were the legitimate rewards of her victory in the first
Sino-Japanese war of 1895. And to add insult to injury, Russia
then took concessions in Liaontung after Japan was forced
to give them up! Hardly my idea of European cooperation with
Japan.
Britain seems to have been more friendly to Japan
than America, perhaps because she already had a large
empire but America was just beginning her imperial
musings? In any event, some quotes from the
Wikipedia article on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of
1902:
"It was thought [by the Japanese] that friendship within Asia would
be more amenable to the USA, who was uncomfortable with the rise of
Japan as a power."
"China and the United States were strongly opposed to the alliance."
"[By 1920] US-Japanese relations were steadily breaking down."
After Japan, acting in accordance with Anglo-Japanese Alliance
ejected the Germans from the Shantung peninsula in WW1, and
got agreement from China, the US, and European powers to retain
the concessions after the war, there was a loud outcry in
the US after the war demanding that Japan give them up,
which she eventually was forced to do.
By 1924, American Capt Joe Stilwell in Vladivostok had a pretty
negative view of the Japanese:
"The arrogant little bastards were ... all over town this
a.m. in American cars, posting M.P.'s and sticking out their
guts... They need a kick in the slats in the worst way...
They have systematically bothered and annoyed Americans
about passports... and seem to go out of their way to make
people despise and hate them."
[Tuchman, "Stilwell and the American Experience in China"]
(Seems the Japanese were treating Americans and Europeans
rather the same as they'd been treated earlier.)
I don't see how these things could have made Japan feel
at all comfortable that America, the same people who sent
Perry to impose unfair and unequal trade agreements under
threat of violence, would later protect Japan's interests
if only she would once again give up territory and concessions
she won by war.
>> obvious at the time? If it was obvious that she would
>> not be subjugated after the western powers finished
>> fighting in Europe and could turn to expansion in Asia
>> again, if she simply maintained the status-quo?
>
> See above.
>[...]
> Beasley has the economics of the situation. Also, BF Chamberlain's _Japanese
> Things_ has a great deal of "at the time" info regarding Japanese/Western
> relations ca. 1904.
Thanks again. Chamberlain's book was published in 1890 though,
wasn't it?
Marlock
droping those bombs on purely military targets like isolated navy or
army base would have done the trick.
the game was to impress, or rather scare the russian.
don't kid urselves with casualty story for little children...
David H Thornley
>
> In addition, Bywater was able to predicted a large scale conflict
> between the Japan and the US back in the mid 30ies. Read his book.
>
middle 1920s. An interesting book.
Besides, there was no secret about possible conflict.
War between the US and Japan had been an obvious possibility since
the US took the Philippines, and the navies had been building
against each other.
Lloyd Olson
>
> droping those bombs on purely military targets like isolated navy or
> army base would have done the trick.
Where exactly were there any isolated military targets ? That weren't part
of a city. And no guarantee what ever was bombed would do "the trick". There
is an unknown in war, and things don't always go as planned. Japan bombed
Pearl Harbor, that trick didn't keep the United States out of the Pacific
theater, it united the Americans. A very hard thing to do, and quite the
opposite of what Japan hoped to achieve.
>
> the game was to impress, or rather scare the russian.
Russia was our ally, no need to impress or scare. Not to mention Russia had
built up a rather large and powerful military force, so it would take more
than a few atomic weapons to scare them. Stalin and the Russians were a
people not easily scared.
>
> don't kid urselves with casualty story for little children...
>
So if the war dragged on for years, or the allies attempted an invasion of
mainland Japan, there would have been no casualties ?
My Father served in the US Army for all of the war, Africa and European
theater. He was of the opinion that if it saved one American life, it was
worth doing. Others probably felt the same way back then. They wanted to end
the war and get back home as soon as possible.
David H Thornley
relevant to the start of the WWII Pacific War than relationships
during the Russo-Japanese war.
David H Thornley
>
> droping those bombs on purely military targets like isolated navy or
> army base would have done the trick.
>
after the second nuke, and why the discussion focussed on the US ability
to destroy Japan without invasion.
Or, for that matter, why, even after the two nukes and all the other
"developments not necessarily to Japan's advantage" (including the
destruction of the Navy, the blockade, the destruction of the
coal route from Hokkaido, and the fire-bombing of cities) some
Japanese thought it worthwhile to attempt a coup to prevent surrender.
It is folly to think one knows what other situations would have
caused a Japanese surrender. We know what worked, and how close
it came to not working.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > David H Thornley <da...@thornley.net> wrote:
> > Right, but that was a few decades after Chamberlain's works.
> >
> Sure, but the deteriorating relationship after WWI is more
> relevant to the start of the WWII Pacific War than relationships
> during the Russo-Japanese war.
Right, but this is in response to the contention that the European/US
antagonism of Japan "had been going on for decades" prior to Japan's
1920s expansions.
Mike
David H Thornley
>
> The Nanking was a horrible attrocity.
Yup.
But horrible attrocities
> are means of almost every great power since, well, since we
> record history.
Nope. They'd fallen out of fashion in the West. The bombardment of
Metz was considered bad in the Franco-Prussian War, and even the
horrors of WWI didn't include any atrocities like Nanking.
> Therefore, no matter how horrible that was, it wasn't worse
> then, e.g., the dropping of two nuclear bombs over civilan targets.
>
In that case, I have some good news for you.
Nobody ever dropped nukes on civilian targets.
The presence of civilians in military zones is not the problem
of the attacking forces in military law, but the problem of
the defending forces. If this were done the other way, it would
be legal to defend military targets by surrounding them with
civilians.
> Nobody has atacked the US for that...
>
Plenty of people have blamed the US, but they were in response
to attacks on the US.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> "Marlock" <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:PM00047A3...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> After the fact, it seems likely more people died at
> Dresden than at Hiroshima, i.e. the main strategic
We also know that more Japanese died in Okinawa than in either Hiroshima or
Nagasaki.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
1) It was written in the mid-20s, not mid-30s.
2) Theodore Roosevelt forsaw the possibility of a conflict with Japan in the
early 1900s.
3) None of this changes the fact that the US and Japan were on good terms
and even partners through the end of WWI.
Mike
Chris
> After the fact, it seems likely more people died at
> Dresden than at Hiroshima, i.e. the main strategic
> innovation of the atomic bomb was in the economy
> of its delivery, i.e. one aircraft dropping 10 or 20kt
> (TNT equivalent) rather than thousands of aircraft.
I don't believe this is true anymore. The best number for Dresden
would be circa 25,000 people, far lower than Hiroshima or Nagasaki
numbers (roughly 80-90k deaths). See Evans, _Telling Lies About
Hitler_ for how six figure numbers for the death toll became accepted
among Western historians for many years: David Irving is prominently
involved.
However, the firebombing of Tokyo on the night of 9-10 March probably
did kill more people than either atomic bombing: around 100k people.
Chris Manteuffel
Stuart McGraw
I meant decades prior to the final breakdowns
(the embargoes, etc) that lead to Perl Harbor.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
Among others, you can read _Japan's Longest Day_.
> which military target that deserved
> the attack of a A-bomb????
Hmm, how 'bout the IJA 2nd Army HQ? Ball-bearing production facilities?
Munitions facilities.
> Two citizens, each a statined garizon in the middle of the town.
Sorry, this makes no sense.
MIke
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> The European powers had centuries of experience dealing
> diplomatically and militarily with each other so I suppose
> they could be expected to "read the handwriting" regarding the
> falling out of favor of colonialism.
True. And so could Japan, given how quickly they adopted many
Western mores, including military and government structures,
diplomatic ties, etc.
> But could Japan be expected to? A Japan that had started
> relations with the west barely 50 years before, whose culture
> and world view was completely different, who didn't even have
> any other asian powers to consult with since every other asian
> country had been ripped apart by the west?
This isn't quite accurate. Japan's world view was very much Western at
that point, and not "completely different". And not every other asian
country had been ripped apart by the west; Japan had joined in quite
enthusiastically, and had outright annexed another Asian country.
> And that's even assuming they'd want to buy into a view
> that was, "now that we have milked colonialism to our advantage
> and you are just starting to, we decided it's bad and you
> can't do it."
That's not what happened, though. Japan began an attempted expansion that
would bring them directly into conflict with modern states, without
allies.
Which Western powers did this? Well, Germany...
> This is a rather similar situation today when
> many developed counties, who got that way using cheap hydrocarbon
> energy, say to developing countries, "you can't do what we did.
> because we decided it's bad". Is it any wonder the reaction
> is similar?
To put this poor analogy to rest, continuing along proven bad course
of action creates a worse situation, not a better one, even for the
developing countries.
> France, Germany, and Russia forced Japan to give up the
> concessions in China's Liaontung peninsula that she thought
> were the legitimate rewards of her victory in the first
> Sino-Japanese war of 1895. And to add insult to injury, Russia
> then took concessions in Liaontung after Japan was forced
> to give them up! Hardly my idea of European cooperation with
> Japan.
And she kept Formosa and other possessions, and would later take other
things from Russia, and within a framework of alliances similar to those
forged between European powers. And she would appeal to the US to mediate
a treaty between her and another European power.
> Britain seems to have been more friendly to Japan
> than America, perhaps because she already had a large
> empire but America was just beginning her imperial
> musings?
Chamberlain disagrees, and after all, he was a professor in Tokyo at the
time, and one of the more astutue observers of Japan.
> By 1924, American Capt Joe Stilwell in Vladivostok had a pretty
> negative view of the Japanese:
Which is a very different time-frame from the early 1900s.
> I don't see how these things could have made Japan feel
> at all comfortable that America, the same people who sent
> Perry to impose unfair and unequal trade agreements under
> threat of violence, would later protect Japan's interests
> if only she would once again give up territory and concessions
> she won by war.
This reference to Perry is often brought up by people who haven't
really studied the period. In fact both pro and anti shogunate forces
saw the benefit in opening to the west prior to the arrival of Perry,
but internal politics precluded them from expressing that openly. The
faction most opposed would be, of course, the Dutch.
> >[...]
> > Beasley has the economics of the situation. Also, BF Chamberlain's _Japanese
> > Things_ has a great deal of "at the time" info regarding Japanese/Western
> > relations ca. 1904.
> Thanks again. Chamberlain's book was published in 1890 though,
> wasn't it?
Then he must have been prescient, as he describes the beginnings of the
Russo-Japan war.
I believe you're reading the Wikipedia article; _Things Japanese_ is not
the same _Japanese Things_: Being Notes on Various Subjects Connected with
Japan_.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> On Dec 8, 5:25 pm, "Don Phillipson" <e...@SPAMBLOCK.ncf.ca> wrote:
> > After the fact, it seems likely more people died at
> > Dresden than at Hiroshima, i.e. the main strategic
> > innovation of the atomic bomb was in the economy
> > of its delivery, i.e. one aircraft dropping 10 or 20kt
> > (TNT equivalent) rather than thousands of aircraft.
> I don't believe this is true anymore. The best number for Dresden
> would be circa 25,000 people, far lower than Hiroshima or Nagasaki
> numbers (roughly 80-90k deaths).
Official figures for either bomb are varied, but as of 2000, about 130k names
were on the Hiroshima cenotaph, and about 60-80k was the accepted figure
for Nagasaki. As contrasts you bring up the Tokyo fire-bombing, but it's
important to note that the Okinawa operation cost approximately 200k Japanese
lives, about equally divided between troops and civilians.
> However, the firebombing of Tokyo on the night of 9-10 March probably
> did kill more people than either atomic bombing: around 100k people.
This is also a controversial figure, but from a different perspective. The
US commonly lists about 120+k as the death toll, while Japanese sources
typically run 70-80k.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> Lloyd Olson wrote:
> > "Marlock" <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> > news:PM00047A3...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> > What is shameful about ending the war sooner ? And saving a lot of lives,
> > including Japanese.
> >
> > Conventional bombing would have gone on longer and cost way more lives.
> >
> droping those bombs on purely military targets like isolated navy or
> army base would have done the trick.
So, it's OK to drop it on, say, an Army headquarters? Good, glad that's
settled.
> the game was to impress, or rather scare the russian.
1) "the game" was to get Japan to surrender; had Japan immediately accepted
the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the bombs would not have been dropped.
2) The Russians already knew about a-bombs; Truman told them
> don't kid urselves with casualty story for little children...
Don't act like a little child. Address things when they're brought up to
you, don't simply gainsay them.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
Right, but that's not really true. While there was some tension developing
post WWI, there had been little in the way of outright antagonism until
about the mid-late 30s.
Mike
Marlock
>
> 2) The Russians already knew about a-bombs; Truman told them
I tought this has happened at Potsdam, after they were delievered
to their targets.
Marlock
> Marlock wrote:
>>
>> The Nanking was a horrible attrocity.
>
> Yup.
>
> But horrible attrocities
>> are means of almost every great power since, well, since we
>> record history.
>
> Nope. They'd fallen out of fashion in the West. The bombardment of
> Metz was considered bad in the Franco-Prussian War, and even the
> horrors of WWI didn't include any atrocities like Nanking.
U gotta be kidding me :) Have u ever heard of Austro-German-Russian
wars? 7 years war? And what happened to a number of German cities
that just happened to be in the place of advancing Austrian armies
(in a number of cases, consisting of Croatian soldiers... horrible
massacres of entire populations... btw, I am Croatian :) )
Massacres have been around much longer then u think.
>
>> Therefore, no matter how horrible that was, it wasn't worse
>> then, e.g., the dropping of two nuclear bombs over civilan targets.
>>
> In that case, I have some good news for you.
>
> Nobody ever dropped nukes on civilian targets.
>
> The presence of civilians in military zones is not the problem
> of the attacking forces in military law, but the problem of
> the defending forces. If this were done the other way, it would
> be legal to defend military targets by surrounding them with
> civilians.
>
>> Nobody has atacked the US for that...
This last sentece only tells that you have been reading the army
weekly reports, and that only :) lol:) are u for real about this? :)
btw, hiroshima and nagasaki were cities, not military zones. what
R U talking about!!!???
basically u r proposing that most of the World is a military zone.
>>
> Plenty of people have blamed the US, but they were in response
> to attacks on the US.
>
yes, no doubt there. and had the japanese army generals or hitler had
a bombs in their possessions, I can see where that would be going...
but, what I am saying is that the a-bomb was no response to the
Japanese.
Consider this. Everybody was/is saying, the bombs were/are necessary
to brake the spirit of the Japanese people.
a. Most of the bigger Japanese cities were already in flames. Fog of
War documentary gives u some clear statistical data on this. I
seriously doubt that the common folk had the gut to continue
fighting after that, even if it was the "strong" Japanese.
b. If u read notes, letters and bibliographies of the average
Japanese soldiers, u can tell that NOT ALL felt they needed to
fight to the bitter end.
note on this: but I agree with Mike and others who are saying the
it was the emperor who had the last word. I have no idea what his
toughts were before the a bombs, but I am pretty sure he was not
considering surrender.
although, he was aware of the destruction of the mainland Japan
by LeMays' deadly hordes....
Droping a bombs on isolated areas, with minimal civilian presence
would deliver the message to the emperor.
But droping a bomb on high civilian density targets, with a
possibility of "extensive" kill would spread the message further
away... even all the way to the Potsdam, where Stalin and Truman
were sitting around an oval table.
Consider the ACE IN THE SLEAVE Truman got when Stalin heard the news
...
...
...
Common people... somebody has to be getting what I am aiming at?
Marlock
>
> My Father served in the US Army for all of the war, Africa and European
> theater. He was of the opinion that if it saved one American life, it was
> worth doing. Others probably felt the same way back then. They wanted to end
> the war and get back home as soon as possible.
>
No denying there! I am pretty sure everybody felt the same, and
there's no blame there. Only natural!
Marlock
> Marlock wrote:
>>
>> droping those bombs on purely military targets like isolated navy or
>> army base would have done the trick.
>>
> In which case you can explain why the Japanese only considered surrender
> after the second nuke, and why the discussion focussed on the US ability
> to destroy Japan without invasion.
>
> Or, for that matter, why, even after the two nukes and all the other
> "developments not necessarily to Japan's advantage" (including the
> destruction of the Navy, the blockade, the destruction of the
> coal route from Hokkaido, and the fire-bombing of cities) some
> Japanese thought it worthwhile to attempt a coup to prevent surrender.
>
> It is folly to think one knows what other situations would have
> caused a Japanese surrender. We know what worked, and how close
> it came to not working.
>
I agree with you on everything said.
But nevertheless, droping a bomb on an army or navy base outside
of the big urban area (an island possibly?) would have done the
trick, were it simply for scaring off the Japanese.
As far as the idea about the coup, and fight till the bitter
end, u had that in Europe too. Nuts are common withing humanity,
no matter which religion or color they adhere to.
Congrats to Mike and the rest of you for great knowledge on facts,
I am impressed.
I hope I did not sound too foolish in some of the claims I made.
I however, nevertheless, strongly believe that the US had a policy
of bringing the Japanese down to their knees one way or the other,
formed prior to the war (if it was for the Japanese attrocities,
they would have attacked back in the late 30ies; the same could be
said for the Nazi regime). US happened to be one the right side,
and indeed the US soldiers WERE fighting the good fight.
But the policies in Washington do not necesarilly represent just the
bright side.
Do not forget that the US emerged from the ww2 as the ONLY superpower!
(Russian were never really that much of a threat, even with their
vast armies and nuclear arsenal. In fact, I rembember reading the
already in the Eisenhower administration the US was aware that the
Soviets were falling behind).
And that (being the only superpower) did not happen just like that.
And in order to acomplish that, the US had to bring down the potential
rivals in one way or another. Plus, grow and expand their industry,
army and influence.
And that takes strategic planning a few decades in advance.
And to believe that the US first considered serious and major
operations in the Pacific... is sureal :)
Again, please do not take my claims the wrong way. I am not trying
to be rude, nor a troll. In fact, I am really happy that the subject
is getting a lot of attention.
With kind regards!
Marlock
True. The same goes for the British.
Also, the German prisoners of war reported extremly "gentelmently"
approach by the japanese captors!
Marlock
>
> Russia was our ally, no need to impress or scare. Not to mention Russia had
> built up a rather large and powerful military force, so it would take more
> than a few atomic weapons to scare them. Stalin and the Russians were a
> people not easily scared.
Where did you get this information from? Duck and cover adverts?
Marlock
I was not aware of that.
I know that considerably more Japanese died from conventional
bombing.
Michele
news:PM00047A3...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> William Black wrote:
>> Marlock wrote:
>>> David H Thornley wrote:
>>>> the Pacific, and until the Japanese started their move
>>>> in the Pacific (by invading southern Indochina) tried to keep
>>>> things quiet and handled properly. If Roosevelt had wanted
>>>> war with Japan, he could have had one before Hitler invaded
>>>> Poland. Consider the sinking of the US gunboat Panay, and
>>>> the rape of Nanking.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The Nanking was a horrible attrocity. But horrible attrocities
>>> are means of almost every great power since, well, since we
>>> record history.
>>> then, e.g., the dropping of two nuclear bombs over civilan targets.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> this is a horrible, simplty horrible thing to say.
>
In war, sometimes truthful things are horrible. That they are horrible
doesn't make them less truthful. You are not well acquainted with the
history of war, are you?
> there is absolutely no legitimation,
Of course there is legitimation. It was a legitimate target according to the
laws and customs of war then in force, the Hague Conventions of 1907.
On the contrary, using civilians for beheading practice and raping women, as
in nanking, was against those laws of war.
That's all the legitimation it takes, in the one case, and that lacks, in
the other.
> nor just cause, whatsoever
"just cause"? The surrender of Japan, when it took place in history,
prevented tens of thousands more deaths in occupied China - _per month_. It
prevented the deliberate killing of enemy POWs, that had already been
ordered in territories still occupied by Japan, if the enemy had advanced
with conventional offensives into those territories. It prevented hundreds
of thousands of deaths, both among military personnel on both sides, and in
particular among civilians, if landings in Japan had taken place.
> just a bloody demonstration of power.
Well, yes. And it worked: Japan saw it had to surrender. That's the point of
making war, unless the point is extermination (as in the "3-all" Japanese
policy, or in the Vernichtungskrieg policy of Nazi Germany in the East).
> shameful act that will live in infamy!
>
If you feel like feeling shame for an act that you had no hand in deciding
or executing, please feel free.
Michele
> America wanted to crush Japan in one way or the other. War was a good
> way.
Well, no. The embargo would have worked perfectly - provided that the
Japanese continued to wage war against China, which was a war _Japan_
wanted.
Besides, you seem to really believe that every country needs to become an
empire in order to thrive. It ain't so. Switzerland, like many other
countries, has to import stuff and even manpower. Yet it's been around for
centuries and it's thriving.
Going imperial was a free, deliberate choice for Japan (and, FWIW, for Italy
in 1936 and Germany in 1939). Nobody forced them. They started wars of
aggression of their own choice. They failed.
As a side note, they did this just as some of the actual imperial powers had
already decided that imperalism did not work all too well, at least not any
longer. So the Axis powers also added bad timing.
Michele
>
> droping those bombs on purely military targets like isolated navy or
> army base would have done the trick.
If that were true, then certainly, dropping just one bomb on a military
target that happened to be inside a city should have done the trick, right?
Only, you see, it did not. It took a second bomb. And even then, half of the
war council was against surrendering. It took the unprecedented direct
intervention of the Emperor.
So it seems that your "done trick" is a tale for little children.
>
> the game was to impress, or rather scare the russian.
>
Was it? So you will be able to quote actual documents, by the US
administration and military, stating so much - "what we really want is to
scare the Soviets"? Go ahead, quote them.
> don't kid urselves with casualty story for little children...
>
The tens of thousands of Chinese civilians killed in the Japanese
occupation, per month, by the summer of 1945, are definitely a story I
wouldn't recommend for children. They would not sleep well.
Geoffrey Sinclair
>I will start with this:
>
>> The problem here is that Japan's "agreement" included at least
>> holding onto its gains in China, e.g. puppet state Manchukuo
>> (created 1932 after invasion in 1931). Japan captured Peking
>> (Beijing) and Shanghai (focus of US interests) in 1937, with
>> notorious brutality, and Tsingtao, Canton and Hankow in 1938,
>> thus controlled much of the Chinese seacoast. In the same
>> decade internal Japanese politics was characterized by
>> general militarization and selective assassination of public
>> figures believed "doves." It appears that Japanese envoys
>> in Washington in 1941 had no authority to agree to Japanese
>> withdrawal from any parts of China.
>
> This in NO WAY differs from anyyhing that any other great power
> did at their time, including the US (native Americans).
And this ends up with the idea if one person gets away with
a crime then another person should also get away with a crime.
As for the period post WWI.
The western colonial expansions were over, most of the territories
cost more than they produced, which rather turned them off the
idea. The other major powers in the Pacific wanted peace in the
area, they had what they wanted, even the USSR limited itself to
what it considered the border after the Japanese attacks in 1938
and 1939.
When the Japanese fired on or even sank western warships the
result was talks, not declarations of war.
Japan was the one wanting more.
> Every great power had an era of militarilization, followed by
> a determiniation of foreign policy that more then seldomly
> included assasinations, creation of public states, invasions
> etc.
And for the Japanese this was in the period after it decided to
emerge from isolation. Up until the decade after the turn of the
20th century Japan was doing little more than other powers. For
example the Scramble for Africa, the enforced treaties with China.
Leaving only a handful of countries not colonised or dominated
by Western Powers.
The assassinations in Japan were rather more than those in
the other colonial powers, at least over the issue of
colonialisation.
Also the Western expansion required minimal military power,
unless fighting other Western powers, there was a big gap in
military effectiveness between the western and non western
powers. See things like The Pursuit of Power by McNeill.
Also Plagues and Peoples by McNeill, which shows the effects
of diseases on human history.
WWI saw the dismantling of the major colonial rivalries, it
was the last big allocation of spheres of influence by treaty
as the winners took control of territories previously held by
the losers. The remaining colonial powers being allies in a
long and exhausting war meant a reduction in the chances of
further war.
Note in January 1915 Japan presented what the western powers
called the 21 demands on China. The Japanese largely ended up
with what they wanted but at a big cost in reputation. Given the
general agreement to largely leave China to the Chinese while
controlling the export and import trade.
As Japan expanded in China it forced the Chinese to trade with
Japan, cutting trade to other countries.
The difference in Japan was pre WWI the expansion was a
government lead idea, post WWI it was largely forced on the
government by radicals within the military, until the radicals
ended up in control of the government. The contradictions
between the government's stated positions and the actions
of Japan's military meant Japan ended up not being trusted.
> So, simply to say that the Japan is a "bad" guy is just
> over-simplification.
No it is not once we move to post WWI, Japan alone was
the one attacking others.
> Japan did not go into China just for the fun of it. Their aim
> was to secure territory, working force, resources... everything
> that a big power needs, and everything that the big powers have
> been doing all along. Romans, British, Americans, you name it!
And two wrongs making a right is a bad idea.
And discovering the war with China that started in 1937 cost more
than it gained is a sign to stop the war, not expand it.
Japan, or rather the expansionists in Japan, went into China in
1937 partly due to the way China was becoming united again.
Rather than a collection of states that could be more easily
manipulated. A China equal to Japan on the world's stage
was not something the expansionists wanted. They preferred
China as a Japanese colony, the rest of the world disagreed.
By the way given Japan's post war success with less territory,
work force and resources under direct control rather refutes
the idea they are that important to big power status.
> It is true that the war in China was a devestatign drian of
> resources, but you can not negate the fact the the Japanese
> military planing so the take-over of the ex-european colonies as
> a partial solution to that problem.
The Japanese went into China in 1937, the chance to take over
European Colonies appeared in the middle of 1940.
The war in China was a drain long before mid 1940.
> And after the european states
> began falling one after another in Europe, it was just a question
> of time when someone takes over. Japan simply decide it was to
> be first.
Actually it was coming to a deal with Nazi Germany about the old
spheres of influence ideas. And the Philippines were not a European
Colony and had a definite independence date set.
> I do not differ Japan from anyother big power, or big-power-wannabe.
> They made a big gamble, and lost. US gambled as well (some time ago),
> but won.
Again because someone else did it is not proof the action is right.
Also the major boost to US power was the expansion across North
America, not the Philippines or overseas territories. And the reality
of the "internal" expansion was disease, numbers, and technology
were on the US side, not the native American's. It was not much
of a gamble. The wars with Mexico were rather one sided.
> And to claim that the US administration was a simply puppy trying
> to keep the peace in the Pacific makes me laugh.
The US administration was not simple, nor a puppy, and it was trying
to keep the peace in the Pacific in the 1937 to 1941 period. You can
claim the peace initiative was more to do with avoiding the disruption
to the China trade before mid 1940, and afterwards it was all about the
rise of Nazi power, while also trying to stop the suffering in China. The
cost of the approaching European war was going to be considerable,
even more so if the Pacific became a war zone, with associated drains
on men and material, and possible loss of access to important raw
material, like rubber and tin.
Fundamentally the Japanese demanded the west supply the materials
it wanted to continue its war with China, with the or else being it would
help Nazi Germany. The west said no, though of course the no came
as Japan upped the threats against the west, rather than against China.
You can make a case the more Japan threatened the more the western
powers realised it was in their interest to stop trading, so as to limit
Japan's war making potential.
And the nuclear weapons were the cheapest way out of the Pacific
war, in terms of human lives lost. Given the steady death toll in China
alone, the fact some Japanese starved to death on the 1945/46
winter, the famine in Indo China, the approaching famine in Malaya
and so on.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Lloyd Olson
news:PM00047A4...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
>>
>
I don't have the books here right now. The author was Adam Tooze. Perhaps
you've read his works ?
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
Your timeline is wrong, then.
Potsdam, and the Potsdam Declaration, were more than a week before
the first a-bomb was dropped.
Mike
Taki Kogoma
allegedly proclaimed to soc.history.war.world-war-ii:
The Potsdam conferene was from 17 July to 2 August 1945.
The "deliveries" were on 6 and 9 August 1945.
--
Capt. Gym Z. Quirk (Known to some as Taki Kogoma) quirk @ swcp.com
Just an article detector on the Information Supercollider.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> David H Thornley wrote:
> > The presence of civilians in military zones is not the problem
> > of the attacking forces in military law, but the problem of
> > the defending forces. If this were done the other way, it would
> > be legal to defend military targets by surrounding them with
> > civilians.
> >> Nobody has atacked the US for that...
> This last sentece only tells that you have been reading the army
> weekly reports, and that only :) lol:) are u for real about this? :)
Yes, and I do not understand your confusion.
> btw, hiroshima and nagasaki were cities, not military zones. what
> R U talking about!!!???
> basically u r proposing that most of the World is a military zone.
Tell me, which Hague Convention agreement was violated by the attacks?
But yes, military targets are perfectly valid targets, and even the
Japanese people knew this. There is a reason Japanese evacuated the major
cities if they had somewhere else to go.
> but, what I am saying is that the a-bomb was no response to the
> Japanese.
Then you are wrong.
If the Japanese had accepted the Potsdam Declaration, or at least opened
negotiations at the time, the bombs would not have been dropped.
> Consider this. Everybody was/is saying, the bombs were/are necessary
> to brake the spirit of the Japanese people.
Who stated this, please?
> a. Most of the bigger Japanese cities were already in flames. Fog of
> War documentary gives u some clear statistical data on this. I
And yet the Japanese fought on.
> seriously doubt that the common folk had the gut to continue
> fighting after that, even if it was the "strong" Japanese.
Then you are unaware of the Japanese at the time.
> b. If u read notes, letters and bibliographies of the average
> Japanese soldiers, u can tell that NOT ALL felt they needed to
> fight to the bitter end.
I have spoken to Japanese who were alive at the time; it didn't matter
how they felt. They were going to obey orders and fight on, if those
were the orders.
> note on this: but I agree with Mike and others who are saying the
> it was the emperor who had the last word. I have no idea what his
> toughts were before the a bombs, but I am pretty sure he was not
> considering surrender.
Again, you are wrong. While he took little direct action to intervene, he
successively manuevered more dovish people into the PM role.
However, if you read the words you wrote, you are stating that Hirohito
was against surrender before the dropping of the bombs, but for surrender
afterwards. Doesn't this imply a useful role for the bombs in the ending
of the war?
> Droping a bombs on isolated areas, with minimal civilian presence
> would deliver the message to the emperor.
It wasn't his decision to make.
> But droping a bomb on high civilian density targets, with a
> possibility of "extensive" kill would spread the message further
> away... even all the way to the Potsdam, where Stalin and Truman
> were sitting around an oval table.
Again, your timeline is backwards; Stalin already knew about the bombs.
> Common people... somebody has to be getting what I am aiming at?
Everyone gets it. We simply disagree.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> > It is folly to think one knows what other situations would have
> > caused a Japanese surrender. We know what worked, and how close
> > it came to not working.
> I agree with you on everything said.
> But nevertheless, droping a bomb on an army or navy base outside
> of the big urban area (an island possibly?) would have done the
> trick, were it simply for scaring off the Japanese.
Which target did you have in mind?
> As far as the idea about the coup, and fight till the bitter
> end, u had that in Europe too. Nuts are common withing humanity,
> no matter which religion or color they adhere to.
Yes, people would fight to the bitter end if ordered to do so.
> I hope I did not sound too foolish in some of the claims I made.
> I however, nevertheless, strongly believe that the US had a policy
> of bringing the Japanese down to their knees one way or the other,
No. Had the Japanese pressed for surrender after Guadalcanal, she like
would have received some favorable terms. The US was always far more
interested in the European war.
> formed prior to the war (if it was for the Japanese attrocities,
Nope. They had no real problems with Japanese hegemony in the area,
so long as they did not expand into strategically important areas
for the European conflict.
> Do not forget that the US emerged from the ww2 as the ONLY superpower!
> (Russian were never really that much of a threat, even with their
> vast armies and nuclear arsenal. In fact, I rembember reading the
> already in the Eisenhower administration the US was aware that the
> Soviets were falling behind).
Didn't matter that they were falling behind; they were "right there" on
the continent, and able to directly influence events.
> And that (being the only superpower) did not happen just like that.
> And in order to acomplish that, the US had to bring down the potential
> rivals in one way or another.
Then what the US did makes no sense; in fact, they helped REBUILD these
"rivals", not bring them down.
> And that takes strategic planning a few decades in advance.
Which implies that there was no such plan; such strategic plans normally
do not survive repeated changes in administrations.
> And to believe that the US first considered serious and major
> operations in the Pacific... is sureal :)
Again, this seems to fly in the face of what you have previously posted.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > Don Phillipson <e9...@spamblock.ncf.ca> wrote:
> >> "Marlock" <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> >> news:PM00047A3...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> >
> >> After the fact, it seems likely more people died at
> >> Dresden than at Hiroshima, i.e. the main strategic
> >
> > We also know that more Japanese died in Okinawa than in either Hiroshima or
> > Nagasaki.
> I was not aware of that.
Roughly 100,000 Japanese civilians, or a bit over 1/4 the population died, most
at the hands of either themselves or the IJA. This is a source of considerable
resentment even today in the islands. In addition, roughly 95-100k IJA/IJN
troops died there.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> Japan, or rather the expansionists in Japan, went into China in
> 1937 partly due to the way China was becoming united again.
> Rather than a collection of states that could be more easily
> manipulated. A China equal to Japan on the world's stage
> was not something the expansionists wanted.
Agree with most of what you write, but here I believe you're giving the
Japanese movement too much credit; I don't see them having anything like
such a coherent goal in their actions.
> Also the major boost to US power was the expansion across North
> America, not the Philippines or overseas territories.
And it's important to note that the Japanese expansion onto the Korean
penninsula was considered by the international community to be a logical
extension of Japanese power in its own sphere of influence.
Mike
Lloyd Olson
> .
>
> But droping a bomb on high civilian density targets, with a
> possibility of "extensive" kill would spread the message further
> away... even all the way to the Potsdam, where Stalin and Truman
> were sitting around an oval table.
> Consider the ACE IN THE SLEAVE Truman got when Stalin heard the news
Probably no ace in the sleeve. Russian intelligence must have informed
Stalin before Truman told him.
Marlock
Aha, Mike mentioned that guy. Now I see why.
Marlock
actually I think u are right there
Marlock
> Marlock <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> David H Thornley wrote:
>> > Marlock wrote:
>
>> > It is folly to think one knows what other situations would have
>> > caused a Japanese surrender. We know what worked, and how close
>> > it came to not working.
>
>> I agree with you on everything said.
>> But nevertheless, droping a bomb on an army or navy base outside
>> of the big urban area (an island possibly?) would have done the
>> trick, were it simply for scaring off the Japanese.
>
> Which target did you have in mind?
I have no knowledge of the relelvant army and navy bases of that time,
so it might as well be that all of you are right when claiming that
the bases in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the TOP TOP targets.
>
>> As far as the idea about the coup, and fight till the bitter
>> end, u had that in Europe too. Nuts are common withing humanity,
>> no matter which religion or color they adhere to.
>
> Yes, people would fight to the bitter end if ordered to do so.
How do you know this? Nazis though that too, but it turned out boggeous.
o the war (if it was for the Japanese attrocities,
> Then what the US did makes no sense; in fact, they helped REBUILD these
> "rivals", not bring them down.
Sure. And earn a FORTUNE whilst doing that. Same like NATO, or Iraq.
Shock doctrine. Then send in the industry to rebuild and earn high
profits....
>
>> And to believe that the US first considered serious and major
>> operations in the Pacific... is sureal :)
>
>
> Again, this seems to fly in the face of what you have previously posted.
>
yes, it's either out of contents, or a mistake in writing.
Marlock
>> the game was to impress, or rather scare the russian.
>>
>
> Was it? So you will be able to quote actual documents, by the US
> administration and military, stating so much - "what we really want is to
> scare the Soviets"? Go ahead, quote them.
>
Ask McNamara. The man OPENLY CONFESED THAT THEY ALL WERE/ARE WAR
CRIMINALS! He regreted the things he did.
HE OPENLY NEGATES the need of the usage of the A bomb over Japan.
Watch Fog of War, please........
>> don't kid urselves with casualty story for little children...
>>
>
> The tens of thousands of Chinese civilians killed in the Japanese
> occupation, per month, by the summer of 1945, are definitely a story I
> wouldn't recommend for children. They would not sleep well.
Good thing that the good forces of the West immidiately reacted
back when the Japanese atrocities started, and prevented not
only further killing but also the WW2.... please...
Marlock
> Marlock <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> David H Thornley wrote:
>
>> > The presence of civilians in military zones is not the problem
>> > of the attacking forces in military law, but the problem of
>> > the defending forces. If this were done the other way, it would
>> > be legal to defend military targets by surrounding them with
>> > civilians.
>
>> >> Nobody has atacked the US for that...
>
>> This last sentece only tells that you have been reading the army
>> weekly reports, and that only :) lol:) are u for real about this? :)
>
> Yes, and I do not understand your confusion.
I think you just answered my question.
>
>> btw, hiroshima and nagasaki were cities, not military zones. what
>> R U talking about!!!???
>> basically u r proposing that most of the World is a military zone.
>
> Tell me, which Hague Convention agreement was violated by the attacks?
I guess nobody really ever breaks international law. You are right.
>
> But yes, military targets are perfectly valid targets, and even the
> Japanese people knew this. There is a reason Japanese evacuated the major
> cities if they had somewhere else to go.
>
>> but, what I am saying is that the a-bomb was no response to the
>> Japanese.
>
> Then you are wrong.
>
> If the Japanese had accepted the Potsdam Declaration, or at least opened
> negotiations at the time, the bombs would not have been dropped.
>
>> Consider this. Everybody was/is saying, the bombs were/are necessary
>> to brake the spirit of the Japanese people.
>
> Who stated this, please?
Well everyone is saying that were it not for the A bombs droped
twice, the Japanese people would be fighting till the bitter end.
Read the posts.
>
>> a. Most of the bigger Japanese cities were already in flames. Fog of
>> War documentary gives u some clear statistical data on this. I
>
> And yet the Japanese fought on.
>
>> seriously doubt that the common folk had the gut to continue
>> fighting after that, even if it was the "strong" Japanese.
>
> Then you are unaware of the Japanese at the time.
Introduce some data, I am truly curious.
I do understand the influence of bushido code, and the love for
the emperor, but Japan at the time was one big rubble already...
>
>> b. If u read notes, letters and bibliographies of the average
>> Japanese soldiers, u can tell that NOT ALL felt they needed to
>> fight to the bitter end.
>
> I have spoken to Japanese who were alive at the time; it didn't matter
> how they felt. They were going to obey orders and fight on, if those
> were the orders.
>
>> note on this: but I agree with Mike and others who are saying the
>> it was the emperor who had the last word. I have no idea what his
>> toughts were before the a bombs, but I am pretty sure he was not
>> considering surrender.
>
> Again, you are wrong. While he took little direct action to intervene, he
> successively manuevered more dovish people into the PM role.
>
> However, if you read the words you wrote, you are stating that Hirohito
> was against surrender before the dropping of the bombs, but for surrender
> afterwards. Doesn't this imply a useful role for the bombs in the ending
> of the war?
Yes. This is were I agree with you and the rest. But my argument
is in favour of a different choice of a target. I am not into
arguing the usage of the bomb. It makes no sense to talk about that.
>
>> Droping a bombs on isolated areas, with minimal civilian presence
>> would deliver the message to the emperor.
>
> It wasn't his decision to make.
>
What do you mean???? Who then offered surrender? Who decided that
the Japan will surrender?
>> But droping a bomb on high civilian density targets, with a
>> possibility of "extensive" kill would spread the message further
>> away... even all the way to the Potsdam, where Stalin and Truman
>> were sitting around an oval table.
>
> Again, your timeline is backwards; Stalin already knew about the bombs.
Fair enough. A little demonstration won't hurt though.
>
Marlock
> On 2009-12-09, Marlock <marloc...@gmail.com>
> allegedly proclaimed to soc.history.war.world-war-ii:
>> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
>>> 2) The Russians already knew about a-bombs; Truman told them
>>
>> I tought this has happened at Potsdam, after they were delievered
>> to their targets.
>
> The Potsdam conferene was from 17 July to 2 August 1945.
>
> The "deliveries" were on 6 and 9 August 1945.
>
My mistake. sry.
Marlock
> "Marlock" <marloc...@gmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
> news:PM00047A2...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
>
>> America wanted to crush Japan in one way or the other. War was a good
>> way.
>
> Well, no. The embargo would have worked perfectly - provided that the
> Japanese continued to wage war against China, which was a war _Japan_
> wanted.
>
> Besides, you seem to really believe that every country needs to become an
> empire in order to thrive. It ain't so. Switzerland, like many other
> countries, has to import stuff and even manpower. Yet it's been around for
> centuries and it's thriving.
You are thinking too big. Try Monaco.
> Going imperial was a free, deliberate choice for Japan (and, FWIW, for Italy
> in 1936 and Germany in 1939). Nobody forced them. They started wars of
> aggression of their own choice. They failed.
> As a side note, they did this just as some of the actual imperial powers had
> already decided that imperalism did not work all too well, at least not any
> longer. So the Axis powers also added bad timing.
Only when confronted with other imperialist powers.
narrl...@hotmail.com
> "Marlock" <marlockena...@gmail.com> wrote in message
The Soviets knew almost as much about the Manhattan Project as the
Americans did; so much in fact, that Stalin gave specific orders for
his spies to concentrate on proven processes, not theoretical
breakthroughs. See inter alia the fine books by Richard Rhodes and
David Holloway.
Narr
Marlock
cheers for the info!
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > Yes, people would fight to the bitter end if ordered to do so.
> How do you know this? Nazis though that too, but it turned out boggeous.
Really? The country (Germany) was almost completely overrun before the
Germans stopped fighting. There was a bitter battle for Berlin, which
cost almost 60k Soviet casualties. That's pretty bitter.
In any event, my mother-in-law was among those being forced to drill
with bamboo spears to attack US troops (she was in grade school at the
time) at the time. That's pretty bitter.
The Okinawans had fought with the island completely overrun, and killed
themselves (or too often were killed by their fellow Japanese) rather
than surrender. That's pretty bitter.
> > Then what the US did makes no sense; in fact, they helped REBUILD these
> > "rivals", not bring them down.
> Sure. And earn a FORTUNE whilst doing that. Same like NATO, or Iraq.
> Shock doctrine. Then send in the industry to rebuild and earn high
> profits....
Sorry, again this makes no sense. If they were going to destroy competition,
they should simply keep selling, not rebuild competition.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> > Was it? So you will be able to quote actual documents, by the US
> > administration and military, stating so much - "what we really want is to
> > scare the Soviets"? Go ahead, quote them.
> Ask McNamara. The man OPENLY CONFESED THAT THEY ALL WERE/ARE WAR
> CRIMINALS! He regreted the things he did.
Uh, what did he do in the Pacific War?
> HE OPENLY NEGATES the need of the usage of the A bomb over Japan.
Sorry, he had precisely zero to do with it. Not a good source.
> > The tens of thousands of Chinese civilians killed in the Japanese
> > occupation, per month, by the summer of 1945, are definitely a story I
> > wouldn't recommend for children. They would not sleep well.
> Good thing that the good forces of the West immidiately reacted
> back when the Japanese atrocities started, and prevented not
> only further killing but also the WW2.... please...
So, when the US and others began refusing to sell Japan the materiale to
wage war in China, you stated they were forcing Japan to attack them. Now,
you are saying that outright attacking Japan would have been the right
thing to do?
MIke
Marlock
> Marlock <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
>
>> > Yes, people would fight to the bitter end if ordered to do so.
>
>> How do you know this? Nazis though that too, but it turned out boggeous.
>
> Really? The country (Germany) was almost completely overrun before the
> Germans stopped fighting. There was a bitter battle for Berlin, which
> cost almost 60k Soviet casualties. That's pretty bitter.
Against the Soviets yes, against the US/British troops not so.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> >> btw, hiroshima and nagasaki were cities, not military zones. what
> >> R U talking about!!!???
> >> basically u r proposing that most of the World is a military zone.
> >
> > Tell me, which Hague Convention agreement was violated by the attacks?
> I guess nobody really ever breaks international law. You are right.
Regardless of whether or not anyone breaks international law, the fact
remains that the Hague Conventions were NOT violated by dropping nuclear
weapons on defended city.
> >> Consider this. Everybody was/is saying, the bombs were/are necessary
> >> to brake the spirit of the Japanese people.
> > Who stated this, please?
> Well everyone is saying that were it not for the A bombs droped
> twice, the Japanese people would be fighting till the bitter end.
They may well have; however, the bombs were not needed to "break the spirit
of the Japanese people" but to force the Japanese LEADERSHIP to accept their
position.
> > Then you are unaware of the Japanese at the time.
> Introduce some data, I am truly curious.
You could read Cook & Cook's _Japan at War: An Oral History_ for examples
or _The Pacific War: 1931-1945_ by Ienaga for examples. The Japanese
were training to repel an invasion.
> I do understand the influence of bushido code, and the love for
> the emperor, but Japan at the time was one big rubble already...
Bushido had nothing to do with it; noone was samurai anymore. Simply, they
would obey the orders of the military because to do otherwise was to
invite imprisonment, or worse.
> > However, if you read the words you wrote, you are stating that Hirohito
> > was against surrender before the dropping of the bombs, but for surrender
> > afterwards. Doesn't this imply a useful role for the bombs in the ending
> > of the war?
> Yes. This is were I agree with you and the rest. But my argument
> is in favour of a different choice of a target. I am not into
> arguing the usage of the bomb. It makes no sense to talk about that.
It is possible that dropping the second bomb over Tokyo Bay may have
frightened the Japanese Cabinet into surrendering. However, even after
the FIRST bomb, AND the Soviet invasion of Manchukoku, Anami postponed
a Cabinet meeting because he "had more important business elsewhere".
Clearly stalling.
> >> Droping a bombs on isolated areas, with minimal civilian presence
> >> would deliver the message to the emperor.
> > It wasn't his decision to make.
> What do you mean???? Who then offered surrender? Who decided that
> the Japan will surrender?
Hirohito's role in everything was to approve UNANIMOUS decisions handed him
by his Cabinet. He never offered a direct opinion at the meetings until
the fateful meeting when Suzuki DIRECTLY ASKED HIM for a decision.
Mike
Marlock
> Marlock <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> > Was it? So you will be able to quote actual documents, by the US
>> > administration and military, stating so much - "what we really want is to
>> > scare the Soviets"? Go ahead, quote them.
>
>> Ask McNamara. The man OPENLY CONFESED THAT THEY ALL WERE/ARE WAR
>> CRIMINALS! He regreted the things he did.
>
> Uh, what did he do in the Pacific War?
He was a part of the statistical data office of LeMay's command.
For instance, when the new type of bomber was introduced (B-something),
it was designed to fly high enough to evade zero interception.
However, the bombing results were not that good (McNamara did the
numbers personally). And when he got into LeMay's office and showed
the numbers, LeMay's reactionwas instant: get the low, and give
them napalm. The results were horrific.
>
>> HE OPENLY NEGATES the need of the usage of the A bomb over Japan.
>
> Sorry, he had precisely zero to do with it. Not a good source.
Mike, I have a feeling that you have a need to be an overall judge
of every single point I make. McNamara was one of the top US
personel in charge of bombing operations over Japan.
He knew most of the stuff concerning US planes over Japanese sky.
>
>> Good thing that the good forces of the West immidiately reacted
>> back when the Japanese atrocities started, and prevented not
>> only further killing but also the WW2.... please...
>
> So, when the US and others began refusing to sell Japan the materiale to
> wage war in China, you stated they were forcing Japan to attack them. Now,
> you are saying that outright attacking Japan would have been the right
> thing to do?
>
As far as I know, the sanctions come as a reaction to the occupation
of ex-european colonies. Correct me if I am wrong.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > Marlock <marloc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> Ask McNamara. The man OPENLY CONFESED THAT THEY ALL WERE/ARE WAR
> >> CRIMINALS! He regreted the things he did.
> >
> > Uh, what did he do in the Pacific War?
> He was a part of the statistical data office of LeMay's command.
> For instance, when the new type of bomber was introduced (B-something),
> it was designed to fly high enough to evade zero interception.
B-29?
> However, the bombing results were not that good (McNamara did the
> numbers personally). And when he got into LeMay's office and showed
> the numbers, LeMay's reactionwas instant: get the low, and give
> them napalm. The results were horrific.
He was part of a statistical group; I can find no evidence that he
was so personally important. However, though the Tokyo bombing was
devastating, the other cities, though often more greatly damaged, suffered
far fewer casualties.
> >> HE OPENLY NEGATES the need of the usage of the A bomb over Japan.
> >
> > Sorry, he had precisely zero to do with it. Not a good source.
> Mike, I have a feeling that you have a need to be an overall judge
> of every single point I make.
If you make a point, we are free to refute it.
> McNamara was one of the top US
> personel in charge of bombing operations over Japan.
> He knew most of the stuff concerning US planes over Japanese sky.
Sorry, but that sounds a lot like McNamara greatly overstated his
importance.
> > So, when the US and others began refusing to sell Japan the materiale to
> > wage war in China, you stated they were forcing Japan to attack them. Now,
> > you are saying that outright attacking Japan would have been the right
> > thing to do?
> >
> As far as I know, the sanctions come as a reaction to the occupation
> of ex-european colonies. Correct me if I am wrong.
You are wrong. The sanctions began first as a reaction to continued Japanese
incursions into China. They escalated gradually, and the complete embargo
was put into effect when Japan moved to occupy the entirity of French
Indochina, not merely the northern part, which was agreed to by the French.
MIke
Stuart McGraw
> Stuart McGraw <smcg...@frii.com> wrote:
>> The European powers had centuries of experience dealing
>> diplomatically and militarily with each other so I suppose
>> they could be expected to "read the handwriting" regarding the
>> falling out of favor of colonialism.
>
> True. And so could Japan, given how quickly they adopted many
> Western mores, including military and government structures,
> diplomatic ties, etc.
It is not at all obvious to me that learning things like
mechanical engineering or economics is exactly the same
difficultly as understanding the nuances of diplomatic
relations between countries that had been doing that with
each other for centuries. Particularly true when
recognizing that some change in tone represents a long
term trend. And even more so when the endemic racism
of the times resulted in receiving different treatment
than other European powers.
And indeed, one could take the later breakdown of government
control of the military as evidence she she *hadn't* gained
a full understanding of government structures yet. (Well,
"full understanding" is a bit of an overstatement, given
that all countries are still a long way from that yet.)
>> But could Japan be expected to? A Japan that had started
>> relations with the west barely 50 years before, whose culture
>> and world view was completely different, who didn't even have
>> any other asian powers to consult with since every other asian
>> country had been ripped apart by the west?
>
> This isn't quite accurate. Japan's world view was very much Western at
> that point, and not "completely different".
Again, not at all obvious to me. That she had adopted western
technology and many other form of westernization doesn't
necessarily mean that the deeper world view of Japanese leaders
was somehow morphed to that of Europeans. Even today I am told
it is a mistake to think of Japan as just like a European country
that uses a funny complex writing system. (And please don't
exaggerate my position into some kind of strawman of extreme
nihonjinron-ism.)
"completely different", if you want to take it extremely literally,
is of course an overstatement. Substitute "much more different
that the European countries were from each other" if that's better.
> And not every other asian
> country had been ripped apart by the west;
Nit-pick if you wish. Most major European powers has carved out
some piece of China for itself. China by this time makes me think
of a dead animal on the side of the road being picked apart by crows.
The obscene opium trade; every time some group of Chinese would
reach the breaking point, the foreign armies were there to put them
down, and demand more concessions, more treaty ports, more indemnity
payments. The Chinese would be left with fewer of their own resources
and have to borrow money from the colonizers to pay the colonizers.
The French in Indochina, America in the Philippines, the Dutch in
Indonesia, the British everywhere. The history of western colonialism
in Asia may not be as bad as in Africa or earlier in the Americas but
it is still a pretty grim picture.
> Japan had joined in quite
> enthusiastically, and had outright annexed another Asian country.
Right, they understood it is eat or be eaten.
>> And that's even assuming they'd want to buy into a view
>> that was, "now that we have milked colonialism to our advantage
>> and you are just starting to, we decided it's bad and you
>> can't do it."
>
> That's not what happened, though. Japan began an attempted expansion that
> would bring them directly into conflict with modern states, without
> allies.
As I said, it seems to me that it must be pretty hard to
catch up with several hundred years of western development
in just 50 or so. That they did as well as they did is
astounding. That they did so imperfectly is not surprising.
> Which Western powers did this? Well, Germany...
>
>> This is a rather similar situation today when
>> many developed counties, who got that way using cheap hydrocarbon
>> energy, say to developing countries, "you can't do what we did.
>> because we decided it's bad". Is it any wonder the reaction
>> is similar?
>
> To put this poor analogy to rest, continuing along proven bad course
> of action creates a worse situation, not a better one, even for the
> developing countries.
"proven"? How was it "proven" before it played out?
>> France, Germany, and Russia forced Japan to give up the
>> concessions in China's Liaontung peninsula that she thought
>> were the legitimate rewards of her victory in the first
>> Sino-Japanese war of 1895. And to add insult to injury, Russia
>> then took concessions in Liaontung after Japan was forced
>> to give them up! Hardly my idea of European cooperation with
>> Japan.
>
> And she kept Formosa and other possessions, and would later take other
> things from Russia, and within a framework of alliances similar to those
> forged between European powers. And she would appeal to the US to mediate
> a treaty between her and another European power.
Life goes on. I fail to see how that somehow erases having
been screwed over by three major powers because Japan was
not strong enough to resist them.
>[...]
> This reference to Perry is often brought up by people who haven't
> really studied the period. In fact both pro and anti shogunate forces
> saw the benefit in opening to the west prior to the arrival of Perry,
> but internal politics precluded them from expressing that openly. The
> faction most opposed would be, of course, the Dutch.
I'm sorry. I consider that a pretty abhorrent rationalization.
Rather like that of the rapist: "Yes, judge, I heard her
crying, 'no!', but I knew that down inside, she really wanted it."
>[...]
> I believe you're reading the Wikipedia article; _Things Japanese_ is not
> the same _Japanese Things_: Being Notes on Various Subjects Connected with
> Japan_.
Ah, yes. Thanks for the correction.
Michele
> I however, nevertheless, strongly believe that the US had a policy
> of bringing the Japanese down to their knees one way or the other,
> formed prior to the war
So you would have something, anything, to build this strong belief upon? A
book by a reputable historian? Some specific events? In short, facts rather
than your beliefs?
Michele
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
>>
>> Tell me, which Hague Convention agreement was violated by the attacks?
>
> I guess nobody really ever breaks international law. You are right.
>
Quite the contrary. Using gases (Italy in Ethiopia) or bacteriological
weapons (Japan, experimentally, in China) broke international treaties. The
Germans managed to break virtually every article of Section III, Hague
Convention IV 1907 in their occupation of Poland. The British violated Hague
Convention III 1907 when they bombed Petsamo, just the same violation by the
Japanese when they bombed Pearl Harbor.
I could continue for a thousand lines. But you won't find a treaty provision
that made the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings illegal according to the
treaties then in force.
Michele
news:PM00047A5...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
>
>>> the game was to impress, or rather scare the russian.
>>>
>>
>> Was it? So you will be able to quote actual documents, by the US
>> administration and military, stating so much - "what we really want is to
>> scare the Soviets"? Go ahead, quote them.
>>
>
> Ask McNamara. The man OPENLY CONFESED THAT THEY ALL WERE/ARE WAR
> CRIMINALS! He regreted the things he did.
> HE OPENLY NEGATES the need of the usage of the A bomb over Japan.
No need to use all caps. In any case, you are not answering. What I asked
for was a document _of the time_ -not later recriminations, which have no
bearing at all, given that the bombs rapidly became to be seen as a bad
idea... only after the fact.
So you have no evidence at all, whatsoever, that the intention at the time
was to scare the Soviets.
>
> Watch Fog of War, please........
>
No thanks. Shows are for show, as the word implies. Books are for
understanding.
>
>>> don't kid urselves with casualty story for little children...
>>>
>>
>> The tens of thousands of Chinese civilians killed in the Japanese
>> occupation, per month, by the summer of 1945, are definitely a story I
>> wouldn't recommend for children. They would not sleep well.
>
> Good thing that the good forces of the West immidiately reacted
> back when the Japanese atrocities started, and prevented not
> only further killing but also the WW2.... please...
>
Which has no bearing, either. The point was whether the bombs should be used
or not, when they were actually available, not in 1939, when they were not.
Please.
And anyway, you objected to the US sanctions and embargo, arguing that they
"forced" Japan to war. Are you now complaining that the USA had not done
more, earlier? Say declare war on Japan as soon as news of Nanking reached
the West? This is what they should have done? Please.
Michele
> Michele wrote:
>> "Marlock" <marloc...@gmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
>> news:PM00047A2...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
>>
>>> America wanted to crush Japan in one way or the other. War was a good
>>> way.
>>
>> Well, no. The embargo would have worked perfectly - provided that the
>> Japanese continued to wage war against China, which was a war _Japan_
>> wanted.
>>
>> Besides, you seem to really believe that every country needs to become an
>> empire in order to thrive. It ain't so. Switzerland, like many other
>> countries, has to import stuff and even manpower. Yet it's been around
>> for
>> centuries and it's thriving.
>
> You are thinking too big. Try Monaco.
I'm glad you don't find a better reply. It means you can see that going
imperial is not a must.
>
>> Going imperial was a free, deliberate choice for Japan (and, FWIW, for
>> Italy
>> in 1936 and Germany in 1939). Nobody forced them. They started wars of
>> aggression of their own choice. They failed.
>> As a side note, they did this just as some of the actual imperial powers
>> had
>> already decided that imperalism did not work all too well, at least not
>> any
>> longer. So the Axis powers also added bad timing.
>
> Only when confronted with other imperialist powers.
>
You miss the point. Several of those imperialist powers had already decided
to gradually dismiss their empires. Britain had passed the India Act, and
the members of the Commonwealth were already substantially independent. The
USA, insofar as they can be considered an imperialist power, had already set
a date for the Philippines' autonomy. Why, even the French were discussing
different statuses for some of their overseas territories. Empires were
simply falling out of fashion.
Marlock
> B-29?
I think so, yes.
However, though the Tokyo bombing was
> devastating, the other cities, though often more greatly damaged, suffered
> far fewer casualties.
>
Not true. Again, watch Fog of War, McNamara gives numerous
examples of total destruction of Japanese cities, and compares
the losses with US cities.
Again, ur data is wrong.
> Sorry, but that sounds a lot like McNamara greatly overstated his
> importance.
>
Wrong. This is my guess, since he was analysing all data coming
from that Theatre of War.
They escalated gradually, and the complete embargo
> was put into effect when Japan moved to occupy the entirity of French
> Indochina, not merely the northern part, which was agreed to by the French.
OK, I did not know this.
pbrom...@aol.com
> Common people... somebody has to be getting what I am aiming at?
As Mr. Fester said, we do get it. We get it about once every six
months or so when somebody with more opinions than facts comes in and
starts saying what a terrible, senseless, needless crime it was to
drop the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The very knowledgeable
posters (I am not one of them) then proceed to demolish these
arguments with remorseless facts.
Yes, it was terrible. Nobody here will ever deny it. In fact, most
of the posters know much more than you about how terrible it was,
because they have studied many aspects of WWII, including this, in
great detail.
But it most certainly was not senseless, and was very much needed.
Most of the people who feed us this line are doing so from a mindset
that was created by living in a world that has had to cope with the
existence of atomic and nuclear weapons for almost 65 years. No such
mindset existed in 1945. At that time, the bomb was just a very, very
powerful weapon that had been enormously expensive and difficult to
create and had the potential (eventually demonstrated) to end the war
and save countless lives.
That it was dropped on Japan is blamed on American racism. That such
racism existed is undeniable (I am married into a Japanese-American
family), but the bombing did not spring from that. Did you know that
the bomb was originally intended to be dropped on Germany,
specifically Berlin, but German resistance collapsed before that could
happen? Probably not.
Have you heard or read of operation Downfall? Ketsu-go? Probably
not. These are the respective code names for the invasion and defense
of Kyushu, which was next on the list. Read up on them, they are
truly frightening in potential consequences for both sides. You will
never again believe the bomb should not have been dropped. The
military and government was fully ready to ruthlessly sacrifice the
entire population of Japan, in "ichioku gyokusai", or 100 million
broken jewels. Smashing the family jewels is the last thing a Samurai
does before killing himself during an enemy's final assault on his
last stronghold. This held powerful symbolism in 1945 Japan.
Blockade? The noose was tightening. Mass starvation was very close
at hand - there was some in 45-46, despite the war having ended. But
the military and government would have found all the food they needed
for themselves and the young and the old, the "useless mouths", would
have received none. The Japanese populace was completely cowed to the
point of even believed they were winning the war.
If you were Harry Truman and these are your options, do you really
want to risk using your greatest weapon to blow up some uninhabited
island, in the uncertain hope that your enemy will be so impressed
that he will give up? You've already burned most of his capital city
to the ground and because you are reading his mail you know he is not
going to surrender!
Remember, you only have two of these things, and it will be some
months before you get more. The entire war cost America about 300,000
dead. Casualty estimates by the US Navy for the invasion of Japan
were reaching 1,000,000. How long would it take to impeach an
American president who sacrificed a million sons, brothers, uncles and
dads because he too squeamish to blow up a city that contained 2nd
General Army headquarters - the equivalent of destroying OKW a few
months before D-Day? How many military men could even think of
recommending such action?
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> I could continue for a thousand lines. But you won't find a treaty provision
> that made the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings illegal according to the
> treaties then in force.
And I don't know of any Axis leaders being tried for the bombings of
London, Shanghai, etc.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> On 12/08/2009 11:13 PM, mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > True. And so could Japan, given how quickly they adopted many
> > Western mores, including military and government structures,
> > diplomatic ties, etc.
> It is not at all obvious to me that learning things like
> mechanical engineering or economics is exactly the same
> difficultly as understanding the nuances of diplomatic
> relations between countries that had been doing that with
> each other for centuries.
What part of "military and government structures, diplomatic ties, etc."
is unclear?
> And indeed, one could take the later breakdown of government
> control of the military as evidence she she *hadn't* gained
> a full understanding of government structures yet.
Or, we can take the later breakdown of government as evidence that in
70 years, things can change, as they were to change in Russia, Germany,
the US, etc. (ie, "the West")
> > This isn't quite accurate. Japan's world view was very much Western at
> > that point, and not "completely different".
> Again, not at all obvious to me. That she had adopted western
> technology and many other form of westernization doesn't
> necessarily mean that the deeper world view of Japanese leaders
> was somehow morphed to that of Europeans.
So they didn't value resources, as did the Europeans? Territory? Prestige?
International currencies? Large corporations? "Lebensraum"?
What, precisely, was particularly Japanese about their world view?
> Even today I am told
> it is a mistake to think of Japan as just like a European country
> that uses a funny complex writing system.
Perhaps you should live there. Like it or not, most of the world is
moving towards "Westernization", and Japan was one of the first non-white
nations to do so.
> "completely different", if you want to take it extremely literally,
> is of course an overstatement. Substitute "much more different
> that the European countries were from each other" if that's better.
How so, precisely?
> > And not every other asian
> > country had been ripped apart by the west;
> Nit-pick if you wish. Most major European powers has carved out
> some piece of China for itself. China by this time makes me think
> of a dead animal on the side of the road being picked apart by crows.
Except that what you think of is certainly wrong, in this case; it was
definetly NOT a dead animal, as the Boxer Rebellion, Sun Yat-Sen, etc.,
would show, and the West (and Japan, in cooperation) were very careful
NOT to push for too much in China, and in fact rising Chinese nationalism,
not the Japanese, would force them out.
> > Japan had joined in quite
> > enthusiastically, and had outright annexed another Asian country.
> Right, they understood it is eat or be eaten.
Not really; Japan was in no danger of being eaten.
However, you are now claiming that Japan was adopting a Western world-view,
despite claiming that they hadn't?
> > That's not what happened, though. Japan began an attempted expansion that
> > would bring them directly into conflict with modern states, without
> > allies.
> As I said, it seems to me that it must be pretty hard to
> catch up with several hundred years of western development
> in just 50 or so.
And at that time, they were not directly in conflict with every Western Power.
> That they did as well as they did is
> astounding. That they did so imperfectly is not surprising.
And these breaks came well after Japan had demonstrated her understanding
of how the West worked, not before.
> >> This is a rather similar situation today when
> >> many developed counties, who got that way using cheap hydrocarbon
> >> energy, say to developing countries, "you can't do what we did.
> >> because we decided it's bad". Is it any wonder the reaction
> >> is similar?
> > To put this poor analogy to rest, continuing along proven bad course
> > of action creates a worse situation, not a better one, even for the
> > developing countries.
> "proven"? How was it "proven" before it played out?
Sorry, are you claiming it has NOT been proven that emitting large amounts of
fossil fuels contributes to a bad situation? Or are you claiming that it was
not KNOWN at the time (even to the Japanese) that colonial expansionism was
costly and cubersome?
> > And she kept Formosa and other possessions, and would later take other
> > things from Russia, and within a framework of alliances similar to those
> > forged between European powers. And she would appeal to the US to mediate
> > a treaty between her and another European power.
> Life goes on.
And Japan seems to have learned from them, yes?
> I fail to see how that somehow erases having
> been screwed over by three major powers because Japan was
> not strong enough to resist them.
Hmm, how about a later war where Japan carefully formed an alliance in
order to firm up
> > This reference to Perry is often brought up by people who haven't
> > really studied the period. In fact both pro and anti shogunate forces
> > saw the benefit in opening to the west prior to the arrival of Perry,
> > but internal politics precluded them from expressing that openly. The
> > faction most opposed would be, of course, the Dutch.
> I'm sorry. I consider that a pretty abhorrent rationalization.
Then take it up with the Japanese; that is, in fact, the way Monbusho teaches
it. Of course, they didn't bother to check with you. You can also read up
on Japan at the time (Beasley has several good books) and see the behind-the-
scenes manuevering of the various factions to gain the greatest advantage of
the opening.
> Rather like that of the rapist: "Yes, judge, I heard her
> crying, 'no!', but I knew that down inside, she really wanted it."
I see; but in "defending" Imperial Japan ca. 1937, you claim that "Your
honor, I saw all these other guys doing something decades ago, and so I
thought it OK to do it today" is somehow a valid rationalization for
her actions in China.
> >[...]
> > I believe you're reading the Wikipedia article; _Things Japanese_ is not
> > the same _Japanese Things_: Being Notes on Various Subjects Connected with
> > Japan_.
> Ah, yes. Thanks for the correction.
The newer addition also has some notes on the Boxer rebellion.
Mike