Did Stalin think Roosevelt was a fool?

[Anonymous Remailer (austria)]

I thought he might because Roosevelt did some dumb things, such as
continuing all-out support of the USSR even after they were
obviously going to win.

I read that Stalin once asked Gromyko if Roosevelt was clever.
Aren't all POTUS supposed to be clever? It sounds like Stalin had
his doubts about FDR.

What do you think?

[Don Phillipson]

"Anonymous Remailer (austria)" <mixm...@remailer.privacy.at> wrote in
message news:2e049bb05f01a4bd...@remailer.privacy.at...

1. Dogmatic Marxists often think all non-Marxists are fools,
so far as they lack the foresight promised by "dialectical
materialism."

2. Intelligence agencies during WW2 did indeed spend some
time and attention on the supposed psychology (personality)
of supreme commanders (allied and enemy:) but usually only
when needed to make up for a shortage verifiable information
about their actions (command decisions) and aims (words).

--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)

[Mario]

Don Phillipson, 17:59, domenica 10 giugno 2012:

> "Anonymous Remailer (austria)" <mixm...@remailer.privacy.at>
> wrote in message
> news:2e049bb05f01a4bd...@remailer.privacy.at...
>
>>I thought he might because Roosevelt did some dumb things,
>>such as
>> continuing all-out support of the USSR even after they were
>> obviously going to win.
>>
>> I read that Stalin once asked Gromyko if Roosevelt was
>> clever. Aren't all POTUS supposed to be clever? It sounds
>> like Stalin had his doubts about FDR.
>>
>> What do you think?
>
> 1. Dogmatic Marxists often think all non-Marxists are fools,
> so far as they lack the foresight promised by "dialectical
> materialism."

This is true for any dogmatic person, not just Marxists.

Was Stalin a dogmatic Marxist?
I don't think so.

> 2. Intelligence agencies during WW2 did indeed spend some
> time and attention on the supposed psychology (personality)
> of supreme commanders (allied and enemy:) but usually only
> when needed to make up for a shortage verifiable information
> about their actions (command decisions) and aims (words).
>

--

H

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

In soc.history.war.world-war-ii Mario <ack...@ack.ack> wrote:
> Don Phillipson, 17:59, domenica 10 giugno 2012:

> > 1. Dogmatic Marxists often think all non-Marxists are fools,
> > so far as they lack the foresight promised by "dialectical
> > materialism."


> This is true for any dogmatic person, not just Marxists.

> Was Stalin a dogmatic Marxist?
> I don't think so.

I agree; Stalin was, first and foremost, a Stalinist.

Mike

[GFH]

I think one must view Stalin's (and WSC's) view of FDR as a changing
opinion. IMHO, it is clear that opinions at Yalta (Feb. 1945, when
FDR was a walking dead man) were quite different from Tehran (Dec. 1943).

GFH

[Chris Morton]

In article , Mario says...

>Was Stalin a dogmatic Marxist?
>I don't think so.

Stalin was a dogmatic STALINIST.

Stalinism was whatever Stalin SAID it was at any given moment. Hence the
sanguinary slaughter of so many blindly obedient STALINISTS.


--
Gun control, the theory that 110lb. women have the "right" to fistfight with
210lb. rapists.

[Chris Morton]

In article <jr1upo$je$1...@speranza.aioe.org>, Don Phillipson says...

>
>"Anonymous Remailer (austria)" <mixm...@remailer.privacy.at> wrote in
>message news:2e049bb05f01a4bd...@remailer.privacy.at...
>
>>I thought he might because Roosevelt did some dumb things, such as
>> continuing all-out support of the USSR even after they were
>> obviously going to win.
>>
>> I read that Stalin once asked Gromyko if Roosevelt was clever.
>> Aren't all POTUS supposed to be clever? It sounds like Stalin had
>> his doubts about FDR.
>>
>> What do you think?
>
>1. Dogmatic Marxists often think all non-Marxists are fools,
>so far as they lack the foresight promised by "dialectical
>materialism."

3. Stalin thought EVERBODY was a fool... except HIM.

Read DeJonge's biography. Stalin had an EXCEPTIONALLY high opinion of himself.
Those who disagreed... or who didn't agree fervently enough came to bad ends.

Stalin always thought he was the sharpest operator in the room. Barbarossa
apparently severely shook his confidence... but only momentarily. He bounced
back... killing those who had carried out his fatally flawed pre-war
instructions, along the way.

Stalin didn't surround himself with smart men. He surrounded himself with
blindly obedient, conscienceless men. Stalin's ideal underling would be a
combination of a mute Joe Biden and Adolf Eichmann: utterly ruthless... but no
real threat to the boss.

[Roman W]

On Saturday, June 9, 2012 8:14:31 PM UTC+1, Anonymous Remailer (austria) wrote:

> I read that Stalin once asked Gromyko if Roosevelt was clever.
> Aren't all POTUS supposed to be clever?

No, they're not. Americans themselves sometimes argue about the intelligence
of their president, as you may remember from recent history.

RW

[cman...@gmail.com]

On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:26:05 AM UTC-4, GFH wrote:

> I think one must view Stalin's (and WSC's) view of FDR as a changing
> opinion. IMHO, it is clear that opinions at Yalta (Feb. 1945, when
> FDR was a walking dead man) were quite different from Tehran (Dec. 1943).

S.M. Plokhy's _Yalta_ was a fantastic book I highly recommend on the
issues of how FDR, WSC, and JS interacted and dealt with each other.
Really well done microscopic (generally two or more chapters on each
of their meetings) look at the relationship.

His take was that FDR deliberately tried to position himself as the
neutral arbiter between WSC and JS; essentially, he was trying to be
the Good Cop to Churchill's Bad Cop in their relationship with Stalin.
That meant that he would necessarily have to agree with Stalin against
Churchill enough to build trust with JS, then use that trust to get
what he wanted.

What made it difficult, of course, was that by February 1945 WSC and
FDR needed Stalin rather more than JS needed them, because the Western
leaders cared about the welfare of their people in a way that JS
didn't. So, for example, FDR and WSC had to spend a lot of time, and
political capital, getting Stalin's support for moving liberated
Western POW's back to their home countries quickly and with a minimum
of suffering, whereas Stalin, who viewed all Soviet POW's as traitors
not deserving of life, didn't care about the fate of those men. So
when the topic came up, the Western Allies necessarily had to treat it
as a favor asked of JS, such that he could get favors elsewhere in
return.

As for FDR's health at Yalta, while it was clear that he did not look
good at Yalta, it is hard to find any evidence of his health affecting
decisions made there. According to Plokhy, every time FDR made a
concession to Stalin, he had definitely discussed it first with his
staff, and even if they did not always agree with him, he made clear
what he was going to do to them before going out and following the
same line in the main meetings. In other words, he may have made some
poor decisions, but they weren't because in the heat of a meeting he
got tired or anything like that- they were because he made a poor
decision.

The American eyewitness accounts of the Yalta Conference rarely cite
FDR's health as an issue at all. Plokhy noted that most of the
attention to FDR's health came from British sources, which would use
that as an explanation for the times that FDR did not support WSC
against JS. Now, of course the American eye-witnesses were all FDR
inner-circle loyalists, who had spent a long time with FDR so they
would be used to his health issues and be more inclined to ignore them
than to emphasize them, but by the same token the US and the UK did
have legitimate reasons- outside of FDR's health- to disagree on many
of the issues, and the British accounts largely ignored those issues,
generally portraying all differences as due to FDR's health leaving
him confused on the issue.

Chris Manteuffel

[Alan Meyer]

On 06/11/2012 10:36 AM, Chris Morton wrote:

...

> Stalin didn't surround himself with smart men. He surrounded
> himself with blindly obedient, conscienceless men. Stalin's
> ideal underling would be a combination of a mute Joe Biden and
> Adolf Eichmann: utterly ruthless... but no real threat to the
> boss.

I'm having a lot of trouble imagining a mute Joe Biden, but
combining a passionate democrat with a soulless and bureaucratic
bigot and murderer completely escapes me.

However leaving that aside, I would have to say that Stalin did
want and did tolerate competent men in positions of power. By
1944 I think the top generals in the Red Army were highly
competent men, in the peculiar sense in which a Russian general
could be competent (i.e. the mission means everything, the lives
of his own troops means almost nothing.)

Molotov strikes me as having been a competent man. Even Beria
was competent in his way.

However, I think your fundamental premise, that Stalin did not
tolerate anyone who was a threat to him, is absolutely true. Men
like Zhukov and Rokossovsky were kept on very short leashes and,
especially in Rokossovsky's case, were made to feel the strength
and the savagery of Stalin's absolute power.

I'm not an expert, but it seems to me that Beria was controlled
by different means. He was so closely identified with Stalin,
and so universally hated and despised, that he must have had at
least some understanding that if Stalin were deposed, Beria would
soon follow - as indeed he did after Stalin's death.

An argument could be made that Hitler's approach was similar. He
too demanded competent generals. He too kept them on short
leashes. He too put the mission, as he saw it, far ahead of the
lives of his men. He too had leading lieutenants who were so
closely identified with Hitler's crimes that they had no future
apart from Hitler and were therefore completely loyal.

The cases of Roosevelt and Churchill were quite different and I
think it would be interesting to compare the results they got
with the results obtained by the dictators. Both of the
democratic leaders seemed to me to tolerate incompetence more
than the autocrats did. I'm thinking especially of Roosevelt and
MacArthur, and Churchill and Montgomery. I don't believe that
either MacArthur or Montgomery were truly incompetent, but both
had serious ego problems that made them far less effective than
they should have been. I don't believe that Hitler or Stalin
would have tolerated them. At the very least, Hitler and Stalin
would have crushed their egos immediately and insisted on big
results, not big talk.

Alan

[Roman W]

On Thursday, June 21, 2012 4:59:11 AM UTC+1, Alan Meyer wrote:
> Both of the
> democratic leaders seemed to me to tolerate incompetence more
> than the autocrats did.

They had no choice - being democratic leaders, Roosevelt and Churchill did not
have as much latitude in their decisions as Stalin and Hitler did.

RW

[Michael Emrys]

On 6/21/12 7:10 AM, Roman W wrote:
> They had no choice - being democratic leaders, Roosevelt and Churchill did not
> have as much latitude in their decisions as Stalin and Hitler did.

I don't know, Churchill was plenty willing and able to sack several of
his leading generals when they didn't perform to his pleasure.

By and large Roosevelt seems to have been much more willing to let the
services work all that out internally.

Michael

[Roman W]

On Thursday, June 21, 2012 5:48:34 PM UTC+1, Michael Emrys wrote:
> On 6/21/12 7:10 AM, Roman W wrote:
> > They had no choice - being democratic leaders, Roosevelt and Churchill did not
> > have as much latitude in their decisions as Stalin and Hitler did.
>
> I don't know, Churchill was plenty willing and able to sack several of
> his leading generals when they didn't perform to his pleasure.

Yes, he could pull. But he couldn't push as hard -- if the service
did not want to do something, he was not able to force them to comply
100% to his wishes.

For example, he nominated inexperienced Lord Mountbatten to be Chief of
Combined Operations so that he could overcome the institutional resistance of
"traditional" army that Mountbatten's predecessor, Roger Keyes, could not
handle. Stalin would have much less difficulty scaring his subordinates
into accepting his pet project.

RW

[Michael Emrys]

On 6/21/12 10:11 AM, Roman W wrote:
> Stalin would have much less difficulty scaring his subordinates
> into accepting his pet project.

I agree. Also, I agree that that was not always in the best interests of
the USSR.

Michael

[Alan Meyer]

Yes, and the same goes even more so for Germany.

At the beginning of the war, the Germans would seem to have had the best
officer corps. The Russians had a good one until the great purge of
1936-8. After that they had nothing but scared robots. The British and
Americans both probably had too many older and more conservative men,
and men who had too long experienced the pleasure of being officers and
gentlemen and not long enough experienced the do or die lessons of warfare.

Growing experience made, first the British, then the Americans, better
and more effective soldiers. Growing interference by Hitler made the
Wehrmacht less and less effective.

My sense of the difference between Hitler and Stalin here is that each
one was a little more relaxed and trusting of his professional soldiers
while things were going well, but became more controlling and hence did
more damage, when things were going poorly. So Hitler's influence over
his armies became more destructive as the war progressed while Stalin's
became less so.

However neither man would tolerate serious criticism and Stalin, being
more paranoid and more insecure, probably did more damage to the
military side of his own war effort than Hitler did. Certainly that was
true in 1941 and early 42.

In the end, it's hard to imagine tragedy on a larger scale than the war
between Germany and the USSR, and at least in modern times, hard to find
any tragedy so easily ascribed to just two men.

Alan

[Rich Rostrom]

Alan Meyer <ame...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> An argument could be made that Hitler's approach was similar

[to Stalin's]...

But not a good argument. Hitler had enormous
personal charisma and enjoyed the freely given
loyalty of his chief henchmen - most of whom
had served him faithfully for years when he
little to give them and no way to punish them.

He also enjoyed the adulation of the German
public - rendered ecstatically during his
public speeches.

His party and his regime were his personal creations.

The German army was not - it had a previous institutional
basis. But the German army accepted Hitler's takeover,
pledged loyalty to him, and appeared to be entirely
happy with him. So he pretty much left it alone - until
after 20 July.

Stalin had none of this. He rose to power
through back-room dealings among the senior
Bolsheviks _after_ the Soviet state was
created, and was for years a secondary figure,
sneered at as "Comrade File Cabinet".

He assembled his political support by using
his administrative power to reward supporters -
that is, he bought it. Then he systematically
purged _everyone_ who was not dependent on him.

He never expected anyone to obey him for any
reason except fear or reward.

The Soviet army, like the German army, pre-existed
Stalin's supremacy. But Stalin was not satisfied
with professions of loyalty. As with the Party,
he purged the army of every officer who was not
completely dependent on and servile to him.
--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

[Alan Meyer]

On 06/22/2012 10:34 PM, Rich Rostrom wrote:> Alan Meyer

I think your characterizations of Hitler and Stalin are generally
accurate. Hitler was a charismatic, if egomaniacal, leader.
Stalin was a creature of the shadows by comparison. Hitler did
have at least the grudging support of most of the army and the
enthusiastic support of some of it. Stalin ruled by fear.

However I think it's a mistake to think that Hitler left the army
alone until July 20 (1944 I presume). Here are some examples of
decisions in which Hitler's interference played a negative role
before then:

His partial attempt to stop the westward sweep of the army
through France in 1940. His own hesitation was such that he
hesitated to stop them and hesitated to let them proceed and,
while he was dithering, they went ahead and won the campaign.
He, of course, had no compunctions about taking credit.

His changing directions in 1941 in the USSR, halting the
advance on Moscow to achieve what his generals believed were
secondary objectives.

His failure to heed increasingly desperate requests from the
Russian front in late 1941 for winter clothing and equipment.

His obsession with Stalingrad that committed more to the
campaign than was warranted. Then, even more fatally, his
refusal to allow a retreat.

His focus on the war against the Jews and other people who
offended against his deep prejudices, to the extent of
diverting resources from the war against the Russians.

His mistaken campaign in the Caucasus.

His decision to reinforce the Afrika Korps in late 1942,
early '43 instead of pulling them out, resulting in losses on
the same scale as Stalingrad.

I understand that generals make mistakes. I know that if we
picked any German general we liked and named him supreme
commander, he would have made mistakes too. But Hitler's
mistakes were much worse than many of the generals would have
made. They were also very systematic and became increasingly bad
as time went on. July 20 was a kind of a tipping point, but all
of the elements were there before then.

Still, I agree with your central point. Hitler did not rule the
army through terror, at least not until after July 20, 1944.

I also agree with your characterization of Stalin, and I think
your critique of my equation of the two in regard to their method
of command is justified. I glossed over some very important
differences between the two.

Alan

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Jun 24, 2:19 pm, Alan Meyer wrote:
> On 06/22/2012 10:34 PM, Rich Rostrom wrote:

> > .... Hitler had enormous

> > personal charisma and enjoyed the freely given

> > loyalty of his chief henchmen....He also enjoyed

> > the adulation of the German public - rendered
> > ecstatically during his public speeches.
>

>.... Hitler was a charismatic, if egomaniacal, leader.
>....But Hitler's mistakes were much worse than many

> of the generals would have made.

Having listened to one Hitler speech in a translation
made by H.V.Kaltenborn (well-known CBS German-
speaking radio correspondent of the day) der Fuhrer's
adulation by the huge crowd at the Sportspalast in
Berlin was clearly evident. He was, indeed, a
hyptnotizer, interrupted time and again with roars of
"Seig Heils."

In today's New York Times there appears a review of a
new biography of Hitler by A,N. Wilson, a portion of
which seems to tie-in rather well with Mr. Meyer's
analysis of some of Hitler's later military decisions. it
describes Hitler's earlier personal characteristics in
these words:
"The future dictator who would seek to dominate the
world was breathtakingly lazy. He exhibited a pathetic
inability to succeed as an art student; a habitual hostility
to paid employment; a wholly nremarkable penchant for
pretty teenage girls; and a pretentious infatuation with the
composer Richard Wagner. As a soldier in World War I,
Hitler was so ineffectual at anything but message-running
and mindless clerical work that even after the need for more
officers became urgent, his superiors could not bring
themselves to promote someone so lacking in leadership
skills....
"Wilson is also effective when he recreates Hitler's rise
to political prominence. He imaginatively identifies Hitler as
a sort of "hypnotic" performance artist who could hold a
crowd rapt for hours with his operatic rants. It was Hitler's
singular skill as an orator that set him above his National
Socialist colleagues. He had a gift for nearly ceaseless gab
and a blunt willingness to twist conditions to his advantage
by manipulating opponents with lies and deceptions. These
qualities, Wilson suggests, are the answer to the riddle of
how such a mediocre man could eventually emerge
triumphant."
"
The reviewer is not as generous in some of his other
coverage of the biography. Those interested in reading the
review can find it at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/books/review/hitler-by-a-n-wilson.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y

WJH

[Rich Rostrom]

Alan Meyer <ame...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> However I think it's a mistake to think that Hitler left the army
> alone until July 20 (1944 I presume). Here are some examples of
> decisions in which Hitler's interference played a negative role
> before then:
>

>... attempt to stop the... army [in] France in 1940...
>... changing directions in 1941 in the USSR ...

As head of state Hitler exercised supreme authority
over the Heer, of course. This included making or
approving nearly all high command appointments, and
making or approving all promotions to top rank.

He regarded himself as war leader, and presided over
all command sessions where major operational plans were
decided on. His word was final, of course.

He supported Guderian in creating the panzer forces,
was deeply involved in development of tanks, aircraft,
and other armaments and equipment.

(One of the plans to assassinate Hitler was based on
the adoption of a new field uniform. It was to be
modeled for Hitler, and also Goering and Himmler,
whose "private armies" would also adopt the new
uniform. A volunteer agreed to be the model - and
carry a bomb in the knapsack. When the three targets
were all around him inspecting the kit, he would
set it off. For various reasons it did not come off.)

What he did not do was interfere with the Heer as
an institution. He arranged the removal of Fritsch
and Blomberg, whom he considered insufficiently
pliant. But that was about it.

Stalin, by contrast, purged most of the army's
senior officers: 3 of 5 marshals, 13 of 15 of the
next rank, all commanders of military districts,
and the great majority of major generals, brigadier
generals, and even colonels IIRC. The proportion
declined with lower rank.

Even after 20 July, nothing like that happened
in Germany.

[Roman W]

On Sunday, June 24, 2012 10:30:47 PM UTC+1, wjho...@aol.com wrote:

> "Wilson is also effective when he recreates Hitler's rise
> to political prominence. He imaginatively identifies Hitler as
> a sort of "hypnotic" performance artist who could hold a
> crowd rapt for hours with his operatic rants. It was Hitler's
> singular skill as an orator that set him above his National
> Socialist colleagues. He had a gift for nearly ceaseless gab
> and a blunt willingness to twist conditions to his advantage
> by manipulating opponents with lies and deceptions. These
> qualities, Wilson suggests, are the answer to the riddle of
> how such a mediocre man could eventually emerge
> triumphant."

If Hitler was born in today's times, he would become a corporate executive
and a major historical tragedy would have been avoided.

RW

[Bill]

On Tue, 26 Jun 2012 09:57:54 -0400, Roman W <bloody...@gazeta.pl>
wrote:

Ex soldier, no 'matriculation' so can't even get into university. He
wouldn't even get an interview for a multinational. He might just get
a job in the post room, if he 'knew someone'.

With his combat record the best he could reasonably hope for today
would be a highly paid nobody working for Blackwater or Executive
Outcomes.

There's a very narrow window for a man with his background and skill
set to get into politics and rise to the top, thank goodness...

It runs, more or less, from the rise of the newsreels to the
introduction of television into just about every home.

His two great skills, logo design and political rhetoric, are just
not open to a man without a good degree these days.

He'd end up propping up the bar in the local 'legion', drinking cheap
beer and cursing the Jews, as generations of 'Hitlers' have.

[Rich Rostrom]

Roman W <bloody...@gazeta.pl> wrote:

> If Hitler was born in today's times, he would become a corporate executive
> and a major historical tragedy would have been avoided.

Unlikely.

Hitler had flashes of ability to work -
he loved to show off his knowledge of
the details of armaments, for instance.

But he had no real ability or interest
in administration. After assuming the
Chancellorship, he spent much of the
next year lazing about reading Karl May
novels. He was not detail-oriented,
except when some area caught his fancy.

He blew off his opportunities for proper
education and training, instead wasting
his time talking endlessly about his
grand ideas, and probably daydreaming
about his great future destiny.

Eventually he reached a position where
he could get up on platforms and enthrall
large crowds, which proved to be his
real vocation.

He might have become a stage actor
(except that acting is a real craft
which requires study, discipline, and
obedience to the director) or a film
actor (which is even more so, and hard
work to boot).

Politics... his spell-binding speeches
wouldn't be successful in politics
today - pure oratory is not very
important.

He might become the leader of a pocket
religious sect - except of course he
rejected religion.

I could see him as the leader of some
pocket political cult. Which is really
all he was in the 1920s, until the
Depression created an opening for him.

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Jun 26, 2:30 pm, Rich Rostrom wrote:

> Roman W wrote:
> > If Hitler was born in today's times, he would
> > become a corporate executive and a major
> > historical tragedy would have been avoided.
>
> Unlikely. Hitler had flashes of ability to work

>... he had no real ability or interest in
> administration. ... He was not detail-oriented

I believe there are more than a few CEO's today
who may have similar characterics as the above
and yet have still become successful for other
reasons. Particularly if they look good on TV,
speak well, have a charismatic personality, and
are convincing, even when wrong.

>.. his spell-binding speeches wouldn't be
> successful in politics today - pure oratory is not
> very important.

I disagree with that. The ability to hypnotize a
crowd is unique, takes a certain talent, and Hitler
had it. The hallmark of many successful politicians,
past and present, is their ability to arouse the
emotions of a constituency, sometimes to a fever
pitch. The tendency for any group of people to
become emotionally aroused by telling them what
they want to hear, particularly when it concerns a
highly controversial issue, should not be
underestimated.

> I could see him as the leader of some
> pocket political cult. Which is really
> all he was in the 1920s, until the
> Depression created an opening for him.

The Nazis were more than a "pocket political cult"
as history has taught us. And I think it was more
than the Great Depression which brought about the
leader in Hitler that he became. More likely It was
the harsh provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.
Many of Hitler's cohorts had the ability and
background to become leaders, but it was Hitler who
rose above them all. It had to be something extra
that he had and the othera didn't, which fit the pattern
of the times.

I believe THAT something was the unique talent Hitler
had for delusional oratorical overkill. It had to be heard
to be believed. Even for one who couldn't understand
a word of German, it was there. And it paved the way
for all that followed.

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

In soc.history.war.world-war-ii wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:

> In today's New York Times there appears a review of a
> new biography of Hitler by A,N. Wilson, a portion of

> world was breathtakingly lazy. He exhibited a pathetic
> inability to succeed as an art student; a habitual hostility
> to paid employment; a wholly nremarkable penchant for
> pretty teenage girls; and a pretentious infatuation with the
> composer Richard Wagner. As a soldier in World War I,
> Hitler was so ineffectual at anything but message-running
> and mindless clerical work that even after the need for more
> officers became urgent, his superiors could not bring
> themselves to promote someone so lacking in leadership
> skills....
> "Wilson is also effective when he recreates Hitler's rise
> to political prominence. He imaginatively identifies Hitler as
> a sort of "hypnotic" performance artist who could hold a
> crowd rapt for hours with his operatic rants. It was Hitler's
> singular skill as an orator that set him above his National
> Socialist colleagues. He had a gift for nearly ceaseless gab
> and a blunt willingness to twist conditions to his advantage
> by manipulating opponents with lies and deceptions. These
> qualities, Wilson suggests, are the answer to the riddle of
> how such a mediocre man could eventually emerge
> triumphant."

Evaluations of Hitler's war record (and certain character traits) seem to
be cyclic in their conclusions, and are (of course) going to be tinged by
the authors' political slants. In the 60s, it was common to refer to
Hitler as a coward, disparagig his war record, etc. Later, this criticism
disappeared, as it was mentioned that he was wounded, decorated, etc. We
seem to be returning to the 60s version. In addition to Wilson's book
Mr Hopwood alludes to, Thomas Weber has stated that according to letters
he's found in the Bavarian War Archives, Hitler was not a front-line runner,
but a rear-echelon sort, disparages both his Iron Crosses, as either due
to Hitler's relationships with higher officers, or "very common" (in the
case of the 2nd class cross.)

I don't know which is the truth, but the facts are that Hitler was a
volunteer for the war, and volunteered for the German forces, though a
citizen of Austria, and did see action. Though both his Iron Crosses are
disparaged, the fact remains that he WAS decorated for bravery more than
once, and was gassed in combat. The only thing all accounts I've read agree
on was that he wasn't really popular with his fellow enlistees; he didn't
hang out with the guys, and was constantly harping on politics.

I don't know if it will ever be possible to get an accurate picture him; he
is too polarizing, and there are those who like their villians served up
without any positive human characteristics (eg, bravery, ambition, etc.)
To me, that seems to miss the point; men who do great evil cannot come into
that kind of power without some sort of positive characteristics. Nobody would
be drawn to them, or follow them. If you wish to prevent people like that from
gaining power again, it seems it would be best to try to understand their
abilities, even if that means "giving the Devil his due".

Mike

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote:
> Roman W <bloody...@gazeta.pl> wrote:

> > If Hitler was born in today's times, he would become a corporate executive
> > and a major historical tragedy would have been avoided.

> But he had no real ability or interest
> in administration. After assuming the
> Chancellorship, he spent much of the
> next year lazing about reading Karl May
> novels. He was not detail-oriented,
> except when some area caught his fancy.

Very true of many leaders, political or business. The US has had many
presidents of the same nature (without the disastrous consequences, of
course.) I can't imagine that Britain hasn't suffered through the odd
"non-detail-oriented" PM, herself.

> He blew off his opportunities for proper
> education and training, instead wasting
> his time talking endlessly about his
> grand ideas, and probably daydreaming
> about his great future destiny.

He seemed to have gotten himself into trouble academically several times,
but was able to bring his grades up on occassion. "Unmotivated" might
be a good word.

> Eventually he reached a position where
> he could get up on platforms and enthrall
> large crowds, which proved to be his
> real vocation.

Well, he had to work his way up into that position. And he did considerably
more than "enthrall" crowds; he got them to march off into a major war
while the memory of the previous one was still relatively fresh in their minds.

> Politics... his spell-binding speeches
> wouldn't be successful in politics
> today - pure oratory is not very
> important.

Well, it is important, and he wasn't just any orator; he was arguably one
of the finest orators of the past several generations.

> I could see him as the leader of some
> pocket political cult. Which is really
> all he was in the 1920s, until the
> Depression created an opening for him.

Well, he had positioned himself as a leader within that cult (though it seems
to me that given that they are commonplace, calling a nationalistic move-ment
in any nation a "pocket cult" is stretching it) and that same cult had
some so-called war heroes in it.

Mike

[Roman W]

On Wednesday, June 27, 2012 1:57:27 AM UTC+1, wjho...@aol.com wrote:

> The Nazis were more than a "pocket political cult"
> as history has taught us. And I think it was more
> than the Great Depression which brought about the
> leader in Hitler that he became. More likely It was
> the harsh provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

First and foremost, they were the consequence of the pre-WW1 German
political climate. It was all there in 1914. Even the willingness of
the German army to carry out genocide was there, as evidenced by their
mass murder of the Herreros.

RW

[Mario]

Roman W, 15:57, martedě 26 giugno 2012:

I suppose he could have great success in TV business.


--
H

[J]

On Jun 27, 9:45 am, Mario <ack....@ack.ack> wrote:

> I suppose [HITLER] could have great success in TV business.

Can you see him on The Apprentice?! He'd be the first apprentice to
fire The Donald!

Cheers . . . J

[Bill Shatzer]

Mario wrote:
> Roman W, 15:57, marted� 26 giugno 2012:

- snips -

>>If Hitler was born in today's times, he would become a
>>corporate executive and a major historical tragedy would have
>>been avoided.

> I suppose he could have great success in TV business.

Perhaps a televangelist for one of the charismartic sects.

That's about the only place Hitler-like oratory persists in the
television age.

Certainly his "skills" were unlike those of, say, David Sarnoff or Fred
Friendly.

[Rich Rostrom]

"wjho...@aol.com" <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:

> > I could see him as the leader of some
> > pocket political cult. Which is really
> > all he was in the 1920s, until the
> > Depression created an opening for him.
>
> The Nazis were more than a "pocket political cult"
> as history has taught us.

In the 1920s, they were very small and ineffective.
They got 6.5% in May 1924, 3% in November 1924,
and 2.6% in May 1928.

> And I think it was more
> than the Great Depression which brought about the
> leader in Hitler that he became. More likely It was
> the harsh provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Nazi vote jumped to 18.3% in September 1930,
and to 37.4% in July 1932.

Hitler had been denouncing Versailles all along.
By 1930, the Treaty had been relaxed, with deals
to allow the write-off of most reparation payments.

Certainly resentment over Versailles was a factor
in Hitler's support - but it is equally certain
that it did not cause the tremendous growth of the
Nazis in 1930-1932.

[Rich Rostrom]

mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

> Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote:

> > But he had no real ability or interest

> > in administration... He was not detail-oriented,

> > except when some area caught his fancy.
>
> Very true of many leaders, political or business.

That's a very peculiar assertion. There are some
individuals who reach positions of power who are
not hard workers, but they are exceptions - as
Hitler was (excluding of course hereditary rulers).

> The US has had many presidents of the same nature...

"many"? And not in the last century.

> > Eventually he reached a position where
> > he could get up on platforms and enthrall
> > large crowds, which proved to be his real vocation.
>
> Well, he had to work his way up into that position. And he did considerably
> more than "enthrall" crowds; he got them to march off into a major war
> while the memory of the previous one was still relatively fresh in their minds.

He got them to vote for his party. Then he used the
votes to maneuver into supreme power. He used his
oratory to cement his control, but after 1933 it
was backed by guns. Then he personally decided on
war, and they obeyed.

He did not go around the country holding rallies
where he orated calls for volunteers, personally
persuading men to volunteer for service and their
families to encourage volunteering.

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote:
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

> > Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote:

> > > But he had no real ability or interest
> > > in administration... He was not detail-oriented,
> > > except when some area caught his fancy.
> >
> > Very true of many leaders, political or business.

> That's a very peculiar assertion. There are some
> individuals who reach positions of power who are
> not hard workers, but they are exceptions - as
> Hitler was (excluding of course hereditary rulers).

The statements to which I responded contain "not detail-oriented" and
"no real ability or interest in administration", and does not remark
on "hard work".

> > The US has had many presidents of the same nature...

> "many"? And not in the last century.

See above. A very recent president was reknowned for not being "detail
oriented" except as it suited him, and interest in hands-on administration
varies according to the individual.

> > > Eventually he reached a position where
> > > he could get up on platforms and enthrall
> > > large crowds, which proved to be his real vocation.
> >
> > Well, he had to work his way up into that position. And he did considerably
> > more than "enthrall" crowds; he got them to march off into a major war
> > while the memory of the previous one was still relatively fresh in their
minds.

> He got them to vote for his party. Then he used the

Of which he was the head.

> votes to maneuver into supreme power. He used his

Right; like many parliamentary politicians. He subverted the process at the
end, but that doesn't change the fact that the journey was similar to that of
other politicians up to that point.

> oratory to cement his control, but after 1933 it

Hence part of his fame as an effective orator.

> He did not go around the country holding rallies
> where he orated calls for volunteers, personally
> persuading men to volunteer for service and their
> families to encourage volunteering.

Now you're playing weak semantic games; he very clearly prepared the country
for war (or are you disagreeing and claiming he did not?) and the German
people seemed to go along quite willingly (or are you claiming they did
not?)

Or are you claiming the only way one could prepare a populace for war is
to go around the country calling for volunteers? (Very) recent history
suggests otherwise.

Mike
Mike

[Rich Rostrom]

mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

>
> Now you're playing weak semantic games; he very clearly prepared the country
> for war (or are you disagreeing and claiming he did not?)

Yes, I am disagreeing. Hitler talked a lot about
rearming Germany to claim its proper place in the
world. But he didn't announce any intention of
going to war until very late in the game.

> and the German people seemed to go along quite willingly
> (or are you claiming they did not?)

They submitted to his orders, which by that time
were backed by the coercive power of the state.
That is very different from yielding to the force
of rhetoric.

I won't deny that Hitler's previous efforts made
the German people less reluctant to submit to his
war orders, but that's still far from "persuading
them to go to war."

Also, by 1939, Hitler's personal persuasive efforts
had been dwarfed by the massive output of Goebbels'
propaganda apparatus, and by indoctrination through
the schools and Hitler Youth.

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote:
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

> > Now you're playing weak semantic games; he very clearly prepared the country
> > for war (or are you disagreeing and claiming he did not?)

> Yes, I am disagreeing. Hitler talked a lot about
> rearming Germany to claim its proper place in the
> world. But he didn't announce any intention of
> going to war until very late in the game.

I don't see how "late in the game" changes much, even if true, especially
since he'd been referring to Lebensraum for some time.

> > and the German people seemed to go along quite willingly
> > (or are you claiming they did not?)

> They submitted to his orders, which by that time
> were backed by the coercive power of the state.
> That is very different from yielding to the force
> of rhetoric.

It's also very different from being reluctantly dragged into things.

> I won't deny that Hitler's previous efforts made
> the German people less reluctant to submit to his
> war orders, but that's still far from "persuading
> them to go to war."

> Also, by 1939, Hitler's personal persuasive efforts
> had been dwarfed by the massive output of Goebbels'
> propaganda apparatus, and by indoctrination through
> the schools and Hitler Youth.

Good point; no doubt Hitler had no input whatsoever in Goebbel's efforts.

Mike

[Rich Rostrom]

mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

> > Also, by 1939, Hitler's personal persuasive efforts
> > had been dwarfed by the massive output of Goebbels'
> > propaganda apparatus, and by indoctrination through
> > the schools and Hitler Youth.
>
> Good point; no doubt Hitler had no input whatsoever in Goebbel's efforts.

Let me get a mop to clean up that sarcasm
dripping all over the floor...

OK.

Goebbels no doubt shaped his propaganda to Hitler's
ends.

But that is not relevant to an evaluation of the
effect of Hitler's personal oratorical efforts,
nor does it support the claim that Hitler, by
his oratorical powers, induced the German people
to march off to war.