The Goodspeed hypothesis: _German Wars, 1914-1945_
gerold firl
of WWI lately on soc.history.war.misc. In the course of that
discussion it has become apparent that many posters on this newsgroup
are unfamiliar with the revisionist analysis of the Great War. (Note:
the term "revisionist" in relation to WWI refers to a revision of the
Versailles war guilt verdict, which claimed that Germany bore sole and
complete responsibility for initiating the conflict.)
A.J.P. Taylor, in _From Sarajevo to Potsdam_ (1965) summarized the
peregrinations of revisionism thusly:
"Did Germany's rulers deliberately launch a European war, either from
apprehension or to establish their domination over the Continent? The
answers by historians have gone up and down with the years.
Immediately after the outbreak of war, _Entente_ historians usually
declared that Germany had followed a course of planned aggression,
while German historians claimed that she had acted in self-defence.
Between the wars, most historians came to agree that the war had
started by mistake. Now we seem back at the view that German
militarism was mainly responsible." (p. 21)
Taylor leaves much unsaid, however. Immediately after the war, even
during the Versailles peace conference, Entente historians awakening
from war enthusiasm and emerging from under wartime censorship went
far beyond the position that the war started by "mistake". Probably
the earliest was _The War Guilt and Peace Crime of the Entente Allies_
by Stewart E. Bruce (1920), a remarkably prescient analysis of the
future consequences of the vindictive settlement at Versailles. Bruce
argues that Russia, France, and Britain did more to initiate the war
than did Germany, though his primary interests were the future
consequences of the peace settlement. Perhaps more should be said
regarding this insightful analysis at a later time, but I'll include a
single quote from Bruce before moving on to Goodspeed:
"Modern warfare has discarded poison arrows; but has substituted
instead, poison gas and poison propaganda. The most insidious, the
most deadly and without a question the most cowardly method of warfare
is modern propaganda. Poison gas often brings instant death to the
professional fighters on the battlefield - and ends there; but poison
propaganda does not see the full results of its deadly, venomous and
wicked work in three generations. Bayonets and bullets maim and kill
human flesh on the field of battle; but poison propaganda inflames and
pollutes the minds and consciences of men, women and children of an
entire nation." (p. 87-8)
As seen in earlier threads the readers of soc.history.war certainly
show the toxic symptoms of propaganda poisoning planted nearly 90
years before. No shortage of lurid and hateful ethnocentrism can be
found on this newsgroup, and certainly mere statements of fact and
history will not help those suffering from semantic pollution.
Nonetheless, I think it worthwhile to review the excellent work done
by Goodspeed to rectify our historical amnesia.
"... it is the theme of this book that we live always in the shadow of
the past, that our tomorrows are to a large extent determined by our
yesterdays - abd by our thoughts about our yesterdays... The only way
to escape from these shadows is to dispel them with the light of
truth." (p. ix)
I will here summarize and review the thesis proposed by D. J.
Goodspeed in _The German Wars: 1914-1945_ (1977):
1. WWI and WWII were actually one war, with an armistice from
1918-1939 - four years on, 21 off, and a closing act of six years
duration.
2. France, not Germany, desired and created WWI.
a) France was the nation whose aims could only be met by a great
war.
b) Between 1894 - 1914 France, Russia, and Great Britain spent more
on armaments than Germany and Austria-Hungary.
c) The armies of the Entente Cordiale greatly outnumbered the
Central Powers, and had a more powerful navy.
d) The immediate cause of the war, the assassination of the heir to
A-H, was rooted in Russia's Balkan policy, strongly supported by
France.
e) In the last days before the war the German government worked
harder to prevent war than did France or Russia or Great Britain.
f) Russia was the first of the great powers to order general
mobilization, while Germany mobilized only after both Russia and
France.
3. The wars changed the world in unforeseen and unwelcome ways for all
concerned, and rendered warfare obsolete as an instrument of policy.
4. Political leadership and governmental decision making has been
extraordinarily inadequate in the 20th century. This may be our most
urgent issue for the 21st.
Before WWI, European culture espoused a common ideology: in 1939,
Europe was a "spiritual madhouse" in the breakdown of Christian
consensus. Goodspeed concludes his preface thusly:
"The First World War was an unnecessary war. The differences between
the belligerants, their conflicting ambitions, and their varying
visions of the future were not so great or so fundamental as to demand
a settlement by arms. And the war did infinitely more harm than good.
It was a cul de sac down which the West should never have ventured. It
killed the promise of a civilization, and it killed it frivolously,
having nothing to offer in its place. Even those achievements that at
the time appeared to be beneficial results of the conflict - the
overthrow of tsardom, the weakening of empire, the establishment of a
League of Nations - were stillborn. The tyranny of the Bolsheviks
replaced the tyranny of the tsar, an exchange of whips for scorpions.
The empires lingered on and defended themselves at Amritsar and in
Algeria. The League failed. Quite possibly, had it not been for the
First World War, Western civilization might have worked out its inner
contradictions and progressed to a more just, generous, and creative
society. As it was, in 1914 we stepped out into the night." (p. ix)
Goodspeed supports his thesis with a tightly-reasoned argument drawing
upon the full range of diplomatic documents, the memoirs of the
primary participants, a wide range subsequent histories (Albertini in
particular) and other archival materials. I'll expand on any of the
points as necessary in a subsequent post.
This is probably enough for now. It summarizes the primary theme of
_The German Wars_. I'm currently reading Albertini, which contains a
wealth of primary materials; I'll pass on any interesting or useful
additions as I find them.
- gerold
Don Phillipson
news:579d7686.02120...@posting.google.com...
> I will here summarize and review the thesis proposed by D. J.
> Goodspeed in _The German Wars: 1914-1945_ (1977):
>
> 1. WWI and WWII were actually one war, with an armistice from
> 1918-1939 - four years on, 21 off, and a closing act of six years
> duration.
>
> 2. France, not Germany, desired and created WWI.
> a) France was the nation whose aims could only be met by a great
> war. . . .
>
> 4. Political leadership and governmental decision making has been
> extraordinarily inadequate in the 20th century. . . .
Goodspeed is unusual (among revisionists) by mentioning
the political leadership of individuals: also valuably studied
in Robert Massie's book Dreadnought (which reaches the
opposite conclusion, i.e. blames Germany for promoting
the Austrian invasion of Serbia.)
The "desires" of various countries (e.g. Germany's
supposed desire for a bigger overseas empire) are not
a reliable indicator of anything unless we can articulate
these psychological phenomena with what happened
materially. The conclusion that the Central Powers were
guilty of starting WW1 cites the material fact that they
fought only on foreign soil. Germany invaded Russia,
Belgium and France, and Austria invaded Russia,
Serbia and Italy. No belligerents invaded Germany or
Austria (or were ever in a position to do so before
the collapse in late 1918.)
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs (Ottawa, Canada)
dphil...@trytel.com.com.com.less2
Michael P Reed
> Germany invaded Russia,
> Belgium and France, and Austria invaded Russia,
> Serbia and Italy. No belligerents invaded Germany or
> Austria (or were ever in a position to do so before
> the collapse in late 1918.)
ISTR that Tannenberg was in Prussia.
--
Regards,
Michael P. Reed
narrl...@hotmail.com
IIRC, eastern (Galician) portions of A-H
were also overrun by the Tsar's troops
early on.
Ed Frank
David Thornley
gerold firl <gerol...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>We've had some interesting discussion regarding the origin and meaning
>of WWI lately on soc.history.war.misc. In the course of that
>discussion it has become apparent that many posters on this newsgroup
>are unfamiliar with the revisionist analysis of the Great War. (Note:
>the term "revisionist" in relation to WWI refers to a revision of the
>Versailles war guilt verdict, which claimed that Germany bore sole and
>complete responsibility for initiating the conflict.)
>
that the responsibility for starting WWI as it actually started
is mostly Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian in descending order.
While this is contrary to the Versailles treaty, it's nothing like
your claims. In other words, using "revisionist" as you do, there
is nothing like *the* revisionist analysis.
>A.J.P. Taylor, in _From Sarajevo to Potsdam_ (1965) summarized the
>peregrinations of revisionism thusly:
>
>"Did Germany's rulers deliberately launch a European war, either from
>apprehension or to establish their domination over the Continent?
This would be a useful question to consider if we adhered to the
Versailles interpretation. As we don't, well, it isn't.
>Taylor leaves much unsaid, however. Immediately after the war, even
>during the Versailles peace conference, Entente historians awakening
>from war enthusiasm and emerging from under wartime censorship went
>far beyond the position that the war started by "mistake".
I don't have to agree with them, either. That a war started at all
was the result of actions by some Serbians with some but undetermined
connection to Serbian officials, along with actions taken by Austria-
Hungary. That it turned into WWI as we know it was something of
an accident.
Probably
>the earliest was _The War Guilt and Peace Crime of the Entente Allies_
>by Stewart E. Bruce (1920), a remarkably prescient analysis of the
>future consequences of the vindictive settlement at Versailles.
It is also possible to think that the Germanic countries bore the
most responsibility and to think that Versailles, overall, was a
Bad Thing.
>"Modern warfare has discarded poison arrows; but has substituted
>instead, poison gas and poison propaganda.
The difficulty is picking out the poison propaganda. This is a
job for a serious historian.
>As seen in earlier threads the readers of soc.history.war certainly
>show the toxic symptoms of propaganda poisoning planted nearly 90
>years before.
At least one does.
>I will here summarize and review the thesis proposed by D. J.
>Goodspeed in _The German Wars: 1914-1945_ (1977):
>
>1. WWI and WWII were actually one war, with an armistice from
>1918-1939 - four years on, 21 off, and a closing act of six years
>duration.
>
This depends on what you mean "one war", I suppose. However,
WWII did not grow out of Franco-German rivalry, but out of Hitler's
desire to conquer Slavic lands.
>2. France, not Germany, desired and created WWI.
France may well have wanted a war more than Germany did, but France
was not in any position to create WWI.
> a) France was the nation whose aims could only be met by a great
>war.
Shaky autocracies sometimes wanted war, in the hope that it would
be short and victorious. It wasn't for any of those autocracies.
> b) Between 1894 - 1914 France, Russia, and Great Britain spent more
>on armaments than Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Mostly irrelevant, since Britain was only on friendly terms with
France and Russia, and was not an ally.
> c) The armies of the Entente Cordiale greatly outnumbered the
>Central Powers, and had a more powerful navy.
The Entente armies did not greatly outnumber the Central Powers.
The Entente had a more powerful navy, which cut into its potential
land strength.
> d) The immediate cause of the war, the assassination of the heir to
>A-H, was rooted in Russia's Balkan policy, strongly supported by
>France.
That's going to be hard to establish.
> e) In the last days before the war the German government worked
>harder to prevent war than did France or Russia or Great Britain.
Specifics, please.
> f) Russia was the first of the great powers to order general
>mobilization, while Germany mobilized only after both Russia and
>France.
>
Russia ordered general mobilization on receipt of a German
ultimatum. The time relationship is mostly irrelevant, as once
Russia decided how to react to that ultimatum WWI was going to
happen.
>3. The wars changed the world in unforeseen and unwelcome ways for all
>concerned, and rendered warfare obsolete as an instrument of policy.
>
Yes to the former, no to the latter. Warfare has continued to be
an incident of policy.
>4. Political leadership and governmental decision making has been
>extraordinarily inadequate in the 20th century. This may be our most
>urgent issue for the 21st.
>
They've generally been a lot better than what went on earlier, but
the problems are far more complex.
>Before WWI, European culture espoused a common ideology: in 1939,
>Europe was a "spiritual madhouse" in the breakdown of Christian
>consensus. Goodspeed concludes his preface thusly:
>
You could argue that.
>"The First World War was an unnecessary war. The differences between
>the belligerants, their conflicting ambitions, and their varying
>visions of the future were not so great or so fundamental as to demand
>a settlement by arms.
Probably not. However, there were matters such as control of the
seas near Great Britain that may have had to be settled by war.
And the war did infinitely more harm than good.
>It was a cul de sac down which the West should never have ventured.
It was not a voluntary decision on the part of "the West". It was
the result of a series of decisions made by individual decision-
makers. There was never a time when "the West" could have decided
not to go to war. There were times when individual countries could
have kept a lid on the conflict.
It
>killed the promise of a civilization, and it killed it frivolously,
>having nothing to offer in its place. Even those achievements that at
>the time appeared to be beneficial results of the conflict - the
>overthrow of tsardom, the weakening of empire, the establishment of a
>League of Nations - were stillborn.
I don't think so; while democratic nationalism failed rather badly
between the wars, I think it laid the grounds for more secure
peace and democracy after WWII.
>Algeria. The League failed. Quite possibly, had it not been for the
>First World War, Western civilization might have worked out its inner
>contradictions and progressed to a more just, generous, and creative
>society. As it was, in 1914 we stepped out into the night." (p. ix)
>
Could be.
>Goodspeed supports his thesis with a tightly-reasoned argument drawing
>upon the full range of diplomatic documents, the memoirs of the
>primary participants, a wide range subsequent histories (Albertini in
>particular) and other archival materials. I'll expand on any of the
>points as necessary in a subsequent post.
>
OK, here's some to consider.
1. Exactly what was French policy doing that contributed to the
assassination of the Archduke?
2. What was the real purpose of the High Seas Fleet?
3. Why did Austria-Hungary refuse a reasonable reply to the "timed
note"? Why did Germany fail to restrain Austria-Hungary's desire
for war with Serbia?
4. Why do people get the army sizes so far wrong?
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Louis Capdeboscq
> are unfamiliar with the revisionist analysis of the Great War. (Note:
> the term "revisionist" in relation to WWI refers to a revision of the
> Versailles war guilt verdict, which claimed that Germany bore sole and
> complete responsibility for initiating the conflict.)
This is a straw man.
Nobody believes that Germany bore sole and complete responsibility for
initiating the conflict.
The orthodox view, shared by most in this group, including among the people
whom you debated with David Thornley and myself, is that responsibility for
WWI was shared, in varying proportions, among the powers.
To rank some of the countries involved from "most responsible" to "least
responsible" (keeping in mind that ALL the countries in the list are partly
responsible, so NONE bears "sole and complete" responsibility), the general
view would look about like this :
1. Austria
2. Russia
3. Germany
4. France
5. Britain.
I'm not including minors, but if Serbia was to be included she should be
either just before Russia (but after Austria) or immediately after Russia.
Some would put her between Germany and France, but my own opinion would have
the Serbs as more responsible as the Germans.
Louis Capdeboscq
> Poison gas often brings instant death to the
> professional fighters on the battlefield - and ends there;
Look up the pictures of people who were gassed, e.g. in Afghanistan, or in
the Iran-Iraq war. Mustard gas, when you survive it, does not end there.
> but poison
> propaganda does not see the full results of its deadly, venomous and
> wicked work in three generations.
Obviously, killing someone outright also adversely affects the next three
generations as well.
> Bayonets and bullets maim and kill
> human flesh on the field of battle; but poison propaganda inflames and
> pollutes the minds and consciences of men, women and children of an
> entire nation." (p. 87-8)
Tell the difference to the widows and orphans of dead soldiers.
> No shortage of lurid and hateful ethnocentrism can be
> found on this newsgroup, and certainly mere statements of fact and
> history will not help those suffering from semantic pollution.
Indeed, the most interesting being that the "lurid and hateful
ethnocentrism" is being pushed by someone who isn't even from the same
ethnic group as the one he is "supporting" by his drivel.
> 1. WWI and WWII were actually one war, with an armistice from
> 1918-1939 - four years on, 21 off, and a closing act of six years
> duration.
So that's ten years on and 21 off, not a very good case for "one war", is it
?
> 2. France, not Germany, desired and created WWI.
There were people in France, as well as in Germany (or in other countries),
who desired a war. They were a minority in both countries, however that
minority had more influence in Germany - which was not a democracy - than in
France - which was one.
Also, as it happened Germany was a more powerful nation. While France was in
no position to create WWI, Germany was. Or rather it had more influence on
the creating of WWI than France had.
> a) France was the nation whose aims could only be met by a great
> war.
Why "great war" ? How were France's aims served by a war involving
Austria-Hungary ?
Here's a list of national aims that required a war:
- Austria-Hungary: crush Serbia, "stabilize" the Balkans.
- Russia: gain a foreign policy success to consolidate the hold of the Czar
at home.
- Germany: confront Russia before the force ratio had deteriorated too far,
since Russia's growth was outpacing Germany's so the latter's superiority
was going to vanish.
- France: regain Alsace and Lorraine
- Italy: get Trieste and other irredentist claims.
- Britain: quash an economic rival.
The British aim I've read in Ferguson, but I never saw it expressed in
contemporary documents, which means either that I haven't read enough on the
topic, or that no significant minority expressed it, or both.
Appart from that, every other aim for every other country was expressed in
their respective countries by a loud minority.
So if one assumes that recovering Alsace and Lorraine did in fact constitute
"France's aims" because these aims were stated although never acted upon,
then I can find plenty of other countries - in fact every other one - which
had similar stated-but-unacted-upon national goals. Ok, Austria-Hunagry DID
act upon hers.
> b) Between 1894 - 1914 France, Russia, and Great Britain spent more
> on armaments than Germany and Austria-Hungary.
...though they didn't spend more as a percentage of their national income,
so this only reflects the fact that overall they had a larger economy.
Of course, this is quite meaningless since Britain wasn't allied to France
and Russia.
And until you demonstrate that the French could determine British and
Russian defense spendings, this doesn't support your thesis. If the French
could have decided the military outlays of Russia and Great Britain - much
as they would undoubtedly have loved to - my bet is that the British would
have built less capital ships but the BEF would have been at least twice as
large in 1914.
> c) The armies of the Entente Cordiale greatly outnumbered the
> Central Powers, and had a more powerful navy.
Why don't you add the United States while you are at it ? This would make an
even stronger case as the Americans had a significant navy.
You have already posted false figures on peacetime forces. The combined
forces of Russia, France and Britain outnumbered those of Germany and
Austria-Hungary, though not "greatly". This is also only to be expected as
the three countries had a larger population base.
Following your reasoning, Germany started WWI because the German army and
defense budget were larger than the French ones. Since WWI-WWII were the
same Franco-German conflict, then the matter is settled.
> d) The immediate cause of the war, the assassination of the heir to
> A-H, was rooted in Russia's Balkan policy, strongly supported by
> France.
... as in when France refused to support Russia in 1908 ?
Please show how the assassination of the heir to Austria-Hungary was part of
Russian policy.
> e) In the last days before the war the German government worked
> harder to prevent war than did France or Russia or Great Britain.
Specifics please ?
> f) Russia was the first of the great powers to order general
> mobilization, while Germany mobilized only after both Russia and
> France.
Germany issued an ultimatum to Russia, and mobilized simultaneously with
France (one hour difference which means that the Germans made their decision
in the absence of knowledge of the French mobilization).
> 3. The wars changed the world in unforeseen and unwelcome ways for all
> concerned, and rendered warfare obsolete as an instrument of policy.
Yes for the first statement, no for the second.
Plenty of wars after 1945 - Korea, Vietnam, Iraq...
> 4. Political leadership and governmental decision making has been
> extraordinarily inadequate in the 20th century. This may be our most
> urgent issue for the 21st.
On the other hand, political leadersip did avoid a nuclear war in the second
half of the 20th century.
> Before WWI, European culture espoused a common ideology: in 1939,
> Europe was a "spiritual madhouse" in the breakdown of Christian
> consensus.
It is really, really a stretch to assume, as your sentence does, that
"Christian consensus" was a "common ideology" espoused by European culture.
To the extent that European culture exists, and that its common ideology is
"Christian consensus" (leaving aside matters like the Croats and Serbs
fighting it out though both are Christian), then this is still true today so
WWI didn't change anything.
By the way, citing 1939 is quite irrelevant if you're arguing that there was
only one war between 1914-1945. You should want to look at 1945. Between
1945 and today, Europe was much more united than it had been in 1914, so
using your argument that WWI and WWII were the same conflict (which I
disagree with, but let's follow it for the sake of argument), then it did
improve European unity.
> "The First World War was an unnecessary war.
What is a necessary war ?
> The differences between
> the belligerants, their conflicting ambitions, and their varying
> visions of the future were not so great or so fundamental as to demand
> a settlement by arms.
The same was said of WWII. After all, practically everybody hated the
communists at the time...
> And the war did infinitely more harm than good.
Now what else is new ?
> It killed the promise of a civilization,
Not to lay it on to thick, but I think that European civilization had
already gone a bit beyond "promise". I understand that American civilization
is so much older, but speaking of the promise of a civilization is really
silly.
> and it killed it frivolously,
> having nothing to offer in its place.
So Europe was an uncivilized place in 1945 ? Are you saying the Americans
were the Barbarian invaders ?
> The empires lingered on and defended themselves at Amritsar and in
> Algeria.
But of course if WWI had been averted, then the colonial empires would have
lasted much longer.
>Quite possibly, had it not been for the
> First World War, Western civilization might have worked out its inner
> contradictions and progressed to a more just, generous, and creative
> society.
Please define "Western civilization", as I'm not aware that, for instance
Britain and Russia were really part of the same "just, generous and creative
society". In fact, I'm not aware of any society in 1914 that was all three,
which makes me doubt that such a European unification, had it been at all
possible (which I doubt), would have been along those lines.
LC
Alan Allport
message news:at2c0u$k73$1...@news-reader11.wanadoo.fr...
> To rank some of the countries involved from "most responsible" to "least
> responsible" (keeping in mind that ALL the countries in the list are
partly
> responsible, so NONE bears "sole and complete" responsibility), the
general
> view would look about like this :
>
> 1. Austria
> 2. Russia
> 3. Germany
> 4. France
> 5. Britain.
>
> I'm not including minors, but if Serbia was to be included she should be
> either just before Russia (but after Austria) or immediately after Russia.
> Some would put her between Germany and France, but my own opinion would
have
> the Serbs as more responsible as the Germans.
I decided to drop out of these threads after Thanksgiving, mainly because of
lack of time, but partly because the arguments were starting to get
circular. However, just for the sake of record, this would be my own
responsibility countdown:
1. Austria (for determining to fight its "limited" war against Serbia even
though it quickly became obvious that the conflict could not be contained).
2. Germany (for diplomatically bankrolling Austria's actions regardless of
the consequences).
3. Russia (for mobilizing first and encouraging some Serbian recalcitrance).
4. Britain (for failing to make its determination to fight over Belgium
clear earlier).
5. France (for egging on the Russians).
To place Serbia, one first has to decide what one means by "Serbia" (the
government? the people? the "Black Hand"?). The precise role of Serbia in
the Sarajevo assassination will I believe remain mysterious for ever,
despite the occasional sensationalist claim to have uncovered everything.
Since it does however seem clear that some senior Serbs were at least aware
of the conspiracy, and could have done more to stop it, I'd place Serbia at
the German mark, or inbetween Germany and Russia (2.5). The less-than-total
Serbian acceptance of the July 25 ultimatum seems to me irrelevant, since
the Austrians were not sincere in offering it as an alternative to war in
the first place and would very probably have followed any acceptance up with
an even stiffer and more unacceptable set of demands.
My placing of France after Britain is not to suggest that the British were
keener in general for war (the reverse was true), but that they did at least
have the option of remaining out: a conscious decision involves some extra
responsibility. Also, Grey was arguably too vague in his responses to
Lichnowsky about British action in the event of a general European war
(although he was constrained by domestic political demands). The French I
place last simply because they alone of all the actors had no choice in 1914
about whether to join the war. True, they did encourage the Russians to take
a harder line, but I suspect Russia would have had to support Serbia
regardless of French backup, or else lose any kind of controlling stake in
the Balkans. The Germans had decided years before to invade France as part
of their opening strategic moves: other than France abandoning its alliance
and its claims to be a Great Power completely, and accepting the role of
German satellite status, it's difficult to see any way that it could have
not fought.
Alan.
gerold firl
Correct. And in fact, the French offensive in Alsace ("Plan XVII")
also captured a small amount of German territory. Nonetheless, it's
true that the German invasion of France through Belgium created
enormous damage, and did so in the full glare of publicity.
Additionally, Belgium was an innocent neutral, rendering the German
invasion even more odious.
However, when we speak of responsibility further levels of complexity
must be addressed. The Schlieffen Plan was formulated under the
assumption that Germany would be fighting two enemies simultaneously,
France in the west and Russia in the east. Given the enormous
disparity in numbers, fighting both at the same time was almost sure
to result in defeat. But Russian mobilization was several weeks slower
than the other combatents, thus offering the possibility of defeating
France with a lighting blow, then rushing troops eastward to confront
the Russians. Of course, the plan was extremely risky, and would never
be advocated as a matter of choice. Schlieffen calculated the number
of troops required to make it work, and the German army was never
close to having enough men. This in itself is a clear indication of
the reluctance with which the German military contemplated a possible
war; the General Staff saw the Plan as the best option of a bad bunch.
As it turned out, the assumption that the next war would be fought on
two fronts was accurate. The secret military appendix to the Dual
Entente spelled out in detail the plan to coordinate the east-west
attack on Germany. Invading Belgium was terrible, but German planners
chose to give rather than receive.
_The German Wars_ is not widely known or readily availible. For those
who are interested in viewing the 20th century world war(s) from a
different perspective, the Goodspeed hypothesis is a useful
counterweight to the standard model, still tainted by the echoes of
wartime propaganda and the Versailles travesty.
- gerold
William Shapiro
consider using]
> As seen in earlier threads the readers of soc.history.war certainly
> show the toxic symptoms of propaganda poisoning planted nearly 90
> years before. No shortage of lurid and hateful ethnocentrism can be
> found on this newsgroup, and certainly mere statements of fact and
> history will not help those suffering from semantic pollution.
> Nonetheless, I think it worthwhile to review the excellent work done
> by Goodspeed to rectify our historical amnesia.
>
> "... it is the theme of this book that we live always in the shadow of
> the past, that our tomorrows are to a large extent determined by our
> yesterdays - abd by our thoughts about our yesterdays... The only way
> to escape from these shadows is to dispel them with the light of
> truth." (p. ix)
>
> I will here summarize and review the thesis proposed by D. J.
> Goodspeed in _The German Wars: 1914-1945_ (1977):
>
> 1. WWI and WWII were actually one war, with an armistice from
> 1918-1939 - four years on, 21 off, and a closing act of six years
> duration.
This does little to futher the analysis of the question who bears the
responsibility for the start of the First World War unless there is link to
be made from it. Goodspeed, to my knowledge, was not the first to have
suggested this.
>
> 2. France, not Germany, desired and created WWI.
> a) France was the nation whose aims could only be met by a great
> war.
France wanted to the return of territories lost in the Franco-Prussian War.
She had rebuilt her armies long before then, why the wait if France so
dearly wanted it? France had other grievances against other nations in
Europe. A few of these, including the claims to Egypt, could be said to be
achievable only by a war with Britain. Yet, France did not start a war with
her traditional enemy.
> b) Between 1894 - 1914 France, Russia, and Great Britain spent more
> on armaments than Germany and Austria-Hungary.
This is a case of looking at the bottom line numbers. Between 1894-1914,
Britain and Russia had to spend more money on armaments thans Germany and
Austria-Hungary. Russia fought a fairly expensive war with Japan, after
which they had to essentially rebuild their navy. During this time period as
well, Russia was also fighting constant little campaigns in Central Asia
against holdouts among their conquered peoples.
The British, between 1894-1901 fought no less than 30 separate military
campaigns. This included the recapture of Sudan by Kitchener, the expedition
to Fashoda, as well the Boer-War and the Boxer Rebellion. Furthermore,
German naval construction forced the British, based on their stated need for
a "Two-power Naval Standard" and the revolution in naval design caused by
the Dreadnought to completely rethink their fleet. Essentially, once the
Dreadnought-style warship, the RN had to go replace her entire battle-line
in order to ensure that she had a credible means of defending her
territories (rightfully stolen or otherwise obtained).
Germany on the other had, did not have to do this. It was starting from
scratch, so did not have as much to replace in the two decades before the
Great War/World War I. Furthermore, their doctrine, at least for their army,
was better at incorporating new weapons for most of this period. This meant
that it did not go through so many binges of buying outmoded weapons as the
British did. I have no data for Austria-Hungary.
Germany, with the exception of two small colonial campaigns in her African
colonies did not engage in a significant campaign aside from the Boxer
Rebellion.
So of course, the members of what would be the Entente spent more on
armaments. They had to. They were the ones who were fighting wars during
that period. They were the ones who were in conflict, mostly with each
other. They were also the ones who were working to negotiate agreements to
limit the potentiality for armed conflict.
> c) The armies of the Entente Cordiale greatly outnumbered the
> Central Powers, and had a more powerful navy.
In reverse order, this sub-point again paints an inaccurate picture.
Austria-Hungary had a very small navy. It had no need for a large one. Its
territories were all accessible to her by overland means. Its only threat
from the sea, in her view, was from Italy. Britain had by far the largest
navy on the planet. Then again, it was deployed to meet world-wide
commitments. Its was equipped to fight far from home ports. The German Navy,
however, was designed to operate primarilly the waters around Northern
Europe. Based on teh length of coastline, the types of ships purchased, this
fleet was not meant to be used as a defensive force. It was designed to
clear the Royal Navy from the North Sea and the Channel.
> d) The immediate cause of the war, the assassination of the heir to
> A-H, was rooted in Russia's Balkan policy, strongly supported by
> France.
> e) In the last days before the war the German government worked
> harder to prevent war than did France or Russia or Great Britain.
But this was done by threatening other nations, while enabling the one
nation that really wanted to go to war (Austria-Hungary). Not exactly the
best way to prevent a war. Had Germany actually wanted to prevent a war, it
would have restrained Austria-Hungary. A-H did have a significant grievance
against the Serbs. However, if they, and Germany, were really the
peace-wanting peoples in this situation, Germany would not have encouraged
the military option.
> f) Russia was the first of the great powers to order general
> mobilization, while Germany mobilized only after both Russia and
> France.
Russian and French mobilization did not mean war. Their war plans were not
pegged to the timetables which Schlieffen had burdened his successors.
Furthermore, mobilization of French and Russian reserves are not as
important as mobilization of German reserve formations. Both France and
Russia were unclear as to exactly what they would use their reserves for.
Neither nation considered reserve formations to be good enough to act as
front line combat units. However, Germany's reserve units were intended to
operate along side units of the standing army as front line combat units.
>
> 3. The wars changed the world in unforeseen and unwelcome ways for all
> concerned, and rendered warfare obsolete as an instrument of policy.
Wars have a habit of changing the world, or at least part of it involved, in
unforseen ways. Seems that warfare is still a very vibrant piece of foreign
policy. (See e.g. Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia, Iraq, Suez in 1956, Panama in
1989)
>
> 4. Political leadership and governmental decision making has been
> extraordinarily inadequate in the 20th century. This may be our most
> urgent issue for the 21st.
Rather sweepin argument there. What is this based on? If you look at
Chamberlain, Johnson, and the British PM in '56, maybe. On the other hand,
others could rightly argue that leaders like Churchill and Eisenhower were
the norm for leaders in the 20th Century.
>
> Before WWI, European culture espoused a common ideology: in 1939,
> Europe was a "spiritual madhouse" in the breakdown of Christian
> consensus. Goodspeed concludes his preface thusly:
>
> "The First World War was an unnecessary war. The differences between
> the belligerants, their conflicting ambitions, and their varying
> visions of the future were not so great or so fundamental as to demand
> a settlement by arms. And the war did infinitely more harm than good.
> It was a cul de sac down which the West should never have ventured. It
> killed the promise of a civilization, and it killed it frivolously,
> having nothing to offer in its place. Even those achievements that at
> the time appeared to be beneficial results of the conflict - the
> overthrow of tsardom, the weakening of empire, the establishment of a
> League of Nations - were stillborn. The tyranny of the Bolsheviks
> replaced the tyranny of the tsar, an exchange of whips for scorpions.
> The empires lingered on and defended themselves at Amritsar and in
> Algeria. The League failed. Quite possibly, had it not been for the
> First World War, Western civilization might have worked out its inner
> contradictions and progressed to a more just, generous, and creative
> society. As it was, in 1914 we stepped out into the night." (p. ix)
>
> Goodspeed supports his thesis with a tightly-reasoned argument drawing
> upon the full range of diplomatic documents, the memoirs of the
> primary participants, a wide range subsequent histories (Albertini in
> particular) and other archival materials. I'll expand on any of the
> points as necessary in a subsequent post.
Let's see if this is a fair representation of your argument at this point.
Prior to 8/1914, Europe operated on a common ideology based on a form
Christianity. That this was a good thing for the world at large and that
eventually it would have allowed for the freeing of colonies, avoided
tragedies like Amritsar and others. However, because of the war, there
sprang up various ideologies as people tried to sort out a different way of
acting, thinking, and dealing with each other and this is a bad thign.
If this is indeed the argument, I think Goodspeed then is just arguing that
he misses the time when only white-male Christians had the power. That the
rest of the world would be infinitely better off it had just let the
Christian based ideology which governed at the time to progress. However,
this was the same ideology which got the European powers into the war.
Remember, none of the colonizing powers were really that interested in
giving up their colonies. The British Indianization plan alone would have
taken decades to complete, and that was a precursor to India receiving
dominion status. France had no wish to divest itself of its colonies. Some
were even regarded as departments of France itself. Maybe Austria-Hungary
would be the exception, and the First World War was a tragedy that prevented
an expansion of power among the people at the expense of those who actually
held the power. However, based on human history, without some sort of
impetus or catalyst, it seems unlikely that this would be the case.
Bill
John D Salt
news:MPG.185fd9591...@news.ntlworld.com:
> In article
> <579d7686.02120...@posting.google.com>,
> gerol...@yahoo.com says...
[Snips]
>> _The German Wars_ is not widely known or readily availible.
>
> You can say that again. Unable to be bought from Amazon and
> unavailable in any library.
>
> There are a lot of books like that.
It took me about half a minute to check with Amazon.com and find
eight second-hand copies of the book offered for sale.
All the best,
John.
Don Phillipson
news:EdfJ9.117$eQ3....@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
> The British, between 1894-1901 fought no less than 30 separate military
> campaigns. This included the recapture of Sudan by Kitchener, the
expedition
> to Fashoda, as well the Boer-War and the Boxer Rebellion. Furthermore,
This list may define "military campaign" too broadly, e.g.
Fashoda was simply an exploring expedition (albeit by
a militiary formation): there was no fighting;
Britain took no initiative in the Boxer Rebellion; its
diplomats were among those of a dozen countries
besieged in Peking, so British troops fought (like
those of half a dozen oother countries) to restore
the status quo;
Kitchener fought Omdurman as Sirdar of the
Egyptian government, not Britain;
the Boer War was a conventional war between
independent states.
> German naval construction forced the British, based on their stated need
for
> a "Two-power Naval Standard" and the revolution in naval design caused by
> the Dreadnought to completely rethink their fleet. Essentially, once the
> Dreadnought-style warship, the RN had to go replace her entire battle-line
Something seems backwards here. The Dreadnought did indeed
introduce revolutionary new battleship technology (making all
existing capital ships obsolete): but this was an initiative of
British naval constructors (not German).
> Germany, with the exception of two small colonial campaigns in her African
> colonies did not engage in a significant campaign aside from the Boxer
> Rebellion.
This omits the origins of the 2nd German Empire, based on
war between Prussia and several other German states (Saxony,
Austria etc.) which established the basis for Prussian domination
of all German kingdoms (except Austria and its Catholic dependencies.)
These wars of the 1860s, in combination with the Franco-Prussian
War, may have established the worst precedent, because all were
brief, affordable and survivable (even by France after 1871). So the
generals and statesmen of 1914 may have hoped military action
that year would be basically similar.
David Thornley
Alan Allport <all...@ee.upenn.edu> wrote:
>"Louis Capdeboscq" <Louis.Capdebosc...@wanadoo.fr> wrote in
>message news:at2c0u$k73$1...@news-reader11.wanadoo.fr...
>
>> To rank some of the countries involved from "most responsible" to "least
>> responsible" (keeping in mind that ALL the countries in the list are
>partly
>> responsible, so NONE bears "sole and complete" responsibility), the
>general
>> view would look about like this :
>>
>> 1. Austria
>> 2. Russia
>> 3. Germany
>> 4. France
>> 5. Britain.
>>
>lack of time, but partly because the arguments were starting to get
>circular. However, just for the sake of record, this would be my own
>responsibility countdown:
>
>1. Austria (for determining to fight its "limited" war against Serbia even
>though it quickly became obvious that the conflict could not be contained).
>2. Germany (for diplomatically bankrolling Austria's actions regardless of
>the consequences).
>3. Russia (for mobilizing first and encouraging some Serbian recalcitrance).
>4. Britain (for failing to make its determination to fight over Belgium
>clear earlier).
>5. France (for egging on the Russians).
>
followed by Germany and Russia, then Britain and France. I don't
know why the British would have felt they had to address the problem
of invasion of Belgium: after all, the Schlieffen plan was kept
a secret, and Germany would really not have wanted speculation that
they might go through Belgium.
>To place Serbia, one first has to decide what one means by "Serbia" (the
>government? the people? the "Black Hand"?). The precise role of Serbia in
>the Sarajevo assassination will I believe remain mysterious for ever,
>despite the occasional sensationalist claim to have uncovered everything.
Yup. The assassination was not an official Serbian act, but it
was conducted by Serbians with some help from inside the Serbian
government. Serbian activities after the assassination were not
helpful, although it doesn't look like that really mattered, for
the reasons you give.
>My placing of France after Britain is not to suggest that the British were
>keener in general for war (the reverse was true), but that they did at least
>have the option of remaining out: a conscious decision involves some extra
>responsibility.
For practical purposes, I don't see how the British were to stay out.
Staying out would be a break from a British policy centuries old, to
fight against the strongest European power to avoid giving that power
continental hegemony. The fact that Germany was offering probably
the greatest threat to British sea power since sea power in the modern
sense started meant that staying neutral and letting Germany win was
extremely dangerous.
Also, Grey was arguably too vague in his responses to
>Lichnowsky about British action in the event of a general European war
>(although he was constrained by domestic political demands).
Exactly what was he responding to? He was certainly constrained by
domestic political demands, and indeed Great Britain had an internal
crisis brewing, but how specifically was he asked to address the
subject of an invasion of Belgium?
Of course, this is partly irrelevant since, as I have said, Britain
pretty much had to go to war against Germany for its own safety.
Any serious observer of British history had to figure on that.
However, German war planners were much more concerned with optimizing
their fighting plans than their war-winning plans.
The French I
>place last simply because they alone of all the actors had no choice in 1914
>about whether to join the war.
Right.
True, they did encourage the Russians to take
>a harder line, but I suspect Russia would have had to support Serbia
>regardless of French backup, or else lose any kind of controlling stake in
>the Balkans.
Probably. Austro-Hungarian actions made it very difficult for Russia
to stand aside. While Poincare probably encouraged Russia in general
terms, he could not possibly have done so in specific, since Austria-
Hungary deliberately timed the crisis to prevent that.
What I'd like to know is whether war would have developed if Austria-
Hungary had been open about its plans. Austria-Hungary had a large and
legitimate grievance against Serbia, and nobody would have objected
to, or been surprised by, Austria-Hungary taking action. I have the
feeling that it was the way the action was taken that made the difference.
The Germans had decided years before to invade France as part
>of their opening strategic moves: other than France abandoning its alliance
>and its claims to be a Great Power completely, and accepting the role of
>German satellite status, it's difficult to see any way that it could have
>not fought.
>
That is one of the reasons of German responsibility: the fact that
a war against anybody else would open with a strong attack on France.
This left Germany with no possible way to limit the war, should that
seem otherwise possible. Preparing for a two-front war was wise
on their part, but insisting on one seems overly restricting, and
insisting on threatening yet a third power in the process seems
positively foolish.
David Thornley
Don Phillipson <dphil...@trytel.com> wrote:
>"William Shapiro" <we...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
>news:EdfJ9.117$eQ3....@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
>
>> The British, between 1894-1901 fought no less than 30 separate military
>> campaigns. This included the recapture of Sudan by Kitchener, the
>expedition
>> to Fashoda, as well the Boer-War and the Boxer Rebellion. Furthermore,
>
>This list may define "military campaign" too broadly, e.g.
>Kitchener fought Omdurman as Sirdar of the
>Egyptian government, not Britain;
>the Boer War was a conventional war between
>independent states.
>
Did that matter? Didn't Kitchener need British financial support?
Moreover, the list was not only of colonial combat: Russia also
fought a war with Japan, and you would expect Britain and Russia
to have to spend lots of money because they fought conventional
wars.
>> German naval construction forced the British, based on their stated need
>for
>> a "Two-power Naval Standard" and the revolution in naval design caused by
>> the Dreadnought to completely rethink their fleet. Essentially, once the
>> Dreadnought-style warship, the RN had to go replace her entire battle-line
>
>Something seems backwards here. The Dreadnought did indeed
>introduce revolutionary new battleship technology (making all
>existing capital ships obsolete): but this was an initiative of
>British naval constructors (not German).
>
The issue is more complicated.
In 1900, say, Britain had a large lead in battleships, and a very large
lead in cruisers. While there was constant development going on, there
was nothing revolutionary apparent, and it appeared that the current
fleets would be important for a long time to come.
I believe it was the 1903 Jane's Fighting Ships that saw a proposal for
a new type of battleship by an Italian naval designer (Cuniberti?).
This new battleship was to be armed with a large number of 12" guns,
with no other secondary armament useful against battleships and cruisers.
This was shortly followed by the Russo-Japanese war, where the naval
engagements were often fought at considerably greater ranges than
had been the norm. If ranges continued to increase, it would put
the 6-9" guns comprising secondary battleship armament at a disadvantage.
The first dreadnought battleship to be ordered was not, in fact,
Dreadnought. It was the USS South Carolina. However, the British
hurried the production of Dreadnought, and so finished first.
South Carolina was in general a much worse warship than Dreadnought,
but she was an all-big-gun battleship with a gun disposition more
advanced than Dreadnought's. She would have had much the same
effect on naval development as Dreadnought did, although not with
the same immediate impact. German authorities would have realized
that, if they were to emulate the South Carolina class while Britain
still built ships on the line of the King Edward VII, they could
gain a considerable advantage in individual warships.
So, while the British pushed the Dreadnought concept hard, if the
British had tried to ignore it and hope it went away it would
have showed up very soon anyway, probably with the Germans getting
the jump.
Alan Allport
news:3df60bbb$0$4459$a186...@newsreader.visi.com...
> Also, Grey was arguably too vague in his responses to
> Lichnowsky about British action in the event of a general European war
> (although he was constrained by domestic political demands).
>
> Exactly what was he responding to? He was certainly constrained by
> domestic political demands, and indeed Great Britain had an internal
> crisis brewing, but how specifically was he asked to address the
> subject of an invasion of Belgium?
Perhaps not Belgium specifically, but there is an argument to be made that
goes roughly like this: in his heart, Grey knew that if Germany attacked
France then Britain would have to intervene sooner or later, or the balance
of power in western Europe would be destroyed and the British Empire placed
in an impossibly disadvanteous position. Splendid isolation was not really
an option in such a war. If he had made it much clearer to the German
representative in London that Britain would be bound to aid France if
Germany attacked her, especially around July 25-28, then it is possible that
the Emperor and his court would have been more chary of supporting the
Austrian bid to crush Serbia. Now, this argument is open to a host of
criticisms, I agree. Grey could not act unilaterally in his foreign policy,
but had to respect the opinion of the Cabinet, Parliament, and the nation as
a whole - all of which remained opposed to war at this stage in the July
Crisis. And of course the onus of blame doesn't fall on Grey simply because
he was less resolute than he might have been about actions that he was only
responding to, not initiating (although some German apologists after the war
tried to make this case - "it was your fault because you didn't talk us out
of it"). But I do think as wily and respected a diplomat as Grey might have
been more imaginative in his hints to Lichnowsky. The bitter irony, of
course, is that Grey prevaricated because he sincerely didn't want war. If h
e had been the bug-eyed zealot of some historians' fantasies, he would have
tried to plunge Britain into the fray immediately and thus perhaps have
dissuaded the Germans from acting in the first place. Such are the tragedies
of unintended consequences.
> What I'd like to know is whether war would have developed if Austria-
> Hungary had been open about its plans. Austria-Hungary had a large and
> legitimate grievance against Serbia, and nobody would have objected
> to, or been surprised by, Austria-Hungary taking action. I have the
> feeling that it was the way the action was taken that made the difference.
The assassination was on June 28. Almost a month passed before the Austrians
responded with their ultimatum to Serbia. In that time, most of the sympathy
that Austria had enjoyed throughout Europe had evaporated away. It tends to
be forgotten now that the immediate response to Franz Ferdinand's death of
most powers, including Britain, France, and Russia - the Tsar was none too
keen on assassins, having lost a grandfather to one - was that Austria did
have *some* right to punish Serbia, even though it wasn't clear what that
punishment should be or what connection the government in Belgrade had to
events. (Incidentally, the Viennese authorities never did bother to try to
find out if Pasic's administration was actually involved in the plot. They
weren't particularly interested. As AJP Taylor put it, "Serbia's real crime
was to exist"). But after four weeks of time-wasting, Austria lost her
position on the high moral ground. By late July, it was becoming more
evident that the Austrians were less interested in responding to a clear
wrong than they were in capitalizing on a unique opportunity to destroy a
pesky rival. Had they taken action against the Serbs with more alacrity and
moderation (humiliating punitive demands along the lines of those in the
eventual ultimatum), they probably would have gotten away with it.
Alan.
William Shapiro
"Don Phillipson" <dphil...@trytel.com> wrote in message
news:GFlJ9.2938$lL6.6...@news20.bellglobal.com...
> "William Shapiro" <we...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> news:EdfJ9.117$eQ3....@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
>
> > The British, between 1894-1901 fought no less than 30 separate military
> > campaigns. This included the recapture of Sudan by Kitchener, the
> expedition
> > to Fashoda, as well the Boer-War and the Boxer Rebellion. Furthermore,
>
> This list may define "military campaign" too broadly, e.g.
> Fashoda was simply an exploring expedition (albeit by
> a militiary formation): there was no fighting;
> Britain took no initiative in the Boxer Rebellion; its
> diplomats were among those of a dozen countries
> besieged in Peking, so British troops fought (like
> those of half a dozen oother countries) to restore
> the status quo;
> Kitchener fought Omdurman as Sirdar of the
> Egyptian government, not Britain;
> the Boer War was a conventional war between
> independent states.
>
Firl claimed (based on Goodspeed) that Britain and Russia were the ones who
were arming for a European War duing the period 1894-1914. According to
Goodspeed, this is based partly on the fact that the members of the Entente
spent more on armaments than Germany and her allies during that period.
While officially the Egyptian government had responsibility for Omdurman,
there was a considerable continent of British regular infantry, artillery,
and cavalry. In the end, the British government would have to pay for it.
Just as it had to pay for Fashoda and etc. (While there was no combat at
Fashoda, they still had to pay for the deployment, etc.)
> > German naval construction forced the British, based on their stated need
> for
> > a "Two-power Naval Standard" and the revolution in naval design caused
by
> > the Dreadnought to completely rethink their fleet. Essentially, once the
> > Dreadnought-style warship, the RN had to go replace her entire
battle-line
>
> Something seems backwards here. The Dreadnought did indeed
> introduce revolutionary new battleship technology (making all
> existing capital ships obsolete): but this was an initiative of
> British naval constructors (not German).
However once it became apparent what the Dreadnought meant, the British had
to completely rebuild their battle-line. If they did not, then they would be
left with a lot of obsolete style battleships. While a division of
pre-Dreadnoughts might be a match for a Dreadnought, that would leave the
Royal Navy vulnerable to a navy which was equipped primarily with
Dreadnoughts and not pre-Dreadnoughts.
>
> > Germany, with the exception of two small colonial campaigns in her
African
> > colonies did not engage in a significant campaign aside from the Boxer
> > Rebellion.
>
> This omits the origins of the 2nd German Empire, based on
> war between Prussia and several other German states (Saxony,
> Austria etc.) which established the basis for Prussian domination
> of all German kingdoms (except Austria and its Catholic dependencies.)
>
> These wars of the 1860s, in combination with the Franco-Prussian
> War, may have established the worst precedent, because all were
> brief, affordable and survivable (even by France after 1871). So the
> generals and statesmen of 1914 may have hoped military action
> that year would be basically similar.
>
Again, the argument was about the period of 1894-1914.
Bill
gerold firl
> Firl claimed (based on Goodspeed) that Britain and Russia were the ones who
> were arming for a European War duing the period 1894-1914. According to
> Goodspeed, this is based partly on the fact that the members of the Entente
> spent more on armaments than Germany and her allies during that period.
Obviously there was an arms race throughout Europe during this period.
However, the extent to which the Entente outspent the Triple Alliance
was enormous. You don't have to take Goodspeed's word for it; see
Ferguson, who provides some handy graphs of military spending, broken
down by country, throughout this entire period. From the graphs you
can see the spikes caused by wars such as the Russo-Japanese dustup in
1905. However, if you disregard those spikes, you will also see a
consistent trend: the Entente was spending a lot more money on the
military.
Unquestionably Germany was participating in the arms race. However,
German military spending was lagging that of her rivals. Hardly the
actions of a country planning for war, which is what Goodspeed was
trying to communicate.
- gerold
William Shapiro
There was no denial that an arms race was going on. However, there is a
reason why the British and Russians so outspent Germany: they were using
their armaments on a fairly regularly basis through at least the first half
of the period in question. Germany's fortune at not having to fight a
serious campaign, combined with Austria-Hungary's lack of spending on naval
units, since it had no overseas interests and a very limited access to the
Mediterranean, made for a lower spending total than the nations who would
eventually make up the Entente. Remember, Mr. Firl said that the totals of
one group was grossly higher than the other. One cannot simply ignore the
spikes when it is inconvenient to their argument.
Bill
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
dphil...@trytel.com (Don Phillipson) wrote:
> but this was an initiative of
> British naval constructors (not German).
The design of the US South Carolina class started in 1904 but given
the at the time lengthy design and building process finished after the
Dreadnought. I can not say for certain that Fisher was aware of this
but it would certainly account for the haste with which Dreadnought
was built.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote:
> I don't
> know why the British would have felt they had to address the problem
> of invasion of Belgium:
Britain had been concerned with the security of the channel ports
since Henry VIII. When held by a major sea power they were a potential
threat. In fact someone referred to them as the counterscarp of
England. The formation of Belgium put the ports in the hands of a
country that lacked both the resources and the desire to be a threat.
The British guarantee was aimed just as much at the French at the time
it was made.
D. Patterson
Fisher was acutely aware of the American construction programme, and
Britain acted to create a suitable counterweight to the nascent American
seapower. Britain solidified an alliance with Japan and worked to arm
the Imperial Japanese Navy as a counterforce to the United States Navy.
The evolving resposne of the United States was to develop a two ocean
navy with dreadnoughts and the succeeding aircraft carrier groups for
the defense of its Atlantic and Pacific coasts and their island
outposts.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Alan Allport
news:3DF74E3E...@fidalgo.net...
> Britain solidified an alliance with Japan and worked to arm
> the Imperial Japanese Navy as a counterforce to the United States Navy.
No, not really. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was aimed squarely at Russia,
and to a lesser extent Germany. The Admiralty's view was that "war between
Great Britain and the United States is not a contingency sufficiently
probable to need special steps to meet it". This was made explicit in the
1905 renewal when the treaty was reworded to make it clearer that it was
aimed at *European* powers alone.
Alan.
D. Patterson
The rewording of the alliance agreement was made to allay American
concerns, but the fact remains that Britain assisted an aggressive
Japanese Empire to construct a modern naval force large enough to
threaten American defenses in the Asia-Pacific regions. Japanese
warships constructed in Britain, transfers of British naval technology
to Japan, British training on Japanese naval personnel, and similar
activities were seen to give an aggressive Japanese Empire an
unprecedented and growing capability to unilaterally threaten American
defenses in the Pacific and Asian regions. As late as 1919, Britain
still refused to recognize Woodrow Wilson's second of the Fouteen
Points, the absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas. Britian also
lobbied vigorously against the planned 1916 and 1919 expansion of the
U.S. Navy with a fleet of dreadnoughts second to no other navy in the
world. The U.S. Congress chose to heed anti-war sentiments and British
opposition to a naval arms race and canceled the American naval
expansion. The United States subsequently entered into the naval arms
limitation treaties and scrapped pre-dreadnoughts and dreadnoughts under
construction. Britain succeeded in having the German High Seas Fleet
destroyed, deterring a naval construction race with the United States,
and maintaining a naval fleet dominant over the naval fleets of the
United States and Japan. In a conflict between the United States and
Britain, the Japanese navy would be a pivotal advantage for Britain. In
response to such a potential threat to its defenses, the United States
maintained War Plan Orange-Red, requiring a two ocean navy for a
conflict with a hypothetical Anglo-Japanese alliance, until 1939.
Britain participated in the conferences which annulled the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance with the Four-Power Pacific Treaty. Regardless
of what the principal purpose of the alliance may or may not have been
in 1902 or 1905, the existance of a modern Japanese navy made possible
by British assistance and support increasingly threatened American
defenses. British strategies and war plans benefited by the existance
and maintenance of this threat of a potential wartime alliance, whether
or not Britain would ever exploit the potential threat to the American
defenses.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Alan Allport
> The rewording of the alliance agreement was made to allay American
> concerns, but the fact remains that Britain assisted an aggressive
> Japanese Empire to construct a modern naval force large enough to
> threaten American defenses in the Asia-Pacific regions. Japanese
> warships constructed in Britain, transfers of British naval technology
> to Japan, British training on Japanese naval personnel, and similar
> activities were seen to give an aggressive Japanese Empire an
> unprecedented and growing capability to unilaterally threaten American
> defenses in the Pacific and Asian regions.
Too much imprecision here: the distinctions between intent, perception and
outcome are crucial. Perhaps British aid to Japan did indirectly put
pressure on the Americans, but the British were most definitely not "working
to arm the Imperial Japanese Navy as a counterforce to the United States
Navy", as was originally claimed. Their concern was Russia alone, or almost
alone. Any other effect was incidental. And the passive construction in the
second sentence is the problem: "were seen" by whom? The Americans? Fair
enough, but perception is not proof of culpability. No doubt the US Navy did
have a very different take on events in the Pacific, and that was their
prerogative. But it says nothing about British motivation, or the original
logic behind the naval treaty.
Alan.
gerold firl
> > Obviously there was an arms race throughout Europe during this period.
> > However, the extent to which the Entente outspent the Triple Alliance
> > was enormous. You don't have to take Goodspeed's word for it; see
> > Ferguson, who provides some handy graphs of military spending, broken
> > down by country, throughout this entire period. From the graphs you
> > can see the spikes caused by wars such as the Russo-Japanese dustup in
> > 1905. However, if you disregard those spikes, you will also see a
> > consistent trend: the Entente was spending a lot more money on the
> > military.
> >
> > Unquestionably Germany was participating in the arms race. However,
> > German military spending was lagging that of her rivals. Hardly the
> > actions of a country planning for war, which is what Goodspeed was
> > trying to communicate.
> There was no denial that an arms race was going on. However, there is a
> reason why the British and Russians so outspent Germany: they were using
> their armaments on a fairly regularly basis through at least the first half
> of the period in question. Germany's fortune at not having to fight a
> serious campaign, combined with Austria-Hungary's lack of spending on naval
> units, since it had no overseas interests and a very limited access to the
> Mediterranean, made for a lower spending total than the nations who would
> eventually make up the Entente. Remember, Mr. Firl said that the totals of
> one group was grossly higher than the other. One cannot simply ignore the
> spikes when it is inconvenient to their argument.
If you reread the paragraph in question, when I say "disregard the
spikes" (due to spending specific to particular wars) that means
subtract that component from Entente totals. In other words, I'm not
'ignoring' them, I'm subtracting them from the long-term spending
trend.
That long-term trend shows, year in and year out, Germany spending
less on arms and armament than her rivals. I realize that fact is very
inconvenient to your argument, yet fact it remains.
If you want to investigate the national strategies pursued by the
European great powers in the run-up to war, military spending patterns
are an important source of data. Based on that data, Wilhelmine
Germany does not appear to be a country spoiling for war. If Germany
were planning on waging aggressive war, one would expect she would
devote commensurate resources toward that program.
Russia's only war during this period was the Japanese war of 1905.
France fought none. After subtracting the costs of the Japanese
adventure, Franco-Russian military spending was still far greater than
Germany's.
You seem to be claiming that we cannot draw any conclusions regarding
the long-term strategic aims of the various European nations based
upon their military spending patterns. Goodspeed sees this pattern as
evidence that French dreams of revenge were being nursed throughout
the four decades between 1871 and WWI, and that Russia became her
willing, if somewhat unwitting, tool about halfway through.
- gerold
gerold firl
> gerold firl wrote:
> > 2. France, not Germany, desired and created WWI.
>
> There were people in France, as well as in Germany (or in other countries),
> who desired a war. They were a minority in both countries, however that
> minority had more influence in Germany - which was not a democracy - than in
> France - which was one.
No - "Revanche" was a widely-held desire throughout France. Germany
had no need or desire to attack France. Been there, done that.
> > a) France was the nation whose aims could only be met by a great
> > war.
>
> Why "great war" ? How were France's aims served by a war involving
> Austria-Hungary ?
France could not fight Germany. France needed to get all of Europe
involved. In this, her aims coincided with Russia. A local war in the
Balkans would not suffice to establish Russian hegemony over Istanbul
('Tsargrad') and entry to the Mediterranean. Britain was strongly
opposed to the idea of having Russian naval competition acting as a
threat to Suez. Only in the confusion of a general European war could
Russia hope to break-out of the Black Sea.
> Here's a list of national aims that required a war:
>
> - Austria-Hungary: crush Serbia, "stabilize" the Balkans.
> - Russia: gain a foreign policy success to consolidate the hold of the Czar
> at home.
That is your analysis of Russian aims? A 'foreign policy success'?
Does it matter what kind of success? How about going to war against
Germany and Austria-Hungary - is that your idea of a 'foreign policy
success'?
> - Germany: confront Russia before the force ratio had deteriorated too far,
> since Russia's growth was outpacing Germany's so the latter's superiority
> was going to vanish.
> - France: regain Alsace and Lorraine
> - Italy: get Trieste and other irredentist claims.
> - Britain: quash an economic rival.
> So if one assumes that recovering Alsace and Lorraine did in fact constitute
> "France's aims" because these aims were stated although never acted upon,
> then I can find plenty of other countries - in fact every other one - which
> had similar stated-but-unacted-upon national goals.
France didn't act upon it because she was too weak. The desire was
there, only the strength was lacking.
> > b) Between 1894 - 1914 France, Russia, and Great Britain spent more
> > on armaments than Germany and Austria-Hungary.
>
> ...though they didn't spend more as a percentage of their national income,
> so this only reflects the fact that overall they had a larger economy.
France spent a much higher percentage of national income on arms than
any other European nation.
> > c) The armies of the Entente Cordiale greatly outnumbered the
> > Central Powers, and had a more powerful navy.
>
> Why don't you add the United States while you are at it ? This would make an
> even stronger case as the Americans had a significant navy.
The US was not part of a hostile alliance. It's true that the British
figures are only peripherally significant; the most important
comparison is France and Russia v. Germany and A-H.
> You have already posted false figures on peacetime forces.
Tsk tsk. I have posted figures from both Goodspeed and Mosier that are
in substantial agreement. You have claimed that somewhere on the
internet there are different figures, but have provided no citations.
Your claim is devoid of merit, and your accusation ('false figures')
can hardly be an honest mistake.
> > d) The immediate cause of the war, the assassination of the heir to
> > A-H, was rooted in Russia's Balkan policy, strongly supported by
> > France.
>
> ... as in when France refused to support Russia in 1908 ?
>
> Please show how the assassination of the heir to Austria-Hungary was part of
> Russian policy.
I have already posted testimony from Serbian government officials
stating that Russian and Serbian military intelligence coordinated the
activities of the Black Hand. I provided citations. That's history. If
you have contrary data, lets see it. If not, your protestations are
null and void.
> Germany issued an ultimatum to Russia, and mobilized simultaneously with
> France (one hour difference which means that the Germans made their decision
> in the absence of knowledge of the French mobilization).
An ultimatum - Germany informed Russia that going to general
mobilization would inevitably lead to war. That was a true statement.
Russia continued with general mobilization - what does that tell you
about Russian intentions?
Germany mobilized five hours after France according to the sources I
have cited; what is the source of your information? You never provide
cites. Why not?
- gerold
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
gerol...@yahoo.com (gerold firl) wrote:
> Hardly the
> actions of a country planning for war, which is what Goodspeed was
> trying to communicate.
You could try checking what Germany was spending the money on. The 42
cm howitzer was hardly defensive. It was largely useless against
anything smaller than a fort.
William Shapiro
message news:<at2c13$k73$2...@news-reader11.wanadoo.fr>...
> > gerold firl wrote:
>
> > > 2. France, not Germany, desired and created WWI.
> >
> > There were people in France, as well as in Germany (or in other
countries),
> > who desired a war. They were a minority in both countries, however that
> > minority had more influence in Germany - which was not a democracy -
than in
> > France - which was one.
>
> No - "Revanche" was a widely-held desire throughout France. Germany
> had no need or desire to attack France. Been there, done that.
>
> > > a) France was the nation whose aims could only be met by a great
> > > war.
> >
> > Why "great war" ? How were France's aims served by a war involving
> > Austria-Hungary ?
>
> France could not fight Germany. France needed to get all of Europe
> involved. In this, her aims coincided with Russia. A local war in the
> Balkans would not suffice to establish Russian hegemony over Istanbul
> ('Tsargrad') and entry to the Mediterranean. Britain was strongly
> opposed to the idea of having Russian naval competition acting as a
> threat to Suez. Only in the confusion of a general European war could
> Russia hope to break-out of the Black Sea.
>
If that is true, then why had Britain ceased to be the guarrantor of the
Ottoman Empire after the 1878 war? The whole purpose of the British buildup
on Cyprus was because Britain recognized that the fall of the Ottoman Empire
was inevitable and that most likely Russia would acquire it.
At the same time, Germany was looking to expand in the east.
Bill
William Shapiro
Have you ever read any of the national records from that period? Or is all
this distilled through the revisionist histories which so far have been the
basis of your argument? Tell you what, go to the PRO and look at the
records. Then go to the Scottish PRO, where you can find some more records
(these mostly personell documents which have been donated). They paint, at
least on the British side, a very different picture of exactly what the
money was being spent on and why.
>
> Russia's only war during this period was the Japanese war of 1905.
> France fought none. After subtracting the costs of the Japanese
> adventure, Franco-Russian military spending was still far greater than
> Germany's.
Russia also maintained a police state. The military in Russia was the law of
the Tsar essentially. It was used to over-awe and intimidate the territories
which had been added to the Tsar's realms by force. To keep these
territories under his control, he had to spend on a large military to make
sure that everything stayed as it was.
Furthermore, as Mr. Young points out in his post, it might be more
instructive to look at what the nations were spendign their money on, rather
than the amount they were spending.
>
> You seem to be claiming that we cannot draw any conclusions regarding
> the long-term strategic aims of the various European nations based
> upon their military spending patterns. Goodspeed sees this pattern as
> evidence that French dreams of revenge were being nursed throughout
> the four decades between 1871 and WWI, and that Russia became her
> willing, if somewhat unwitting, tool about halfway through.
First they are spending money to both destroy Germany. Now Russia is only
France's dupe? This does not make much sense.
Bill
TMOliver
> In article
> <579d7686.02121...@posting.google.com>,
> gerol...@yahoo.com (gerold firl) wrote:
>
>> Hardly the
>> actions of a country planning for war, which is what
>> Goodspeed was trying to communicate.
>
> You could try checking what Germany was spending the money
> on. The 42
> cm howitzer was hardly defensive. It was largely useless
> against anything smaller than a fort.
>
...and the short range and marginal accommodations of the new
German capital ships limited them to conflicts close to home,
not for the defense of commerce or overseas colonies (left to
obsolete and expendable naval forces. The Fleet was in both
design and construction evolved to engage the RN in some
cataclysmic confrontation for control of the NordZee, a
Trafalgar North. The High Seas Fleet was hardly a "defensive
force" in any traditional naval sense, and as the war went
on even the submarines, a potentially effective littoral defense
vehicle, were not "missioned" or trained in that capacity.
TMO
David Thornley
<ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <3df60bbb$0$4459$a186...@newsreader.visi.com>,
>thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote:
>
>> I don't
>> know why the British would have felt they had to address the problem
>> of invasion of Belgium:
>
> Britain had been concerned with the security of the channel ports
>since Henry VIII. When held by a major sea power they were a potential
>threat. In fact someone referred to them as the counterscarp of
>England. The formation of Belgium put the ports in the hands of a
>country that lacked both the resources and the desire to be a threat.
>The British guarantee was aimed just as much at the French at the time
>it was made.
>
to intervene over Belgium, and it would have been very dangerous
to just let Germany conquer the place. However, what I meant was
in prewar discussions. In those, there was no obvious reason for
Britain to emphasize Belgian neutrality, and therefore it seems
unreasonable to me to criticize them for not doing so. (It may
be legitimate to criticize Grey for sounding wishy-washy, but
that's another issue. In any case, any reasonable diplomats
- and the German High Command does not count here, although they
made diplomatic-level decisions - should have realized that
Britain could hardly stay out of the war by themselves.)
gerold firl
> > That long-term trend shows, year in and year out, Germany spending
> > less on arms and armament than her rivals. I realize that fact is very
> > inconvenient to your argument, yet fact it remains.
> >
> > If you want to investigate the national strategies pursued by the
> > European great powers in the run-up to war, military spending patterns
> > are an important source of data. Based on that data, Wilhelmine
> > Germany does not appear to be a country spoiling for war. If Germany
> > were planning on waging aggressive war, one would expect she would
> > devote commensurate resources toward that program.
> Have you ever read any of the national records from that period? Or is all
> this distilled through the revisionist histories which so far have been the
> basis of your argument?
I haven't combed through any archives, if that's what you mean. I am
getting my information from 'revisionist' histories: Ferguson,
Goodspeed, Albertini, Keegan, Taylor, and a few others as well.
Are you suggesting that the data is wrong? Is Ferguson falsifying the
record as part of his revisionist agenda? (Hint: attacking the honesty
of sources is generally the desperate last gasp when you've run out of
legitimate historical ammunition.)
> Tell you what, go to the PRO and look at the
> records. Then go to the Scottish PRO, where you can find some more records
> (these mostly personell documents which have been donated). They paint, at
> least on the British side, a very different picture of exactly what the
> money was being spent on and why.
I don't know what a PRO is; perhaps you can explain why that is
relevant?
> > Russia's only war during this period was the Japanese war of 1905.
> > France fought none. After subtracting the costs of the Japanese
> > adventure, Franco-Russian military spending was still far greater than
> > Germany's.
> Russia also maintained a police state. The military in Russia was the law of
> the Tsar essentially. It was used to over-awe and intimidate the territories
> which had been added to the Tsar's realms by force. To keep these
> territories under his control, he had to spend on a large military to make
> sure that everything stayed as it was.
You're saying the Russian military was so busy repressing the peasants
they had no time for war? Hmm. Interesting hypothesis.
>
> Furthermore, as Mr. Young points out in his post, it might be more
> instructive to look at what the nations were spendign their money on, rather
> than the amount they were spending.
Right: the good fellas were spending money on defense, while the bad
guys were spending it on weapons designed for one thing only: savagely
attacking their peace-loving neighbors. These rhetorical gymnastics of
yours are a nice example of how the patriot rationalizes their
ethnocentricity.
> > You seem to be claiming that we cannot draw any conclusions regarding
> > the long-term strategic aims of the various European nations based
> > upon their military spending patterns. Goodspeed sees this pattern as
> > evidence that French dreams of revenge were being nursed throughout
> > the four decades between 1871 and WWI, and that Russia became her
> > willing, if somewhat unwitting, tool about halfway through.
> First they are spending money to both destroy Germany. Now Russia is only
> France's dupe? This does not make much sense.
It doesn't make sense, but that appears to be what happened. Russia
was sucked into the Entente with promises of expansion into the
Balkans. Russia was building her enormous ground forces with the idea
of picking up the pieces of the Ottoman Empire; Austria-Hungary was
the primary obstacle to that ambition. Russia didn't want to fight
Germany, but the German-Austrian alliance wasn't going away. The
French wanted to fight Germany, but couldn't do it alone. On paper,
France plus Russia should have been able to handle Germany and A-H.
The third member of the Triple Alliance, Italy, had already been
bought-off, and there was a strong probability that Britain would
pile-on as well. It seemed like a sweet deal: France sees Germany
destroyed, Russia gets a new playground, and Brittania rules the
waves. Only it didn't quite work out.
I say that Russia and Britain were duped because they were suckered
into fighting a war that offered a lot of pain for very little gain.
- gerold
Al Kirke
<ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote in message
news:at7ars$6is$1...@thorium.cix.co.uk...
> In article <3df60bbb$0$4459$a186...@newsreader.visi.com>,
> thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote:
>
> > I don't
> > know why the British would have felt they had to address the problem
> > of invasion of Belgium:
>
> Britain had been concerned with the security of the channel ports
> since Henry VIII. When held by a major sea power they were a potential
> threat. In fact someone referred to them as the counterscarp of
> England. The formation of Belgium put the ports in the hands of a
> country that lacked both the resources and the desire to be a threat.
> The British guarantee was aimed just as much at the French at the time
> it was made.
>
from The MemoryHole at the radio-button: @anti-war propaganda
http://www.blancmange.net/tmh/tmhframe.html
The World War of 1914-1918 Harry Elmer Barnes
" ....
Belgian gesture was a transparent subterfuge, used by Sir
Edward Grey to inflame the British populace. He himself
admitted that he would have resigned if England had not
entered the war, even though Germany had respected
Belgian neutrality. The documents show us that Grey refused
even to discuss the German proposal to respect Belgian
neutrality as a condition of British neutrality. Belgium had not
even figured in the British cabinet discussions when war was
decided upon. Lord Morley's Memorandum on Resignation
proves this. "
Question: anybody have a copy of Morley's Memorandum?
Al
Louis Capdeboscq
> > There were people in France, as well as in Germany (or in other
countries),
> > who desired a war. They were a minority in both countries, however that
> > minority had more influence in Germany - which was not a democracy -
than in
> > France - which was one.
>
> No - "Revanche" was a widely-held desire throughout France. Germany
> had no need or desire to attack France. Been there, done that.
Again, you have not demonstrated that "Revanche" was indeed a widely-held
desire. Or rather, that the desire to act upon it was widely-held. There are
plenty of works analysing the politics of the French 3rd Republic at the
time, see for instance Azema's work "La Troisieme Republique". The consensus
is that most of the French had been raised in the notion that Alsace and
Lorraine had been wrongly taken away and that it would be a good thing to
have them back, but that the majority of the French were NOT favorable to
going to war with Germany in order to recover those provinces. And that had
very little to do with a perception of the French inferiority, as the
average Frenchman didn't realize his country's inferiority.
There was a vocal minority, in France, advocating a rematch with Germany.
There was a similar faction in Germany, which was also a minority and was
also more influential than the raw numbers of supporters indicated, which
supported German expansion in the West, notably annexation of the rest of
the Briey iron ore bassin, the northern French coal and steel regions,
definitive cowing of France so as to eliminate a military rival and gain
access to French colonies, etc.
In other words, there were people, in both countries, in favor of war. In
both countries, they were minorities.
> > > a) France was the nation whose aims could only be met by a great
> > > war.
> >
> > Why "great war" ? How were France's aims served by a war involving
> > Austria-Hungary ?
>
> France could not fight Germany. France needed to get all of Europe
> involved.
You don't get it. According to you, all that France wanted was a war with
Germany to regain Alsace and Lorraine. Because France could not fight
Germany alone, it needed Russian help. Obviously, the best-case scenario
from the French point of view is one where the Russians are fighting only
Germany, rather than spreading their forces against two enemies.
So I'm waiting for you to provide a rationale for the French to have
Austria-Hungary at war.
> In this, her aims coincided with Russia. A local war in the
> Balkans would not suffice to establish Russian hegemony over Istanbul
> ('Tsargrad') and entry to the Mediterranean.
Stop right there.
Firstly, you have not established that Russian policy was serious about
getting Istanbu, as opposed to being generally interested in getting the
straits
Secondly, you have the French orchestrating the whole thing. The French
couldn't care less if Russia didn't get the straits - all they're interested
in is having the Russians attack East Prussia and German Poland. So Russian
control of the straits did not coincide with the French aims - even if they
had been what you say they were which they were not. For instance, and it's
not the first time that I've asked this question, why according to your
theory did the French let the Russians down during the 1st Balkan war
instead of igniting a general conflagration ?
> > - Russia: gain a foreign policy success to consolidate the hold of the
Czar
> > at home.
>
> That is your analysis of Russian aims? A 'foreign policy success'?
Yes. A prestige gain.
Quite a common attitude with dictatorships, really. See the Argentinian
junta making a grab for the Malvinas in 1982...
> Does it matter what kind of success? How about going to war against
> Germany and Austria-Hungary - is that your idea of a 'foreign policy
> success'?
Initially, the expected success was making Austria-Hungary back down.
Obviously once it had been publically declared that Russia would support
Serbia, the Czar could not back down because of his shaky perceived
political position at home.
> France didn't act upon it because she was too weak. The desire was
> there, only the strength was lacking.
But what changed in French strength in 1914 compared to 1908 ?
> > > b) Between 1894 - 1914 France, Russia, and Great Britain spent more
> > > on armaments than Germany and Austria-Hungary.
> >
> > ...though they didn't spend more as a percentage of their national
income,
> > so this only reflects the fact that overall they had a larger economy.
>
> France spent a much higher percentage of national income on arms than
> any other European nation.
Hm ? Only if you take an average of 1894-1914. In fact,for domestic
political reasons, the German government was reluctant to increase the size
of the armed forces (not to dillute Prussian leadership).
After 1910 when these considerations are removed in favor of a greater
urgency for rearmament, German military budget went from $205,000,000 to
$442,000,000 in 1914. So in 1914 the Germans had gone up to 4.6% of GNP in
military spending. At the time the Russians were spending $324,000,000 (6.3%
of national income) and the French $197,000,000 (3.72% of national income).
That's the situation in 1914. Source: Kennedy, decline and fall of the great
powers. Also backed by Ferguson, once you've gone through the bibliography
to find the missing data.
> Tsk tsk. I have posted figures from both Goodspeed and Mosier that are
> in substantial agreement. You have claimed that somewhere on the
> internet there are different figures, but have provided no citations.
I posted figures from Ellis' "WWI statistical digest" which match other
sources that I have. I haven't read Goodspeed, and don't recall the figures
in Mosier (though I could look it up as I have the book).
> An ultimatum - Germany informed Russia that going to general
> mobilization would inevitably lead to war.
Germany gave Russia a (short) delay to back down otherwise there would be
war. Delay + threat of war = ultimatum. That's the usual definition.
> Russia continued with general mobilization - what does that tell you
> about Russian intentions?
That they would rather be at war with Germany and Austria-Hungary than back
down and let Austria-Hungary crush Serbia.
> Germany mobilized five hours after France according to the sources I
> have cited; what is the source of your information? You never provide
> cites. Why not?
Because I did: I quoted Keegan's "The First World War" a fairly recent
(1999) and commonly available book by a reputable scholar.
You can also look up the discussion on the start of the war in Holger
Herwig's "The First World War, Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918" or
Marc Ferro's and Henri Miquel's respective "The Great War". I pulled out the
first 4 one-volume histories of WWI from my shelves and they all say the
same thing.
David Thornley
Al Kirke <alki...@attbi.com> wrote:
>
>from The MemoryHole at the radio-button: @anti-war propaganda
>
> http://www.blancmange.net/tmh/tmhframe.html
>
>The World War of 1914-1918 Harry Elmer Barnes
>
> " ....
> Belgian gesture was a transparent subterfuge, used by Sir
> Edward Grey to inflame the British populace. He himself
> admitted that he would have resigned if England had not
> entered the war, even though Germany had respected
> Belgian neutrality.
So?
In the first place, Britain had very good reasons to fight against
Germany regardless of Belgium, considering the German naval buildup
and potential of Continental hegemony. Those were the main
reasons for British intervention in previous wars.
The documents show us that Grey refused
> even to discuss the German proposal to respect Belgian
> neutrality as a condition of British neutrality.
There's a *real* big problem here.
When did the Germans talk to Grey about Belgian neutrality?
Why would they do so when the only plan available for the German
Army was to march straight through Belgium? Why would they hint
at violating that neutrality when they hoped to achieve surprise
by such violation?
Moreover, why should Britain give *anything* in exchange for somebody
not violating Belgian neutrality? The Germans had signed a treaty
agreeing to respect it, hadn't they? If they were going to violate
that treaty, why would they not violate it for other reasons, later,
when there might not be a war for Britain to join?
Belgium had not
> even figured in the British cabinet discussions when war was
> decided upon. Lord Morley's Memorandum on Resignation
> proves this. "
>
A political memorandum rarely proves anything.
gerold firl
> gerold firl wrote:
> > "Revanche" was a widely-held desire throughout France. Germany
> > had no need or desire to attack France. Been there, done that.
> Again, you have not demonstrated that "Revanche" was indeed a widely-held
> desire. Or rather, that the desire to act upon it was widely-held.
Exactly. The desire was very widely held. The desire to act upon that
wish was not present, however, because France couldn't beat Germany
alone.
You may recall that Boulanger nearly managed to take-over French
government in a coup de revanche back in the 1880's; his cachet was
purely based upon a platform of war against Germany.
In the next decade there was the Dreyfuss affair; nowadays it is
remembered as primarily an anti-semitic crusade, but lets not forget
the ostensible crime for which he was condemned: treasonous
fraternization with Germany. He was accused of the most damning
misdemeanor possible.
In the next decade there was a substantial movement in favor of arms
limitation. When Germany made participation conditional on French
pledges to respect the current borders, France refused. The dream was
still alive, but had to wait until 1918 for the moment of fulfillment.
Revanche was a given in French politics. The end was known, only the
means were lacking.
> plenty of works analysing the politics of the French 3rd Republic at the
> time, see for instance Azema's work "La Troisieme Republique". The consensus
> is that most of the French had been raised in the notion that Alsace and
> Lorraine had been wrongly taken away and that it would be a good thing to
> have them back, but that the majority of the French were NOT favorable to
> going to war with Germany in order to recover those provinces.
And they were right: going to war for Alsace-Lorraine was idiotic. No
one has ever accused Poincare or Clemenceau of having an excess of
wisdom.
> There was a vocal minority, in France, advocating a rematch with Germany.
>
> There was a similar faction in Germany, which was also a minority and was
> also more influential than the raw numbers of supporters indicated, which
> supported German expansion in the West, notably annexation of the rest of
> the Briey iron ore bassin, the northern French coal and steel regions,
> definitive cowing of France so as to eliminate a military rival and gain
> access to French colonies, etc.
Nonsense. Annexations to the west became an issue after the war
started, but were never a serious platform of pre-war German politics.
You try to make it sound like German advocates of war with France were
of equal significance to French revanchists; you can't be serious.
Revanch had been a religious obsession for the French nation - again,
think of Gen. Boulanger on his coal-black charger, cantering through
the boulevards of Paris, medals gleaming, prompting many a moistened
eye, not to mention the swooning ladies. The German pro-war fanatics -
and there were some, to be sure - were more concerned with colonial
expansion. They were looking for new worlds to conquer - France was a
done deal.
> In other words, there were people, in both countries, in favor of war. In
> both countries, they were minorities.
But in France they reflected a long-standing national priority.
> > > > a) France was the nation whose aims could only be met by a great
> > > > war.
> > >
> > > Why "great war" ? How were France's aims served by a war involving
> > > Austria-Hungary ?
> >
> > France could not fight Germany. France needed to get all of Europe
> > involved.
>
> You don't get it. According to you, all that France wanted was a war with
> Germany to regain Alsace and Lorraine. Because France could not fight
> Germany alone, it needed Russian help. Obviously, the best-case scenario
> from the French point of view is one where the Russians are fighting only
> Germany, rather than spreading their forces against two enemies.
>
> So I'm waiting for you to provide a rationale for the French to have
> Austria-Hungary at war.
It was the only way to suck Germany in. The Serbian assassins provide
the spark and the kindling, Austria responds, next it's Russia. The
terms of the Dual Entente specified that if Russia becomes involved in
a war with A-H supported by Germany, then France will attack Germany.
Those terms were specified back in the 1890's.
> > In this, her aims coincided with Russia. A local war in the
> > Balkans would not suffice to establish Russian hegemony over Istanbul
> > ('Tsargrad') and entry to the Mediterranean.
> Stop right there.
>
> Firstly, you have not established that Russian policy was serious about
> getting Istanbu, as opposed to being generally interested in getting the
> straits
Istanbul/Tsargrad was the key to the straits.
> Secondly, you have the French orchestrating the whole thing. The French
> couldn't care less if Russia didn't get the straits - all they're interested
> in is having the Russians attack East Prussia and German Poland. So Russian
> control of the straits did not coincide with the French aims - even if they
> had been what you say they were which they were not. For instance, and it's
> not the first time that I've asked this question, why according to your
> theory did the French let the Russians down during the 1st Balkan war
> instead of igniting a general conflagration ?
I don't know - but Poincare came into power in 1912, if I recall
correctly. During the first Balkan war Caillaux had not yet been
neutralized. Apparently conditions weren't right.
>
> > > - Russia: gain a foreign policy success to consolidate the hold of the
> Czar
> > > at home.
> >
> > That is your analysis of Russian aims? A 'foreign policy success'?
> Yes. A prestige gain.
>
> Quite a common attitude with dictatorships, really. See the Argentinian
> junta making a grab for the Malvinas in 1982...
You are saying that Russia was willing to ignite a general European
war for two reasons:
1. They wanted a "foreign policy success" to boost domestic political
support, and:
2. They couldn't let Serbia down.
That doesn't make any sense.
> > Does it matter what kind of success? How about going to war against
> > Germany and Austria-Hungary - is that your idea of a 'foreign policy
> > success'?
> Initially, the expected success was making Austria-Hungary back down.
> Obviously once it had been publically declared that Russia would support
> Serbia, the Czar could not back down because of his shaky perceived
> political position at home.
No - there was no doubt that Russian mobilization against A-H meant
war with Germany too. The terms of the Triple Alliance were public,
unlike the secret Franco-Russian pact. If A-H was attacked by Russia,
Germany would fight alongside her ally. According to the agreement of
the Dual Entente, once that condition was satisfied - Russia and A-H
were at war - France would attack Germany.
As for the Czar, he was much less interested in war than his ministers
Sazanov and Izvolsky. Saying that Russia "had" to go to war over
Serbia is absurd. They chose to go to war - they didn't have to.
Russia went to war with eyes open; in fact, Russian military
intelligence worked hand-in-glove with their Serbian counterparts to
orchestrate the assassinations.
The secret clauses of the Dual Entente also stipulated that in the
event of war between Russia and A-H, consultations between the two
governments would be required to coordinate their mobilization.
Poincare was in Petersberg July 20-23, that is one week before the
outbreak of war. No records have survived describing the conversations
that took place during those fateful days, but it seems a good bet
that terms of coordinated mobilization were discussed.
- gerold
gerold firl
> gerold firl wrote:
> > France didn't act upon it because she was too weak. The desire was
> > there, only the strength was lacking.
>
> But what changed in French strength in 1914 compared to 1908 ?
To amplify on my previous response: on 29 July, in the last days of
peace, Poincare was asked by Senator Tristram if war could still be
avoided. Poincare replied: "It would be a great pity. We should never
again find conditions better." (Albertini III, p. 82)
> > France spent a much higher percentage of national income on arms than
> > any other European nation.
>
> Hm ? Only if you take an average of 1894-1914. In fact,for domestic
> political reasons, the German government was reluctant to increase the size
> of the armed forces (not to dillute Prussian leadership).
>
> After 1910 when these considerations are removed in favor of a greater
> urgency for rearmament, German military budget went from $205,000,000 to
> $442,000,000 in 1914. So in 1914 the Germans had gone up to 4.6% of GNP in
> military spending. At the time the Russians were spending $324,000,000 (6.3%
> of national income) and the French $197,000,000 (3.72% of national income).
>
> That's the situation in 1914. Source: Kennedy, decline and fall of the great
> powers. Also backed by Ferguson, once you've gone through the bibliography
> to find the missing data.
The missing data? What data is missing? Ferguson's Table 13 (p. 110)
lists military expenditures as a percentage of net national product
for Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria and Italy from
1887-1913. His figures do not match yours very well, but there is no
need to resort to either the bibliography or your secret decoder ring
to decipher them. Ferguson shows that in 1893 military spending stood
at 4.4% of NNP for Russia, 4.2% for France, and 3.4% for Germany. In
1913 those numbers had increased to 5.1% for Russia, 4.8% for France,
and 3.9% for Germany. In absolute terms, that corresponds to the
following amounts (in millions of pounds sterling):
France Russia Germany
1894 37.6 85.8 36.2
1913 72.0 101.7 93.4
I notice you are reporting figures for 1914, after the war began,
rather than the pre-war years, which better reflect planning and
intentions. German military spending went up significantly after the
war began, but Russia and France were massively outspending Germany in
the pre-war years.
> > Germany mobilized five hours after France according to the sources I
> > have cited; what is the source of your information? You never provide
> > cites. Why not?
> Because I did: I quoted Keegan's "The First World War" a fairly recent
> (1999) and commonly available book by a reputable scholar.
"In actual fact, not only was Russian mobilization premature, but
French mobilization was decided before noon and promulgated at 3.55
p.m. on 1 August, while German mobilization was decided at 5 p.m. (4
p.m. french time) the same day and promulgated shortly afterwards."
(Albertini III, p. 104)
So according to Albertini the French decision to mobilize was taken
some 4 hours before the German order was signed.
> You can also look up the discussion on the start of the war in Holger
> Herwig's "The First World War, Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918" or
> Marc Ferro's and Henri Miquel's respective "The Great War". I pulled out the
> first 4 one-volume histories of WWI from my shelves and they all say the
> same thing.
Are you aware of the widespread falsification of French history
regarding the First World War?
"The German _White Book_ and the Austrian _Red Book_ were incomplete,
but they did not contain manipulated documents. the British _Blue
Book_ had lacunae but no falsifications. The Russian _Orange Book_ is
full of authentic documents... all the documents in the [French]
_Yellow Book_ were more or less modified. Of all the diplomatic books
published after the outbreak of the war, it is without doubt the one
which least mirrors the truth." (Albertini III, p. 160)
And it's not only the official diplomatic record of the French
government which has been doctored; French history texts perpetuate
many of the same lies. In 1914 the French claimed that Austrian
general mobilization had preceeded that of Russia:
"...although for a good many years the point had been settled beyond
doubt, eminent French writers were still stating that Russia ordered
general mobilization because Austria had done so." (p. 161)
Whereas Germany published a complete record of unaltered diplomatic
records immediately after the war, the corresponding French records
still remained unpublished in 1939. It seems quite clear what they
were trying to hide... unless you have another interpretation?
- gerold
Al Kirke
> In article <UjxK9.142177$pN3.10377@sccrnsc03>,
> Al Kirke <alki...@attbi.com> wrote:
> >
> >from The MemoryHole at the radio-button: @anti-war propaganda
> >
> > http://www.blancmange.net/tmh/tmhframe.html
> >
> >The World War of 1914-1918 Harry Elmer Barnes
> >
> > " ....
> > Belgian gesture was a transparent subterfuge, used by Sir
> > Edward Grey to inflame the British populace. He himself
> > admitted that he would have resigned if England had not
> > entered the war, even though Germany had respected
> > Belgian neutrality.
>
> So?
>
> In the first place, Britain had very good reasons to fight
> against Germany regardless of Belgium, considering
> the German naval buildup and potential of Continental
> hegemony. Those were the main reasons for British
> intervention in previous wars.
Absolutely. The British thought so too. Cite:
John Charmley, (1995) Churchill's Grand Alliance, p.57
"But this was not Britian's only war aim: "We have to
maintain our position as an Empire and a Common-
wealth. If we fail to do so we cannot exist as a World
Power. And we have to accept out full share of respon-
sibility for the future of Europe.' This was what the war
was being fought for, and this was the objective for
which thousands of Britons were being asked fo fight
and die. 'If we fail to do that,' Eden warned his col-
leagues, 'we shall have fought this war to no purpose,
and the mastery of Europe which we have refused to
Germany by force of arms will pass to her by natural
succession as soon as the control of our arms is removed.' "
op. cit. p.359
"It was all very odd. The British had fought two world
wars to prevent Germany from dominating Europe,
and they had still ended up in a German-dominated
Europe. They had fought to preserve their indepen-
dence, but they had lost it all the same.
Now tell us in 50 words or less why we too should have
sent American boys to die in those wars ...
> > The documents show us that Grey refused
> > even to discuss the German proposal to respect Belgian
> > neutrality as a condition of British neutrality.
>
> There's a *real* big problem here.
>
> When did the Germans talk to Grey about Belgian
> neutrality? Why would they do so when the only plan
> available for the German Army was to march straight
> through Belgium? Why would they hint at violating
> that neutrality when they hoped to achieve surprise
> by such violation?
What do you think their motives were?
> Moreover, why should Britain give *anything* in
> exchange for somebody not violating Belgian
> neutrality? The Germans had signed a treaty
> agreeing to respect it, hadn't they? If they
> were going to violate that treaty, why would
> they not violate it for other reasons, later,
> when there might not be a war for Britain to join?
>
> > Belgium had not even figured in the British
> > cabinet discussions when war was decided
> > upon. Lord Morley's Memorandum on Resignation
> > proves this. "
> >
> A political memorandum rarely proves anything.
Do you think any political talk proves anything?
Everybody is happy. The French got Alsace-Lorraine.
The Polish got Danzig. And the Germans are now no
threat to the Royal Navy.
Al
David Thornley
Al Kirke <alki...@attbi.com> wrote:
>
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
>news:3dfd6447$0$4452$a186...@newsreader.visi.com...
>>
>> against Germany regardless of Belgium, considering
>> the German naval buildup and potential of Continental
>> hegemony. Those were the main reasons for British
>> intervention in previous wars.
>
>Absolutely. The British thought so too. Cite:
>John Charmley, (1995) Churchill's Grand Alliance, p.57
>
> "But this was not Britian's only war aim: "We have to
> maintain our position as an Empire and a Common-
> wealth. If we fail to do so we cannot exist as a World
> Power.
This is an excellent statement of what Britain was fighting
for. If Britain had sat the war out, and Germany had won, then
Britain's position as a Great Power would have depended entirely
on German attitudes, as then it would be possible for Germany
to defeat Britain.
While WWI was a lot more expensive than anybody thought, it still
left the British Commonwealth and Empire in a very strong position.
(I am of course discussing WWI here, but the WWII quote applies
very well to the early 1910s.)
>Now tell us in 50 words or less why we too should have
>sent American boys to die in those wars ...
>
WWI or WWII? There's a big difference there.
>> When did the Germans talk to Grey about Belgian
>> neutrality? Why would they do so when the only plan
>> available for the German Army was to march straight
>> through Belgium? Why would they hint at violating
>> that neutrality when they hoped to achieve surprise
>> by such violation?
>
>What do you think their motives were?
>
Whose motives? The Germans wanted to destroy France as a
Great Power. It is notable that the German reaction to any
war was to destroy France first.
>> Moreover, why should Britain give *anything* in
>> exchange for somebody not violating Belgian
>> neutrality? The Germans had signed a treaty
>> agreeing to respect it, hadn't they? If they
>> were going to violate that treaty, why would
>> they not violate it for other reasons, later,
>> when there might not be a war for Britain to join?
>>
>> > Belgium had not even figured in the British
>> > cabinet discussions when war was decided
>> > upon. Lord Morley's Memorandum on Resignation
>> > proves this. "
>> >
>> A political memorandum rarely proves anything.
>
>Do you think any political talk proves anything?
>
It can, but only en masse. (I of course exempt formal diplomatic
measures such as declarations of war.)
A political memorandum exists primarily to make the writer look
good. It does not normally exist to clarify the issues. Picking
one such memorandum and calling it proof is fatuous.
gerold firl
> In article <pIzL9.385304$QZ.59738@sccrnsc02>,
> Al Kirke <alki...@attbi.com> wrote:
> >
> >"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
> >news:3dfd6447$0$4452$a186...@newsreader.visi.com...
> >>
> >> In the first place, Britain had very good reasons to fight
> >> against Germany regardless of Belgium, considering
> >> the German naval buildup and potential of Continental
> >> hegemony. Those were the main reasons for British
> >> intervention in previous wars.
Another example of how striving for security can have the opposite
effect. From the British perspective, they were trying to 'play it
safe,' but in reality such efforts only increased their danger and led
to their downfall.
> >Absolutely. The British thought so too. Cite:
> >John Charmley, (1995) Churchill's Grand Alliance, p.57
> >
> > "But this was not Britian's only war aim: "We have to
> > maintain our position as an Empire and a Common-
> > wealth. If we fail to do so we cannot exist as a World
> > Power.
>
> This is an excellent statement of what Britain was fighting
> for. If Britain had sat the war out, and Germany had won, then
> Britain's position as a Great Power would have depended entirely
> on German attitudes, as then it would be possible for Germany
> to defeat Britain.
Attempting to attain absolute security is doomed. The US has now
fallen into the same trap. A strong Europe based upon German-British
partnership would have been the ideal foundation for a political union
promoting liberal ideals and political pluralism worldwide. Instead we
got the USSR, Naziism, and US hegemony. Britain was not responsible
for starting WWI, but Britain was very irresponsible to allow it to
take place.
> >Now tell us in 50 words or less why we too should have
> >sent American boys to die in those wars ...
> >
> WWI or WWII? There's a big difference there.
WWI. Without WWI there would never have been WWII.
> Whose motives? The Germans wanted to destroy France as a
> Great Power. It is notable that the German reaction to any
> war was to destroy France first.
Here you need to consider a more comprehensive historical perspective.
Are you aware that in 1870 France declared war on the Germans? That
war was a continuation of a long history of French aggression toward
Germany. Alsace and Lorraine had been nibbled away from German control
for the previous couple centuries, with France taking small segments
of territory whenever the opportunity arose. In 1871 the French
expected a repeat of that previous pattern - hence their outrage at
defeat.
There was never any question of destroying France as a Great Power -
unless by "Great Power" you mean 'power able to attack neighbors at
will and get away with it'.
- gerold
David Thornley
gerold firl <gerol...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote in message news:<3dff3ea8$0$22235$a186...@newsreader.visi.com>...
>> >>
>> >> against Germany regardless of Belgium, considering
>> >> the German naval buildup and potential of Continental
>> >> hegemony. Those were the main reasons for British
>> >> intervention in previous wars.
>
>Another example of how striving for security can have the opposite
>effect. From the British perspective, they were trying to 'play it
>safe,' but in reality such efforts only increased their danger and led
>to their downfall.
>
involved. I find this questionable in the first place, and certainly
don't see that getting into WWI was a bad decision on the basis
of the information available at the time.
Notice that Britain came into the war against an expansionist naval
power, seeking European dominance, who started the war by breaking
a treaty Britain considered vital.
>> This is an excellent statement of what Britain was fighting
>> for. If Britain had sat the war out, and Germany had won, then
>> Britain's position as a Great Power would have depended entirely
>> on German attitudes, as then it would be possible for Germany
>> to defeat Britain.
>
>Attempting to attain absolute security is doomed.
Of course. There is a difference, however, between adequate and
absolute. The British had good reason to try to seek a certain
level of security.
The US has now
>fallen into the same trap. A strong Europe based upon German-British
>partnership would have been the ideal foundation for a political union
>promoting liberal ideals and political pluralism worldwide.
This possibility was destroyed by Germany. Britain couldn't afford
to stay on the side of the Germans.
Moreover, it seems odd to consider Germany under the Kaiser as
promoting liberal ideals and political pluralism. Bismarck's
adoption of parts of the liberal agenda was to preempt liberals,
not to spread liberalism.
If there was to be an alliance to promote liberal ideas and political
pluralism, it would have to be Anglo-French.
>got the USSR, Naziism, and US hegemony. Britain was not responsible
>for starting WWI, but Britain was very irresponsible to allow it to
>take place.
>
By the time Britain could do *anything*, there was a war involving
France, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. This was already
a very impressive war.
>> >Now tell us in 50 words or less why we too should have
>> >sent American boys to die in those wars ...
>> >
>> WWI or WWII? There's a big difference there.
>
>WWI. Without WWI there would never have been WWII.
>
No particular reason, as far as I can see. The US had no
vital national interest in intervening in WWI.
>> Whose motives? The Germans wanted to destroy France as a
>> Great Power. It is notable that the German reaction to any
>> war was to destroy France first.
>
>Here you need to consider a more comprehensive historical perspective.
>
I do.
>Are you aware that in 1870 France declared war on the Germans? That
>war was a continuation of a long history of French aggression toward
>Germany.
Yup. A history that could definitely be considered over. France
only did that as long as France was more powerful. With the formation
of a unified Germany, and the demographic decline of France, the
danger was more the other way.
>There was never any question of destroying France as a Great Power -
>unless by "Great Power" you mean 'power able to attack neighbors at
>will and get away with it'.
>
In that sense, there aren't going to be many Great Powers. What I
mean is more like "power able to defy any other power". Germany
apparently intended to make France dependent on Germany in some
ways. A continued German fleet buildup also threatened Britain's
status as a Great Power.
D. Patterson
>
> In article <579d7686.02121...@posting.google.com>,
> gerold firl <gerol...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote in message news:<3dff3ea8$0$22235$a186...@newsreader.visi.com>...
> >> >>
> >> >Now tell us in 50 words or less why we too should have
> >> >sent American boys to die in those wars ...
> >> >
> >> WWI or WWII? There's a big difference there.
> >
> >WWI. Without WWI there would never have been WWII.
> >
> No particular reason, as far as I can see. The US had no
> vital national interest in intervening in WWI.
>
The United States did have a vital interest to secure in World War One.
The objective of the United States was to keep any major power with
hostile intentions from gaining any new colonial footholds in the New
World or on the borders of the United States which could be used to
directly attack the United States or interdict maritime trade or other
trade with the United States.
Germany demonstrated a hostile interest in the territories of the
continental United States, and Germany was engaged in the hostile
destruction and interdiction of trade with the United States. Germany
sought the defeat of Great Britain and its conquest by naval blockade,
and the United States was determined to deny Germany any and all
opportunity to gain control of France, Great Britain, the British Royal
Navy, or the British Commonwealth, which could give Germany the power to
dominate worldwide maritime commerce in concert with Britain, Japan,
France, or any other nation/s.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
TMOliver
I'll add that by 1914, the mercantile interests of the US had
developed as great if not greater sensitivity than had national
security interests.
In economic and financial circles in the US, the government was
certainly viewed as guarantor and protector of commercial
shipping interests, but even more important for the "Wall
Street" perspective of the US's future was the need for the
government to insure that growing US commercial interests in
Asia were fostered and protected, and the common and consistent
goal of increasing economic dominance in the Americas (Mexico,
S. & C.). While British interests in the US "sphere of
commercial influence" were certainly viewed as highly
competitive and commercial threats, entry by German interests
were seen as potentially even more threatening.
The idea that Germany might establish a Continental hegemony
allowing its commercial interests to be combined and
strengthened with those of France, or the even more frightening
prospects that "near kinfolks" in London and Berlin might end up
"dividing the world" must have seemed practical and frightening.
An intersting example of a potential danger.....
In 1914, the US was the world's major cotton producer, a
commodity in high demand worldwide. US mills only had the
capacity to handle a small portion of crops, and Great Britain
and Germany were the two major purchasers, providing hard cash
and goods in positive trade balance transactions. and literally
propping up the economy in much of the US South, still
economically miles behind much of the rest of the country.
British and German interests, acting competitively, bid up
cotton prices. British and German interests, potentially allied
by the results of a German victory and negotiated peace, acting
in concert, would take even the grits and fatback off Southern
tables.
....and then for those financiers and erl bidness types
looking ahead to tomorrow, there's the issue of German,
engineers, steel erectors and suppliers and oil companies
setting up shop in Maracaibo, Tampico or Vera Cruz (or Port
Arthur and Beaumont).
TMO
gerold firl
> In article <579d7686.02121...@posting.google.com>,
> gerold firl <gerol...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote in message news:<3dff3ea8$0$22235$a186...@newsreader.visi.com>...
> >> >>
> >> >> In the first place, Britain had very good reasons to fight
> >> >> against Germany regardless of Belgium, considering
> >> >> the German naval buildup and potential of Continental
> >> >> hegemony. Those were the main reasons for British
> >> >> intervention in previous wars.
> >
> >Another example of how striving for security can have the opposite
> >effect. From the British perspective, they were trying to 'play it
> >safe,' but in reality such efforts only increased their danger and led
> >to their downfall.
> >
> This assumes that Britain would have been better off without getting
> involved. I find this questionable in the first place, and certainly
> don't see that getting into WWI was a bad decision on the basis
> of the information available at the time.
Many in Britain, in 1914, did believe it was a bad decision. They
predicted many of the dire consequences which subsequently came to
pass - but in fact, things turned out worse than anyone had foreseen.
At this late date, it seems clear to many that it was a mistake:
first, for Britain to not prevent the war, and second, to get involved
once it started.
>
> Notice that Britain came into the war against an expansionist naval
> power, seeking European dominance, who started the war by breaking
> a treaty Britain considered vital.
Actually, I think the German navy was still smaller than the French
navy at the start of the war - or had it passed the French a few years
earlier? Not sure about that. In any case, the so-called threat of the
German navy was highly subjective.
The idea that Germany was 'seeking European dominance' in 1914 is an
anachronism, read backwards from the Hitler era. Projecting back in
time from the Fuehrer to the Kaiser is a complete misreading of
European culture in 1914.
What is the basis of your belief that Germany was either seeking
European dominance or threatening Britain in 1914? Think about the
actual data upon which this perception is constructed: when you try to
take hold of it, it vanishes.
> >> This is an excellent statement of what Britain was fighting
> >> for. If Britain had sat the war out, and Germany had won, then
> >> Britain's position as a Great Power would have depended entirely
> >> on German attitudes, as then it would be possible for Germany
> >> to defeat Britain.
> >Attempting to attain absolute security is doomed.
> Of course. There is a difference, however, between adequate and
> absolute. The British had good reason to try to seek a certain
> level of security.
Certainly. But when you are the superpower, at the top of the heap,
there is a temptation to view even remotely plausible potential
threats with more alarm than they deserve - and then to react with
excessive force to quench them.
>
> The US has now
> >fallen into the same trap. A strong Europe based upon German-British
> >partnership would have been the ideal foundation for a political union
> >promoting liberal ideals and political pluralism worldwide.
> This possibility was destroyed by Germany. Britain couldn't afford
> to stay on the side of the Germans.
>
> Moreover, it seems odd to consider Germany under the Kaiser as
> promoting liberal ideals and political pluralism. Bismarck's
> adoption of parts of the liberal agenda was to preempt liberals,
> not to spread liberalism.
Perhaps that was Bismarck's motivation. The results are what matter,
however. Germany had the most politically powerful labor movement in
Europe, where the Social Democrats exerted a significant influence for
both international peace and domestic social justice.
> If there was to be an alliance to promote liberal ideas and political
> pluralism, it would have to be Anglo-French.
French ideals were far in advance of actual practice. I can't think of
any examples of political repression and corruption in Germany to
match the Dreyfus affair. Anti-semitism was a greater problem in
France than in Germany. Once French revanchism had died-out, Germany,
France and Britian would have become the leading triumvarate of a
united Europe.
> >got the USSR, Naziism, and US hegemony. Britain was not responsible
> >for starting WWI, but Britain was very irresponsible to allow it to
> >take place.
> >
> By the time Britain could do *anything*, there was a war involving
> France, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. This was already
> a very impressive war.
Sure - but let it run its course. Germany would have won, but it would
have emerged heavily indebted to Britain and the US. Imagine a
miniature Marshall Plan beginning in 1916 or 17, with no USSR lurking
in the background. There would have been much need of reconstruction
and reform throughout the continent. The idea that there would be this
encouraging impetus to follow-up with further wars strikes me as
implausible. I don't think any of the participants would be eager for
another round. Even though the war would not have been as destructive
as WWI, the casualties would still have been huge, and the same kind
of revulsion toward militarism and autocracy would have taken hold.
>
> >> >Now tell us in 50 words or less why we too should have
> >> >sent American boys to die in those wars ...
> >> >
> >> WWI or WWII? There's a big difference there.
> >
> >WWI. Without WWI there would never have been WWII.
> No particular reason, as far as I can see. The US had no
> vital national interest in intervening in WWI.
Except to protect the huge American loans in Britain and France that
developed over the first three years of the war.
> >> Whose motives? The Germans wanted to destroy France as a
> >> Great Power. It is notable that the German reaction to any
> >> war was to destroy France first.
> >
> >Here you need to consider a more comprehensive historical perspective.
> >
> I do.
>
> >Are you aware that in 1870 France declared war on the Germans? That
> >war was a continuation of a long history of French aggression toward
> >Germany.
>
> Yup. A history that could definitely be considered over. France
> only did that as long as France was more powerful. With the formation
> of a unified Germany, and the demographic decline of France, the
> danger was more the other way.
Actually, if the two had been more closely matched, the danger would
have been less. France would not have needed to involve the other
nations of Europe. The rivalry would have been more open, and more
easily contained.
That history was not over. Revanch was still a powerful motive for
die-hard fanatics like Poincare, Clemenceau, and Paleologue.
> >There was never any question of destroying France as a Great Power -
> >unless by "Great Power" you mean 'power able to attack neighbors at
> >will and get away with it'.
> In that sense, there aren't going to be many Great Powers. What I
> mean is more like "power able to defy any other power". Germany
> apparently intended to make France dependent on Germany in some
> ways. A continued German fleet buildup also threatened Britain's
> status as a Great Power.
Actually, it seems that the prevailing sentiment in pre-war Germany
was that France would eventually become reconciled to peaceful
coexistence within a more unified Europe. After everything blew up
wartime passions poisoned the atmosphere, but there was no movement
afoot in pre-war Germany to cripple France.
The idea that the German navy was a threat to British Great Power
status just doesn't hold water. Even if France and Germany allied
against Britain - a most unlikely threat - Britain would not be
defeated.
- gerold
D. Patterson
>
[...]
> The idea that the German navy was a threat to British Great Power
> status just doesn't hold water. Even if France and Germany allied
> against Britain - a most unlikely threat - Britain would not be
> defeated.
>
> - gerold
Why don't you just cut to the chase and deny the Holocaust as well? It
would save us all a lot of hurrah and bandwidth if you would just get to
the point with your apologist agenda seeking to deny or justify the
crimes against peace and the crimes against humanity committed by
Germany in the First World War and the Second World War. Simply put,
World War One would not have happened and could not have happened
without the deliberate efforts of Germany to engage Russia, Belgium, and
France in war for the purpose of conquering their territories. Kaiser
Wilhelm II would have gladly taken the thrones away from his cousins in
Great Britain and Russia at the first opportunity. Your denials of these
historical facts constitute false historical revisionism.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
David Thornley
>> >
>> This assumes that Britain would have been better off without getting
>> involved. I find this questionable in the first place, and certainly
>> don't see that getting into WWI was a bad decision on the basis
>> of the information available at the time.
>
>Many in Britain, in 1914, did believe it was a bad decision. They
>predicted many of the dire consequences which subsequently came to
>pass - but in fact, things turned out worse than anyone had foreseen.
>
had foreseen. This argument is equally applicable to the Great Powers
that really kicked the war off: Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia.
>At this late date, it seems clear to many that it was a mistake:
>first, for Britain to not prevent the war, and second, to get involved
>once it started.
>
Doesn't seem clear to me, actually.
Nor do I know how Britain was supposed to prevent WWI. Britain could
have done more to discourage it, but given what went on I don't
think that would have stopped it.
>Actually, I think the German navy was still smaller than the French
>navy at the start of the war - or had it passed the French a few years
>earlier? Not sure about that. In any case, the so-called threat of the
>German navy was highly subjective.
>
The Germany navy, at the start of WWI, was much larger than the
French in modern ships. The introduction of the dreadnought had
done much to give Germany a better chance. By 1910 or so, most
naval powers were producing dreadnoughts, Germany faster than
anybody else but Britain. If you want to call this a few years
earlier, go ahead, but remember that the German building
programs date to considerably earlier.
The projected actions of the High Seas Fleet were highly subjective,
but the size and capability was not. The fact that it was too large
in relatively short-legged battleships to be suitable for any role
other than challenging British sea power in home waters was also
objective.
>The idea that Germany was 'seeking European dominance' in 1914 is an
>anachronism, read backwards from the Hitler era.
Backwards, forwards, who cares? If you mean to argue that the
Kaiser's idea of European dominance was closer to Napoleon's
than Hitler's, fine. It doesn't change things.
>What is the basis of your belief that Germany was either seeking
>European dominance or threatening Britain in 1914?
The belief that Germany was seeking European dominance: primarily
the actions of other major European powers from a heck of a long
time ago. The powerful countries tried to extend their reach.
Before the Nineteenth Century, there really was no way to get
actual European dominance, but that didn't stop Habsburgs from
trying.
If you want to rephrase it as saying that Germany wanted security
from France and Russia, it means the same thing in practice. The
only way Germany could get security would be to crush French and
Russian military capabilities, and then Germany would be the
strongest power in continental Europe, by far.
Threatening Britain: Germany was quite vocal in wanting more
colonies, which would have to come at some other European power's
expense, but this isn't the important part. The important part
is really the High Seas Fleet.
Britain survives by means of oceanic transport. Britain isn't
self-sufficient. This was not true of any other Great Power at
that time (or any time past the ancient period, AFAICT).
Britain's power rested through the centuries on the basis of having
the biggest and best fleet around. Britain did this in the face
of larger and potentially wealthier European powers by encouraging
other European powers to gang up on the leader, thus at least ensuring
that the leader had to concentrate on army instead of navy.
Therefore, a country that was the major industrial power in Europe,
and (without looking it up) probably the most populous after Russia,
and was building a large fleet, was threatening the British position
in the world, and indeed Britain's independence. It didn't matter
quite so much what that country's rulers were talking about, or
even what they were planning: it was the capability that mattered.
Similarly, if France had been publicly developing anti-fortification
weapons on the Austro-Hungarian scale, and creating something of
a mechanized exploitation force, Germany would be threatened.
It wouldn't matter how much the French disclaimed any thoughts of
actually using that capability.
Building the High Seas Fleet was a huge mistake for Germany. It
guaranteed British hostility and wasn't sufficient to defeat Britain.
Think about the
>actual data upon which this perception is constructed: when you try to
>take hold of it, it vanishes.
>
Nope.
>> Of course. There is a difference, however, between adequate and
>> absolute. The British had good reason to try to seek a certain
>> level of security.
>
>Certainly. But when you are the superpower, at the top of the heap,
>there is a temptation to view even remotely plausible potential
>threats with more alarm than they deserve - and then to react with
>excessive force to quench them.
>>
Sometimes. However, Britain's power was more fragile than most other
nation's power, in that it rested on the ability to control things
outside its borders, namely the sea.
>> Moreover, it seems odd to consider Germany under the Kaiser as
>> promoting liberal ideals and political pluralism. Bismarck's
>> adoption of parts of the liberal agenda was to preempt liberals,
>> not to spread liberalism.
>
>Perhaps that was Bismarck's motivation. The results are what matter,
>however. Germany had the most politically powerful labor movement in
>Europe, where the Social Democrats exerted a significant influence for
>both international peace and domestic social justice.
>
This does not translate into promoting liberalism outside Germany's
boundaries. To give an example, the US is a democracy with strong
traditions of liberty and political freedom, and during the Cold
War routinely supported right-wing thugs because they were anti-
Communist. Even today, US foreign policy seems to favor
dictatorships in some cases, and US interests suffer for it when
they are overthrown.
>> If there was to be an alliance to promote liberal ideas and political
>> pluralism, it would have to be Anglo-French.
>
>French ideals were far in advance of actual practice.
One might consider battleships with names like Liberte bombarding
Athens. However, ideals can often be exported more than actuality.
>> By the time Britain could do *anything*, there was a war involving
>> France, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. This was already
>> a very impressive war.
>
>Sure - but let it run its course. Germany would have won, but it would
>have emerged heavily indebted to Britain and the US.
Many people, and many countries, resent their creditors. It would
have been very easy to spin British participation as fattening
off the heroic German efforts to defend German soil, and to come up
with a lot of resentment. We still see some resentment from Britain
and the Commonwealth for US participation in the war before 1941,
when the US was doing something of the same thing you envisage
Britain doing here.
So, I don't know how German attitudes towards Britain would have
come out of it.
This would have been different if Britain had joined into the war,
blockading the French and sending the BEF to help the Germans.
This simply wasn't going to happen.
>and reform throughout the continent. The idea that there would be this
>encouraging impetus to follow-up with further wars strikes me as
>implausible.
Not for a while. However, and this is the important thing, German
action against Britain did not have to be in the form of a ground
war. That was Britain's peculiar weakness.
I don't think any of the participants would be eager for
>another round. Even though the war would not have been as destructive
>as WWI, the casualties would still have been huge, and the same kind
>of revulsion toward militarism and autocracy would have taken hold.
>>
Maybe. On the other hand, much of the revulsion toward autocracy was
that the autocracies generally lost. The primary winners were the US,
Britain, and France, all democracies. Autocrats tend to benefit from
victorious wars.
>> No particular reason, as far as I can see. The US had no
>> vital national interest in intervening in WWI.
>
>Except to protect the huge American loans in Britain and France that
>developed over the first three years of the war.
>
And if the US had not made those loans?
>> >Are you aware that in 1870 France declared war on the Germans? That
>> >war was a continuation of a long history of French aggression toward
>> >Germany.
>>
>> Yup. A history that could definitely be considered over. France
>> only did that as long as France was more powerful. With the formation
>> of a unified Germany, and the demographic decline of France, the
>> danger was more the other way.
>
>Actually, if the two had been more closely matched, the danger would
>have been less. France would not have needed to involve the other
>nations of Europe. The rivalry would have been more open, and more
>easily contained.
>
Could be, but Germany was busy making an enemy out of Russia, and
France would doubtless have cultivated Russia.
>> In that sense, there aren't going to be many Great Powers. What I
>> mean is more like "power able to defy any other power". Germany
>> apparently intended to make France dependent on Germany in some
>> ways. A continued German fleet buildup also threatened Britain's
>> status as a Great Power.
>
>Actually, it seems that the prevailing sentiment in pre-war Germany
>was that France would eventually become reconciled to peaceful
>coexistence within a more unified Europe. After everything blew up
>wartime passions poisoned the atmosphere, but there was no movement
>afoot in pre-war Germany to cripple France.
>
There was no movement afoot in pre-war France to cripple Germany,
just to recover Alsace-Lorraine. I don't think pre-war Russia
wanted to see the fall of the Kaiser and Kaiser-Koenig. If
Germany had not annexed Alsace-Lorraine, and had maintained a
more even balance between Austria-Hungary and Russia, things might
have remained more peaceful.
>The idea that the German navy was a threat to British Great Power
>status just doesn't hold water. Even if France and Germany allied
>against Britain - a most unlikely threat - Britain would not be
>defeated.
>
That gets *really* iffy. Add the French fleet to the German and
you get something pretty close to even with the British in 1914 or
so, and with large ports close to Britain. I think this would have
been enough to launch an invasion that Britain was ill-prepared to
counter. It might well have been enough to impose enough of a
blockade to bring Britain to its knees.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
> Not sure about that. In any case, the so-called threat of the
> German navy was highly subjective.
In October 1914 Britain had a total of 23 Dreadnoughts and 7
battlecruisers assigned to the Grand Fleet. Of these four were
refitting, two were repairing collision damage and Audacious had been
sunk. Also the Admiralty might detach battlecruisers as with
Invincible, Inflexible and Princess Royal after Coronel. As von
Ingerhol would be choosing when to engage the High seas fleet Could
meet the Grand Fleet on more or less equal terms. In addition Jellicoe
seems to have believed that ship for ship the Germans were superior.
France had completed 4 dreadnoughts before the war started and had 3
more that were advanced enough for completion during the war. Germany
had 16 dreadnoughts and 5 battlecruisers in the High Seas fleet.
France probably had the edge in pre-dreadnoughts.
D. Patterson
>
> In article <3e03470a$0$4436$a186...@newsreader.visi.com>, thor...@visi.com
> says...
>
> > It might well have been enough to impose enough of a
> > blockade to bring Britain to its knees.
>
> night about the effect of the German blockade on Britain in 1917.
>
> Children were dying of starvation - partly due to not having proper
> rationing.
It was a certainty that Germany could have used the naval blockade to
compel Great Britain to sue for peace or surrender in World War One.
Germany only needed to use more U-boats at earlier dates on station
around Great Britain. Germany botched the task by grossly
underestimating the resourcefulness of Britons to adapt to the shortages
caused by the German U-boat blockade, so they failed to produce and
assign enough U-boats early enough to accomplish their mission.
Germany's long delay in scaling the U-boat assault to the required
levles gave Great Britain the precious time it needed to develop convoys
with anti-submarine defenses, and time to bring the situation under
control and actually improve nutrition and health statistics compared to
pre-war levels.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
See:
Holger H. Herwig, Department of History, University of Calgary. Total
Rhetoric, Limited War: Germany's U-Boat Campaign 1917-1918. Journal of
Strategic and Military Studies.
http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/journal/1998/article2.html
Drazen Kramaric
<all...@ee.upenn.edu> wrote:
>To place Serbia, one first has to decide what one means by "Serbia" (the
>government? the people? the "Black Hand"?). The precise role of Serbia in
>the Sarajevo assassination will I believe remain mysterious for ever,
Only if you choose to disregard what Serbs themselves have to say. If
you were forced to learn in school how Princip was hero, you might
find the idea of Serbian "innocence" or inability to assign the blame
for the assasination of Archduke to Serbia as ridicule as I do.
Assasination of Archduke was in accordance with long term Serbian
policy of westward expansion.
After all, I lived through the most recent attempt.
Drax
Drazen Kramaric
>Yup. The assassination was not an official Serbian act, but it
>was conducted by Serbians with some help from inside the Serbian
>government.
It wasn't as official as a declaration of war, but on the other hand,
Afghanistan hasn't declared war on US either. Nor I do not see Iraqis
doing any overt acts of aggression against the United States.
>Serbian activities after the assassination were not helpful, although it
>doesn't look like that really mattered, for the reasons you give.
From Austrian point of view, the assasination was a last drop.
>Probably. Austro-Hungarian actions made it very difficult for Russia
>to stand aside.
Why? Serbia was a landlocked country whose control would have brought
nothing to Russia. Russians would have been much better with
supporting Bulgaria and with already friendly Rumania got another land
border with Ottomans.
>What I'd like to know is whether war would have developed if Austria-
>Hungary had been open about its plans. Austria-Hungary had a large and
>legitimate grievance against Serbia, and nobody would have objected
>to, or been surprised by, Austria-Hungary taking action.
Precisely. Russians should have left Austrians to defeat Serbian army
and than in cooperation with Germany and France stop Austria when the
honour has been satisfied and Karadjordjevic dynasty overthrown.
Drax
Drazen Kramaric
>This is an excellent statement of what Britain was fighting
>for. If Britain had sat the war out, and Germany had won, then
>Britain's position as a Great Power would have depended entirely
>on German attitudes, as then it would be possible for Germany
>to defeat Britain.
After WW1, Germany was no longer a Great Power. The only remaining
Great Power was France. How come British felt secure with Europe where
only one Great Power remained?
Why was victorious France OK, while victorious Germany would be a big
no-no?
Drax
Drazen Kramaric
<all...@ee.upenn.edu> wrote:
> As AJP Taylor put it, "Serbia's real crime was to exist").
Austria has no problem supporting Serbs in their struggle against
Ottomans.
Austria had no problems with Obrenovic dynasty whose last monarch has
been brutally murdered by the very same people who eventually murdered
Franz Ferdinand.
Austria had a problem with Serbia who claimed Bosnia and all the south
Slavs living there considered as Serbs.
Drax
Drazen Kramaric
wrote:
>The rewording of the alliance agreement was made to allay American
>concerns, but the fact remains that Britain assisted an aggressive
>Japanese Empire to construct a modern naval force large enough to
>threaten American defenses in the Asia-Pacific regions.
Always the same story from Dallas: "Aggressive <insert the name of the
country> that threatenes American defenses". Regardless of when, where
and how. It was always the other guys who are aggressive and always
the peaceloving Americans whose "defenses" are threatened. Americans
are never aggressive, their invasions are never aggressions, it was
always the bad guys who made Americans do it.
Drax
gerold firl
> gerold firl wrote:
> >
> [...]
> > The idea that the German navy was a threat to British Great Power
> > status just doesn't hold water. Even if France and Germany allied
> > against Britain - a most unlikely threat - Britain would not be
> > defeated.
> Why don't you just cut to the chase and deny the Holocaust as well? It
> would save us all a lot of hurrah and bandwidth if you would just get to
> the point with your apologist agenda seeking to deny or justify the
> crimes against peace and the crimes against humanity committed by
> Germany in the First World War and the Second World War.
That is priceless. That you for articulating your peculiar world view.
We're talking here about the denial of history, the unwillingness to
acknowledge the chain of causality: actions, reactions, and the
continuing cycles of repercussions.
You believe that the analysis of D. J. Goodspeed is related to
holocaust revisionism, part of an "apologist agenda" of denial,
covering the "crimes against peace and humanity" committed by Germany.
It seems to me, however, that the problem you encounter when
confronted by the Goodspeed hypothesis is a projection of your own
sense of denial. I believe that Germany is responsible for the crimes
of WWII, and that Germans must come to terms with that responsibility.
To a large degree that has taken place, and Germany is still in the
process of reaching an internal understanding of the Nazi crime.
While the massive defeat of WWII has forced Germany to do intensive
soul-searching, the victors have found it easier to avoid the
difficult questions. If you are able to consider the facts
objectively, it becomes clear that the responsibility for WWII extends
beyond the direct perpetrators of the crime. I speak here not only of
France and Russia, who were the prime instigators of the first war,
but also the US. I believe the US bears a greater share of
responsibility for WWII than the UK. I'll explain why below.
Most Americans today phrase the putative "lessons" of WWII in terms of
appeasement and the Munich agreement. But that is a very short-sighted
view; inexcusably myopic, in fact. Munich was a blunder of minute
proportions compared to the monumental criminality of twenty years
previous. Woodrow Wilson proposed peace terms on very specific terms:
his 14 Points. Germany agreed to an armistice on those terms. Had
those terms been honored, Adolf Hitler would have become a
housepainter instead of your icon of evil. Many clear-sighted
observers recognized that the Versailles settlement would lead to
another war - they were predicting it in 1920.
> Simply put,
> World War One would not have happened and could not have happened
> without the deliberate efforts of Germany to engage Russia, Belgium, and
> France in war for the purpose of conquering their territories. Kaiser
> Wilhelm II would have gladly taken the thrones away from his cousins in
> Great Britain and Russia at the first opportunity. Your denials of these
> historical facts constitute false historical revisionism.
Earlier in this thread you claimed that Germany was planning on
invading the US. That claim is only slightly less preposterous than
your analysis above. An examination of the pre-war sources provide no
evidence to support your belief that Germany planned to conquer
French, Russian, or Belgian territory. Your position is absurd, but
your expression is a useful reminder of the depths of historical
ignorance, denial, and psychological projection so commonly found in
the US.
- gerold
D. Patterson
Drax,
Those comments of yours are a fraud. "Always" is an awfully long time.
As can be seen in any cursory examination, "always" does not apply in
any of the examples you have cited. Would you care to retract those
statements as hyperbole run amuck, or do you want to try and defend the
indefensible?
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Michael P Reed
> In addition Jellicoe
> seems to have believed that ship for ship the Germans were superior.
Jellicoe was the RN's answer to George B. McClellan. Great organizer and
trainer, but was more worried about losing than winning a battle.
--
Regards,
Michael P. Reed
Michael P Reed
Britain did not measure "power" in "Continental" terms (i.e. land forces), but r
ther in naval. France was not a naval threat to Britain, whereas a victorious
Germany was. Britain had a long history of going ape if it perceived someone
challenging their naval might. FWIW, it was usually France.
mike stone
>
>Jellicoe was the RN's answer to George B. McClellan. Great organizer and
>trainer, but was more worried about losing than winning a battle.
But with _much_ more justification.
The stakes were simply too uneven. If Jelllicoe managed to sink _every_ German
capital ship, that (maybe) shortened the war a few months. OTOH, if Scheer got
lucky and destroyed the Grand Fleet, then as WSC put it, Jellicoe had lost the
war in an afternoon. He _had_ to be cautious
--
Mike Stone - Peterborough England
The gap between genius and insanity is measured in success.
David Thornley
mike stone <mws...@aol.com> wrote:
>>From: Michael P Reed mpr...@chartermi.net
>
>>Jellicoe was the RN's answer to George B. McClellan. Great organizer and
>>trainer, but was more worried about losing than winning a battle.
>
>But with _much_ more justification.
>
>The stakes were simply too uneven. If Jelllicoe managed to sink _every_ German
>capital ship, that (maybe) shortened the war a few months. OTOH, if Scheer got
>lucky and destroyed the Grand Fleet, then as WSC put it, Jellicoe had lost the
>war in an afternoon. He _had_ to be cautious
Right. Britain had some leaders who saw the situation very clearly
and acted accordingly, regardless of how those actions looked to others.
One was Jellicoe, who knew how to use the Grand Fleet and commanded
it well in its one major battle. He is often accused of overcaution
for being cautious in a situation where caution was vital. Haig
is another one: he understood very well how the war would have to
be won, and won it that way. He knew there was no cheap way to win,
unlike other people who kept looking for one (which was reasonable)
and sending large forces out in pursuit of one (which was not).
David Thornley
Drazen Kramaric <drazen....@zg.hinet.hr> wrote:
>On Mon, 9 Dec 2002 10:56:17 -0500, "Alan Allport"
><all...@ee.upenn.edu> wrote:
>
>
>>To place Serbia, one first has to decide what one means by "Serbia" (the
>>government? the people? the "Black Hand"?). The precise role of Serbia in
>>the Sarajevo assassination will I believe remain mysterious for ever,
>
>Only if you choose to disregard what Serbs themselves have to say.
I do not trust the contemporary Serbs, the ones that knew what
was happening (even if in their own little sphere).
If
>you were forced to learn in school how Princip was hero, you might
>find the idea of Serbian "innocence" or inability to assign the blame
>for the assasination of Archduke to Serbia as ridicule as I do.
>
The government of Serbia was not "innocent" in any general sense.
There was at least some complicity in the assassination, at least
on some levels, and it seems to me that the Serbian government
was encouraging radical action.
>Assasination of Archduke was in accordance with long term Serbian
>policy of westward expansion.
>
After all, the Archduke was pro-Slav, and could be expected to make
the life of Slavs in the Monarchy as good as possible, which rather
conflicted with the Serbian dreams of a Greater Serbia. The
Dual Monarchy had to be stopped from offering a better deal.
>After all, I lived through the most recent attempt.
>
And may not be the most objective judge of Serbians.
Again, the extent of official Serbian participation in the assassination
remains an open question. What we do know is that the Serbian
government was not completely innocent.
David Thornley
overthrowing their current dynasty sounds reasonable to me
for several reasons. If Austria-Hungary had announced that they
were going to remove that dynasty, substitute another government
(were there any reasonable heirs of the previous dynasty?), and
provide support for its efforts to clean up Serbia, would
Russia have mobilized in support of Serbia?
I'm not quite interested in what the Russians *should* have done,
but what they would have done under other circumstances. What if
Austria-Hungary had formed reasonable goals (under the circumstances,
overthrowing the Serbian government was reasonable), announced them,
and let the discussion proceed? Would WWI have taken place?
gerold firl
> In article <3e04dd35...@news.hinet.hr>,
> Drazen Kramaric <drazen....@zg.hinet.hr> wrote:
> >On 10 Dec 2002 15:43:55 GMT, thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote:
> >
> >>What I'd like to know is whether war would have developed if Austria-
> >>Hungary had been open about its plans. Austria-Hungary had a large and
> >>legitimate grievance against Serbia, and nobody would have objected
> >>to, or been surprised by, Austria-Hungary taking action.
> >
> >Precisely. Russians should have left Austrians to defeat Serbian army
> >and than in cooperation with Germany and France stop Austria when the
> >honour has been satisfied and Karadjordjevic dynasty overthrown.
> I don't remember the Dual Monarchy having any defined war goals:
> overthrowing their current dynasty sounds reasonable to me
> for several reasons. If Austria-Hungary had announced that they
> were going to remove that dynasty, substitute another government
> (were there any reasonable heirs of the previous dynasty?), and
> provide support for its efforts to clean up Serbia, would
> Russia have mobilized in support of Serbia?
I'm not clear on A-H war goals either, although the 11-point ultimatum
seems like a reasonable starting point: they wanted an end to Serbian
agitation and incitement.
In the longer run, A-H had been attempting to consolidate control over
the Adriatic Balkan seaboard, with Trieste as their primary port.
There had been some idea of getting secure overland communications
with Salonika, but when you already have Trieste, Salonika is really
unnecessary.
In answer to your last question, I think that Russia was going to
mobilize no matter what. The assassination was intended to provoke an
Austrian attack; the negotiations of Poincare, Paleologue, Izvolsky
and Sazanov in Petersburg July 20-23 cemented the agreement to proceed
with war. As Poincare said, the circumstances would never be better;
it was then or never. If they didn't take that chance to launch the
war, they never would.
> I'm not quite interested in what the Russians *should* have done,
> but what they would have done under other circumstances. What if
> Austria-Hungary had formed reasonable goals (under the circumstances,
> overthrowing the Serbian government was reasonable), announced them,
> and let the discussion proceed? Would WWI have taken place?
The French really wanted Britain on board, so it had to appear that
Austria was the aggressor. If Austria had not mobilized against
Serbia, further provocations would have been offered; maybe another
high-profile assassination, maybe some bombings, certainly various
insults and border incidents to convince Austria to pull the trigger.
- gerold
gerold firl
> In article <579d7686.02121...@posting.google.com>,
> gerold firl <gerol...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote in message news:<3e00dbde$0$22179$a186...@newsreader.visi.com>...
> >> >
> >> This assumes that Britain would have been better off without getting
> >> involved. I find this questionable in the first place, and certainly
> >> don't see that getting into WWI was a bad decision on the basis
> >> of the information available at the time.
> >Many in Britain, in 1914, did believe it was a bad decision. They
> >predicted many of the dire consequences which subsequently came to
> >pass - but in fact, things turned out worse than anyone had foreseen.
> Things turned out worse than pretty much anybody in any country
> had foreseen. This argument is equally applicable to the Great Powers
> that really kicked the war off: Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia.
Actually, pre-war German planners were very pessimistic about their
chances of winning the next war (see Ferguson, quoting memoirs,
official memoranda, and Reichstag speeches) hence their resort to the
desperate gamble of the Schlieffen Plan. Many writers, as early as the
1890's, had foreseen the deadly stalemate of trench warfare. Ivan
Bloch wrote a very detailed analysis of what the next European war
would look like. Germany gambled on the quick knock-out preciscely
because they didn't want to get involved in a war of attrition against
numerically superior foes. The Entente favored attrition, since that
played to their strength, and Britain counted upon their starvation
blockade to win a long war. They did not expect to go hungry
themselves, but submarines proved more effective than anyone expected.
> >At this late date, it seems clear to many that it was a mistake:
> >first, for Britain to not prevent the war, and second, to get involved
> >once it started.
> Doesn't seem clear to me, actually.
>
> Nor do I know how Britain was supposed to prevent WWI. Britain could
> have done more to discourage it, but given what went on I don't
> think that would have stopped it.
Britain could have prevented WWI by unambiguously declaring:
1. They would fight with the Entente, or
2. They would fight with the Alliance (Germany and A-H) or
3. They would remain neutral.
Any position aside from the one they adopted, where the French
believed Britain would fight and Germany believed they would not. That
position of ambiguity encouraged both sides to project the British
position according to their own desires.
> >Actually, I think the German navy was still smaller than the French
> >navy at the start of the war - or had it passed the French a few years
> >earlier? Not sure about that. In any case, the so-called threat of the
> >German navy was highly subjective.
> The Germany navy, at the start of WWI, was much larger than the
> French in modern ships. The introduction of the dreadnought had
> done much to give Germany a better chance. By 1910 or so, most
> naval powers were producing dreadnoughts, Germany faster than
> anybody else but Britain. If you want to call this a few years
> earlier, go ahead, but remember that the German building
> programs date to considerably earlier.
>
> The projected actions of the High Seas Fleet were highly subjective,
> but the size and capability was not. The fact that it was too large
> in relatively short-legged battleships to be suitable for any role
> other than challenging British sea power in home waters was also
> objective.
OK, but a more important question was whether the challenge to the RN
would come in the form of attack or defense. In Germany the KM was
seen as a defensive force, positioned to dissuade Britain from naval
aggression. To the British war party, even a defensive navy was an
affront - it was an attempt to limit British naval options, and as
such was considered a threat.
> >The idea that Germany was 'seeking European dominance' in 1914 is an
> >anachronism, read backwards from the Hitler era.
> Backwards, forwards, who cares? If you mean to argue that the
> Kaiser's idea of European dominance was closer to Napoleon's
> than Hitler's, fine. It doesn't change things.
Certainly it does. "European dominance" based upon a customs union
might have created some economic challenges for Britain, but those
could have been met with peaceful means. Launching a war to prevent a
Zollverein is stupid.
> >What is the basis of your belief that Germany was either seeking
> >European dominance or threatening Britain in 1914?
> The belief that Germany was seeking European dominance: primarily
> the actions of other major European powers from a heck of a long
> time ago. The powerful countries tried to extend their reach.
> Before the Nineteenth Century, there really was no way to get
> actual European dominance, but that didn't stop Habsburgs from
> trying.
BAM! There is your smoking gun. You are saying that you believe
Germany was trying to become the tyrant of Europe: but look at the
so-called factual basis of that belief. The fact that *other countries
tried it in the past*. That is a totally inadequate basis for drawing
such important conclusions, and for launching such a disastrous
policy.
> If you want to rephrase it as saying that Germany wanted security
> from France and Russia, it means the same thing in practice. The
> only way Germany could get security would be to crush French and
> Russian military capabilities, and then Germany would be the
> strongest power in continental Europe, by far.
That is not the only way. If Russia had not been ensnared by French
blandishments a power-sharing arrangement in Europe would have
evolved. Germany would have been the most powerful state, but could
not have dominated the rest of the continent. The best way to contain
the aggressive tendancies of the individual states was within a
federated political structure. The primary impediment to such a
solution came from France, because of the desire for revanche.
> Threatening Britain: Germany was quite vocal in wanting more
> colonies, which would have to come at some other European power's
> expense, but this isn't the important part. The important part
> is really the High Seas Fleet.
>
> Britain survives by means of oceanic transport. Britain isn't
> self-sufficient. This was not true of any other Great Power at
> that time (or any time past the ancient period, AFAICT).
Germany imported a third of her food before 1914.
You're saying that British security needs were more important than
anyone else. To someone from Britain, if they take a completely
subjective perspective, that is quite true. However, the ability to
live in a multi-variate world as a good neighbor requires
understanding the security needs of others as well. The key to
building collective security is negotiating win-win compromise
solutions, so everybody buys-in. The French would have to give up
their dream of revanche, so France was not interested in compromise;
Britain felt no need of compromise, because she was the dominant
superpower of the age. That attitude was a mistake, based upon the
arrogance of power.
> Building the High Seas Fleet was a huge mistake for Germany. It
> guaranteed British hostility and wasn't sufficient to defeat Britain.
True. In hindsight, that is clear. Just as it should be clear that
British involvement in WWI was also a mistake.
> >Think about the
> >actual data upon which this perception is constructed: when you try to
> >take hold of it, it vanishes.
> Nope.
The so-called evidence you have cited to demonstrate the future threat
of an undefeated Germany consists of the fact that *other* countries,
in the past, have threatened Britain after becoming dominant on the
continent. We have Napoleon and Habsburg Spain as the previous
examples. But that is a flimsy reed upon which to build a world war.
> >> Moreover, it seems odd to consider Germany under the Kaiser as
> >> promoting liberal ideals and political pluralism. Bismarck's
> >> adoption of parts of the liberal agenda was to preempt liberals,
> >> not to spread liberalism.
> >Perhaps that was Bismarck's motivation. The results are what matter,
> >however. Germany had the most politically powerful labor movement in
> >Europe, where the Social Democrats exerted a significant influence for
> >both international peace and domestic social justice.
> This does not translate into promoting liberalism outside Germany's
> boundaries. To give an example, the US is a democracy with strong
> traditions of liberty and political freedom, and during the Cold
> War routinely supported right-wing thugs because they were anti-
> Communist. Even today, US foreign policy seems to favor
> dictatorships in some cases, and US interests suffer for it when
> they are overthrown.
Alternative history is a notoriously slippery subject, and of course
there is no way to 'know' what might have been. Certainly the treaty
of Brest-Litovsk provides a poor example of what German-led Europe
could have been. However, I don't believe Brest-Litovsk provides a
valid model. It was created during a desperate wartime period, with
Germany facing defeat while starvation stalked the streets.
The most cogent model of what a German-led European community might
have looked like can be seen in the work of Friedrich Naumann, whose
_Mitteleuropa_ was the best selling and most influential book
published in Germany during the war. (See _Mitteleuropa_ by the
American historian Henry Cord Meyer (1955) for a complete history and
discussion.)
In Naumann's vision, _Mitteleuropa_ would be a voluntary political
community based upon self-determination and economic interdependance.
He saw it starting with Germany and Austria-Hungary, with other
countries joining as they saw the benefits of peaceful cooperation. It
is much like the current EU.
> >> By the time Britain could do *anything*, there was a war involving
> >> France, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. This was already
> >> a very impressive war.
> >
> >Sure - but let it run its course. Germany would have won, but it would
> >have emerged heavily indebted to Britain and the US.
>
> Many people, and many countries, resent their creditors. It would
> have been very easy to spin British participation as fattening
> off the heroic German efforts to defend German soil, and to come up
> with a lot of resentment. We still see some resentment from Britain
> and the Commonwealth for US participation in the war before 1941,
> when the US was doing something of the same thing you envisage
> Britain doing here.
>
> So, I don't know how German attitudes towards Britain would have
> come out of it.
Sure, there are always uncertainties, but as it turned out US loans to
Britain during WWI tied the two countries together. While there were
resentments toward the US, they were greatly outweighed by their
common interests.
> This would have been different if Britain had joined into the war,
> blockading the French and sending the BEF to help the Germans.
> This simply wasn't going to happen.
No - that would have been unscrupulous as well.
> >and reform throughout the continent. The idea that there would be this
> >encouraging impetus to follow-up with further wars strikes me as
> >implausible.
>
> Not for a while. However, and this is the important thing, German
> action against Britain did not have to be in the form of a ground
> war. That was Britain's peculiar weakness.
Sure, but in time economic self-interest would draw the two trade
blocs (British Empire and Europe) closer together. A war would be
immensely destructive, with no real benefit to anybody.
> I don't think any of the participants would be eager for
> >another round. Even though the war would not have been as destructive
> >as WWI, the casualties would still have been huge, and the same kind
> >of revulsion toward militarism and autocracy would have taken hold.
> Maybe. On the other hand, much of the revulsion toward autocracy was
> that the autocracies generally lost. The primary winners were the US,
> Britain, and France, all democracies. Autocrats tend to benefit from
> victorious wars.
Except that the people of all the countries in the war emerged
immensely strengthened relative to their governments. In Germany the
SDP agreed to sacrifice for the duration of the war, with the clear
goal of a payoff after in terms of greater political representation.
Even in A-H, more politicaly backward than Germany, great progress
toward democratization was made after the death of Franz-Joseph in
1916.
> >> No particular reason, as far as I can see. The US had no
> >> vital national interest in intervening in WWI.
> >Except to protect the huge American loans in Britain and France that
> >developed over the first three years of the war.
> And if the US had not made those loans?
Then the US would have had no business in the war.
- gerold
D. Patterson
>
> "D. Patterson" <n...@fidalgo.net> wrote in message news:<3E026569...@fidalgo.net>...
> > gerold firl wrote:
> > >
> > [...]
> > > The idea that the German navy was a threat to British Great Power
> > > status just doesn't hold water. Even if France and Germany allied
> > > against Britain - a most unlikely threat - Britain would not be
> > > defeated.
>
> > Why don't you just cut to the chase and deny the Holocaust as well? It
> > would save us all a lot of hurrah and bandwidth if you would just get to
> > the point with your apologist agenda seeking to deny or justify the
> > crimes against peace and the crimes against humanity committed by
> > Germany in the First World War and the Second World War.
>
> That is priceless. That you for articulating your peculiar world view.
>
> We're talking here about the denial of history, the unwillingness to
> acknowledge the chain of causality: actions, reactions, and the
> continuing cycles of repercussions.
>
My world view is the same as the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles
and the general consensus of most historians. The few historians who
deny this world view do so in flagrant contradiction to the plain
evidence and are justly regarded by the historical community as deluded
and counterfactual revisionists.
Versailles Treaty, Article 231…"The Allied and Associated Governments
affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies
for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated
Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of
the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."
It is your own counterfactual and ahistorical denials which epitomize
the hopelessness of your apologies for the German culpability in
planning and deliberately starting World War One.
> You believe that the analysis of D. J. Goodspeed is related to
> holocaust revisionism, part of an "apologist agenda" of denial,
> covering the "crimes against peace and humanity" committed by Germany.
>
> It seems to me, however, that the problem you encounter when
> confronted by the Goodspeed hypothesis is a projection of your own
> sense of denial. I believe that Germany is responsible for the crimes
> of WWII, and that Germans must come to terms with that responsibility.
> To a large degree that has taken place, and Germany is still in the
> process of reaching an internal understanding of the Nazi crime.
>
> While the massive defeat of WWII has forced Germany to do intensive
> soul-searching, the victors have found it easier to avoid the
> difficult questions. If you are able to consider the facts
> objectively, it becomes clear that the responsibility for WWII extends
> beyond the direct perpetrators of the crime. I speak here not only of
> France and Russia, who were the prime instigators of the first war,
> but also the US. I believe the US bears a greater share of
> responsibility for WWII than the UK. I'll explain why below.
>
Since France and Russia were quite incapable of starting World War One,
your claims that they did so represent a reprehensible example of the
long since discredited German black propaganda designed to shift the
responsibility from the German perpetrators of the crime to their French
and Russian victims. The burden of proof is yours to demonstrate that
Germany did not deliberately start World War One to further its
militaristic goals and Weltpolitik. You and aplogists like yourself have
manifestly failed to remotely meet such a burden of proof.
> Most Americans today phrase the putative "lessons" of WWII in terms of
> appeasement and the Munich agreement. But that is a very short-sighted
> view; inexcusably myopic, in fact. Munich was a blunder of minute
> proportions compared to the monumental criminality of twenty years
> previous. Woodrow Wilson proposed peace terms on very specific terms:
> his 14 Points. Germany agreed to an armistice on those terms. Had
> those terms been honored, Adolf Hitler would have become a
> housepainter instead of your icon of evil. Many clear-sighted
> observers recognized that the Versailles settlement would lead to
> another war - they were predicting it in 1920.
>
Your sentiments are yet another repetition of the same false German
denials of their responsibility for the crimes of their militaristic
leadership. Adolf Hitler's career was set in motion by the political and
financial support and instructions of a German Army intelligence
officer. This German officer was a member of the same group of officers
which began preparations for the next war long before the Versailles
Treaty even existed. In other words, it made no difference whatsoever
what treaty was agreed upon with Germany or was imposed upon Germany,
because this same group of officers were determined to renew the lost
war at the first opportunity to do so. It only remained to be seen in
the coming years which German political parties would satisfy the
militarists' desires for rearmament and renewal of the struggle for an
expanded German Empire at the expense of its victims.
The renewal of the war with Germany at a future date was easily
predicted, because the Germans responsible for the first war left no
doubt in their public demeanor that they desired to see Germany triumph
in a second war. Britain and France sought to keep Germany too weak to
carry out such a plan for a renewal of the last war. The British and
French hopes for the success of any German government to restrain the
German militaristic adventurists were dim at best. The United States,
being unable to restrain the worst impulses of German militarists or the
French and British reactions to the German militancy, retreated into
isolationism while awaiting a means to influence the European
participants headed towards an inevitable renewal of the conflicts.
> > Simply put,
> > World War One would not have happened and could not have happened
> > without the deliberate efforts of Germany to engage Russia, Belgium, and
> > France in war for the purpose of conquering their territories. Kaiser
> > Wilhelm II would have gladly taken the thrones away from his cousins in
> > Great Britain and Russia at the first opportunity. Your denials of these
> > historical facts constitute false historical revisionism.
>
> Earlier in this thread you claimed that Germany was planning on
> invading the US. That claim is only slightly less preposterous than
> your analysis above. An examination of the pre-war sources provide no
> evidence to support your belief that Germany planned to conquer
> French, Russian, or Belgian territory. Your position is absurd, but
> your expression is a useful reminder of the depths of historical
> ignorance, denial, and psychological projection so commonly found in
> the US.
>
> - gerold
Germany did, in fact, plan on invading the United States. The plans for
the German invasion of the United States were ordered by Kaiser Wilhelm
II, and the plans were enthusiastically endorsed by Admiral Alfred von
Tirpitz. After counseling against the adventure, Count Alfred von
Schlieffen nearly ordered the execution of the plan in obedience to the
orders of Kaiser Wilhelm II. In the last move, however, Count Alfred von
Schlieffen finally succeeded in persuading the Kaiser that the planned
invasion must be cancelled because Germany had too few troops to sustain
the operation to its conclusion. Contrary to your misrepresentaion of my
earlier comments, the plans for the German invasion of the United States
were under consideration during the period from 1897 to 1907. Before and
during World War One, Germany considered a number of means by which it
could foment and/or participate in an invasion of the United States in
concert with Mexico or Mexico and Japan. There is nothing preposterous
about my comments regarding a German invasion of the United States. My
comments are supported by a number of uncontroverted historical
documents including papers in the German military archives, the
Zimmerman Telegram, and eyewitness U.S. Army intelligence reports.
Contrary to your denials, German planned to conquer Russian, Belgian,
and French territories. Conquered Russian and French territories were to
be annexed to the German Reich, and the conquered Belgian state was to
be reduced in status to that of a vassal state, unable to govern all of
its own affairs.
If anyone's "position is absurd" as you describe, it must surely be
yours, because the facts flatly contradict your statements and
conclusions.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Akorps666
What a wonderful phrase! That seems to sum up very well
some recent writers ... like the guy who claimed the Americans
didn't have many guns during the early period of our history ...
The logic seems to be, pick a contemporary bias, and seek
to justify it with selective extracts from the historical record.
>Germany did, in fact, plan on invading the United States. The plans for the
German invasion of the United States were ordered by Kaiser Wilhelm II, and the
plans were enthusiastically endorsed by Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. After
counseling against the adventure, Count Alfred von Schlieffen nearly ordered
the execution of the plan in obedience to the orders of Kaiser Wilhelm II. In
the last move, however, Count Alfred von Schlieffen finally succeeded in
persuading the Kaiser that the planned invasion must be cancelled because
Germany had too few troops to sustain the operation to its conclusion. Contrary
to your misrepresentaion of my earlier comments, the plans for the German
invasion of the United States were under consideration during the period from
1897 to 1907. Before and during World War One, Germany considered a number of
means by which it could foment and/or participate in an invasion of the United
States in concert with Mexico or Mexico and Japan. There is nothing
preposterous about my comments regarding a German invasion of the United
States. My comments are supported by a number of uncontroverted historical
documents including papers in the German military archives, the Zimmerman
Telegram, and eyewitness U.S. Army intelligence reports.
I'm extremely interested in German plans to invade the USA during
and prior to WW2, especially the west coast (California). I even had
a series of vivid dreams about that :-) I only found a few scattered
references though, so far. Especially some planning during the 1930s
to establish the feasibility of landing on the west coast.
D. Patterson
>
> > The rewording of the alliance agreement was made to allay American
> > concerns, but the fact remains that Britain assisted an aggressive
> > Japanese Empire to construct a modern naval force large enough to
> > warships constructed in Britain, transfers of British naval technology
> > to Japan, British training on Japanese naval personnel, and similar
> > activities were seen to give an aggressive Japanese Empire an
> > unprecedented and growing capability to unilaterally threaten American
> > defenses in the Pacific and Asian regions.
>
> Too much imprecision here: the distinctions between intent, perception and
> outcome are crucial. Perhaps British aid to Japan did indirectly put
> pressure on the Americans, but the British were most definitely not "working
> to arm the Imperial Japanese Navy as a counterforce to the United States
> Navy", as was originally claimed. Their concern was Russia alone, or almost
> alone. Any other effect was incidental. And the passive construction in the
> second sentence is the problem: "were seen" by whom? The Americans? Fair
> enough, but perception is not proof of culpability. No doubt the US Navy did
> have a very different take on events in the Pacific, and that was their
> prerogative. But it says nothing about British motivation, or the original
> logic behind the naval treaty.
>
> Alan.
The imprecision is due in part to your incomplete quotation of what I
wrote and a misunderstanding, perhaps, of what I meant to address. I was
replying with the earlier messages in the thread in mind.
Don Phillipson wrote:
>
[...]>
> Something seems backwards here. The Dreadnought did indeed
> introduce revolutionary new battleship technology (making all
> existing capital ships obsolete): but this was an initiative of
> British naval constructors (not German).
[...]
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
>
> In article <GFlJ9.2938$lL6.6...@news20.bellglobal.com>,
> dphil...@trytel.com (Don Phillipson) wrote:
>
> > but this was an initiative of
> > British naval constructors (not German).
>
> The design of the US South Carolina class started in 1904 but given
> the at the time lengthy design and building process finished after the
> Dreadnought. I can not say for certain that Fisher was aware of this
> but it would certainly account for the haste with which Dreadnought
> was built.
We were discussing the American construction of the dreadnought type of
battlleship, the USS SOUTH CAROLINA (BB-26), and how it did and did not
influence the British construction and launching of the HMS DREADNOUGHT
and dreadnought type sister-ships before the Americans completed the
construction of their own dreadnought type battleships. I wrote, "Fisher
was acutely aware of the American construction programme, and Britain
acted to create a suitable counterweight to the nascent American
seapower. Britain solidified an alliance with Japan and worked to arm
the Imperial Japanese Navy as a counterforce to the United States Navy."
Evidently I failed to make my meaning clear enough, because I omitted
mentioning the other navies in the Pacific as well. The omission was due
to my focus on the importance of the USS SOUTH CAROLINA (BB-26) and USS
MICHIGAN (BB-27). Perhaps I should have written something like, "Fisher
was acutely aware of the American construction programme, and Britain
acted to create a suitable counterweight to the nascent American
seapower. Britain solidified an alliance with Japan and worked to arm
the Imperial Japanese Navy as a counterforce to the French, Russian,
American, German, and Dutch navies in the Asia-Pacific regions." Yes,
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was primarily concerned with countering
French naval forces and/or Russian naval forces in the China area of
operations, but Britain knew full well that the alliance would also
serve additionally as a potential counterforce to any American, German,
and Dutch naval forces in the Pacific-Asia regions. Between 1865 and
1880, the United States went from being the first ranking naval power to
the 12th ranked naval power below 11th ranked Chile. By 1900, the United
States became the third ranking naval power, behind second ranking
Germany and first ranking Britain. Being the third ranking naval power
behind second ranking Germany, Britain had very good reason to factor
the U.S. Navy into its plans for its naval construction programmes. If
the lesser ranking French and Russian navies were reason enough to
justify the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, then the third ranking U.S. Navy
cannot be discounted as being at least a significant collateral factor
in British planning.
Recognition of the British efforts to maintain suitable naval alliances
does not necessarily imply that Britain had any hostile intent towards
the United States or vice versa. Britain went much farther than it had
ever done so in the past to allay such American concerns about the
potential for the defensive Anglo-Japanese Alliance to be used against
the United States. Britain had also placed the Royal Navy in harm's way
against German naval forces in defense of the U.S. Navy during
confrontations in Venezuela and the Phillipines. Nevertheless, the
American and British naval construction programmes alike had to treat
the American, British, German, French, Japanese, Italian, and Dutch
navies as potential worldwide adversaries for the purposes of designing
and constructing their naval fleets. Until there was an offsetting and
enduring alliance on paper between the United States and Britain, the
American naval construction programme had to treat the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance as a potential threat to the American territories in the
Pacific and the United States itself.
The Japanese Empire did not hide the fact that it wanted to expand its
empire to the Asian-Pacific territories possessed by the Chinese,
European, and American powers. Consequently, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
substantially increased American and European concerns that Japan might
use the ostensible defensive alliance as a means for an offensive
expansion of its empire. Subsequent events proved the concerns were well
founded, when the Japanese Empire conquered the German territories and
virtually annexed them to its empire, despite the terms of the League of
Nations mandates. However, the alliance served British interests by
removing Japan as a potential threat to its own Asia-Pacific possessions
while the alliance was in force.
Britain had to construct its naval forces to meet whatever threats it
might encounter, especially the challenge presented by the new German
naval construction programme and the Italian navy's VITTORIO EMANUALE.
The American construction of the dreadnought type battleships, USS SOUTH
CAROLINA (BB-26) and USS MICHIGAN (BB-27), complicated Britain's problem
of constructing and maintaining a naval force capable of dominating or
at least matching a single challenger or any potential combination of
challengers. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance allowed Britain to concentrate
more of its naval forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, but it also
removed a British naval force from the Orient and Pacific which could
have discouraged or otherwise impeded any potential Japanese offensives
against American and/or European possessions.
The United States was more than ordinarily concerned about the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, because of Japan's openly declared
imperialistic foreign policies and its recent actions in the
Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. After Carranza's revolutionaries
and his subsequent Government of Mexico purchased Japanese armaments and
granted Japan a long-term lease to vast tracts of Baja California in a
secret treaty and alliance, Japanese armed forces conducted covert
operations along the borders of the United States and Mexico. Upon
learning about the presence of these Japanese forces, the United States
immediately dispatched a substantial part of the very small U.S. Army to
those border regions and established a permanent naval base and a major
fleet presence at San Diego, California. Japan subsequently cancelled
its plans to construct a Japanese naval base on its leasehold at
Magdalena Bay in Baja California. During World War One, Germany made a
failed attempt to enlist Mexico and Japan in a joint invasion and
conquest of the American Southwest in 1917. Mexico considered Germany's
proposal and consulted the Japanese Embassy for their reaction to it
before declining Germany's offer. Despite the sometimes unfavorable
relationship between the United States and Japan, in 1917-1918 the
Japanese navy defended the U.S. Hawaiian Territory, while the U.S. naval
forces in Hawaii were relieved from that duty to serve with the U.S.
Fleet in the Atlantic against German naval forces. When the Japanese
navy next returned to Hawaii, they came to destroy what they had once
defended. Proof, once again, that alliances and wars make for
conflicting purposes, shifting objectives, and bewildering appearances.
Suffice it to say that Britain's efforts to maintain naval superiority
by naval construction and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with respect
Germany and other naval powers had the sometimes intended and sometimes
unintended effect of complicating the efforts of the other principal
naval powers to do likewise for their own naval interests, and the
responses of the other major naval powers like the third ranking United
States Navy with the SOUTH CAROLINA (BB-26) further exacerbated Britains
naval problems. The result was a naval armaments race which was not
quelled until the destruction of the German High Seas Fleet and the
advent of the Washington Treaty with its naval armaments limitations
well after World War One. Britain's rapid construction of the HMS
DREADNOUGHT was certain to have been influenced additionally by the
American construction of the SOUTH CAROLINA CLASS, but the earlier and
more important influences were the construction of the Italian VITTORIO
EMANUALE CLASS and the ideas of men like Admiral Lord John or Jackie
Fisher, W. H. Gard, Sir William Watts, and the Committee on Designs:
Captain Reginald Bacon, Captain John Jellicoe, and Rear Admiral Prince
Louis of Battenburg. Germany too contemplated a dreadnought type
battleship in 1904, before the debut of the DREADNOUGHT, but Germany's
unique problems with facilities, the Kiel Canal, and mission roles
delayed realization of its own concepts. Germany had to play catchup
with Italy, Britain, and the leisurely built United States dreadnoughts,
even though the dreadnought types of battleships with same caliber and
all main armaments were presaged by the German BRANDENBURG class of
armoured cruisers dating from 1888-1889.
"The Dreadnought did indeed introduce revolutionary new battleship
technology...but this was an initiative of" several nations who were
already designing and/or constructing their first dreadnought type
battleships in the years before the HMS DREADNOUGHT was laid down,
completed, and revealed to the world. Consequently, if Britain had not
obsoleted its own pre-dreadnoughts when it did in 1906, Italy, the
United States, Japan, and Germany would have done so between 1906 and
1910 anyway.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Akorps666
won, and won it that way. He knew there was no cheap way to win,
Why do you keep defending Haig? Haig's methods belong to the
stone age ... it was only when the tanks broke through the German
front, at Amiens, August 1918 (the Black Day of the German Army)
that German resistance began to collapse. The tanks won the war
and Haig got the credit.
There are a lot of books written by people with vested interests
defending Haig, but they are wrong. Haig's strategy was barbaric,
and suicidal for the British Empire in squandering irreplaceable
manpower. It was only when the most advanced technology
weapons, in this case the tanks, began to be used effectively
that the war was won. Trading megatons of human flesh for megatons
of human flesh, as Haig did before Amiens, only led to mutual
suicide, as England, France and Germany were bled white,
and world power began to shift away from Europe to America.
Europe no longer had the manpower or willpower to hold their colonies
over the long run, for example. Demoralization due to mass slaughter,
as well as loss of manpower, was a critical factor.
David Thornley
Akorps666 <akor...@aol.com666> wrote:
>>Haig is another one: he understood very well how the war would have to be
>won, and won it that way. He knew there was no cheap way to win,
>
>Why do you keep defending Haig? Haig's methods belong to the
>stone age ... it was only when the tanks broke through the German
>front, at Amiens, August 1918 (the Black Day of the German Army)
>that German resistance began to collapse. The tanks won the war
>and Haig got the credit.
>
and in the quantity available in 1918 (and that quantity wasn't
Haig's fault). The combined arms that attacked at Amiens were
under Haig, and used at Haig's direction in ways Haig approved of.
>There are a lot of books written by people with vested interests
>defending Haig, but they are wrong. Haig's strategy was barbaric,
>and suicidal for the British Empire in squandering irreplaceable
>manpower.
OK, how else was anybody going to win? It was necessary to defeat
the enemy army to win, and the only way to defeat it was to attack
it. Unfortunately, this was a period of mass armies without
effective communications and with lousy tactical mobility, and
so there was no way of achieving a breakthrough like WWII (which
had a lot of attrition in it also).
It was only when the most advanced technology
>weapons, in this case the tanks, began to be used effectively
>that the war was won.
Coincidence. The tanks didn't change much of anything. The successful
attacks were due to the infantry and artillery tactics that had been
developed over time, and due to the sheer strain on the German army
from years of fending off Allied attacks. Read something on the
condition of the German army in the second half of 1918 - it didn't
need tanks to defeat it, only competent attacks.
Trading megatons of human flesh for megatons
>of human flesh, as Haig did before Amiens, only led to mutual
>suicide,
Um, megatons is an exaggeration. Even one megaton would be.
Not to mention, was there any choice other than what you call
"mutual suicide"?
The people you call Haig apologists have one thing in common:
nobody has showed them any other way to win WWII other than
bleeding the German army to death.
as England, France and Germany were bled white,
>and world power began to shift away from Europe to America.
This would have happened no matter what the Allied strategy,
unless it led to swift Allied defeat, in which case I suppose
Germany could match US power for a long time to come.
>Europe no longer had the manpower or willpower to hold their colonies
>over the long run, for example.
This is not necessarily a bad thing for the colonies. The failures
of decolonization were mostly in the wake of WWII. Without that,
decolonization could have been much more successful.
D. Patterson
>
> In article <20021224074819...@mb-ct.aol.com>,
> Akorps666 <akor...@aol.com666> wrote:
> >>Haig is another one: he understood very well how the war would have to be
> >won, and won it that way. He knew there was no cheap way to win,
> >
> >Why do you keep defending Haig? Haig's methods belong to the
> >stone age ... it was only when the tanks broke through the German
> >front, at Amiens, August 1918 (the Black Day of the German Army)
> >that German resistance began to collapse. The tanks won the war
> >and Haig got the credit.
> >
> Tanks don't win wars. Especially not the ones available in 1918,
> and in the quantity available in 1918 (and that quantity wasn't
> Haig's fault). The combined arms that attacked at Amiens were
> under Haig, and used at Haig's direction in ways Haig approved of.
>
> >There are a lot of books written by people with vested interests
> >defending Haig, but they are wrong. Haig's strategy was barbaric,
> >and suicidal for the British Empire in squandering irreplaceable
> >manpower.
>
> OK, how else was anybody going to win? It was necessary to defeat
> the enemy army to win, and the only way to defeat it was to attack
> it. Unfortunately, this was a period of mass armies without
> effective communications and with lousy tactical mobility, and
> so there was no way of achieving a breakthrough like WWII (which
> had a lot of attrition in it also).
>
The general consensus up to the Summer of 1918 proved to be wrong. It
was possible to achieve a breakthrough in the front, and the American
Expeditioanry Force (AEF) proved it. In fact, the AEF was poised for
launching a breakout when the Armistice ended the war.
> It was only when the most advanced technology
> >weapons, in this case the tanks, began to be used effectively
> >that the war was won.
>
> Coincidence. The tanks didn't change much of anything. The successful
> attacks were due to the infantry and artillery tactics that had been
> developed over time, and due to the sheer strain on the German army
> from years of fending off Allied attacks. Read something on the
> condition of the German army in the second half of 1918 - it didn't
> need tanks to defeat it, only competent attacks.
>
It was no coincidence. The tanks were an important and perhaps vital
contributors to making a breakthrough at the front. What had been
missing before were the tactical doctrines and officer leadership
required to keep the tank and infantry attacks in unhesitating motion
towards the correct tactical objectives. The observation that
communications for command and control were too primitive for these
purposes is mostly very true, but the AEF proved that the problem was
not insurmountable.
> Trading megatons of human flesh for megatons
> >of human flesh, as Haig did before Amiens, only led to mutual
> >suicide,
>
> Um, megatons is an exaggeration. Even one megaton would be.
>
> Not to mention, was there any choice other than what you call
> "mutual suicide"?
>
He was using metaphorical hyperbole.
Yes, there had been a choice, and Haig failed to make the correct
choice. The British and French armies had an insufficient delegation of
authority and leadership to the junior officers and non-commissioned
officers. Haig among other senior officers were responsible for
maintaining this inadequate state of affairs, despite pleas from the
junior officers to rectify the problem. The successes of the German army
and espcially the Stosstruppen were attributable to their superior
degree of such delegations of authority and training of junior officers
and non-commissioned officers. The American army while not being as well
trained as the German junior officers and non-commissioned officers,
nevertheless proved capable of fielding a force of junior officers and
non-commissioned officers with the authority to exercise greater
latitude of individual initiative than was generally found in the French
and British armies. This greater latitude to employ individual
initiative permitted the AEF to operate more effectively while
outrunning its communications for command and control. This initiative
also allowed junior officers and non-commissioned officers to push their
tank attacks much faster and deeper into the breakthrough objectives
than was thought possible in the other armies.
> The people you call Haig apologists have one thing in common:
> nobody has showed them any other way to win WWII other than
> bleeding the German army to death.
>
That is simply wrong. The AEF and Pershing demonstrated how Haig should
have accomplished the mission years earlier.
> as England, France and Germany were bled white,
> >and world power began to shift away from Europe to America.
>
> This would have happened no matter what the Allied strategy,
> unless it led to swift Allied defeat, in which case I suppose
> Germany could match US power for a long time to come.
>
[...]
That is doubtful. Like Britain, the United States considered an
expansionist imperial Germany to be a threat to the security of its
neighbors and the United States itself. Even in the extreme result of a
British surrender, the United States would certainly have assumed
leadership of the remaining British Commonwealth and French dissidents
and recaptured Britain and France. It would have taken longer to do so
than in World War Two, but the United States would never have allowed a
conquest of France or Britain to stand any longer than necessary.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Akorps666
so I don't mean this as an ad hominem
attack, but your ignorance of WW1 and
the tanks is colossal. I don't want to
push the point, because I generally
enjoy your postings, just to warn you
that you are way off the mark, as a
friend speaking to a friend. I probably
won't explain in detail as I usually don't
like to write unless there is some important
contemporary point that needs to be
elucidated. I don't know what books you
have been reading or where you got your
information, but it is profoundly wrong.
I don't know what concept you are missing,
perhaps the importance of breakthrough
attacks, so I don't really know how to
enlighten you. If you can break through
the enemy front, you don't need to go
through the exchange of massive numbers
of casualties for massive numbers of
casualties. The tank was the master
weapon of the period, along with the
airplane, it may be the master weapon
concept that you don't understand. If you
have a weapon like the tank that the
enemy has no counter for, you can get
a 100 to 1 casualty ratio in your favor,
rather than trading casualties 1 for 1 with
the enemy. Look what we did in
Afghanistan, where laser guided smart
projectiles and other smart weapons
seemed to be the master weapon. We
took the whole country with less than 100
casualties due to enemy fire. Those smart
weapons combined with the tactics of
close air support allowed us to break the
enemy front wherever they tried to take
a stand, like the tanks allowed the German
front in 1918 to be broken, where the
massed artillery and infantry attacks had
failed.
Oh well, this is hopeless, probably noone
will ever understand ... the lessons of 1918
still haven't been learned in 2002 even by
very intelligent people. When you compare
intelligent posters like Thornley to the
mass of lunatics who post on the net, it
makes one despair for the future of the
human race. If even a highly intelligent
individual can't understand such a basic
truth, what hope is there that the masses
will understand?
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
akor...@aol.com666 (Akorps666) wrote:
> The tank was the master
> weapon of the period,
You seem to be proving your own ignorance of the period. The tank
helped but the main limitations were logistics and communications. For
a start the attacker had to march while the defender could bring
reinforcements up by rail. Tanks of the period had ranges of less than
thirty miles and terrible reliability. Even the Medium tanks had a top
speed of about 5mph. You also seem to be under estimating the
vulnerability of the tanks of the period. Armour maximum was around
8mm protecting against small arms fire only.
Haig did not keep the same tactics from the Somme to 1918. The
equipment and training of British troops were changed by lessons
learnt. By the end of the war British units had one machine gun per
platoon, regularly outflanked strong points and used close cooperation
with the artillery.
D. Patterson
>
> In article <20021226060012...@mb-ca.aol.com>,
> akor...@aol.com666 (Akorps666) wrote:
>
> > The tank was the master
> > weapon of the period,
>
> You seem to be proving your own ignorance of the period. The tank
> helped but the main limitations were logistics and communications. For
> a start the attacker had to march while the defender could bring
> reinforcements up by rail. Tanks of the period had ranges of less than
> thirty miles and terrible reliability. Even the Medium tanks had a top
> speed of about 5mph. You also seem to be under estimating the
> vulnerability of the tanks of the period. Armour maximum was around
> 8mm protecting against small arms fire only.
>
The most common Allied tanks had armor ranging from the 12mm of the
British Mk. I and Mark IV to the 22mm of the French Renault F.T.17 and
the 24mm of the Schneider M.16 C.A. These tanks were most vulnerable to
direct and indirect artillery fire, impassable terrain, and mechanical
failures. Command and control problems were notorious. Yes, the these
early tanks were distressingly vulnerable. Nevertheless, infantry were
even more vulnerable than the tanks. Whenever the tanks were available
in sufficient numbers and state of mechanical reliability, their use
saved countless Allied lives in the engagements, and they made it
possible for for the infantry to advance over kilometers instead of
meters of ground with thousands of casualties instead of hundreds of
thousands of casualties. Cambrai, St. Mihiel, and other engagements
demonstrated that tanks were formidable weapons lacking adequate
countermeasures when used properly in massed assaults in proper terrain.
Even when inadequate numbers of tanks were used as infantry support, the
WWI tank was indispensible for breaking into defensive positions and
breaking up enemy assaults. The ground gained and casualties saved by
the proper usage of tanks was in much greater proportion than the all
too few tanks which succeeded in reaching the battlefields to engage the
enemy. Yes, tanks in the era of WWI had grave problems, but they still
succeeded in making their use upon the battlefield an indispensible
component of the combined arms team by the end of the war. If the war
had continued for another three months, the essential need for the use
of tanks would have become glaringly obvious as the Allied armies
rapidly advanced into Germany.
> Haig did not keep the same tactics from the Somme to 1918. The
> equipment and training of British troops were changed by lessons
> learnt. By the end of the war British units had one machine gun per
> platoon, regularly outflanked strong points and used close cooperation
> with the artillery.
>
> Ken Young
> ken...@cix.co.uk
> Maternity is a matter of fact
> Paternity is a matter of opinion
Yes, Haig was learning, but he was learning too slowly and at ruinous
costs. Gough should never have been allowed to pressure Fuller into
using the tanks as relatively non-mobile defensive strongpoints during
the Spring 1918 offensives. Haig and Gough should have encouraged Fuller
to employ the British tanks in fully mobile armored strike forces as he
originally intended. Such armored strike forces could have entirely
aborted the German infiltration tactics by breaking into their base of
artillery support and logistics. Without their artillery fire support,
the German infiltrations of the British strongpoints would have been
checked by the British infantry without such horrendous losses to the
German artillery fire directed by the infiltrators.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
David Thornley
Akorps666 <akor...@aol.com666> wrote:
>Thornley, you are a very intelligent poster,
>so I don't mean this as an ad hominem
>attack, but your ignorance of WW1 and
>the tanks is colossal. I don't want to
>push the point, because I generally
>enjoy your postings, just to warn you
>that you are way off the mark, as a
>friend speaking to a friend.
Thank you, I will reply in kind.
>I don't know what concept you are missing,
>perhaps the importance of breakthrough
>attacks, so I don't really know how to
>enlighten you.
Breakthrough and exploitation are the main alternatives to
attrition, but tanks weren't critical to either. By 1918,
everybody still in the war knew how to penetrate defensive
lines with infantry and artillery alone. The problem was
that the defensive lines were normally in depth, so breaking
through one would leave the attackers facing another. While
tanks were very useful in the initial assault, they were
unlikely to penetrate very far and still keep running.
Exploitation is also useful, and the fact is that cavalry
was still pretty much the best exploitation force. It
never got used much in that role in the West. It had the
advantage that it could penetrate broken terrain, move
somewhat faster than an infantryman, and didn't come to
a creaking halt due to mechanical problems.
>casualties. The tank was the master
>weapon of the period, along with the
>airplane, it may be the master weapon
>concept that you don't understand. If you
>have a weapon like the tank that the
>enemy has no counter for, you can get
>a 100 to 1 casualty ratio in your favor,
Well, master weapons are nice, unless your enemy has them, but
they usually don't exist. WWI tanks were very vulnerable to
artillery and even determined machine-gun crews. They were
prone to breakdowns, and could nearly kill their crews with heat
and fumes. This didn't mean they weren't useful, and Haig
wanted all he could get, but they were by no means a master
weapon.
>the enemy. Look what we did in
>Afghanistan, where laser guided smart
>projectiles and other smart weapons
>seemed to be the master weapon.
I'd rather look at the '91 Gulf War. Much of the devastation
there was done by "dumb" projectiles coming out of tank guns.
>a stand, like the tanks allowed the German
>front in 1918 to be broken, where the
>massed artillery and infantry attacks had
>failed.
>
The massed artillery and infantry attacks had inflicted great
losses on the Germans, and by 1918 the German Army was well
below strength and (after the failure of their offensives)
demoralized. The fact that the Allies were able to make
considerable gains depended on that, rather than on tanks.
This should be obvious from the quantity of British tanks
available, which was far too few to cause such results.
D. Patterson
You say "the quantity of British tanks available..." as if the the
French tanks used by the French and American forces did not matter at
all in the gains of the Allies. Such an implication would be wrong. The
French tanks used by the French and Americans substantially outnumbered
the British tanks in use by the Allies. Although some forty-seven
British Mark V and Mark V Star tanks were in use by the Americans
assigned to support British offensives as one example, it was the French
Renault F.T.17 light tank and variants which were produced and used in
greater numbers and effect, with 3,177 delivered after April 1917. By
1918 tanks were regarded as being such an indispensible weapon, General
Pershing ordered his AEF Tank Corps commander to go to the French in
Paris and "give anything in the A.E.F. for 500 [Renault F.T.17 and other
French] tanks." Pershing succeeded in obtaining only forty-eight more on
that occassion.
Furthermore, the tanks, British and French leveraged battlefield gains
all out of proportion to their limited numbers and abysmal mechanical
performance. It was not just the deteriorated condition of the German
forces which was responsible for the major Allied gains in the late war.
The mechanical and other failures of tanks were highlighted and
pronounced because military operations were prone to failure without
their successful employment.
You say, "they [tanks] were by no means a master weapon." The German
enemy, who lacked anything more than twenty AV7 heavy tanks and
seventy-five captured Allied tanks, disagreed with your conclusion.
After only the second French tank attack occurred on 5 May 1917, the
German High Command declared "tanks were able, for the first time, to
show their full worth without heavy losses." On 20 November 1917 some
400 British tanks made a breakthrough along seven miles of the German
frontlines and advanced five miles into their defenses at Cambrai. The
lack of an adequate doctrine for using infantry to consolidate the gains
of the tanks ultimately reversed these spectacular results. During the
18 July 1918 Aisne-Marne offensive the French made a successful use of
350 tanks in the attack. On 8 August 1918, some 600 British tanks
smashed the German salient at Amiens and caused entire German units to
collapse for the first time, according to General Eric von Ludendorff
describing it as a "Black Day" for the German Army. The American
offensive at St. Mihiel on 12 September 1918 successfully used tanks,
despite their many inadequacies and failures, to turn a carefully
planned German retreat out of the salient into a rout and trap for the
pocketed German defenders. General von Ludendorff of the German High
Command praised the Allied tanks as being a principal factor in
Germany's defeat.
We can quibble over what the term "master weapon" is or is not supposed
to mean, but there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that WWI tanks
with all of their admittedly profound inadequacies nevertheless proved
themselves to be, as General Eric von Ludendorff noted, "a principal
factor in Germany's defeat."
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Akorps666
penetrate very far and still keep running.
Fuller explains his solution to that problem better than I can,
in his "Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier", which focuses
mainly on his experiences with the tanks in WW1. Its a very
good read, by the way, if you haven't read it before.
It also reflects my own views pretty closely. Of course Fuller
makes some mistakes, I make mistakes every day also.
But I think Fuller's views are closer to the truth in this case
than the Haig view. I was puzzling over this matter today,
wondering why the Haig view is so much more commonly
held than the Fuller view, though the few practitioners of
genius, such as Rommel, Guderian, Manstein, are more
closely aligned in there thinking with Fuller's views.
I think it is the difference between genius and orthodoxy.
The masses accept the orthodox view, and the majority
of authors do also, so if you base your conclusions on
the volume of print supporting different views, the Haig
view will probably win. I'm not trying, ever, to persuade
anyone of anything, just trying to explicate the logic
of the situation as best I can, everyone should think
for themselves and draw their own conclusions, I may
very well be wrong as I often am.
Orthodoxy has a lot in its favor, representing the most
clever views of the most clever minds of the past, collected
together and having survived the acid test of criticism (so far).
So the normal person can go through life unscathed, by just
memorizing and parroting the orthodox views, and will
probably never get caught out for being wrong, as 99% plus
of the rest of the people know no better either. The few
who criticize the orthodox view are probably 99% crazy
anyway. But then there is the one in a million who does
come up with something new of genius. The reward for
that is liable to be cruxification, then after that persecuted
genius is dead, his views will be assimiliated into the
orthodox worldview in distorted fashion, contrary to the
intention of the creator or discoverer of those views. Such
a reward for originality :-)
So I think the logic of the situation favors Fuller, but the
mass orthodoxy favors Haig. One has to think through
the logic oneself to really be sure which is right. And
even then, it may only be experience that can determine
the truth, which is no longer possible to obtain except
by very rare luck or chance of fortune.
I wish I had made xerox copies of Ernest Swinton's wonderful
little books on the tanks in WW1, they also make a very good
read. If I remember right, Swinton also gives a solution to
the problem of keeping the tank advance moving forward.
Obviously I can't respond to every point, even answering
this one was a huge strain on my brain :-)
Dallas obviously understands this whole topic far better
than I do, so I should just shut up I think :-)
Akorps666
mean,
There is one issue related to the concept of "master weapon"
that occured to me a few minutes ago, and is relevant to the
war on terrorism.
The idea is that the USA is short on manpower, but has the
various master weapons and economic resources in abundance.
So logically it seems to me, we should hire allied mercenaries
to do our ground fighting as much as possible, and supply the
master weapons when needed, to give them battlefield supremacy.
Even the unarmored horsemen of the very brave Northern Alliance,
were able to defeat the better armed Taliban, when the USA
was able to provide air support, the master weapon in that case.
And even paying our allies very well, is probably cheaper than
having American ground troops doing the fighting.
The main role of American ground troops in this scenario,
is to be attached to the Allied forces, in a low key role,
for liason, and to check that the Allied forces are doing
what they are supposed to do. You always need to check
carefully that Allies are doing what they say they are doing,
but it doesn't take a large number of American ground troops
to take care of that mission. That way you multiply many
times over the value of the small number of American troops
available. If the Allies don't do what they agree to, you just
stop paying them. So the Americans don't have to take
the role of giving orders, which causes resentment, you
just pay the ones that cooperate and stop paying the ones
that don't.
The master weapon concept seems very useful in practice,
the side that has the "master weapon" enhances the value
of his own conventional weapons, and neutralizes the value
of the enemy weapons. I don't know how to explain the
concept very well unfortunately. But if you reach a deadlock
with conventional arms, then one side gains a new weapon
that is able to defeat the enemy arms that create the deadlock,
the enemy position can collapse and then your own conventional
arms can be unleashed to great effect.
For example, in WW1, the machine gun was deadly against
infantry assault, but the tank was able to move forward against
the machine guns, allowing the infantry assault to resume
movement, once the defending machine guns were neutralized.
The airplane in 1918 was another example of a master weapon,
for example strafing retreating columns of enemy troops after
their front had collapsed, turning a retreat into a rout. The airplane
was the perfect pursuit weapon, in cases where one side had
them and the other didn't. Even in the Gulf War, on the so-called
"Highway of Death", we saw the effectiveness of planes attacking
retreating enemy forces, though the pursuit phase may have
been stopped too soon :-)
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
Patterson) wrote:
> Such armored strike forces could have entirely
> aborted the German infiltration tactics by breaking into their base
> of artillery support and logistics
The problem is that the technology was not there. The Mk I and Mk IV
heavy tanks had a maximum speed of 3.7mph, the improved Mk V 4.6mph.
The most common Medium the Whippet could manage 8.3 mph the later
Medium tanks were slower. Attempts to use the Mk IX supply tank as a
troop carrier were a total failure. The atmosphere inside plus the
temperature and the noise resulted on the troops being unfit for
combat after being driven a significant distance. The tanks range was
also limited due to the fuel guzzling nature of early engines. There
was a reason for Fuller to demand a completely new tank for Plan 1919.
Mechanical reliability was also a major problem. Of the IIRC 400 or
so tanks used at the start of Cambrai, something like 20 or so were
serviceable by the time of the German counter attacks. Most of the
rest had suffered mechanical breakdown that could not be repaired in
the field.
You are of course correct about the armour of early tanks. I confused
that with the Vickers Medium. However that armour was only proof
against small arms. The armour of the Mk I could be penetrated by a
reversed rifle bullet. All the early tanks suffered from bullet splash
to the point where crews were issued with chain mail visors. On reason
for armour problems was that it had only previously been produced for
naval use. No one had any real experience in making thin armour plate.
To sum up. In my opinion WW1 tanks were only suitable for set piece
attacks in cooperation with infantry and artillery. They could only be
used when transported near enough to the front (by rail normally) to
reach the start points without excessive losses from breakdowns. At
the Somme something like 50% of the tanks involved never made it into
combat. As a comparison the Germans had a 25% attrition tate for the
Anschluss IIRC. It took something like 30 years of development to get
from the first tanks to something that could conduct a Blitzkrieg.
TMOliver
>
> There is one issue related to the concept of "master weapon"
> that occured to me a few minutes ago, and is relevant to the
> war on terrorism.
Perhaps more relevant to some sort of fantasy-driven existence
from which you increasingly seem to posture and postulate...
>
> The idea is that the USA is short on manpower, but has the
> various master weapons and economic resources in abundance.
> So logically it seems to me, we should hire allied
> mercenaries to do our ground fighting as much as possible,
> and supply the master weapons when needed, to give them
> battlefield supremacy.
Among the other problems which exist with mercenaries (and have
existed throughout history) is the general uncertainty as to
the "upon whom and when" they may apply their efforts (and those
nasty master weapons you want them to be provided).
> Even the unarmored horsemen of the
> very brave Northern Alliance, were able to defeat the better
> armed Taliban, when the USA was able to provide air support,
> the master weapon in that case. And even paying our allies
> very well, is probably cheaper than having American ground
> troops doing the fighting.
You've been watching too much TV. Mounted Northern Alliance
troops were a sort of "glamor-shot" for bored videocam
operators, and consisted of those NA troopers "in transit" but
without access to a seat in the cab or bed of the true "theater
master weapon", the Nissan and Toyota "Club Cab" pickups. As
for "bravery". some who attended the fray have noted that much
of the "bravery" was cultural (not a bad thing in itself), and a
great deal of the combat was motivated by those combined (and
traditional, especially among Afghans) military goals "getting
even" and "getting a bunch of what your neighbor has but won't
tomorrow".
>
> The main role of American ground troops in this scenario,
> is to be attached to the Allied forces, in a low key role,
> for liason, and to check that the Allied forces are doing
> what they are supposed to do. You always need to check
> carefully that Allies are doing what they say they are
> doing, but it doesn't take a large number of American ground
> troops to take care of that mission. That way you multiply
> many times over the value of the small number of American
> troops available. If the Allies don't do what they agree to,
> you just stop paying them. So the Americans don't have to
> take the role of giving orders, which causes resentment, you
> just pay the ones that cooperate and stop paying the ones
> that don't.
Back nearly forty years ago, I participated in a grimly
unsporting event conceived along those lines. Pardon the
expression, but "T'was no bueno por chit" then, and is unlikely
to have any better prospects now.
>
> The master weapon concept seems very useful in practice,
> the side that has the "master weapon" enhances the value
> of his own conventional weapons, and neutralizes the value
> of the enemy weapons. I don't know how to explain the
> concept very well unfortunately. But if you reach a deadlock
> with conventional arms, then one side gains a new weapon
> that is able to defeat the enemy arms that create the
> deadlock, the enemy position can collapse and then your own
> conventional arms can be unleashed to great effect.
My lad, there are several glaring holes in the casing of your
"master weapon", a couple of the more blatant of which might be
the discovery that (a) the mastery off master weapons is subject
to substantial alteration in time and place, and conditions
just the other side of the ridge may relegate your master weapon
to inappropriate obsolescence, and (b) the other guy may arrive
at the lists bearing a master weapon capable of indubitably
fucking up your day.
From the enormous vulnerability of armored vehicles (even
today's main battle tanks) to both distant artillery and nearby
anti-tank weapons (and we must have learned little in WWI,
because 1939's Panzer Is and IIs were horribly vulnerability to
machine gun fire and "man carried" bolt action anti-tank
'rifles' in .50/12.7mm and 20mm) to the shocking realization (at
least to you) that air superiority (such as we enjoyed for every
inch of in the Afghan campaign) is not automatically assumable
and often must be purchased at high price during a period when
the enemy's counterpart to your "master weapon" flies higher,
faster and is better flown than your'n, as occurred for a large
part of WWII, until the "firstest" part of the equation gave way
to us having the "mostest"(and it of a quality of design,
construction and operation to deal with what some here have
characterized as technical superiority of German weapons or
better fighting capacity of German troops, both claims more than
largely offset by the reality of conflict in which, given
relative equality in numbers and equipment, the battle often
goes to the side most experienced, best trained, ideally
prepared, and personally and collectively motivated, qualities
which certainly applied to Germany early in the war, just as
they applied to Japanese forces for a shorter period.
Perhaps you ought to move out on the porch; pour yourself a
sizeable mug of some mildly psychotropic and modestly
intoxicating beverage; put your feet on the rail, and gently
ponder just how incredibly full of bullshit most of what has
spewed like projectile diarrhea from your over-stimulated
keyboard. Master weapon, my ass! There have been moments in
time when a single weapon or weapon system occupied dominant
status, i.e. a day in the mud in which precipitation and
topographical conditions combined to increase the effectiveness
of the longbow at Agincourt, but attempting to elevate the
machine gun to some sort of "super weapon" status in WWI ignores
what may have been an even more effective barrier to attacks or
even troop ovement and logistics, the emergence of artillery.
Obviously, nuclear weapons fall into a quite different category
(and have for over half a century), but their "master" status is
diluted and diminished by their possession by others, leaving
one no alternative but the traditional approaches, "more" and
"more effective means of employment", to maintain paper
superiority, and the unceasing debates as to whose rockets fly
further or whose submarines slip more noiselessly beneath the
waves.
Am I patronizing you in ad hominem fashion?
To utilize an expression popular during my brief but
illuminating naval career, but one often applicable later in
life...
"Fucking-A!"
TMO
David Thornley
Akorps666 <akor...@aol.com666> wrote:
>>While tanks were very useful in the initial assault, they were unlikely to
>penetrate very far and still keep running.
>
>Fuller explains his solution to that problem better than I can,
>in his "Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier", which focuses
>mainly on his experiences with the tanks in WW1. Its a very
>good read, by the way, if you haven't read it before.
>
used books on the web reveals three copies, with prices above
$150. I'll check the local libraries.
>But I think Fuller's views are closer to the truth in this case
>than the Haig view. I was puzzling over this matter today,
>wondering why the Haig view is so much more commonly
>held than the Fuller view, though the few practitioners of
>genius, such as Rommel, Guderian, Manstein, are more
>closely aligned in there thinking with Fuller's views.
>
Those guys had the tools. If Haig had had reliable tanks and
portable radios and good cross-country trucks, what would he
have done with them? We'll never know. We do know Haig
wanted all the tanks he could get, but not if he would have
used them for anything other than supporting infantry assaults.
Now, I don't know what could have been ready for 1919, so it
is possible that the Allies could have made a mobile battle
of it. However, Haig's way of thinking won the war in 1918.
I'm not really willing to say that all the generals of WWI were
idiots. It seems more reasonable to me to assume that roughly
the same were competent between WWI and WWII, and therefore
(particularly given the relative sizes of the British armies
involved) we might look for good British commanders. Well,
let's look at an Australian, Monash, often admired for his
accomplishments in the last half-year or so of the war.
Monash was from Australia, was not a professional soldier, and
still was very good at what he did. You'd think that this would
make an innovative commander if anything did.
What Monash did was conduct the standard combined-arms assault
very well. I believe he usually had tanks, and used them to
best effect to support the infantry attack. He was not able
to come up with anything startling and new, but rather to
conduct effective and relatively economical attacks.
Moreover, looking over the British generals on the Western Front,
I see none that seriously disagreed with Haig and were successful.
The same is true of the French and Americans. They were all
playing off much the same book, although the French were better
at getting more tanks into action. Nivelle had plans to
smash through the German lines, and he darn near wrecked the
French Army. Pershing arrived in France determined to avoid
the same old fighting, but instead became good at it.
>I think it is the difference between genius and orthodoxy.
Haig's methods were not orthodox in the sense of being
accepted at the time. Many people were appalled at the
fighting and tried to come up with assorted schemes to
avoid the attrition. This was often possible on the sparser
Ottoman fronts, but not in France. Unfortunately, the only
real way to beat Germany was to defeat Germany on the Western
Front.
>The masses accept the orthodox view, and the majority
>of authors do also, so if you base your conclusions on
>the volume of print supporting different views, the Haig
>view will probably win.
It seems to me that the orthodox view of Haig, right now,
is that Haig was an unimaginative butcher who had no other
thought than smothering the Germans in bodies. I find the
problem with this view to be that none of these orthodox
people has come up with a convincing alternative to Haig's
strategy.
>anyway. But then there is the one in a million who does
>come up with something new of genius. The reward for
>that is liable to be cruxification, then after that persecuted
>genius is dead, his views will be assimiliated into the
>orthodox worldview in distorted fashion, contrary to the
>intention of the creator or discoverer of those views. Such
>a reward for originality :-)
>
The three stages of acceptance:
1. That doesn't make sense.
2. That will never work in practice.
3. I was thinking that way all along!
>So I think the logic of the situation favors Fuller, but the
>mass orthodoxy favors Haig.
I think the logic of the situation favors Haig. The logic of
other situations, such as WWII favors Fuller more (if I understand
Fuller correctly). Fuller was thinking thoughts that the
hardware of the time simply couldn't support.
One has to think through
>the logic oneself to really be sure which is right. And
>even then, it may only be experience that can determine
>the truth, which is no longer possible to obtain except
>by very rare luck or chance of fortune.
>
Bad luck, usually. I keep hoping that we can keep warfare
confined to books, newsgroups, and games. It'll probably
happen about the same time that we achieve a practical utopia.
("[The authors] assume that everybody will be contented with
his share, and discuss whether it is to be delivered by
balloon or by motor-car," G.K. Chesterson, as accurately as
my memory will serve.)
The most likely end to war I see is the extinction of the human
species, and I think that too high a price to pay.
>I wish I had made xerox copies of Ernest Swinton's wonderful
>little books on the tanks in WW1, they also make a very good
>read. If I remember right, Swinton also gives a solution to
>the problem of keeping the tank advance moving forward.
>
The books I found on the net that looked potentially like these
were "Eyewitness" and "Over My Shoulder". The first looks
expensive, if less so than Fuller's memoirs. The second
is available quite reasonably. Do these sound familiar?
>Dallas obviously understands this whole topic far better
>than I do, so I should just shut up I think :-)
>
If I only said what I was absolutely sure of, to avoid
making mistakes, I'd learn a lot less.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote:
> Fuller was thinking thoughts that the
> hardware of the time simply couldn't support.
You have to be very careful with Fuller. He had the habit of
rewriting his books to suit the latest evidence. This included most of
the stuff he published on WW1. He also had several axes to grind.
D. Patterson
>
> In article <3E0B5705...@fidalgo.net>, n...@fidalgo.net says...
Insufficient numbers of tanks were available to operate in sufficient
numbers in every zone of defense. Consequently, the tanks were used in
too few numbers "penny packets" in specific engagements as infantry
support to be effective against the Hutier attacks and infiltration
tactics. German tank hunting parties using large caliber rifles sought
to disable the few available Allied tanks with well placed shots through
the thinner armor protecting the engine compartments, for one example.
During World War Two, proper tank and armor tactical doctrine did a
better job of countering these tactics with concentrations of tanks and
the use of infantry to protect the armor against close assault by
infantry. In 1918, the proper methods for using the proper numbers of
tanks in concentrations with proper infantry support had not yet been
adequately developed and implemented. Most of the German advances were
made possible by failures of the Allied defenders to make any use or
proper use of the tanks. In a number of cases, tanks were used to
counterattack and stop the German advance when conventional
infantry-artillery measures failed to do so.
>
> > The ground gained and casualties saved by
> > the proper usage of tanks was in much greater proportion than the all
> > too few tanks which succeeded in reaching the battlefields to engage the
> > enemy. Yes, tanks in the era of WWI had grave problems, but they still
> > succeeded in making their use upon the battlefield an indispensible
> > component of the combined arms team by the end of the war. If the war
> > had continued for another three months, the essential need for the use
> > of tanks would have become glaringly obvious as the Allied armies
> > rapidly advanced into Germany.
> >
> > > Haig did not keep the same tactics from the Somme to 1918. The
> > > equipment and training of British troops were changed by lessons
> > > learnt. By the end of the war British units had one machine gun per
> > > platoon, regularly outflanked strong points and used close cooperation
> > > with the artillery.
> > >
> > > Ken Young
> > > ken...@cix.co.uk
> > > Maternity is a matter of fact
> > > Paternity is a matter of opinion
> >
> > Yes, Haig was learning, but he was learning too slowly and at ruinous
> > costs. Gough should never have been allowed to pressure Fuller into
> > using the tanks as relatively non-mobile defensive strongpoints during
> > the Spring 1918 offensives.
>
> And why not? This is exactly what a 'genius' named Rommell did in Libya
> against British attacks.
>
Actually, that is not what Rommel did. Rommel used anti-aircraft
artillery emplacements as the relatively immobile strong points, and he
used the armor in their proper roles as the mobile force of maneuver to
flank the British assault force and pursue it after it was first
severely attritioned by the direct and indirect artillery fire. It was
the British who once more attempted to use the strongpoint concept in
World War Two North Africa with its boxes of combined arms teams. Once
again, the boxes sacrificed the strengths of tanks and emphasized their
weaknesses with disastrous consequences. Rommel disposed his armor and
armored-infantry to take advantage of their mobility, while the British
sacrifced their mobility to their disadvantage.
Gough tried to get Fuller to use the tanks in the role of immobile
pillboxes, to which Fuller vehemently objected. In a reluctant
compromise, Fuller tried to regain some degree of mobility for the tanks
by agreeing to implement Gough's concept of the strongpoints but
modified it with the use of tanks as mobile forces striking outwards
from the strongpoints; i.e. the "savage rabbits." The compromise of the
tank's strengths and exposure of its weaknesses proved to be a failure,
and was one of the important reasons why the German offensives on the
British front in 1918 were successful.
> > Haig and Gough should have encouraged Fuller
> > to employ the British tanks in fully mobile armored strike forces as he
> > originally intended. Such armored strike forces could have entirely
> > aborted the German infiltration tactics by breaking into their base of
> > artillery support and logistics. Without their artillery fire support,
> > the German infiltrations of the British strongpoints would have been
> > checked by the British infantry without such horrendous losses to the
> > German artillery fire directed by the infiltrators.
>
> You are asking commanders to deploy a new and relatively unstudied weapon to
> do complicated manoeuvres and tactics in a scenario not commonly encountered.
>
Yes, that is absolutely correct. Commanders who "deploy a new and
relatively unstudied weapon to do complicated manoeuvres and tactics in
a scenario not commonly encountered" most effectively generally win
battles and win wars. Commanders who fail to adapt quickly enough to new
the new weapons and tactics tend to lose battles and lose wars.
> Tanks or no tanks, the British reserve lines were weak and understength with
> too much resources at the front.
>
The British situation called for extraordinary application of unorthodox
weaponry and tactics to compensate for their being outnumbered and
without space to trade for time. Instead, orthodox tactics and British
Commonwealth lives were traded to preserve the limited space between the
BEF and the seacoast.
> And how would tanks find their targets in the mist - probably the biggest
> factor in the strength of the German advances?
Tanks were quite useful for their ability to destroy strong targets.
Their greatest value, however, is their psychological value. Troops and
commands tend to panic when a large number of tanks are known to be
prowling their immediate vicinity. One or two tanks may be seen as a
threat which can be eliminated by close infantry assault and/or observed
fire for artillery concentrations. But a large number of tanks in the
vicinity cannot be easily stopped in time, and they typically breed
panic and a rapid loss of defensive cohesion. This has been observed to
be generally true in every war employing tanks, beginning with World War
One. The tanks would have found their targets in the mist using the same
methods they normally used. Visibility from these tanks were all but
non-existant anyway. They mostly had to be guided towards their targets
anyway. The more mist there was to conceal the tanks from artillery
fire, the better off they were. The same mists which made the German
infiltration tactics terrifying also served to make the tank
counterattacks even more terrifying to the German infiltrators. The
infiltrators were effective in panicking the Allied strongpoint defenses
only so long as the infiltrators were able to maintain communications
for observed artillery fire on the Allied strongpoints and resupply of
the infiltrators' machingun posts fixing the Allied strongpoints for the
followup German assault teams. Having a stronger Allied tank-infantry
force overrunning the infiltrators' outposts enroute to overrunning of
their supporting machinegun posts and artillery observation posts on the
mainline of resistance tended to deny the infiltrators the usage of
their artillery, communications, and various logistical supports (such
as machinegun ammunition), which resulted in their panicked retreats.
There was simply no adequate offensive or defensive capability left to
the infantry infiltrators once their lines of communication with their
mainline of resistance and artillery support had been severed by the
overrunning of their mainline of resistance by an Allied tank-infantry
assault force.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
D. Patterson
>
> In article <3E0BD802...@fidalgo.net>, n...@fidalgo.net says...
[...]
> an old battlefield of shells and mud. This was optimal ground for the tanks.
>
> Unlike 3rd Yrpres for example.
>
> > The
> > lack of an adequate doctrine for using infantry to consolidate the gains
> > of the tanks ultimately reversed these spectacular results. During the
> > 18 July 1918 Aisne-Marne offensive the French made a successful use of
> > 350 tanks in the attack.
>
>
> > On 8 August 1918, some 600 British tanks
> > smashed the German salient at Amiens and caused entire German units to
> > collapse for the first time, according to General Eric von Ludendorff
> > describing it as a "Black Day" for the German Army.
>
>
> Some BEF Divisions prided themselves on their success with never using tanks
> at all.
>
> > The American
> > offensive at St. Mihiel on 12 September 1918 successfully used tanks,
> > despite their many inadequacies and failures, to turn a carefully
> > planned German retreat out of the salient into a rout and trap for the
> > pocketed German defenders. General von Ludendorff of the German High
> > Command praised the Allied tanks as being a principal factor in
> > Germany's defeat.
> >
> > We can quibble over what the term "master weapon" is or is not supposed
> > to mean, but there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that WWI tanks
> > with all of their admittedly profound inadequacies nevertheless proved
> > themselves to be, as General Eric von Ludendorff noted, "a principal
> > factor in Germany's defeat."
>
>
> And he named numerous days as 'black'.
>
> Personally, I'd leave ultimate judgement of an effectiveness of a weapon or
> tactic to historians - not protagonists in historical events.
We cannot judge the effectiveness of World War One era tanks by their
inability to traverse the muddy and shellhole ridden battlefields of
that war. Neither can we judge their effectiveness by their inability to
survive direct and indirect artillery fire in that war. You could put
today's most powerful Abrams tank into that same battlefield and see it
become immobilized by the bad terrain and destroyed by artillery and
close infantry assault. If we were to use the criterion you propose as
the measure of the effectiveness of tanks, no tank ever built would
measure up to such a standard. Since such tanks have subsequently been
used to win engagements and battles in World War One and later wars
despite such inadequacies, there seems to be no reason to dismiss or
discount the achievements of tanks during World War One either.
Perhaps you meant that General Eric von Ludendorff was the antagonist
and not the "protagonist"? In any case, most historians who take the
trouble of analyzing and assessing the value of tanks in the warfare of
World War One state that tanks became an essential and valued weapon by
the end of the war. They derive their conclusions in great part from the
observations of the senior army commanders of both sides in addition to
the proponents of the tanks forces like Fuller and others, who are often
discounted because of their advocacy of tanks. In other words, it was
not the value of tanks in World War One which were an issue of
contention among military commanders, military science experts, or
military historians. The fact that tanks were valuable and even
indispensable to warfare was generally accepted and no longer in serious
question. What was at issue and an unending bone of contention during
the interwar years was the proper role for the participation of tanks in
warfare. Were the tanks to be used as an infantry support weapon or as
the principal weapon of an armored warfare combat branch? Before the end
of World War One, no major army voluntarily fought without the use of
tanks. After the end of World War One, no major army contemplated a
major war without the use of tanks as one of the key weaponry systems of
its armed forces.
You may not respect the opinion of General Eric von Ludendorff, but his
opinion was also representative of the Allied army commanders as well.
General Pershing did not order the trade of anything (infantry division,
aero squadrons, artillery, supplies, etc.) in the AEF for 500 French
tanks without good reason. The inclusion of tanks as a required weapon
in all future war plans of all the major armies immediately after the
conclusion of World War One is unmistakable evidence that tanks were
regarded as "a principal factor in Germany's defeat" as desrcibed by
General Eric von Ludendorff in the German ranks and others in the Allied
ranks.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
gerold firl
Wow. If I hadn't read some of your other posts, I'd be sure you're
joking. But you've amply demonstrated your lack of objectivity and
fanatical nativism. Even before the treaty was signed Article 231 was
known to be both a distortion of fact and an invitation to future
disater. Consider, for example, the words of Stewart Bruce:
"To-day, after the conflict has subsided, the German, stil confident
of the righteousmess of his position, is quite at a loss to interpret
this so-called decree of Providence, and on looking over the whole
field, is beginning to suspect that it is not a final decree, or even
a decree at all, but only a painful chapter in a great volume, a
volume that contains many chapters; and perhaps in the last chapter
the final decree shall be set forth, even in words that all nations
may understand, words that will burn like fire into the hearts and
consciences of mankind." _The War Guilt and Peace Crime of the
Entente Allies_, p. 122-3, Stewart E. Bruce, 1920
Stewart Bruce foresaw the evil fruits of Versailles. Wilson and even
Lloyd George recognized the folly of Clenenceau. They feared the
patently dishonest vindictiveness of Versailles would lead to another
war, as indeed it did. Even after all this time, you refuse to face up
to that ugly reality. It's exactly that kind of intellectual
dishonesty that made the crimes of Naziism possible.
You use this term _Weltpolitik_ as if you understand something of
history from more than one blindly nationalistic perspective - yet
your ingorance is abyssmal. The facts are on the table, and have been
for decades, although France attempted to delay publication of the
diplomatic record as long as possible. However, it is to the credit of
France that many of her historians, as soon as wartime censorship
eased, asserted strongly the primary responsibility of France and
Russia for WWI:
"... the greater part of the left wing of revisionists in France went
further and asserted the guilt of France and Russia, of Poincare and
Paleologue, of Izvolsky and Sazanov. Georges Demartial denounced the
falsifications of the _Yellow Book_ and the scale and priority of
Russian mobilization in relation to that of Austria. Mathias Morhardt
asseverates that the war was let loose by Russian mobilization and
that it still remains to be discovered in what conditions th
egovenments of France and Great Britain approved if this catastrophic
step, the one overtly by resolute, warlike and rash action, the other
by a policy of inertia." (Luciano Magrini, in the preface to
Albertini, _Origins of the War of 1914_, V. I, p. x)
The facts have been known for a long time, but you are living proof
that there still exist blind devotees of stale propaganda. You don't
seem to realize the limited shelflife of such products.
> > Most Americans today phrase the putative "lessons" of WWII in terms of
> > appeasement and the Munich agreement. But that is a very short-sighted
> > view; inexcusably myopic, in fact. Munich was a blunder of minute
> > proportions compared to the monumental criminality of twenty years
> > previous. Woodrow Wilson proposed peace terms on very specific terms:
> > his 14 Points. Germany agreed to an armistice on those terms. Had
> > those terms been honored, Adolf Hitler would have become a
> > housepainter instead of your icon of evil. Many clear-sighted
> > observers recognized that the Versailles settlement would lead to
> > another war - they were predicting it in 1920.
> Your sentiments are yet another repetition of the same false German
> denials of their responsibility for the crimes of their militaristic
> leadership. Adolf Hitler's career was set in motion by the political and
> financial support and instructions of a German Army intelligence
> officer. This German officer was a member of the same group of officers
> which began preparations for the next war long before the Versailles
> Treaty even existed.
See how vague your claims are: who was this officer? When did this
political and financial support take place? In any case, what made a
hateful program of revenge, as peddled by Adolf Hitler, a viable
product in Germany? Stewart Bruce also describes the "Peace Crime" as
a "peace catastrophe", knowing the potential for creating a further
round of suffering. When Bruce wrote of "words of fire" burning into
the "hearts and consciences of mankind" what better decription could
be given to the death camps and gulags? By refusing to face the
responsibility of the US, Britain, France and Russia for creating the
seedbed of Naziism you create the possibility of future crimes.
> > > Simply put,
> > > World War One would not have happened and could not have happened
> > > without the deliberate efforts of Germany to engage Russia, Belgium, and
> > > France in war for the purpose of conquering their territories. Kaiser
> > > Wilhelm II would have gladly taken the thrones away from his cousins in
> > > Great Britain and Russia at the first opportunity. Your denials of these
> > > historical facts constitute false historical revisionism.
> >
> > Earlier in this thread you claimed that Germany was planning on
> > invading the US. That claim is only slightly less preposterous than
> > your analysis above. An examination of the pre-war sources provide no
> > evidence to support your belief that Germany planned to conquer
> > French, Russian, or Belgian territory. Your position is absurd, but
> > your expression is a useful reminder of the depths of historical
> > ignorance, denial, and psychological projection so commonly found in
> > the US.
> Germany did, in fact, plan on invading the United States. The plans for
> the German invasion of the United States were ordered by Kaiser Wilhelm
> II, and the plans were enthusiastically endorsed by Admiral Alfred von
> Tirpitz. After counseling against the adventure, Count Alfred von
> Schlieffen nearly ordered the execution of the plan in obedience to the
> orders of Kaiser Wilhelm II. In the last move, however, Count Alfred von
> Schlieffen finally succeeded in persuading the Kaiser that the planned
> invasion must be cancelled because Germany had too few troops to sustain
> the operation to its conclusion.
That's an interesting claim. You say that Wilhelm was on the brink of
ordering an amphibeous invasion of the US? When exactly was this
taking place? And what is the source of your information regarding
this implausible plot? I should warn you that the colored funny papers
are not considered a valid reference, unless it comes from Daddy
Warbucks himself (and maybe Punjab, although his puckish sense of
humor must be taken with a grain iof salt.)
> Contrary to your misrepresentaion of my
> earlier comments, the plans for the German invasion of the United States
> were under consideration during the period from 1897 to 1907. Before and
> during World War One, Germany considered a number of means by which it
> could foment and/or participate in an invasion of the United States in
> concert with Mexico or Mexico and Japan. There is nothing preposterous
> about my comments regarding a German invasion of the United States. My
> comments are supported by a number of uncontroverted historical
> documents including papers in the German military archives, the
> Zimmerman Telegram, and eyewitness U.S. Army intelligence reports.
Goodness gracious, eyewitness accounts? These official sounding
reports were the testimony of secret agents witnessing the attempted
invasion? Have you heard of a certain Oberleutnant Strangelove of the
German General Staff? He cut his world-domineering teeth when the
Great War was no more than a gleam in Schlieffen's eye.
> If anyone's "position is absurd" as you describe, it must surely be
> yours, because the facts flatly contradict your statements and
> conclusions.
You've almost got me convinced. Please elaborate on your provocative
hypothesis.
- gerold
D. Patterson
Be watchful when they mow the grass growing up through your toes while
you are waiting for a "hypothesis."
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Akorps666
miles of the German frontlines and advanced five miles into their defenses at
Cambrai.
>Advancing over ground much conducive to rapid tank advance. The ground wasn't
an old battlefield of shells and mud. This was optimal ground for the tanks.
>Unlike 3rd Yrpres for example.
You're *SUPPOSED* to pick ground favorable for the tanks, instead
of pushing them into an environment where they can't be used
effectively.
Its astonishing that we have to re-argue every point that Fuller
argued over in 1917-18. Thank God for Dallas, who has an astonishingly
deep insight into the situation.
Akorps666
"Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier", which focuses mainly on his experiences
with the tanks in WW1. Its a very good read, by the way, if you haven't read it
before.
>I've got to read that sometime. Unfortunately, a quick check of used books on
the web reveals three copies, with prices above $150. I'll check the local
libraries.
Get it from the library so you are sure you don't get ripped off.
There was some kind of scam going on in the 1980s as far as
ordering the book, not sure what that was all about but the libraries
should have some copies, you should be able to get it by
inter-library loan or some such method.
>>I wish I had made xerox copies of Ernest Swinton's wonderful little books on
the tanks in WW1, they also make a very good read. If I remember right, Swinton
also gives a solution to the problem of keeping the tank advance moving
forward.
>The books I found on the net that looked potentially like these were
"Eyewitness" and "Over My Shoulder". The first looks expensive, if less so
than Fuller's memoirs. The second is available quite reasonably. Do these
sound familiar?
Yes, but get them through the library unless you have money to burn.
Those two were the main ones as I recall, except I think there was
some overlap. There were also some minor gems like "The Red Tab
Dope" or something, not what most people would be interested in, but
giving a wonderful flavor of the time, pre-WW1, a worldview now lost forever.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
akor...@aol.com666 (Akorps666) wrote:
> miles of the German frontlines and advanced five miles into their
> defenses at Cambrai.
And only managed five miles under ideal conditions. This took out the
front line and part of the second line but left the third line
untouched. I do not consider that it is a coincidence that five miles
was the limit of artillery range.
D. Patterson
Cambrai was a prime example of a British officer making his own
prediction come true. Major General G. Harper, 51st Highland Division
didn't believe in tanks, and he refused to coordinate his operations
with the tanks. Consequently, the tank-infantry attack was highly
successful on his right flank with the 12th, 20th, and 6th Divisions and
on his left flank with the 62nd and 36th Divisions, while the 51st
Highland Division uncoordinated infantry attack in the center of the
salient failed to keep pace towards Flesquieres. The failure of the 51st
Highland Division to work with the tanks left the other divisions
exposed to German fire into their flanks from Flesquieres in the center
of the British salient and finally slowed their own advances for the
day. Additionally, Byng had failed to heed Haig's warning that the left
wing with the 62nd and 36th Divisions needed greater strength to sustain
the drive towards Cambrai and the Bourlon Wood. Because no provision had
been made to bridge the canals in the event that the bridges were
destroyed, the three cavalry divisions who were supposed to exploit the
breakthrough created by the tank-infantry assault failed to cross the
canals in strength and conduct a timely rollback of the German defenses
which would soon dominate the British held salient with galling fire
from the heights. Another crossing point at Crevecoeur-sur-Escaut was
overlooked and not used. The tanks made it to their objectives, but the
infantry failed to follow, so the tanks were forced to withdraw from the
farthest advances, having no infantry support to consolidate the gains.
The 51st Highland Division eventually eliminated the German defenses in
the center of the salient at Flesquieres, but the advance had stalled
for the day, and the Germans were afforded the precious time needed to
begin the two day reinforcement of the breach in the Hindenburg Line.
Ludendorff almost ordered a retreat signalling the success of the
British atttack, but the failure of the British attack to promptly cross
the canals and complete the cavalry envelopment of Cambrai as planned
left the British salient exposed to dangerous flanking fires from the
heights and a quickly stiffening German reinforcement and defense.
You describe the advance as "only managed five miles under ideal
conditions." The five mile gain was not limited by the radius of action
of the tanks or the range limits of the artillery. The gain was limited
by the enemy flanking fires and a failure to provide the necessary
combat bridging of the canals. The 62nd Division advanced five miles
while engaged in combat. This was not a five mile advance while in
pursuit. This was a five mile advance while engaged in an assault of
successive lines of fortifications in the highly fortified Hindenburg
Line. It has been claimed by some observers that this was the most
ground ever gained while engaged in combat of any British Division on
the Western Front. The Hindenburg Line was among the strongest of the
German fortifications on the Western Front, so it was not as heavily
manned, because the strength of the fortifications made heavy manning
unnecessary. The conditions can hardly be considered ideal for tanks,
even if the ground was relatively dry and supportive for tanks.
The failure of the Cambrai assault had nothing to do with the range of
the artillery. The artillery did what it was supposed to do. The tanks
did what they were supposed to do and more, despite all of the expected
breakdowns from mechanical unreliability. The 62nd and some of the other
infantry divisions did what they were supposed to do and oftem much more
despite devastating flanking fires. The Cambrai assault failed to
envelope Cambrai with the three cavalry divisions as planned because the
51st refused to work with tanks and made a fatal delay in the overall
advance of the infantry divisions on its flanks. It also failed because
no provisions were made to reinforce the left flank divisons of the
attack or for combat engineers to immediately bridge the canals. The
British failed to hold the Cambrai salient because it was not made large
enough to avoid being pinched off at the base by flanking fires and the
Hutier counterattacks which followed.
The tanks did exactly what they were meant to do. They worked as a
tank-infantry team to overrun the fortified machinegun posts and rapidly
penetrate into the rear areas of the defenses to eliminate the artillery
support, communications, and logistics the isolated front line units
required to sustain their defensive fires. The advantages gained by the
tank-infantry teams on the left and right flanks of the assault were
squandered by a failure to properly use the tanks in the center of the
attack and by a failure to properly exploit the breakthrough or
consolidate the gains in a timely fashion.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
D. Patterson
>
> In article <3E0E27E3...@fidalgo.net>, n...@fidalgo.net says...
>
> > The Cambrai assault failed to envelope Cambrai with the three cavalry divisions
> > as planned because the
> > 51st refused to work with tanks and made a fatal delay in the overall
> > advance of the infantry divisions on its flanks.
>
>
> 'One major check was experienced on the front of 51st Division, not, as often
> alleged, because of poor tactics adopted by its commander...but because of
> the peculiarly tough defences, which included an anti-tank battery at
> Flesquieres village.'
>
> Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory (2001 p.218-19)
Perhaps and perhaps not. This truth of this incident is obscured by all
of the partisan bickering, and it is difficult to tell who is bringing
forth the true facts and who is not. Much of the orthodox literature
seems to be based upon the accounts of Baker-Carr, JFC Fuller, and
Liddell Hart. This view of the battle is still represented in many of
today's publications. One such example on today's WWW is:
"The British achieved success all along the line, bar at Flesquieres (at
the centre of the attack), where 51st Highland divisional commander
Harper had determined not to work in tandem with tank commanders,
suspicious of tank technology."
http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/cambrai.htm
In all fairness, there is an opposing view of Harper's actions. The
author John Hussey published an article claiming that Baker-Carr, JFC
Fuller, and Liddell Hart were responsible for creating and maintaining a
myth and that Harper employed the infantry with the tanks in a correct
fashion. See:
Geoffrey Miller <gmil...@bigpond.net.au>. Re: Harper at Cambrai.
<ww...@raven.cc.ukans.edu>
http://www.ku.edu/~kansite/WWI-L/2002/05/msg00226.html
Unexplained by the article, however, are the missed opportunities to
take Flesquières from the rear as recommended by Braithwaite of the
62nd:
"Controversy concerning the 51st Division's tactics and their failure to
take Flesquières continues to this day. Harper, the Divisional GOC did
not take advantage of the tanks, and insisted that his men, instead of
forming small mobile battle groups clustered near the tanks (as
practised by all of the other assaulting units) advanced in waves, and
stayed away from the tanks on the basis that they would draw fire. At
first, as the line near Havrincourt was penetrated, these tactics
appeared to have paid off. But the defenders of the village, from the
84th Infantry Regiment, and the fourteen field batteries deployed in and
around the village, picked off both tanks and infantrymen alike as they
moved towards Flesquières. The 51st fought all day for the village
without success. By midday it was clear that there was a problem.
Braithwaite, in command of the 62nd, suggested to Harper that he could
advance from the north of Havrincourt and take Flesquières in the rear.
But nothing was done. There are two interesting memorials in the
village, on the left as you pass through."
A day tour of the Cambrai battlefields of 1917
http://www.1914-1918.net/tour_cambrai.htm
In other words, Hussey's article makes claims about the facts of the
events which contradict the historical claims of other participants,
including those of other infantry commanders such as Braithwaite. The
current consensus of opinion do not acknowledge Hussey's claims to fact.
The current consensus supports a view that Harper failed to take
Flesquières, and the failure to take Flesquières was due to a failure to
use infantry maneuver and/or coordination with tanks to accomplish the
mission of the 51st Division. In any case and regardless of the outcome
of the controversy about Harper's actions with respect to the tanks,
Harper's failure to make a timely capture of Flesquières was never
argued to be the fault of the tanks to perform their tasks. All of the
other divisions in the assault, e.g. the 62nd Division at Havrincourt,
also faced formidable anti-tank defenses and succeeded in defeating them
to make some of the most spectacular gains ever made against the
Hindenburg Line by the British Army.
I'm not aware that Gary Sheffield has addressed the missed opportunity
where the 51st Division could have followed Braithwaite's advice and
attacked Flesquières from the rear using the 62nd's zone of maneuver. Do
you know of any exculpatory evidence?
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
gerold firl
> gerold firl wrote:
> > You've almost got me convinced. Please elaborate on your provocative
> > hypothesis.
> you are waiting for a "hypothesis."
No worries. I'm fully aware that you are unable to formulate a
hypothesis. Your tired farrago of half-remembered propaganda
warmed-over with snippets of comic strip patriotism is certainly no
hypothesis - more like an overgrown cliche, bloated and swollen into a
funhouse hall of mirrors. I do like the fact that you're spewing it
all over usenet though, it provides some nice documentation regarding
the current state of public ignorance. I would like to encourage you
to spew your worst, it's amusing as well as enlightening.
You were saying that Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty is commonly
accepted as a simple statement of fact by mainstream historians.
- gerold
David Thornley
D. Patterson <n...@fidalgo.net> wrote:
>
>We cannot judge the effectiveness of World War One era tanks by their
>inability to traverse the muddy and shellhole ridden battlefields of
>that war. Neither can we judge their effectiveness by their inability to
>survive direct and indirect artillery fire in that war. You could put
>today's most powerful Abrams tank into that same battlefield and see it
>become immobilized by the bad terrain and destroyed by artillery and
>close infantry assault.
Which would seem to me to mean that tank effectiveness in WWI was
limited by things other than obstinacy in use. If the Abrams would
have difficulties on the battlefield, certainly the available tanks
would have greater ones, and so they would not be decisive weapons.
>military historians. The fact that tanks were valuable and even
>indispensable to warfare was generally accepted and no longer in serious
>question. What was at issue and an unending bone of contention during
>the interwar years was the proper role for the participation of tanks in
>warfare. Were the tanks to be used as an infantry support weapon or as
>the principal weapon of an armored warfare combat branch?
Entirely true. However, this misses the point I was concentrating
on. I claim that WWI tanks were valuable in the support of the sort
of attacks that could be made by other arms alone, and that they
were not capable of changing the nature of warfare in 1918. To
put it in your terms, I am arguing that the tank, as it existed in
1918, was adequate only for infantry support, not for what later
became known as armored warfare.
In context, this is an argument that Haig was generally right in
his views and actions. He wanted as many tanks as he could get,
but got along with what he could get.
Other people have blamed Haig for premature attacks. In 1916, for
example, the French army was being battered bloody at Verdun.
Haig's choices were to let the Germans continue to beat the French
up, or to attack with raw troops and staff. Neither is an attractive
choice, and the records from the German side show that Haig's attacks
put a great strain on the German Army.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote:
> Haig's choices were to let the Germans continue to beat the French
> up, or to attack with raw troops and staff.
It is clear that Haig was subject to great French pressure. The date
of the Somme was brought forward several times in response to French
requests. IIRC the original date was sometime in August. The site of
the attack was also dictated by the French as the original attack was
intended to be carried out in conjunction with French troops. It has
to be remembered that during 1916 the French were the major faster in
the coalition.
Forgotten Victory points out that Britain was following the same
pattern as in earlier wars. Supporting continental allies with troops
and money. The number of troops were greater but this was a result of
the difference in the site of the war. It would be interesting to
compare casualties with troops engaged with other wars. I still do not
think that proportionally WW1 casualties approached those of the
Retreat from Kabul, one survivor of the fighting force IIRC.
Akorps666
>limited by things other than obstinacy in use. If the Abrams would
>have difficulties on the battlefield, certainly the available tanks
>would have greater ones, and so they would not be decisive weapons.
I think the principle is that ground suitable for the profitable use
of the weapons needs to be chosen, rather than thrusting them
into an environment where they can't function.
For example, you don't use an airplane to drive down a road.
For that you use a car. You don't use a car to sail across
the water. For that you use a boat. You can't expect a boat
to fly. For that you use an airplane ...
Of course there are flying boats, and cars that can swim,
and you can design a specialized tank that can cross water.
But the idea of the original tank was not to cross a swamp,
but to neutralize the bullet via armor, while crossing favorable
ground, then neutralize the enemy machines guns, so the
infantry could advance, then the infantry could neutralize
the enemy artillery so the tanks could advance. Then by
echelon methods a continuous advance could be carried
out, as it took at least 24 hours for the tanks in the first
wave (or at least the crew) to recover and be ready for
further action. The mass artillery attacks used prior
to the tanks reduced the mobility of the advance by
churning up the group and creating impassable swamps,
so by leaving the ground in good condition the tank methods
made possible a continuous advance, in theory, if they had
been used correctly according to Fuller's advice. But by
putting the whole tank force into the initial assault, there
would be no reserves left for use on day 2, and as said the
tank crews were exhausted by that point and needed
at least a day to recover.
>Haig was generally right in his views and actions. He wanted as many tanks as
he could get,
Haig opposed the tank corps in various ways, and tried to reduce it.
It was only after the battle of Hamel, July 1918, where the tanks
had their first spectacular and complete success, rolling over the
enemy lines as if in a clockwork battle, that the authorities became
excited, and realized they had a war winning weapon on their hands.
That led to the decisive battle of Amiens, August 8, 1918, the Black Day
of the German Army, which caused Ludendorff's nerves to collapse,
after which the German war effort came unglued. The tanks completely
smashed the German front, and Ludendorff lost confidence in his
troops, so decided that Germany had to sue for peace. Later he
regained his nerve but it was too late.
Louis Capdeboscq
> You may recall that Boulanger nearly managed to take-over French
> government in a coup de revanche back in the 1880's; his cachet was
> purely based upon a platform of war against Germany.
His cachet was purely based on charisma. His platform was practically
nonexistant, and French politics of the time were extremely shaky so it
would be a little too complex to describe Boulangisme here. Suffice it to
say that it wasn't a spontaneous eruption of "revanchiste" war.
By the way, Boulanger did not, in fact, take over French government. He gave
up.
> In the next decade there was the Dreyfuss affair; nowadays it is
> remembered as primarily an anti-semitic crusade, but lets not forget
> the ostensible crime for which he was condemned: treasonous
> fraternization with Germany. He was accused of the most damning
> misdemeanor possible.
Germany was France's most likely enemy after 1871, for obvious reasons:
looking at a map would provide the answer.
The various cases of US citizens being wrongly convicted of espionnage,
either supposedly for the benefit of Italy or the USSR, doesn't indicate a
hidden US agenda to prosecute an invasion of Fascist Italy or the USSR.
> In the next decade there was a substantial movement in favor of arms
> limitation. When Germany made participation conditional on French
> pledges to respect the current borders, France refused. The dream was
> still alive, but had to wait until 1918 for the moment of fulfillment.
France had no intention to recognize her eastern border, and any politician
aknowledging it would have immediately lost its job.
There's an immense difference between that and actively doing something
about it, particularly planning a war.
To borrow one of your terms from another post, I have to say with all due
respect that you have a very poor grasp of the French mindset of the period.
> Revanche was a given in French politics.
Much as "in God we trust" is a given in US politics, which doesn't mean that
the US would actively plan to start a war against non-Christian or atheist
countries.
That "paying lipservice" is a US phrase doesn't mean that other countries
can't do it...
> And they were right: going to war for Alsace-Lorraine was idiotic. No
> one has ever accused Poincare or Clemenceau of having an excess of
> wisdom.
But no-one has yet accused Poincare of Clemenceau of having started WWI, for
the simple reason that they were in no position to do so even had they
wished to.
> You try to make it sound like German advocates of war with France were
> of equal significance to French revanchists; you can't be serious.
In practical terms, I am quite serious.
The French "revanchists" echoed a widely-shared feeling among the nation,
which was less true of the "Greater Germans".
In practical terms, however, those willing to act upon these ideas were, in
both countries, distinct minorities.
> Revanch had been a religious obsession for the French nation - again,
> think of Gen. Boulanger on his coal-black charger, cantering through
> the boulevards of Paris, medals gleaming, prompting many a moistened
> eye, not to mention the swooning ladies.
... and declaring war on Germany ? I must have missed that part...
> The German pro-war fanatics -
> and there were some, to be sure - were more concerned with colonial
> expansion. They were looking for new worlds to conquer - France was a
> done deal.
Most were concerned with European expansion, for the simple reason that
German investments were mostly within Europe. The French hawkish
industrialists, by contrast, were more divided.
> But in France they reflected a long-standing national priority.
No, they reflected a long-standing ideal. A national priority is something
that is acted upon. If the French were animated of such a feeling, they
would have got together to start a war with Germany earlier.
> > So I'm waiting for you to provide a rationale for the French to have
> > Austria-Hungary at war.
>
> It was the only way to suck Germany in.
Why not a straight declaration of war between Russia and France against
Germany ?
Why not manufacture the assassination of a German diplomat by Belgian
fanatics ?
>The Serbian assassins provide
> the spark and the kindling, Austria responds, next it's Russia.
So the French have to make sure that Austria responds, that Serbia doesn't
bow to Austria's conditions, and that Russia backs up Serbia. Three
necessary conditions before Germany is even in the war.
Please note that by that stage, the geopolitical situation has actually
degraded from the French point view, because if Russia is at war with
Austria-Hungary, and Germany suddenly decides to attack France the French
are in trouble.
This is a really stupid plan.
>The
> terms of the Dual Entente specified that if Russia becomes involved in
> a war with A-H supported by Germany, then France will attack Germany.
> Those terms were specified back in the 1890's.
Nope. I looked up the originals, it says nothing of the sort. And before you
start questioning my reading of the French or Russian mindsets, I thought I
should let you know that the originals were drafted in French and my grasp
of that language is quite good.
> > Firstly, you have not established that Russian policy was serious about
> > getting Istanbu, as opposed to being generally interested in getting the
> > straits
>
> Istanbul/Tsargrad was the key to the straits.
I know that.
You still have not established that the Russians were serious about getting
it. Please note that getting involved in a war with Germany and
Austria-Hungary brings the Russians no closer to Istanbul, rather the
contrary.
> > why according to your
> > theory did the French let the Russians down during the 1st Balkan war
> > instead of igniting a general conflagration ?
>
> I don't know - but Poincare came into power in 1912, if I recall
> correctly. During the first Balkan war Caillaux had not yet been
> neutralized. Apparently conditions weren't right.
So if I understand you correctly we have moved from a plan by the French in
general to a conspiracy held by the French equivalent of the Gnomes of
Zurich or Adolf Hitler: people with an agenda, capitalizing on popular
feelings but not representing their country's opinion ?
Now please explain what changed between 1908 and 1914, keeping in mind that
being President of the French 3rd Republic was NOT being the equivalent of
the German Chancellor, the British Prime Minister, the US President, or the
Russian Czar. Let's say that Poincare had the same political position as
Queen Victoria - with less prestige.
> You are saying that Russia was willing to ignite a general European
> war for two reasons:
No, Russia was not willing to ignite a general European war. Russia, like
Austria, at first hoped to keep the war localized to Serbia.
If you believe that war over Serbia meant WWI, then Austria-Hungary was the
one willing to start WWI.
Later on, German intervention confronted the Russians with the choice of
either backing down or escalating the conflict to a European war. At that
stage, the Russians decided that they were willing to fight a general war -
which makes them partly responsible as they could have avoided that war by
backing down. Please note, however, that Germany or Austria-Hungary were
just as, if not more, responsible by that stage as they, too, could have
backed down.
> 1. They wanted a "foreign policy success" to boost domestic political
> support, and:
>
> 2. They couldn't let Serbia down.
>
> That doesn't make any sense.
Why doesn't it make sense ? The Russian government thought that it would
look good by adopting a strong stance over Serbia and making Austria back
down.
> No - there was no doubt that Russian mobilization against A-H meant
> war with Germany too.
Sorry, but that's inaccurate. It only meant war with Germany if Germany
chose to declare war.
> The terms of the Triple Alliance were public,
> unlike the secret Franco-Russian pact.
The terms of the alliance between Russia and France were just as well-known,
they formed the basis for the German war planning.
> According to the agreement of
> the Dual Entente, once that condition was satisfied - Russia and A-H
> were at war - France would attack Germany.
No, in fact France would only attack the country that would have attacked
Russia. So in a scenario where Austria - Hungary attacks Serbia and Russia
attacks Austria-Hungary, France doesn't have to get involved (and probably
wouldn't have). Only if Germany then attacks Russia will France have to move
against Germany.
> Saying that Russia "had" to go to war over
> Serbia is absurd.
Did I say that ?
> They chose to go to war - they didn't have to.
Ditto with Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
> Poincare was in Petersberg July 20-23, that is one week before the
> outbreak of war.
Except that by that point they couldn't have known that there would be an
outbreak of war since Austria-Hungary hadn't even reacted to the
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.
Louis Capdeboscq
> To amplify on my previous response: on 29 July, in the last days of
> peace, Poincare was asked by Senator Tristram if war could still be
> avoided. Poincare replied: "It would be a great pity. We should never
> again find conditions better." (Albertini III, p. 82)
I will have to read Albertini to find the context to this.
So far, suffice it to say that there is no reason why a senator (in France
the Senate is definitely the less important of the two chambers) should ask
a public question to the president of the republic so this must have been a
private exchange. So... ?
> to decipher them. Ferguson shows that in 1893 military spending stood
> at 4.4% of NNP for Russia, 4.2% for France, and 3.4% for Germany. In
> 1913 those numbers had increased to 5.1% for Russia, 4.8% for France,
> and 3.9% for Germany. In absolute terms, that corresponds to the
> following amounts (in millions of pounds sterling):
>
> France Russia Germany
> 1894 37.6 85.8 36.2
> 1913 72.0 101.7 93.4
So we have France matching German military expenditure, and please keep in
mind that in the late 1890's the French were engaged in various colonial
campaigns to a greater extent than the Germans.
After the turn of the century, and particularly 1910, German military
expenditure starts climbing. As Germany has the greater GNP, military
spending as a % of GNP is indeed higher for France. That was never
questioned, what was questioned was that your figures indicated a desire to
attack Germany.
Also, please note that if your (or Ferguson's) thesis was correct, then the
Franco-Russian "alliance" was in a better position in 1894 than in 1913-14
so why wait the extra 20 years for Germany to realize its mistake ?
> I notice you are reporting figures for 1914, after the war began,
No, these are for the first eight months of 1914.
> rather than the pre-war years, which better reflect planning and
> intentions.
French military spending remained more or less constant, while the German
one soared after 1910.
What changed in 1910 was that Germany decided to increase her defense
spendings. You could say that this was to match the French and Russian
levels of military expenditure as a % of GNP (though this doesn't make much
sense, as it doesn't take into account the very different breakdown of
military expenditures, and a lot of the German increase went to the navy
anyway), but even then if the French and Russians had that devilish plan to
overwhelm Germany, why not strike once German defense spendings had started
climbing rather than wait until Germany had caught up ?
> "In actual fact, not only was Russian mobilization premature, but
> French mobilization was decided before noon and promulgated at 3.55
> p.m. on 1 August, while German mobilization was decided at 5 p.m. (4
> p.m. french time) the same day and promulgated shortly afterwards."
> (Albertini III, p. 104)
>
> So according to Albertini the French decision to mobilize was taken
> some 4 hours before the German order was signed.
I have my doubts about what "decided" meaning the same thing in both cases,
but keeping with Albertini's interpretation, the Germans and the French then
decided independently to mobilize. Or in other words, the German
mobilization did not happen as a reaction to the French one, contrary to
what the chronology that you had posted implied, because the Germans could
not have, within 5 minutes, read the first French mobilization tracts and
decided and promulgated their own mobilization.
> > You can also look up the discussion on the start of the war in Holger
> > Herwig's "The First World War, Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918" or
> > Marc Ferro's and Henri Miquel's respective "The Great War". I pulled out
the
> > first 4 one-volume histories of WWI from my shelves and they all say the
> > same thing.
>
> Are you aware of the widespread falsification of French history
> regarding the First World War?
I was unaware that Holger Herwig and John Keegan were French historians.
I am quite aware of how French archives were doctored - though "widespread
falsification" is false as what remains can be corroborated with other
sources. That is why the two French histories that I quoted are recent ones.
> _Yellow Book_ were more or less modified. Of all the diplomatic books
> published after the outbreak of the war, it is without doubt the one
> which least mirrors the truth." (Albertini III, p. 160)
Which of ocurse doesn't amount to "widespread falsification".
> And it's not only the official diplomatic record of the French
> government which has been doctored; French history texts perpetuate
> many of the same lies. In 1914 the French claimed that Austrian
> general mobilization had preceeded that of Russia:
Please quote a French history text perpetuating that lie and I'll believe
you.
I can find lots of history texts - French, British, German and Americans -
from 50+ years ago that "perpetuate many of the same lies". What every
country's propaganda claimed has, thankfully, been generally debunked today.
> Whereas Germany published a complete record of unaltered diplomatic
> records immediately after the war, the corresponding French records
> still remained unpublished in 1939. It seems quite clear what they
> were trying to hide... unless you have another interpretation?
My interpretation is that when someone writes "it seems quite clear what
they were trying to hide" in such a case he should stop watching X-Files (or
go back watching it).
I'm not an archivist, however for having done research with French
archives - although they were military ones, I know that they are really the
beginning, and not the end. That, however, doesn't equate to "widespread
falsification", far from it. It's generally little worse than what you find
in other official records (I'm thinking of some WWI controversies regarding
the British official histories that I read about recently), usually they
will lack by omission rather than by outright falsification. For the period
that I was interested in, i.e. the 1940's, lots of archival material became
available fairly recently (in the 1990's). The "new" material was useful in
correcting details, or answering / confirming obscure points of details, but
no hidden truth emerged. The general picture as had been formed as early as
the late 1940's or the early 1950's was still valid.
I would assume, pending proof to the contrary, that the same would be true
of diplomatic records. When archives are not released immediately, it can
mean any number of things, but generally the simplest explanation lies with
bureaucratic sloth, or lack of staff, followed by aversion to take risks
(the archivists won't bother to check but he won't release the archives in
case some secret damaging to a current higher-up's reputation would lie
there), followed - usually a distant third - by a real secret, one that the
powers that be actually tried to hide.
Finally, and again from direct - even if limited - experience, what I can
tell about the doctoring of archives is that it is seldom done very
adroitly. Modern bureaucracies generate absolutely huge amounts of
paperwork, and it's very hard for any but the most adroit (and influential)
person to alter all the evidence. So it's usually not all that hard to
debunk doctored archives using other archival material - for instance, we
have excellent archival evidence from the French side about the 1940
campaign, even though Gamelin, Huntziger and Petain weren't all that keen on
keeping perfectly accurate but potentially damaging records.
The result is that current historical research by French, German, British
(etc) historians fairly well matches. I'm afraid that so far the consensus
is against the devious plans that you outline.
Louis Capdeboscq
> A strong Europe based upon German-British
> partnership would have been the ideal foundation for a political union
> promoting liberal ideals and political pluralism worldwide.
Except that Imperial Germany was not anymore interested in a partnership
with the British than in promoting such things as "liberal ideals and
political pluralism".
> Instead we got the USSR,
The USSR was not a consequence of Britain's taking part in WWI. It was a
consequence of a lot of things, including German actions. Without the
Germans, there probably would have been a revolution in any case, but the
odds of the Bolsheviks ending up on top were very slim.
> Britain was not responsible
> for starting WWI, but Britain was very irresponsible to allow it to
> take place.
Where does that put the other powers in your view ?
> Are you aware that in 1870 France declared war on the Germans? That
> war was a continuation of a long history of French aggression toward
> Germany.
Depending on whether you include Austria with "the Germans" (but since you
consider the HRE to be ancient Germany you should) "the Germans" declared
war on France approximately as often as the other way around. The Austrians
were extremely keen on declaring war on France for a century or so, the
Prussians were just too far at the time.
I don't think that one can point at a trend of French aggression toward
Germany. Keeping in mind that I disagree with your characterization as
"Germany" of a few areas, my reading of history has "France" and "Germany"
(quotation marks because these are not really accurate terms for some of the
period being considered) aggressing the other whenever they could get away
with it.
> Alsace and Lorraine had been nibbled away from German control
> for the previous couple centuries, with France taking small segments
> of territory whenever the opportunity arose.
Again, if you go back far enough they were first neither in Francia nor in
Germania (I'll start with Charlemagne, but if you want to go back farther
then the matter is settled as the Rhine was the border between Gaul and
Germany, just as today - to reconstitute Gaul the French should give parts
of Provence to Italy and take some of Belgium in exchange). At the time,
Lorraine and Alsace were part of neither. Then they were annexed by the HRE,
became twin vassals of the Kings of France and the Emperors (not "of
Germany" at the time), shifting back and forth according to military
fortunes and - mostly - hereditary mariages and becquests. Then the
Habsbourg made a grab in the 16th century (also of the Low Countries, which
I'm surprised to note you don't characterize as "Germans" though they were
under Imperial control episodically, just as Alsace and Lorraine, as early
as the late 12th century), the French pushed back in the 17th century. You
could argue that the late 16th Habsbourg borders were the point of maximal
extension from the "German" point of view, and that the situation under
Napoleon, with France having the whole Rhineland plus most of Western
Germany as vassal states represented the point of maximal "French"
extension. Be that as it may, it's just as silly to take the map in its most
favorable "German" configuration and call further changes French aggression
as it would be to consider "German aggression" the unification of Germany.
Also, in 1871 the French moved to correct a perceived slight and block
German unification. Not to annex territory.
> In 1871 the French
> expected a repeat of that previous pattern - hence their outrage at
> defeat.
They were understandably displeased with having been invaded and losing a
war - I'm not aware of Prussian joy after 1806-1807, despite the fact that
Prussia had declared war and expected to win.
> There was never any question of destroying France as a Great Power -
> unless by "Great Power" you mean 'power able to attack neighbors at
> will and get away with it'.
There was every question of destroying France as a major industrial power,
and make it a sort of German colony though these aims only rose to the front
after the war had started - similarly, the French only included the recovery
of Alsace and Lorraine in their war goals after 1917.
Following your definition of "Great Power", then WWI+WWII certainly
destroyed Germany as one.
Louis Capdeboscq
> Actually, I think the German navy was still smaller than the French
> navy at the start of the war - or had it passed the French a few years
> earlier?
It had indeed, depending on what you call "a few" years.
> Not sure about that. In any case, the so-called threat of the
> German navy was highly subjective.
I'm not sure why German fears of a two-front wars are considered legitimate
while British fears of Germany challenging Britain's sea mastery are not.
Both are obviously subjective, though.
> I can't think of
> any examples of political repression and corruption in Germany to
> match the Dreyfus affair.
True, in Germany Dreyfus would have been left to rot in jail and nobody
would have taken his defense and have had his trial revised.
I'm not sure why you consider the Dreyfus affair an example of "political
repression" (exactly who was repressed ?), but examples of corruption are
many in every European country - there are a few juicy ones in Germany
involving steel procurement up to and including WWI.
> Once French revanchism had died-out, Germany,
> France and Britian would have become the leading triumvarate of a
> united Europe.
So you mean that Germany should simply have become a democracy, handed over
Alsace and Lorraine and stopped building ships to make the world a better
place ?
> Sure - but let it run its course. Germany would have won, but it would
> have emerged heavily indebted to Britain and the US.
... not to worry as it could have paid off its debts by the tribute exacted
from occupied / defeated countries.
> Imagine a
> miniature Marshall Plan beginning in 1916 or 17, with no USSR lurking
> in the background.
And who exactly would have paid for the Marshall Plan ?
Not that the victorious Germans would have had any intention of allowing
defeated - and hostile - neighbors to be reconstructed, or at least I know I
wouldn't if I was the one running Germany in such a situation.
> I don't think any of the participants would be eager for
> another round.
Let's see. On the one hand, you argue without any shred of historical
evidence that a people like the French could hold a grudge about Alsace and
Lorraine with no weakening over 40 years, yet after another Alsace and
Lorraine had been taken away from then they would suddenly have become happy
? Repeat with the Russians (who had a tradition of having a long memory),
Belgians, etc.
> Actually, if the two had been more closely matched, the danger would
> have been less. France would not have needed to involve the other
> nations of Europe. The rivalry would have been more open, and more
> easily contained.
History belies that theory, unfortunately. You could argue that Austria and
France were more or less closely matched (though increasingly less so as
France grew stronger and Austria grew weaker) between the 16th and the 19th
century. Austria was one of the staunchest opponent of France, at least as
much as Britain and probably more so than any other country. Yet their
"rivalry" always ended up involving other nations of Europe.
> The idea that the German navy was a threat to British Great Power
> status just doesn't hold water. Even if France and Germany allied
> against Britain - a most unlikely threat - Britain would not be
> defeated.
France and Germany together would outbuild Britain and defeat the Royal Navy
after a few years of buildup. This was such an unlikely threat that it
probably wasn't considered, but I guess you could sprout some conspiracy
theory that the British started WWI in order to let the Germans and the
French bleed each other white rather than unite against their common real
enemy...
Louis Capdeboscq
Not necessarily, Britain was quite effective at breaking non-British
Zollverein's to impose her own Navigation Acts (the British version) - see
the various Anglo-Dutch wars.
You could also argue that the Zollverein itself was partly established
through war.
Louis Capdeboscq
> We're talking here about the denial of history, the unwillingness to
> acknowledge the chain of causality: actions, reactions, and the
> continuing cycles of repercussions.
Yes, that's about what most of us perceive you're doing.
> Woodrow Wilson proposed peace terms on very specific terms:
> his 14 Points. Germany agreed to an armistice on those terms.
Wrong. The armistice document that the Germans signed was quite clear - it
required immediate disarmament, sending the fleet to Scapa Flow, evacuation
of conquered territory, evacuation of Rhineland and Allied bridgeheads on
the right bank, etc.
The Germans CLAIMED that they had been duped, and indeed the actual
armistice conditions came as a bad surprise to them. But the point is that
the generals were urging the government to sign practically anything for
fear of a communist insurgency, however much they denied it postwar.
> Had
> those terms been honored, Adolf Hitler would have become a
> housepainter instead of your icon of evil.
Not necessarily, as even the 14 points would have led to Germany abandoning
her conquests as well as some of the territory within the 1914 borders.
Something far less than the victorious outcome trumpeted by the army
communiques to the German public until the last moment.
> Many clear-sighted
> observers recognized that the Versailles settlement would lead to
> another war - they were predicting it in 1920.
And many predicted that we would be nuclear waste by now.
In fact, WWII might very well not have happened.
Louis Capdeboscq
> After WW1, Germany was no longer a Great Power. The only remaining
> Great Power was France.
After 1918 ?
Appart from Hitler and a few die-hards in the Foreign Office, who really
shared that view ?
Certainly not the French...
> How come British felt secure with Europe where
> only one Great Power remained?
It didn't, that's why it backed Germany against France in 1923, 1935 and
1936.
> Why was victorious France OK, while victorious Germany would be a big
> no-no?
Because 1914 France was not building a Flotte de Haute Mer ?