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Farhan Siddiqui
Mar 24, 2000, 3:00:00 AM3/24/00
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The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review Volume V, Number 3 (15 February
2000) ______________________________________________________ Part I:
Russian Federation (1) Executive Branch by Susan J. Cavan (2) Foreign
Relations by Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah K. Miller (3) Media by
Jonathan Solomon (4) Domestic Issues & Legislative Branch by Michael
DeMar Thurman (5) Armed Forces by LCDR James J. Duke Jr. and Lt Col
Jill Skelton Part II: Newly Independent States (1) CIS by Sarah K.
Miller (2) Western Region by Tammy Lynch (3) Caucasus by Miriam Lanskoy
(4) Central Asia by Monika Shepherd (5) Baltic States by Kate Martin
Part I: RUSSIAN FEDERATION (1) EXECUTIVE BRANCH Putin's Soul In an
address to the justice ministry board at the end of last month, acting
President Vladimir Putin pointed out that the machinery of state
was "neglected, rickety and disorderly," and prescribed the creation of
a "strong" state, defined as one which "upholds the rights and freedoms
of the individual." (ITAR-TASS, 1025 & 1028 GMT, 31 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0131, via World News Connection) Putin further criticized the
legislative chaos created by the melding of Soviet-era and post-Soviet
laws, and called for a renovation of the legal framework to be
facilitated by the judiciary. These comments, along with some public
ruminations on a possible referendum on land reform, thus far provide a
scant basis for assessing Putin's political intentions. Little more is
thought to be forthcoming, however, as candidate Putin has announced
that he will delay issuing his electoral platform for fear of criticism
of his policies. "As soon as you make it public, they will start
gnawing at it and tearing it to pieces," Putin claimed. (IZVESTIA, 9
Feb 00; via Johnson's Russia List) Despite the lack of information
about his political affiliations, Putin still seems quite likely to win
the March presidential elections. Earlier this month two potential
challengers withdrew themselves from the race. Fatherland-All Russia
leaders Yevgeni Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov both pulled out of the
presidential poll, with Luzhkov taking a parting shot at Putin. "I am
not running against Vladimir Putin...," Luzhkov said, "but I am very
worried for Russia's future under Putin." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2 Feb
00; via C-...@clari.net) Luzhkov is not the only leading Russian figure
with reservations about Putin's stewardship of Russia. As John
Thornhill observes in The Financial Times (8 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis),
there is a battle on for Vladimir Putin's political soul and many
prominent Russian liberals are concerned that they are not winning the
struggle. Andrei Piontkovsky, who heads the Center for Strategic
Studies, observes, "People say Putin is the lesser evil but in what
units can you measure evil?" Piontkovsky elaborated on his concerns for
a Putin regime by reviewing what Putin has undertaken thus
far: "Putinism is war, it is national 'consolidation' based on hatred
towards a particular ethnic group. It is attacks on freedom of speech
and use of information to create zombies, it is isolation from the
outside world and further economic degradation." (THE RUSSIAN JOURNAL,
14-20 Feb 00; via Johnson's Russia List) The return of Yastrzhembsky In
compiling his presidential team, Vladimir Putin has, rather unusually,
reached out to a former Yel'tsin apparatchik (and reputed close
adviser) who was abruptly dismissed during the government crisis of
1998, following the devaluation of the ruble. Sergei Yastrzhembsky,
Yel'tsin's press spokesman and a deputy chief of his Kremlin staff, has
been named by presidential decree to oversee the press services of the
armed forces, including the Chechen campaign, as well as other
agencies. (INTERFAX, 1825 GMT, 20 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0120, via World
News Connection) The appointment suggests that Putin has a great deal
of confidence in Yastrzhembsky, as "managing" media coverage of the war
in Chechnya has been a high priority of his administration and surely
will continue to be so at least until the presidential elections.
Yastrzhembsky was most recently a member of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's
administration, and his appointment could possibly be viewed as
conciliatory towards the mayor. It may, however, reveal more about the
shift of importance in part of the "Family" within the Kremlin.
Yastrzhembsky's ouster in 1998 was reputed to have been engineered by
then-Chief of Staff Valentin Yumashev and Tatiana Dyachenko. (See
EDITORIAL DIGEST, 16 Sep 98) It is unlikely that Putin sought their
input into this latest appointment. Borodin farce The once powerful
Kremlin economic manager, Pavel Borodin, seemed headed for his long-
anticipated fall last month when press reports claimed that Swiss
authorities had issued a warrant for his arrest in connection with the
Mabetex corruption investigation. This is a story as muddy and complex
as a money-laundering scheme itself, however, as in the days following
the initial reports questions quickly surfaced about whether a warrant
had been issued, or perhaps a secret warrant? Was Borodin to be
arrested or merely brought in for questioning? Perhaps most crucial to
Borodin is the issue of whether his new post as secretary of The
Belarus-Russian State Council provides him with immunity from
prosecution. Borodin categorically denied the warrant story: "There is
no warrant for my arrest...," he said, "This is purely a political
assassination attempt." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 0950 PST, 28 Jan 00; via
C-...@clari.net) Putin himself is not unaffected by this development.
His Kremlin career did begin, after all, in the economic management
office as a deputy to Borodin. Dismissing Borodin from his Kremlin post
was one of Putin's earliest moves as acting president, but by
ensconcing Borodin at the new State Council, Putin created an aura of
protection surrounding his former boss. GOVERNMENT Stepashin on war
plans It may be that Sergei Stepashin felt a moment of bitterness
toward Putin in the initial aftermath of the Duma faction clash that
produced an alliance between Unity and the Communists, but whatever his
motivations or regrets he certainly dropped a bombshell last month when
he confirmed what we long surmised: The Chechen war was planned long in
advance of the alleged terrorist bombings in Moscow. (THE MOSCOW TIMES,
20 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) Stepashin claimed that the decision to
invade Chechnya was made in March 1999 and planned for August-
September. Stepashin, who was head of the MVD at the time and therefore
certainly in a position to know, further claimed that Putin, as then-
FSB chief, was fully aware of the military planning. While analysts
within Russia commenting on this development are surprisingly few,
there are those attempting to explain the ramifications of this
information and its impact on a determination of the current
leadership's character. Respected military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer
(in the article cited above) warns: "In Chechnya, Putin has acted as an
irrational warmonger.... It is possible that Putin -- the political
unknown -- is in fact a Russian version of Milosevic, an aggressive,
irresponsible nationalist armed with thousands of nuclear warheads."
SECURITY SERVICES Where is Babitsky? Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei
Babitsky has been missing in Chechnya since the middle of January.
Various sources have claimed since his disappearance that he was
arrested by Russian forces for aiding Chechen rebels, was under house
arrest and/or had been traded to Chechen rebels for three Russian
soldiers. Recently, Federal Security Services Chief Nikolai Patrushev
weighed in on the case by confirming to reporters that Babitsky was
alive, but Patrushev would not elaborate on Babitsky's status or
whereabouts. "I don't know where he is -- that is beyond our
department," Patrushev claimed. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 8 Feb 00; via lexis-
nexis) Service rallies for elections Patrushev also recently held a
collegium meeting in order to brief his personnel on their role in the
conduct of the upcoming presidential elections. (MOSCOW NEWS, 26 Jan
00; via lexis-nexis) Patrushev highlighted the need for the FSB to
target "dirty election technology," which he characterized as "mud
slinging, illegally obtained facts, information about individuals'
private life, and other types of sleaze." There were no recorded
comments on the penalty for mud slinging, but the inherent threat will
undoubtedly serve further to chill an already cowed media. The meeting
was also attended by Kremlin Chief of Staff Aleksandr Voloshin, who
asked the service to focus on Article 11 of the Presidential Election
Law, which deals with foreign influence on an election campaign.
Voloshin's comments were seen as having a direct effect on media
coverage of the Chechen war. Should any outlet change its reportage
from a "Russian" interpretation to the more critical take of foreign
media coverage in Chechnya, an investigation of foreign influence of
that media outlet would surely follow. by Susan J. Cavan (2) FOREIGN
RELATIONS Dr. Albright makes a house call Maybe history really has
ended: Russian-US relations, at least, seem to be in a state of
suspended animation. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's deeply
pointless trip to Moscow in early February accomplished little that
could not have been handled by FedEx -- with one caveat. By making a
merely symbolic appearance in the Russian capital just as the Chechen
capital Grozny fell, Albright again gave the Kremlin's vicious war the
United States' seal of polite disapproval. And yet the actions of
Russian government recently indicate that history remains in motion, if
only in reverse. The revelation of Russia's involvement in helping Iraq
skirt sanctions on its oil, as well as deeper ties to anti-Western
governments in Asia, hint that the new regime in the Kremlin is reading
from a very old playbook. Although they reportedly got along well
personally, Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov did
little during Albright's recent visit to Moscow but return to tiresome
go-rounds on Chechnya, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Kosovo and
Russia-NATO relations. Nothing of substance was accomplished on any
front. The only two agreements signed, in fact, were minor: a protocol
for how to recover American technology if a Russian rocket carrying an
American satellite failed, and amendments to a previous agreement on
monitoring nuclear threats. (INTERFAX, 1452 GMT, 27 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0127, via World News Connection) The Chinese are suspected of
having stolen American missile guidance systems by blowing up such a
rocket in 1996 (THE WASHINGTON POST, 8 Jul 98; via lexis-nexis), so the
new missile security measures were a useful, if belated, measure to
take. But given that these deals were about as complex as an apartment
lease, Albright's trip to Moscow was merely symbolic. Albright's trip,
moreover, was symbolic in the worst possible way, undermining the weak
criticism of the Chechen war that she offered. While in Moscow,
Albright joined the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Tunis, Canada, as well as officials from the Palestinian
Authority, the European Union, Japan, China and Switzerland at meetings
on the Middle East question that the White House had helped Moscow to
sponsor. (ITAR-TASS, 0801 GMT, 1 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0201, via World
News Connection) Albright later warned that Russia risked international
isolation for pursuing its savage war in the Caucasus. (THE WASHINGTON
POST, 3 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) Well, apparently not. Albright arrived
in Moscow unsure whether acting Russian President Vladimir Putin would
be able to find time to meet her, but after a three-hour session with
him on 3 February she was fulsome with her praise. The former KGB
officer, Albright said, was "a very well-informed person, a good
interlocutor, obviously a Russian patriot who seeks a normal position
with the West." No, the Secretary of State and Putin had not agreed on
Chechnya, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Kosovo or Russia-NATO
relations. But Putin had spoken without using notes. "What is
important," Albright added, "is to judge him by what he does." (THE NEW
YORK TIMES, 3 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) Which act had made more of an
impression on Albright -- Putin's speaking without a script or his
prosecution of the Chechen war? Prudently reserving judgment, the
Secretary of State did not say. Judging him by what he does However,
her emphasis on Putin's deeds rather than his words seemed especially
justified after Putin addressed the diplomats gathered for the Middle
East summit. Putin's struck an accommodating stance that was as
remarkable for its moderation as it was for its insincerity. In his
first speech on foreign policy since assuming power on New Year's Eve,
Putin declined to use some of the code words of anti-Westernism that
had marked Yel'tsin's last years. He did not, for example, refer to
Russia's ambition to help create a "multipolar world," and insisted
instead that "we are not fighting for spheres of influence and we are
not trying to compete with anyone." Criticism of NATO action in Kosovo,
usually an explicit part of any Russian foreign policy statement, was
limited to an oblique commitment to "forming a stable and indivisible
Europe built not on the (exercise) of force but on the principles of
the United Nations (charter)." (UPI, 1258 GMT, 1 Feb 00; via lexis-
nexis) Instead, Putin insisted that Russia would cooperate with other
world powers in tackling the problems of international terrorism, the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, "aggressive separatism" and, in a new
theme, the potential for conflict emerging from the growing gap between
rich and poor nations. "Russia is a reliable, constructive and
predictable partner in building Big Europe," Putin said. "Our policy
will remain honest, open and transparent." (INTERFAX, 1019 GMT, 1 Feb
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0201, via World News Connection) The difference
between Putin's words and deeds became apparent days after his talk,
however, when US ships enforcing United Nations sanctions against Iraq
intercepted a Russian tanker suspected of smuggling oil. The tanker had
sought to evade the UN patrols by hugging the Iranian coast, but was
caught off the United Arab Emirates as it passed through the Strait of
Hormuz. State Department spokesman James Foley later said US officials
had been warning Moscow about the activities of Russian-flagged ships
for the previous month. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1217 EST, 3 Feb 00; via
lexis-nexis) Illicit smuggling of Iraqi oil, Foley said, had increased
sharply since autumn 1998. Russia's deeper involvement in thwarting the
sanctions comes less than a month after Moscow forced the UN to appoint
its candidate to head the new Iraqi weapons inspection team. (See THE
NIS OBSERVED, 18 Jan 00) At the same time Russia has been pressing for
the appointment of new permanent member countries to the UN Security
Council, and has said it will welcome changes among the current
rotating members. (INTERFAX, 0908 GMT, 31 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0131,
via World News Connection) Russia is Iraq's largest creditor-nation,
and has long sought to end sanctions in order to pursue lucrative
contracts exploiting its oil reserves. The Russian government denied
that the privately owned tanker was smuggling but offered to cooperate
fully with the investigation of the affair. Rossiyskaya gazeta, the
government-owned daily, took the opportunity to strike a firmer stance
against the West. The tanker incident, the paper said, had been sprung
just after Albright left Moscow as part of a wider plan to "undermine
trust in Russia" -- just as previous libeling of the Soviet Union had
undermined its authority. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 8 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0208, via World News Connection) The seizure of the Russia ship might
well have been inspired by the political tussle between Russia and the
US over sanctions against Iraq, but the marked increase in Russian
smuggling would seem to put the blame for escalating tensions with
Russia, not the US. And whether Putin makes explicit reference to
a "multipolar" world order or not, his actions in the Far East (see
below) indicate that his government remains committed to building
strong military and diplomatic ties to Asian nations -- especially
China -- with their own grievances about US dominance. The explicit
comparison, moreover, of Western criticism of Russia now and its
previous criticism of the Soviet Union -- published in a government
newspaper -- indicates how far the Kremlin has slipped back into its
old world view. Putin has already retired the Yel'tsin nostrum that the
Soviet Union was not Russia. His foreign policy deeds, if not his
words, show the decree to which he also equates Russia's orientation in
the world with that of the empire it supposedly abandoned. by Chandler
Rosenberger * * * * * 'Tacit' multipolarism Russia's Asia policy got a
boost from Deputy Foreign Minister Gregori Karasin on 8 February in a
speech outlining Moscow's three main goals in East Asia. All three aims
were predictable, focusing on international security, bilateral
confidence-building and political-economic development. (RFE/RL
NEWSLINE, 8 Feb 00) Karasin's comments clarified acting President
Vladimir Putin's foreign policy speech from 1 February and anticipated
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's East Asia trip this week. In his speech,
Putin omitted any mention of Russia's "multipolar policy," which has
guided Russia's attempts to improve relations with non-Western
countries over the past few years. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 2 Feb
00) However, Karasin's remarks a week later reveal that, despite
Putin's omission, little change is likely in Russia's Asia policy.
Putin may indulge in fewer rhetorical flourishes as he attempts to
establish himself as a competent statesman in the runup to the
presidential election; however, that should not be mistaken for a
genuine shift in Russia's Asia policy. It seems that a newly
reinvigorated "tacit multipolarism" may pick up where the previous
government's largely successful "multipolar policy" left off. In this
context, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's trip to North Korea (DPRK),
Japan and Vietnam this week indicates Russia's renewed energy for
tackling issues that were shelved due to Yel'tsin's illnesses and the
urgency of other concerns such as Kosovo and Chechnya. During his stay
in the DPRK, Ivanov will sign the new Russia-DPRK Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty which has been on hold since last spring when
Karasin initialed it in Pyongyang. (REUTERS, 7 Feb 00; via
RussiaToday.com) Russian relations with the DPRK were strained in the
early 1990s by Russia's warming ties with South Korea, but the new
treaty and a good trip for Ivanov will signal an improvement in
relations. In addition to the bilateral benefits of warming relations
with the DPRK, better ties will suit Russia's long-term diplomatic
goals on the peninsula. For some time Russia has expressed interest in
six-way talks to conclude a peace treaty between North and South Korea.
Russian involvement in arranging peace talks on the peninsula would be
a timely diplomatic gain for Moscow, and the new Friendship Treaty is
the first step towards this goal. Although the Kurile Islands and peace
treaty issues remain unresolved with the Japanese, Ivanov's trip may
yield more results than his trip to Tokyo last spring. This may be due
to the more pragmatic approach that Russia has been taking towards
Japan. At this point, these two subjects continue to plague relations
since Japan still hinges the Russo-Japanese peace treaty on the
resolution of the Kurile Islands issue, while Russia is unwilling to
give up its control over the islands. Although these obstacles, as well
as US National Missile Defense plans, have thwarted Russo-Japanese
relations in the past, Ivanov's trip will likely focus on the more
positive aspects of Russo-Japanese relations such as economic
cooperation. Japan remains Asia's economic powerhouse and provided
Russia with much-needed loans even after the Asian financial collapse,
when other lenders refused. Although Ivanov and his Japanese
counterpart inevitably will discuss the outstanding territorial issues,
Russia seems prepared to intensify relations in other realms. This
decision will not solve the problems in Russo-Japanese relations, but
for the time being it will give Russia an opportunity to strengthen
important economic ties. (ITAR-TASS, 0929 GMT, 28 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0128, via World News Connection) Economics have been the driving force
behind Russia's relations with Vietnam for some time. Beginning with
arms sales, Russia has sought out profitable deals with the Vietnamese
that are now expanding into the energy and technology sectors.
According to the Vietnamese, Russia is their country's eighth largest
investor, but several new projects may propel Russia to the top of the
list in the near future. In addition to the bilateral economic
situation, Ivanov's visit will prepare the grounds for April's ASEAN
business forum, at which Russian companies will have a chance to meet
with ASEAN members. (ITAR-TASS, 1907 GMT, 3 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0203,
via World News Connection) None of these developments should surprise
Western politicians, since Russia has openly warned the West of its
intentions in Asia for months. Now that a new, healthier leadership
seems poised to replace formally the old, ailing one, Russia appears to
be revitalizing its Asia policy. For some time, Russia's multipolar
policy has focused on increasing and improving Russian partnerships in
Asia. In light of Russia's increasingly frail relations with the West,
it is natural that Russia pursues these economic and security
partnerships. But even though there are economic benefits to be had,
Karasin's remarks and Russia's current international situation suggest
that geopolitics remain the driving force behind Putin's "tacit
multipolarism." As such, the major thrust of the policy seems aimed at
the West. by Sarah K. Miller (3) MEDIA The real information war In
1999, being an independent journalist in Russia was hardly the safest
of professions. Twelve journalists were murdered last year and many
more were assaulted, according to Alexei Simonov, president of the Fund
for Defense of Glasnost. (ITAR-TASS, 2129 GMT, 12 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0113, via World News Connection) On the night of 29 November 99,
unknown assailants severely battered Igor Rostov, general director of
the Kaskad TV and radio company of Kaliningrad. In a letter to Interior
Minister Vladimir Rushailo and Acting Prosecutor General Vladimir
Ustinov protesting the attack, the president of the National TV and
Radio Association, Eduard Sagalaev, directly linked the incident to the
Duma campaigns. "Against the complicated background of the election
campaign, correspondents and chiefs of regional mass media bodies daily
become a direct object of pressure and threats on the part of persons
carrying out the dirty political struggle," Sagalaev declared. (ITAR-
TASS, 1535 GMT, 3 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1204, via World News
Connection) Many press offices came under attack as well. On 1
December, the Interfax agency reportedly received a bomb threat just
prior to a press conference with Anatoly Chubais and Union of Right
Wing Forces leader Sergei Kirienko. The agency received a nearly
identical threat the next day as well. While the occasion gave Interfax
the opportunity to declare that the news agency has "never been and
will never be politically engaged," it was typical of attempts by
varying factions to exert physical pressure in efforts to influence the
mass media's reporting, as well as who they let speak. (INTERFAX, 1130
GMT, 2 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1203, via World News Connection) The
situation deteriorates the farther away from Moscow one travels. In the
Maritime Krai, a feed cable of the radio station Lemma, which gave a
voice to opponents of the region's governor, was cut in December. There
one must receive 14 separate authorizations to set up a mere newspaper
stand, while in Sakhalin the government demands four, which almost
seems fair in comparison! Most regions are lucky if they have an
independent news outlet, and it must be considered that the majority of
printing presses and broadcast centers which the independent media in
Russia use are leased from the state. (OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, 9 Dec 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-1209, via World News Connection) And you complained about
campaign mudslinging in New Hampshire? Whereas some used violence, or
at least the threat of it, to affect coverage of the campaigns, the
oligarchs and the blocs relied on other means. On 3 December, Moscow's
Mayor and Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) leader Yuri Luzhkov won a libel
lawsuit against Boris Berezovsky's state-managed ORT TV network and one
of its prominent anchors, Sergei Dorenko. ORT was forced to pay 50,000
rubles and Dorenko R100,000 due to the "moral damage" done to the
mayor. (ITAR-TASS, 1915 GMT, 3 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1203, via World
News Connection) But strangely (or not so strangely) enough, three days
later reports surfaced that Dorenko had been appointed deputy director
general of ORT. For its part, ORT neither confirmed nor denied the
apparent promotion. (INTERFAX, 1612 GMT, 6 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1206,
via World News Connection) But the propaganda attacks by those in the
Kremlin's pocket were seemingly successful in propelling the Unity bloc
to victory over OVR. Berezovsky, by then a newly elected Duma
representative, openly declared that Dorenko "is an indefinitely
talented person," and that Dorenko's actions bore "a plus rather than a
minus sign. Dorenko's role was enormous." (INTERFAX, 1102 GMT, 22 Dec
99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1222, via World News Connection) >From 28 November
through the election, the European Institute for the Media, under the
auspices of the OSCE, monitored the press coverage of the campaigns.
According to the institute's Gillian McCormack, OVR "and its leaders,
Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov, received the most negative coverage
of any party during the campaign." She declared the pro-Kremlin ORT and
RTR networks "the worst offenders," and noted that the media war was
fiercest between Berezovsky's Kremlin-allied outlets and Vladimir
Gusinsky's OVR-allied outlets. Stations owned by both blatantly
promoted their respective blocs in reports that aired under the
pretense of being actual news pieces, according to McCormack. McCormack
took ORT and the RTR network to task for several reasons. First, as
they had the "greatest national audience reach, (they) had a particular
responsibility to provide impartial information about the political
choice on offer to the electorate." Their coverage, heavily biased
against OVR and for Unity, "failed to meet standards set in Russian law
and in international agreements and conventions signed by the Russian
Federation." Feeding off Vladimir Putin's popularity, the networks
would often combine coverage of his actions in government with that of
Unity's campaigning. She noted that Dorenko's Sunday night news
analysis program on ORT was the most popular such program in Russia
leading up to the election, and condemned him for using "his position
to call Luzhkov everything from a supporter of evil sects to a
murderer." In McCormack's opinion, the problems of the Russian media
stem from the nature of their ownership and the absence of political
interest in protecting journalists, not to mention a general lack of
journalistic ethics, integrity and depth. Indeed, she observed
that "the absence of any real analysis of the Chechen conflict" is
partly the cause of its high popularity among Russians, not to mention
the fact that this popularity directly transferred to Putin and Unity.
(MOSCOW TIMES, 29 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) It must seem absolutely
ludicrous, then, that Putin "expressed hope that journalists will do
their utmost to ensure an 'honest and clean' campaign" in the March
presidential race. (ITAR-TASS, 1211 GMT, 13 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0113,
via World News Connection) Trouble at NTV Heaven forbid anyone should
question the speed of Putin's rise to power and popularity or his
background! The "Voice of the People" program on Gusinsky's NTV did
just this, and received the wrath of state-run media as a result. In an
editorial shortly afterward, Rossiyskaya gazeta implied that those on
NTV who questioned Putin were "yesterday's men, who still dream of
returning the country to its 'radiant past.'" Indeed, why should these
issues "be discussed in the premier's absence, if he demonstrates day
in, day out his openness and readiness to give public replies to the
most pointed of questions?" (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 20 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0120, via World News Connection) On 21 January, NTV co-founder and
general director Oleg Dobrodeev resigned without expressing a reason.
Yevgeny Kiselev, chairman of the board of NTV and host of the "Itogi"
program, took his place. The move was interpreted by the Moscow media
as indication of "deep disturbances among television management as a
result of political pressures associated with the election season and
Chechen campaign." According to the St. Petersburg Times, a Western-
owned English-language paper, Izvestia television critic Irina
Petrovskaya interviewed Gusinsky at NTV's sixth birthday party.
Gusinsky claimed that he and Dobrodeev were disagreeing over the
coverage of Chechnya, and that he, himself, had insisted that NTV "not
be a mouthpiece for the Defense Ministry and that it report the tragedy
of refugees and civilians as well as the military successes." Dobrodeev
did not attend the party. The Moscow media viewed Gusinsky's assertions
cynically. Dobrodeev was the one who was pushing for more balanced
coverage, they felt. At a press conference on 19 December, Dobrodeev
appeared depressed by the partisan journalism during the Duma
campaigns, saying "All television channels came out of this election
campaign with huge losses to their reputations. I can only hope that we
at NTV managed to minimalize them." Manana Alslamzian of Internews
Russia summed up the concerns of the press: "Who will replace such
people and how much lower will the ethical standards of our journalism
drop?" (ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 21 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) A sign of
things to come? What began as a freedom of the press issue has become
the telling indicator of whether glasnost is truly dead under a Putin
government. On 23 January, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter
Andrei Babitsky was arrested because he "broke the rules set for
correspondents in the area of the anti-terrorist operation," according
to acting Prosecutor General Ustinov. In Ustinov's 31 January
announcement, he stated that Babitsky would remain incarcerated for at
least the next 10 days. (INTERFAX, 1117 GMT, 31 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0131, via World News Connection) However, on 3 February the Russian
government reported that he was traded to "Chechen rebels" for some
Russian soldiers. The exchange was videotaped by members of the FSB,
and aired on Russian television. An FSB spokesman confirmed on NTV that
his service had made the tape, but said that "the question of the
journalist's freeing and turning over should be addressed to the
prosecutor's office and military command. The Russian Federal Security
Service did not institute a criminal case, did not detain Andrei
Babitsky, and had no relation to his detention and to what happened
later." He added that the only reason that the FSB made the videotape
was that an "FSB worker proved to be the only one who had a video
camera." (ITAR-TASS, 0839 GMT, 4 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0204, via World
News Connection) And just what was an FSB worker doing at the exchange
of a Russian national with "terrorists," especially when the
service "had no relation" to the affair at all? Also on 4 February,
reports circulated that the transfer had occurred at Babitsky's
request. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the Kremlin's spokesman on the Chechen
War, displayed a copy of an agreement that Babitsky had supposedly
signed to authorize the exchange. (MOSCOW TIMES, 4 Feb 00; via lexis-
nexis) First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Colonel General
Valery Manilov commented at a press conference that "it would be okay,
and even worth talking of gratitude or even an award, if there's no
dark side to the question, which has been expressed by Andrei's
willingness to go to the militants." (INTERFAX, 1447 GMT, 4 Feb 00;
FBIS-SOV-2000-0204, via World News Connection) The possibility of
gratitude for such a "criminal" as Babitsky? Defense Minister Igor
Sergeev had harsher words. "Babitsky is not [Arnold] Schwarzenegger and
he's not a banker, so they must have valued him for his information,
which suggests that the information he had been supplying was not
always objective, mildly speaking .... I'd trade 10 Babitskys for one
Russian soldier," Sergeev said in an interview on ORT. (MOSCOW TIMES, 4
Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) According to the Moscow Times, the sister
paper of the St. Petersburg Times, Babitsky was one of the few
reporters whose coverage of the war ran contrary to the rosy picture
put forth by the government-controlled media. It seems likely, then,
that Babitsky's reports contained too much truth for someone in Moscow,
and he was silenced. Babitsky's wife was justifiably enraged and
frightened. In an interview on 3 February, she related that the
government had not let her talk with him at all prior to the
exchange. "I don't even know if he is OK. If Yastrzhembsky says he's
OK, I don't believe him. I don't believe that Yastrzhembsky." (MOSCOW
TIMES, 4 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) Do we? by Jonathan Solomon (4)
DOMESTIC ISSUES & LEGISLATIVE BRANCH DUMA 16 Duma deputies left without
party affiliation Among others, Roman Abramovich, Boris Berezovsky,
Nikolai Gonchar, Mikhail Gutseriev, Alexander Korzhakov, Anatoly
Kulikov and Nikolai Ryzhkov, have yet to announce to which party they
will adhere. Although the numbers fluctuate, the Communist Party will
be the largest single faction in the Third Duma with 93 seats. The
second largest party, Unity, has 81 deputies. Fatherland-All Russia has
46 deputies, the Union of Rightist Forces has 32 and YABLOKO has 21
deputies. The Liberal Democratic Party faction will be the smallest
group with 17 members. In addition to those parties that ran for
office, there are three parliamentary factions: People's Deputy [sic]
with 58 members, Russian Regions Group (the Union of Independent
Deputies) with 39 members, and the Agro-Industrial Deputy Group with 37
members. (ITAR-TASS, 1919 GMT, 21 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0121, via World
News Connection) The numbers Itar-Tass provides, when tallied, do not
actually add up to 450, the number of members of the Duma. The
discrepancy comes from the districts where elections were annulled due
to too many votes in opposition to all the candidates and the vacancy
of the Chechen Republic seat. Opposition boycott ends The Union of
Rightist Forces, YABLOKO, and Fatherland-All Russia, whose members
walked out of the Duma during its first session in protest of a
collusive agreement between the CPRF and Unity, have returned. However,
the three factions have as yet to take up the deputy speaker posts
allotted to them. (BBC World News, 1131 CET, 9 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis)
The question remains whether the three parties will continue their
coordination in opposition to the CPRF/Unity alliance. It is difficult
to know for sure, although two recent developments suggest continued
cooperation is unlikely. First, YABLOKO broke ranks and began
negotiations with Unity prior to the opposition parties' return.
Second, almost everyone in the Duma "supports" acting President
Vladimir Putin, and by extension his Unity party. It appears that the
imminent election of Putin to the presidency has made the parties that
might have opposed him reluctant to do so, perhaps wanting to
participate in the division of spoils after election day. REGIONS
Chechen process of 'normalization' begins It was only to be expected.
Moscow is now beginning to reconstitute Chechnya as a region of the
federation. Recently, a Chechen State Council was set up in Gudermes,
tasked with the coordination of the area's re-building. (INTERFAX, 1017
GMT, 5 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0205, via World News Connection)
Additionally, Chechens are to receive Russian passports. Over 100,000
blank passports are being sent to the police in "liberated" areas of
Chechnya. The new passports will be issued first to schoolchildren aged
14 and older, as well as persons who have temporary identification
cards. (ITAR-TASS, 1351 GMT, 6 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0206, via World
News Connection) And finally, Chechens will be allowed to vote for the
next Russian president. Alexandr Veshnyakov, chairman of Russia's
Central Electoral Commission (CEC), discussed the setting up of the
Electoral Commission of the Chechen Republic (ECCR) which will be given
the same power as similar commissions in Russia's other regions. Along
with elections at the federal level, the ECCR is empowered to
coordinate the holding of regional referenda as well as to prepare and
hold elections to regional governing bodies. Veshnyakov also noted that
until Chechnya has erected its own governing bodies, the process will
be run from Moscow. (ITAR-TASS, 1341 GMT, 1 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0201,
via World News Connection) It is going to take more than bricks,
mortar, and elections to rebuild Chechnya and its relations with
Russia. As the Chechen rebels withdraw into the mountains in the south
of the republic, Moscow may claim victory for now, but winning the
peace may be something else entirely. by Michael DeMar Thurman (5)
ARMED FORCES Russian arms industry's long-term prognosis Russiaąs arms
industry is buzzing with excitement. Acting President Vladimir Putin
approved a $2.18 billion defense procurement budget on 27 January,
which represents a 50-percent increase from 1999. Conventional weapons
will receive higher priority at the expense of nuclear forces, which
consumed 80 percent of the procurement budget last year. (MOSCOW TIMES,
28 Jan 00; via Center for Defense Information Russia Weekly, No. 86)
Russiaąs deputy prime minister, Ilya Klebanov, who oversees Russian
arms sales abroad, rashly predicts Russia will sell $4 billion of
Russian weapons in 2000. This would surpass the $3.5 billion 1999
figure, a record in the post-Soviet era. (AFP, 8 Feb 00; via Johnsonąs
Russia List) Some may believe Russiaąs arms industry, which has been
starved for funds since 1991, is on the road to prosperity. However,
Russiaąs defense sector still has a rough future. The 50-percent
procurement budget increase was due to a reallocation of funds, not an
overall increase in the defense budget. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 1 Feb 00) If
past history is any indication, the defense ministry will be fortunate
to receive full funding. Despite Klebanov's promises to pay all
arrears, the ministry received only 60 percent of funds for the 1999
budget. This is better than 1998, when only 12 percent of the
procurement budget was funded. (MOSCOW TIMES, 28 Jan 00; via Center for
Defense Information Russia Weekly, No. 86) Russiaąs predicted arms
export boom is just an optimistic forecast. Recent reports indicate
Russia may be returning to Soviet-era plan targets. Russiaąs three main
arms trading companies --Rosvooruzhenie, Promeksport, and Rossiyskie
Technologi -- will be compelled by the government to "demonstrate
convincingly exactly how they are planning to fulfill the declared
plans." Some Western analysts have painted a less than rosy picture of
Russiaąs arms exports. They highlight lost market shares in Eastern
Europe and the fact that many former Soviet client states are too poor
to purchase Russian weapons. Some experts even predict an eventual
decline in Russiaąs lucrative arrangement with China and India as the
two buyers increasingly move towards producing their own weapons or
look to other suppliers. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 7 Feb 00)
Russiaąs defense industry problems are far from over. The industry owes
recent successes to technological advances made during the Soviet era.
The collapse of state funding has halted development of any new
discoveries, and many engineers have left the defense sector for more
lucrative positions in the banking and trade industries. The loss of
engineering talent may be a root cause of recent quality problems.
Sukhoi, one of Russiaąs leading aircraft manufacturers, suffered some
serious setbacks in 1999 when a new Su-27 purchased by Ethiopia
crashed. Five months later an Su-30 crashed at the Paris air show.
India has suspended negotiations over the purchase of 300 T-90 tanks
and a manufacturing license after the production model performed poorly
during trials. (AFP, 8 Feb 00; via Johnsonąs Russia List) The prognosis
for Russiaąs arms industry is not good. The 2000 defense budget and
arms export plan are desperate government measures to prevent a
complete collapse of the arms industry and the associated political
fallout. by LCDR James J. Duke Jr. * * * * * All indications are that
the dominoes will keep falling The shake-up of the Russian military
leadership is continuing. In the last two months acting President Putin
has replaced two senior field commanders in Chechnya and the commander-
in-chief of the interior ministry troops. Now there are rumors that the
replacement of military leaders has reached the highest levels --
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev and, by extension, those officers close
to him. It is anticipated that Putin will, shortly after the
presidential elections, move quickly to replace the senior leadership
in the top echelons of the armed forces. This decision will include the
defense minister, probably the chief of the General Staff, and
possibly, commanders of the various service branches. (DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, 26 Jan 00; Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 8 Feb 00) Reasons
for these anticipated changes should not come as a surprise. Putin has
not been pleased with the military reforms instituted over the last two
and a half years. Sergeev has met calls for much-needed reforms with
largely superficial actions, primarily supporting improvements in the
Strategic Rocket Forces -- all at the expense of the disintegrating
conventional forces. Corruption is pervasive and increasingly threatens
to rent the fabric of military discipline and capabilities permanently.
According to most reports, the maltreatment of troops is rampant.
Finally, Putin must consider his political future and decide whether it
would be advantageous, once he wins the elections, for him to leave in
place those Yel'tsin-appointed senior military officers to whom he owes
much of his success to date, since they could call in their markers at
any time. As evidenced in the current Chechen War, Russian military
leaders have shown an increasing willingness to use their weight in
presenting demands of the political leadership. Two main contenders for
the defense minister position most often mentioned are the current
chief of the General Staff, army General Anatoly Kvashnin, and chairman
of the Duma's Defense Committee, retired General Andrei Nikolaev.
General Kvashnin was appointed by Yel'tsin in May 1997 and has been
described as an "effective ... backroom operator whose political skills
may exceed his abilities as a commander." (Jamestown Foundation
MONITOR, 8 Feb 00) He is considered the author not only of the
deployment of Russian peacekeepers into Kosovo but also of the
aggressive military strategy in Chechnya. It is rumored that Kvashnin
and Putin have developed a close working relationship. It is also
claimed that the two men struck a deal last September in which Kvashnin
promised a military victory in Chechnya that would insure Putin's
popularity and political success. In return, Putin would approve a
large increase in the military budget and essentially a free hand for
the military in their conduct of the Chechen War. (GLOBE AND MAIL, 3
Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) This apparent close working relationship and
Kvashnin's support of Putin's objectives in Chechnya would bode well
for Kvashnin's selection as the next defense minister. However, many
experts feel that Kvashnin's star has passed its zenith. Also, once
Putin is president, Kvashnin could prove to be a political liability:
He represents the "old" establishment; and, if Russia declares the
Chechen War a victory, then Kvashnin holds one of Putin's IOUs. More
and more talked about as a successor to Sergeev is retired Russian
General Andrei Nikolaev. He is a former first deputy chief of the
General Staff, and is currently the chairman of the Duma's Defense
Committee. He was reportedly considered in 1997 by Yel'tsin for the
position of chief of the General Staff. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR,
8 Feb 00) Nikolaev is said to share Putin's ideas on military reforms
and has a connection to the Federal Security Services as former
commander of the Border Troops -- a plus on Putin's list. He is a long-
time opponent to the reforms advocated by Sergeev, saying that they
address only the mechanics of reducing the armed forces rather than the
necessary reevaluation of basic roles and missions. His views on
Chechnya are also said to be very close to Putin's. Sources close to
Nikolaev say that, when Putin was forming his Chechen policy, he took
Nikolaev's views as his starting point. (DEFENSE AND SECURITY, 26 Jan
00) However, like Kvashnin, he is considered a political animal with
ambitions and political loyalties, and a penchant for confrontations.
So who is it to be, Kvashnin or Nikolaev, or somebody else out there
still unseen in the wings? Nobody is a clear winner. Most analysts are
still trying to figure Putin out and he is holding his cards pretty
much to his chest. by Jill Skelton
2000) ______________________________________________________ Part I:
Russian Federation (1) Executive Branch by Susan J. Cavan (2) Foreign
Relations by Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah K. Miller (3) Media by
Jonathan Solomon (4) Domestic Issues & Legislative Branch by Michael
DeMar Thurman (5) Armed Forces by LCDR James J. Duke Jr. and Lt Col
Jill Skelton Part II: Newly Independent States (1) CIS by Sarah K.
Miller (2) Western Region by Tammy Lynch (3) Caucasus by Miriam Lanskoy
(4) Central Asia by Monika Shepherd (5) Baltic States by Kate Martin
Part I: RUSSIAN FEDERATION (1) EXECUTIVE BRANCH Putin's Soul In an
address to the justice ministry board at the end of last month, acting
President Vladimir Putin pointed out that the machinery of state
was "neglected, rickety and disorderly," and prescribed the creation of
a "strong" state, defined as one which "upholds the rights and freedoms
of the individual." (ITAR-TASS, 1025 & 1028 GMT, 31 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0131, via World News Connection) Putin further criticized the
legislative chaos created by the melding of Soviet-era and post-Soviet
laws, and called for a renovation of the legal framework to be
facilitated by the judiciary. These comments, along with some public
ruminations on a possible referendum on land reform, thus far provide a
scant basis for assessing Putin's political intentions. Little more is
thought to be forthcoming, however, as candidate Putin has announced
that he will delay issuing his electoral platform for fear of criticism
of his policies. "As soon as you make it public, they will start
gnawing at it and tearing it to pieces," Putin claimed. (IZVESTIA, 9
Feb 00; via Johnson's Russia List) Despite the lack of information
about his political affiliations, Putin still seems quite likely to win
the March presidential elections. Earlier this month two potential
challengers withdrew themselves from the race. Fatherland-All Russia
leaders Yevgeni Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov both pulled out of the
presidential poll, with Luzhkov taking a parting shot at Putin. "I am
not running against Vladimir Putin...," Luzhkov said, "but I am very
worried for Russia's future under Putin." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2 Feb
00; via C-...@clari.net) Luzhkov is not the only leading Russian figure
with reservations about Putin's stewardship of Russia. As John
Thornhill observes in The Financial Times (8 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis),
there is a battle on for Vladimir Putin's political soul and many
prominent Russian liberals are concerned that they are not winning the
struggle. Andrei Piontkovsky, who heads the Center for Strategic
Studies, observes, "People say Putin is the lesser evil but in what
units can you measure evil?" Piontkovsky elaborated on his concerns for
a Putin regime by reviewing what Putin has undertaken thus
far: "Putinism is war, it is national 'consolidation' based on hatred
towards a particular ethnic group. It is attacks on freedom of speech
and use of information to create zombies, it is isolation from the
outside world and further economic degradation." (THE RUSSIAN JOURNAL,
14-20 Feb 00; via Johnson's Russia List) The return of Yastrzhembsky In
compiling his presidential team, Vladimir Putin has, rather unusually,
reached out to a former Yel'tsin apparatchik (and reputed close
adviser) who was abruptly dismissed during the government crisis of
1998, following the devaluation of the ruble. Sergei Yastrzhembsky,
Yel'tsin's press spokesman and a deputy chief of his Kremlin staff, has
been named by presidential decree to oversee the press services of the
armed forces, including the Chechen campaign, as well as other
agencies. (INTERFAX, 1825 GMT, 20 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0120, via World
News Connection) The appointment suggests that Putin has a great deal
of confidence in Yastrzhembsky, as "managing" media coverage of the war
in Chechnya has been a high priority of his administration and surely
will continue to be so at least until the presidential elections.
Yastrzhembsky was most recently a member of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's
administration, and his appointment could possibly be viewed as
conciliatory towards the mayor. It may, however, reveal more about the
shift of importance in part of the "Family" within the Kremlin.
Yastrzhembsky's ouster in 1998 was reputed to have been engineered by
then-Chief of Staff Valentin Yumashev and Tatiana Dyachenko. (See
EDITORIAL DIGEST, 16 Sep 98) It is unlikely that Putin sought their
input into this latest appointment. Borodin farce The once powerful
Kremlin economic manager, Pavel Borodin, seemed headed for his long-
anticipated fall last month when press reports claimed that Swiss
authorities had issued a warrant for his arrest in connection with the
Mabetex corruption investigation. This is a story as muddy and complex
as a money-laundering scheme itself, however, as in the days following
the initial reports questions quickly surfaced about whether a warrant
had been issued, or perhaps a secret warrant? Was Borodin to be
arrested or merely brought in for questioning? Perhaps most crucial to
Borodin is the issue of whether his new post as secretary of The
Belarus-Russian State Council provides him with immunity from
prosecution. Borodin categorically denied the warrant story: "There is
no warrant for my arrest...," he said, "This is purely a political
assassination attempt." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 0950 PST, 28 Jan 00; via
C-...@clari.net) Putin himself is not unaffected by this development.
His Kremlin career did begin, after all, in the economic management
office as a deputy to Borodin. Dismissing Borodin from his Kremlin post
was one of Putin's earliest moves as acting president, but by
ensconcing Borodin at the new State Council, Putin created an aura of
protection surrounding his former boss. GOVERNMENT Stepashin on war
plans It may be that Sergei Stepashin felt a moment of bitterness
toward Putin in the initial aftermath of the Duma faction clash that
produced an alliance between Unity and the Communists, but whatever his
motivations or regrets he certainly dropped a bombshell last month when
he confirmed what we long surmised: The Chechen war was planned long in
advance of the alleged terrorist bombings in Moscow. (THE MOSCOW TIMES,
20 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) Stepashin claimed that the decision to
invade Chechnya was made in March 1999 and planned for August-
September. Stepashin, who was head of the MVD at the time and therefore
certainly in a position to know, further claimed that Putin, as then-
FSB chief, was fully aware of the military planning. While analysts
within Russia commenting on this development are surprisingly few,
there are those attempting to explain the ramifications of this
information and its impact on a determination of the current
leadership's character. Respected military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer
(in the article cited above) warns: "In Chechnya, Putin has acted as an
irrational warmonger.... It is possible that Putin -- the political
unknown -- is in fact a Russian version of Milosevic, an aggressive,
irresponsible nationalist armed with thousands of nuclear warheads."
SECURITY SERVICES Where is Babitsky? Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei
Babitsky has been missing in Chechnya since the middle of January.
Various sources have claimed since his disappearance that he was
arrested by Russian forces for aiding Chechen rebels, was under house
arrest and/or had been traded to Chechen rebels for three Russian
soldiers. Recently, Federal Security Services Chief Nikolai Patrushev
weighed in on the case by confirming to reporters that Babitsky was
alive, but Patrushev would not elaborate on Babitsky's status or
whereabouts. "I don't know where he is -- that is beyond our
department," Patrushev claimed. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 8 Feb 00; via lexis-
nexis) Service rallies for elections Patrushev also recently held a
collegium meeting in order to brief his personnel on their role in the
conduct of the upcoming presidential elections. (MOSCOW NEWS, 26 Jan
00; via lexis-nexis) Patrushev highlighted the need for the FSB to
target "dirty election technology," which he characterized as "mud
slinging, illegally obtained facts, information about individuals'
private life, and other types of sleaze." There were no recorded
comments on the penalty for mud slinging, but the inherent threat will
undoubtedly serve further to chill an already cowed media. The meeting
was also attended by Kremlin Chief of Staff Aleksandr Voloshin, who
asked the service to focus on Article 11 of the Presidential Election
Law, which deals with foreign influence on an election campaign.
Voloshin's comments were seen as having a direct effect on media
coverage of the Chechen war. Should any outlet change its reportage
from a "Russian" interpretation to the more critical take of foreign
media coverage in Chechnya, an investigation of foreign influence of
that media outlet would surely follow. by Susan J. Cavan (2) FOREIGN
RELATIONS Dr. Albright makes a house call Maybe history really has
ended: Russian-US relations, at least, seem to be in a state of
suspended animation. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's deeply
pointless trip to Moscow in early February accomplished little that
could not have been handled by FedEx -- with one caveat. By making a
merely symbolic appearance in the Russian capital just as the Chechen
capital Grozny fell, Albright again gave the Kremlin's vicious war the
United States' seal of polite disapproval. And yet the actions of
Russian government recently indicate that history remains in motion, if
only in reverse. The revelation of Russia's involvement in helping Iraq
skirt sanctions on its oil, as well as deeper ties to anti-Western
governments in Asia, hint that the new regime in the Kremlin is reading
from a very old playbook. Although they reportedly got along well
personally, Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov did
little during Albright's recent visit to Moscow but return to tiresome
go-rounds on Chechnya, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Kosovo and
Russia-NATO relations. Nothing of substance was accomplished on any
front. The only two agreements signed, in fact, were minor: a protocol
for how to recover American technology if a Russian rocket carrying an
American satellite failed, and amendments to a previous agreement on
monitoring nuclear threats. (INTERFAX, 1452 GMT, 27 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0127, via World News Connection) The Chinese are suspected of
having stolen American missile guidance systems by blowing up such a
rocket in 1996 (THE WASHINGTON POST, 8 Jul 98; via lexis-nexis), so the
new missile security measures were a useful, if belated, measure to
take. But given that these deals were about as complex as an apartment
lease, Albright's trip to Moscow was merely symbolic. Albright's trip,
moreover, was symbolic in the worst possible way, undermining the weak
criticism of the Chechen war that she offered. While in Moscow,
Albright joined the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Tunis, Canada, as well as officials from the Palestinian
Authority, the European Union, Japan, China and Switzerland at meetings
on the Middle East question that the White House had helped Moscow to
sponsor. (ITAR-TASS, 0801 GMT, 1 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0201, via World
News Connection) Albright later warned that Russia risked international
isolation for pursuing its savage war in the Caucasus. (THE WASHINGTON
POST, 3 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) Well, apparently not. Albright arrived
in Moscow unsure whether acting Russian President Vladimir Putin would
be able to find time to meet her, but after a three-hour session with
him on 3 February she was fulsome with her praise. The former KGB
officer, Albright said, was "a very well-informed person, a good
interlocutor, obviously a Russian patriot who seeks a normal position
with the West." No, the Secretary of State and Putin had not agreed on
Chechnya, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Kosovo or Russia-NATO
relations. But Putin had spoken without using notes. "What is
important," Albright added, "is to judge him by what he does." (THE NEW
YORK TIMES, 3 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) Which act had made more of an
impression on Albright -- Putin's speaking without a script or his
prosecution of the Chechen war? Prudently reserving judgment, the
Secretary of State did not say. Judging him by what he does However,
her emphasis on Putin's deeds rather than his words seemed especially
justified after Putin addressed the diplomats gathered for the Middle
East summit. Putin's struck an accommodating stance that was as
remarkable for its moderation as it was for its insincerity. In his
first speech on foreign policy since assuming power on New Year's Eve,
Putin declined to use some of the code words of anti-Westernism that
had marked Yel'tsin's last years. He did not, for example, refer to
Russia's ambition to help create a "multipolar world," and insisted
instead that "we are not fighting for spheres of influence and we are
not trying to compete with anyone." Criticism of NATO action in Kosovo,
usually an explicit part of any Russian foreign policy statement, was
limited to an oblique commitment to "forming a stable and indivisible
Europe built not on the (exercise) of force but on the principles of
the United Nations (charter)." (UPI, 1258 GMT, 1 Feb 00; via lexis-
nexis) Instead, Putin insisted that Russia would cooperate with other
world powers in tackling the problems of international terrorism, the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, "aggressive separatism" and, in a new
theme, the potential for conflict emerging from the growing gap between
rich and poor nations. "Russia is a reliable, constructive and
predictable partner in building Big Europe," Putin said. "Our policy
will remain honest, open and transparent." (INTERFAX, 1019 GMT, 1 Feb
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0201, via World News Connection) The difference
between Putin's words and deeds became apparent days after his talk,
however, when US ships enforcing United Nations sanctions against Iraq
intercepted a Russian tanker suspected of smuggling oil. The tanker had
sought to evade the UN patrols by hugging the Iranian coast, but was
caught off the United Arab Emirates as it passed through the Strait of
Hormuz. State Department spokesman James Foley later said US officials
had been warning Moscow about the activities of Russian-flagged ships
for the previous month. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1217 EST, 3 Feb 00; via
lexis-nexis) Illicit smuggling of Iraqi oil, Foley said, had increased
sharply since autumn 1998. Russia's deeper involvement in thwarting the
sanctions comes less than a month after Moscow forced the UN to appoint
its candidate to head the new Iraqi weapons inspection team. (See THE
NIS OBSERVED, 18 Jan 00) At the same time Russia has been pressing for
the appointment of new permanent member countries to the UN Security
Council, and has said it will welcome changes among the current
rotating members. (INTERFAX, 0908 GMT, 31 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0131,
via World News Connection) Russia is Iraq's largest creditor-nation,
and has long sought to end sanctions in order to pursue lucrative
contracts exploiting its oil reserves. The Russian government denied
that the privately owned tanker was smuggling but offered to cooperate
fully with the investigation of the affair. Rossiyskaya gazeta, the
government-owned daily, took the opportunity to strike a firmer stance
against the West. The tanker incident, the paper said, had been sprung
just after Albright left Moscow as part of a wider plan to "undermine
trust in Russia" -- just as previous libeling of the Soviet Union had
undermined its authority. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 8 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0208, via World News Connection) The seizure of the Russia ship might
well have been inspired by the political tussle between Russia and the
US over sanctions against Iraq, but the marked increase in Russian
smuggling would seem to put the blame for escalating tensions with
Russia, not the US. And whether Putin makes explicit reference to
a "multipolar" world order or not, his actions in the Far East (see
below) indicate that his government remains committed to building
strong military and diplomatic ties to Asian nations -- especially
China -- with their own grievances about US dominance. The explicit
comparison, moreover, of Western criticism of Russia now and its
previous criticism of the Soviet Union -- published in a government
newspaper -- indicates how far the Kremlin has slipped back into its
old world view. Putin has already retired the Yel'tsin nostrum that the
Soviet Union was not Russia. His foreign policy deeds, if not his
words, show the decree to which he also equates Russia's orientation in
the world with that of the empire it supposedly abandoned. by Chandler
Rosenberger * * * * * 'Tacit' multipolarism Russia's Asia policy got a
boost from Deputy Foreign Minister Gregori Karasin on 8 February in a
speech outlining Moscow's three main goals in East Asia. All three aims
were predictable, focusing on international security, bilateral
confidence-building and political-economic development. (RFE/RL
NEWSLINE, 8 Feb 00) Karasin's comments clarified acting President
Vladimir Putin's foreign policy speech from 1 February and anticipated
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's East Asia trip this week. In his speech,
Putin omitted any mention of Russia's "multipolar policy," which has
guided Russia's attempts to improve relations with non-Western
countries over the past few years. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 2 Feb
00) However, Karasin's remarks a week later reveal that, despite
Putin's omission, little change is likely in Russia's Asia policy.
Putin may indulge in fewer rhetorical flourishes as he attempts to
establish himself as a competent statesman in the runup to the
presidential election; however, that should not be mistaken for a
genuine shift in Russia's Asia policy. It seems that a newly
reinvigorated "tacit multipolarism" may pick up where the previous
government's largely successful "multipolar policy" left off. In this
context, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's trip to North Korea (DPRK),
Japan and Vietnam this week indicates Russia's renewed energy for
tackling issues that were shelved due to Yel'tsin's illnesses and the
urgency of other concerns such as Kosovo and Chechnya. During his stay
in the DPRK, Ivanov will sign the new Russia-DPRK Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty which has been on hold since last spring when
Karasin initialed it in Pyongyang. (REUTERS, 7 Feb 00; via
RussiaToday.com) Russian relations with the DPRK were strained in the
early 1990s by Russia's warming ties with South Korea, but the new
treaty and a good trip for Ivanov will signal an improvement in
relations. In addition to the bilateral benefits of warming relations
with the DPRK, better ties will suit Russia's long-term diplomatic
goals on the peninsula. For some time Russia has expressed interest in
six-way talks to conclude a peace treaty between North and South Korea.
Russian involvement in arranging peace talks on the peninsula would be
a timely diplomatic gain for Moscow, and the new Friendship Treaty is
the first step towards this goal. Although the Kurile Islands and peace
treaty issues remain unresolved with the Japanese, Ivanov's trip may
yield more results than his trip to Tokyo last spring. This may be due
to the more pragmatic approach that Russia has been taking towards
Japan. At this point, these two subjects continue to plague relations
since Japan still hinges the Russo-Japanese peace treaty on the
resolution of the Kurile Islands issue, while Russia is unwilling to
give up its control over the islands. Although these obstacles, as well
as US National Missile Defense plans, have thwarted Russo-Japanese
relations in the past, Ivanov's trip will likely focus on the more
positive aspects of Russo-Japanese relations such as economic
cooperation. Japan remains Asia's economic powerhouse and provided
Russia with much-needed loans even after the Asian financial collapse,
when other lenders refused. Although Ivanov and his Japanese
counterpart inevitably will discuss the outstanding territorial issues,
Russia seems prepared to intensify relations in other realms. This
decision will not solve the problems in Russo-Japanese relations, but
for the time being it will give Russia an opportunity to strengthen
important economic ties. (ITAR-TASS, 0929 GMT, 28 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0128, via World News Connection) Economics have been the driving force
behind Russia's relations with Vietnam for some time. Beginning with
arms sales, Russia has sought out profitable deals with the Vietnamese
that are now expanding into the energy and technology sectors.
According to the Vietnamese, Russia is their country's eighth largest
investor, but several new projects may propel Russia to the top of the
list in the near future. In addition to the bilateral economic
situation, Ivanov's visit will prepare the grounds for April's ASEAN
business forum, at which Russian companies will have a chance to meet
with ASEAN members. (ITAR-TASS, 1907 GMT, 3 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0203,
via World News Connection) None of these developments should surprise
Western politicians, since Russia has openly warned the West of its
intentions in Asia for months. Now that a new, healthier leadership
seems poised to replace formally the old, ailing one, Russia appears to
be revitalizing its Asia policy. For some time, Russia's multipolar
policy has focused on increasing and improving Russian partnerships in
Asia. In light of Russia's increasingly frail relations with the West,
it is natural that Russia pursues these economic and security
partnerships. But even though there are economic benefits to be had,
Karasin's remarks and Russia's current international situation suggest
that geopolitics remain the driving force behind Putin's "tacit
multipolarism." As such, the major thrust of the policy seems aimed at
the West. by Sarah K. Miller (3) MEDIA The real information war In
1999, being an independent journalist in Russia was hardly the safest
of professions. Twelve journalists were murdered last year and many
more were assaulted, according to Alexei Simonov, president of the Fund
for Defense of Glasnost. (ITAR-TASS, 2129 GMT, 12 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0113, via World News Connection) On the night of 29 November 99,
unknown assailants severely battered Igor Rostov, general director of
the Kaskad TV and radio company of Kaliningrad. In a letter to Interior
Minister Vladimir Rushailo and Acting Prosecutor General Vladimir
Ustinov protesting the attack, the president of the National TV and
Radio Association, Eduard Sagalaev, directly linked the incident to the
Duma campaigns. "Against the complicated background of the election
campaign, correspondents and chiefs of regional mass media bodies daily
become a direct object of pressure and threats on the part of persons
carrying out the dirty political struggle," Sagalaev declared. (ITAR-
TASS, 1535 GMT, 3 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1204, via World News
Connection) Many press offices came under attack as well. On 1
December, the Interfax agency reportedly received a bomb threat just
prior to a press conference with Anatoly Chubais and Union of Right
Wing Forces leader Sergei Kirienko. The agency received a nearly
identical threat the next day as well. While the occasion gave Interfax
the opportunity to declare that the news agency has "never been and
will never be politically engaged," it was typical of attempts by
varying factions to exert physical pressure in efforts to influence the
mass media's reporting, as well as who they let speak. (INTERFAX, 1130
GMT, 2 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1203, via World News Connection) The
situation deteriorates the farther away from Moscow one travels. In the
Maritime Krai, a feed cable of the radio station Lemma, which gave a
voice to opponents of the region's governor, was cut in December. There
one must receive 14 separate authorizations to set up a mere newspaper
stand, while in Sakhalin the government demands four, which almost
seems fair in comparison! Most regions are lucky if they have an
independent news outlet, and it must be considered that the majority of
printing presses and broadcast centers which the independent media in
Russia use are leased from the state. (OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, 9 Dec 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-1209, via World News Connection) And you complained about
campaign mudslinging in New Hampshire? Whereas some used violence, or
at least the threat of it, to affect coverage of the campaigns, the
oligarchs and the blocs relied on other means. On 3 December, Moscow's
Mayor and Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) leader Yuri Luzhkov won a libel
lawsuit against Boris Berezovsky's state-managed ORT TV network and one
of its prominent anchors, Sergei Dorenko. ORT was forced to pay 50,000
rubles and Dorenko R100,000 due to the "moral damage" done to the
mayor. (ITAR-TASS, 1915 GMT, 3 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1203, via World
News Connection) But strangely (or not so strangely) enough, three days
later reports surfaced that Dorenko had been appointed deputy director
general of ORT. For its part, ORT neither confirmed nor denied the
apparent promotion. (INTERFAX, 1612 GMT, 6 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1206,
via World News Connection) But the propaganda attacks by those in the
Kremlin's pocket were seemingly successful in propelling the Unity bloc
to victory over OVR. Berezovsky, by then a newly elected Duma
representative, openly declared that Dorenko "is an indefinitely
talented person," and that Dorenko's actions bore "a plus rather than a
minus sign. Dorenko's role was enormous." (INTERFAX, 1102 GMT, 22 Dec
99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1222, via World News Connection) >From 28 November
through the election, the European Institute for the Media, under the
auspices of the OSCE, monitored the press coverage of the campaigns.
According to the institute's Gillian McCormack, OVR "and its leaders,
Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov, received the most negative coverage
of any party during the campaign." She declared the pro-Kremlin ORT and
RTR networks "the worst offenders," and noted that the media war was
fiercest between Berezovsky's Kremlin-allied outlets and Vladimir
Gusinsky's OVR-allied outlets. Stations owned by both blatantly
promoted their respective blocs in reports that aired under the
pretense of being actual news pieces, according to McCormack. McCormack
took ORT and the RTR network to task for several reasons. First, as
they had the "greatest national audience reach, (they) had a particular
responsibility to provide impartial information about the political
choice on offer to the electorate." Their coverage, heavily biased
against OVR and for Unity, "failed to meet standards set in Russian law
and in international agreements and conventions signed by the Russian
Federation." Feeding off Vladimir Putin's popularity, the networks
would often combine coverage of his actions in government with that of
Unity's campaigning. She noted that Dorenko's Sunday night news
analysis program on ORT was the most popular such program in Russia
leading up to the election, and condemned him for using "his position
to call Luzhkov everything from a supporter of evil sects to a
murderer." In McCormack's opinion, the problems of the Russian media
stem from the nature of their ownership and the absence of political
interest in protecting journalists, not to mention a general lack of
journalistic ethics, integrity and depth. Indeed, she observed
that "the absence of any real analysis of the Chechen conflict" is
partly the cause of its high popularity among Russians, not to mention
the fact that this popularity directly transferred to Putin and Unity.
(MOSCOW TIMES, 29 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) It must seem absolutely
ludicrous, then, that Putin "expressed hope that journalists will do
their utmost to ensure an 'honest and clean' campaign" in the March
presidential race. (ITAR-TASS, 1211 GMT, 13 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0113,
via World News Connection) Trouble at NTV Heaven forbid anyone should
question the speed of Putin's rise to power and popularity or his
background! The "Voice of the People" program on Gusinsky's NTV did
just this, and received the wrath of state-run media as a result. In an
editorial shortly afterward, Rossiyskaya gazeta implied that those on
NTV who questioned Putin were "yesterday's men, who still dream of
returning the country to its 'radiant past.'" Indeed, why should these
issues "be discussed in the premier's absence, if he demonstrates day
in, day out his openness and readiness to give public replies to the
most pointed of questions?" (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 20 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0120, via World News Connection) On 21 January, NTV co-founder and
general director Oleg Dobrodeev resigned without expressing a reason.
Yevgeny Kiselev, chairman of the board of NTV and host of the "Itogi"
program, took his place. The move was interpreted by the Moscow media
as indication of "deep disturbances among television management as a
result of political pressures associated with the election season and
Chechen campaign." According to the St. Petersburg Times, a Western-
owned English-language paper, Izvestia television critic Irina
Petrovskaya interviewed Gusinsky at NTV's sixth birthday party.
Gusinsky claimed that he and Dobrodeev were disagreeing over the
coverage of Chechnya, and that he, himself, had insisted that NTV "not
be a mouthpiece for the Defense Ministry and that it report the tragedy
of refugees and civilians as well as the military successes." Dobrodeev
did not attend the party. The Moscow media viewed Gusinsky's assertions
cynically. Dobrodeev was the one who was pushing for more balanced
coverage, they felt. At a press conference on 19 December, Dobrodeev
appeared depressed by the partisan journalism during the Duma
campaigns, saying "All television channels came out of this election
campaign with huge losses to their reputations. I can only hope that we
at NTV managed to minimalize them." Manana Alslamzian of Internews
Russia summed up the concerns of the press: "Who will replace such
people and how much lower will the ethical standards of our journalism
drop?" (ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 21 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) A sign of
things to come? What began as a freedom of the press issue has become
the telling indicator of whether glasnost is truly dead under a Putin
government. On 23 January, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter
Andrei Babitsky was arrested because he "broke the rules set for
correspondents in the area of the anti-terrorist operation," according
to acting Prosecutor General Ustinov. In Ustinov's 31 January
announcement, he stated that Babitsky would remain incarcerated for at
least the next 10 days. (INTERFAX, 1117 GMT, 31 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0131, via World News Connection) However, on 3 February the Russian
government reported that he was traded to "Chechen rebels" for some
Russian soldiers. The exchange was videotaped by members of the FSB,
and aired on Russian television. An FSB spokesman confirmed on NTV that
his service had made the tape, but said that "the question of the
journalist's freeing and turning over should be addressed to the
prosecutor's office and military command. The Russian Federal Security
Service did not institute a criminal case, did not detain Andrei
Babitsky, and had no relation to his detention and to what happened
later." He added that the only reason that the FSB made the videotape
was that an "FSB worker proved to be the only one who had a video
camera." (ITAR-TASS, 0839 GMT, 4 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0204, via World
News Connection) And just what was an FSB worker doing at the exchange
of a Russian national with "terrorists," especially when the
service "had no relation" to the affair at all? Also on 4 February,
reports circulated that the transfer had occurred at Babitsky's
request. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the Kremlin's spokesman on the Chechen
War, displayed a copy of an agreement that Babitsky had supposedly
signed to authorize the exchange. (MOSCOW TIMES, 4 Feb 00; via lexis-
nexis) First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Colonel General
Valery Manilov commented at a press conference that "it would be okay,
and even worth talking of gratitude or even an award, if there's no
dark side to the question, which has been expressed by Andrei's
willingness to go to the militants." (INTERFAX, 1447 GMT, 4 Feb 00;
FBIS-SOV-2000-0204, via World News Connection) The possibility of
gratitude for such a "criminal" as Babitsky? Defense Minister Igor
Sergeev had harsher words. "Babitsky is not [Arnold] Schwarzenegger and
he's not a banker, so they must have valued him for his information,
which suggests that the information he had been supplying was not
always objective, mildly speaking .... I'd trade 10 Babitskys for one
Russian soldier," Sergeev said in an interview on ORT. (MOSCOW TIMES, 4
Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) According to the Moscow Times, the sister
paper of the St. Petersburg Times, Babitsky was one of the few
reporters whose coverage of the war ran contrary to the rosy picture
put forth by the government-controlled media. It seems likely, then,
that Babitsky's reports contained too much truth for someone in Moscow,
and he was silenced. Babitsky's wife was justifiably enraged and
frightened. In an interview on 3 February, she related that the
government had not let her talk with him at all prior to the
exchange. "I don't even know if he is OK. If Yastrzhembsky says he's
OK, I don't believe him. I don't believe that Yastrzhembsky." (MOSCOW
TIMES, 4 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) Do we? by Jonathan Solomon (4)
DOMESTIC ISSUES & LEGISLATIVE BRANCH DUMA 16 Duma deputies left without
party affiliation Among others, Roman Abramovich, Boris Berezovsky,
Nikolai Gonchar, Mikhail Gutseriev, Alexander Korzhakov, Anatoly
Kulikov and Nikolai Ryzhkov, have yet to announce to which party they
will adhere. Although the numbers fluctuate, the Communist Party will
be the largest single faction in the Third Duma with 93 seats. The
second largest party, Unity, has 81 deputies. Fatherland-All Russia has
46 deputies, the Union of Rightist Forces has 32 and YABLOKO has 21
deputies. The Liberal Democratic Party faction will be the smallest
group with 17 members. In addition to those parties that ran for
office, there are three parliamentary factions: People's Deputy [sic]
with 58 members, Russian Regions Group (the Union of Independent
Deputies) with 39 members, and the Agro-Industrial Deputy Group with 37
members. (ITAR-TASS, 1919 GMT, 21 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0121, via World
News Connection) The numbers Itar-Tass provides, when tallied, do not
actually add up to 450, the number of members of the Duma. The
discrepancy comes from the districts where elections were annulled due
to too many votes in opposition to all the candidates and the vacancy
of the Chechen Republic seat. Opposition boycott ends The Union of
Rightist Forces, YABLOKO, and Fatherland-All Russia, whose members
walked out of the Duma during its first session in protest of a
collusive agreement between the CPRF and Unity, have returned. However,
the three factions have as yet to take up the deputy speaker posts
allotted to them. (BBC World News, 1131 CET, 9 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis)
The question remains whether the three parties will continue their
coordination in opposition to the CPRF/Unity alliance. It is difficult
to know for sure, although two recent developments suggest continued
cooperation is unlikely. First, YABLOKO broke ranks and began
negotiations with Unity prior to the opposition parties' return.
Second, almost everyone in the Duma "supports" acting President
Vladimir Putin, and by extension his Unity party. It appears that the
imminent election of Putin to the presidency has made the parties that
might have opposed him reluctant to do so, perhaps wanting to
participate in the division of spoils after election day. REGIONS
Chechen process of 'normalization' begins It was only to be expected.
Moscow is now beginning to reconstitute Chechnya as a region of the
federation. Recently, a Chechen State Council was set up in Gudermes,
tasked with the coordination of the area's re-building. (INTERFAX, 1017
GMT, 5 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0205, via World News Connection)
Additionally, Chechens are to receive Russian passports. Over 100,000
blank passports are being sent to the police in "liberated" areas of
Chechnya. The new passports will be issued first to schoolchildren aged
14 and older, as well as persons who have temporary identification
cards. (ITAR-TASS, 1351 GMT, 6 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0206, via World
News Connection) And finally, Chechens will be allowed to vote for the
next Russian president. Alexandr Veshnyakov, chairman of Russia's
Central Electoral Commission (CEC), discussed the setting up of the
Electoral Commission of the Chechen Republic (ECCR) which will be given
the same power as similar commissions in Russia's other regions. Along
with elections at the federal level, the ECCR is empowered to
coordinate the holding of regional referenda as well as to prepare and
hold elections to regional governing bodies. Veshnyakov also noted that
until Chechnya has erected its own governing bodies, the process will
be run from Moscow. (ITAR-TASS, 1341 GMT, 1 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0201,
via World News Connection) It is going to take more than bricks,
mortar, and elections to rebuild Chechnya and its relations with
Russia. As the Chechen rebels withdraw into the mountains in the south
of the republic, Moscow may claim victory for now, but winning the
peace may be something else entirely. by Michael DeMar Thurman (5)
ARMED FORCES Russian arms industry's long-term prognosis Russiaąs arms
industry is buzzing with excitement. Acting President Vladimir Putin
approved a $2.18 billion defense procurement budget on 27 January,
which represents a 50-percent increase from 1999. Conventional weapons
will receive higher priority at the expense of nuclear forces, which
consumed 80 percent of the procurement budget last year. (MOSCOW TIMES,
28 Jan 00; via Center for Defense Information Russia Weekly, No. 86)
Russiaąs deputy prime minister, Ilya Klebanov, who oversees Russian
arms sales abroad, rashly predicts Russia will sell $4 billion of
Russian weapons in 2000. This would surpass the $3.5 billion 1999
figure, a record in the post-Soviet era. (AFP, 8 Feb 00; via Johnsonąs
Russia List) Some may believe Russiaąs arms industry, which has been
starved for funds since 1991, is on the road to prosperity. However,
Russiaąs defense sector still has a rough future. The 50-percent
procurement budget increase was due to a reallocation of funds, not an
overall increase in the defense budget. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 1 Feb 00) If
past history is any indication, the defense ministry will be fortunate
to receive full funding. Despite Klebanov's promises to pay all
arrears, the ministry received only 60 percent of funds for the 1999
budget. This is better than 1998, when only 12 percent of the
procurement budget was funded. (MOSCOW TIMES, 28 Jan 00; via Center for
Defense Information Russia Weekly, No. 86) Russiaąs predicted arms
export boom is just an optimistic forecast. Recent reports indicate
Russia may be returning to Soviet-era plan targets. Russiaąs three main
arms trading companies --Rosvooruzhenie, Promeksport, and Rossiyskie
Technologi -- will be compelled by the government to "demonstrate
convincingly exactly how they are planning to fulfill the declared
plans." Some Western analysts have painted a less than rosy picture of
Russiaąs arms exports. They highlight lost market shares in Eastern
Europe and the fact that many former Soviet client states are too poor
to purchase Russian weapons. Some experts even predict an eventual
decline in Russiaąs lucrative arrangement with China and India as the
two buyers increasingly move towards producing their own weapons or
look to other suppliers. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 7 Feb 00)
Russiaąs defense industry problems are far from over. The industry owes
recent successes to technological advances made during the Soviet era.
The collapse of state funding has halted development of any new
discoveries, and many engineers have left the defense sector for more
lucrative positions in the banking and trade industries. The loss of
engineering talent may be a root cause of recent quality problems.
Sukhoi, one of Russiaąs leading aircraft manufacturers, suffered some
serious setbacks in 1999 when a new Su-27 purchased by Ethiopia
crashed. Five months later an Su-30 crashed at the Paris air show.
India has suspended negotiations over the purchase of 300 T-90 tanks
and a manufacturing license after the production model performed poorly
during trials. (AFP, 8 Feb 00; via Johnsonąs Russia List) The prognosis
for Russiaąs arms industry is not good. The 2000 defense budget and
arms export plan are desperate government measures to prevent a
complete collapse of the arms industry and the associated political
fallout. by LCDR James J. Duke Jr. * * * * * All indications are that
the dominoes will keep falling The shake-up of the Russian military
leadership is continuing. In the last two months acting President Putin
has replaced two senior field commanders in Chechnya and the commander-
in-chief of the interior ministry troops. Now there are rumors that the
replacement of military leaders has reached the highest levels --
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev and, by extension, those officers close
to him. It is anticipated that Putin will, shortly after the
presidential elections, move quickly to replace the senior leadership
in the top echelons of the armed forces. This decision will include the
defense minister, probably the chief of the General Staff, and
possibly, commanders of the various service branches. (DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, 26 Jan 00; Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 8 Feb 00) Reasons
for these anticipated changes should not come as a surprise. Putin has
not been pleased with the military reforms instituted over the last two
and a half years. Sergeev has met calls for much-needed reforms with
largely superficial actions, primarily supporting improvements in the
Strategic Rocket Forces -- all at the expense of the disintegrating
conventional forces. Corruption is pervasive and increasingly threatens
to rent the fabric of military discipline and capabilities permanently.
According to most reports, the maltreatment of troops is rampant.
Finally, Putin must consider his political future and decide whether it
would be advantageous, once he wins the elections, for him to leave in
place those Yel'tsin-appointed senior military officers to whom he owes
much of his success to date, since they could call in their markers at
any time. As evidenced in the current Chechen War, Russian military
leaders have shown an increasing willingness to use their weight in
presenting demands of the political leadership. Two main contenders for
the defense minister position most often mentioned are the current
chief of the General Staff, army General Anatoly Kvashnin, and chairman
of the Duma's Defense Committee, retired General Andrei Nikolaev.
General Kvashnin was appointed by Yel'tsin in May 1997 and has been
described as an "effective ... backroom operator whose political skills
may exceed his abilities as a commander." (Jamestown Foundation
MONITOR, 8 Feb 00) He is considered the author not only of the
deployment of Russian peacekeepers into Kosovo but also of the
aggressive military strategy in Chechnya. It is rumored that Kvashnin
and Putin have developed a close working relationship. It is also
claimed that the two men struck a deal last September in which Kvashnin
promised a military victory in Chechnya that would insure Putin's
popularity and political success. In return, Putin would approve a
large increase in the military budget and essentially a free hand for
the military in their conduct of the Chechen War. (GLOBE AND MAIL, 3
Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) This apparent close working relationship and
Kvashnin's support of Putin's objectives in Chechnya would bode well
for Kvashnin's selection as the next defense minister. However, many
experts feel that Kvashnin's star has passed its zenith. Also, once
Putin is president, Kvashnin could prove to be a political liability:
He represents the "old" establishment; and, if Russia declares the
Chechen War a victory, then Kvashnin holds one of Putin's IOUs. More
and more talked about as a successor to Sergeev is retired Russian
General Andrei Nikolaev. He is a former first deputy chief of the
General Staff, and is currently the chairman of the Duma's Defense
Committee. He was reportedly considered in 1997 by Yel'tsin for the
position of chief of the General Staff. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR,
8 Feb 00) Nikolaev is said to share Putin's ideas on military reforms
and has a connection to the Federal Security Services as former
commander of the Border Troops -- a plus on Putin's list. He is a long-
time opponent to the reforms advocated by Sergeev, saying that they
address only the mechanics of reducing the armed forces rather than the
necessary reevaluation of basic roles and missions. His views on
Chechnya are also said to be very close to Putin's. Sources close to
Nikolaev say that, when Putin was forming his Chechen policy, he took
Nikolaev's views as his starting point. (DEFENSE AND SECURITY, 26 Jan
00) However, like Kvashnin, he is considered a political animal with
ambitions and political loyalties, and a penchant for confrontations.
So who is it to be, Kvashnin or Nikolaev, or somebody else out there
still unseen in the wings? Nobody is a clear winner. Most analysts are
still trying to figure Putin out and he is holding his cards pretty
much to his chest. by Jill Skelton
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