nope. he was constutionally bound to preserve the union.
all who voted for secession were commiting a crime.
Was he ever indicted? Was he ever impeached? Was he ever convicted of an
illegal act? If not, he was no criminal. A criminal is one who has been
convicted of a crime for which he was indicted, such conviction made
according to the rules of law.
Bob Kolker
It is possible to argue that once a Legislature votes for seceding,
then those who voted for it can be arrested for treason. The arrest of
the whole Legislature prior to the vote is an enfrigment of the
legislative procedure.
One could define a "criminal" either narrowly, as someone who has been
convicted of a crime, or broadly, as someone who has committed a crime,
whether or not he is ever subsequently brought to justice in a court of
law. I think the broader definition is the more useful of the two in
this discussion.
Instead of asking whether Lincoln was ever indicted for any act
connected with the arrest of the Maryland legislators (not "the
Maryland legislature", since not all members were arrested), it would
be better to ask whether any act he committed in connection with those
arrests was an indictable offense. If so, indictable under what
statute?
Lincoln did not have the Maryland Legislature arrested.
>When Lincoln had the Maryland Legislature arrested to stop the state
>from seceding from the Union, were his actions criminal and illegal?
Possibly unconstitutional, not illegal (what statute was being
broken?) and certainly not criminal (criminality requires conviction
for comission of a crime).
Chief justice Roger B Taney proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that
Lincolns' actions were indeed criminal and illegal.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ex_parte_Merryman
Maybe in the North they only teach the history that sounds good to
them.
Anyone want to talk about Lincolns true legacy....
He waged war on the South killing 620,000 men and murdering 50,000
Southern civilians including blacks.
He had a plan to repatriate the freed slaves with Africa (send them
back).
"Natty" <mcampb...@comcast.net> wrote in
message
news:1156032372....@i3g2000cwc.googlegrou
ps.com...
He didn't (as others have noted) have the
Legislature arrested, only some individual members
of it.
As for illegal, it would seem to be no more so
than arresting any other citizens would be. The
Constitution does not give State Legislators any
privilege of immunity from arrest, nor does any
Federal Statute thta I know of.
--
Mike Stone - Peterborough, England
"It is so stupid of modern civilisation to have
given up believing in the devil, when he is its
only explanation"
Ronald Knox
Who fired the first shot?
>
> He had a plan to repatriate the freed slaves with Africa (send them
> back).
Why is this a Bad Thing?
Bob Kolker
>
Weren't most arrested for inciting the rioting in Baltimore and
destroying private property (the railroad lines into Baltimore)?
HankC
That was in regard to habeus corpus, and it was regarding whether
Lincoln exceeded his constitutional authority in that regard. Being
unconstitutional may be, but is not necessarily, the same as being
illegal or criminal.
>
> Maybe in the North they only teach the history that sounds good to
> them.
Or maybe there's a little more emphasis on facts instead of Lost Cause
mythology...
>
> Anyone want to talk about Lincolns true legacy....
>
> He waged war on the South killing 620,000 men and murdering 50,000
> Southern civilians including blacks.
The south chose the course of war, not Lincoln. Lincoln did not force
Davis to order the firing on Fort Sumter, and had said openly in a
letter that Fort Sumter would be resupplied, but reinforcements would
*only* be landed in the event of an attack on Sumter. Lincoln was not
even in office when Confederate forces fired upon the Star of the West
in January 1861. Nor was he in office when the garrison of Fort
Barrancas in Florida confronted a group of men trying to seize the fort
under cover of darkness, also in January 1861 (an incident that
occurred before Florida had voted on secession, by the way). Numerous
other federal installations, including forts and arsenals, were seized
under threat of force before the states these place were located in had
even voted on secession. Oh, and one civilian merchant ship that
wandered too close to Charleston was fired upon, too.
At the time of the firing on Fort Sumter, Lincoln had not accepted a
single company of militia for federal service and the standing army
strength was 16,000 men, the vast majority of which were stationed in
small contingents in forts and strongpoints in the west or on the west
coast, keeping an eye on the natives. In contrast, in South Carolina
and Florida *alone* in the days right before Sumter, there were over
15,000 troops under arms, with more being brought into service on an
almost daily basis. Sumter, by the way, had a garrison of less than 80
men and because of its construction was virtually no threat to the city
of Charleston.
Bear in mind also that a Peace convention held in Virginia and presided
over by former President Tyler was attended by exactly *zero*
representatives of the seceding states - not even to observe and see
what incentives or compromises were being put on the table for
consideration.
Consider that Lincoln could have had *no* idea when he sent out his
call for militia what the response would be. He could not know ahead
of time if the northern Democrats would support a war for the Union or
if he would have a rebellion in the north on his hands as well. He
could not know how many would volunteer to serve. He could not know
the reaction of the other slave states, and if Missouri, Kentucky,
Maryland or Delaware would secede as well. He could not know in
advance how much or how far Congress would support him when they
convened. He could not know for certain what the reaction of the
international community, especially Brittain and France, would be. All
of these were complete unknowns and involved huge risks.
>
> He had a plan to repatriate the freed slaves with Africa (send them
> back).
Because he thought that blacks could not receive fair treatment in the
US if freed. It might interest you to know that Lincoln only held that
view early on, and changed his views on colonization completely once he
realized that former slaves considered themselves Americans and did not
want to be sent back to Africa. Lincoln, like all human beings, was
entitled to change his view of things upon a fuller understanding of
the facts.
>Consider that Lincoln could have had *no* idea when he sent out his
>call for militia what the response would be. He could not know ahead
>of time if the northern Democrats would support a war for the Union...
He had already polled _one_ Northern Democrat:
Sen. Stephen Douglas, whose only criticism of
Lincoln's message was that it should call for
200,000 men, not just 75,000.
Douglas was after all the leader of the
"Northern Democracy" - his unbending
Unionism was a pretty clear sign that
other northern Democrats would feel the
same way.
I don't know how much contact Lincoln
had had with John A. Logan and John
McClernand, both leading Illinois
Democrats before the war, and both of
them solid War Democrats who became
major generals in the Union army.
But I rather think he knew he could count
on them.
--
| He had a shorter, more scraggly, and even less |
| flattering beard than Yassir Arafat, and Escalante |
| never conceived that such a thing was possible. |
| -- William Goldman, _Heat_ |
*Snip*
> Maybe in the North they only teach the history that sounds good to
> them.
No. At least here in New Jersey (the state that voted for McClellan in '64),
they are, if anything, pretty generous toward the South in grade school
education. Still, you don't seriously think anyone posting here is relying
on K-12 education instead of lots of post-secondary reading to form
opinions, do you?
> Anyone want to talk about Lincolns true legacy....
>
> He waged war on the South killing 620,000 men and murdering 50,000
> Southern civilians including blacks.
Man, if Lincoln could do all that, then just give me 100 Lincolns, and I'll
take over the world. :-)
Seriously, you state as proven fact a lot of stuff that is highly debatable
and almost certainly untrue. If Anderson and Fort Sumter had first fired on
Charleston, you might have a slim point. Sorry, but as is, your description
best fits Jeff Davis and friends.
-Bert
--
***********************************************
You can visit Professor Bert Atsma's Website at:
http://faculty.ucc.edu/biology-atsma/
>
>Brad Meyer wrote:
>> On Sat, 19 Aug 2006 19:57:40 CST, "Natty" <mcampb...@comcast.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >When Lincoln had the Maryland Legislature arrested to stop the state
>> >from seceding from the Union, were his actions criminal and illegal?
>>
>> Possibly unconstitutional, not illegal (what statute was being
>> broken?) and certainly not criminal (criminality requires conviction
>> for comission of a crime).
>
>Chief justice Roger B Taney proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that
>Lincolns' actions were indeed criminal and illegal.
At most, he proved they were unconstitutional. He did not have the
means to do otherwise. Lincoln's actions, in fact, were right in line
with Andrew Jackson's "Now they have their judgement, let them enforce
it".
>Maybe in the North they only teach the history that sounds good to
>them.
Merryman has been hashed on this board about a zillion times in the
decade I have been posting here. Nothing you have run out is new or
news. At least our schools taught the difference between illegal and
unconstitutional.
>Anyone want to talk about Lincolns true legacy....
>
>He waged war on the South killing 620,000 men and murdering 50,000
>Southern civilians including blacks.
It generally takes two parties to make a war.
Fair 'nuff. Though I daresay that he could have had no idea on just
how many of the rank-and-file Democrats on the street he could count on
to share the opinions of Douglas, or how many of them would actively
enlist and serve in the military. For that matter, he couldn't be
absolutely sure what sort of response enlistment-wise he'd get from the
Republicans. The overall enlistment in the early months was far beyond
any but the most sanguine expectations.
Steve
Well, do we have an issue here?
> It is possible to argue that once a Legislature votes for seceding,
> then those who voted for it can be arrested for treason.
Once they secede, they are no longer the "state legislature."
They have
become a mere mob in possession of a public building.
That Wikipedia article says, "Taney showed beyond the shadow of a doubt
that Lincoln's actions were entirely contrary to written law." The
article does not say that the detention of John Merryman was a criminal
act -- that is your characterization. Nor, in his _Merryman_ opinion,
did Taney characterize Lincoln's actions as criminal. Again, that is
your characterization, not Taney's.
Let us suppose that Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus on
presidential authority in Apr. 1861 was unconstitutional (I will
stipulate for the record that I agree with Taney on this point), and
that therefore the detention of John Merryman was unconstitutional.
Would this necessarily mean that the detention of the Maryland
legislators a few months later was also unconstitutional? A strong
case could be made that it was not. In July, 1861, Congress, meeting
in special session, had passed a resolution approving all of Lincoln's
actions taken to suppress the rebellion up to that point. The
resolution did not itemize those actions, but clearly one of them was
the suspension of habeas corpus. One might then reasonably ask, if
Congress approves the suspension of habeas corpus, has Congress not
suspended habeas corpus? And if Congress has suspended habeas corpus,
why would the detention of the Maryland legislators a month later be
unconstitutional?
Let us also suppose, strictly for the sake of argument, that there is
no distinction between an "unconstitutional" act and a "criminal" act.
Given that supposition, consider the suspension of habeas corpus
provided for under the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. That law denied
habeas corpus to a particular class of federal prisoners, even though
the Constitution plainly asserts that habeas corpus may not be
suspended except in cases of war or rebellion, neither of which was
going on at the time. If the suspension of habeas corpus under the
Fugitive Slave Law was unconstitutional -- as it plainly seems to have
been -- and if an unconstitutional act is a criminal act, who were the
criminals? The congressmen who voted for the Fugitive Slave Law? The
executive and judicial officials who enforced it? All of the above?
What is your opinion?
>Let us also suppose, strictly for the sake of argument, that there is
>no distinction between an "unconstitutional" act and a "criminal" act.
The question is what the nature of the act is.
For Lincoln to declare habeas corpus suspended
might be unconstitutional, but it is hard to see
what statute it violated to be criminal.
However, if the suspension was unconstitutional
and therefore invalid, to hold a person prisoner
and deny habeas corpus anyway would be...
illegal restraint? false arrest? kidnapping?
_That_ would be the actual crime.
Not within the constitution you cannot. Treason is quite narrowly
defined in the constitution as making war on the US or any of them (any
of the states), or giving aid and comfort to an enemy making war on the
USA.
Secession is not making war.
In any case you have to convict using a jury from the federal district
in which the crime is alleged to take place. Fat chance of getting a
conviction if perhaps half the population are southern sympathizers, as
they will vote to aquitt regardless. So you have either an out and out
aquittal or a hung jury.
> The arrest of
> the whole Legislature prior to the vote is an enfrigment of the
> legislative procedure.
Or after.
Interesting argument. Under the current law of my state, you could try
to make an argument for "criminal confinement." It wouldn't meet my
state's statutory definition of kidnapping, and false arrest is not a
crime, but what they call a "common law tort." Furtthermore, under
this argument criminal confinement would not come into play upon upon
mere arrest (another reason for rejecting the notion that it would be
kidnapping), but only after a writ of habeas corpus has been issued and
ignored.
But here's the complication: I suppose that, in 1861, criminal
confinement would not have been a federal crime, but a state crime, yet
the writ of habeas corpus issued by Taney in the _Merryman_ case was a
federal writ, not a state writ. So would criminal confinement even
have come into play under Maryland law unless a state writ of habeas
corpus had been issued? If so -- Taney himself had written only two
years earlier in ABLEMAN v BOOTH, "We do not question the authority of
State court or judge who is authorized by the laws of the State to
issue the writ of habeas corpus to issue it in any case where the party
is imprisoned within its territorial limits, provided it does not
appear, when the application is made, that the person imprisoned is in
custody under the authority of the United State ... but, after the
return is made and the State judge or court judicially apprized that
the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they
can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the
dominion and jurisdiction of another Government, and that neither the
writ of habeas corpus nor any other process issued under State
authority can pass over the line of division between the two
sovereignties." If a Maryland state judge had issued a writ ordering
the release of Merryman, by Taney's earlier reasoning Lincoln would
have been entitled to ignore it, so where's the violation of any
Maryland law against criminal confinement?
Firing on Ft. Sumter. What was that all about?
Seizing forts, custom houses, arsenals?? Seizing naval assets?
Redefining the borders of the United States?
I don't recall at the moment, but did Jefferson Davis suspend the writ
of habeus corpus in the Confederacy? Would that make him a criminal
like Lincoln?
>"Gary Charbonneau" <char...@indiana.edu> wrote:
>
>>Let us also suppose, strictly for the sake of argument, that there is
>>no distinction between an "unconstitutional" act and a "criminal" act.
>
>The question is what the nature of the act is.
>
>For Lincoln to declare habeas corpus suspended
>might be unconstitutional, but it is hard to see
>what statute it violated to be criminal.
>
>However, if the suspension was unconstitutional
>and therefore invalid, to hold a person prisoner
>and deny habeas corpus anyway would be...
>
>illegal restraint? false arrest? kidnapping?
>
>_That_ would be the actual crime.
Only _after_ the decision. If the person were released upon the
decision being rendered, the best he would have is a tort, not a
criminal complaint. Oh, I suppose one could argue that the prez ought
to have known that his actions were indeed unconstitutional, but I
doubt anyone could make that fly in a court of law.
>
> Not within the constitution you cannot. Treason is quite narrowly
> defined in the constitution as making war on the US or any of them (any
> of the states), or giving aid and comfort to an enemy making war on the
> USA.
>
> Secession is not making war.
Perhaps. But firing on Ft. Sumter is.
Bob Kolker
The Confederate Congress authorized Davis to suspend habeas corpus,
which he then did.
Not "federal district", but "state" -- if a federal offense is
committed in a state, the trial has to be held in that state. If it's
committed outside of any state, the trial may be held wherever Congress
directs.
There was an interesting case in 1861: A Georgia militiaman who had
participated in the seziure of Fort Pulaski for some reason went up
north to New Jersey, where he was arrested for treason. He was
released pending an opportunity to hold the trial in Georgia, where the
crime had been committed (and of course he was never subsequently
tried).
Fort Pulaski was seized _before_ Georgia seceded. If the accused had
indeed participated in the seizure of the fort as part of an armed
state militia force, he had committed treason. If we were to suppose
that secession is constitutional, then, strange to say, it would be the
case that at the time the accused was arrested the Constitution
required him to be tried, for a crime against the U.S., in a foreign
country!
It do make a tee tiny bit of difference don't it.
But so is keeping troops in a nation you don't have diplomatic
relations with.
>
> Bob Kolker
Nothing to do with Maryland legislators.
>
> Redefining the borders of the United States?
Which comes back to the fundamental question of what is the USA, is it
a servant of the people, or is it the master of the people. You
contend it is the master of the people, I contend otherwise.
It does if they are taking material actions in support of such
activities. Like voting to take their state out of the Union with the
intent to join forces with those who committed such acts.
>
>
> >
> > Redefining the borders of the United States?
>
> Which comes back to the fundamental question of what is the USA, is it
> a servant of the people, or is it the master of the people. You
> contend it is the master of the people, I contend otherwise.
Sure, you merely contend that the States are the master of the people.
I fail to see the difference, and I wager the Tenneseeans who danced at
the end of a rope didn't either.
what has ft sumter have to do with a foreign nation. it was in a state of
the union not a foreign country.
>
>
> Which comes back to the fundamental question of what is the USA, is it
> a servant of the people, or is it the master of the people. You
> contend it is the master of the people, I contend otherwise.
Who is a servant and who is a master can be decided by shot and shell.
It very often is. Al, wake up and smell the reality. Might makes Right.
It always has and it always will, until our species is extinct.
Bob Kolker
THe question of whether a CSA was a nation is debatable. In fact, it was
debated with shot and shell. The Southrons lost both the war and the
argument. When logic does not suffice, the deadly force will just have
to do.
Your precious secess goes like this: A thief claims he has made a
rightful claim on your wallet. When you defend your wallet, he opens
fire. But thats all right. He was delare your wallet was his by his own
due process.
Bob Kolker
Union troops can be anywhere they are needed in the United States
of America.
How so?
What you REALLY contend is that SOME PEOPLE should OWN
other PEOPLE.
=================================================================
== Moderator's comment: Let's keep this civil, please
http://www.constitution.org/cons/constitu.htm
----quote
Article V
, , , , ,
Section. 3. Treason against the United States shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them
Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court.
, , , , , ,
[Amendment VI]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
---------end quote
Both state and federal district within that state. My understanding is
that this is the same as the congressional district.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sixth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution
> If it's
> committed outside of any state, the trial may be held wherever Congress
> directs.
>
> There was an interesting case in 1861: A Georgia militiaman who had
> participated in the seziure of Fort Pulaski for some reason went up
> north to New Jersey, where he was arrested for treason. He was
> released pending an opportunity to hold the trial in Georgia, where the
> crime had been committed (and of course he was never subsequently
> tried).
Fat chance he could be convicted.
> Fort Pulaski was seized _before_ Georgia seceded. If the accused had
> indeed participated in the seizure of the fort as part of an armed
> state militia force, he had committed treason.
Nope. If the government cannot convict because a jury cannot be found
that would convict, the that is jury nullification (which FYI is legal
and part of our judicial system), and the people (represented by the
jury) reject the law and/or it's application in this case.
> If we were to suppose
> that secession is constitutional, then, strange to say, it would be the
> case that at the time the accused was arrested the Constitution
> required him to be tried, for a crime against the U.S., in a foreign
> country!
All of this seeming contradition goes away if you understand that
sovereignty flows from the consent of the people. If the people of
Georgia wanted to seceed then it was legal as the right to determine
what was and was not legal in the state of Georgia flows from their
will.
However you seem to be an individual that thinks the government has
rights over the people rather than the government being the chattle of
the people.
Jeff Davis attempted to suspend the entire US Constitution.
So isnt it true that by law the US should have abandoned Ft Sumter. And
they were staying in the fort illegally?
You are correct. I was thinking of Article III, which specified only
that that trial had to be held in the state in which the offense
occurred. I do not think that the Sixth Amendment obleterated the
distinction between crimes committed in states and crimes committed
outside of any any state.
> > If it's
> > committed outside of any state, the trial may be held wherever Congress
> > directs.
> >
> > There was an interesting case in 1861: A Georgia militiaman who had
> > participated in the seziure of Fort Pulaski for some reason went up
> > north to New Jersey, where he was arrested for treason. He was
> > released pending an opportunity to hold the trial in Georgia, where the
> > crime had been committed (and of course he was never subsequently
> > tried).
>
> Fat chance he could be convicted.
>
>
> > Fort Pulaski was seized _before_ Georgia seceded. If the accused had
> > indeed participated in the seizure of the fort as part of an armed
> > state militia force, he had committed treason.
>
> Nope. If the government cannot convict because a jury cannot be found
> that would convict, the that is jury nullification (which FYI is legal
> and part of our judicial system), and the people (represented by the
> jury) reject the law and/or it's application in this case.
Jury nullification may be legal, but that's mainly because there's no
obvious way to prevent it. "Jury nullification" means that a jury finds
a defendant "not guilty" even though they believe he is guilty. They
do so because they think that the law he has violated is an unjust law,
not because they think he has violated no law. In the old days, in the
early years of the Republic, there were two kinds of courts -- courts
of law, and courts of equity. The purpose of courts of law was to
uphold the law and provide for the punishment of those who broke it.
The purpose of courts of equity was to render justice, regradless of
what the law said (because sometimes the law's an ass). But courts of
equity died out early because people were uncomfortable with the notion
that it is up to individual judges to decide when the law's an ass and
when it's not. Many today are equally uncomfortable with the notion
that it should be up to individual juries, but as a practical matter
how do you put a stop to it -- other than to allow the prosecution a
reasonable chance to exclude from juries people who might be tempted to
nullify the law?
It is, of course, true that it might have been difficult to find a
Georgia jury that would not have engaged in jury nullification, but
that's beside the point. The question is whether the militiaman had
committed treason, not whether some jury might have thought he had
committed treason but should not be punished for it.
> > If we were to suppose
> > that secession is constitutional, then, strange to say, it would be the
> > case that at the time the accused was arrested the Constitution
> > required him to be tried, for a crime against the U.S., in a foreign
> > country!
>
> All of this seeming contradition goes away if you understand that
> sovereignty flows from the consent of the people. If the people of
> Georgia wanted to seceed then it was legal as the right to determine
> what was and was not legal in the state of Georgia flows from their
> will.
Dead wrong. You're conflating an appeal to equity (or rather you're
own view of what is equitable) with the law. You put forth the premise
that the people of Georgia ought to be allowed to secede if they want
to, and then by some bizarre leap of logic conclude that the law
actually does allow them to secede if they want to. The law does not
allow it. The law _could_ allow it, if the Constitution were amended,
but any such amendment would require the consent of three-fourths of
the states, not merely the consent of the people of Georgia. The
sovereignty of the people of the United States flows from the people of
the United States, it does not flow from the people of Georgia. The
Georgia tail does not wag the American dog.
> However you seem to be an individual that thinks the government has
> rights over the people rather than the government being the chattle of
> the people.
I think that, when it comes to the question of the dissolution of the
Union, those among the people of the United States who do not wish the
Union dissolved ought to have just as much right to a say in the
question as the people of some state where a majority can be found in
favor of dissolution. I'm guessin' that you think that, once Georgia
had enacted an ordinance of secession, the secessionist government of
Georgia had "rights" (i.e., power) over the people of Georgia who did
not favor such an ordinance as well as over those who did, right? In
other words, I'm guessin' that you equate "the people" with "the
majority of the voters in some state," not with "the majority of the
voters of the United States."
Do it? Before the Maryland legislators were arrested, Congress had
approved Lincoln's actions taken during the time that Congress not in
session -- actions which, as was well known at the time, included the
suspension of habeas corpus. As I said earlier in this thread, "One
might then reasonably ask, if Congress approves the suspension of
habeas corpus, has Congress not suspended habeas corpus? And if
Congress has suspended habeas corpus, why would the detention of the
Maryland legislators a month later be unconstitutional?"
The Confederate congress authorized Davis to suspend habeas corpus on
three different occasions: From Apr. 19th to Sept. 17th, 1862, from
Oct. 13th, 1862 to Feb. 13, 1863, and from Feb. 17 1864 to Aug. 1864.
If one wants to be an absolute stickler about constitutional niceties,
one might question whether the power of Congress (U.S. or Confederate)
to suspend habeas corpus allowed it to delegate this power to the
president. If it lacks this power, then Davis' suspension of habeas
corpus was unconstitutional because Congress' delegation of that power
to him was unconstitutional.
What it boils down to is the fact that the power to suspend habeas
corpus is clearly an emergency power, and the legislative branch is not
necessarily the branch of government best suited to emergency action.
When Lincoln authorized the suspension of habeas corpus along the rail
lines leading into Washington in Apr. 1861, Congress was not in
session, and there appeared to be some doubt about the government's
ability to hold onto its national capital long enough for Congress to
meet there a couple of months later. Lincoln therefore acted by
suspending habeas corpus, though Congress had never delegated to the
president any power to do so. Davis acted only after a delegation of
power from the Confederate congress, but that very delegation suggested
a recognition on the part of the congress that the power to decide
precisely when, where, and how to suspend habeas corpus may be an
appropriate power for the executive branch to exercise under certain
circumstances.
The U.S. and Confederate constitutions were both slightly defective in
their wording of the habeas corpus suspension clause by failing to
allow Congress to "provide for" the suspension of habeas corpus in the
same way that they allowed Congress to "provide for" the calling out of
the militia: by delegating the power to the president at least during
times when Congress is not in session and therefore unable to exercise
it directly.
If that comment applies to Fort Sumter, it begs the question.
A little over a week ago, I said the following in another thread:
"The sites of federal forts were ceded by states pursuant to Article
II, Section 8 of the Constitution, which give Congress the power "To
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings." South Carolina
had ceded the site of Fort Sumter to the United States for the purpose
of erecting a fort, and from that moment had no more legal authority
over that site than the state of Maryland has over the District of
Columbia.
The legislation under which South Carolina had made this cession did
not state that the cession would be reversed if South Carolina seceded
(and had such a condition have been placed on the cession, Congress
would certainly have refused it on the grounds of the
unconstitutionality of unilateral secession).. By an act of the South
Carolina legislature, Dec. 31st, 1836, ""Resolved, That this state do
cede to the United States, all the right, title and claim of South
Carolina to the site of Fort Sumter and the requisite quantity of
adjacent territory, Provided, That all processes, civil and criminal
issued under the authority of this State, or any officer thereof, shall
and may be served and executed upon the same, and any person there
being who may be implicated by law; and that the said land, site and
structures enumerated, shall be forever exempt from liability to pay
any tax to this state." By that act, South Carolina voluntarily
relinquished "all right, title and claim ... to the site of Fort
Sumter" unless and until Congress ceded the site back to South
Carolina, without any reservation providing for the reversion of the
site to South Carolina should the state secede. That Fort Sumter was
not only the property of but, with the very limited exception specified
in the act of cession, the sovereign territory of the United States was
a matter not only of U.S.law, but South Carolina law as well."
In other words, even if one assumes the constitutionality of secession,
Fort Sumter was not in either South Carolina or the Confederacy, where
"in" means "within the territorial jurisdiction of." It was
jurisdinctionally and legally no more "in" South Carolina or the
Confederacy than the District of Columbia is "in" Maryland. Therefore,
your comment, "But so is keeping troops in a nation you don't have
diplomatic Relations with," is a rhetorical point that has little
relevance -- except insofar as the Confederacy was, by that point of
rhetoric, making war on the U.S. by placing its troops in some fort of
the U.S. (for example, Fort Pulaski).
federal property belongs to the people of all the states. people of one
state cannot determine its fate.
When was it legally determined that the
Confederacy _was_ a foreign country?
Lincoln consistently took the view that it was
not, a position which he was fully entitled to
maintain unless/until Congress legislated to the
contrary and/or the Supreme Court held that it
_was_ foreign soil. Afaik, neither body _ever_ did
so.
--
Mike Stone - Peterborough, England
"It is so stupid of modern civilisation to have
given up believing in the devil, when he is its
only explanation"
Ronald Knox
"Natty" <mcampb...@comcast.net> wrote in
message
news:1156612080.6...@m73g2000cwd.googlegr
oups.com...
> >
> So isnt it true that by law the US should have
abandoned Ft Sumter. And
> they were staying in the fort illegally?
>
Illegally as determined by what court and in what
case?
Incidentally, the US "should" only have abandoned
Ft Sumter if it believed that it was in its (the
US's) own interest to do so. Supposing purely for
argument's sake that secession was valid, then SC
was a foreign country and its inhabitants foreign
nationals. If that were so, the US gov't had no
duty or obligation toward then irt Ft Sumter or
anything else, and its actions should have been
determined solely by its own interest, ie by the
interest of those who had _not_ seceded. Those who
_had_ seceded were now either rebels or
foreigners, and either way, the US had no further
duty to pay any attention to their claims except
inasmuch as it _wished_ to do so.
> So isnt it true that by law the US should have abandoned Ft Sumter. And
> they were staying in the fort illegally?
No, it's not true. Article I, Section of the Constitution says that
Congress has the power "To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may,
by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become
the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like
authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature
of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts,
magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings." Even if
one assumes the constitutionality of South Carolina's ordinance of
secession, that ordinance would not have applied to Fort Sumter. Since
Congress' power of legislation over Fort Sumter was exclusive, South
Carolina had no power of legislation over the fort; its ordinance of
secession could not touch it. Consequently, Fort Sumter would have
remained U.S. sovereign territory. There is no question of the
legality of the United States stationing troops in its own territory.
However (again assuming the constitutionality of South Carolina's
ordinance of secession), South Carolina's occupation of Fort Moultrie,
Castle Pinckney, and the U.S. arsenal and customshouse in Charleston --
also legally untouchable by any ordinance of secession -- would have
amounted to an invasion of U.S.sovereign territory and thus an act of
war against the United States.
In February, 1861, Joseph Holt, U.S. Secretary of War, wrote the
following letter to Isaac W. Hayne, South Carolina atteorney general,
who had come to Washington to attempt to persuade the U.S. government
to abandon Fort Sumter:
****************
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, February 6, 1861.
Hon. I. W. HAYNE,
Attorney-General of the State of South Carolina:
SIR: The President of the United States has received your letter of the
31st ultimo, and has charged me with the duty of replying thereto. In
the communication addressed to the President by Governor Pickens, under
date of the 12th of January, and which accompanies yours, now before
me, his excellency says:
"I have determined to send to you Hon. I. W. Hayne, the
attorney-general of the State of South Carolina, and have instructed
him to demand the surrender of Fort Sumter, in the harbor of
Charleston, to the constituted authorities of the State of South
Carolina. The demand I have made of Major Anderson, and which I now
make of you, is suggested because of my earnest desire to avoid
bloodshed, which a persistence in your attempt to retain the possession
of that fort will cause, and which will be unavailing to secure to you
that possession, but induce a calamity most deeply to be deplored."
The character of the demand thus authorized to be made appears- under
the influence, I presume, of the correspondence with the Senators to
which you refer-to have been modified by subsequent instructions of his
excellency, dated the 26th, and received by yourself on the 30th of
January, in which he says:
"If it be so that Fort Sumter is held as property, then as property,
the rights, whatever they may be, of the United States can be
ascertained; and for the satisfaction of these rights the pledge of the
State of South Carolina you are authorized to give."
The full scope and precise purport of your instructions, as thus
modified, you have expressed in the following words:
"I do not come as a military man to demand the surrender of a fortress,
but as the legal officer of the State-its attorney-general-to claim for
the State the exercise of its undoubted right of eminent domain, and to
pledge the State to make good all injury to the rights of property
which arise from the exercise of the claim."
And lest this explicit language should not sufficiently define your
position, you add:
"The proposition now is that her [South Carolina's] law officer should,
under authority of the governor and his council, distinctly pledge the
faith of South Carolina to make such compensation in regard to Fort
Sumter and its appurtenances and contents, to the full extent of the
money value of the property of the United States delivered over to the
authorities off South Carolina by your command."
You then adopt his excellency's train of thought upon the subject so
far as to suggest that the possession of Fort Sumter by the United
States, "if continued long enough, must lead to collision," and that
"an attack upon it would scarcely improve it as property, whatever the
result, and if captured it would no longer be the subject of account."
The proposal, then, now presented to the President is simply an offer
on the part of South Carolina to buy Fort Sumter and contents as
property of the United States, sustained by a declaration in effect
that if she is not permitted to make the purchase she will seize the
fort by force of arms. As the initiation of a negotiation for the
transfer of property between friendly governments this proposal
impresses the President as having assumed a most unusual form. He has,
however, investigated the claim on which it professes to be based,
apart from the declaration that accompanies it; and it may be here
remarked that much stress has been laid upon the employment of the
words "property" and "public property" by the President in his several
messages. These are the most comprehensive terms which can be used in
such and surely, when referring to a fort or any other public
establishment, they embraced the entire and undivided interest of the
Government therein.
The title of the United States to Fort Sumter is complete and
incontestible. Were its interest in this property purely proprietary,
in the ordinary acceptation of the term, it might, probably, be
subjected to the exercise of the right of eminent domain; but it has
also political relations to it, of a much higher and more imposing
character than those of mere proprietorship. It has absolute
jurisdiction over the fort and the soil on which it stands. This
jurisdiction consists in the authority to "exercise exclusive
legislation" over the property referred to, and is therefore clearly
incompatible with the claim of eminent domain now insisted upon by
South Carolina. This authority was not derived from any questionable
revolutionary source, but from the peaceful cession of South Carolina
herself, acting through her legislature, under a provision of the
Constitution of the United States. South Carolina can no more assert it
over the district of Columbia. The political and proprietary rights of
the United States in either case rest upon precisely the same grounds.
The President is, however, relieved from the necessity of further
pursuing this inquiry by the fact that, whatever may be the claim of
South Carolina to this fort, he has no constitutional power to cede or
surrender it. The property of the United States has been acquired by
force of public law, and can only be disposed of under the same solemn
sanctions. The President, as the head of the executive branch of the
Government only, can no more sell and transfer Fort Sumter to South
Carolina than he can sell and convey the Capitol of the United States
to Maryland, or to any other State or individual seeking to possess it.
His excellency the governor is too familiar with the Constitution of
the United States, and with the limitations upon the powers of the
Chief Magistrate of the Government it has established, not to
appreciate at once the soundness of this legal proposition....
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. HOLT,
Secretary of War.
it never was deemed a foreign country, that was the whole point of the war.
we have quite a few troops in cuba and no diplomatic relations with them.
So who is responsible for the murder of 50,000 Southern civilians
during the war? Not Lincoln?
The USA should have recognized South Carolina as a seperate nation as
soon as she passed the ordinence of secession. That is from a strict
interpretation of the constituition that states (or the people of each
given state, let us not get into that arguement) had to give consent to
ratify the constitution and so join the union, and nothing in it states
they cannot withdraw consent.
> Lincoln consistently took the view that it was
> not, a position which he was fully entitled to
> maintain unless/until Congress legislated to the
> contrary and/or the Supreme Court held that it
> _was_ foreign soil.
That would be wrong. The president has a hell of a lot of stroke in
diplomatic matters, and as to the rest, he has no authority to make war
w/o consent of congress.
A very bad precident set by that administration.
All this is BS anyway as the US government did not treat the southern
states as proper states till long after the war. They recognized the
secession as a fact in how they treated southern states after the war.
---snip
all those who voted for secession.
--------------snip
> > > Fort Pulaski was seized _before_ Georgia seceded. If the accused had
> > > indeed participated in the seizure of the fort as part of an armed
> > > state militia force, he had committed treason.
> >
> > Nope. If the government cannot convict because a jury cannot be found
> > that would convict, the that is jury nullification (which FYI is legal
> > and part of our judicial system), and the people (represented by the
> > jury) reject the law and/or it's application in this case.
>
> Jury nullification may be legal, but that's mainly because there's no
> obvious way to prevent it. "Jury nullification" means that a jury finds
> a defendant "not guilty" even though they believe he is guilty.
No -- They find that he is not guilty even if they think he did
probably do what the prosecution claims, but that they either think;
1) The law in question is BS, or 2) the law in question is being
wrongly applied. Which the supreme court has ruled something like 20
times of the history of this nation, and as recently as the 1990s IIRC,
that they have every right to do either one.
http://www.chrononhotonthologos.com/lawnotes/jurynull.htm
------quote---
"...there can be no doubt that the jury has an `unreviewable and
unreversible power...to acquit in disregard of the instructions on the
law given by the trial judge....'"
U.S. v Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1139 (1972).
Other info related to Dougherty case: 16 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 177.
"It may not be amiss...to remind you of the good old rule, that on the
question of fact, it is the province of the jury, and on the question
of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But, it must be
observed that by law...you have nevertheless a right to take it upon
yourselves to judge both, in controversey...both objects are lawfully
within your power of decision." Justice John Jay to the jury, Georgia
v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. 1, 4 (1794), 1 L.Ed. 483. "...for as, on the one
hand, it is presumed that juries are the best judges of facts; it is,
on the other hand, presumable, that the court are the best judges of
law. But still, both objects are lawfully within your power of
decision."
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/156/51.html
'It may not be amiss here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good old
rule that on questions of fact it is the province of the jury, on
questions of law it is the province of the court, to decide. But it
must be observed that, by the same law which recognizes this reasonable
distribution of jurisdiction, you have, nevertheless, a right to take
[156 U.S. 51, 65] upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine
the law as well as the fact in controversy.
..the jury has "...the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of
both law and facts."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Horning v D.C., 254 U.S. 135, 138, 41 S.Ct. 53,
54, 65 L.Ed. 185 (1920)
"...no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
U.S. Constitution, 7th Amendment. Only another common law jury can
review a decision of a jury. There is no other appeal. Not even the
Supreme Court can review a jury's decision.
--------end quote----
FYI no one is guilty under our system of justice unless they 1)
confess, 2) agree to a judge only trial and the judge finds them
guilty, 3) Plead nolo contendre, 4) a jury finds them guilty.
If a jury finds you not guilty you are not guitly regardless of what
happend.
Jury nullification is part of the legal system, it is an additional
check on the power of government, specifically legislators, prosecutors
and judges.
http://www.free-market.net/resources/lit/history-jury-null.html
http://friesian.com/nullif.htm
> They
> do so because they think that the law he has violated is an unjust law,
> not because they think he has violated no law. In the old days, in the
> early years of the Republic, there were two kinds of courts -- courts
> of law, and courts of equity. The purpose of courts of law was to
> uphold the law and provide for the punishment of those who broke it.
> The purpose of courts of equity was to render justice, regradless of
> what the law said (because sometimes the law's an ass). But courts of
> equity died out early because people were uncomfortable with the notion
> that it is up to individual judges to decide when the law's an ass and
> when it's not. Many today are equally uncomfortable with the notion
> that it should be up to individual juries, but as a practical matter
> how do you put a stop to it -- other than to allow the prosecution a
> reasonable chance to exclude from juries people who might be tempted to
> nullify the law?
You seem to confuse me with someone who thinks the current practice of
stacking juries with the ignorant and easy to persuade is a good thing.
Juries have the right and duty to nullify bad laws.
Morally and I think with some justice based on the constitution the
court should not be allowed to exclude people who do not agree to
follow the law. The law that a randomly picked, unbiased against or
for the defendant jury will not convict on, is a bad law and should be
struck from the law books if if more than say three juries refuse to
convict.
Or they may refuse to convict where the prosecutor is being an ass,
such as prosecuting a sick old man for growing pot to treat himself
with.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Kubby
Which is unfortunately not what happened, but should have.
> It is, of course, true that it might have been difficult to find a
> Georgia jury that would not have engaged in jury nullification, but
> that's beside the point. The question is whether the militiaman had
> committed treason, not whether some jury might have thought he had
>committed treason but should not be punished for it.
No they would honestly think him not guilty, as they held that
secession was a right, and not treason, and everyone in the deep
southern states knew pretty well secession was going to happen if
Lincoln was elected.
That he helped to grab the federal facility before the passage of the
act is irrelevant, as he was acting under the authority of the state
government and the state had the right to secede.
And no they do not have to follow the law, SCOTUS has ruled on that
definitively, not that I really give a tinkers damn what they rule, but
you act like you would.
> > > If we were to suppose
> > > that secession is constitutional, then, strange to say, it would be the
> > > case that at the time the accused was arrested the Constitution
> > > required him to be tried, for a crime against the U.S., in a foreign
> > > country!
> >
> > All of this seeming contradition goes away if you understand that
> > sovereignty flows from the consent of the people. If the people of
> > Georgia wanted to seceed then it was legal as the right to determine
> > what was and was not legal in the state of Georgia flows from their
> > will.
>
> Dead wrong. You're conflating an appeal to equity (or rather you're
> own view of what is equitable) with the law.
Well mine, and that of a large fraction of the founding fathers and a
lot of people who follow the philosophy of the enlightenment.
> You put forth the premise
> that the people of Georgia ought to be allowed to secede if they want
>to,
Consent of the governed, vox populi vox dei, all that sort of ideas
and ideals the American Revolution was fought over.
http://www.sacklunch.net/Latin/V/voxpopulivoxDei.html
vox populi, vox Dei: (An old proverb quoted by William of Malmesbury in
the Twelfth Century), The voice of the people is the voice of God.
> and then by some bizarre leap of logic conclude that the law
> actually does allow them to secede if they want to.
You seem to be being deliberately rude. Is that your intent? One can
disagree with other people's political philosophy without being
insulting.
Yes the US Constitution as written and ratified by the states taken
literally would allow any state to secede.
> The law does not allow it.
We disagree on the matter. --- See it is possible to disagree without
being insulting.
> The law _could_ allow it, if the Constitution were amended,
> but any such amendment would require the consent of three-fourths of
> the states, not merely the consent of the people of Georgia. The
> sovereignty of the people of the United States flows from the people of
> the United States, it does not flow from the people of Georgia. The
> Georgia tail does not wag the American dog.
>
> > However you seem to be an individual that thinks the government has
> > rights over the people rather than the government being the chattle of
> > the people.
>
> I think that, when it comes to the question of the dissolution of the
> Union, those among the people of the United States who do not wish the
> Union dissolved ought to have just as much right to a say in the
> question as the people of some state where a majority can be found in
> favor of dissolution.
This would imply that the people of the majority of the states would
have the right to force the people of one state to stay in the union
even though it is not their desire to do so and not in their best
interest. That is called tyranny. You do not have the moral right to
force people to stay in a political union with you who do not wish to,
if you cannot make it to their best interest, then you should let them
go.
Please to note that the constitution explicitly stated that the
constitution and the jurisdiction of the federal government extended
only to states ratifying it.
http://www.constitution.org/constit_.htm
"Article. VII.
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying the Same."
Nowhere in that document does it state or imply that a state cannot
unratify the constitution.
For your entertainment and amusement:
******************
RESOLUTIONS
PASSED BY THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA,
ON THE 19TH DAY OF MARCH, 1864,
DECLARING THE LATE ACT OF CONGRESS FOR
THE SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
ALSO, RESOLUTIONS, PASSED ON THE SAME
DAY, SETTING FORTH THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
IN THE CONTEST WITH THE
LINCOLN GOVERNMENT, AND THE
TERMS UPON WHICH PEACE
SHOULD BE SOUGHT.
BOUGHTON, NISBET, BARNES & MOORE, STATE PRINTERS,
MILLEDGEVILLE, GA.
1864.
RESOLUTIONS,
INTRODUCED BY HON. LINTON STEPHENS
Resolutions on the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus.
The General Assembly of the State of Georgia do Resolve, 1st. That,
under the Constitution of, the Confederate States, there is no power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but in a manner
extent, regulated and limited by the express, emphatic and unqualified
Constitutional prohibitions, that "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law," and that "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
places to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." And
this conclusion results from the two following reasons: First, because
the power to suspend the writ, is derived not from express delegation,
but only from implication, which must always yielded to express,
conflicting and restricting words. Second, because this power being
found nowhere in the Constitution, but in words, which are copied from
the original Constitution of the United States, as adopted in 1787,
must yield in all points of conflict to the subsequent amendments of
1789, which are also copied into our present Constitution, and which
contain the prohibitions above quoted, and were adopted with the
declared purpose of adding further declaratory and restrictive clauses.
2nd. That "due process of law" for seizing the persons of the
people, as defined by the Constitution itself, is a warrant issued upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the persons to be seized, and the issuing of such warrants,
being the exertion of a Judicial power, is, if done by any branch of
the government except the Judiciary, a plain violation of that
provision of the Constitution, which vests the Judicial power in the
Courts alone; and therefore, all seizures of the persons of the people,
by any officer of the Confederate Government, without warrant, and all
warrants for that purpose, from any but a Judicial source, are in the
Judgment of this General Assembly unreasonable and unconstitutional.
3rd. That the recent act of Congress to suspend the privilege
of the writ of Habeas Corpus in cases of arrests ordered by the
President, Secretary of War, or General officer commanding the
Trans-Mississippi Military Department, is an attempt to sustain the
military authority in the exercise of the Constitutional, Judicial
function of issuing warrants, and to give validity to unconstitutional
seizures of the persons of the people; and as the said act, by its
express terms, confines its operation to the upholding of this class of
unconstitutional seizures, the whole suspension, attempted to be
authorized by it, and the whole act itself, in the judgement of this
General Assembly, are unconstitutional.
4th. That in the judgment of this General Assembly, the said
act is a dangerous assault upon the Constitutional power of the Courts,
and upon the liberty of the people, and beyond the power of any
possible necessity to justify it; and while our Senators and
Representatives in Congress are earnestly urged to take the first
possible opportunity to have it repealed, we refer the question of its
validity to the Courts, with the hope, that the people and the military
authorities will abide by the decision.
5th. That as Constitutional Liberty is the sole object which
our people, and our noble army have, in our present terrible struggle
with the Government of Mr. Lincoln, so also is a faithful adherence to
it, on the part of our own Government, through good fortune in arms,
and through bad, one of the great elements of our strength and final
success; because the constant contrast of Constitutional Government on
our part, with the usurpations and tyrannies, which characterize the
Government of our enemy, under the ever recurring and ever false plea
of the necessities of war, will have the double effect of animating our
people with an unconquerable zeal, and of inspiring the people of the
North more and more, with a desire and determination to put an end to a
contest which is waged by their Government openly against our liberty
and as truly, but more covertly, against their own.
THOS. HARDEMAN,
Speaker House Representatives.
L. CARRINGTON,
Clerk House Representatives.
PETER CONE,
President of Senate, Pro. Tem.
L. H. KENAN,
Secretary of Senate.
Approved March 19th, 1864.
JOSEPH E. BROWN,
Governor.
Not if passing the ordinance of secession was considered an act of
rebellion or insurrection. What if all the people of New York City
voting as a body politic declared all laws of New York State null and
void within city limits. You don't think that the national guard will be
called in to put a stop to this nonsense?
The secesh was no more valid or legal than Shay's Rebellion in
Massachussetts.
Bob Kolker
That is from a strict
> interpretation of the constituition that states (or the people of each
> given state, let us not get into that arguement) had to give consent to
> ratify the constitution and so join the union, and nothing in it states
> they cannot withdraw consent.
>
article VI does.
and after the first 13 states congress accepted all the remaining state,
not vice versus
>
> > Lincoln consistently took the view that it was
> > not, a position which he was fully entitled to
> > maintain unless/until Congress legislated to the
> > contrary and/or the Supreme Court held that it
> > _was_ foreign soil.
>
> That would be wrong. The president has a hell of a lot of stroke in
> diplomatic matters, and as to the rest, he has no authority to make war
> w/o consent of congress.
>
he does have the power to suppress rebellion. and congress supported lincoln
anyway.
> A very bad precident set by that administration.
>
you mean the george washington administration as he set that precident.
> All this is BS anyway as the US government did not treat the southern
> states as proper states till long after the war. They recognized the
> secession as a fact in how they treated southern states after the war.
>
they did not act as proper states.
"Alfred Montestruc" <monte...@gmail.com> wrote
in message
news:1156724615.4...@h48g2000cwc.googlegr
oups.com...
>
> Mike Stone wrote:
>
> > Lincoln consistently took the view that it was
> > not [a foreign country], a position which he
was fully entitled to
> > maintain unless/until Congress legislated to
the
> > contrary and/or the Supreme Court held that it
> > _was_ foreign soil.
>
> That would be wrong. The president has a hell
of a lot of stroke in
> diplomatic matters,
Yes. Including (arguably) the right to determine
whether S Carolina should be recognised as a
foreign country. Like Buchanan before him, he took
the position that it should not, a position he was
entirely within his rights to take, absent any
legislation or court decision to the contrary.
and as to the rest, he has no authority to make
war
> w/o consent of congress.
>
Yes he has. Under Sec 2 of the Militia Act 1792,
he is entitled to use the Militia without prior
consent of Congress, if the latter be not in
session, and continue doing so for 30 days after
the commencment of the next session. By that time,
congress certainly _had_ consented to Lincoln's
actions. Sec 3 of the same act indicates that the
Militia may be so used when this is necessary "in
the judgment of the President" ie he does not need
anyone's prior consent to take such action. If you
think he is exceeding his power, you have to get
Congress or the Courts to take action against him
He doesn't need to get their approval _before_ he
acts.
> A very bad precident set by that administration.
>
> All this is BS anyway as the US government did
not treat the southern
> states as proper states till long after the war.
They recognized the
> secession as a fact in how they treated southern
states after the war.
>
On that point I agree with you. Thaddeus Stevens
and Co took _secession_ doctrine to its logical
conclusion, arguing (as you do) that the CS had
ceased to be states of the Union when they
seceded, but carrying your argument further by
going on to note that, since in 1865 they had also
ceased to be _independent_ of the US, they were
now a million or so square miles of unorganised
territory, for which Congress might legislate as
it saw fit. To paraphrase the old joke about
Kentucky, one might say that the Radical
Republicans had accepted the secessionist position
_after_ the War.
I reject that position, and hence I tend to
disapprove both of secessionists _and_ of radical
reconstructionists. This position sometimes brings
me into conflict not only with neo-rebs, but also
with "unionists" who condemn secession while
contriving to nonetheless _approve_ of
reconstruction - imho an inconsistent position.
This however, has nothing to do with Mr Lincoln,
who was in no way to blame for reconstruction as
it developed after his death.
I don't know but what we're arguing a distinction without much of a
difference here. You're fond of Wikipedia, so check out how it defines
"jury nullifcation" in its article on the subject,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jury_nullification: "Jury nullification is
a jury's refusal to render a verdict according to the law, as
instructed by the court, regardless of the weight of evidence
presented. Instead, a jury bases its verdict on other grounds.
Historically, examples include the perceived injustice of a law in
general, the perceived injustice of how the law applies in a particular
case, the race of a party or accuser, or the jury's own prejudices."
"The perceived injustice of a law in general" may correspond to your
"The law in question is BS," though I can't be sure just what you meant
by that. "The perceived injustice of how the law applies in a
particular case" may correspond to your "the law in question is being
wrongly applied," though I think you meant something else. Both of
these two encompass my intended meaning whn I said , "'Jury
nullification' means that a jury finds a defendant 'not guilty' even
though they believe he is guilty. They do so because they think that
the law he has violated is an unjust law, not because they think he has
violated no law." As the Wikipedia article notes, there are other and
much more negative motivations for jury nullification that I did not
mention.
Note also that the Wikipedia article says, "Jury nullification is a de
facto power of the jury, and is not ordinarily described as a right,"
and then explains the reasons why this power exists.
Finally (to tie this discussion to something having to do with the
Civil War, so, the moderators do not quite properly object), note the
statement farther down in the article, " Nullification has a mixed
history in the United States. Jury nullification appeared in the
pre-Civil War era when juries occasionally refused to convict for
violations of the Fugitive Slave Act. However, during the Civil Rights
era [I would add 'as well as the pre-and-post Civil War eras'],
all-white juries were known to refuse to convict white defendants for
the murder of African-Americans."
> FYI no one is guilty under our system of justice unless they 1)
> confess, 2) agree to a judge only trial and the judge finds them
> guilty, 3) Plead nolo contendre, 4) a jury finds them guilty.
>
> If a jury finds you not guilty you are not guitly regardless of what
> happend.
When you say "no one is guilty," that simply means that no one may be
held accountable and punished under the law for a crime unless one of
those four conditions is met. It does not mean that no one has
committed a crime. When you say that "If a jury finds you not guilty
you are not guilty regardless of what happened" you are simply
mistaken. If you have committed a crime, then you are guilty of having
committed that crime, even if a jury "finds" otherwise and you cannot
be punished.
On Septmber 11th, 2001, four airliners crashed in the area of the east
coast of the United States. The fact that no one on board any of those
airliners was ever "found guilty" of committing a crime by a jury does
not mean that no one on board any of those airliners committed a crime
that day.
> > They
> > do so because they think that the law he has violated is an unjust law,
> > not because they think he has violated no law. In the old days, in the
> > early years of the Republic, there were two kinds of courts -- courts
> > of law, and courts of equity. The purpose of courts of law was to
> > uphold the law and provide for the punishment of those who broke it.
> > The purpose of courts of equity was to render justice, regradless of
> > what the law said (because sometimes the law's an ass). But courts of
> > equity died out early because people were uncomfortable with the notion
> > that it is up to individual judges to decide when the law's an ass and
> > when it's not. Many today are equally uncomfortable with the notion
> > that it should be up to individual juries, but as a practical matter
> > how do you put a stop to it -- other than to allow the prosecution a
> > reasonable chance to exclude from juries people who might be tempted to
> > nullify the law?
>
> You seem to confuse me with someone who thinks the current practice of
> stacking juries with the ignorant and easy to persuade is a good thing.
> Juries have the right and duty to nullify bad laws.
They also have the power to nullify good laws. Would you say that they
have the right to nullify good laws? A legal right, perhaps, but
surely not a moral right. The duty to nullify good laws? Is there a
duty to refuse to do one's duty?
In 1808, Congress passed a law making it illegal to import slaves into
the U.S. In 1820, it passed another law declaring that any American
citizen serving as a crewman on a foreign ship engaged in the slave
trade, or any person whatsoever serving as a creman on an American ship
engaged in the slave trade, "shall be adjudged a pirate" and sentenced
to death. In 1858 an American slave ship, WANDERER, with hundreds of
slaves on board, was seized abd brought into port. A Savannah jury
nullified the 1808 and 1820 statutes by finding the crew members not
guilty, though they knew very well that they were. Four years later,
after a finding of "guilty" by a New York jury, the captain of the
slave ship American ERIE, was executed under the same statutes that the
Savammah jury had nullified.
Which one of these juries failed to do its duty, the one that nullified
the law, or the one that upheld it?
Not necessarily - but definitely those klutzes who
decided to bambard Ft Sumter.
That the jury finds the law to be wrong. As in the legislators had no
business making such a law.
> "The perceived injustice of how the law applies in a
> particular case" may correspond to your "the law in question is being
> wrongly applied," though I think you meant something else.
Ok give you an example. If I were on a jury in a state with a three
strikes law, and they bring a case before me where the person is pretty
obviously guilty of the felony charged, but in my opinion the law
should either not exist or be at most a mistemenior (sic), say
posession of more pot than is judged reasonable for personal use and so
is held to be a dealer, and presents no evidence that the person is
violent or a habitual criminal in the theft and violation of the rights
of others term, I either will not convict, or will not convict on
felony charges. I will not be a party to throwing a person in prison
for life for smoking weed or even dealing weed, as long as he or she is
not violent.
On the other hand I do hold that even if the laws against pot are
wrong, they are laws, and should be enforced, with a fine, or short
jail time. Prison for life? The DA can ram it.
Sure, but they are dead. You cannot prosecute a dead man in the USA
AFAIK.
>
> > > They
> > > do so because they think that the law he has violated is an unjust law,
> > > not because they think he has violated no law. In the old days, in the
> > > early years of the Republic, there were two kinds of courts -- courts
> > > of law, and courts of equity. The purpose of courts of law was to
> > > uphold the law and provide for the punishment of those who broke it.
> > > The purpose of courts of equity was to render justice, regradless of
> > > what the law said (because sometimes the law's an ass). But courts of
> > > equity died out early because people were uncomfortable with the notion
> > > that it is up to individual judges to decide when the law's an ass and
> > > when it's not. Many today are equally uncomfortable with the notion
> > > that it should be up to individual juries, but as a practical matter
> > > how do you put a stop to it -- other than to allow the prosecution a
> > > reasonable chance to exclude from juries people who might be tempted to
> > > nullify the law?
> >
> > You seem to confuse me with someone who thinks the current practice of
> > stacking juries with the ignorant and easy to persuade is a good thing.
> > Juries have the right and duty to nullify bad laws.
>
> They also have the power to nullify good laws. Would you say that they
> have the right to nullify good laws?
Here is the crux of the matter. The people, acting through
representatives in the legislature and through the jury box get to
define what is and is not good law. If prosecuters cannot get juries
to consistently convict when they have made a good case and proven the
person did it, it is bad law.
> A legal right, perhaps, but
> surely not a moral right. The duty to nullify good laws? Is there a
> duty to refuse to do one's duty?
We held that to be true in Nerumburg. You owe your fellow man and/or
god and/or your self-respect more than you owe the state. If the state
demands that you ignore your duty to god, your fellow man or your
self-respect, the state is asking too much.
>
> In 1808, Congress passed a law making it illegal to import slaves into
> the U.S. In 1820, it passed another law declaring that any American
> citizen serving as a crewman on a foreign ship engaged in the slave
> trade, or any person whatsoever serving as a creman on an American ship
> engaged in the slave trade, "shall be adjudged a pirate" and sentenced
> to death. In 1858 an American slave ship, WANDERER, with hundreds of
> slaves on board, was seized abd brought into port. A Savannah jury
> nullified the 1808 and 1820 statutes by finding the crew members not
> guilty, though they knew very well that they were. Four years later,
> after a finding of "guilty" by a New York jury, the captain of the
> slave ship American ERIE, was executed under the same statutes that the
> Savammah jury had nullified.
We are all human, not saints.
>
> Which one of these juries failed to do its duty, the one that nullified
> the law, or the one that upheld it?
My take --the former.
Are you talking about the southern Unionists who were murdered
because of
their patriotism?
> The USA should have recognized South Carolina as a seperate nation as
> soon as she passed the ordinence of secession.
You keep saying that-- over and over again.
As though "secession" were a right. The only ones who believed
that also
had a very strong interest in preserving Negro Slavery.
The secessionists were outvoted in the Presidential Election of
1860.
Then,
The secessionists were outvoted on the battlefield.
This "precious right of secession" is intimately tied to the need to
own Negroes.
Absolutely not. I'm talking about innocent farmers and non combatants
who were murdered by rampaging Union troops.
> Absolutely not. I'm talking about innocent farmers and non combatants
> who were murdered by rampaging Union troops.
And I am talking about innocent farmers and noncombatants in
eastern
Tennessee and Texas who remained loyal to the Union.
You will probably find that any army--Union or Confederate-- had
soldiers
who rampaged, wherever they were.
Can you document those 50,000 "murders?"
dilorenzo is not a credible source.
Natty can't.
There is nothing in that poorly researched column to justify the claim
of 5,000 Southern civilians killed, never mind 50,000.
JFE
Compared to the Russians there was very little rapine either.
Bob Kolker
Now, Jim, it very clearly documents the deaths of 4000 innocent cattle
and "not less than" 3000 innocent sheep in the Shenandoah Valley alone
in 1864. Throw in some innocent pigs and some innocent chickens, and a
number of 50,000 would certainly be possible.
All kidding aside, I do recall reading somewhere an estimate that
50,000 Southern civilians may have died as a result of the war. I do
not find that number at all incredible, though it was surely based on
sheer guesswork. I don't recall that the estimate included a breakdown
as to who died, or why they died. Certainly there is no reason to
believe that more than a small fraction of them were murdered by Union
soldiers. Many of them, for example, might have been escaped slaves
who died of disease in squalid "contraband camps." Others might have
been people killed by other Southerners during the general breakdown in
law and order that occurred throughout much of the South as the
Confederacy entered its final decline. Still others might have been
draft dodgers or suspected draft dodgers killed by Confederate troops
or home guards. The number of different categories of victims might be
fairly large.
I wouldn't idealize either side on that score.
There are always soldiers who believe that rape and pillage is
their due.
Although, it is probably safe to say that American armies of the
Civil War
weren't as bad as other armies in history.
But, then, we might be surprised.
Most of the soldiers were farm boys. I don't think that they were
brought up as rapists and looters. Perhaps some did sucomb to the
temptation but I think both the Reb Army and the Union Army consisted of
fairly innocent young men.
Bob Kolker
>
To whom it may concern, Sirs, this is a history forum. If some people
are so ashamed or embarrassed by the fact that the Union army committed
barbaric attrocities against the South that are as uncivilized as any
in the history of warfare you should not show your ignorance by
refuting it here.
Rape, pillage, murder, starving noncombatants by blockading ports and
burning crops. Indiscrimanate shelling of cities full of woman and
children, burning down noncombatants houses. This is what the Union
army did to break the South. Sherman wrote by his own hand a letter
that stated he was taught at West Point that he would be hanged if ever
caught doing the things he ordered his army to do. Maybe you gentlemen
should research Shermans rampage through the South.
"Even the women and children must feel the hard hand of war"
Then you shouldn't be "surprised or embarrassed" that Secession and
Rebellion
was mainly about the precious right to enslave another race.
> by the fact that the Union army committed
> barbaric attrocities against the South that are as uncivilized as any
> in the history of warfare ....
And the Southern armies didn't treat southern civilians much better,
either.
> ......starving noncombatants by blockading ports and
> burning crops.
The south could have grown food to eat.
> Indiscrimanate shelling ....
Mostly a waste of time, from a strictly military angle.
>of cities full of woman and
> children, .....
Is that because the Rebels hid amongst the civilians, and wouldn't
come out in
the open to fight?
>burning down noncombatants houses.
Hampton was burned down by confederate forces-- something which
happened
more often than not.
>This is what the Union
> army did to break the South.
Kind of like what we did in Fallujah two years ago.
And every year we celebrate the taking of Tall Afar by doing it
again.
>
. Maybe you gentlemen
> should research Shermans rampage through the South.
>
My wife is a southerner. She hates Sherman, too.
> "Even the women and children must feel the hard hand of war"
A quicker way to end the war. Privation. Want. Cause their boys
to
quit the field and come home to live in peace.
Of want.
Of abuse by Union soldiers.
Of abuse by Confederate soldiers.
Hung because they remained loyal to the Union.
considering the length of the war, 50,000 seems a little on the low
side.
I compare that with over 100,000 Iraqi dead since our invasion since
2003.
> Rape, pillage, murder, starving noncombatants by blockading ports and
> burning crops. Indiscrimanate shelling of cities full of woman and
> children, burning down noncombatants houses.
One such incident occured at Fayetteville, Ark., in early 1862.
Confederate Surgeon Washington Gammage called the pillage of
Fayetteville "one of the most disgraceful scenes that I ever saw."
Gammage said the troops left the town -- or what was left after they
torched much of it -- carrying off not only all the food they could
carry, but bonnets,
dresses, schoolbooks and even baby rattles. Of course the troops in
question were the Confederate troops of Generals Ben McCulloch and
Sterling Price, and the town they sacked and burned was a Confederate
town, and the people that they robbed were their own.
> > > > > So who is responsible for the murder of 50,000 Southern civilians
> > > > > during the war? Not Lincoln?
> > > >
> > > > Are you talking about the southern Unionists who were murdered
> > > > because of
> > > > their patriotism?
> > >
> > > Absolutely not. I'm talking about innocent farmers and non combatants
> > > who were murdered by rampaging Union troops.
> >
> > Can you document those 50,000 "murders?"
Sorry, a Rockwell/DiLorenzo/Libertarian website doesn't cut it as
documentation. Can you offer some unbiased scholarly documentation?
Agree.
>
> I compare that with over 100,000 Iraqi dead since our invasion since
> 2003.
But Iraq now has a population much larger than that of the CSA then.
IIRC the CSA was a total of about 10 million souls, and Iraq has
between 30 & 40 million, and at this point in time the US Army does not
call in artillery or air strikes on civilians knowing they are
civilians and doing so to break their moral. That was done by the US
Army in the war between the states (firing artillery on civilians to
break their moral, shelling of Atlanta and other places.) While the
Confederate Army did not knowingly shell their own civilians, and the
war was fought 95-99% in the south.
> To whom it may concern, Sirs, this is a history forum.
True enough. The cause of history is not served by citing the
fraudulent and error-filled work of DiLorenzo in support of a
fantasy-filled assertion.
> If some people
> are so ashamed or embarrassed by the fact that the Union army committed
> barbaric attrocities against the South that are as uncivilized as any
> in the history of warfare you should not show your ignorance by
> refuting it here.
If you want to play "dueling atrocities," I'm game. The list of
atrocities
committed by the Confederates is arguably longer. Read about
Centralia or Lawrence.
War is, by definition, a hardship-filled exercise.
JFE
>
> Rape, pillage, murder, starving noncombatants by blockading ports and
> burning crops. Indiscrimanate shelling of cities full of woman and
> children, burning down noncombatants houses. This is what the Union
> army did to break the South. Sherman wrote by his own hand a letter
> that stated he was taught at West Point that he would be hanged if ever
> caught doing the things he ordered his army to do. Maybe you gentlemen
> should research Shermans rampage through the South.
It worked, didn't it?
>
> "Even the women and children must feel the hard hand of war"
>
Precisely. Maybe that is why we have not had a secession since. If I
recall, Sherman said something about war being all hell. Did I get that
right?
The worst thing about a war is losing it.
Bob Kolker
When one speaks about morality and war one should always keep in
mind a few bedrock problems. For example, when is it sensible to lose a
war rather than act in ways that are thought by some to be "immoral"?
It is all very well to criticize ruthless behaviour but it is pretty
hollow unless one actually values being nice more than winning the war
one is in.
So the southerners received it from both sides.
> It is all very well to criticize ruthless behaviour but it is pretty
> hollow unless one actually values being nice more than winning the war
> one is in.
Didn't Sherman pose that question?
Why shouldn't he make "Georgia howl" if it would cause armies to
dissolve so
that the young men could come home alive?
> .... and at this point in time the US Army does not
> call in artillery or air strikes on civilians knowing they are
> civilians and doing so to break their moral.
Fallujah? Tall Afar? Still goes on today.
Well then, I guess 50,000 civilian deaths in the South does sound
pretty
high.
Anyway, looks like Natty just pulled that figure out of his
jammies.
And they didn't have 500 lb "precision" guided bombs, or bomblets
back
then either.
We can talk about the "direct effects" of artillery. Or we can
also talk about
the indirect effects-- such as the aftermath (civil disorder,
infectious disease)
when an army passes through.
And the people in the South would have suffered at the hands of both
Confederate
and Union armies.
Get hold of the movie _Shenandoah_ if you can.
Though fiction, I think it's a good portrayal of
how it must have been. For many civilians trying
to get on with their lives, _both_ armies must
have been the enemy.
--
Mike Stone - Peterborough, England
"It is so stupid of modern civilisation to have
given up believing in the devil, when he is its
only explanation"
Ronald Knox
Probably true in all wars.
Tough times call for 'coloring outside the lines.' I assume Lincoln
realized this and was willing to accept the consequences if it achieved
his mission. It shows a person willing to rise to whatever the
situation calls for. We should more more people like that today.
Looking back on such people they are seen as hero's with a few flaws if
they achieve what most people consider good, or as ruthless bad guys if
they fail and the other side wins.
To judge and view based upon the 'rules of the road' without seeing the
bigger picture then playing out is to commit yourself to the rabble and
not rise above to see the larger picture playing out.
paul
>
>
>
> Please to note that the constitution explicitly stated that the
> constitution and the jurisdiction of the federal government extended
> only to states ratifying it.
>
> http://www.constitution.org/constit_.htm
>
> "Article. VII.
> The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient
> for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
> ratifying the Same."
>
>
> Nowhere in that document does it state or imply that a state cannot
> unratify the constitution.
It's easy enough to test your thesis.
Here's Article VI: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding."
Here's an actual ordinance of "unratification":
**********
"AN ORDINANCE to dissolve the union between the State of North Carolina
and the other States united with her, under the compact of government
entitled 'The Constitution of the United States.'
We, the people of the State of North Carolina in convention assembled,
do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, That the
ordinance adopted by the State of North Carolina in the convention of
1789, whereby the Constitution of the United States was ratified and
adopted, and also all acts and parts of acts of the General Assembly
ratifying and adopting amendments to the said Constitution, are hereby
repealed, rescinded, and abrogated.
We do further declare and ordain, That the union now subsisting between
the State of North Carolina and the other States, under the title of
the United States of America, is hereby dissolved, and that the State
of North Carolina is in full possession and exercise of all those
rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and
independent State.
Done in convention at the city of Raleigh, this the 20th day of May, in
the year of our Lord 1861, and in the eighty-fifth year of the
independence of said State."
***************
Let us now consider North Carolina's ordinance of "unratification" in
light of Article VI. We begin by asking if it was a "Thing in the
Constitution or Laws" of North Carolina. If it wasn't, then it could
not possibly have had any legal effect in North Carolina regardless of
what the Constitution of the U.S. says or doesn't say. However, it
certainly appears to be a "Thing in the Constitution or Laws" of North
Carolina. It was called an "ordinance," it was issued by a body
claiming to have the power to enact law for North Carolina, and it was
issued to have a specific legal effect, namely, to allow North Carolina
henceforth legally to "exercise all of those rights of sovereignty
which belong and appertain to a free an independent State."
So now, the North Carolina convention having adopted this ordinance of
"unratification," we ask what legal effect it had under the
Constitution of the United States. As a result of this ordinance, did
the Constitution and laws of the United States legally become
inoperative in North Carolina? They absolutely did not. By Article
VI, the Constitution and laws of the United States remained "the
supreme Law of the Land" in North Carolina, that "Thing in the
Constitution or Laws" of North Carolina that was the ordinance of
"unratification" notwithstanding. The "union subsisting between the
State of North Carolina and the other States, under the title of the
United States of America" was not legally dissolved," and North
Carolina was not "in full possession and exercise of all those rights
of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent
State."
Seventy-three years before North Carolina adopted its ordinance of
"unratification," while it was considering its ordinance of
ratification, North Carolina's governor, a leading delegate to the
ratification convention, had observed in defense of Article VI, "The
Constitution must be the supreme law of the land; otherwise, it would
be in the power of any one state to counteract the other states, and
withdraw itself from the Union." He did not want states to be allowed
to withdraw from the Union under the Constitution, through
"unratification" or any other mechanism. There is no evidence that
any other delegates to the North Carolina ratification convention
wanted any such thing either.
Your statement that "Nowhere in that document does it state or imply
that a state cannot unratify the constitution" is therefore shown to be
false. That a state, once having ratified the Constittution, could not
lawfully and unilaterally "unratify" it later is implied by a plain and
straightforward reading of Article VI.
Elsewhere I referred to U.S. Army General Orders No. 100, the "Lieber
Code," issued in April 1863 and encompassing the Army's official
understanding of what was and was not permitted under the "laws of
war." I cited "Art. 19. Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the
enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants,
and especially the women and children, may be removed before the
bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war
to omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity."
The following additional articles are relevant here:
Art. 20. Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign
nations or governments. It is a law and requisite of civilized
existence that men live in political, continuous societies, forming
organized units, called states or nations, whose constituents bear,
enjoy, suffer, advance and retrograde together, in peace and in war.
Art. 21. The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy,
as one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such
is subjected to the hardships of the war.
Art. 17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve
the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the
speedier subjection of the enemy.
Art. 18. When a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants,
in order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of
provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them
back, so as to hasten on the surrender.
In sum, blockading ports and burning crops, to starve the civiian
population, was considered perfectly permissible. Bombarding defended
towns containing civilians was also considered perfectly permissible.
Even burning noncombatants' houses was permissible in cases of
military necessity (for example, when Lee's army retreated from
Gettysburg, it set fire to some of the houses in the town to provide a
smokescreen to disguise the retreat). However,
Art. 44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded
country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized
officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place
by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such
inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other
severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.
A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence,
and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be
lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.
If the people, acting through representatives in the legislature, and
the people, acting through the jury box, get to define what is and is
not good law, where does the balance lie when the people acting through
the jury box disagree with the people acting through representatives in
the legislature? Indeed, is this not precisely what jury nullification
usually means -- that a jury rejects as "bad law" a statute enacted by
the people's representatives in some legislative body? Where a
unanimous verdict is required for a conviction, doesn't jury
nullification mean in practice that a single juror may nullify the
votes of all the other members of the jury, as well as of the people's
representatives in the legislature?
Consider a jury that might have nullified the Fugitive Slave Law of
1850 by refusing to convict a person who had clearly violated that law.
Now, I can understand the argument that says that the jury, as the
judge of the law, had the right to decide that the Fugitive Slave Law
was unconstitutional. This, however, would not have been jury
nullification. It would have been what is called "jury review," the
equivalent of the "judicial review" that permits an appeals court to
overturn a conviction on the grounds that the statute under which a
person was convicted violates the Constitution. I can also understand
that argument that says that, because slavery was unjust, it would have
been unjust to punish a person for helping a fugitive slave to escape,
so perhaps a jury would have had a moral duty to refuse to uphold the
Fugitive Slave Law. What I have great difficulty in understanding is
the argument that says that every individual has a moral right to "get
to decide" what laws shall or shall not be enforced, and when,
regardless of the merits of a particular case. I reject that argument,
else I should have to say (for example) that a black jury member "gets
to decide" that a black defendant accused of murdering a white person,
and guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the evidence
presented in court, shall go free for no better reason than that the
perpetrator is black and the victim is white. Why would you want to
argue that some jury might have a moral right to let your murderer go
free because of your respective gene pools?
In the 18th and 19th centuries, it was simply accepted even among those
who advocated "humane" warfare that at an attacker had the right to
fire on a defended town regardless of the presence of civilians in the
town. The Lieber Code, the first attempt to codify the "laws of war"
and adopted for the guidance of the U.S. Army as "General Orders No.
100" on Apr. 24th, 1863, stated: "Art. 19. Commanders, whenever
admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so
that the noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may be
removed before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of
the common law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be
a necessity." If the Confederates did not want Atlanta to be
bombarded, their option was to abandon Atlanta and not defend it.
Given that the Confederates chose to defend Atlanta, the civilians in
the town who did not wish to endure bombardment had one option, and
that was to flee the city.
Funny.
Considering that the other side was doing some serious "coloring
outside
the lines" based on some fanciful doctrine of "right of secession."
Gary Charbonneau wrote:
> j...@ams.org wrote:
>
>>Natty wrote:
>>
>>>Marcaurelius wrote:
>>>
>>>>Natty wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>So who is responsible for the murder of 50,000 Southern civilians
>>>>>during the war? Not Lincoln?
>>>>
>>>> Are you talking about the southern Unionists who were murdered
>>>>because of
>>>> their patriotism?
>>>
>>>http://www.lewrockwell.com/dilorenzo/dilorenzo8.html
>>
>>There is nothing in that poorly researched column to justify the claim
>>of 5,000 Southern civilians killed, never mind 50,000.
>
>
> Now, Jim, it very clearly documents the deaths of 4000 innocent cattle
> and "not less than" 3000 innocent sheep in the Shenandoah Valley alone
> in 1864. Throw in some innocent pigs and some innocent chickens, and a
> number of 50,000 would certainly be possible.
They weren't all innocent. The record also reflects that they
repeatedly refused to swear a loyalty oath to the Union, and instead
launched several 'suicide' attacks, usually around dinner time.
The law must meet both tests, elected representatives subject to loss
of his or her job if they tick off the voters must vote for it, and the
people must be accepting of it enough to not nullify consistently, as
in a prosecuter will not be thinking " This prosecution is a waste of
my time as 50% of the time the jury will refuse to convict cause many
folks around here hate that law."
What is wrong with redundancy in a safety system? Engineers use it all
the time, a fuse and a circut breaker are often both on the same
circut, two seperate totally independent pressure relief devices in a
steam boiler, to prevent explosions, suspenders & belt if you are
really concerned about loss of your trousers.
Bad laws and bad government are far worse than any one criminal who is
not in charge of a government can be, and redundant safety protection
seems like a good idea to me as a designer who has designed machines
that people's lives depend on. The danger of a government out of
control dwarfs the danger of criminals.
FYI the US government collects in taxes many thousands of times the
amount of money stolen every year in the USA, the US federal government
kills (legally in war, and judicial homicide by cops and executioners)
many times the number of people murdered in this country on a yearly
basis, at least while we are at war, and IIRC if you time averaged the
killings by the US government over the 20th century, and compaired it
to our murder rate, the US government is the much bigger killer than US
criminals.
That is a government we think of as being good, now imagine a bad
government totally out of control, , ,
>Indeed, is this not precisely what jury nullification
> usually means -- that a jury rejects as "bad law" a statute enacted by
> the people's representatives in some legislative body? Where a
> unanimous verdict is required for a conviction, doesn't jury
> nullification mean in practice that a single juror may nullify the
> votes of all the other members of the jury, as well as of the people's
> representatives in the legislature?
No you get a hung jury, and a mistrial, and if the prosecuter thinks
that say 50 to 75% of the time he will not get that one juror out of
twelve that will refuse to convict, he refiles the charges. That
happens often enough in murder cases.
If the jury does not hang, and is convinced by the one or more jurors
that the law is really bad, and/or the law is being wrongly applied,
then they aquit.
>
> Consider a jury that might have nullified the Fugitive Slave Law of
> 1850 by refusing to convict a person who had clearly violated that law.
> Now, I can understand the argument that says that the jury, as the
> judge of the law, had the right to decide that the Fugitive Slave Law
> was unconstitutional. This, however, would not have been jury
> nullification. It would have been what is called "jury review," the
> equivalent of the "judicial review" that permits an appeals court to
> overturn a conviction on the grounds that the statute under which a
> person was convicted violates the Constitution. I can also understand
> that argument that says that, because slavery was unjust, it would have
> been unjust to punish a person for helping a fugitive slave to escape,
> so perhaps a jury would have had a moral duty to refuse to uphold the
> Fugitive Slave Law. What I have great difficulty in understanding is
> the argument that says that every individual has a moral right to "get
> to decide" what laws shall or shall not be enforced, and when,
> regardless of the merits of a particular case. I reject that argument,
> else I should have to say (for example) that a black jury member "gets
> to decide" that a black defendant accused of murdering a white person,
> and guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the evidence
> presented in court, shall go free for no better reason than that the
> perpetrator is black and the victim is white. Why would you want to
> argue that some jury might have a moral right to let your murderer go
> free because of your respective gene pools?
The idea is that you have responsible adult jurors, not mental children
in the jury box (which is exactly what you describe). I realize that
this is not always going to be the case, but seriously this is one of
the reasons I am not too keen on universal suffrage. I think the
potential voter/juror/militaman/citizen (from the wag who wrote about
the three boxes of citizenship, ballot box, jury box, and ammo box)
needs to be at least emotionally an adult, which the person you
describe is not.
I think that many different tests could be made to weed out people who
are not consistantly able to make responsible decisions, [I would most
strongly advocate that the voter/juror must be self-supporting, that
gets rid of people too emotionally unstable to support themselves.] but
unfortunatly people will scream about it.
But doesn't your position imply that the people of a minority of the
states, or the people of one state, have the right to force the people
of a majority of the states to consent to a dissolution of the Union,
even though it is not the desire of the majority to do so, and not in
the majority's best interest? What is the philosophical justification
for the claim that the desires and interests of a minority should
always take precedence over the desires and interests of a majority in
the matter of secession? What causes the desires and interests of the
minority to become some kind of absolute moral imperative here?
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution declares, "New states may be
admitted by the Congress into this union; but no new states shall be
formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any
state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of
states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned
as well as of the Congress." This clause was added for the obvious
purpose of guaranteeing the right of a state majority to approve, or
disapprove, the secession of a state minority. Do you feel that there
is something tyrannical about the requirement that Congress is
prohibited from granting statehood to a part of a state that wishes to
secede from the rest of the state, without the consent of the state
legislature? Should Article IV, Section 3 be amended?
Suppose that some portion of a state should secede from the rest, and
use violence to prevent the enforcement of the state's laws in that
portion of the state. Article IV, Section 4 declares, "The United
States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form
of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on
application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the
legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence." If the
state legislature (or, if the legislature is not in session, the
governor), were to call upon the United States for assistance to halt
the violent resistance to the enforcement of the state's laws, the U.S.
would be constitutionally obliged to intervene against the state
minority, on behalf of the state majority as reflected in the
legislature. Isn't this a guarantee of what you would consider
"tyranny" by a state majority over a state minority? Should Article IV,
Section 4 be amended to delete such a guarantee?
The present state constitution of Mississippi contains the following
provision in Article III, the state bill of rights: "Sec. 7. The right
to withdraw from the Federal Union on account of any real or supposed
grievance, shall never be assumed by this state, nor shall any law be
passed in derogation of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of
this state to the government of the United States." This clause seems
rather peculiar to me; should the people of Mississippi decide that
they wanted to secede, they could simply amend the state bill of rights
to delete the clause that bans them from doing so. But if it weren't
for that peculiarity, which renders it utterly meaningless, would you
characterize the clause as tyrannical?
So your position is that a spouse has no right to unilaterally dissolve
a marrage, and they have to stay in it. Or are you arguing that they
must leave all or most of the property they brought to the marrage?
I have heard you assert that southerners could have just left the USA
for Brazil, Cuba or other places, but that they would have to abvandon
all their claims to the southern states.
In any case your argumemt is very close to an arguement to the effect
that a spouse cannot unilaterally divorce, and if they do they must
abandon all claims to property of the marraige. That is absurd. It is
the spouse's body and personal freedom, not the other partners.
The people of the southern state owned the land of the southern states,
it was their liberty, their sovereignty. They had and have the moral
right to politically associate with whom they choose, that the northern
states did not like that they did not want to be politically associated
with them anymore was the northern states problem.
Slavery is an issue that is used as a smoke screen by northerners and
unionists. Was it wrong, sure, but it does not make forcing the
southern people to stay in the union at gunpoint right, and the north
did not care enough about it to boycott poducts of slave labor before
the war.
---------snip
>
> The present state constitution of Mississippi contains the following
> provision in Article III, the state bill of rights: "Sec. 7. The right
> to withdraw from the Federal Union on account of any real or supposed
> grievance, shall never be assumed by this state, nor shall any law be
> passed in derogation of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of
> this state to the government of the United States."
Which clause was required by the federal government as a condition of
federal troops leaving the state.
Promises extracted at gunpoint are not really promises. Laws written
by elected legislators while having a gun pointed at them are not
really laws.
---snip