Inconsistent foundations: why Huntington was wrong about Belarus?

[Steve Hayes]

Inconsistent foundations: why Huntington was wrong about Belarus?

In his famous book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order Samuel P. Huntington [1] attributed Belarus to the
Orthodox Civilization. According to him, the imaginary dividing line
between the Western and the Orthodox civilizations runs through the
territory of Belarus. In fact, it lies close to the eastern border of
interwar Poland, which included the western areas of today’s Belarus.
Our expert Dr. Kiryl Kascian discusses why constitutional identity of
Belarus contradicts to its attribution to the Orthodox Civilization by
Huntington.

The idea of this text primarily is inspired by the contemporary
politics in a wider region of Eastern Europe. The ideological
foundations of these developments are linked to significantly diverse
interpretations of history and their institutionalization. Hence, they
echo Huntington’s framework of civilizations’ clash.
“Russian world” as a form of Civilizations’ Clash

Huntington suggested that “Russia is creating a block with an Orthodox
heartland under its leadership and a surrounding buffer of relatively
weak Islamic states which it will in varying degrees dominate and from
which it will attempt to exclude the influence of other powers” (p.
164). He also underlines two other core elements of this framework.
First, it’s the centrality of post-Soviet Orthodox countries for “the
development of a coherent Russian bloc in Eurasian and world affairs”.
Second, it is pivotal for Russia not only to maintain this system, but
to have it accepted and approved by the world.
In one of my previous texts with ICELDS, I emphasized that the Russian
legislation lacks any clear definition of the concept of the “Russian
World”. It represents a hybridization of cultural views with some
political agendas, and its sources are primarily public addresses and
other texts of Russian politicians, clergy and intellectuals. It also
seems that appeals to this unwritten doctrine is equally important for
at least some Russia’s neighboring countries. For example, Ukrainian
authorities view the “Russian World” as a security threat and a
justification for Russia’s interference in the domestic affairs of
Ukraine [2].

Considering the notion “Orthodox” in the terms proposed by Huntington,
it seems relevant to focus on the statements by the two leading
Russian public figures, namely Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Gundiaev
(known as Patriarch Kirill). Putin’s “Crimean Speech” of March 2014
suggested that the baptism of Prince Vladimir in Khersones
“predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and
human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and
Belarus”[3]. Concurrently, Gundiaev actively promotes the Russian
world as a system of common values which the entire Eastern Slavic
civilization created through the populace’s baptism by Prince Vladimir
in the Dnieper river in Kyiv [4]. Therefore, their messages suggest
the central role of the Orthodox Christianity for the Russian
historical canon and for the ideological foundations of the relations
with the neighboring Eastern Slavic countries. In any case, it is
Russia and its culture that assume the role of a “civilizational
magnet” within this framework. Meanwhile, Huntington’s view on Russia
and its geopolitical ambitions in its immediate neighborhood is
significantly consistent with the Weltanschauung of the leadership of
the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church.

Constitutional self-perception of history in Belarus

As for Belarus, Huntington (p. 164) interpreted some developments of
the early 1990s in Belarus in a way that allows him to conclude that
as of 1995 Belarus was “part of Russia in all but name” with “little
sense of national identity” and with significant fractions of the
population who “seem to identify as much with Russia as with their own
country.” These observations were first published as a book back in
1996, following just five years of the reinstated independence of
Belarus. Nevertheless, since then Belarus sustained as an independent
state, although it remained an active member of the Russian-led
economic and security alliances in the post-Soviet space.
The official interpretation of the Belarusian statehood’s history can
be found in the a concise phrase in the Preamble of the country’s
Constitution. According to this document, contemporary Belarus relies
on “the centuries-old history of development of Belarusian statehood.”
Interestingly, this formula of the statehood was elaborated during the
period described by Huntington, as the country adopted its
Constitution on 15 March 1994. The Preamble with this formula remained
unchanged even when in 1996 a new substantially-revised version of the
Constitution was adopted.

Although the Constitution does not contain references to specific
historical state formations on the territory of modern Belarus, its
draft mentioned that the Belarusian statehood rooted in the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) and the Belarusian Democratic Republic (BNR)
[5]. Declared in 1918, the BNR can be regarded as the Belarusian
statehood in modernity and the first one which used the name
“Belarus”. At the same time, the role of the GDL, which existed until
1795 and since 1569 was in the state union with the Kingdom of Poland,
is important as it was the first formation which united the Belarusian
lands within a single state.

As for the GDL, both Soviet and modern Russian historical narratives
are dominated by the view that suggests that the Eastern Slavic
territories were allegedly conquered by Lithuanians and later
subordinated to the Polish authorities. However, the Belarusian view
on the GDL as a form of the Belarusian historical statehood (though
indirectly) can observed earlier in the constitutional acts of the
BNR. Therefore, this approach cannot be regarded as an invention of
the Belarusian nationalism in the late Soviet Union [6].
Still, the current Belarusian historical narrative states that the
earlier statehood tradition encompasses the Duchies of Polack and
Turau, which later were incorporated into the GDL. This process
generally complies with the formulation of the Belarusian
constitutional Preamble and its view upon the historical development
of the Belarusian statehood as a sequence of the following formations:
the Duchy of Polack (and Turau) – the GDL (and its Commonwealth with
the Kingdom of Poland) – BNR – Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic –
Republic of Belarus.

Belarus: inconsistency of civilizational foundations

There are two aspects which should be emphasized with regard of
historical interpretation of this sequence. First, it does not cover
the period from 1795 to 1917 when the lands of today’s Belarus were a
part of the Russian Empire. In other words, the period when Belarus
was in the Russian Empire is perceived as foreign domination. This
interpretation of the period of Russian Empire in the Belarusian lands
can be found even in some constitutional acts of the Belarusian Soviet
Socialist Republic (the 1919 Manifesto and the 1937 Constitution) [7].
Moreover, during this period the Orthodox Christianity regained its
dominant role in Belarus following the dissolution in 1839 of the
Brest Church Union of 1596 between the Orthodoxy and Catholicism in
Rzeczpospolita and the subsequent absorption of the Uniate Church by
the state-sposored Russian Orthodox Church [8].
Second, references to the Duchy of Polack (and Turau) require a closer
look at the words of Gundiaev and Putin about the personality of
Prince Vladimir taken in the Belarusian context. In fact, the
documented political history in the Belarusian lands begins with the
episode when he raped Rahnieda, a minor daughter of the Polack Prince
Rahvalod, in the eyes of her family. Then Rahnieda’s father and
brothers were killed, and the city of Polack was captured [9]. Thus,
while Russian (and also Ukrainian) narratives portray Prince Vladimir
as a prominent statesman, Belarusian interpretations of his
personality would per se include this episode in Polack with all its
negative connotations.

Hence, the case of Belarus demonstrates that despite close
contemporary political alliances with Russia, this country has
significantly different historical foundations. They are often
contradictory with Russo-centric historical canons, as promoted by the
Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church. Still, these canons are not
explicitly institutionalized in the legal acts of Belarus, although
the current concise formulations combined with the references to
historical constitutional acts provide the ground for a wider
interpretation of the official historical canon of Belarus as
inconsistent with the civilizational foundations of the “Russian
World” and subsequently with the “Orthodox Civilization”, as described
by Samuel P. Huntington.

References:

[1] Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.
[2] Position on Article 7 of the Law on Education submitted by the
Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, CDL-REF(2017)051,
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)051-e.
[3] Address by President of the Russian Federation, 18/03/2014,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.
[4] Slovo Sviateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla na V Vsemirnom kongresse
sootechestvennikov, prozhivayushchikh za rubezhom, 05/11/2015,
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4265245.html.
[5] Navumcyk, Siarhiej. VKL i BNR pryhadvalisia u prajekcie pieršaj
Kanstytucyi suverennaj Bielarusi. RFE/RL Belarusian Service,
15/03/2018, https://www.svaboda.org/a/29101047.html.
[6] Kascian, Kiryl (2011). ‘Nation and Statehood in the Constitutional
Acts of the Belarusian People’s Republic’, pp. 109-15, in: Doucette,
Siobhan, et al. (eds.). Returning to Europe: Belarus Past and Future.
Warsaw: Lazarski University.
[7] Kascian, Kiryl (2011). ‘BSSR: ad heahraficna-administracyjnaj
farmacyi da bielaruskaj nacyjanalnaj adzinki’, pp. 174-182 , in:
Bialoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne No. 36.
[8] See for instance: Plokhy, Serhii (2017). Lost Kingdom: The Quest
for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation, from 1470 to the
Present. New York: Basic Books.
[9] See: Wilson, Andrew (2011). Belarus: the Last European
Dictatorship. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Source:
https://t.co/7kjxQPoXrv

--
Steve Hayes
http://www.khanya.org.za/stevesig.htm
http://khanya.wordpress.com