U-571 movie
Don H
about capturing an Enigma machine.
For controversy about it see Newsgroup >> "alt.movies"
===========================
ell...@crosswinds.net
> The Americans never did get wise till late in the war.
> Although the Purple and Naval dispatch codes were broken early in
> 1937. Makes you wonder why Pearl Harbor happened. Sort of like getting
> the U.S. involved in WW1. Lies told to the masses.........
A good portion of the blame for Pearl Harbor rests with the policy of
not manning the new radar installation on the north shore of the
island 24-7 as well as the officer who told the two techs that were
practicing with the equipment past the closing hour that the planes
they were reading were a delivery of new bombers.
Of course, hindsight is always 20/20. On the morning of the raid,
radar was in its infancy (not even standard on ships yet!) and
_everyone_ knew that the Japanese would _never_ attack the US.
--
Matt Gauthier <ell...@crosswinds.net>
Mike Rosing
Speaking of fiction, any one here read "Black Cipher"? It's a bit
overly
dramatic, but it seems to have most of the buzz words correct. I assume
the
descriptions of the insides of NSA and GCHQ are reasonably close to
correct,
but anyone here who can say otherwise?
I got a laugh at one point where the author describes a supercomputer
called
"Paradox" which is a teraflop machine. Used for code breaking.
Hmmmm....
what does floating point have to do with breaking codes?? Otherwise, he
seems to have the buzz words in the right order :-)
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
Tony T. Warnock
> 1937. Makes you wonder why Pearl Harbor happened. Sort of like getting
> the U.S. involved in WW1. Lies told to the masses.........
For one thing, the attack order on Pearl was never sent over Purple, Naval
Dispatch, Orange, etc. The Japanese fleet kept radio silence. The Americans
knew something was up but they guessed that Manila or Taiwan would be the
target. This was before satellites or even long range aerial survalence. It
was a well-planned attack (not necessarily well motivated.)
A few months later at Midway, the USN did use their knowledge of Japanese
codes.
Purple, Orange, Coral, etc. were broken with only cyphertext. The
reconstructed codebreaking machines along with parts of some Japanese coding
machines can be seen at the NSA museum. The resemblence is uncanny.
NFN NMI L. a.k.a. S.T.L.
with breaking codes.
<<and _everyone_ knew that the Japanese would _never_ attack the US.>>
The Japanese had a history of launching unannounced attacks. Ask the Russians.
-*---*-------
S.T. "andard Mode" L. ***137***
STL's Wickedly Nifty Quotation Collection: http://quote.cjb.net
Andrew Carol
a.k.a. S.T.L. <stl...@aol.com> wrote:
> Teraflop supercomputers are fast, badass computers. They have everything to
> do
> with breaking codes.
His question was related to their use of the term FLOPS. Floating
Point Operations Per Second. The vast bulk of code analysis probably
does not require floating point arithmetic. Ciphers don't deal well
with roundoff.
>
> <<and _everyone_ knew that the Japanese would _never_ attack the US.>>
>
> The Japanese had a history of launching unannounced attacks. Ask the
> Russians.
They did after Pearl Harbor, but their war with Russia was already old
news in the 40's and one time does not make a "history" of it.
--- Andy
Joseph Reuter
> > The Japanese had a history of launching unannounced attacks. Ask the
> > Russians.
>
> They did after Pearl Harbor, but their war with Russia was already old
> news in the 40's and one time does not make a "history" of it.
I believe that one of the dispatches from Washington to the Pacific
commanders shortly before Dec 7, 1941, observed that "Japan has
never preceded an attack with a declaration of war." (Quoted from
memory, don't take it to the bank.)
--
Joseph A. Reuter, Wizard-in-Training Joseph...@trw.com
"Olorin I was in my youth in the West that is forgotten."--Tolkien
You can't win, you can't break even, and it's the only game in town.
Joaquim Southby
aaccaa...@apple.com writes:
>> The Japanese had a history of launching unannounced attacks. Ask the
>> Russians.
>
>They did after Pearl Harbor, but their war with Russia was already old
>news in the 40's and one time does not make a "history" of it.
>
next day they invaded Korea and began an advance towards Manchuria. As
an afterthought, they declared war on Russia.
In July of 1937, a Japanese regiment garrisoned by treaty in the Chinese
city of Tientsin used a fabricated incident (they had been setting up
incidents since 1931) as pretext to shell a Chinese fort and to extend
Japanese control over the Tientsin-Peking region. As an afterthought,
they declared war on China.
On the morning of December 7, 1941...you know the rest.
Does three times make a history?
Douglas A. Gwyn
> The Americans never did get wise till late in the war.
Get wise to what? Americans were extensively involved
with the Enigma cracking effort, both at Bletchley Park
and Stateside.
ell...@crosswinds.net
>>_everyone_ knew that the Japanese would _never_ attack the US.
It actually wasn't meant sarcastically. As I understand it (I wasn't
alive then, so I could be wrong) the conventional wisdom then was that
Japan didn't pose a serious threat.
--
Matt Gauthier <ell...@crosswinds.net>
UBCHI2
Douglas A. Gwyn
> It was my understanding that the US had broken Purple and two Japanese
> Naval codes before 1935. The information about the attack was
> purported(Kahn- "Codebreakers") to have been sent as early as
> September of 41. That information was sent to Berlin and was
> intercepted by the British, but not forwarded as it might give away
> that the British had an Enigma machine.
No, the information available via intercept was to the effect
that the Japanese were getting ready to start something, but
not specifically that Pearl Harbor would be attacked first
nor at any specific time.
The US National Archives II, within walking distance of my
office (if one didn't have to cross the Beltway), contains
the records of the Congressional investigation into the
Pearl Harbor incident, if you want to review the evidence.
NOSPAM@cell2000.net Stou Sandalski
"Don H" <donlhu...@bigpond.com> wrote in message
news:QOyN4.9195$E4.1...@newsfeeds.bigpond.com...
> This movie is a complete fiction, even though dramatically well acted --
> about capturing an Enigma machine.
> For controversy about it see Newsgroup >> "alt.movies"
> ===========================
>
The movie wasn't so much about the enigma as much as about the "heroism of
the silent service" (One of the guys from the movie was on leno a few nights
ago hehe). It was pretty much fiction, but it was very entertaining and
suspenseful. But which Hollywood movie has had more then 2% truth in it?
watching that movie made me wonder how the Germans or in fact any country
generate the codes they used, how did they randomly create the codes in the
codebooks? did they pull numbers out of a hat or something? anyone have info
on this?
Richard Heathfield
>
> Would you? Is it easier to win if you tell of your plans in advance?
"When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite." -
Churchill.
--
Richard Heathfield
"Usenet is a strange place." - Dennis M Ritchie, 29 July 1999.
C FAQ: http://www.eskimo.com/~scs/C-faq/top.html
34 K&R Answers: http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton/kandr2/index.html (63
to go)
Darren New
> But which Hollywood movie has had more then 2% truth in it?
Apollo-13?
--
Darren New / Senior MTS / Invisible Worlds Inc.
San Diego, CA, USA (PST). Cryptokeys on demand.
Not so much a killfile as a slightly-woundedfile.
Tom St Denis
Darren New wrote:
>
> Stou Sandalski wrote:
> > But which Hollywood movie has had more then 2% truth in it?
>
> Apollo-13?
Hmm, Shindlers List, Mississippi (sp?) Burning, The Great Gatsby....
Tom
--
Want your academic website listed on a free websearch engine? Then
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and there are no advertisements.
Diet NSA
In article <
390A1BED...@eton.powernet.co.uk
>, Richard Heathfield <bin...@eton.powernet.co.uk> wrote:
>UBCHI2 wrote:
>>
>> Would you? Is it easier to win if you tell of your plans in
advance?
>
>"When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite." -
>Churchill.
>
Taking the time to be polite could be a
delay that costs you everything (including
your own life). Remember how the major
villians in the James Bond movies would
often take a long & indirect route to
"terminating" Mr. Bond ;-)
" V hfdt afogx nfvw ufo axb (o)(o) " - Gtnjv
----------------------------------------------------
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NOSPAM@cell2000.net Stou Sandalski
Stou
"Tom St Denis" <t...@dasoft.org> wrote in message
news:390B4FB7...@dasoft.org...
Joaquim Southby
Nick Barron
wrote:
> The Americans never did get wise till late in the war.
> Although the Purple and Naval dispatch codes were broken early in
> 1937. Makes you wonder why Pearl Harbor happened. Sort of like getting
> the U.S. involved in WW1. Lies told to the masses.........
Not really; although the codes were "broken" there was nowhere near enough
manpower to produce the required decrypts in time for Pearl Harbour. There's
a couple of very good articles dispelling the conspiracy theory in the
latest Cryptologia.
Paul Matthews
the codes were "too" random. For example if the wheel settings for the day
were 1-3-5, the next day the wheel settings would never have the same wheel
in the same place e.g. the settings would not be 1-5-4 because wheel 1 was
in the same place. Similarly the plugboard settings would never replace a
letter with its neighbour - e.g. S would never be swapped for R or T. The
bods are Bletchley Park quickly realised this and this substantially cut
down the permutations to find the day's settings. In trying to be
unpredictable, the code setters infact made it easier for Enigma to be
broken.
--
Paul Matthews
Stou Sandalski <tangui NOS...@cell2000.net> wrote in message
news:yBrO4.17934$Nd6.3...@news-west.usenetserver.com...
David Hamer
apply to German navy Enigma operations - so I will here cite
evidence that the Army/GAF did not always have such restrictions
on the daily Enigma settings.
The table [Sonder-Maschinenschlüssel] reproduced as Plate 4 in
Codebreakers, Hinsley & Stripp (eds.) [and elsewhere] tends to
refute Matthews' statement. In a month's worth of daily settings
there are clearly several counter examples to the 'never in the
same place' rules for Walzenlage [e.g. I IV II is followed by
V IV I, and III I IV is even followed by II I IV, etc.]. Counter
examples are also present for the 'never replace a letter with
its neighbour' rule for Steckerverbindungen - where RQ, GF, and
others appear.
Given that the Kriegsmarine was significantly more security-minded
the navy may very well have had such restrictions at some point.
Perhaps Ralph Erskine would care to comment...!
David Hamer
Paul Matthews wrote:
>
> Hello, I believe that one of failings of the original Enigma code books was
> the codes were "too" random. For example if the wheel settings for the day
> were 1-3-5, the next day the wheel settings would never have the same wheel
> in the same place e.g. the settings would not be 1-5-4 because wheel 1 was
> in the same place. Similarly the plugboard settings would never replace a
> letter with its neighbour - e.g. S would never be swapped for R or T.
--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
David Hamer The Crypto Simulation Group
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Jim Gillogly
>
> Hello, I believe that one of failings of the original Enigma code books was
> the codes were "too" random. For example if the wheel settings for the day
> were 1-3-5, the next day the wheel settings would never have the same wheel
> in the same place e.g. the settings would not be 1-5-4 because wheel 1 was
> in the same place.
First, that's not "too random": it's "not random enough". I'm reminded of
the ancient computer heads-or-tails game from the 1960's, where the program
used a Markov model or something to predict what the human would pick next,
and consistently out-randomed him.
Second, I'm looking at a listing of the Enigma keys for the Bangkok-Tokio
German attache traffic, from the National Archives. Line 02 has rotors
II-III-I, and line 03 has rotors II-IV-I. Line 04 has V-IV-II and line 05
has V-IV-I. I don't see a case where all three are the same, but in these
100 lines there are many adjacent settings with two rotors the same in the
same position.
> Similarly the plugboard settings would never replace a
> letter with its neighbour - e.g. S would never be swapped for R or T. The
> bods are Bletchley Park quickly realised this and this substantially cut
> down the permutations to find the day's settings. In trying to be
> unpredictable, the code setters infact made it easier for Enigma to be
> broken.
In line 00 we have RS Steckered together. Line 01 has CD. Line 02 has
ON and WX. Line 03 has FG and ON. Line 04 is the first one that doesn't
have this property.
In at least one case (lines 61 and 62) the same Ringstellung is used in
the same position. This is the only one I spotted on a quick skim, so
it may be a non-randomness: with three Ringstellungen per setting and
100 settings, you'd expect 10 or 12 such matches. If I were a real
cryppie, though, I don't think I'd spend too much time counting on this.
Before you ask, there are also cases of the same letters being
Steckered together in adjacent settings: for example, EU in lines
06 and 07.
This may not refute your recollection about the "original" key lists,
since I don't know what year this list was used. For the experts here,
the rotors are drawn from only the first five, and there are 10
Steckered pairs in each -- that may help narrow down the date.
--
Jim Gillogly
14 Thrimidge S.R. 2000, 20:32
12.19.7.3.4, 3 Kan 7 Uo, First Lord of Night
William Rowden
Jim Gillogly <j...@acm.org> wrote:
> Paul Matthews wrote:
> > Hello, I believe that one of failings of the original Enigma code books was
> > the codes were "too" random.
> > bods are Bletchley Park quickly realised this and this substantially cut
> > down the permutations to find the day's settings.
IIRC, one of the characteristics of the Enigma that Bletchley Park
*did* exploit was that no letter would be enciphered as itself. This
reduced the number of locations a probable plaintext could appear in
the ciphertext.
According to the NOVA program "Decoding Nazi Secrets," when letters
(for transmitting the daily key, if memory servers) were chosen by the
operators, they were often not very random. The group "MAD" would be
matched with "RID", "BER" with "LIN", "HIT" with "LER", etc. (I'm not
making a comparison; Godwin's Law does not apply. :-])
Perhaps someone else knows more detail about these weaknesses.
--
-William
SPAM filtered; damages claimed for UCE according to RCW19.86
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Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Steve Rush
>were 1-3-5, the next day the wheel settings would never have the same wheel
>in the same place e.g. the settings would not be 1-5-4 because wheel 1 was
>in the same place.
Several counterexamples have been posted. Perhaps you were thinking of the
"Nothing encrypts as itself." rule that did apply to Enigma. A given plaintext
letter would never result in the same letter in the cyphertext, because the
circuit representing a keystroke went into the rotor stack at one contact, and
came out at another contact. This reduced the number of possible plaintext ->
cyphertext mappings. Add a little known plaintext (called a "crib" at
Bletchley Park") and the cryptanalysis problem becomes tractable without
electronic computers, if you have some people like Alan Turing to supply the
inspiration, and a big enough budget to hire the perspiration. There were
crossword-puzzle contests in Britain in those days whose winners got prizes
that they didn't expect, in the form of government jobs.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
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If it's spam, it's a scam. Don't do business with Net abusers.
Joaquim Southby
stev...@aol.com writes:
>>Hello, I believe that one of failings of the original Enigma code books was
>>the codes were "too" random. For example if the wheel settings for the day
>>were 1-3-5, the next day the wheel settings would never have the same wheel
>>in the same place e.g. the settings would not be 1-5-4 because wheel 1 was
>>in the same place.
>
>Several counterexamples have been posted. Perhaps you were thinking of the
>"Nothing encrypts as itself." rule that did apply to Enigma.
>
"Seizing the Enigma":
"The air force never used the same rotor in the same position two days in
a row, except perhaps from one keying period to the next."
The Luftwaffe enforced this rule; the Kriegsmarine did not.
William Rowden
Joaquim Southby <noad...@this.place> wrote:
> He's partly correct and thinking of the right thing. From David
> Kahn's "Seizing the Enigma":
>
> "The air force never used the same rotor in the same position two days
> in a row, except perhaps from one keying period to the next."
By what amount (percent) would this reduce the key space to be searched?
David Hamer
In a month's worth of daily settings there are clearly several
counter examples to the 'never in the same place' rules for
Walzenlage [e.g. I IV II is followed by V IV I, and III I IV is
even followed by II I IV, etc.]. ^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^
In general the Kriegsmarine was much more security conscious
when it came to Enigma use. One example - internal settings
were not left to the Enigma operator but were the province of the
Communications Officer [except for the less critical traffic]
- hence the locks fitted to naval Enigma variants. Also, naval
message key procedures were much more complex - see Ralph Erskine's
paper: "Naval Enigma: A Missing Link, Intl. J. of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence, Vol. 3(4).
Joaquim Southby wrote:
[snipped]
> "The air force never used the same rotor in the same position two days in
> a row, except perhaps from one keying period to the next."
>
> The Luftwaffe enforced this rule; the Kriegsmarine did not.
[snipped]
Jim Reeds
In article <8eumhp$v2f$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, William Rowden <row...@eskimo.com> writes:
|> By what amount (percent) would this reduce the key space to be searched?
If there are 5 rotors, there would be 32 rotor combos available
instead of 60. This cuts the number of bombe runs down by
a factor of almost 2.
The general formula is an easy application of the principle
of inclusion-exclusion: n(n-1)(n-2) - 3(n-1)(n-2) + 3(n-2) - 1.
--
Jim Reeds, AT&T Labs - Research
Shannon Laboratory, Room C229, Building 103
180 Park Avenue, Florham Park, NJ 07932-0971, USA
re...@research.att.com, phone: +1 973 360 8414, fax: +1 973 360 8178
Thomas Scharle
: In article <8etiee$jv6$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>,
: Joaquim Southby <noad...@this.place> wrote:
: > He's partly correct and thinking of the right thing. From David
: > Kahn's "Seizing the Enigma":
: > "The air force never used the same rotor in the same position two days
: > in a row, except perhaps from one keying period to the next."
: By what amount (percent) would this reduce the key space to be searched?
This raises a question that I'm sort of curious about,
frequent changing of pass-phrases. It would be possible to make
a daily trivial change to a pass-phrase ... I'll take a most
obvious example, just changing one letter for the day of the
week ... would something that simple enhance the security of the
pass-phrase ... or would that be counted as just a "secret
algorithm" kind of thing, no real enhancement in security?
--
Tom Scharle scha...@nd.edu "standard disclaimer"
Jim Gillogly
>
> In article <8etiee$jv6$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Joaquim Southby <noad...@this.place> wrote:
> > He's partly correct and thinking of the right thing. From David
> > Kahn's "Seizing the Enigma":
> >
> > "The air force never used the same rotor in the same position two days
> > in a row, except perhaps from one keying period to the next."
>
> By what amount (percent) would this reduce the key space to be searched?
If rotor selections were restricted in this way, for the "choose three
rotors out of five" case the rotor choices would be reduced from 60
to 33, a healthy 45% reduction.
--
Jim Gillogly
15 Thrimidge S.R. 2000, 15:56
12.19.7.3.5, 4 Chicchan 8 Uo, Second Lord of Night
Joaquim Southby
dha...@eclipse.net writes:
>I will reiterate...this from an example of Luftwaffe daily settings.
>
>In a month's worth of daily settings there are clearly several
>counter examples to the 'never in the same place' rules for
>Walzenlage [e.g. I IV II is followed by V IV I, and III I IV is
>even followed by II I IV, etc.]. ^^^^^^^^
>
noted your first post. I quoted a document that supports the original
poster's question; you quoted one that belies it. Rather than degenerate
into an "Is - Isn't" exchange, let's leave it at that. Perhaps the
Luftwaffe regulations called for one method and were later changed;
perhaps the regulations were ignored in some instances.
Both Kahn in "Seizing the Enigma" and Simon Singh in "The Code Book"
mention the restriction on reuse of rotor arrangements. Since Bletchley
Park counted on such a restriction in their attempts at solution, it's
probably safe to say that violations of the restriction (which obviously
existed per your cite) were probably the exception and not the rule.