De Gaulle and the British
Rhino
strong negative feelings about the British during WW II. Furthermore, I have
the impression that those feelings were De Gaulle's true reason for denying
the British entry to the European Common Market for many years and for
withdrawing France from the military aspects of NATO back in the 60s.
Am I right about that? If so, what particular events of WW II triggered this
anti-British animosity?
--
Rhino
Rich Rostrom
> ... what particular events of WW II triggered
> [De Gaulle's] anti-British animosity?
Robert Heinlein once claimed that Japanese
has five diffferent words for "gratitude", all
of which translate as varying degrees of
resentment.
The British government recognized De Gaulle
as the legitimate head of state of France, and
provided the financial support and supplies
for the Free French organization and forces.
That made De Gaulle and Free France completely
dependent on Britain - and "he that pays the piper
calls the tune."
De Gaulle thought of himself as chief of state
of a Great Power - the nominal equal of Churchill,
In practice he was completely subordinate to
Churchill, and Free France was obliged to do
what the British wanted. Free French troops
in action were under British operational command,
with De Gaulle as an impotent spectator.
Britain paid no attention to France's particular
interests - as a colonial power, for instance.
Furthermore, while Britain recognized De Gaulle
as head of state, De Gaulle and Free France
lacked any power to take control of French
colonies that preferred Vichy. That could happen
only by British action, and the British mostly didn't
act - they often left the Vichy alone, regardless
of De Gaulle's wishes.
Free French moves to seize control of French
colonies in the Americas were blocked - the
U.S. objected to any European battles for
control in the Americas, and Britain considered
keeping the U.S. happy far more important
than upholding De Gaulle's authority.
When the Allies invaded French North Africa in
1942, they did not declare that De Gaulle was
now in charge - instead they recognized the
existing Vichy officials as lawful authority,most
notoriously Admiral Darlan; De Gaulle was shut out.
(It is generally believed that the assassination
of Darlan a few weeks later was a Gaullist plot.)
Furthermore, the invasion was planned and
conducted without even consulting with Free
France. The British and Americans did not
trust De Gaulle's organization to maintain
security, nor did they believe Free France
could do anything useful to help the operation.
There was cooperation with an underground
force in North Africa - but this was an entirely
separate group, who used General Giraud as
their figurehead. Giraud was a five star general,
where De Gaulle was only a two star general.
After Darlan's death Giraud was recognized as
head of French forces. De Gaulle was forced
to accept this, and to form a coalition regime
with Giraud and his associates.
All this was _intensely_ humiliating to De Gaulle,
and he blamed the British for it.
j...@cix.compulink.co.uk
no.offline.c...@example.com (Rhino) wrote:
> Am I right about that? If so, what particular events of WW II
> triggered this anti-British animosity?
Two things that certainly contributed to it were:
De Gaulle reckoned he had the right to form a new French government
after Overlord. The British (and Americans) were not committed to him
doing so. This annoyed him, and when he was annoyed, he could be very
annoying back, and frequently was.
There was a lot of information that the Free French weren't trusted
with. This was because their codes were no good: the British and
Americans knew from Ultra that the Germans were reading them. It seemed
clear that the Free French would not take kindly to the news that their
codes were being read by the Germans, and would likely refuse to believe
it. Which would then likely blow Ultra. Frankly, De Gaulle and his
forces were reckoned to be of lesser value than Ultra, and that does
seem a plausible position.
--
John Dallman, j...@cix.co.uk, HTML mail is treated as probable spam.
Dave Smith
De Gualle was an arrogant ass. He didn't seem to mind the sacrifices
made by Canadian troops and perhaps was not aware of the lack of support
for the war effort in French Canada. In 1967 he made a state visit to
Canada and made the comment " Vive la Quebec libre" in support o Quebec
separatism, a comment that saw the end of his visit and him get booted
out of Canada.
Bay Man
news:ifns6h$4m0$1...@news.datemas.de...
De Gaulle was a tosser of the highest order in the fight against Hitler. He
was more concerned about the glory of France, than the ultimate defeat of
Hitler. Churchill made De Gaulle. Before that he was unknown to 95% of the
French People. His broadcasts via the BBC made the French people aware of
him. He was an unelected leader, the reason why the US only gave him an 18
gun salute on entering the USA. The US didn't regard him as the leader of
France.
>From an Allied viewpoint in WW2 the French overall could not be trusted
100% - the setting up of Vichy France proved that. Their view was correct
when the Fench scuttled the French fleet at Toulon rather than go over to
Allied control - a despicable act. The French fought against the US and
British in their colonies - despicable acts viewed by the UK and US. Here
were people who would not fall in line to fight Hitler, who had occupied
most of France and installed a clear puppet government. In WW2 Frenchmen
fought Frenchmen.
Churchill admired De Gaulle for his leadership qualities, but disliked the
man (he had the same view of Montgomery) that is why Churchill allowed him
to be the leader of Free French forces in the UK.
After D-Day, De Gaulle was hindering the fighting, walking around liberated
towns causing problems with large crowds saying he was in charge - Churchill
and Roosevelt were considering flying him off to Malta out of the way. On a
few occasions British officers pulled out guns on French officials who
stated they were in charge, when the Brits were; who just happened to be
fighting the Nazis a mile or so away as well. Once a town was liberated the
Brits and US armies were eager to hand over the towns to the French, as long
as they never hindered movements.
De Gaulle in US newspapers was saying that the French should not side with
the US and UK. He had a big chip on his shoulder. He should have been
replaced, and Churchill and Roosevelt could have replaced him. Churchill
wanted him to remain. DeGaulle thought he should be equal with Churchill
and Roosevelt and in all the strategic decisions. The fact is France had
little to offer in the whole scale of things. If you didn't recognise Vichy
France the capital of France was in London - in a requisitioned apartment
block.
After WW2, the real chip came out. His aggression towards the UK and US was
clear to see. The fact was that France was split in WW2, Frenchmen fought
Frenchmen, they also fought the Nazi's and the US and the UK too. France
was embarrassed over WW2. France was angry with itself for its conduct in
WW2. When you are angry with yourself you take it out on others. During
and post WW2 DeGaulle attempted and succeeded in bringing pride and belief
back to the French people - his only real achievement.
Churchill wanted his body to leave from Waterloo station at his funeral, so
DeGaulle would have to walk through the station named after a major French
defeat. It was his last laugh at DeGaulle - he had a sense of humour.
BTW, the European Union was a British idea with Churchill after WW2
campaigning in Europe for the idea.
Nomen Nescio
"Rhino" <no.offline.c...@example.com> wrote:
When DeGaulle first went to London and set himself up as leader of
Free France, Churchill wanted nothing to do with him and FDR wasn't
too enamoured of him either. I can't give specifics on that, but am
pretty sure it was the case.
That might have soured DeGaulle a bit on the British, but I would
have expected him to warm up over the course of the war as his Free
French were entirely supported by the British and the US.
I think DeGaulle's real problem with 'les Anglo-Saxons' was his
Frog pride that was hurt by France's ignominious performance
against the Germans in 1940, and a personal pride that made it
difficult for him not to resent being a supplicant to the British
and Americans.
That's just a half-baked guess based on what I remember of
DeGaulle's post-war shenanigans, tweaking the noses of the
Americans, British and Canadians whenever he had the chance. He was
just a big, very big, baby.
Don Phillipson
news:b76dnecYDqp-DILQ...@giganews.com...
>> Am I right about that? If so, what particular events of WW II
>> triggered this anti-British animosity?
>
> De Gaulle reckoned he had the right to form a new French government
> after Overlord. The British (and Americans) were not committed to him
> doing so. This annoyed him, and when he was annoyed, he could be very
> annoying back, and frequently was.
>
> There was a lot of information that the Free French weren't trusted
> with. This was because their codes were no good: the British and
> Americans knew from Ultra that the Germans were reading them.
Points omitted:
1. After the French surrender in 1940, Britain issued ultimatums
for the deactivation of the French fleet to prevent its use by
victorious Germany. When Vichy failed to respond the RN
bombarded Mediterranean fleet bases of its former ally,
sinking several ships and killing 2000 French sailors. Britain
also tried and failed to invade Dakar in French West Africa.
British armies also fought the Vichy French in Syria in 1941.
2. The British and US governments differed in policy toward
De Gaulle's "Free French" organisation, e.g. the USA recognised
Petain's Vichy administration as the legitimate government of
France and maintained a US embassy there 1940-41 (and so
did Canada, conveniently for British intelligence.) Churchill
unilaterally treated De Gaulle more or less like the other allied
"governments in exile" in London (Polish, Norwegian, Dutch
etc.) but the USA never allowed the Free French this status.
3. Despite slim resources (provided by the UK) the Free
French retained a small capacity for independent action,
e.g. military occupation of the N.American islands of
St. Pierre and Miquelon in 1942 (hitherto under nominal
Vichy rule.) Roosevelt and Churchill treated this as a
provocative act, interfering with allied war plans.
4. Churchill backed De Gaulle consistently and accepted
that France ought to be a "great power," e.g. in postwar
international politics and the military occupation of Germany
(as in 1919.) This claim was debated with Stalin and Roosevelt
at the Yalta Conference (Feb. 1945) when they agreed, if
Churchill wanted his Free French clients to be an Occupation
Power, he could make his own arrangements: so the French
Zone of Occupation was subdivided out of the British zone.
This also guaranteed France a place in Vienna and Berlin
(and at the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal) as
one of only four Occupying Powers. This guaranteed
France official Great Power status in 1945 and for the
next 20 years, i.e. conferred huge political capital.
#2 had a bearing on item A above. restoration of government
in France after its Liberation. Allied planners created only
AMGOT = Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories,
applied in Italy. But Italy had been an Axis enemy, whatever
its politics in 1943-44, and neither Vichy French nor Free
French would have tolerated the imposition of AMGOT on
what Allied propaganda had described as a Nazi-occupied
hotbed of resistance. Failing to agree on any policy about
French government after Liberation, the US and UK left a
vacuum which De Gaulle was able to occupy in 1944.
(Churchill and Roosevelt probably thought De Gaulle
planned to set himself up as a dictator after the war,
like Franco or Salazar: being a contrarian, he was happy
to prove them wrong when he quit politics in 1946.)
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
MCGARRY
courage to do what he did during the debacle in 1940. He wasn't just
hiding in England, he went back and fourth trying to get aid from
Churchill and trying to stop the French government from capitulating.
The plane lent to him by Churchill was attacked by German fighters but
escaped being shot down.
His call of the 18th June on the BBC, which is now famous in France,
was heard by very few as he was practically unknown then.
He organised the free french army in England and tried to get the
resistance to work together rather than squabbling. But he allways had a
soft spot for the communist party of France after the war. The first
resistance was organised by the communists.
When he came to Normandy on June 14th 1944 he set up a provisional
government at Bayeux.
In an interview on the BBC with one of Churchill's aid de camp, many
years ago, the aid de camp recounted an anecdote concerning Churchill
and DeGaulle. Churchill was ranting on about the insufferable Degaulle.
The AIde de camp said ," Bur Sir he is a great statesman"
Churchill retorked "What!? He thinks he's the center of the universe and
that he's allways right" Then after a second or two he added " Yes, your
right he, is a great statesman"
--
Audio Tour Guide d day Normandy. Self Guiding.
http://normandy-tour-guide.cpmac.com.audio-guide.php3
Driver guide Normandy
Mart van de Wege
> "Rhino" <no.offline.c...@example.com> wrote in message
> news:ifns6h$4m0$1...@news.datemas.de...
>
>> From an Allied viewpoint in WW2 the French overall could not be
>> trusted
> 100% - the setting up of Vichy France proved that. Their view was
> correct when the Fench scuttled the French fleet at Toulon rather than
> go over to Allied control - a despicable act.
Erm, sorry?
A major part of the French fleet was put out of operation by the
*British* at Mers-el-Kebir.
The scuttling at Toulon was in response to a *GERMAN* takeover of the
fleet.
Mart
--
"We will need a longer wall when the revolution comes."
--- AJS, quoting an uncertain source.
Bay Man
news:86y673k...@gareth.avalon.lan...
> "Bay Man" <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> writes:
>
>> "Rhino" <no.offline.c...@example.com> wrote in message
>> news:ifns6h$4m0$1...@news.datemas.de...
>>
>>> From an Allied viewpoint in WW2 the French overall could not be
>>> trusted
>> 100% - the setting up of Vichy France proved that. Their view was
>> correct when the Fench scuttled the French fleet at Toulon rather than
>> go over to Allied control - a despicable act.
>
> Erm, sorry?
>
> A major part of the French fleet was put out of operation by the
> *British* at Mers-el-Kebir.
Because they broke the treaty with the UK, which said no separate peace with
Germany. They could have given the navy to the UK before negotiating with
the Germans. But never.
> The scuttling at Toulon was in response
> to a *GERMAN* takeover of the fleet.
Which was expected at some point they could have handed the ships over to
the RN. But never. Thet scuttled the ships, so no one could have them.
Rich Rostrom
> There was a lot of information that the Free French weren't trusted
> with. This was because their codes were no good: the British and
> Americans knew from Ultra that the Germans were reading them. It seemed
> clear that the Free French would not take kindly to the news that their
> codes were being read by the Germans, and would likely refuse to believe
> it. Which would then likely blow Ultra. Frankly, De Gaulle and his
> forces were reckoned to be of lesser value than Ultra, and that does
> seem a plausible position.
There's a problem with this. The break into
Enigma in 1939-1940 was a joint effort of
British and French intelligence. The Polish
codebreakers who had escaped the fall of
their country all went to France, and worked
at PC Bruno at Vignolles, under the supervision
of Captain Bertrand of the Services de
Renseignement.
During the defeat of France, Bertrand evacuated
the staff of PC Bruno to North Africa. After the
truce was agreed, a new codebreaking center
was established at Cadix, in the Vichy zone of
mainland France, using ex-PC Bruno personnel.
The Cadix center was funded by the Vichy
regime - but it continued to cooperate with
Bletchley Park until the German occupation of
southern France after TORCH. (According to
one report I've read, Cadix decoded some
Abwehr signals which allowed Vichy security
to arrest and deport a network of German
covert agents in the Vichy zone.)
So there was no reason to keep "the French"
in the dark about ULTRA.
Louis C
> I have long had the impression - perhaps mistaken - that De Gaulle developed
> strong negative feelings about the British during WW II.
I think that's mistaken. De Gaulle was an extremely difficult person
to work with, in general. He didn't harbor any particular ill-feelings
about Britain.
He did feel strongly about the independence of France, as he believed
Free France stood for, which led him to oppose the Allies on
occasions, in order to refute charges - abundantly and repeatedly laid
by Vichy and German propaganda - that he was but a puppet of the
Jewish-ridden City and of international finance. De Gaulle supported
the British attack on Mers el-Kébir on the BBC, saying he shared the
sadness of his countrymen but the action itself was understandable and
things were better off that way. He also supported the various British
invasions of French territory, including when he wasn't made a part of
it like Madagascar or Torch.
De Gaulle's relationship with Churchill was sometimes difficult, both
were exceptionally strong-willed characters and neither was
particularly prone to entertaining the notion that he might be wrong,
let alone admitting it. Still, Churchill generally recognized De
Gaulle as basically a democrat. Also, he thought American involvement
with Europe would come and go (as it had in WWI) whereas France would
stay, which meant keeping it as an ally for the post-war period was
one of his priorities. De Gaulle got along exceptionally poorly with
Roosevelt, which led to the Americans basically supporting Vichy until
1943.
The USA continued to consider Vichy the official French government
(which allowed them to try to curb Vichy collaboration with Germany in
North Africa), they then appointed a key Vichy character in charge of
North Africa (Darlan was to Vichy what Goering was to Nazi Germany),
and following his death they strongly supported Giraud. Giraud was a
strong conservative with zero political sense. Under his "rule", the
Vichy administrators and policies remained i.e. "traitors" who had
conspired to "help foreigners attack our country" (i.e. resisters who
had tried to prevent fighting with the Allied invasion forces, some of
whom had actually been successful) were tried and sent to jail, ditto
with some Jews or suspected communists, let alone anyone suspected of
gaullist sympathies. It took the realization of how much damage these
policies were doing to the Allied image, as well as Giraud's plain
political incompetence which allowed him to be outmanoeuvered by De
Gaulle, before the Americans resigned themselves to having to deal
with the hated Free French leader (now leader of "Fighting France").
De Gaulle was generally supportive of the Allied effort, his main rows
with the Americans involved getting as many French troops rearmed as
possible, i.e. more than American planners had allowed for, as well as
the refusal to evacuate Strasbourg during the Nordwind offensive. He w
Louis C
Rhino wrote:
> Furthermore, I have
> the impression that those feelings were De Gaulle's true reason for denying
> the British entry to the European Common Market for many years and for
> withdrawing France from the military aspects of NATO back in the 60s.
Let's not confuse issues.
British entry into the EEC was blocked because Britain wanted to join
on its own terms, i.e. essentially a free trade zone like the one it
had tried to set up to rival the initial "European Community for Coal
and Steel". Standing up to the British gained De Gaulle a lot of
political capital at home, both because Britain was the richest and
strongest European power at the time, and because you'll never lose
votes on either side of the Channel tweaking the nose of the party on
the opposite side.
Withdrawing France from the military aspects of NATO was aimed at the
Americans, not the British. Some of the reasons involved US spying
(the Americans didn't trust France not to turn communist during the
Cold War and took no chances, neither did they like that unreliable
country becoming nuclear), others were simply political gesticulating.
It was part of De Gaulle's general policy of France cutting its own
path. Note that France remained part of NATO, i.e. it would have
automatically declared war on the Soviet Union had the Warsaw Pact
invaded. It's just that French forces would have been co-belligerent
(and would soon have joined, "of their own free will", a NATO force
under non-French command) instead of being automatically integrated
into a structure commanded by a US general.
Don't forget his cashing in of all the French dollar reserves for gold
in, 1966?, as well if you want some of the highlights of his annoying
the Americans. But if your aim is to arrive at a list of all the times
when De Gaulle was obnoxious, you're going to need a lot of paper to
write it all down, leaving most of the space for De Gaulle's annoying
his own countrymen.
LC
p 47
news:75cf09c6-c4e2-489c...@39g2000yqa.googlegroups.com...
(...)
Note that France remained part of NATO, i.e. it would have
> automatically declared war on the Soviet Union had the Warsaw Pact
> invaded.
Contrary to the popular belief no one of articles (the famous article No.5
included) in the NATO treaty stipulates the automatic declaration of war on
the agressor in case of the attack on the any NATO country
p47
narrl...@hotmail.com
Leaving aside postwar sins, I've always thought that France badly
needed an arrogant ass--a great arrogant ass--during the early 1940s.
FDR in particular seems to have wanted to pretend that France no
longer existed, and the US establishment's preference for Vichy and
then the politically empty Giraud wasn't serving anyone very well.
Narr
Alan Nordin
> one of his priorities. De Gaulle got along exceptionally poorly with
> Roosevelt, which led to the Americans basically supporting Vichy until
> 1943.
Could you expand on this? I have always thought FDR's problem with De
Gaulle was that he claimed to be the head of state of France in
addition to the leader of the Free French. Considering the principle
of self determination laid down in the Atlantic Charter at FDR's
insistance, it follows that FDR would have issue with De Gaulle.
Rich Rostrom
> De Gaulle ... supported the various British
> invasions of French territory, including when he wasn't made a part of
> it like Madagascar or Torch.
But I can't believe he did not feel
resentful and humiliated by his
complete exclusion from TORCH.
> The USA ... appointed a key Vichy character in charge of
> North Africa (Darlan was to Vichy what Goering was to Nazi Germany),
I think it would be more accurate
to say that the Allies _recognized_
Darlan as political head in North
Africa. Darlan could hold the allegiance
of the French officials and forces in
North Africa.
De Gaulle could not. In fact De Gaulle
and Free France were effectively
powerless and irrelevant at the time.
> and following his death they strongly supported Giraud.
The North African officials accepted
Giraud's authority, and Giraud was
unquestionably anti-German and
pro-Allied.
> Giraud was a
> strong conservative with zero political sense. Under his "rule", the
> Vichy administrators and policies remained i.e. "traitors" who had
> conspired to "help foreigners attack our country" (i.e. resisters who
> had tried to prevent fighting with the Allied invasion forces, some of
> whom had actually been successful) were tried and sent to jail...
A bit odd, since Giraud himself had done so,
One might also note that after De Gaulle gained
control, he carried out a vendetta against any
French senior officers whose opposition had
been particularly embarrassing for him.
I am thinking particularly of Boisson, who was
cashiered and imprisoned for the crime of having
successfully opposed the British/Free French
invasion of Dakar in 1940.
Louis C
> But I can't believe he did not feel
> resentful and humiliated by his
> complete exclusion from TORCH.
He certainly did, just as he must have felt resentful and humiliated
for being excluded from CATAPULT. My point was that, regardless of his
personal feelings, he still publically sided with the Allies and
supported their action. Following TORCH, he called on his partisans to
fight alongside the Allies.
> I think it would be more accurate
> to say that the Allies _recognized_
> Darlan as political head in North
> Africa.
I disagree.
Darlan was not in charge in North Africa, he had no authority over
local forces, he was there as an individual. He was the most senior
Vichy official that happened to be fortuitously (from Eisenhower's
point of view) available, so the Allies decided to put him in charge.
Darlan himself had problems asserting his authority, because people
were loyal to "The Marshal", not to him.
> Darlan could hold the allegiance
> of the French officials and forces in
> North Africa.
So the Americans decided, at least. Events showed that wasn't exactly
true. Darlan didn't deliver the French fleet, which had been another
Allied wish, and it took time for all French forces to rally the
Allies. After Darlan's death, the Allies had no problem holding the
allegiance of French officials and forces in North Africa and
elsewhere, showing Darlan hadn't even been necessary. The reality was
that the USA carried enormous prestige among the population at large,
the Germans and collaboration were unpopular, so fighting alongside
the Allies was going to be popular, including among Vichy officials
after the German occupation of all of France.
> De Gaulle could not.
Whoever the Americans appointed would. I agree De Gaulle wouldn't
command the loyalty of the military cadres (the rank and file was
massively defecting to Free French units), it took a while for that to
happen. But the reality was that the Americans held the power to
appoint whoever they wanted.
> In fact De Gaulle
> and Free France were effectively
> powerless and irrelevant at the time.
They were certainly powerless, they weren't exactly irrelevant as the
Vichy regime had grown massively unpopular in North Africa (and in
many other places), so De Gaulle was cheered on his first visit there.
Simply put, if De Gaulle had been irrelevant, given how he didn't have
American support how did he manage to become the head of the new
government so quickly?
> The North African officials accepted
> Giraud's authority, and Giraud was
> unquestionably anti-German and
> pro-Allied.
Everybody, including Darlan, was anti-German. Everybody, including
Darlan, was pro-Allied by 1943. Giraud could do the job, but not on
his own as his political sense was absolutely nil and his own opinions
were that of a man of the 19th century, completely out of touch with
the wishes of the population at large.
> > Giraud was a
> > strong conservative with zero political sense. Under his "rule", the
> > Vichy administrators and policies remained i.e. "traitors" who had
> > conspired to "help foreigners attack our country" (i.e. resisters who
> > had tried to prevent fighting with the Allied invasion forces, some of
> > whom had actually been successful) were tried and sent to jail...
>
> A bit odd, since Giraud himself had done so,
Giraud had certainly not been "disloyal" to Vichy. He had escaped from
German captivity, a different proposition.
And Giraud wasn't the problem so much as the former Vichy
administrators, who had enthusiastically carried out Vichy policies
(i.e. against suspected communists, Jews and the like) and were
thoroughly discredited.
> One might also note that after De Gaulle gained
> control, he carried out a vendetta against any
> French senior officers whose opposition had
> been particularly embarrassing for him.
Most of the people in positions of responsibility within France had
not been gaullist. De Gaulle still had to work with them and, for the
most part, did. A few notorious Vichy cadres were tried immediately,
creating a minor scandal within Vichy, but De Gaulle was lagging
behind popular feelings in most of these cases.
> I am thinking particularly of Boisson, who was
> cashiered and imprisoned for the crime of having
> successfully opposed the British/Free French
> invasion of Dakar in 1940.
That wasn't a crime, otherwise a lot of French officers would have
been cashiered. Boisson was judged for having carried out Vichy
policies as a governor of French Equatorial Africa, of the kind
alluded to above. Things like the execution of Adolphe Gaetan for
"gaullist activities" as late as 19 Nov 1942 didn't help.
It wasn't just a case of De Gaulle settling personal scores, these
people were really unpopular.
LC
Rich Rostrom
> Rich Rostrom wrote:
>
> > But I can't believe he did not feel
> > resentful and humiliated by his
> > complete exclusion from TORCH.
>
> He certainly did, just as he must have felt resentful and humiliated
> for being excluded from CATAPULT.
TORCH, unlike CATAPULT, directly involved
the political control of French territory.
De Gaulle could not expect to play any
role to play in CATAPULT. TORCH was
a different story.
> My point was that, regardless of his personal feelings,
> he still publically sided with the Allies and supported
> their action. Following TORCH, he called on his partisans to
> fight alongside the Allies.
He could hardly do otherwise.
> > I think it would be more accurate to say that the Allies _recognized_
> > Darlan as political head in North Africa.
>
> I disagree.
>
> Darlan was not in charge in North Africa, he had no authority over
> local forces, he was there as an individual. He was the most senior
> Vichy official that happened to be fortuitously (from Eisenhower's
> point of view) available, so the Allies decided to put him in charge.
That is, they _recognized_ him as the most
senior French official in North Africa, rather
than attempting to appoint De Gaulle or Mast
or Bethouart.
> Darlan himself had problems asserting his authority, because people
> were loyal to "The Marshal", not to him.
When Darlan issued the cease-fire order, the
French forces in North Africa all submitted
to the Allies immediately. That was what was
needed.
> Darlan didn't deliver the French fleet...
Which wasn't in North Africa.
> After Darlan's death, the Allies had no problem holding the
> allegiance of French officials and forces in North Africa...
By that time, the Allies were present in
overwhelming force and the French
apparat was fully committed to the
Allies. Also, the Germans had occupied
southern France, thereby abolishing the
"space" for Vichy's neutral position.
> and elsewhere, showing Darlan hadn't even been necessary.
Not absolutely necessary, but extremely
useful at a critical moment.
> The reality was
> that the USA carried enormous prestige among the population at large,
> the Germans and collaboration were unpopular, so fighting alongside
> the Allies was going to be popular...
That doesn't follow. What _was_ popular
was staying out of the war and not getting
shot at or bombed. That was the entire
point of Vichy's de facto neutral position
in 1940-1942. There were some French
who wanted to strike at the Germans.
There were many others who wanted no
part of the war if they could stay out of it.
> including among Vichy officials
> after the German occupation of all of France.
That came some weeks after TORCH,
IIRC.
> > De Gaulle could not.
>
> Whoever the Americans appointed would.
Eventually, perhaps. But during
TORCH, when the Allies needed
French resistance to stop and
French cooperation to move into
Tunisia, Darlan could give orders
that the French in North Africa
would follow. Do you really think
De Gaulle could have?
> > In fact De Gaulle
> > and Free France were effectively
> > powerless and irrelevant at the time.
>
> They were certainly powerless, they weren't exactly irrelevant...
At the time. On 7-8 November 1942,
De Gaulle had no effective following
in North Africa. The pro-Allied group
which seized Algiers the night before
the landings had no connection to
Free France.
> ... De Gaulle was cheered on his first visit there.
> Simply put, if De Gaulle had been irrelevant, given how he didn't have
> American support how did he manage to become the head of the new
> government so quickly?
He had British backing, a de facto claim
to be French chief of state, and faced no
serious rivals. Darlan was, conveniently,
dead; Giraud had no political sense or
ambitions. Who else was there?
> Everybody, including Darlan, was anti-German. Everybody, including
> Darlan, was pro-Allied by 1943.
Darlan was not pro-Allied by 1943. He
was dead.
> > A bit odd, since Giraud himself had done so,
>
> Giraud had certainly not been "disloyal" to Vichy. He had escaped from
> German captivity, a different proposition.
But he cooperated, or intended to, with
Allied forces invading French territory.
That would certainly be regarded as
disloyal or even traitorous by Petain.
Louis C
> TORCH, unlike CATAPULT, directly involved
> the political control of French territory.
> De Gaulle could not expect to play any
> role to play in CATAPULT. TORCH was
> a different story.
TORCH, like CATAPULT, was a case of De Gaulle's British allies keeping
in the dark while they were planning and executing an operation aimed
at other Frenchmen. I am no particular fan of De Gaulle myself, but
his position would have been extremely difficult in either case.
I agree that appointing Darlan as the de facto head of state in French
North Africa was an unprecedented blow for De Gaulle and members of
the resistance.
> > My point was that, regardless of his personal feelings,
> > he still publically sided with the Allies and supported
> > their action. Following TORCH, he called on his partisans to
> > fight alongside the Allies.
>
> He could hardly do otherwise.
Other posts called him a big baby. I don't think that's what he was,
and he definitely didn't try sulking as a reaction. Instead, he
distantiated himself from Darlan and was eventually authorized by the
BBC to broadcast that he was in no way involved with the Algiers deals
going on, but he still called on the pursuit of the fight rather than
trying to simply lead his own faction - backed on the by then
relatively sizeable domestic French resistance movement - the way he
did in the resistance rivalries (Free French vs SOE vs OSS).
> That is, they _recognized_ him as the most
> senior French official in North Africa, rather
> than attempting to appoint De Gaulle or Mast
> or Bethouart.
Mast and Bethouart were too junior, but Darlan had no particular
authority in North Africa. Nogues et al were not subordinated to him.
The Allies could have appointed e.g. Juin as an interim solution.
> When Darlan issued the cease-fire order, the
> French forces in North Africa all submitted
> to the Allies immediately.
Not exactly. The Allies had gained Algiers largely thanks to the
action of the local resistance (which definitely speeded things up,
I'm not claiming the French defenses would necessarily have won), and
they already controlled Oran. Tunisia had its own agenda, and its
local leader proceeded on its own - and mistaken - way until the local
military forces decided of their own initiative to join the Allies,
the first clashes with the Germans taking place on 18 Nov.
What Darlan did was provide Nogues, commanding in Morocco, with the
fig leaf he required to cease his by then hopeless military resistance
(his position had become very bad). For the Americans, it was seen as
a time saver. However, they could easily have, hm, "renegotiated" the
deal with Darlan in the same way as they just had with Giraud.
> By that time, the Allies were present in
> overwhelming force and the French
> apparat was fully committed to the
> Allies.
>From the start, Allied strength was overwhelming in North Africa, even
though it didn't appear so to the Allies, and even though the French
were disappointed with the actual size of the landing forces.
> Also, the Germans had occupied
> southern France, thereby abolishing the
> "space" for Vichy's neutral position.
True, but that was just a matter of days following TORCH, no matter
what Darlan or anyone else did.
> Not absolutely necessary, but extremely
> useful at a critical moment.
I'm not as impressed with that argument as you seem to be. The Allies
historically used Darlan and came off all right. That's not a proof
that it was the only, let alone the best, possible solution.
> > The reality was
> > that the USA carried enormous prestige among the population at large,
> > the Germans and collaboration were unpopular, so fighting alongside
> > the Allies was going to be popular...
>
> That doesn't follow. What _was_ popular
> was staying out of the war and not getting
> shot at or bombed.
1942 wasn't 1940. By then, it was clear that being left alone wasn't
an option for the French, and so were the twin realities of German
occupation and collaboration policy. The military perspectives weren't
the same either.
> That was the entire
> point of Vichy's de facto neutral position
> in 1940-1942.
That was the official point. In practice, there was no united Vichy
position, but different people with varying agendas. Most stemmed from
the mistaken calculation in 1940 that German would win the war. By
1942, distantiating themselves from the Germans wasn't really an
option for the collaborationists (the Germans were Nazis, but they
weren't fools, they were good at making sure other people would be
compromised, too). Others hoped to sit the war out and get one back on
Germany at the 11th hour, but they were a minority. The majority of
the Vichy leadership amounted to a French version of Franco: they'd
take what they could grab, meanwhile focusing on bringing the country
as far back to the Middle Ages as they could.
> There were some French
> who wanted to strike at the Germans.
> There were many others who wanted no
> part of the war if they could stay out of it.
By 1942, when it looked like fighting the Germans had a fighting
chance, lots of people wanted a part in it.
> > Whoever the Americans appointed would.
>
> Eventually, perhaps. But during
> TORCH, when the Allies needed
> French resistance to stop and
> French cooperation to move into
> Tunisia, Darlan could give orders
> that the French in North Africa
> would follow. Do you really think
> De Gaulle could have?
I don't.
De Gaulle was popular among the population, but anything but among the
people in charge. Getting cooperation would have involved getting
someone else. Giraud or Juin could have been possible solutions, while
setting up a civilian government - a democratic one if possible - to
get things in motion in the right direction.
As it happened, the French conditions for the deal - which the
Americans were only too happy to provide as it seemed to make for
stability - were that the French administration would carry on
untouched, except for what touched on military operations which would
come under Allied leadership. In practice, as I wrote, that meant an
administration that was officially bent on pursuing Vichy in absentia,
anti-Semitic legislation included. These policies were hugely
unpopular and thoroughly discredited the government, paving the way
for De Gaulle. Less incompetent leadership in North Africa would have
meant no De Gaulle comeback for at least months more.
> The pro-Allied group
> which seized Algiers the night before
> the landings had no connection to
> Free France.
No, though that they ended up having them is an indication as to what
the alternatives were.
> He had British backing, a de facto claim
> to be French chief of state, and faced no
> serious rivals. Darlan was, conveniently,
> dead; Giraud had no political sense or
> ambitions. Who else was there?
De Gaulle didn't claim to be chief of state, he claimed to represent
the "real France", the one that was fighting the Nazis. By 1942, that
was broadly true. The bulk of the army cadres were Vichysts (former
Vichysts or ex-Vichysts but still Vychists at heart), but the bulk of
the population was Gaullist, not out of a deep knowledge of the
character himself but for what he represented.
But again, De Gaulle wasn't the only politically astute Frenchman
around. The Americans picked Giraud, they knew about his lack of
political sense, they'd picked Darlan, they let things rot until it
was too late and De Gaulle had a wide opening. I'm not convinced
things were run as smoothly as you make them to have been.
> > Everybody, including Darlan, was anti-German. Everybody, including
> > Darlan, was pro-Allied by 1943.
>
> Darlan was not pro-Allied by 1943. He
> was dead.
A good point. Make that by 1943 minus a week, then...
> > Giraud had certainly not been "disloyal" to Vichy. He had escaped from
> > German captivity, a different proposition.
>
> But he cooperated, or intended to, with
> Allied forces invading French territory.
Yes, but Vichy hadn't noticed by then, and by the time it did it was
too late. Furthermore, Giraud's politics were quite in touch with
Vichy's, which means they were thoroughly out of touch with the
aspirations of the local people.
> That would certainly be regarded as
> disloyal or even traitorous by Petain.
Definitely, and Petain disavowed all involved, which didn't prevent
the latter from claiming they still represented him. Such was his
prestige. Kind of like Hitler, really.
LC
ammar smender
wrote:
> I have long had the impression - perhaps mistaken - that De Gaulle developed
> strong negative feelings about the British during WW II. Furthermore, I have
> the impression that those feelings were De Gaulle's true reason for denying
> the British entry to the European Common Market for many years and for
> withdrawing France from the military aspects of NATO back in the 60s.
>
I don't think the americans or the british liked him either. He was
picked because he was probably less qualified but the lessor evil. He
probably knew that and was trying too hard to prove that he is a
leader of a super power that did not exsit any more. Rosevelt truely
disliked De Gaulle.