Cyprus Mail: Partition in Cyprus Solution Greek Cypriots Deserve
Serdar Boztas
For fair use only. 30 Jan, 2005.
http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.php?id=18106&cat_id=1
Comment - Partition is the solution we deserve
By Loucas Charalambous
IN AN ARTICLE published in Athens newspaper Ta Nea, Alexis Heraclides,
a lecturer at Greece?s Pantion University, arrives at the following
conclusion:
?The Cyprus problem cannot be solved ? and will not be solved ? as
long as the majority of Greek Cypriots are not in a position to
comprehend the level of their responsibility for the situation in
Cyprus up to the fait accompli of 1974. And this is, I would say, the
deeper meaning of the ?resounding no? of April 24, 2004 ? they said no
because they cannot yet face up to their guilt for that period.?
I disagree that this was the reason we rejected the settlement last
April, but I will agree with Heraclides? point that Greek Cypriots are
in no position to comprehend their responsibilities ? the
responsibilities of their leadership, to be more precise ? for the
situation before 1974. When they discuss the Cyprus problem, they
always start from the premise that the Turks are to blame for
everything. Our guys are the innocent virgins.
This column has on countless occasions pointed out the horrific
responsibilities of our leadership. These responsibilities can be seen
in the violent dissolution of the state established by the Zurich
agreement three years earlier, with the aim of terminating the
participation of the Turkish Cypriots.
That Tassos Papadopoulos ? one of the protagonists of this depressing
story, which led to all the misfortunes that have followed since then
? is today the president of the Republic, thanks to the vote of the
Greek Cypriots, is the most conclusive proof of their inability to
recognise the responsibilities that Heraclides correctly talks about.
In a country with a politically mature people, Papadopoulos and the
other instigators of the bloody events of 1963 would have been
finished as politicians. No mature people would have elected as their
president, with the main responsibility of solving the national
problem, one of the men who had been instrumental in creating it.
The uproar, which was sparked the previous week by the views expressed
by the General Secretary of the United Democrats, Costas
Themistocleous, about the absurd term, ?pseudo-state?, which the
politicians and media insist on using, perfectly illustrates our
political immaturity. Themistocleous had said he disagreed with the
use of the prefix ?pseudo? for everything relating to the occupation
regime, and preferred the terms ?illegal regime? or ?unrecognised
regime?, provoking a storm of protest.
These idiotic word-games betray the politicians? inability to approach
the problem with any seriousness. Paranoia has taken grip ? placing
the ?pseudo? prefix in front of every word relating to the Turkish
Cypriots and their regime has come to be considered national policy.
And we are under the illusion that this pitiful practice is an
adequate way of tackling the national problem.
I would take Heraclides? views a step further, to their logical
conclusion. The Cyprus problem has already been solved. A gullible
population, thanks to the guidance of Papadopoulos and Christofias,
supported by the political lightweights governing Greece since last
March, has already chosen partition. This will inexorably lead to the
creation of two states, along today?s dividing line.
No matter how repugnant, I personally consider that, in the end, such
a solution is the one that our behaviour deserves. And it will prove
our just punishment.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005
Agamemnon
"Serdar Boztas" <ser...@rmit.edu.au> wrote in message
news:cba8ef29.05013...@posting.google.com...
> .. and will probably get.
>
Over nine thousand years ago the first farmers came to Cyprus and built the
earliest known settlements and from there radiated to Crete and mainland
Greece. They were then followed back to Cyprus by colonists from Greece
during the Minoan, Mycenaean, Archaic, Classical and Macedonian Hellenistic
periods which resulted in the creation and consolidation of a Hellenic
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the Cypriot people.
Cyprus predominantly Greek character and identity was unaffected by
invasions by the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Persians, and Romans. Since Minoan
and Mycenaean times Cyprus had its own Greek originated monarchy. It was
also an ally of Assyria and at the time of Artaxerxes II Evagoras the king
of Cyprus was recognised as an equal by the Persian king. Cyprus then fell
to Macedonian rule in Hellenistic times after which Cyprus became part of
the Roman and then the Byzantine Greek empire. Frankish Crusaders and the
Venetians subjugated the Cypriot people to a feudal system but none of these
invaders were as cruel as the Ottoman Turks.
Under the Ottomans the Cypriot people were regarded simply as salves that
had no right to participate in the government, carry out trade or build
places of worship simply because they were Christians.
Since Christians were not allowed to have any share in power the Ottoman
Turks to maintain their rule by military might abducted young Christian
children from their families in the "Paidomazwma" or “Child Tax” who were
then brainwashed into becoming fanatical Muslim fighters or "Janissaries" in
Islamic religious schools or Talibans by being forced to read nothing but
the Koran every day and by being made to believe that the Sultan was their
father. Today this crime is considered to be genocide.
The Ottoman period witnessed horrendous crimes against humanity including
huge massacres of Cypriot civilians such as the massacre of the population
of Famagousta and the public hanging of Archbishop Kyprianos, three Bishops
and other priests and Greek Cypriot dignitaries in Nicosia.
The fact that Christians were treated as second class citizens with no right
to hold office in the Ottoman state and were discriminated against and
forced to pay heavy taxes in comparison to the Muslims caused some to
convert to Islam on the outside, but secretly these "Linovamvakoi" continued
to worship Christ in underground churches and keep Greek culture alive.
Three hundred and seven years of brutal Ottoman oppression and degeneration
ended when on June 4 1878 Turkey sold Cyprus to the British in return for
military assistance. The Treaty of Lausanne sealed the end of any notion of
a legitimate Turkish claim to the overwhelmingly Greek populated island.
Article 21 of the treaty gave the minority Muslims on the island the choice
of leaving the island completely and living as Turks in Turkey, or staying
there as British nationals.
When it was becoming apparent that Cyprus was to be freed of the British
yoke, Turkey reneged on the treaties which bound it and began a campaign of
state sponsored terrorism against the majority of Cypriots both Christians
and Muslims that wanted independence and democracy. This was synchronised
with a Turkish government orchestrated campaign to exterminate the
indigenous Greeks of Asia-Minor and Constantinople. In November 1957 the TMT
Terrorist Organisation was formed by Rauf Denktash, and was funded and
trained by Turkey.
On 12 June 1958 eight innocent unarmed Greek Cypriot civilians from
Kondemenos village were murdered by T.M.T. terrorists near the Turkish
Cypriot populated village of Geunyeli in an totally unprovoked attack, after
being dropped off there by the British authorities. After this the Turkish
government ordered the TMT to blow up the offices of the Turkish press
office in Nicosia in order to falsely put the blame of the Greek Cypriots
and prevent independence negotiations from succeeding. It also began a
string of assassinations and murders of prominent Turkish Cypriot supporters
of independence.
In the following year, after the conclusion of the independence agreements
on Cyprus, the Turkish Navy sent a ship to Cyprus fully loaded with arms for
the TMT Terrorists which was caught red-handed in the infamous "Deniz"
incident.
Cyprus finally gained its independence from British colonialism on 16th
August 1960 but at the price of an unworkable and divisive constitution
imposed on it by the British to satisfy Turkey which violated the democratic
rights of the Greek Cypriot majority and made Cyprus ungovernable due to the
unreasonable vetoes and numerical quotas that were given to the 18% Muslim
minority that bore no relation to their numbers and which allowed Turkey to
use them as pawns to interfere in Cyprus internal affairs and destabilise
the country. After the government was repeatedly forced into deadlock and
all major legislation and the budget were repeatedly vetoed by the Muslims
at the behest of Turkey, President Makarios proposed 13 amendments to the
constitution in order to bring it in line with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and international democratic norms. At the same time a plan was
drawn up to deal with the threat of Turkish state sponsored terrorism which
was predicted would intensify, the so called Akritas plan.
In December 1963 after years of violent intimidation of both Muslims and
Christians by Dektash's TMT, a full scale campaign of Turkish state
sponsored terror was initiated against the people of Cyprus when the TMT was
found to be in possession of vast quantifies of illegal Turkish supplied
arms and now outgunned the Cyprus authorities. Turkey used the violence
which it organised as a cover to send commandos into Cyprus who were to
collude with the TMT and the Turkish battalion that was stationed there
under the so-called Treaty of Guarantee so as to capture the Nicosia to
Kyrenia main highway to use as a bridge-head for a full scale invasion.
Despite UN and international condemnation Turkey mounted waves of
indiscriminate air strikes and chemical weapons attacks using napalm on
civilians in Muslim and Christian villages and on the newly formed National
Guard which was given a UN mandate to restore the peace.
In 1967 Turkey was behind another wave of violent aggression when its troops
seized the strategically important Larnaka to Limasol highway and attacked
UN peace keepers. Seven months earlier America in collusion with the king
had organised a military coup in Greece and instead of taking action against
Turkey, America forced the Greek junta to withdraw the 20,000 strong Greek
garrison that had been placed in Cyprus in 1964 in accordance with the
previous UN mandate and left Cyprus completely defenceless.
On July 20th 1974 after nearly seven years of relative peace, the Turkish
Army without provocation executed its third premeditated invasion of the
island of Cyprus, on the pretext of a failed CIA organised coup ordered by
Henry Kissinger to assassinate President Makarios, using naval landing
craft, over 40,000 heavily armed troops, 400 tanks and full air cover, all
of which had been put in place weeks earlier long before the coup and
planned since the 1950's. The troops landed in the Greek Cypriot dominated
town of Kyrenia and proceeded to attack the Greek Cypriot population.
On August 14th in violation a UN cease-fire, 3 weeks after democratic
Government had been restored, the Turkish invasion continued. Further
reinforcements were shipped into the less than 5% of Cyprus territory which
had already been captured by the Turks and UN Peacekeepers were deliberately
fired upon and killed. Britain deliberately prevented the UN from taking
action to stop the Turkish invasion and took no action to stop the invasion
and genocide of the Greek Cypriots in violation its own status as a
guarantor power because it wanted Cyprus to be permanently partitioned.
Using its heavy forces in conjunction with renewed napalm and bombing raids
against civilians Turkey attacked and captured 38% of the territory
belonging to the defenceless island Republic, whose National Guard consisted
of less than 1,000 men, 35 (or so) old WW2 Tanks and no air force or navy to
speak of.
The Greek Cypriots who legally owned nearly all of the land and property in
the northern third of Cyprus, and formed the majority of the population
there were forced to leave their ancestral homes. Those who refused to go
willingly and acquiesce to ethnic cleansing were beaten and punished and
even raped. The fleeing Greek Cypriots who were captured were imprisoned in
Concentration Camps located both in occupied Cyprus and in Turkey, to which
the UN and Red Cross were denied free access. Over 1,600 Greek Cypriots
including women and children, known to have been sent to these concentration
camps are still unaccounted for.
The total of number of displaced persons was in the region of 200,000 or 1/3
of the total Greek Cypriot population, which numbered 600,000. This is
equivalent to 20 million people being ethnically cleansed from a county the
size of the United Kingdom.
The Turkish army following the orders of prime Minster Bullent Ecevit and
using the captured Greek Cypriots as hostages threatened Cyprus with the
further invasion of the free areas and sanctioned the bombing of Greek and
Turkish Cypriot villages and air-and-chemical-weapons strikes on civilians,
unless the Republic of Cyprus and the UN and the British Bases authorities
consented to the transfer of the Turkish Cypriots in the free areas to the
north against their will.
After a new "cease-fire" was called 20,000 Greek Orthodox and Maronite
Cypriots still remained enclaved in the north in 1975 but through systematic
persecution and the deliberate violation of their rights (as judged by the
ECHR) their number has now fallen to less than 300 and thus the almost
complete ethnic cleansing of the occupied areas by Turkey has been achieved.
Even the Muslim Cypriots have now been almost completely replaced in Cyprus
by over 150,000 Turkish Colonists. Out of the original population of 120,000
Muslim Cypriots who lived in Cyprus, only between 30,000 and 60,000 remain,
the rest being forced to emigrate through economic hardship brought on by
the Turkish occupation and intimidation by the colonists from the Turkish
mainland.
On 13th February 1975 Turkey declared occupied Cyprus a federated Turkish
State which was condemned in UN Security Council Resolution 367(1975). In
1983 Turkey formed the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", condemned in
UN Security Council Resolutions 541(1983) & 550(1984). Having failed to gain
international recognition for this illegal entity, Turkey now plans the
complete annexation of the occupied areas.
The Turkish Military stations about 35,000 heavily armed Troops in occupied
Cyprus, together with 400 Tanks and has two Navel Bases, which it claims are
needed to protect the Turkish Cypriots, but in reality they are there to
stop the Turkish Cypriots from rebelling and prevent the enforcement of over
100 UN Security Council resolutions which demand the Turkish occupation be
ended and the return of the refugees.
Turkey to this day has not shown any sign of repentance or remorse for the
atrocities that it and the Ottoman Empire perpetrated against the people of
Cyprus and instead of recognising or acknowledging its crimes against
humanity glorifies the perpetrators as national heroes while the world looks
on in silence.
--
OXI ! NO ! to the Annan Plan
http://www.oxi-no.org/
markt...@yahoo.com
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eg/eg07/01.htm
The Status of the Two People in Cyprus
Edited by Necati Münir Ertekün
Introduction
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyprus is a difficult and complex issue. It has a long history and
remains unresolved today. But the issue ultimately revolves around one
central fact: the existence of two distinct peoples on the island, the
Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. Their language, culture,
national origin and religion, as well as their aspirations, are
different. However, they are equal to one another in determining the
destiny of the island. Hence, the story of Cyprus is essentially the
story of the relationship between these two peoples.
This booklet is about that relationship from the point of view of
international law. It is designed to meet an essential need, namely, an
in-depth legal analysis of the political equality of the two sides in
Cyprus. For too often this equality has been denied or ignored for
reasons of political expediency and the Turkish Cypriot views have not
been properly appreciated because the legal underpinning's were
generally lacking.
The five sections of this booklet provide the legal background
necessary for a balanced understanding of the Cyprus question. The
booklet contains three legal opinions, one on the right of
self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot people and two on the status
of the two communities in the island, as well as a legal memorandum on
the subject occasioned by the unilateral Greek Cypriot application for
membership to the European Communities. They together shed light on the
major aspects of international law issues involved in, and relevant to,
the Cyprus question. It should be remembered that legal opinions are
regarded as objective expressions of the law under the authority of
their authors.
The author of two of the three opinions is Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht, CBE,
QC, a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who has been Reader in
International Law since 1981. He is at present the Director of the
Research Centre for International Law in Cambridge.
The author of the third opinion, Mr. Monroe Leigh, is at present a
member of a private legal firm, Steptoe & Johnson, Washington, D.C. ,
and a member of the Legal Adviser's Public Advisory Committee on
International Law, U.S. Department of State. He was Legal Adviser to
the Department of State, Washington, by Presidential Appointment during
January 1975 to January 1977.
The legal issues expounded in the opinions of the above mentioned
distinguished lawyers, in the context of the Cyprus question, are
particularly relevant at the present time, in the light of the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 649 (1990) of 12 March 1990, which
called upon the parties "to pursue their efforts to reach freely a
mutually acceptable solution" in the from a bi-communal, bi-zonal
federation. This resolution confirmed the conceptual framework
underlining the principle that a settlement is only possible if the two
politically equal sides are freely able to reach a mutually acceptable
solution through direct talks-a point which formed the basis of the
United Nations Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on 8
March 1990 (S/21183), which contained, inter alia, the following
significant passage:
"Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the
Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority
and minority, but one of two communities in the State of Cyprus. The
mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my
mission of good offices in with the two communities. My mandate is also
explicit that the participation of the two communities in this process
is on an equal footing. The solution that is being sought is thus one
that must be decided upon by, and must be acceptable to, both
communities. It must also respect the cultural, religious, social and
linguistic identity of each community."
Resolution 649 (1990) was the result of this report of the Secretary
General to the Security Council.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter I
The Right of Self-Determination of the Turkish Cypriots (March 9,1990)
Prof. Elihu Lautterrach, C.B.E. , Q.C
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS OPINION
1. I have been asked to advise as a matter of urgency on the legal
justification for the position taken on 28 February, 1990 by the
President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Mr. Denktas,
regarding the wording to be used to describe the participation by the
Turkish Cypriots in any settlement that may be reached with the Greek
Cypriots for the future government of Cyprus.
2. Mr. Denktas noted that whatever the words that may be used whether
communities, peoples, peoples and communities, national communities,
national groups, constituent parties, constituent partners, or
partners- they will not run counter to the view that each of the
parties, in participating in the hoped-for settlement, is exercising
its right of self-determination.
3. The reason for this concern lies in the objection of the Turkish
Cypriot community to any words that may give rise to such implications
as the following: that in these negotiations one group is legally
superior or inferior to the other; that the Greek Cypriot community,
although treated by the United Nations as "the Government of Cyprus"
would by agreeing to a federal-type settlement be seen as in any way
legally bestowing powers upon the Turkish Cypriot community; or that by
entering into a settlement along the general lines contemplated the
Turkish Cypriot community would in any degree be renouncing its legal
and national identity.
4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations responded that "any
change in terminology could alter the conceptual framework to which all
have thus far adhered" and concluded that "we have an impasse of a
substantive kind, which raises questions regarding the essence of the
mandate of good offices given to me by the Security Council."
5. The question is, therefore, what is the correct interpretation of
the mandate conferred upon the Secretary-General? This is essentially a
matter of the interpretation of Security Council resolution 367 (1975)
of 12 March 1975 which, in paragraph 6, requested the Secretary-General
"to undertake a new mission of good offices". In particular, what is
the legal position of those to whom the Secretary-General was to
address his mission?
6. The resolution describes those to whom the Secretary-General is to
render his good offices in three places: in paragraph 2, the Council
regrets certain conduct "as tending to compromise the continuation of
negotiations between the representatives of the two communities on
equal footing"; in paragraph 6, apparently referring to the same
persons, the resolution requires the Secretary-General" to convene the
parties under new agreed procedures"; and, in paragraph 7, the Security
Council called upon "the representatives of the two communities to
cooperate closely with the Secretary-General".
7. There appears to be nothing on the face of that language taken by
itself, to suggest that there is any inequality of status between the
parties or that either of them is doing anything other than further
exercising its right of self-determination by participating in the
settlement negotiations.
8. If, as is correct in the process of interpretation, one looks to the
background of the resolution and to the manner in which it has
subsequently been applied, one finds ample confirmation for this view.
9. So far as the background is concerned, it must be recalled that the
emergence of Cyprus as an independent State in 1960 was an act of
self-determination. The British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd,
described the emerging situation in these terms in 1956: "... it will
be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise
of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the
Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community,
shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to
decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her
Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of self determination
in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual
options". (Statement in the House of Commons,19 December,1956.) This
statement was confirmed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, on 26
June,1958, who also described the Colonial Secretary's assurances as
"pledges".
10. The form taken by this act of self-determination was unique in
character. Neither before nor since has the ending of a colonial
situation been enshrined in a constitution that was guaranteed in
treaty form on the plane of international obligation by the three
members of the United Nations most closely concerned and countersigned
and adopted by the leaders of the two communities directly affected.
This was an evident and necessary reflection of the uneasy relationship
between two peoples divided deeply by religion, language and culture,
and of the apprehension that each might seek a closer association with
the country to which each had an affinity.
11. Three years later the Greek Cypriot community used its power to
prevent the Turkish Cypriot community from playing its proper role in
the Government of Cyprus. There is also uncontroverted and
incontrovertible evidence that those who led this action had in mind a
further breach of the Treaty of Guarantee, namely, union with Greece.
Thus, not only did the Greek Cypriot community or, as it claims to be,
the Government of the Republic of Cyprus break the Constitution and
violate its pledged word in an absolutely fundamental way; it also
repudiated a solemnly assumed treaty undertaking which formed an
indispensable element in any legal assessment of its position. Both the
United Kingdom and Turkey protested.
12. The fact that States have been prepared to recognise and to accord
a place in the United Nations to the constitutionally unlawful Greek
Cypriot regime is comparable to the recognition, many times repeated in
the history of international relations, of de facto governments that
have assumed power after a successful insurrection and repudiation of
constitutional norms. But that de facto acceptance by the international
community could not, and did not, in any way expunge the international
illegality or, even more to the point, deprive the Turkish Cypriot
community of its entitlement, possessed incommon with the Greek Cypriot
community, to the enjoyment of its right of self-determination.
13. The subsequent condemnation in Security Council resolution 541
(1983) of the exercise of this right by the establishment of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a statal entity in Northern
Cyprus responding to the factual division of the country and parallel
to the one existing in Southern Cyprus is legally bewildering. If a
balanced and proportionate reaction to the breach of the undertakings
given in the Treaty of Guarantee is condemned by the United Nations,
this sets at naught the value of any international guarantee, no matter
by whom given.
14. Be that as it may, events subsequent to resolution 367 confirm that
for the purposes of the ensuing series of negotiations the two
communities regarded themselves, and were regarded by the United
Nations, as being equal in status and that no special rights were
attributable to the Greek Cypriot regime by reason of its de facto
local and international status. It is sufficient to list some of the
most important texts that evidence this position: the High-Level
Agreement between the leaders of the two communities, 1977 and 1979;
the Vienna Working Points of 1984; the Draft Framework Agreement on
Cyprus presented by the Secretary-General on 29 March,1986; the Geneva
Accord of 24 August, 1988; and the Opening Statement by the
Secretary-General at the most recent round of talks on 26 February,1990
when, in particular, he stressed that the relationship between the
Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community "is not one
of majority and minority, but one of two communities in the State of
Cyprus" and that "the participation of the two communities is on an
equal footing."
15. It need hardly be added that there is nothing in intervention by
Turkey in 1974 that changes the legal position. This was a lawful
excercise by Turkey of its rights as a guarantor under Article IV of
the Treaty of Guarantee. That lawfulness was expressly acknowledged by
the Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe in a resolution on 29 July, 1974 which referred to the exercise
by the Turkish Government of its "right of intervention in accordance
with Article 4 of the Guarantee Treaty of 1960". The British
Government, though not expressing positive agreement with that view,
has never despite repeated opportunities- denied it; and the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons has said in relation
to the British Government's own position that "there can be no question
that the Treaty makes it perfectly clear that there is a legal right to
intervene". Clearly what Britain is entitled to do, Turkey is equally
entitled to do.
16. Nor is there anything in the situation that suggests that either
side in concluding new arrangements would thereby be exhausting its
inherent right of self-determination. The factor that must maintain the
unity of an internationally and constitutionally re-established
Republic of Cyprus must be the unwavering adherence of both sides to
their promises, not the denial to either side of its right freely to
dispose of its own future.
17. In the light of the above, it does not appear that there is any
legal basis for objecting to the assessment of the position given by
Mr. Denktas.
(*) Issued as a document of the UN General Assembly and of the Security
Council under reference A/44/928 and S/21190 on 14 March 1996
LAUTERPACHT, C. B. E., Q. C. 9 March, 1990
3 Essex Court,
Temple,
London.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter II
Turkish Cypriot Memorandum Addressed to the Council of Ministers of the
European Communities in Respect of an "Application" for Membership by
"the Republic of Cyprus" ( July 12 1990) H.
E. Mr.Rauf R. Denktas, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The President in office of the Council of Ministers has been sent
three applications, dated 3 July 1990, by a body calling itself "the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus" seeking membership for "Cyprus"
(not "the Republic of Cyprus") in the three European Communities. In
this connection, the Turkish Cypriot Side respectfully requests the
Council of Ministers to take into consideration the following
objections and observations.
Cyprus is a two-community island.
2. The basis of the Turkish Cypriot opposition to the present
application is that the Republic of Cyprus as originally conceived and
brought into being in 1960 was founded on the existence of two separate
and politically equal communities-one Turkish, the other Greek.
Whatever may have happened since then-and the essential elements will
be recalled below-the fact remains that there are still two separate
communities in Cyprus and a legal background which recognises the
separateness and political equality of these two communities. Even if
the Greek Cypriot community has in a number of contexts succeeded in
assuming the mantle of "the Republic of Cyprus", that is not a
consideration that can now entitle it to represent the whole of Cyprus
in so fundamental a development as the acquisition of membership of the
European Communities or at all.
Membership of the ECs is unworkable in a divided island.
3. Unlike any other international relationship into which the Greek
Cypriot community has purported to enter-albeit illegally-in the name
of "the Republic of Cyprus", membership of the European Communities
would involve a degree of participation by the Communities in the life
of their Members which is quite unworkable in the circumstances
presently prevailing in Cyprus and pending a mutually acceptable
comprehensive settlement in the form of a bi-communal, bi-zonal,
federal republic. The European Communities cannot have, and should not
consider having, as a single member, an island which is divided into
two parts, each separately governed and divided by a firm boundary,
when membership demands, among other things, free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital, not to mention the application of common
policies on such important matters as agriculture, fisheries and
transport throughout the territories of the Members of the Communities.
The application is misconceived.
4. The applicant, in submitting an application in respect of "Cyprus"
(not, it should be noted, "the Republic of Cyprus") suggests a unity of
the island which is not supportable either in law or in fact. It will
be useful to recall the essential elements in the situation. They are,
regrettably, too often overlooked.
Early recognition of the two-community nature of Cyprus.
5. There are two different peoples in Cyprus. This historical fact was
underlined by the British Government during the period when Cyprus was
approaching independence. The British Colonial Secretary, Mr.
Lennox-Boyd said on 19 December 1956: "... it will be the purpose of
Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self
determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish
Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in
the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for
themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's
Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a
mixed population must include partition among the eventual options".
This statement was confirmed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, on
26 June 1958, who described these assurances as "pledges".
Bi-communal essentials of the 1960 settlement.
6. Despite the reference to "partition" as an option, in answer to
Greek Cypriot claims for union of Cyprus with Greece, this was not the
solution eventually adopted. Instead, a compromise was reached along
the lines of a bi-communal State, in which the respective legal and
political positions of the two communities were carefully regulated.
Absolutely fundamental to the division of power between the two
communities was the idea that Cyprus could not be ruled by one
community to the exclusion of the other. Both communities had to
participate as partners in all decision making and in the
administration of the island. Equally fundamental was the idea that the
greater numbers of the Greek Cypriot community could not be used to
impose unacceptable policies or decisions upon the Turkish Cypriot
community. Adequate checks and balances were provided in the
constitution for the preservation of the national identity and
partnership status of each community.
International and constitutional nature of the 1960 settlement.
7. These fundamentals were incorporated in what has come to be called
"the 1960 settlement". It is characterised by the fact that it is both
an international and a constitutional settlement. Thus the subsequent
conduct of the Greek Cypriot community has to be judged not only in
terms of constitutional law but also of international law.
Strict division of power between the two communities.
8. The 1960 settlement consisted, first, of the Zurich and London
Agreements of 1959. These were international treaties which raised to
the level of international legal obligation the undertakings given by
the parties. Thus, the Zurich Agreement, concluded between the Greek
and Turkish Prime Ministers on 11 February 1959, established the Basic
structure of the emergent Republic of Cyprus. It provided, as basic
articles for inclusion in the Cyprus Constitution, a clear and balanced
division of power between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities,
including provision for a Greek Cypriot President, elected solely by
Greek Cypriots, and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, elected solely by
Turkish Cypriots, and seventy percent-thirty percent distribution of
seats in the Council of Ministers and the legislature, as well as the
same allocation of places in the administration. Also, the President
and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President were granted veto powers which
would have enabled them to block measures prejudicial to their
respective communities. Executive power "ensued from the President and
Vice President acting conjointly". Another essential feature of the
basic articles was the specific exclusion of the total or partial union
of Cyprus with any other State.
International guarantee of the Settlement
9. The undertakings given in these Agreements were reinforced by the
Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, as well as by incorporation in the Cyprus
Constitution itself. The parties to these treaties were the Republic of
Cyprus, on whose behalf "the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish
Cypriot Vice-President" signed, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
These treaties created for the parties rights and duties under
international law. In the Treaty of Guarantee especially the Republic
of Cyprus undertook to ensure respect for its constitution, while
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of this undertaking,
recognised and guaranteed the state of affairs established by the Basic
Articles of the Constitution. This Treaty also expressly provided that
"in so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of
the three guaranteeing Powers reserved the right to take action with
the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the
present Treaty."
Early Greek Cypriot rejection of Turkish Cypriot participation.
10. Within three years of the conclusion of these solemn compacts the
Greek Cypriots had embarked upon a deliberate course of subverting the
basic articles. This culminated in the resignation of the neutral
President of the Constitutional Court and the eventual denial of each
and every right given to Turkish Cypriots under the Constitution. in
pursuance of the so-called "Akritas Plan" that was aimed at uniting the
island with Greece, the Turkish Cypriots were ousted from their
guaranteed positions in the organs of government, the political
equality and the vested rights of the Turkish Cypriots were denied,
while the Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives
enacted, in flagrant violation of the 1960 settlement and the basic
articles of the Constitution, legislation providing for the operation
of various organs of government without Turkish Cypriot participation.
In June 1967 the Greek Cypriot legislature went so far as unanimously
to pass a resolution in favour of "enosis", union with Greece, so
clearly prohibited by Article 185 of the Constitution.
Separation of the Turkish Cypriot community.
11. Since December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot community, faced by
discrimination, threats and physical attacks was, for its self
preservation, compelled gradually to withdraw into self-administering
enclaves, cut off from public services and unassisted by public monies.
The fact of administrative and territorial division between the
communities was acknowledged eleven years later by the Foreign
Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom in the Declaration
of 30 July 1974, which "noted the existence in practice in the Republic
of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot
community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community. "It is further
attested by the maintenance of a dividing line across the island by
UNFICYP, which had arrived in Cyprus with the consent of both sides in
March 1964 as a result of the break up of the partnership state and its
administration. In due course, in 1975, the Turkish Cypriot
administration which had been administering Turkish Cypriots since the
breakdown of the legitimate partnership government, developed into the
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, by way of adaptation to the
circumstances, and for the purpose of creating the federated Turkish
Cypriot wing of a future federal republic of Cyprus, thus
re-establishing the defunct partnership state in a federal form.
Constitutional illegitimacy of Greek Cypriot action acknowledged.
12. The lack of constitutional foundation for the Greek Cypriot
administration was acknowledged by the Foreign Ministers of Greece,
Turkey and the United Kingdom in a Declaration of 30 July 1974 when
they recorded that "among the constitutional questions to be discussed
should be that of an immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the
Vice-President assuming the functions provided for under the 1960
Constitution." Such words could not have been used if the prevailing
condition at the time had been one of adherence to the Constitution. In
fact Makarios had openly declared the 1960 Agreements and the
Constitution to be "dead and buried", and he offered Turkish Cypriots
minority rights in what he regarded a Greek Cypriot state. Here was a
plain recognition, therefore, that there was not a legitimate
government representing the whole population. And the reference to the
need for the Vice-President to assume the functions provided for under
the 1960 Constitution, coupled with the well-known fact that the
Vice-President had been Turkish and had not voluntarily renounced the
exercise of his functions, indicates appreciation that he had been
unlawfully excluded from his office-an exclusion which in
constitutional terms means-inter alia-that the Turkish Cypriot
community was deprived of its right under Article 57 of the
Constitution to veto decisions relating to foreign affairs (or,
conversely, to approve such decisions by deliberately acquiescing in
them) and the collapse of the partnership state.
1974 - `Enosis' thwarted by quarantor action of Turkey.
13. Prior to this, however, certain Greek and Greek Cypriot elements
had carried a stage further their repudiation of the prohibition of
"enosis". For the purpose of bringing about immediate `Enosis', in July
1974 a Greek-inspired and militarily supported coup took place against
Archbishop Makarios, who himself had previously maintained that by
destroying the constitutional order he had brought Cyprus to the
"nearest point to enosis". In the exercise of its rights and duties as
a guarantor of the 1960 settlement and upon the urgent plea of the
Turkish Cypriot side for help, Turkey landed forces in Cyprus in order
to safeguard the Turkish Cypriot population and prevent a takeover of
the island by Greece. They freed the northern part of the island from
Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, which Makarios had described to the
Security Council on 19 July 1974 as "forces of invasion from Greece",
and made it a haven for the whole Turkish Cypriot population including
those stranded in the enclaves in the south-a process which was
completed by the 1975 Agreement on the Voluntary Regrouping of
Populations. There now coexist on the island two separate
administrations-the Greek Cypriot administration in the South which has
assumed the role of "the Republic of Cyprus" and the Turkish Cypriot
administration which has established itself as the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus in view of the refusal of the Greek Cypriot side to
agree to share power with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of equality
as envisaged in the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements.
Greek Cypriots not the lawful government of Cyprus.
14. In the circumstances set out above, it will be readily understood
why the Turkish Cypriots regard as unlawful the assumption by the Greek
Cypriots of the role of "the Republic of Cyprus". That Republic was as
ordained and in the image of the 1960 settlement. The Greek Cypriots
overthrew that settlement in December 1963. Yet they appear to have
been accepted internationally as the appropriate representatives of
Cyprus. This cannot be right, legally or morally, and no one should be
surprised by the view that the Turkish Cypriots take of the situation.
International illegality of Greek Cypriot action.
15. The Turkish Cypriots believe that the unilateral application by the
Greek Cypriots to join the Communities is an international act of an
entirely different order of intensity and significance to anything that
has come before. The Council of Ministers of the European Communities
may not lawfully disregard the illegality of the position and conduct
of the Greek Cypriot regime in Cyprus when the latter purports to
present itself as the "government of the Republic of Cyprus." The
objection now raised by the TRNC on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot
people to the validity of the application rests upon the lack of
entitlement of the Greek Cypriot community to make the application in
the name of "Cyprus" or, indeed, of "the Republic of Cyprus." This
objection rests only indirectly upon the constitutional illegitimacy of
the Greek Cypriot regime for it is possible to conceive of cases in
which merely constitutional illegitimacy would not preclude a regime
from seeking admission to an international organisation on behalf of a
State. However, where, as in this case, the constitutional illegitimacy
occasions an international illegitimacy, the position is quite
different and cannot be ignored by the European Communities. Moreover,
in the case of Cyprus where the bi-communality of the state and its
government was the precondition for legitimacy, this unilateral act by
Greek Cypriots is a clear and unacceptable action to impose their
political will on the Turkish Cypriots on a matter which will affect
generations to come.
Greek Cypriot application violates international and constitutional ban
on Enosis.
16. The application is also open to objection on the ground, arising
from Article 1 of the Treat of Guarantee, and echoed in Article 185 of
the Constitution, that the Republic of Cyprus has undertaken "not to
participate in whole or in part, in any political or economic union
with any State whatsoever." This limitation is broad enough to prohibit
the link with Greece that a membership initiated and negotiated by the
Greek Cypriots alone would bring about, even within the framework of
the European Communities.
Comparison with Germany is false.
17. Greek Cypriot awareness of the vulnerability of the application is
suggested by the following report in the press (see The Wall Street
Journal, 5 July 1990) that Mr. Iacovou, the Foreign Minister of the
Greek Cypriot regime, said:
"the island's political situation shouldn't have an effect on his
country's membership application. He drew an analogy with Germany,
saying that the division of that country into East and West had never
been viewed as a barrier to EC membership."
The "analogy" is quite false and reveals precisely the weakness of the
Greek Cypriot application. When the Federal Republic of Germany became
an original member of the European Communities, no claim was made by it
that the territorial scope of its membership extended beyond the area
under its actual control. It did not claim to represent East Germany
for purposes of becoming a member. It is indeed significant that the
only territorial matters raised by the FRG related to the position of
Land Berlin and the Saar. In the present situation, however, it is
evident that the Greek Cypriots do not seek to limit their application
in a comparable manner.
Application is a nullity. No action should be taken on it.
18. The present opposition to the Greek Cypriot applications is of a
fundamental nature. It arises in limine. The internationally unlawful
character of the authority that purports to make the application
deprives it of the capacity so to act, while, the scope of the
application and the manner of its making both taint the application
with invalidity. It is a nullity. In law, therefore, there exists no
application that the Council of Ministers may refer to the Commission
for an opinion and no application that the Commission may properly
receive. The suggestion is, accordingly, respectfully made that the
proper course is for the Council of Ministers to take no action on the
application. If, nonetheless, this Council of Ministers should feel
that it is necessary or desirable that the Commission should express an
opinion on the validity of the application, then the reference to the
Commission should be precisely limited to this. It should not be a
reference to the Commission for an opinion on the substance of the
application.
TRNC would welcome EC membership but only after settlement. 19.
Notwithstanding this the TRNC does not wish to create the impression
that it is opposed to the eventual membership of the European
Communities by a State of Cyprus restored to legality and stability by
a settlement freely negotiated between parties of equal standing. When
such a political settlement has been achieved, the Turkish Cypriot
community will be no less desirous than the Greek Cypriot community to
secure membership for the whole of Cyprus in a manner that will ensure
that the benefits of such membership, as well as its burdens, are
enjoyed and borne by both communities genuinely, without discrimination
between them.
Greek Cypriot admission would mean a second vote for Greece. 20. In the
meantime, it must be recognised that the effect of the admission to the
European Communities of the Greek Cypriot side under the assumed title
of "the Republic of Cyprus" represented as it is today exclusively by
the Greek Cypriot element in the island would in effect, be to give to
Greece a second vote in all the deliberations of the Communities. There
is no room for the pretence that, left to itself, the Greek Cypriot
community, irrevocably committed in spirit as it has always been to
union with Greece, would act within the organs of the European
Community as anything other than a proxy of Greece. The only way to
ensure that Cyprus acts as a fully independent member of the European
Communities is to insist that membership should not be given to it
until there is reasonable certainty that its foreign and economic
policy will not be subservient to the interests of any neighbour. That
can only be assured by the establishment within Cyprus of a system of
government reflecting the existence of the two communities, each
possessing the capacity to prevent the exploitation of the country's
position for the sole or disproportionate benefit of the other.
Application violates most recent UN Security Council resolution.
21. In its most recent resolution on Cyprus, of 12 March 1990 (649
(1990)), the UN Security Council called on "the parties concerned to
refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation." In the
specialised vocabulary that has developed in this context the words
"the parties" means not only the two Cypriot communities but the
interested governments, including, with special reference to the
present context, Greece. The present move clearly aggravates the
situation by destroying the equality of status between the two
communities that is the essential foundation for the continuance of
negotiations on the wider question.
Membership can only grow out of settlement. Not vice versa.
22. It must be realised that the entry into the European Communities of
a uniquely Greek Cypriot state cannot contribute to the resolution of
the differences between the two communities. Participation in the
European Communities can only grow out of the creation of a new
Republic of Cyprus that fully reflects the proper status and role of
both communities.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter III
Turkish Cypriot Memorandum Addressed to the Council of Ministers of the
European Communities in Respect of an "Application" for Membership by
"the Republic of Cyprus" ( July 12 1990) H.
E. Mr.Rauf R. Denktas, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The President in office of the Council of Ministers has been sent
three applications, dated 3 July 1990, by a body calling itself "the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus" seeking membership for "Cyprus"
(not "the Republic of Cyprus") in the three European Communities. In
this connection, the Turkish Cypriot Side respectfully requests the
Council of Ministers to take into consideration the following
objections and observations.
Cyprus is a two-community island.
2. The basis of the Turkish Cypriot opposition to the present
application is that the Republic of Cyprus as originally conceived and
brought into being in 1960 was founded on the existence of two separate
and politically equal communities-one Turkish, the other Greek.
Whatever may have happened since then-and the essential elements will
be recalled below-the fact remains that there are still two separate
communities in Cyprus and a legal background which recognises the
separateness and political equality of these two communities. Even if
the Greek Cypriot community has in a number of contexts succeeded in
assuming the mantle of "the Republic of Cyprus", that is not a
consideration that can now entitle it to represent the whole of Cyprus
in so fundamental a development as the acquisition of membership of the
European Communities or at all.
Membership of the ECs is unworkable in a divided island.
3. Unlike any other international relationship into which the Greek
Cypriot community has purported to enter-albeit illegally-in the name
of "the Republic of Cyprus", membership of the European Communities
would involve a degree of participation by the Communities in the life
of their Members which is quite unworkable in the circumstances
presently prevailing in Cyprus and pending a mutually acceptable
comprehensive settlement in the form of a bi-communal, bi-zonal,
federal republic. The European Communities cannot have, and should not
consider having, as a single member, an island which is divided into
two parts, each separately governed and divided by a firm boundary,
when membership demands, among other things, free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital, not to mention the application of common
policies on such important matters as agriculture, fisheries and
transport throughout the territories of the Members of the Communities.
The application is misconceived.
4. The applicant, in submitting an application in respect of "Cyprus"
(not, it should be noted, "the Republic of Cyprus") suggests a unity of
the island which is not supportable either in law or in fact. It will
be useful to recall the essential elements in the situation. They are,
regrettably, too often overlooked.
Early recognition of the two-community nature of Cyprus.
5. There are two different peoples in Cyprus. This historical fact was
underlined by the British Government during the period when Cyprus was
approaching independence. The British Colonial Secretary, Mr.
Lennox-Boyd said on 19 December 1956: "... it will be the purpose of
Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self
determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish
Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in
the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for
themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's
Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a
mixed population must include partition among the eventual options".
This statement was confirmed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, on
26 June 1958, who described these assurances as "pledges".
Bi-communal essentials of the 1960 settlement.
6. Despite the reference to "partition" as an option, in answer to
Greek Cypriot claims for union of Cyprus with Greece, this was not the
solution eventually adopted. Instead, a compromise was reached along
the lines of a bi-communal State, in which the respective legal and
political positions of the two communities were carefully regulated.
Absolutely fundamental to the division of power between the two
communities was the idea that Cyprus could not be ruled by one
community to the exclusion of the other. Both communities had to
participate as partners in all decision making and in the
administration of the island. Equally fundamental was the idea that the
greater numbers of the Greek Cypriot community could not be used to
impose unacceptable policies or decisions upon the Turkish Cypriot
community. Adequate checks and balances were provided in the
constitution for the preservation of the national identity and
partnership status of each community.
International and constitutional nature of the 1960 settlement.
7. These fundamentals were incorporated in what has come to be called
"the 1960 settlement". It is characterised by the fact that it is both
an international and a constitutional settlement. Thus the subsequent
conduct of the Greek Cypriot community has to be judged not only in
terms of constitutional law but also of international law.
Strict division of power between the two communities.
8. The 1960 settlement consisted, first, of the Zurich and London
Agreements of 1959. These were international treaties which raised to
the level of international legal obligation the undertakings given by
the parties. Thus, the Zurich Agreement, concluded between the Greek
and Turkish Prime Ministers on 11 February 1959, established the Basic
structure of the emergent Republic of Cyprus. It provided, as basic
articles for inclusion in the Cyprus Constitution, a clear and balanced
division of power between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities,
including provision for a Greek Cypriot President, elected solely by
Greek Cypriots, and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, elected solely by
Turkish Cypriots, and seventy percent-thirty percent distribution of
seats in the Council of Ministers and the legislature, as well as the
same allocation of places in the administration. Also, the President
and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President were granted veto powers which
would have enabled them to block measures prejudicial to their
respective communities. Executive power "ensued from the President and
Vice President acting conjointly". Another essential feature of the
basic articles was the specific exclusion of the total or partial union
of Cyprus with any other State.
International guarantee of the Settlement
9. The undertakings given in these Agreements were reinforced by the
Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, as well as by incorporation in the Cyprus
Constitution itself. The parties to these treaties were the Republic of
Cyprus, on whose behalf "the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish
Cypriot Vice-President" signed, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
These treaties created for the parties rights and duties under
international law. In the Treaty of Guarantee especially the Republic
of Cyprus undertook to ensure respect for its constitution, while
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of this undertaking,
recognised and guaranteed the state of affairs established by the Basic
Articles of the Constitution. This Treaty also expressly provided that
"in so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of
the three guaranteeing Powers reserved the right to take action with
the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the
present Treaty."
Early Greek Cypriot rejection of Turkish Cypriot participation.
10. Within three years of the conclusion of these solemn compacts the
Greek Cypriots had embarked upon a deliberate course of subverting the
basic articles. This culminated in the resignation of the neutral
President of the Constitutional Court and the eventual denial of each
and every right given to Turkish Cypriots under the Constitution. in
pursuance of the so-called "Akritas Plan" that was aimed at uniting the
island with Greece, the Turkish Cypriots were ousted from their
guaranteed positions in the organs of government, the political
equality and the vested rights of the Turkish Cypriots were denied,
while the Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives
enacted, in flagrant violation of the 1960 settlement and the basic
articles of the Constitution, legislation providing for the operation
of various organs of government without Turkish Cypriot participation.
In June 1967 the Greek Cypriot legislature went so far as unanimously
to pass a resolution in favour of "enosis", union with Greece, so
clearly prohibited by Article 185 of the Constitution.
Separation of the Turkish Cypriot community.
11. Since December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot community, faced by
discrimination, threats and physical attacks was, for its self
preservation, compelled gradually to withdraw into self-administering
enclaves, cut off from public services and unassisted by public monies.
The fact of administrative and territorial division between the
communities was acknowledged eleven years later by the Foreign
Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom in the Declaration
of 30 July 1974, which "noted the existence in practice in the Republic
of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot
community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community. "It is further
attested by the maintenance of a dividing line across the island by
UNFICYP, which had arrived in Cyprus with the consent of both sides in
March 1964 as a result of the break up of the partnership state and its
administration. In due course, in 1975, the Turkish Cypriot
administration which had been administering Turkish Cypriots since the
breakdown of the legitimate partnership government, developed into the
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, by way of adaptation to the
circumstances, and for the purpose of creating the federated Turkish
Cypriot wing of a future federal republic of Cyprus, thus
re-establishing the defunct partnership state in a federal form.
Constitutional illegitimacy of Greek Cypriot action acknowledged.
12. The lack of constitutional foundation for the Greek Cypriot
administration was acknowledged by the Foreign Ministers of Greece,
Turkey and the United Kingdom in a Declaration of 30 July 1974 when
they recorded that "among the constitutional questions to be discussed
should be that of an immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the
Vice-President assuming the functions provided for under the 1960
Constitution." Such words could not have been used if the prevailing
condition at the time had been one of adherence to the Constitution. In
fact Makarios had openly declared the 1960 Agreements and the
Constitution to be "dead and buried", and he offered Turkish Cypriots
minority rights in what he regarded a Greek Cypriot state. Here was a
plain recognition, therefore, that there was not a legitimate
government representing the whole population. And the reference to the
need for the Vice-President to assume the functions provided for under
the 1960 Constitution, coupled with the well-known fact that the
Vice-President had been Turkish and had not voluntarily renounced the
exercise of his functions, indicates appreciation that he had been
unlawfully excluded from his office-an exclusion which in
constitutional terms means-inter alia-that the Turkish Cypriot
community was deprived of its right under Article 57 of the
Constitution to veto decisions relating to foreign affairs (or,
conversely, to approve such decisions by deliberately acquiescing in
them) and the collapse of the partnership state.
1974 - `Enosis' thwarted by quarantor action of Turkey.
13. Prior to this, however, certain Greek and Greek Cypriot elements
had carried a stage further their repudiation of the prohibition of
"enosis". For the purpose of bringing about immediate `Enosis', in July
1974 a Greek-inspired and militarily supported coup took place against
Archbishop Makarios, who himself had previously maintained that by
destroying the constitutional order he had brought Cyprus to the
"nearest point to enosis". In the exercise of its rights and duties as
a guarantor of the 1960 settlement and upon the urgent plea of the
Turkish Cypriot side for help, Turkey landed forces in Cyprus in order
to safeguard the Turkish Cypriot population and prevent a takeover of
the island by Greece. They freed the northern part of the island from
Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, which Makarios had described to the
Security Council on 19 July 1974 as "forces of invasion from Greece",
and made it a haven for the whole Turkish Cypriot population including
those stranded in the enclaves in the south-a process which was
completed by the 1975 Agreement on the Voluntary Regrouping of
Populations. There now coexist on the island two separate
administrations-the Greek Cypriot administration in the South which has
assumed the role of "the Republic of Cyprus" and the Turkish Cypriot
administration which has established itself as the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus in view of the refusal of the Greek Cypriot side to
agree to share power with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of equality
as envisaged in the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements.
Greek Cypriots not the lawful government of Cyprus.
14. In the circumstances set out above, it will be readily understood
why the Turkish Cypriots regard as unlawful the assumption by the Greek
Cypriots of the role of "the Republic of Cyprus". That Republic was as
ordained and in the image of the 1960 settlement. The Greek Cypriots
overthrew that settlement in December 1963. Yet they appear to have
been accepted internationally as the appropriate representatives of
Cyprus. This cannot be right, legally or morally, and no one should be
surprised by the view that the Turkish Cypriots take of the situation.
International illegality of Greek Cypriot action.
15. The Turkish Cypriots believe that the unilateral application by the
Greek Cypriots to join the Communities is an international act of an
entirely different order of intensity and significance to anything that
has come before. The Council of Ministers of the European Communities
may not lawfully disregard the illegality of the position and conduct
of the Greek Cypriot regime in Cyprus when the latter purports to
present itself as the "government of the Republic of Cyprus." The
objection now raised by the TRNC on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot
people to the validity of the application rests upon the lack of
entitlement of the Greek Cypriot community to make the application in
the name of "Cyprus" or, indeed, of "the Republic of Cyprus." This
objection rests only indirectly upon the constitutional illegitimacy of
the Greek Cypriot regime for it is possible to conceive of cases in
which merely constitutional illegitimacy would not preclude a regime
from seeking admission to an international organisation on behalf of a
State. However, where, as in this case, the constitutional illegitimacy
occasions an international illegitimacy, the position is quite
different and cannot be ignored by the European Communities. Moreover,
in the case of Cyprus where the bi-communality of the state and its
government was the precondition for legitimacy, this unilateral act by
Greek Cypriots is a clear and unacceptable action to impose their
political will on the Turkish Cypriots on a matter which will affect
generations to come.
Greek Cypriot application violates international and constitutional ban
on Enosis.
16. The application is also open to objection on the ground, arising
from Article 1 of the Treat of Guarantee, and echoed in Article 185 of
the Constitution, that the Republic of Cyprus has undertaken "not to
participate in whole or in part, in any political or economic union
with any State whatsoever." This limitation is broad enough to prohibit
the link with Greece that a membership initiated and negotiated by the
Greek Cypriots alone would bring about, even within the framework of
the European Communities.
Comparison with Germany is false.
17. Greek Cypriot awareness of the vulnerability of the application is
suggested by the following report in the press (see The Wall Street
Journal, 5 July 1990) that Mr. Iacovou, the Foreign Minister of the
Greek Cypriot regime, said:
"the island's political situation shouldn't have an effect on his
country's membership application. He drew an analogy with Germany,
saying that the division of that country into East and West had never
been viewed as a barrier to EC membership."
The "analogy" is quite false and reveals precisely the weakness of the
Greek Cypriot application. When the Federal Republic of Germany became
an original member of the European Communities, no claim was made by it
that the territorial scope of its membership extended beyond the area
under its actual control. It did not claim to represent East Germany
for purposes of becoming a member. It is indeed significant that the
only territorial matters raised by the FRG related to the position of
Land Berlin and the Saar. In the present situation, however, it is
evident that the Greek Cypriots do not seek to limit their application
in a comparable manner.
Application is a nullity. No action should be taken on it.
18. The present opposition to the Greek Cypriot applications is of a
fundamental nature. It arises in limine. The internationally unlawful
character of the authority that purports to make the application
deprives it of the capacity so to act, while, the scope of the
application and the manner of its making both taint the application
with invalidity. It is a nullity. In law, therefore, there exists no
application that the Council of Ministers may refer to the Commission
for an opinion and no application that the Commission may properly
receive. The suggestion is, accordingly, respectfully made that the
proper course is for the Council of Ministers to take no action on the
application. If, nonetheless, this Council of Ministers should feel
that it is necessary or desirable that the Commission should express an
opinion on the validity of the application, then the reference to the
Commission should be precisely limited to this. It should not be a
reference to the Commission for an opinion on the substance of the
application.
TRNC would welcome EC membership but only after settlement. 19.
Notwithstanding this the TRNC does not wish to create the impression
that it is opposed to the eventual membership of the European
Communities by a State of Cyprus restored to legality and stability by
a settlement freely negotiated between parties of equal standing. When
such a political settlement has been achieved, the Turkish Cypriot
community will be no less desirous than the Greek Cypriot community to
secure membership for the whole of Cyprus in a manner that will ensure
that the benefits of such membership, as well as its burdens, are
enjoyed and borne by both communities genuinely, without discrimination
between them.
Greek Cypriot admission would mean a second vote for Greece. 20. In the
meantime, it must be recognised that the effect of the admission to the
European Communities of the Greek Cypriot side under the assumed title
of "the Republic of Cyprus" represented as it is today exclusively by
the Greek Cypriot element in the island would in effect, be to give to
Greece a second vote in all the deliberations of the Communities. There
is no room for the pretence that, left to itself, the Greek Cypriot
community, irrevocably committed in spirit as it has always been to
union with Greece, would act within the organs of the European
Community as anything other than a proxy of Greece. The only way to
ensure that Cyprus acts as a fully independent member of the European
Communities is to insist that membership should not be given to it
until there is reasonable certainty that its foreign and economic
policy will not be subservient to the interests of any neighbour. That
can only be assured by the establishment within Cyprus of a system of
government reflecting the existence of the two communities, each
possessing the capacity to prevent the exploitation of the country's
position for the sole or disproportionate benefit of the other.
Application violates most recent UN Security Council resolution.
21. In its most recent resolution on Cyprus, of 12 March 1990 (649
(1990)), the UN Security Council called on "the parties concerned to
refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation." In the
specialised vocabulary that has developed in this context the words
"the parties" means not only the two Cypriot communities but the
interested governments, including, with special reference to the
present context, Greece. The present move clearly aggravates the
situation by destroying the equality of status between the two
communities that is the essential foundation for the continuance of
negotiations on the wider question.
Membership can only grow out of settlement. Not vice versa.
22. It must be realised that the entry into the European Communities of
a uniquely Greek Cypriot state cannot contribute to the resolution of
the differences between the two communities. Participation in the
European Communities can only grow out of the creation of a new
Republic of Cyprus that fully reflects the proper status and role of
both communities.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter IV
Supplementary Note to the Turkish Cypriot Memorandum of 12 July 1990 on
The Greek Cypriot "Application" for Membership to the European
Communities
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. It will be recalled that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus had
addressed on 12 July 1990 a memorandum to the Council of Ministers of
the European Communities in respect of the Greek Cypriot "application"
of 3 July 1990 for membership.
2. In paragraph 2 of that memorandum, it was pointed out "that there
are still two separate communities in Cyprus, and a legal background
which recognises the separateness and political equality of these two
communities". Furthermore, it was underlined in paragraph 15 of the
said memorandum that the Greek Cypriot application for membership was
not only a constitutional illegitimacy but also occasioned an
international illegitimacy. In view of the fact that the bicommunal
Republic of Cyprus came about as the result of international treaties,
the question of international illegitimacy clearly arises.
3. An examination of the minutes of the preparatory meetings to the
London Conference at the end of which the Zurich and London Agreements
were signed on 19 February 1959 (which minutes were recently released
by the British Government under its "30 year rule") will show that the
parties concerned clearly had in mind the creation of a bicommunal
partnership Republic of Cyprus in which the two constituent communities
of that Republic, namely the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot
communities, were to be politically equal. Not only were all the
documents, including Treaties and Exchange of Notes, signed by the
Representatives of both Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, but also
the extracts given below from the minutes of the preparatory meetings
leave no doubt as to the political equality of the two communities.
4. The minutes of the meeting held in London on 11 February 1959
clearly show that both the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece,
throughout the discussions, had considered it proper that the
representatives of the two communities should participate at all the
stages leading to the establishment of the partnership Republic. For
example, paragraph 49 of the minutes shows that the then Foreign
Minister of Greece, Mr. Averoff, rightly insisted "that it was
indispensable that the conference should be between the three
governments and representatives of the two communities".
5. A careful examination and analysis of the various legal documents
establishing the joint Republic of Cyprus in 1960, and the recently
disclosed minutes of the meetings and conferences leading thereto, can
leave no doubt that the state of affairs created by the documents in
question, including the international Treaties and the Constitution of
the new Republic, is one of political equality and equal constituent
status of the two communities or two peoples.
6. Furthermore, the above-mentioned minutes, also throw light on, and
underline, some of the well-known and indisputable sui generis features
of the 1960 Cyprus settlement:
(a) In the paragraph beginning at the foot of page 3 of the minutes of
the meeting of 13 February 1959, and continuing on page 4, both Mr.
Averoff and Mr. Zorlu stressed, inter alia, that Greece and Turkey,
vis-à-vis Cyprus, were not to be "regarded as Colonial Powers but as
the Cypriots' two mother countries".
(b) In the same paragraph, it is also stressed by the two Foreign
Ministers that "the present settlement would be based not on the
British Government granting a Constitution to the island but on their
signing an international treaty under which they would recognise the
existence of the new Cypriot State together with its Constitution. The
position under international law was that the United Kingdom was
agreeing with Greece and Turkey to guarantee an independent State of
Cyprus and the maintenance of certain essential elements in its
Constitution".
(c) In paragraph 26 of the minutes of 11 February 1959, Mr. Averoff, in
reply to a question by the British Foreign Secretary, drew attention to
a unique feature of the proposed settlement, by pointing out "that in
theory the Republic of Cyprus would be free to conduct foreign policy,
but in practice the mechanism of the veto would ensure that foreign
policy was conducted only in agreement with Greece and Turkey. He
described the new regime as a joint Greek-Turkish adventure".
7. The recently disclosed minutes of the meetings leading to the
establishment of the Republic, also throw some very interesting light
on the point made in paragraph 16 of the Turkish Cypriot memorandum of
12 July 1990. As pointed out in that paragraph, the clear wording of
the second paragraph of Article I of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee
prohibits, inter alia, the participation of the Republic of Cyprus "in
whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state
whatsoever".
8. The following extracts from the minutes of the preparatory meetings
held in London positively identify that the parties to the 1960
settlement had definitely intended to exclude the possibility of the
economic union of Cyprus with any other country and it is interesting
to note that both Mr. Averoff and Mr. Zorlu stressed this point.
(a) In the last complete paragraph on page 4 of the minutes of the
meeting held on 12 February 1950, it is recorded that "M. Averoff and
M. Zorlu said that the maintenance of Commonwealth Preference would not
be excluded. The intention was to exclude more favourable bilateral
agreements between Cyprus and countries other than the Three Powers,
and also to avoid the possibility of either Greece or Turkey securing a
more favourable economic position in Cyprus than the other-of Greece,
for example, establishing a kind of economic enosis".
It is noteworthy that this almost prophetic statement was made at a
time when the European Communities, in their present form, were not yet
in existence.
(b) In the first paragraph of page 2 of the minutes of the meeting held
on 12 February 1959 "M. Zorlu and M. Averoff both made it clear that
there would be no objection to Cypriot membership of international
associations of which both Greece and Turkey were members; e.g. the
Postal Union, and any Free Trade Area".
The well-intentioned desire expressed in paragraph 19 of the Turkish
Cypriot memorandum as to future membership of the EC of a legally
constituted State of Cyprus should be read in the light of this
reference.
9. It should also be noted that paragraph 23 of the Zurich and London
Agreements of 19 February 1959, provides that "The Republic of Cyprus
shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to Great Britain Greece and
Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature".
10. It will be seen, therefore, that the second paragraph of Article I
of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, has been incorporated in that Treaty
in order to give effect to, and to meet the requirements of, the points
referred to above. That is why the need had been felt to refer
specifically in that Article to "economic union" as well as to
"political union".
11. It is for this reason that in paragraph 15 of the Turkish Cypriot
memorandum of 12 July 1990, emphasis was laid, not only on the
"constitutional illegitimacy" of the Greek Cypriot application for full
membership of the EC, but also on the indisputable fact that the Greek
Cypriot application also "occasions an international illegitimacy",
having regard to the international treaties which gave birth to the
1960 state of affairs, as further elucidated by the minutes of the
meetings leading thereto.
3 September 1990.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter V
The Legal Status in International Law of the Turkish Cypriot and the
Greek Cypriot Communities in Cyprus (20 July 1990)
Prof. Monroe Leigh
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I have been asked to give an opinion on the status in international law
of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities in Cyprus.
Negotiations concerning the relationship between the two communities in
Cyprus have for some time been taking place under the auspices of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. After a review of the
historical and legal situation of Cyprus, it is my opinion that the
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot regimes participating in these
negotiations, and the respective communities which they represent, are
presently entitled to exercise equal rights under international law,
including rights of self-determination.
Before considering in detail the legal position of the Greek and
Turkish Cypriots, I wish to make an important point about my use of
terminology in this opinion. I understand that there has been much
discussion between Mr. Denktas, President of the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus, Mr. Vassiliou, President of the (Greek) Republic of
Cyprus, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de
Cuéllar, about how to refer to the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish
Cypriots, both during the course of their negotiations and also in the
new political order which it is their aim to establish in Cyprus. In my
opinion, whether these entities are referred to as communities,
peoples, constituent parties, regimes, or by any other term, has no
determinative or conclusive effect on their present international legal
status.
Any analysis of the position of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
peoples in international law must begin with the establishment on the
Island of Cyprus, in 1960, of the Republic of Cyprus. The government of
the Republic of Cyprus established in accordance with the 1960
Constitution succeeded the British colonial administration as the
legitimate government of the territory comprising the island of Cyprus
on 16 August 1990.
The colony of Cyprus achieved its independence following the
promulgation of three multilateral treaties, which in turn evolved from
an earlier document known as the London Memorandum. Each treaty was
signed by representatives of Britain, Greece, Turkey, and, for the
Republic of Cyprus, by representatives of both the Greek Cypriot
community and the Turkish Cypriot community, in their separate
capacities. In the Treaty of Establishment it was contemplated that the
Republic of Cyprus would have sovereignty over the territory of the
former colony, with the exception of two British military
installations. In the Treaty of Guarantee, the signatories undertook to
recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and
security of the Republic of Cyprus, and "the state of affairs
established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution." Finally, in the
Treaty of Alliance, the signatories undertook to resist any attack or
aggression directed against the independence or territorial integrity
of the Republic of Cyprus.
The Constitution of Cyprus, which entered into force on the same day as
the three treaties, was the product of two prior international
agreements. The "Basic Articles" of the Constitution were first set out
in the Zurich Agreement of 11 February 1959, between Greece and Turkey.
These Basic Articles, which will be discussed below, largely determined
the structure of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, including
the precise manner in which power would be shared by the Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot communities. Representatives of the Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot communities initialled the Agreement. In the Agreed
Measures to Prepare for the New Arrangements in Cyprus, of 19 February
1959, Greece, Turkey and Britain agreed that a Joint Constitutional
Commission composed of representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot peoples, Greece and Turkey would draw up a final Constitution
incorporating the Basic Articles.
The Constitution thus developed effectively incorporated all of these
international agreements. Article 181 of the Constitution declares that
the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance "shall have constitutional
force." Article 182 of the Constitution provides that the Basic
Articles, derived from the Zurich Agreement, "cannot, in any way, be
amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal." Article 185
states that "the territory of the Republic is one and indivisible " and
that total or partial union with any other State or separatist
independence is excluded.
The international agreements by means of which the Republic of Cyprus
was established as a sovereign state and under which the structure of
its government was determined, as well as the Constitution resulting
from them, recognised as binding among the parties the equal status of
the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, and their equal
rights to an effective role in the government of their island and in
determining their political futures. At the outset of the negotiations
leading to the independence of Cyprus, the British Colonial Secretary,
Mr. Lennox-Boyd, declared: "it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's
Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be
effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less
than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances
of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future
status."4 Therefore, in all of these documents rights to determine
their political future were recognised in both the Greek Cypriot
community and the Turkish Cypriot community, and they in turn pledged
to exercise those rights jointly to create a single state governing all
the territory and peoples of Cyprus.
The Basic Articles of the Constitution were carefully drafted to
perpetuate both the recognised equality of the two communities and
their obligation to share the attributes of sovereignty. The very first
article provided that the President of the Republic would be a Greek
Cypriot and the Vice-President would be a Turkish Cypriot. These
officials were to be elected simultaneously but separately by majority
votes of their respective communities. Unlike most presidents and vice
presidents, these two officers shared most essential executive powers.
Most importantly, each was empowered to veto in whole or in part any
law concerning foreign affairs, defence or security. Article 50. The
Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives, the judiciary, the
military and the civil service were likewise divided between the two
communities in agreed proportions, "independent of any statistical
data." Articles 46, 62, 123, 129, 153. In order to be enacted, most
important laws required concurrent majority votes in the delegations of
the two communities to the House of Representatives. Article 78. Taken
together, these articles assured that neither community could take
significant political action at the national level without the other's
concurrence.
Concomitantly, a second group of constitutional articles gave the two
communities extensive powers of self-government. All legislative power
concerning matters of religion, education, personal status, municipal
institutions and affairs was reserved to the exclusive competence of a
Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, each elected by
and ruling over its respective community. Each Communal Chamber could
appoint judges to hear disputes arising out of matters under its
competence and could raise taxes from its own people to support its
separate programmes. Articles 86 and 87. In addition, separately
governed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot municipalities were to be
created in the five largest towns in Cyprus. Article 174.
The Republic of Cyprus was duly declared on 16 August 1960, and
promptly recognised by the international community. The Republic was
admitted to the United Nations on 21 September 1960, became an
independent member of the British Commonwealth on 13 March 1961 and
became the sixteenth member of the Council of Europe on 24 May 1961.
Unfortunately, this carefully balanced and internationally sanctioned
regime lasted only a little over three years. On 30 November 1963,
Archbishop Makarios, the duly-elected Greek Cypriot President of the
Republic, proposed to the Guarantor powers thirteen amendments to the
Cypriot Constitution. s These proposed amendments - six of them to
Basic Articles which were declared immutable by treaty and
constitutional provision - had as their obvious purpose the elimination
of the carefully negotiated balance of power between the two
communities. 6 When adopted these thirteen amendments would decisively
shift the balance of power so as to favour the numerical majority - and
hence assure Greek Cypriot rule.
Civil disorder and armed violence broke out throughout the island. As
an element of this crisis, the Turkish Cypriot members of the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus either withdrew or more likely
were forced from their offices. s Shortly thereafter, the Greek Cypriot
members of the government, purporting to act in legitimate exercise of
their offices, enacted all thirteen amendments. They contended that the
Turkish Cypriots could now only be re-admitted as partners in the
administration if they accepted the amendments passed in their absence.
9 Since the Turkish Cypriot members could not accept these illegal
amendments, they never resumed their seats in the legislature.
The unilateral usurpation of authority by the Greek Cypriots was an
obvious violation of the Constitution, as well as the treaty
obligations accepted by the Greek Cypriot community. The Greek Cypriot
regime had violated Article 182 of the Constitution, which stated that
the Basic Articles "(could) not, in any way, be amended, whether by way
of variation, addition or repeal," and which required concurrent
two-thirds votes of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of
the House of Representatives for all other amendments. Their actions
simultaneously contravened Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee, in
which the Republic of Cyprus undertook "to ensure ... respect for its
Constitution." Both Britain and Turkey issued diplomatic protests
condemning the amendments as "contrary to the Constitution of the
Republic of Cyprus, which is under the safeguard of international
treaties." o These 13 amendments, and the situation dependent upon them
in the area under Greek Cypriot control, cannot therefore be validly
accorded any international recognition.
>From 1964 until the present, the Greek Cypriot regime has claimed to be
the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus, with sovereign
right over the whole Island and all of its inhabitants. There is no
legal basis in international law for such a claim. The formation of a
regime founded on the unilateral usurpation of rights specifically
reserved to the Turkish Cypriot people contravenes the plain language
and obvious intent of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Zurich Agreement and
the 1960 Constitution. The Greek Cypriot regime is neither the
government of the "Republic of Cyprus" originally recognised by the
community of nations in 1960 nor the legitimate successor of that
government. The Greek Cypriot regime therefore had in 1964 and has
today no right under international law to claim that it speaks for the
Turkish Cypriot community or that it wields the sovereign powers that
devolved upon the Republic of Cyprus in 1960.
Whatever the pretensions of the Greek Cypriot regime, the practical
consequence of the events of 1963-1964 was the emergence of parallel
administrative, judicial and legislative organs for each of the two
peoples. Increasingly from 1964 onwards, the Greek Cypriot regime which
purports to be the government of the Republic of Cyprus has not
exercised over the Turkish Cypriot people any of the significant
incidents of sovereign control reserved to the Government of the
Republic of Cyprus in the 1960 Constitution.11 Instead, virtually all
decisions governing the conduct of Turkish Cypriots have been made by
the governmental institutions of the Turkish Cypriot community, and
virtually all decisions concerning the conduct of Greek Cypriots have
been made by the governmental institutions of the Greek Cypriot
community. Physically, the two communities have become increasingly
separated.1z
This practice of parallel self-government and physical separation of
the two Cypriot communities continued after the coup of 15 July 1974,
staged by elements of the Greek Cypriot National Guard but foiled by
the Turkish intervention, which began on 20 July. In the Geneva
Declaration of 30 July 1974, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey
and Britain noted "the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus
of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community
and that of the Turkish Cypriot community." The Turkish interventionl3
could not and did not alter the equal legal status of the two Cypriot
communities, which derived from the earlier treaties and Constitution;
nor was it the origin of the physical separation of the Greek and
Turkish Cypriot peoples, who had been living as separate,
self-governing communities since at least 1964.
The legal rights of the Turkish Cypriot community predate and were
manifested by the proclamation in 1975 of the Turkish Federated State
of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots considered it necessary to "creat [e]
in their own region the legal basis of an order leading to the
establishment of the future independent, Federal Republic of Cyprus"
and reaffirmed that "their final objective is to unite with the Greek
Cypriot community within the framework of a biregional federation."14
This exactly describes the form of the federal system toward which the
leaders of the two communities, meeting under the auspices of the
Secretary General of the United Nations, subsequently agreed to
negotiate in their Four Guidelines of 12 February 1977.
Similarly, the long-delayed decision of the Turkish Cypriot Community
in 1983 to declare itself the independent Republic of Northern Cyprus
cannot lessen the rights to self-determination that the Turkish Cypriot
people share equally with the Greek Cypriot people. For more than 20
years the Turkish Cypriot community has negotiated in good faith with
representatives of the Greek Cypriot community to come to a lasting
political solution to their island's troubles. The fact that the
Turkish Cypriots restrained themselves for 20 years from proclaiming a
separate Turkish Cypriot Republic was, under the circumstances, an act
of continuing forbearance, the exhaustion of which can hardly be
condemned, and stands in sharp contrast to the actions of the Greek
Cypriot community in forcibly dismantling the constitutional Cypriot
regime three years after their specific commitment to preserve it.l6
The events of 1983 are not the source of the Turkish Cypriots' legal
rights to determine their political future and to play an effective
role in the government of the island, nor did they alter those
pre-existing legal rights.
Much consequence has been drawn by some observers, and by the Greek
Cypriot community, from the fact that numerous States have recognised
the Greek Cypriot regime as the sole government of Cyprus. Although
certain minimal criteria of statehood are required by customary
international law, the recognition of governments is, none the less, an
act of an inherently political, rather than legal, character.l7 The
mere fact of international recognition, no matter how widespread,
cannot excuse or confer legitimacy upon the violations of both domestic
constitutional law and international treaty law through which the Greek
Cypriot regime usurped the name as well as the government of the
"Republic of Cyprus," particularly since it never exercised sovereignty
over the whole island.
In any event, the most that can be said is that the international
community has not withdrawn its recognition of the Republic of Cyprus
established in 1960. The recognition of a government cannot
automatically carry with it the recognition of all future governments
of that state.l9 The Greek Cypriot regime has assumed the title
"Republic of Cyprus" but abandoned the substance. Since that time, no
state has affirmatively recognised a "Greek Republic of Cyprus" based
on the amended constitution. All they have done is continue to treat
Cyprus as a single state.
When the subject of statehood, rather than recognition, is examined, it
is apparent that the territory controlled by the Turkish Cypriot
government is at present no less eligible for statehood than its Greek
Cypriot counterpart. The traditional indicia recognised by custormay
international law for the existence of a state are: a permanent
population, a reasonably well-defined territory, an effective
government, and independence from foreign control of decision-making,
particularly regarding relations with other states.2o "An entity that
satisfies [these] requirements... is a state whether or not its
statehood is formally recognised by other states."21
Since the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus satisfies all the formal
legal prerequisites for statehood,22 it is clear that international law
does not forbid its recognition by other states.23
Even though resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations
have condemned or regretted certain events that have taken place on
Cyprus, including the Turkish Cypriots' declaration of independence,
the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly have
consistently recognised that, in the context of negotiations between
the two Cypriot communities, they should and do bargain ` `on an equal
footing."24 The Secretary-General has for many years offered his good
offices to the two Cypriot communities to foster negotiations toward a
mutually satisfactory settlement. Under his auspices, Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot representatives have entered into several interim
agreements indicating that neither community enjoys any special status
relative to the other.2s In a recent resolution the Security Council
reiterated its call for the two communities to "reach freely a mutually
acceptable solution."26 Thus while the United Nations has not
recognised the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by admitting it to
membership, it has always accepted the Turkish Cypriot community's
right to determine its political future not only in conjunction with
but also on an equal footing with the Greek Cypriot community.
Putting aside the talisman of recognition, it is clear that neither of
the governments existing on the Island is qualified to assert that it
is the government of the "Republic of Cyprus." But while the treaties
and agreements of 1959-1960 cannot legally be disregarded by one party
in its own interest, they can surely be replaced by the assent of both
parties to a new, mutually satisfactory political order. Thus,
sovereignty would devolve fully and legitimately o any new Cypriot
government if the successor state or states were the product of a
concurrent exercise of self-determination by the two communities
superseding the joint exercise through which the 1960 Republic was
established.27
In summary, the Turkish Cypriot community has a legal right to
negotiate from a status of equality with the Greek Cypriot community in
the current attempt, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to
reach a workable political solution for the unfortunate situation in
Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot people has never had the right to assert
sovereignty over the Turkish Cypriot people without their consent. Nor,
from the moment the Greek Cypriots unilaterally rejected the
constitutional basis on which the legitimacy of the Cypriot government
rested in international law, has the Greek Cypriot regime had any right
to assert sovereignty over the island. Since that time, practical
necessity has created two governments on Cyprus. The rights of the
peoples of the two communities to determine their own political futures
have remained unchanged and in all respects are equal. The nations of
the world, through resolutions of the Security Council and General
Assembly of the United Nations, have recognised and consistently
reaffirmed these rights, as have the two communities themselves in
their interim negotiated agreements. Under these circumstances,
international law does not sanction differential treatment of the two
communities in the current negotiations or in any resulting settlement.
If these efforts to establish a federal government of Cyprus-with the
equal participation and mutual acceptance of the two peoples should
fail, each regime the Turkish Cypriot no less than the Greek
Cypriot-would be eligible for recognition as an independent state. Such
recognition by other states would not then infringe any principle of
international law.
FOOTNOTE
Sovereignty was formally passed from Britain to the Republic of Cyprus
by the Cyprus Act, 1960, 8 and 9 Elia. II, c. 52.
The London Memorandum of 19 February 1959 was a collection of
agreements signed by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, Greece and
Turkey "as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the
problem of Cyprus". These agreements included texts for the Treaties of
Guarantee and Alliance (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 382 (1960),
No. 5475 and ibid., vol. 397 (1961), No. 5712), the "Basic Structure of
the Republic of Cyprus" (an outline of the essential provisions of the
anticipated Cypriot Constitution), and declarations by representatives
of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities accepting the
other documents "as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of
the problem of Cyprus."
Great Britain was not a signatory to the Treaty of Alliance.
562 Parliamentary Debate, House of Commons (5th ser.) 1267-68 (1956).
He explained that in the event of any exercise of self-determination in
the colony, "I cannot see how it is anything other than logical to
grant a community with such close interests with Turkey, and only 40
miles away, the same rights as we are prepared to recognise should go
to the Greek community." See ibid., pp.1269-70. "In other words," he
said, "Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of
self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition
among the eventual options." See ibid., pp.1267-68. For a further
illustration of this point of view, see Blay, "Self-Determination in
Cyprus: The New Dimensions of an Old Conflict", 10 Australian Yearbook
of International Law 67, 71-72 (1984) (describing this speech as
illustrative of an "implied con.cept of double self-determination for
Cyprus").
The text of these proposed amendments is most conveniently set out in
Ehrlich, "Cyprus, the `Warlike Isle': Origins and Elements of the
Current Crisis",18 Stanford Law Review 1021, 1043, n. 95 (1966).
That the amendments were in fact intended to eliminate the
constitutional balance of power has received confirmation in published
accounts of the "Akritas Plan". The Akritas Plan was first publicised
in the Greek Cypriot newspaper Patris on 21 April 1966. According to J.
Reddaway, this plan was a blueprint for securing Greek dominance and
suggests that one of the goals of the amendments was to ensure the
withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from their role in the government
established by the Constitution. J. Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, pp.
133-34 (1986). While the authenticity of the plan has been questioned,
Glafkos Clerides, then Greek Cypriot President of the House of
Representatives, confirmed it as genuine in an interview with Richard
Patrich in 1971. R. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus
Conflict (1976).
The government of Turkey immediately rejected the proposal. The Times
(London), 7 December 1963, p. 7. Archbishop Makarios refused to accept
any rejection by the Turkish Cypriots. The Times (London), 24 December
1963, p. 6.
Exactly how the Turkish Cypriot members of the government were removed
is a matter of historical dispute. Some sources claim that they
voluntarily walked out in protest. See, e.g., Blay, supra note 4, p. 77
(` `When the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government in the
1963-1964 crisis..."); Evivriades, "The Legal Dimension of the Cyprus
Conflict", 10 Texas International Law Journal 227, 247 (1975) ("The
Turkish Cypriots, alleging a preconceived Greek plan for their
extermination, withdrew from the government and barricaded themselves
in their own neighbour hoods, refusing to allow intercourse with the
Greek Cypriots unless their constitutional rights were strictly
observed."). Others claim that they were forcibly removed from their
offices by the Greek Cypriots. See, e.g., M. Tamkoc, The Turkish
Cypriot State: The Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination 74
(1988) ("This was a peculiar, probably a unique, takeover of the
government of a State, because the governing leadership dislodged their
colleagues from office by brute force, colleagues who had as much right
as they to manage the affairs of a functionally federated State."); N.
Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus 11 (2nd ed. 1984) ("All Turkish Cypriots were
physically barred from taking part in the administration of the
Island."). Still other sources admit that they do not know the truth.
See, e.g., Wolfe, "Cyprus: International law and the Prospects for
Settlement", 84 Proceedings of the American Society of International
Law 107,109 (1984) (' `Turkish Cypriot leaders withdrew or were forced
from government..."). Whatever the reason for their physical absence,
it is clear that they did not formally resign their offices. Dr.
Kutchuk continued to identify himself as the Vice-President of the
Republic of Cyprus, although in 1965 the "Government... stated that it
no longer recognised Dr. [Kutchuk] in his capacity as Vice-President."
See report of the Secretary General on recent developments in Cyprus
(S/6569, para. 10) (29 July 1965).
See report of the Secretary-General on recent developments in Cyprus
(S/6569, para.11) (29 July 1965) (noting that Mr. Clerides, President
of the House of Representatives, "made it plain [to Turkish Cypriot
members seeking readmission to the House] that, unless [the Turkish
Cypriots agreed to four preconditions, including acceptance of laws
passed in their absence abolishing the constitutional requirement of
separate majorities], he would not permit the Turkish Cypriot members
to attend the House. Mr. Clerides also stated that the constitutional
provisions concerning promulgation of the laws by the President and the
Vice-President were no longer applicable. He subsequently stated that
in his opinion the Turkish Cypriot members had no legal standing any
more in the House.").
Note dated 27 July 1965, from the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus (concerning the amendment to the
electoral law abolishing separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot electoral
rolls). See note dated 24 July 1965 from the British High Commission in
Cyprus to the Government of Cyprus (objecting to the passage of the law
providing for elections without divided electoral rolls by stating that
"[a]s one of the Guarantor Powers the British Government protests
against this action which is in breach of basic articles of the
Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.". These diplomatic notes and
the Greek Cypriot replies rejecting both notes are reprinted in United
Nations document S/6569/Add. 1 (5 August 1965).
See report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in
Cyprus (S/6228, para. 203) (11 March 1965) (noting the "inaccessibility
of the areas inhabited entirely by Turkish Cypriots to the Government's
law-enforcing authorities and officials. The organs of the State are
thus powerless in these areas to administer justice."). For example,
this government has never collected any taxes from the Turkish Cypriot
community. See ibid., paras. 178-181 (describing the Turkish Communal
Chamber's withdrawal of authority from the Cyprus Inland Revenue
Department to collect the Chamber's income tax from Turkish Cypriots,
effective 18 February 1965). Likewise, its courts have not judged cases
involving Turkish Cypriots. See ibid., para. 193 (In Nicosia "[t]he
work of the courts, however, has been almost entirely confined to those
cases where the parties involved are Greek Cypriots. Only Greek Cypriot
litigants and Greek Cypriot counsel have attended the courts to
transact business.").
This physical separation began well before the 1974 Turkish
intervention. See report of the Secretary-General to the Security
Council on United Nations Operations in Cyprus (S/5950, paras. 29-30)
(10 September 1964) (describing the creation of Turkish Cypriot
enclaves after December 1963, especially concentrated in Nicosia and
its northern suburbs, a narrow strip astride the road from these
suburbs to Kyrenia, the town of Louroujina, the Lefka region and two
beachheads at Kokkina and Limnitis); report of the Secretary-General on
recent developments in Cyprus (S/6569 and Add. 1 and 2) (29 July 1965)
(describing a reference made by Mr. Clerides, the Greek Cypriot
President of the House of Representatives, to "Turkish [Cypriot]
areas").
Although legal commentators disagree on the legitimacy under
international law of the extension of the Turkish intervention in
August of 1974, it remains a fact that the situation was under close
scruting by the Security Council and that body did not at any point
determine that the Turkish action was a breach of the peace or an act
of aggression. The furthest that the Council went was to express
concern at the situation resulting from "military operations" (a term
broad enough to include the actions of Greek as well as Turkish forces)
"which constituted a most serious threat to peace and security in the
Eastern Mediterranean area" and to record "its formal disapproval of
unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus"
(again a term which, being used in the plural, was wide enough to cover
Greek no less than Turkish military action). United Nations Security
Council resolution 360 (1974). In any case, the important point is that
the Turkish intervention is not the source of the Turkish Cypriots'
rights to determine their political future. Nor should the Turkish
Cypriot people be chargeable with responsibility for the actions of the
government of Turkey in 1974 under its interpretation of its
responsibilities as a Guarantor Power under the 1960 treaty.
S/11624, annex II (1975) (entitled "Statement by Vice-President Denktas
dated 13 February 1975").
See S/12323. Guideline 1 reads: "We are seeking an independent,
non-aligned bi-communal Federal Republic." Guideline 2 anticipated that
there would be "territory under the administration of each community."
Indeed, the parliamentary resolution declaring the foundation of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus contained specific assurances that
the "proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not
hinder the two equal Peoples and their administrations from
establishing a new partnership within the framework of a genuine
federation". Declaration of Independence and Resolution Adopted by the
Turkish Cypriot Parliament on 15 November 1983, para. 22 (b).
United States courts have consistently ruled that whether a government
should be recognised is a political question whose determination is
within the exclusive prerogative of the Executive branch. Banco
Nacional de Cuba ve. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964); National City
Bank of New York ve. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955). See
Restatement No. 204 ("Under the Constitution of the United States, the
President has exclusive authority to recognise or not to recognise a
foreign state or government, and to maintain or not to maintain
diplomatic relations with a foreign government."). International legal
scholars likewise agree that recognition is a political act. See, e.g.,
B. Jankovic, Public International I.aw 100 (1984) (translation from the
5th Serbocroation edition by M. and B. Milosavljevic) ("It is obvious
that in granting individual recognition states are motivated by their
own political interests, and that recognition is basically a political
act."); I. Brownlie, Principles of International Law 94 (3d ed. 1979)
(` `Recognition, as a public act of state, is an optional and political
act and there is no legal duty in this regard."); Akehurst, A Modern
Introduction to International Law 63 (3d ed. 1977); G. von Glahn, Law
Among Nations 91 (3d ed. 1976); J. Brierly, Law of Nations 140 (óth
ed., Waldock, 1963).
See J. Erierly, supra note 16, p.147 ("the recognising state is not
concerned with the question whether the state of things which it is
recognising is legal by the national law of another state"); id.
pp.148-49 ("On the declaratory view of the nature of recognition its
granting or withholding does not, so far as international law is
concerned, affect the status in law of the state or government to which
it is accorded or from which it is withheld.").
Recognition of a State and recognition of a particular governmental
regime are two different things. See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law 95 (3rd ed. 1979) ("Non-recognition of a particular
regime is not necessarily a determination that the state represented by
that regime does not qualify for statehood."); Restatement No. 203,
comment a (while a state cannot recognise a regime as a government
without thereby accepting the statehood of the entity which the regime
claims to be governing.
"[a] state can, however, recognise or treat an entity as a state while
denying that a particular regime as the government of another state
without derecognising the state it governs and without formally
recognising any other government. Restatement No. 203, comment f.
See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 26
December 1933, 165 League of Nations Treaty Series 19; Restatement No.
201 and comments a-e; I. Brownlie, supra note 16, pp. 74-75.
Restatement No. 202. See also J. Crawford, The Creation of States in
International Law 23 (1979) (". , . in principle the denial of
recognition to an entity which otherwise qualifies as a State cannot
entitle the non recognising States to act as if the entity in question
was not a State."); J. Brierly, Law of Nations 139 (óth ed., Waldock,
1963) ("A state may exist without being recognized, and if it does
exist in fact, then, whether or not it has been formally recognised by
other states, it has a right to be treated by them as a state.").
The Turkish Cypriot community has established a republican government
exercising control over the northern third of the island of Cyprus.
Although Turkish troops remain on Cypriot soil, the continuing presence
of troops from a friendly state for the purpose of preserving the
rights of the Turkish Cypriot people under the 1960 treaties is in no
way inconsistent with statehood. The fact that the Turkish intervention
was made pursuant to the terms of the 1960 treaties makes the case even
stronger.
"In most instances, the issue [whether a state should not be recognised
because it acquired the attributes of statehood through the threat or
use of force in violation of the United Nations Charter] is not subject
to authoritative determination" and states,
"particularly after a lapse of time, have been willing to accept a fait
accompli." Restatement No. 202, Reporter's Note 5. For example, the
international community was divided in its opinion on the legality of
India's intervention in Bangladesh, but states have generally
recognised Bangladesh as a state and Bangladesh has been admitted to
the United Nations. Id. See infra, text accompanying note 24.
Similarly, Brierly has stated that "whether or not a new state has
actually begun to exist is a pure question of fact; and as
international law does not provide any machinery for an authoritative
declaration on this question, it is one which every other state must
answer for itself as best it can" J. Brierly, supra note 16, p. 137.
See, for example the following documents: United Nations General
Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) (1976) (considering the "constitutional
system of the Republic of Cyprus [to concern] the Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot communities, "commending" the contacts and negotiations
taking place on an equal footing... between the representatives of the
two communities and call[ing] for their continuation"); United Nations
Security Council resolution 649 (1990) (calling on the leaders of the
two communities "to reach freely a mutually acceptable solution" and
"to cooperate, on an equal footing, with the Secretary-General in
completing" an outline of such a solution); General Assembly resolution
34/30 (1979) (calling for the resumption of the negotiations "between
the representatives of the two communities, to be conducted freely on
an equal footing"); General Assembly resolution 3395 (XXX) (1975)
(same). See also "Opening statement delivered by the Secretary-General
on Monday, 26 February 1990, at 12.15 p.m.", in report of the
Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus (S/21183,
annex 1) (8 March 1990) ("The mandate given to me by the Security
Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with the two
communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of the
two communities in this process is on an equal footing. The solution
that is being sought is thus one that must be decided upon by, and must
be acceptable to, both communities.").
See the following documents: Four Guidelines of 12 February 1977 (See
S/12323) (declaring the goal of a bi-communal Federal Republic and
recognising that the two communities will administer different
territories); Ten-Point Agreement of 19 May 1979 (See A/34/620 and
Corr. 1, annex V, para. 2) (reaffirming the 1977 Guidelines.)
United Nations Security Council resolution 649 (1990) (calling for a
solution "providing for the establishment of a federation that will be
bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as
regards the territorial aspects in line with the present resolution and
the [] 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements").
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that treaties can
be terminated by mutual consent of the parties. Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, art. 54, 1155 United Nations Treaty
Series 331 (1969) ("The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a
party may take place:. . (b) at any time by consent of all the parties
after consultation with the other contracting States."). At some point
in the future, however, it may become apparent that no agreement on a
successor regime can be reached and that further negotiations would be
futile. Should this ever be the case, the only workable solution-one
which international law would not, at that point, forbid-might be
partition of the island, a solution considered by the British Colonial
Secretary in 1956. See discussion supra, note 4.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UN Security Council Resolution 649 of 12 March 1990
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Security Council,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 March 1990
(S/21183) on the recent meeting between the leaders of the two
communities in Cyprus and on his assessment of the current situation,
Recalling its relevant resolutions on Cyprus,
Recalling the statement of the President of the Security Council of 22
February 1990 (S/21160) calling upon the leaders of the two communities
to demonstrate the necessary goodwill and flexibility and to cooperate
with the Secretary-General so that the talks will result in a major
step forward toward the resolution of the Cyprus problem,
Expressing its regret that, in the more than 25 years since the
establishment of UNFICYP, it has not been possible to achieve a
negotiated settlement of all aspects of the Cyprus problem,
Concerned that at the recent meeting in New York it has not been
possible to achieve results in arriving at an agreed outline of an
overall agreement,
1. Reaffirms in particular its resolution 367 (1975) as well as its
support for the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the leaders
of the two communities in which they pledged themselves to establish a
bi-communal Federal Republic of Cyprus that will safeguard its
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment, and
exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form
of partition or secession;
2. Expresses its full support for the current effort of the Secretary
General in carrying out his mission of good offices concerning Cyprus;
3. Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their
efforts to reach freely a mutually acceptable solution providing for
the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards
the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial
aspects in line with the present resolution and their 1977 and 1979
high-level agreements, and to cooperate, on an equal footing, with the
Secretary General in completing, in the first instance and on an urgent
basis, an outline of an overall agreement, as agreed in June 1989;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices
in order to achieve the earliest possible progress and, toward this
end, to assist the two communities by making suggestions to facilitate
the discussions;
5. Calls on the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could
aggravate the situation;
6. Decides to remain actively seized of the situation and the current
effort;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council in his report
due by 31 May 1990 of the progress made in resuming the intensive talks
and in developing an agreed outline of an overall agreement in line
with the present resolution.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
markt...@yahoo.com
The sub-human anti-Turkish hatred fabricators, murderers of innocent
and defenceless Turks and thugs of Armenian/Greek/PKK/KADEK
anti-Turkish Hatred Inc never stop in their relentless dreams of
massacring all Turks everywhere in the World. The sub-human
Greek/Armenian/PKK/KADEK terrorists think repeating anti-Turkish hate
propaganda over and over legitimize their rape, torture and murder of
innocent and defenceless Turkish human beings.
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/eh07/
Cyprus which was ruled by different suzerains, but which never in its
entire history came under Greek rule, was conquered by the Ottomans in
1571 and ruled by them until 1878. Under Ottoman rule the Turks and
Greeks of Cyprus lived in peace and harmony, despite their differences
in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, culture and communal
traditions. Unlike the Venetians, who were the previous rulers of
Cyprus, Ottoman Empire enabled the Greek Cypriot population to flourish
in all fields. In 1878, Great Britain assumed the provisional
administration of Cyprus. In 1914, when the Ottoman Empire entered the
First World War, Cyprus was unilaterally annexed by Great Britain.
Turkey formally recognized this annexation with the signing of the
Peace Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.
Although the Turks and Greeks of Cyprus peacefully co-existed under the
Ottoman administration, their relationship began to deteriorate
following the take-over of the island by Great Britain. Under British
rule, the Greek-Orthodox Church campaigned for the union of Cyprus with
Greece (Enosis). Starting from the mid-1950s, this campaign was given
support by Greece. EOKA was established as an underground terrorist
organization to achieve this aim. Thus, the Enosis movement took a turn
for violence, ostensibly against the British, but in fact with the
objective of uniting the island with Greece. EOKA violence claimed
British and Turkish Cypriot lives. From 1955 to 1958 Turkish Cypriots
were driven away from mixed villages and their houses were burnt down.
Greek and the Greek Cypriot coercion, killing and intimidation,
however, failed to achieve its aims. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots
strongly opposed Enosis. Geopolitically, Cyprus was of great importance
for the national security of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots refused to
accept Greek dominance and regarded Enosis as neo-colonialism. Britain,
as the colonial power, also resisted Enosis and declared that the
Turkish and Greek Cypriots were equally entitled to freely determine
their own future. In the meantime, Greece made several attempts to
exploit the UN as a means of realizing Enosis. However, the UN General
Assembly did not support Greek demands designed to achieve annexation
under the guise of self-determination, but urged a peaceful and just
solution among the parties concerned.
++++++++++++++
After causing much suffering to achieve Enosis, the Greek government
realized that neither Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot people, nor Great
Britain or the UN would consent to the union of Cyprus with Greece. In
shaping the destiny of Cyprus, a negotiated settlement remained to be
the only way. In the late 1950s the world was undergoing rapid change
and the colonies were becoming independent one after another. Britain
expressed its readiness to transfer sovereignty jointly to the Turkish
and Greek Cypriot peoples for the creation of an independent,
partnership state in Cyprus. To achieve this, Britain insisted on
retaining sovereign bases in Cyprus and safeguarding the rights of both
Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Besides, Britain maintained that she should
have the right to intervene along with Turkey and Greece, if there was
an attempt to alter the agreed state of affairs.
Against this background, talks were initiated between the Turkish and
Greek governments, with the knowledge of the two sides in Cyprus. These
talks led to the Zurich Agreement of 1959 which soon afterwards was
endorsed in London between five parties, namely, Turkey, Greece, United
Kingdom, Dr. Küçük on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot people, and
Archbishop Makarios on behalf of the Greek Cypriot people. On this
basis, the constitution of 1960 was negotiated and the Treaties of
Guarantee, Alliance and Establishment were concluded. When the
five-party Treaties were signed, Great Britain transferred sovereignty
to the two peoples on the island. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus came
into being as an independent partnership state.
These arrangements were based on the equality and partnership of the
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in the independence and the
sovereignty of the island. The legitimacy of the 1960 partnership
Republic lay in the joint presence and effective participation of both
sides in all the organs of the state. Neither party had the right to
rule the other, nor could one of the partners claim to be the
government of the other. Basic articles of the constitution and the
Treaties safeguarded the rights of the two equal peoples.
In addition to the internal balance thus created between the two
constituent peoples of Cyprus, the Treaties also established an
external balance between the two respective motherlands. In this
connection, Turkey and Greece would not be able to obtain a more
favorable political or economic position than the other over Cyprus. As
part of these balances the 1960 Agreements prohibited the membership of
Cyprus in any international organization or pacts of Alliance in which
both Turkey and Greece were not members.
Enosis and partition were expressly prohibited. Since the two peoples
had special and close ties with their motherlands, both Turkey and
Greece were given the right to station military contingents in the
island. Turkey, Britain and Greece undertook to guarantee this state of
affairs. Finally, as a result of the Cyprus Agreements, Britain
retained sovereignty over two military bases.
+++++++++++++++++++
As established in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was not a unitary state
but a political partnership. It was hoped that the Turkish Cypriots and
the Greek Cypriots, as the two peoples of the island and new partners,
would be able to live peacefully together. But this expectation was not
fulfilled. The Greek Cypriots and Greece did not give up their
ambitions and designs. They regarded independence merely as a
springboard for annexation of the island to Greece. The Greek Cypriot
leadership continued to campaign for this "objective" and sought to
unlawfully bring about constitutional amendments which would negate the
partnership status of the Turkish Cypriots. This would clear the way
for annexation by creating in effect a Greek Cypriot state, with a
Turkish minority.
Since the pursuit of such goals were prohibited under the constitution
and the guarantee system of 1960, they could only be achieved by
defying and destroying the legitimate order. This meant the use of
force to overtake the joint-State and to force the other partner into
submission. Greek Cypriot and Greek designs and the use of force to
achieve their unlawful aims led to the collapse of the partnership
system. As a result of the Greek Cypriot armed attacks, the bi-national
Republic, as envisaged in the international Treaties, ceased to exist
in December 1963. The breakaway Greek Cypriot wing of the partnership
state usurped the title of " Government of Cyprus". The Turkish
Cypriots who never accepted this seizure of power, began to set up a
Turkish Administration to run their own affairs.
+++++++++++++++++
Starting in December 1963, for the next eleven years the Turkish
Cypriots had to seek survival in violent and traumatic conditions.
Nearly 30,000 Turkish Cypriots who were forced out from their homes
became refugees in enclaves which corresponded to a mere 3% of the
territory of Cyprus. In these enclaves the Turkish Cypriot people lived
under what the UN Secretary-General called, in his reports to the
Security Council, "veritable siege", with no freedom of movement and
deprived of basic necessities to survive. The Greek Cypriots, with
Greek military assistance, raided isolated Turkish villages and
attacked the Turkish Cypriot quarters of the different towns. The armed
campaign led to the destruction of 103 Turkish Cypriot villages along
with all the mosques and holy places. Hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were
murdered, wounded and taken as hostages. In the course of the violence
that erupted in 1963, over 200 Turkish Cypriots went missing. Due to
immense human suffering, thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled from the
island. Those who managed to survive were deprived of their salaries,
their land, and their other means of livelihood. The Security Council
discussed the situation and decided to dispatch a UN peace-keeping
force. This force which was stationed in the island in March 1964 could
not however secure the return to normal conditions since power was
already in the Greek Cypriot hands.
As part of the Enosis strategy, Greece had secretly sent 20,000 troops
to the island in collaboration with the Greek Cypriot leadership. A
military junta had assumed power in Greece and differences developed
between the junta and the Greek Cypriot leadership over the method of
achieving annexation. On 15 July 1974, a coup d'etat took place in
Cyprus, planned and executed by Greece, as a short-cut to Enosis. A
puppet Greek Cypriot government was formed under a Greek Cypriot
gunman. The coup staged by the military junta in Athens resulted in
further bloodshed in the form of massacres of Turkish Cypriots and
through clashes between anti- and pro-coup Greek Cypriot factions.
During the events of 1974 more Turkish Cypriots went missing who remain
unaccounted for until today. The Greek Cypriot leader Makarois, barely
managing to escape, appeared on 19 July 1974 in the Security Council to
accuse Greece of an act of invasion and occupation.
+++++++++=
After consultations with Britain which did not want to take joint
action under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey intervened as a guarantor
power on 20 July 1974 in conformity with its treaty rights and
obligations. The Turkish intervention blocked the way to the annexation
of the island by Greece, stopped the persecution of the Turkish
Cypriots and brought peace to Cyprus. The conditions became ripe for a
negotiated settlement for the first time since December 1963.
In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot people re-organized itself as a
federated state in the hope that this would facilitate a federal
settlement. The UN Secretary-General was entrusted with a mission of
good offices by the Security Council in order to bring the two sides
together and facilitate their negotiations on an equal footing. On 2
August 1975, at the third round of the Vienna talks an agreement was
reached between the two sides, for the voluntary regrouping of
populations. The agreement made it possible for the Turkish and Greek
Cypriots to live in two geographically separate areas and under their
own administrations. Following 1974, the new set of circumstances
contributed to the prosperity of the island. Democracy flourished in
both parts of Cyprus.
The high-level agreement of 1977 between the two sides in Cyprus set
the goal as the establishment of a new partnership in the form of a
bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. Under the auspices of successive UN
Secretaries-General, a number of parameters such as political equality,
bi-zonality, bi-communality, property exchange, the continuation of the
Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance and the tackling of EU membership
after a settlement emerged as a framework for a solution. Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriot side strived for a federation. They maintained that
partnership and reconciliation in the island can only be achieved by
safeguarding the sovereign equality of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots
and the balance between two motherlands vis-a-vis Cyprus.
>From 1974 onwards, in defiance of the rule of law and the established
principle that federations can only be built between equal partners,
the Greek Cypriot side continued with its sovereignty claims over the
entire island. This prompted the Turkish Cypriot side to assert its
rights by proclaiming the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in
1983.
But the Turkish Cypriot side continued to participate in the UN process
and to contribute to the efforts for the achievement of a federal
settlement. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot administration paid
only lip-service to the internationally supported proposal of
federation and dragged its feet in the talks that were being held under
the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. The course which the Greek
Cypriot side followed, namely its rejection of the 1985-86 UN Draft
Framework Agreements, the 1992 UN Set of Ideas and the 1994 Confidence
Building Measures, demonstrated that it was out to ignore the framework
established through the UN process. Indeed, the defiance against the
basic parameters for a solution clearly show that the Greek Cypriot
side never foresaw a bi-zonal federal system and that it totally
rejects the idea of equal partnership with the Turkish Cypriot side.
+++++++++++++++++++
After consultations with Britain which did not want to take joint
action under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey intervened as a guarantor
power on 20 July 1974 in conformity with its treaty rights and
obligations. The Turkish intervention blocked the way to the annexation
of the island by Greece, stopped the persecution of the Turkish
Cypriots and brought peace to Cyprus. The conditions became ripe for a
negotiated settlement for the first time since December 1963.
In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot people re-organized itself as a
federated state in the hope that this would facilitate a federal
settlement. The UN Secretary-General was entrusted with a mission of
good offices by the Security Council in order to bring the two sides
together and facilitate their negotiations on an equal footing. On 2
August 1975, at the third round of the Vienna talks an agreement was
reached between the two sides, for the voluntary regrouping of
populations. The agreement made it possible for the Turkish and Greek
Cypriots to live in two geographically separate areas and under their
own administrations. Following 1974, the new set of circumstances
contributed to the prosperity of the island. Democracy flourished in
both parts of Cyprus.
The high-level agreement of 1977 between the two sides in Cyprus set
the goal as the establishment of a new partnership in the form of a
bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. Under the auspices of successive UN
Secretaries-General, a number of parameters such as political equality,
bi-zonality, bi-communality, property exchange, the continuation of the
Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance and the tackling of EU membership
after a settlement emerged as a framework for a solution. Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriot side strived for a federation. They maintained that
partnership and reconciliation in the island can only be achieved by
safeguarding the sovereign equality of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots
and the balance between two motherlands vis-a-vis Cyprus.
>From 1974 onwards, in defiance of the rule of law and the established
principle that federations can only be built between equal partners,
the Greek Cypriot side continued with its sovereignty claims over the
entire island. This prompted the Turkish Cypriot side to assert its
rights by proclaiming the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in
1983.
But the Turkish Cypriot side continued to participate in the UN process
and to contribute to the efforts for the achievement of a federal
settlement. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot administration paid
only lip-service to the internationally supported proposal of
federation and dragged its feet in the talks that were being held under
the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. The course which the Greek
Cypriot side followed, namely its rejection of the 1985-86 UN Draft
Framework Agreements, the 1992 UN Set of Ideas and the 1994 Confidence
Building Measures, demonstrated that it was out to ignore the framework
established through the UN process. Indeed, the defiance against the
basic parameters for a solution clearly show that the Greek Cypriot
side never foresaw a bi-zonal federal system and that it totally
rejects the idea of equal partnership with the Turkish Cypriot side.
+++++++++++++++++++++++
The international community is trying to help the two parties to reach
a negotiated settlement ever since the outbreak of the Cyprus conflict
in 1963. There is more than one source of division in Cyprus. But the
most crucial one is the differences in the aspirations of the two
sides. Soon after the creation of the bi-national State of Cyprus in
1960, the Greek Cypriots attempted to eliminate the Turkish Cypriots
through ethnic cleansing in order to clear the way for Enosis. They
destroyed the 1960 order and turned the joint state into a Greek
Cypriot entity by usurping the title of "Government of Cyprus".
However, in the face of the strong resistance of the Turkish Cypriots
and the stance of Turkey, the Greek/Greek Cypriot camp failed to
realize their design of "Hellenizing" Cyprus.
In the period following 1974 it became clear that the Greek Cypriots
and Greece have not given up their ambitions of achieving dominance
over Cyprus. Despite the bitter events from 1963 to 1974, the Greek
Cypriot administration, instigated by Greece, increased its military
build-up and provocative activities in the island. The armament efforts
were stepped up under the so-called " joint military doctrine".
Sophisticated weapon systems were introduced into the Greek Cypriot
military arsenal. Air and naval bases for the use of Greece were
constructed. All these military activities have further raised tensions
and deepened the existing mistrust in Cyprus. In the past, Greek
Cypriot arms build-up has only brought about suffering. Then why does
it continue? The Greek Cypriot leadership has made it clear that they
would never give up the cause of Hellenizing Cyprus and that use of
force would not be excluded in attaining this goal.
On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot side has expressed its readiness
for a partnership agreement which safeguards the sovereign equality of
the two sides and the balance between Turkey and Greece. But the Greek
Cypriots have shown that they do not want a partnership on this basis.
And why should they? They have not destroyed the 1960 order in order to
share power with the Turkish Cypriots in a new partnership. The Turks
want to live as equals. The Greeks want dominance and power over the
Turks.
Today, the two peoples of Cyprus are enjoying conditions of peace and
tranquility. But the bitter events from 1963 to 1974 are not forgotten.
The humanitarian tragedy of the Bosnians and the Kosovars recall the
sufferings endured by the Turks of Cyprus. The conflict in Kosovo has
also unveiled the open support of the Greek Cypriot administration to
the aggressor. The Greek Cypriot community and the church have
mobilized their means for the Serbs.
markt...@yahoo.com
The sub-human anti-Turkish hatred fabricators, murderers of innocent
and defenceless Turks and thugs of Armenian/Greek/PKK/KADEK
anti-Turkish Hatred Inc., with a veracious appetite for innocent
Turkish blood, never stop in their relentless dreams of massacring all
Turks everywhere in the World. The sub-human Greek/Armenian/PKK/KADEK
terrorists think repeating anti-Turkish hate propaganda over and over
legitimize their rape, torture and murder of innocent and defenceless
Turkish human beings.
++++++++++++++++++
++++++++++++++++++
http://faculty.menlo.edu:8080/~jhiggins/tcvoices/trnchist/trnccr60.html
The Independence Years: 1960 - 1963.
During the 1960 - 1963 period, the Greek Cypriot leadership, through
numerous statements exposed their ulterior motives by stating that they
viewed independence as a stepping stone to ENOSIS (Union of Cyprus with
Greece):
Makarios: "Independence was not the aim and purpose of the EOKA
struggle. Foreign factors have prevented the achievement of the
national goal, but this should not be a cause for sorrow. New bastions
have been conquered and from this the Greek Cypriots will march on to
complete the final victory (ENOSIS)."
16.08.1960
Greek Cypriot Press
Makarios: ". . . Until this small community that forms part of the
Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is
expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA cannot be considered as
terminated."
04.09.1962
Panayia Village
Makarios: "It is true that the goal of our struggle is to annex Cyprus
to Greece."
05.09.1963
Interview Published
in Uusi Suomi, Stockholm
Makarios: "If I have any ambition, it is to link my name with the union
of Cyprus with Greece. The expansion of Greece's boundaries up to the
shores of North Africa, through ENOSIS."
Interview with "Apoyevmatini"
September 8th, 1964
"The assertion by Mr. Christides (May 10, 1999) that there was no
ethnic cleansing or attempted genocide of Turkish Cypriots by Greek
Cypriots is ridiculous. Until influential Greek Cypriots come to terms
with the appalling behavior of their community toward the smaller
Turkish Cypriot community and stop trying to persuade themselves and
the world that each side was as much to blame as the other, there will
be no reconciliation in Cyprus."
Michael Stephen, British
Parliamentarian (1992-97)
"Makarios's central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so
that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish
Cypriots. Obviously we would never permit that. "The fact is, however,
that neither the United Nations, nor anyone, other than Turkey ever
took effective action to prevent it."
George Ball
American
Undersecretary of State
"Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent on a policy of genocide."
the Washington Post, Feb. 17,
196
"I was convinced that if Archbishop Makarios could not bring himself to
treat the Turkish Cypriots as human beings he was inviting the invasion
and partition of the island."
Sir Alec
Douglas-Home
Former British
Prime Minister
On July 28, 1960 Makarios, the Greek Cypriot president, said: "The
independence agreements do not form the goal they are the present and
not
the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their national cause
and
shape their future in accordance with THEIR will."
In a speech on Sept. 4, 1962 at Panayia Makarios said, "Until this
Turkish
community forming part of the Turkish race that has been the terrible
enemy
of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be
considered terminated."
"When the Turkish Cypriots objected to the amendment of the
Constitution,
Makarios put his plan into effect, and the Greek Cypriot attack began
in
December 1963," wrote Lt. Gen. George Karayiannis of The Greek Cypriot
militia ("Ethnikos Kiryx" 15.6.65). The general was referring to the
notorious "Akritas" plan, which was the blueprint for the annihilation
of
the Turkish Cypriots and the annexation of the island to Greece.
On Dec. 28, 1963, the Daily Express carried the following report from
Cyprus: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot quarter of
Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last
five
days. We were the first Western reporters there, and we have seen
sights too
frightful to be described in print. Horror was so extreme that the
people
seemed stunned beyond tears."
On Dec. 31, 1963, The Guardian reported: "It is nonsense to claim, as
the
Greek Cypriots do, that all casualties were caused by fighting between
armed
men of both sides. On Christmas Eve many Turkish Cypriot people were
brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes, including the
wife
and children of a doctor-allegedly by a group of 40 men, many in army
boots
and greatcoats." Although the Turkish Cypriots fought back as best they
could and killed some militia, there were no massacres of Greek Cypriot
civilians
On Jan. 1, 1964, the Daily Herald reported: "When I came across the
Turkish
Cypriot homes they were an appalling sight. Apart from the walls they
just
did not exist. I doubt if a napalm attack could have created more
devastation. Under roofs springs, children's cots, and gray ashes of
what
had once been tables, chairs and wardrobes. In the neighboring village
of
Ayios Vassilios I counted 16 wrecked and burned out homes. They were
all
Turkish Cypriot's. In neither village did I find a scrap of damage to
any
Greek Cypriot house."
On Jan. 12, 1964, the British High Commission in Nicosia wrote in a
telegram
to London: "The Greek [Cypriot] police are led by extremist who
provoked the
fighting and deliberately engaged in atrocities. They have recruited
into
their ranks as 'special constables' gun-happy young thugs. They
threaten to
try and punish any Turkish Cypriot police who wishes to return to the
Cyprus
Government... Makarios assured Sir Arthur Clark that there will be no
attack. His assurance is as worthless as previous assurances have
proved."
On Jan. 14, 1964, the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish Cypriot
inhabitants of Ayios Vassilios had been massacred on Dec. 26, 1963 and
reported their exhumation from a mass grave in the presence of the Red
Cross. A further massacre of Turkish Cypriots, at Limassol, was
reported by
The Observer on Feb. 16, 1964; and there were many more.
On Feb. 15, 1964, the Daily Telegraph reported: "It is a real military
operation which the Greek Cypriots launched against the 6,000
inhabitants of
the Turkish Cypriot quarter yesterday morning. A spokesman for the
Greek
Cypriot government has recognized this officially. It is hard to
conceive
how Greek and Turkish Cypriots may seriously contemplate working
together
after all that has happened."
On Sept. 10, 1964, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that "UNFICYP"
carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout
the
island during the disturbances... It shows that in 109 villages, most
of
them Turkish-Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed
while
2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and
shops
have been destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Orphomita suburb
of
Nicosia, 50 houses have been totally destroyed while a further 240 have
been
partially destroyed there and in adjacent suburbs."
The U.K. House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs reviewed
the
Cyprus question in 1987 and reported unanimously on July 2 of that year
that
"although the Cyprus Government now claims to have been merely seeking
to
'operate the 1960 Constitution modified to the extent dictated by the
necessities of the situation,' this claim ignores the fact that both
before
and after the events o#, December 1963 the Makarios Government
continued to
advocate the cause of ENOSIS and actively pursued the amendment of the
Constitution and the related treaties to facilitate this ultimate
objective."
The committee continued: "Moreover, in June 1967 the Greek Cypriot
legislature unanimously passed a resolution in favor of enosis, in
blatant
contravention of the 1960 Treaties and Constitution." (Art. I of the
Treaty
of Guarantee prohibited any action likely to directly or indirectly
promote
union with any other state or partition of the island, and Art. 185(2)
of
the Constitution is to similar effect.)
Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral president of the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Cyprus, told Die Welt on Dec. 27, 1963:
"Makarios
bears on his shoulders the sole responsibility for the recent tragic
events.
His aim is to deprive the Turkish community of their rights". In an
interview with the UPI press agency on Dec. 30, 1963 he said, "All this
happened because Makarios wanted to take away all constitutional rights
from
the Turkish Cypriots."
More than 300 Turkish Cypriots are still missing without trace from
these
massacres of 1963/64. These dreadful events were not the responsibility
of
"the Greek Colonels" of 1974 or an unrepresentative handful of Greek
Cypriot
extremists. The persecution of the Turkish Cypriots was an act of
policy on
the part of the Greek Cypriot political and religious leadership, which
has
to this day made no serious attempt to bring the murderers to justice.
The UK Commons Select Committee found that "there is little doubt that
much
of the violence which the Turkish Cypriots claim led to the total or
partial
destruction of 103 Turkish villages and the displacement of about a
quarter
of the total Turkish Cypriot population was either directly inspired
by, or
connived at, by the Greek Cypriot leadership."
The UN secretary-general reported to the Security Council: "When the
disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued during the first
part
of 1964, thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled their homes, taking with
them
only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge in safer
villages and
areas."
On Jan. 14, 1964, "ll Giorno" of Italy reported: "Right now we are
witnessing the exodus of Turkish Cypriots from the villages. Thousands
of
people abandoning homes, land, herds. Greek Cypriot terrorism is
relentless.
This time the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the statues of Plato do not
cover
up their barbaric and ferocious behavior."
There were further attacks on the Turkish Cypriots in 1967. In 1971,
General
Grivas returned to Cyprus to form EOKA-B, which was again committed to
making Cyprus a wholly Greek island and annexing it to Greece. In a
speech
to the Greek Cypriot armed forces at the time (quoted in "New Cyprus,"
May
1987) Grivas said: "The Greek forces from Greece have come to Cyprus in
order to impose the will of the Greeks of Cyprus upon the Turks. We
want
ENOSIS but the Turks are against it. We shall impose our will. We are
strong, and we shall do so."
By July 15, 1974, a powerful force of mainland Greek troops had
assembled in
Cyprus and with their backing, the Greek Cypriot National Guard
overthrew
Makarios and installed one Nicos Sampson as "president." On July 22,
the
Washington Star News reported: "Bodies littered the streets and there
were
mass burials... People told by Makarios to lay down their guns were
shot by
the National Guard."
On April 17, 1991, Ambassador Nelson Ledsky testified before the U.S.
Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that "most of the 'missing persons'
disappeared
in the first days of July 1974, before the Turkish intervention on the
20th.
Many killed on the Greek side were killed by Greek Cypriots in fighting
between supporters of Makarios and Sampson."
On Nov. 6, 1974, Ta Nea reported that dates from the graves of Greek
Cypriots killed in the five days between July 15-20 were erased in
order to
blame these deaths on the subsequent Turkish military action.
On March 3, 1996, the Greek Cypriot Cyprus Mail wrote: "(Greek) Cypriot
governments have found it convenient to conceal the scale of atrocities
during the July 15 coup in an attempt to downplay its contribution to
the
tragedy of the summer of 1974 and instead blame the Turkish invasion
for all
casualties. There can be no justification for any government that
failed to
investigate this sensitive humanitarian issue. The shocking admission
by the
Clerides government that there are people buried in Nicosia cemetery
who are
still included in the list of the 'missing' is the last episode of a
human
drama which has been turned into a propaganda tool."
On Oct. 19 1996, Mr. Georgios Lanitis wrote: "I was serving with the
Foreign
Information Service of the Republic of Cyprus in London... I deeply
apologize to all those I told that there are 1,619 missing persons. I
misled
them. I was made a liar, deliberately, by the government of Cyprus .
....
today it seems that the credibility of Cyprus is nil."
The Times and The Guardian reported on Aug. 21, 1974 that in the
village of
Tokhni on Aug. 14, 1974 all the Turkish Cypriot men between the ages of
13
and 74, except for eighteen who managed to escape, were taken away and
shot.
There were also reports that in Zyyi on the same day all the
Turkish-Cypriot
men aged between 19 an 38 were taken away and were never seen again and
that
Greek-Cypriots opened fire on the Turkish-Cypriot neighborhood of
Paphos
killing men, women, and children indiscriminately.
On July 23, 1974, the Washington Post reported that "in a Greek raid on
a
small Turkish village near Limassol 36 people out of a population of
200
were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to kill
the
inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces arrived."
The
Times and The Guardian also reported on the killings.
"The Greeks began to shell the Turkish quarter on Saturday, refugees
said.
Kazan Dervis, a Turkish Cypriot girl aged 15, said she had been staying
with
her uncle. The [Greek Cypriot] National Guard came into the Turkish
sector
and shooting began. She saw her uncle and other relatives taken away as
prisoners, and later heard her uncle had been shot." (Times 23.7.74)
On July 28, 1974 the New York Times reported that 14 Turkish-Cypriot
men had
been shot in Alaminos. On July 24, 1974 France Soir reported that "the
Greeks burned Turkish mosques and set fire to Turkish homes in the
villages
around Famagusta. Defenseless Turkish villagers who have weapons live
in an
atmosphere of terror and they evacuate their homes and go and live in
tents
in the forest. The Greeks' actions are a shame to humanity."
The German newspaper Die Zeit wrote on Aug. 30, "The massacre of
Turkish
Cypriots in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof of how justified the
Turks
were to undertake their intervention."
"Turkish Cypriots, who had suffered from physical attacks since 1963,
called
on the guarantor powers to prevent a Greek conquest of the island. When
Britain did nothing Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied its northern
part.
Turkish Cypriots have constitutional right on their side and
understandably
fear a renewal of persecution if the Turkish army withdraws", the Daily
Telegraph wrote on Aug. 15, 1996.
"Turkey intervened to protect the lives and property of the
Turkish-Cypriots, and to its credit it has done just that. In the 12
years
since, there have been no killings and no massacres" Lord Willis
(Labor)
told the House of Lords on Dec. 17, 1986.
On March 12, 1977, Makarios declared, "It is in the name of ENOSIS that
Cyprus has been destroyed."