Final Reunion....

[Ray Keller]

Final Reunion....



A final toast for the Doolittle Raiders

It's the cup of brandy that no one wants to drink. On Tuesday, in Fort
Walton Beach, Florida, the surviving Doolittle Raiders gathered publicly for
the last time. They once were among the most universally admired and revered
men in the United States. There were 80 of the Raiders in April 1942, when
they carried out one of the most courageous and heart-stirring military
operations in this nation's history. The mere mention of their unit's name,
in those years, would bring tears to the eyes of grateful Americans. Now
only four survive. After Japan's sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, with the
United States reeling and wounded, something dramatic was needed to turn the
war effort around. Even though there were no friendly airfields close
enough to Japan for the United States to launch a retaliation, a daring plan
was devised. Sixteen B-25s were modified so that they could take off from the
deck of an aircraft carrier. This had never before been tried -- sending such
big, heavy bombers from a carrier. The 16 five-man crews, under the command
of Lt. Col. James Doolittle, who himself flew the lead plane off the USS
Hornet, knew that they would not be able to return to the carrier. They would
have to hit Japan and then hope to make it to China for a safe landing. But
on the day of the raid, the Japanese military caught wind of the plan. The
Raiders were told that they would have to take off from much farther out in
the Pacific Ocean than they had counted on. They were told that because of
this they would not have enough fuel to make it to safety. And those
men went anyway. They bombed Tokyo, and then flew as far as they could. Four
planes crash-landed; 11 more crews bailed out, and three of the Raiders died.
Eight more were captured; three were executed. Another died of starvation in
a Japanese prison camp. One crew made it to Russia. The Doolittle Raid sent
a message from the United States to its enemies, and to the rest of the
world, we will fight. And, no matter what it takes, we will win. Of the 80
Raiders, 62 survived the war. They were celebrated as national heroes, models
of bravery. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer produced a motion picture based on the raid;
"Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo," starring Spencer Tracy and Van Johnson, was a
patriotic and emotional box-office hit, and the phrase became part of the
national lexicon. In the movie-theater previews for the film, MGM proclaimed
that it as presenting the story "with supreme pride." Beginning in 1946,
the surviving Raiders have held a reunion each April, to commemorate the
mission. The reunion is in a different city each year. In 1959, the city of
Tucson, Arizona, as a gesture of respect and gratitude, presented the
Doolittle Raiders with a set of 80 silver goblets. Each goblet was engraved
with the name of a Raider. Every year, a wooden display case bearing all
80 goblets is transported to the reunion city. Each time a Raider passes away
his goblet is turned upside down in the case at the next reunion, as his old
friends bear solemn witness. Also in the wooden case is a bottle of 1896
Hennessy Very Special cognac. The year is not happenstance: 1896 was when
Jimmy Doolittle was born. There has always been a plan: When there are only
two surviving Raiders, they would open the bottle, at last drink from it, and
toast their comrades who preceded them in death. As 2013 began, there were
five living Raiders; then, in February, Tom Griffin passed away at age 96.
What a man he was. After bailing out of his plane over a mountainous Chinese
forest after the Tokyo raid, he became ill with malaria, and almost died.
When he recovered, he was sent to Europe to fly more combat missions. He was
shot down, captured, and spent 22 months in a German prisoner of war camp.
The selflessness of these men, the sheer guts ... there was a passage in the
Cincinnati Enquirer obituary for Mr. Griffin that, on the surface, had
nothing to do with the war, but that emblematizes the depth of his sense of
duty and devotion: "When his wife became ill and needed to go into a
nursing home, he visited her every day. He walked from his house to the
nursing home, fed his wife and at the end of the day brought home her
clothes. At night, he washed and ironed her clothes. Then he walked them up
to her room the next morning. He did that for three years until her death in
2005." So now, out of the original 80, only four Raiders remain: Dick Cole
(Doolittle's co-pilot on the Tokyo raid), Robert Hite, Edward Saylor and
David Thatcher. All are in their 90s. They have decided that there are too
few of them for the public reunions to continue. The events in Fort Walton
Beach this week will mark the end. It has come full circle; Florida's nearby
Eglin Field was where the Raiders trained in secrecy for the Tokyo mission.
The town is planning to do all it can to honor the men: a six-day celebration
of their valor, including luncheons, a dinner and a parade. Do the men ever
wonder if those of us for whom they helped save the country have tended to it
in a way that is worthy of their sacrifice? They don't talk about that, at
least not around other people. But if you find yourself near Fort Walton
Beach this week, and if you should encounter any of the Raiders, you might
want to offer them a word of thanks. I can tell you from firsthand
observation that they appreciate hearing that they are remembered. The men
have decided that after this final public reunion they will wait until a
later date -- some time this year -- to get together once more, informally
and in absolute privacy. That is when they will open the bottle of brandy.
The years are flowing by too swiftly now; they are not going to wait until
there are only two of them. They will fill the four remaining upturned
goblets. And raise them in a toast to those who are gone.

["Delma T. Ivêy"]

On 7/31/2013 9:08 AM, Ray Keller wrote:
> Final Reunion....
>
>
>
> A final toast for the Doolittle Raiders

This is old. Someone already posted this here.

> It's the cup of brandy that no one wants to drink. On Tuesday, in Fort
> Walton Beach, Florida, the surviving Doolittle Raiders gathered publicly for
> the last time. They once were among the most universally admired and revered
> men in the United States.

This piece ran on CNN, you know - that left-wing media outlet your
right-wing fucks love to denigrate. It was written by Bob Greene, a fat
Jew who raped a 17 year old girl and upset his wife so much she died of
heart failure.

> there was a passage in the
> Cincinnati Enquirer obituary for Mr. Griffin that, on the surface, had
> nothing to do with the war, but that emblematizes

That's not a word. He should have written "exemplifies" or "is
emblematic of."

[deep]

On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 09:08:04 -0700, "Ray Keller"
<Left...@re.desperate.com> wrote:

>
>
>
> Final Reunion....
>
>
>
> A final toast for the Doolittle Raiders
>

Unfortunately it was pretty much a suicide mission that served no
useful strategic or tactical purpose.

[George Plimpton]

That's bullshit as usual, you stupid Shallow Shithead. In fact, it
served a *tremendous* strategic purpose. It demonstrated to the
Japanese that their main islands were vulnerable, and it forced them to
pull offensive forces back to defensive positions.

The “Doolittle Raid” as it came to be known in honor of its
commander, Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle, was a pivotal moment in
World War II, resulting in strategic implications far beyond the
modest damage it did to the Japanese homeland, according to Dr.
Robert S. Ehlers, an authority on airpower and director of Angelo
State University’s Center for Security Studies.

Eighty aviators, including 13 from Texas, one of whom was born in
nearby Robert Lee, struck a retaliatory blow on a mission that
marked the first time a foreign power had successfully attacked
the island nation. The raid dramatically re-shaped Japanese
strategy, disastrously as it turned out, in the early months of
the American conflict in the Pacific.

“The raid led directly to the Japanese decision to attack
Midway,” said Ehlers, “and the Battle of Midway became the
turning point in the Pacific War, though the fighting would
continue for more than three years.”

http://www.angelo.edu/content/news/1466-doolittle-raid-remembered-for-impact


Midway:

The Battle of Midway (ミッドウェー海戦 Middowē Kaisen?) was one of
the most important naval battles of the Pacific Campaign of World
War II. Between 4 and 7 June 1942, only six months after Japan's
attack on Pearl Harbor, and one month after the Battle of the
Coral Sea, the United States Navy decisively defeated an Imperial
Japanese Navy (IJN) attack against Midway Atoll, inflicting
irreparable damage on the Japanese fleet. Military historian
John Keegan called it "the most stunning and decisive blow in the
history of naval warfare." It was Japan's worst naval defeat in
350 years.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway


Keep your fucking mouth *shut*, Scheisskopf, you fucking shitstain,
before someone slams a shovel into it.

[George Plimpton]

Meant to include, in order to rub Scheisskopf's nose in the shit some more:

The Japanese plan was to lure the United States' aircraft
carriers into a trap. The Japanese also intended to occupy
Midway as part of an overall plan to extend their defensive
perimeter *in response to the Doolittle Raid*. This operation was
also considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji,
Samoa, and Hawaii itself.


Just keep your fucking ignorant racist yap shut.

[deep]

On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 11:01:12 -0700, George Plimpton <geo...@si.not>
wrote:

>> Unfortunately it was pretty much a suicide mission that served no
>> useful strategic or tactical purpose.
>
>That's bullshit as usual, you stupid Shallow Shithead. In fact, it
>served a *tremendous* strategic purpose. It demonstrated to the
>Japanese that their main islands were vulnerable, and it forced them to
>pull offensive forces back to defensive positions.

Bullshit. If anything it just enraged the Japanese and made them
mobilize their civil defense forces and made them turn the entire
island chain into a massive fortress making any sort of invasion
impossible. Militarily it was a complete waste of valuable resources
and skilled aircrews. The immediate Japanese response was to send an
invasion force into China and they murdered 250,000 men, women and
children. Anybody remotely suspected of assisting the downed aircrews
was brutally murdered.

But they were only Chinese, right? I bet you hate them almost as much
as black people.

[Jeff M]

Actually, it was a huge strategic victory and psychological warfare at
its best.

It is difficult to understand the situation on the home front in early
1942. First, Nazi Germany had conquered essentially all of Europe,
North Africa, and Asia west of the Caucasus. They had a two year long
unbroken string of victories and seemed unstoppable. Meanwhile, our
only major ally, Great Britain, was exhausted and on the brink of
disaster.

In the East, the Japanese Empire had occupied all of China's major
cities and seaports, along with Korea, Taiwan and French Indo-China.
But in the West, and in America particularly, there was nonetheless a
racist stereotype that held the Japanese to be morally, physically and
militarily inferior to his Western counterpart, and a corresponding
confidence that they could not prevail against the military might of
America, Britain and the other European colonial powers.

Then came the tremendous shock of Pearl Harbor and the collapse of the
American position in the Pacific, and the capture of Singapore by the
Japanese, which was probably the single greatest military defeat EVER
suffered by the British. Suddenly, America found itself thrust into a
two-front global war against two separate, incomprehensible, but very
real evil empires that seemed overwhelming, unstoppable, and vastly
superior to our own still rather puny and largely untested military.


The psychological trauma caused by these events cannot be overstated.
Americans were shocked and demoralized. In many quarters, civilian,
political and military alike, confidence and belief in the ultimate
victory of the Western powers was shaken to its very core, and in those
dark early days of 1942, even our national will to persevere and our
drive to win were in grave doubt.

We continued to be on the retreat wherever and whenever we met the
Japanese, and they were pushing us hard and expanding their reach all
across the Pacific. We NEEDED to do something about that before we were
driven out of the Western Pacific entirely, or we could lose the war.

The Doolittle Raid, in single daring stroke, but with relatively low
strategic risk, changed the course of the war. First, it gave Americans
at home a desperately needed boost of confidence, helped dispel much of
the doubt and gloom about the war, and proved that our military was at
least the match of the Japanese and could hit back hard.

Second, it had an equal effect on Japanese confidence and their belief
in their own unstoppable military, in the senior levels of government
(civilians were kept in the dark). The Japanese military was also so
embarrassed that they felt they could not bear the loss of face involved
in allowing another such attack on the home islands. So they were
forced by the Doolittle raid to take certain steps to prevent anything
similar from happening again.

Chief among these was their decision to reinforce and consolidate their
position in the central Pacific. This led to their plan to invade
Midway Island and the Aleutians. Because of superior sigint, the USN
was able to develop a plan to bushwhack the IJN off Midway, and destroy
the bulk of their offensive striking power, a loss from which the IJN
never recovered. It also gave the hard pressed USN some breathing room
until America's tremendous industrial capacity to make itself felt in a
decisive way.

Most experts agree that the Battle of Midway was the turning point in
the war against Japan, like the Battle of Stalingrad was in the war
against Germany. the victory at Midway was the direct result of the
Doolittle Raid, which was therefore of inestimable and unquestionable
strategic importance.

[George Plimpton]

On 7/31/2013 11:38 AM, deep wrote:
> On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 11:01:12 -0700, George Plimpton <geo...@si.not>
> wrote:
>
>>> Unfortunately it was pretty much a suicide mission that served no
>>> useful strategic or tactical purpose.
>>
>> That's bullshit as usual, you stupid Shallow Shithead. In fact, it
>> served a *tremendous* strategic purpose. It demonstrated to the
>> Japanese that their main islands were vulnerable, and it forced them to
>> pull offensive forces back to defensive positions.
>
> Bullshit. If anything it just

Bullshit, you stupid lying shithead. All military historians disagree
with you.

> The immediate Japanese response was to send an
> invasion force into China and they murdered 250,000 men, women and
> children.

Bullshit. That was not in response to the raid.

Japan under Hirohito never wanted for excuses to slaughter Chinese.

>
> But they were only Chinese, right? I bet you hate them almost as much
> as black people.

The raging racism of the left is *alway* just one small provocation away
from being expressed.

Your claim is disproved. There was a tremendous strategic effect of the
raid, and it was positive for the US in its conduct of the war.

As usual, Scheisskopf - Shallow Shithead - is completely full of shit.

[deep]

On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 13:49:14 -0500, Jeff M <NoS...@NoThanks.org>
wrote:

>Most experts agree that the Battle of Midway was the turning point in
>the war against Japan, like the Battle of Stalingrad was in the war
>against Germany. the victory at Midway was the direct result of the
>Doolittle Raid, which was therefore of inestimable and unquestionable
>strategic importance.

At best the Doolittle raid had a positive impact on American morale,
but that's about it. It had no direct impact on the battle of
Midway. Basically our fleet got very, very lucky, and caught the
Japanese by surprise largely due to the fact that the allies broke the
Japanese naval code. The way the entire battle played out was very
complicated, but Yamamoto had his forces spread too thin and
underestimated the American's strength. US bombers caught the vast
majority of the Japanese strength on the decks being refitted with
torpedoes rather than bombs. I doubt any historians really think the
Doolittle raid actually had any positive impact at all on how the
battle actually played out. But I bet you can't swing a dead cat
without hitting a revisionist historian who just loves screaming
Hoo-rah! and Go USA, USA, USA!!

"History is written by the victors."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway

If any singular event gave the advantage to the US it was the breaking
of the Japanese main code.

[George Plimpton]

On 7/31/2013 12:54 PM, deep wrote:
> On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 13:49:14 -0500, Jeff M <NoS...@NoThanks.org>
> wrote:
>
>> Most experts agree that the Battle of Midway was the turning point in
>> the war against Japan, like the Battle of Stalingrad was in the war
>> against Germany. the victory at Midway was the direct result of the
>> Doolittle Raid, which was therefore of inestimable and unquestionable
>> strategic importance.
>
> At best the Doolittle raid had a positive impact on American morale,
> but that's about it. It had no direct impact on the battle of
> Midway.

It *brought about* the battle of Midway, you stupid fat fuck.

[Jeff M]

On 7/31/2013 2:54 PM, deep wrote:
> On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 13:49:14 -0500, Jeff M <NoS...@NoThanks.org>
> wrote:
>
>> Most experts agree that the Battle of Midway was the turning point in
>> the war against Japan, like the Battle of Stalingrad was in the war
>> against Germany. the victory at Midway was the direct result of the
>> Doolittle Raid, which was therefore of inestimable and unquestionable
>> strategic importance.
>
> At best the Doolittle raid had a positive impact on American morale,
> but that's about it. It had no direct impact on the battle of
> Midway.

That is incorrect. History shows that conclusively that the Doolittle
raid caused ADM Yamamoto to move up and expand dormant plans for dealing
with Midway, and ended any military or political opposition to
undertaking a major operation there. Virtually all serious historians
and scholars of WWII in both America and among its allies, and in Japan
itself, agree on this point.

> Basically our fleet got very, very lucky, and caught the
> Japanese by surprise largely due to the fact that the allies broke the
> Japanese naval code.

Yes, as I wrote, our victory was largely due to superior signals
intelligence. But luck played its inevitable role, and the importance of
the skill, courage and perseverance of the USN and particularly the
young naval and marine aviators should not be discounted. Lastly, the
one technical area where the USN was clearly superior to the IJN was in
the art and science of damage control, and this was an often discounted
factor in our lopsided success.

> The way the entire battle played out was very
> complicated,

Like most IJN plans throughout the war, they were too complex, too
inflexible, and too dependent on the enemy behaving exactly as expected.

> but Yamamoto had his forces spread too thin and
> underestimated the American's strength.

Mostly, he failed to understand the actual consequences of the Coral Sea
battle, failed to appreciate the USN's resiliency/survivability and
recuperative/repair capacities, and failed to confirm the number and
location of our carriers. The latter was due largely to our disruption
of a planned Japanese seaplane reconnaissance of Hawaiian waters. He
also failed to appreciate the aggressiveness and fighting ability of his
American enemy.

> US bombers caught the vast
> majority of the Japanese strength on the decks being refitted with
> torpedoes rather than bombs. I doubt any historians really think the
> Doolittle raid actually had any positive impact at all on how the
> battle actually played out.

I think you are missing the point. The Doolittle raid caused Japan to
attempt the invasion of Midway, giving us the opportunity to achieve a
stunning victory there, but that victory still had to be won. So the
Doolittle raid played no part in "how the battle actually played out,"
but it was the major reason why there was a battle to begin with. As I
said, this point is too well documented and universally accepted to be
disputed.

> But I bet you can't swing a dead cat
> without hitting a revisionist historian who just loves screaming
> Hoo-rah! and Go USA, USA, USA!!
>
> "History is written by the victors."
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway
>
> If any singular event gave the advantage to the US it was the breaking
> of the Japanese main code.

Our code breaking was a major advantage in our planning for, and
execution of, the Battle of Midway, but it had nothing whatever to do
with making the battle happen in that time and place.

[George Plimpton]

You are missing a major point here. Scheisskopf - Shallow Shithead -
hates the USA and never fails to discount anything it has done. When
you write of "the aggressiveness and fighting ability of his American
enemy", you're just enraging Scheisskopf.

[Jim Wilkins]

<deep> wrote in message
news:2ljiv8thjdv08mgbv...@4ax.com...

You prove that are as stubbornly, militantly ignorant of history as
you have for science, economics and sociology. Is this what a
'liberal' education has degenerated to, Soviet-style denial of
inconvenient facts?

Japan's reaction to the raid cost them their carrier strike force and
forced them to the defensive for the rest of the war.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway

"The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway as part of an overall

plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle
Raid."

[deep]

There's absolutely no objective evidence Japan would have done things
any differently. Historians love to argue about all kinds of "what
ifs?" Japan was in the process of expanding out throughtout the
Pacific in all directions and had their plans to occupy Midway anyway.
So perhaps Yamamoto moved his plans up a few weeks but there's no
evidence things would have played out any differently. This is just
a case of military hero worship. America loves heroes. If the USN
had lost the battle of Midway then there would be another reason to
credit Doolittle. No doubt it was extraordinarily brave, gutsy
mission meant solely as "paybacks" for Pearl Harbor. Nothing more.
Military success of the raid was non-existent. A quarter MILLION
Chinese were murdered because of it. It's Nimitz that is credited
for winning Midway. Nothing Doolittle did had any significance other
than giving the cheerleaders something to yell about.

And name one single thing about science, economics or sociology I've
been wrong about. Just one would do. I never tow the conservative
line of self-serving bullshit, because that's all it is, self serving
bullshit, but that doesn't mean I'm wrong. Simple fact is I have
science on my side about everything. Liberals believe in education.
Conservatives don't. Conservatives just make shit up as they go and
threaten anyone who disagrees with them.

[Jeff M]

> than giving the cheerleaders something to yell about. [snip]

It strikes me as inconsistent that you would deny such a universally
accepted and non-controversial fact as the Doolittle raid leading
directly to the Battle of Midway, yet, at the same time, you assert that

"A quarter MILLION Chinese were murdered because of it."

The Japanese had already killed untold millions of Chinese civilians by
the time of the Doolittle raid, and would go on to kill tens of millions
more. The "Rape of Nanking," causing similar numbers of civilian
deaths, was already four years in the past by then, and only one of many
atrocities committed by the Japanese. The Chinese were fated to suffer
greatly at the hands of the Japanese, but conditions were such that no
accurate records are available and no reliable casualty figures exist.
Yet you are ready to attribute those roughly estimated and very
speculative casualties directly to the Doolittle raid.

It is illogical and inconsistent to deny such a well documented and
practically irrefutable historical cause and effect on the one hand, and
to assert a far more tenuous causal nexus in the same matter as if it
were an established fact on the other.

Moreover, although ADM Yamamoto had already identified Midway as an
eventual target, there were no active plans to invade it. In WWII
Japan, there was always a political/military debate over strategic
priorities and the allocation of scarce resources. Remember that Prime
Minister Tojo was an Army general and that Japan was involved in a major
land war on the Asian mainland at the time, and so the navy didn't
always get its way. But the Doolittle raid cleared away all that
existing opposition so that ADM Yamamoto could proceed with his plan for
a large scale fleet action and invasion of Midway.

And the rest is history.

[deep]

On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 17:36:45 -0500, Jeff M <NoS...@NoThanks.org>
wrote:

I certainly don't mean to denigrate the bravery of extraordinary men
like Doolittle and his volunteers. Their bravery has never been in
question. It's just there was no significant damage created by their
bombing raid and whether or not that lead to any major "turning the
tide" in the war in the Pacific is speculative at best. America loves
heroes and desperately needed on at the time. That much Doolittle and
his men gave us. I don't know, but did he get the Medal of Honor for
that one? He certainly should have.

[Jim Wilkins]

<deep> wrote in message
news:qi0jv8l2ik2bhv91h...@4ax.com...

> On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 17:24:20 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
> <murat...@gmail.com> wrote:
>

You can't raise your own prestige by tearing down heros who have
EARNED theirs by risking their lives for their country. Honor isn't
zero-sum.

[Jeff M]

That is irrelevant to what I believe is your error.

The following facts are established beyond reasonable doubt.

This was our strategic position in the early days of 1942: the IJN was
in the process of successfully pushing the USN out of the Western
Pacific, severing our SLOC with Australia, and consolidating their hold
on the entire region. America was at risk of losing the war with Japan
before our industrial output could make itself decisively felt.
Therefore, it was strategically essential that America stave off defeat
until then, preferably while blunting further Japanese offensive operations.

The USN was able to achieve a major strategic victory and largely
destroy the IJN's offensive potential at Midway in June of 1942. All of
the preceding are facts.

Now what is not fact but is merely speculative, at best, is your
apparent assumption that, in the absence of the Doolittle raid which
indisputably led to strategic victory at Midway in June of 1942, the USN
would have nonetheless survived, been able to maintain a tenable
position in the Western Pacific, and eventually prevail over the IJN in
battles at other times or places. More importantly, it is speculative,
at best, to assume that and we would not have decided to grant Japan the
negotiated peace it wanted by late 1942, given the low, pre-Doolittle
state of American morale, our repeated military defeats, our material
weakness, and the greater need to defeat Hitler.

> It's just there was no significant damage created by their
> bombing raid and whether or not that lead to any major "turning the
> tide" in the war in the Pacific is speculative at best.

No, that is not factually correct.

> America loves
> heroes and desperately needed on at the time. That much Doolittle and
> his men gave us. I don't know, but did he get the Medal of Honor for
> that one? He certainly should have.

Yes, but that's beside the point.

[Scout]

"Jim Wilkins" <murat...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:ktc3vu$hbg$1...@dont-email.me...

Dudu has already shown multiple times that he has no honor, no concept of
honor and no possibility of becoming honorable.

[Jim Wilkins]

"Scout" <me4...@verizon.removeme.this2.nospam.net> wrote in message
news:ktc84l$50m$1...@dont-email.me...

http://criminalmentality-respect.blogspot.com/

[Scout]

"Jim Wilkins" <murat...@gmail.com> wrote in message

news:ktcaic$f92$1...@dont-email.me...

Interesting.

[Gray Guest]

deep wrote in news:2ljiv8thjdv08mgbv...@4ax.com:

Wow. It directly led to Midway which was the high point of Japanese
ambitions.

Are you really this stupid? Must you keep announcing it?

--
Refusenik #1

Libs suffer from Eleutherophobia. And there is no cure.

Obama called the SEALs and THEY got bin Laden. When the SEALs called Obama,
THEY GOT DENIED. Fuck Obama

[Gray Guest]

deep wrote in news:qi0jv8l2ik2bhv91h...@4ax.com:

Read Miracle at Midway, the best researched bit of literature on the
subject.

But first grow a brain.

[Klaus Schadenfreude]

Lie added.


http://klaus.webege.com/dudu/dudu.htm
Deep Dudu's FORTRESS OF LIES
Now At FOUR HUNDRED
Lies, Falsehoods, Fabrications, Distortions, and Deceptions!
Since July, 2011

[deep]

On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 18:50:51 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"

<murat...@gmail.com> wrote:

><deep> wrote in message
>news:qi0jv8l2ik2bhv91h...@4ax.com...
>> On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 17:24:20 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
>> <murat...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>You can't raise your own prestige by tearing down heros who have
>EARNED theirs by risking their lives for their country. Honor isn't
>zero-sum.
>

Huh? I never said anything about their bravery. Just questioned the
argument that a militarily meaningless bombing raid somehow was the
turning point in the war in the Pacific.

[Klaus Schadenfreude]

Who was claiming it was a "turning point?"

You've already demonstrated you don't know what the fuck a "turning
point" is.

http://klaus.webege.com/dudu/dudu.htm
Deep Dudu's FORTRESS OF LIES

Now Over FOUR HUNDRED

[Johnny Johnson]

In article <8JidnYiw5Jil6mTM...@giganews.com>, Jeff McCann
<NoS...@NoThanks.org> says...

>
> On 7/31/2013 2:54 PM, deep shit wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 13:49:14 -0500, Jeff M <NoS...@NoThanks.org>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Most experts agree that the Battle of Midway was the turning point in
>>> the war against Japan, like the Battle of Stalingrad was in the war
>>> against Germany. the victory at Midway was the direct result of the
>>> Doolittle Raid, which was therefore of inestimable and unquestionable
>>> strategic importance.
>>
>> At best the Doolittle raid had a positive impact on American morale,
>> but that's about it. It had no direct impact on the battle of
>> Midway.
>
> That is incorrect. History shows that conclusively that the Doolittle
> raid caused ADM Yamamoto to move up and expand dormant plans for
> dealing with Midway, and ended any military or political opposition to
> undertaking a major operation there. Virtually all serious historians
> and scholars of WWII in both America and among its allies, and in Japan
> itself, agree on this point.
>
>> Basically our fleet got very, very lucky, and caught the
>> Japanese by surprise largely due to the fact that the allies broke
>> the Japanese naval code.
>
> Yes, as I wrote, our victory was largely due to superior signals intelligence.
>

Just today on The History Channel's "Modern Marvels" series, they had the
documentary episode titled "Codes", wherein they described the Navy's OP-20?G
SigIntGrp breaking of the Japanese Navy's JN-25 code well before the Midway
attack.

While a great segment of the episode; which tracked code writing all the way
back to ancient Egypt; Here's what the U.S. Navy has to say:

How Cryptology enabled the United States to turn the tide in the Pacific War.
http://www.navy.mil/midway/how.html

>
> But luck played its inevitable role, and the importance of the skill, courage
> and perseverance of the USN and particularly the young naval and marine
> aviators should not be discounted. Lastly, the one technical area where the
> USN was clearly superior to the IJN was in the art and science of damage
> control, and this was an often discounted factor in our lopsided success.
>
>> The way the entire battle played out was very
>> complicated,
>
> Like most IJN plans throughout the war, they were too complex, too
> inflexible, and too dependent on the enemy behaving exactly as expected.
>
>> but Yamamoto had his forces spread too thin and
>> underestimated the American's strength.
>
> Mostly, he failed to understand the actual consequences of the Coral
> Sea battle, failed to appreciate the USN's resiliency/survivability and
> recuperative/repair capacities, and failed to confirm the number and
> location of our carriers. The latter was due largely to our disruption
> of a planned Japanese seaplane reconnaissance of Hawaiian waters.
> He also failed to appreciate the aggressiveness and fighting ability of
> his American enemy.
>

"I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a
terrible resolve."
--Japanese Naval Marshal General Isoroku Yamamoto,
Sunday, December 7, 1941, after learning that the Japanese Declaration
of War was delivered hours AFTER the Pearl Harbor attack by the IJN

[Gunner Asch]

On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 17:24:20 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
<murat...@gmail.com> wrote:

Deep is microns deep. On his best day.


--
""Almost all liberal behavioral tropes track the impotent rage of small
children. Thus, for example, there is also the popular tactic of
repeating some stupid, meaningless phrase a billion times" Arms for
hostages, arms for hostages, arms for hostages, it's just about sex, just
about sex, just about sex, dumb,dumb, money in politics,money in
politics, Enron, Enron, Enron. Nothing repeated with mind-numbing
frequency in all major news outlets will not be believed by some members
of the populace. It is the permanence of evil; you can't stop it." (Ann
Coulter)

[Gunner Asch]

Indeed.

[Jim Wilkins]

"Gunner Asch" <gunne...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:qabsv8p0f23i8t89h...@4ax.com...

> Deep is microns deep. On his best day.

And obsessed with a wealth-redistributive 'affirmative action' that
would compensate for his unfairly low allotment of intelligence and
maturity.

[Michael A. Terrell]

Gunner Asch wrote:
>
> Deep is microns deep. On his best day.

His attention span is measured in Ninnyseconds...


--
Anyone wanting to run for any political office in the US should have to
have a DD214, and a honorable discharge.

[George Plimpton]

On 8/4/2013 8:06 AM, Michael A. Terrell wrote:
>
> Gunner Asch wrote:
>>
>> Deep is microns deep. On his best day.
>
>
> His attention span is measured in Ninnyseconds...

Looks like gummer and mikey teardrop have another troglodyte circle jerk
going. brushboy ought to be along shortly.

[George Plimpton]

You have to understand a little more about where and how Scheisskopf's
"thought process" [sic] originates. Scheisskopf hates the US, and never
misses a chance to denigrate the country. Even if the country
successfully follows a course of action of which Scheisskopf approves,
he instinctively assumes it blundered its way to success, or that it
succeeded in doing what he likes due to failing to attain its objectives.

There's no way Scheisskopf ever could admit that the Doolittle raid
yielded any benefit. The raid unquestionably boosted the morale of the
American public, and Scheisskopf would hate that result no matter what,
because he hates America and Americans.

[pyotr filipivich]

Gunner Asch <gunne...@gmail.com> on Sun, 04 Aug 2013 03:31:13 -0700
typed in misc.survivalism the following:

>On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 17:24:20 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
><murat...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>><deep> wrote in message
>>news:2ljiv8thjdv08mgbv...@4ax.com...
>>> On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 09:08:04 -0700, "Ray Keller"
>>> <Left...@re.desperate.com> wrote:
>>>> Final Reunion....
>>>> A final toast for the Doolittle Raiders
>>>>
>>> Unfortunately it was pretty much a suicide mission that served no
>>> useful strategic or tactical purpose.
>>
>>You prove that are as stubbornly, militantly ignorant of history as
>>you have for science, economics and sociology. Is this what a
>>'liberal' education has degenerated to, Soviet-style denial of
>>inconvenient facts?
>>
>>Japan's reaction to the raid cost them their carrier strike force and
>>forced them to the defensive for the rest of the war.
>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway
>>"The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway as part of an overall
>>plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle
>>Raid."
>>
>>
>>
>Deep is microns deep. On his best day.

Deep is a living exemplar of the old poem

"... to walk in the ocean of most souls
would scarcely get your feet damp."
--
pyotr filipivich.
Just about the time you finally see light at the end of the tunnel,
you find out it's a Government Project to build more tunnel.

[Gunner Asch]

On Sun, 04 Aug 2013 11:06:51 -0400, "Michael A. Terrell"
<mike.t...@earthlink.net> wrote:

>
>Gunner Asch wrote:
>>
>> Deep is microns deep. On his best day.
>
>
> His attention span is measured in Ninnyseconds...

ROFLMAO!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

100 Points to House Terrell !!!

[Gray Guest]

Gunner Asch <gunne...@gmail.com> wrote in

news:qabsv8p0f23i8t89h...@4ax.com:

I strongly reccommend Gordon Prange, Miracle at Midway. No researcher
before or since had as much access to living Japanese Naval officers who
were involved in the planning of the Midway operation. Or documents.

Also "Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy". Much broader
obviously, but it helps top put Midway into a much larger perspective.

PS, I do not beleive Yamamoto deserves all of the praise he gets. I remain
unconvinced of his brilliance. To often he split his forces, overreached or
failed to follow up. Whiel Nagumo is tactically responsible for the
"failure" at Pearl Harbor, the simple truth is there was no planned follow
up. And the focus on the carriers, which in my mind was the underlieing
reason to declare it a failure by thier absence, to the benefit of the fuel
storage, repair and submarine facilties displays a narrowness of focus that
is not the hallmark of a great strategist.

Yes we were fooled because many still did not yet fully appreciate the
superiority of air power and a prejudice that did not allow westerners to
regard the Japanese of being able to pull something like that off. But the
Japanese had operated thier carriers under combat conditions and Yamamoto
was a major proponent of air power.

The Japanese were goaded into attacking Midway by the Doolittle Raod evn if
that was not the original intent.

[Jeff M]

Yep. Good analysis.

I will say, though, that Nagumo gets more blame than he deserves,
especially for the failure to engage in additional raids in light of his
success thus far and the lack of effective opposition. Given the
stunning success and minimal losses of the original raids, he had
already obtained an overwhelming victory. So he had far more to lose
than to gain by sticking around for more air raids.

He could only have made his stunning success slightly more stunning, but
at the risk of losing ships to any of the unaccounted for carriers, or
submarines, or losing pilots and aircraft to a by then awakened and more
prepared defense.

The Japanese "short war/decisive fleet battle" doctrine blinded him,
like Yamamoto and most of the IJN, to the strategic importance of fuel
storage and repair facilities in HI. So it made sense to for him
preserve his force entirely intact for the anticipated decisive fleet
engagement, and not risk diminishing his stunning success with avoidable
losses, by returning to home waters instead of lingering to make
additional attacks.

[George Plimpton]

On 7/31/2013 12:54 PM, deep wrote:
> On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 13:49:14 -0500, Jeff M <NoS...@NoThanks.org>
> wrote:
>
>> Most experts agree that the Battle of Midway was the turning point in
>> the war against Japan, like the Battle of Stalingrad was in the war
>> against Germany. the victory at Midway was the direct result of the
>> Doolittle Raid, which was therefore of inestimable and unquestionable
>> strategic importance.
>
> At best the Doolittle raid had a positive impact on American morale,
> but that's about it. It had no direct impact on the battle of
> Midway.

It *brought about* the battle of Midway, you stupid fat fuck.

[BeamMeUpScotty]

It also let the Japanese know that they weren't out of harms way.

They thought they had dealt the U.S. a severe blow and they had to
reconsider their feeling of invulnerability, which meant they had to
waste time and material trying to harden military and war production and
that cost them. And everything we could do to cut them a thousand times
helped to bleed their war effort. We won partly by attrition since they
were running out of planes and ships and in the end the Atomic bomb
destroyed their will to continue.

--
*Rumination*
"All vets are mentally ill in some way and government should prevent
them from owning firearms."
-Dianne Feinstein-

[David R. Birch]

It also had a very negative effect on Japanese morale. The people had
been assured by the Emperor that the home islands would never be attacked.

David

[David R. Birch]

They ran out of pilots and sailors before they ran out of planes and ships.

David

[Gunner Asch]

On Mon, 30 Mar 2015 21:16:13 -0400, BeamMeUpScotty
<I-WAS-JUST-GANG-PROBED-BY-...@IRS.FBI.NSA.CIA.EPA.FCC.DHS.ObamaCare.gov>
wrote:

Well..they really werent all that low on planes..ships..a bit..but
pilots..they were out of those nearly entirely. The Germans were
making more airplanes in 1945 than in 1941..but they had no pilots and
no transporation for all the plane parts.

http://fas.org/irp/eprint/arens/chap4.htm

[Gunner Asch]

Well said.

[ex-PFC Wintergreen]

Not in 1942 they weren't, you stupid illiterate cunt.

[Martin Eastburn]

It didn't bring it upon Midway - Midway had been attacked long before
and again afterwards.

December 7, 1941 - Japanese bomb Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; also attack the
Philippines, Wake Island, Guam, Malaya, Thailand, Shanghai and Midway.
December 8, 1941 - U.S. and Britain declare war on Japan. Japanese land
near Singapore and enter Thailand.
December 9, 1941 - China declares war on Japan.
December 10, 1941 - Japanese invade the Philippines and also seize Guam.
December 11, 1941 - Japanese invade Burma.
December 15, 1941 - First Japanese merchant ship sunk by a U.S. submarine.
December 16, 1941 - Japanese invade British Borneo.
December 18, 1941 - Japanese invade Hong Kong.
December 22, 1941 - Japanese invade Luzon in the Philippines.
December 23, 1941 - General Douglas MacArthur begins a withdrawal from
Manila to Bataan; Japanese take Wake Island.
December 25, 1941 - British surrender at Hong Kong.
December 26, 1941 - Manila declared an open city.
December 27, 1941 - Japanese bomb Manila.

.....
March 24, 1942 - Admiral Chester Nimitz appointed as Commander in Chief
of the U.S. Pacific theater.
April 3, 1942 - Japanese attack U.S. and Filipino troops at Bataan.
April 6, 1942 - First U.S. troops arrive in Australia.
April 9, 1942 - U.S. forces on Bataan surrender unconditionally to the
Japanese.
April 10, 1942 - Bataan Death March begins as 76,000 Allied POWs
including 12,000 Americans are forced to walk 60 miles under a blazing
sun without food or water toward a new POW camp, resulting in over 5,000
American deaths.

April 18, 1942 - Surprise U.S. 'Doolittle' B-25 air raid from the HORNET
against Tokyo boosts Allied morale.

April 29, 1942 - Japanese take central Burma.
May 1, 1942 - Japanese occupy Mandalay in Burma.
May 3, 1942 - Japanese take Tulagi in the Solomon Islands.
May 5, 1942 - Japanese prepare to invade Midway and the Aleutian Islands.
May 6, 1942 - Japanese take Corregidor as Gen. Wainwright
unconditionally surrenders all U.S. And Filipino forces in the Philippines.
May 7-8, 1942 - Japan suffers its first defeat of the war during the
Battle of the Coral Sea off New Guinea - the first time in history that
two opposing carrier forces fought only using aircraft without the
opposing ships ever sighting each other.
May 12, 1942 - The last U.S. Troops holding out in the Philippines
surrender on Mindanao.
May 20, 1942 - Japanese complete the capture of Burma and reach India.

June 4-5, 1942 - Turning point in the war occurs with a decisive
victory for the U.S. against Japan in the Battle of Midway as squadrons
of U.S. torpedo planes and dive bombers from ENTERPRISE, HORNET, and
YORKTOWN attack and destroy four Japanese carriers, a cruiser, and
damage another cruiser and two destroyers. U.S. loses YORKTOWN.

Martin

[George Plimpton]

On 3/30/2015 8:58 PM, Martin Eastburn wrote:
> It didn't bring it upon Midway - Midway had been attacked long before
> and again afterwards.

*THE* battle of Midway, in which the Japanese carriers were destroyed,
occurred as a direct result of Doolittle's attack on the Japanese mainland.

Try again.

[dca...@krl.org]

On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 12:30:21 AM UTC-4, George Plimpton wrote:

>
> *THE* battle of Midway, in which the Japanese carriers were destroyed,
> occurred as a direct result of Doolittle's attack on the Japanese mainland.
>
> Try again.

The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid. Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on the Japanese military strength.

Dan

[Jim Wilkins]

<dca...@krl.org> wrote in message
news:eb73f578-933e-47bb...@googlegroups.com...

================

http://armedforcesmuseum.com/world-war-ii-japanese-admiral-isoroku-yamamoto/
"Yamamoto was agitated as he was hoping for an offensive battle in the
east, which he felt would finish the American fleet. However, Naval
General Staff officers were not willing to take that risk.
On April 18, 1942, Tokyo and the area around it were attacked by the
"Doolittle Raid". As a result, the Naval General Staff gave Yamamoto
permission to implement his Midway Operation. He began to plan a rush
for both Midway and the Aleutians."

-jsw

[dca...@krl.org]

On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 10:27:15 AM UTC-4, Jim Wilkins wrote:


> The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
> Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
> contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
> there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
> the Japanese military strength.
>
> Dan
> ================
>
> http://armedforcesmuseum.com/world-war-ii-japanese-admiral-isoroku-yamamoto/
> "Yamamoto was agitated as he was hoping for an offensive battle in the
> east, which he felt would finish the American fleet. However, Naval
> General Staff officers were not willing to take that risk.
> On April 18, 1942, Tokyo and the area around it were attacked by the
> "Doolittle Raid". As a result, the Naval General Staff gave Yamamoto
> permission to implement his Midway Operation. He began to plan a rush
> for both Midway and the Aleutians."
>
> -jsw

Just as I said. It contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific. Yamamoto was pushing for an offensive battle already. It did not have any bearing on the performance of the Japanese Navy, the ships they had available to deploy, the strategy, the availability of aircraft, the ability to decode Japanese messages, the repairs to the Yorktown.

In short it only influenced the decision to secure the Pacific. It had no affect on the battle.

If the Doolittle Raid was so successful, why was it never repeated? Because from a military standpoint it wasted planes and pilots with almost no damage to the Japanese mainland.

Dan

[Rudy Canoza]

On 3/31/2015 10:11 AM, dca...@krl.org wrote:
> On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 10:27:15 AM UTC-4, Jim Wilkins wrote:
>
>
>> The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
>> Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
>> contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
>> there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
>> the Japanese military strength.
>>
>> Dan
>> ================
>>
>> http://armedforcesmuseum.com/world-war-ii-japanese-admiral-isoroku-yamamoto/
>> "Yamamoto was agitated as he was hoping for an offensive battle in the
>> east, which he felt would finish the American fleet. However, Naval
>> General Staff officers were not willing to take that risk.
>> On April 18, 1942, Tokyo and the area around it were attacked by the
>> "Doolittle Raid". As a result, the Naval General Staff gave Yamamoto
>> permission to implement his Midway Operation. He began to plan a rush
>> for both Midway and the Aleutians."
>>
>> -jsw
>
> Just as I said. It contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific. Yamamoto was pushing for an offensive battle already.

He was *losing* that battle among the strategic planning elite.

The “Doolittle Raid” as it came to be known in honor of its
commander, Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle, was a pivotal moment in
World War II, resulting in strategic implications far beyond the
modest damage it did to the Japanese homeland, according to Dr.
Robert S. Ehlers, an authority on airpower and director of Angelo
State University’s Center for Security Studies.

Eighty aviators, including 13 from Texas, one of whom was born in
nearby Robert Lee, struck a retaliatory blow on a mission that
marked the first time a foreign power had successfully attacked the
island nation. The raid dramatically re-shaped Japanese strategy,
disastrously as it turned out, in the early months of the American
conflict in the Pacific.

“The raid led directly to the Japanese decision to attack Midway,”
said Ehlers, “and the Battle of Midway became the turning point in
the Pacific War, though the fighting would continue for more than
three years.”
[...]
Ehlers explained that the Japanese Army and Navy high commands had
different strategies for defeating the Allies. The army was heavily
engaged in China, had advanced to the borders of India, and wanted
the navy to support an Indian Ocean strategy that would allow the
Japanese to capture Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), an island with major
British naval and air bases at the time. Using Ceylon as a base for
attacks on merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean, the army hoped to
defeat the British force in India, then ultimately link up with the
German Army and defeat the Allies with a unified force.

By contrast, the Japanese Navy wanted to maintain the integrity of
the defensive barrier it had created in the Pacific and to take New
Guinea and at least parts of Australia, along with all the islands
in that region, to keep the Americans from sending reinforcements
there, Ehlers said. Then the navy would go after the remaining
American carriers to ensure Japanese naval mastery and freedom of
action in the Pacific.

“The Doolittle Raid,” said Ehlers, “gave the Japanese Navy what it
wanted, especially since the Emperor weighed in, a very rare thing,
on the Navy’s side in an effort to ensure there wasn’t another
American attack on the Japanese Home Islands. So, the raid set
Japanese strategy in such a way that Midway became the decisive
meeting point, and the Indian Ocean strategy went out the window.”

https://www.angelo.edu/content/news/1466-doolittle-raid-remembered-for-impact


Prediction: you will now stubbornly insist that you are right, and the
academic experts are wrong.

--

Your first duty is to th' country...is to th' flag, and then...and then
th' army,
and then to...and then to god. Flag, Army, God - F.A.G.

Mark Wieber
75th Rangers, 1971-1973

[David R. Birch]

The Doolittle raid demonstrated successfully to the Japanese that we
could and would strike at the home islands and that we were still in the
war. The damage was psychological and it changed the way the high
command saw us as a threat.

No need for a repeat, we had made our point.

David

[dca...@krl.org]

On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 1:54:07 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:


>
> Prediction: you will now stubbornly insist that you are right, and the
> academic experts are wrong.
>

No , but I will point out you only quoted one " academic expert " who happens to be an enthusiastic Texan.

I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle considered the raid a failure.

Dan

[Jim Wilkins]

<dca...@krl.org> wrote in message
news:390bab04-c65e-4a16...@googlegroups.com...

===============

As my reference clearly stated, without the Doolittle Raid the Battle
of Midway wouldn't have happened. That's a 100% 'affect'.

Most likely the confrontations near the Solomons would have been
larger and harder for us instead:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Coral_Sea
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Eastern_Solomons
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Santa_Cruz_Islands
We weren't as lucky during those three as at Midway.

The B-25 raid couldn't be repeated because alerted Jap naval forces
instead of fishing boats would have been guarding the ocean
approaches, and we thought we could bomb Japan far more effectively
with B-29s based in China until we could capture an unsinkable Pacific
island to fly from.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Matterhorn

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Rabaul_(November_1943)
"With the exception of the surprise raid at Pearl Harbor, no attack
against such a formidable land target had been attempted by carrier
aircraft. As such it was considered a highly dangerous mission for
the aircrews and placed the carriers themselves at risk. Halsey later
said the threat that the Japanese cruiser force at Rabaul posed to his
landings at Bougainville was "the most desperate emergency that
confronted me in my entire term as ComSoPac."

"The success of the [Rabaul] raid began to change the strongly held
belief that carrier-based air forces could not challenge land-based
air forces."

Doolittle's B-25s could attack from a greater and thus safer standoff
range than carrier planes, but couldn't return and land on the ship,
making the raid a one-time trick that depended on surprise.

This is the man who originated the idea in response to FDR's request
to do "something" against Japan to boost morale.
http://www.uss-hornet.org/history/wwii/doolittle_bio-Francis_S_Low.shtml

-jsw

[Rudy Canoza]

Doolittle did *not* consider the raid to be a strategic failure, you
liar. He only considered it a "failure" because all the aircraft were
lost, something not in his control when the planes had to launch 170
nautical miles farther from Tokyo than planned.

[dca...@krl.org]

On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 7:13:34 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:

> > I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle considered the raid a failure.
>
> Doolittle did *not* consider the raid to be a strategic failure, you
> liar. He only considered it a "failure" because all the aircraft were
> lost, something not in his control when the planes had to launch 170
> nautical miles farther from Tokyo than planned.
>
>

Doolittle expected to be courtmarshalled.

From Wiki

The raid caused negligible material damage to Japan, but it succeeded in its goal of raising American morale and casting doubt in Japan on the ability of its military leaders to defend their home islands. It also contributed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's decision to attack Midway Island in the Central Pacific--an attack that turned into a decisive strategic defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by the U.S. Navy in the Battle of Midway. Doolittle, who initially believed that loss of all his aircraft would lead to his being court-martialled, received the Medal of Honor and was promoted two steps to Brigadier General.

Dan

[Jim Wilkins]

<dca...@krl.org> wrote in message
news:d3d2edf8-654b-4ac4...@googlegroups.com...

=========================
Your claim was:

"The Battle of Midway was not the direct result of Doolittle's raid.
Since you think it was, explain the direct connection. At best it
contributed to Japan's decision to secure the Pacific region , but
there was no direct connection. The raid did not have any effect on
the Japanese military strength."

Now you've seen the evidence that Midway WAS a direct result of the
Doolittle raid, and your reference repeats it. I grant you that it
didn't do much physical harm or affect their strength, but it was only
expected to damage their morale and trust in their leaders, which was
important since Japan was still a parliamentary democracy whose
military leaders could and later did lose power, due to the loss of
Saipan.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hideki_Tojo
"His popularity was sky-high in the early years of the war, as
Japanese forces went from one great victory to another. However, after
the Battle of Midway, with the tide of war turning against Japan, Tojo
faced increasing opposition from within the government and military.
To strengthen his position, in February 1944, Tojo assumed the post of
Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff. However, after the
fall of Saipan, he was forced to resign on July 18, 1944."

Doolittle's plan was to coordinate with Chennault to land and refuel
in China, and he felt personally responsible for the failure to do
that although the real causes were encountering the unexpected
Japanese patrol boat ~200 miles before their planned launch, and
perennially poor communication in China.

-jsw

[Rudy Canoza]

On 3/31/2015 5:14 PM, dca...@krl.org wrote:
> On Tuesday, March 31, 2015 at 7:13:34 PM UTC-4, Rudy Canoza wrote:
>
>>> I consider S.E. Morrison a academic expert. He and Doolittle considered the raid a failure.
>>
>> Doolittle did *not* consider the raid to be a strategic failure, you
>> liar. He only considered it a "failure" because all the aircraft were
>> lost, something not in his control when the planes had to launch 170
>> nautical miles farther from Tokyo than planned.
>>
>>
>
> Doolittle expected to be courtmarshalled.

For the loss of the planes - *not* because the raid was a strategic
failure. It was a strategic success - not in doubt.

> The raid caused negligible material damage to Japan, but

But it led Japan to abandon there previously preferred goal of invading
India and capturing Ceylon, and instead attack Midway, where they
suffered a huge defeat.

[Rudy Canoza]

This seems to be the consensus opinion of historians, but it's not good
enough for danny.

[One Party System]

BeamMeUpScotty <I-WAS-JUST-GANG-PROBED-BY-THE-ObamaRegime-SPY-
NET...@IRS.FBI.NSA.CIA.EPA.FCC.DHS.ObamaCare.gov> wrote in
news:VzmSw.147617$uF6...@fx17.iad:

It is well known that Midway was an attempt by the IJN to regain face. That
the homeland had been attacked and the emperor endangered was an enormous
blow to the Navy as the protectors of Japan.

Materially the raid had little effect. But morale wise it was a shot in the
arm after a string of losses and it did alter Japanese strategy.

--
There is a certain class of race-problem solvers who don’t want the patient
to get well, because as long as the disease holds out they have not only an
easy means of making a living, but also an easy medium through which to
make themselves prominent before the public.

Booker T. Washington

[One Party System]

"David R. Birch" <dbi...@wi.rr.com> wrote in
news:mfcub...@news3.newsguy.com:

Quite true.

[One Party System]

Martin Eastburn <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in news:BXoSw.229384$L%
2.13...@fx07.iad:

Your thesis is not supported by your facts.

>
> On 3/30/2015 8:06 PM, George Plimpton wrote:
>> On 7/31/2013 12:54 PM, deep wrote:
>>> On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 13:49:14 -0500, Jeff M <NoS...@NoThanks.org>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Most experts agree that the Battle of Midway was the turning point in
>>>> the war against Japan, like the Battle of Stalingrad was in the war
>>>> against Germany. the victory at Midway was the direct result of the
>>>> Doolittle Raid, which was therefore of inestimable and unquestionable
>>>> strategic importance.
>>>
>>> At best the Doolittle raid had a positive impact on American morale,
>>> but that's about it. It had no direct impact on the battle of
>>> Midway.
>>
>> It *brought about* the battle of Midway, you stupid fat fuck.
>>
>

[Jim Wilkins]

"Jim Wilkins" <murat...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:mfffg7$efo$1...@dont-email.me...

Here's an alternate assessment of the raid. Notice that the Japanese
vented their rage over being served their own medicine by massacring a
quarter million Chinese civilians along the escape routes of the
Raiders, a greater toll than for the two A-Bombs.
http://fly.historicwings.com/2013/04/reconsidering-the-doolittle-raid/

-jsw

[Rudy Canoza]

Also at that site:

Common Understanding [what might be called the danny caster
misunderstanding]: In terms of strategic decision making as it related
to the wider war in the Pacific, the Doolittle Raid did not influence
Japanese political or military leaders to alter their plans and courses
of action, except to perhaps reinforce the home islands for better
defense in the event of another American raid.

Actual Fact: The Doolittle Raid and subsequent failure of the IJN
Second Fleet to find, engage and successfully defeat the American
carrier task force had much wider implications. Politically, the
Imperial Japanese Navy was placed in a position of having to engage and
succeed against the Americans in the near term. The public and
political view that if American land-based bombers could attack Tokyo
then Japan was more vulnerable than many had believed was matched by the
Japanese military’s own assessment that such vulnerabilities were not
going to be easily reduced. This created a strong incentive to act
swiftly and boldly. Thus, the ultimate outcome of the Doolittle Raid
turned out to be of extraordinary supreme strategic importance — forced
into stronger action in the wake of the American attack, Admiral
Yamamoto made the key decision to move ahead quickly with a more robust
attack on Midway Island. That decision received broad support, perhaps
in large part justified and enabled by the changed political and
military landscape created by the Doolittle Raid itself.

[Rudy Canoza]

It wasn't merely an attempt to save face. The IJN already felt that
fighting a big naval war in the Pacific was the best strategy, and the
Doolittle raid tipped the balance in the strategic debate between the
army and the navy.

> That
> the homeland had been attacked and the emperor endangered was an enormous
> blow to the Navy as the protectors of Japan.
>
> Materially the raid had little effect. But morale wise it was a shot in the
> arm after a string of losses and it did alter Japanese strategy.
>


--

[BeamMeUpScotty]

The Japanese had to prepare for more attacks.

Makes me wonder why FDR/Doolittle didn't target the Emperor's Palace,
other than it was a one shot deal and they wanted the people to see it.


Truman sure got the Nuclear bombs on target with no real problems.


--

[Jim Wilkins]

"BeamMeUpScotty"
<I-WAS-JUST-GANG-PROBED-BY-...@IRS.FBI.NSA.CIA.EPA.FCC.DHS.ObamaCare.gov>
wrote in message news:AqXSw.141156$_F4....@fx21.iad...

>
> Makes me wonder why FDR/Doolittle didn't target the Emperor's
> Palace,
> other than it was a one shot deal and they wanted the people to see
> it.
>
>
> Truman sure got the Nuclear bombs on target with no real problems.

Before the war the Emperor had supported Prime Minister Konoe's Peace
Faction in its efforts to negotiate an accord with FDR.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fumimaro_Konoe
"Konoe made one more desperate attempt to avert war. He proposed a
personal summit with Roosevelt-in the United States if necessary-to
come to some understanding. Konoe secured backing from the Navy and
the Emperor for this move. The Army agreed, provided that Konoe adhere
to the consensus foreign policy, and be prepared to go to war if his
initiative failed."

The Army was the faction seeking war, promarily through its younger
officers in China who provoked incidents with the Chinese and dared
the reluctant government to back them up
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marco_Polo_Bridge_Incident
"Although a ceasefire had been installed, further efforts to defuse
the escalating conflict failed, largely due to actions by the Japanese
China Garrison Army commanders and militarists within the Imperial
Japanese Army General Staff."

We knew we would need Hirohito's support to gain the willing
cooperation of the population after the brutal war. Actually with his
concurrence we (MacArthur) succeeded beyond all expectation:
http://www.ic.nanzan-u.ac.jp/AMERICA/english/documents/14YOSHIMI_000.pdf
"It is often said that postwar Japanese popular culture is basically
"American".
In other words, "American" influence has been decisive for the
development of
cultural consumption in everyday life in postwar Japan."

"At the same time, the army of occupation was itself very much a part
of the
mass-cultural scenery of postwar Japan. When one considers this other
unconscious level, "America" appears not so much as a "prohibiting"
presence,
but as a "seducing" presence in the everyday consciousness of the
times."

I learned much of this stuff in public High School. Didn't anyone
else?
-jsw

[Rudy Canoza]

What they did to try to prevent more attacks was try to force a decisive
engagement at Midway, which they lost decisively.

[Martin Eastburn]

You don't get it. Midway is the tail end of a long line of Hawaiian
islands. The Big island will be out there in a Billion years give or
take. It and the Alaskan islands were attacked because they could
have search planes running over the north Pacific. Without it, a second
attack on Pearl would have happened. We stopped it at Midway. It was
simply a kill point on the pathway to Hawaii. They wanted to silence
the warning line out there doing the watch. They were like sentries
guarding the post. The Japanese didn't need 3 carrier groups to attack
Midway - they were on the way to Hawaii. They killed every sub that
came near them to keep the secrets.

Martin

[Jim Wilkins]

"Martin Eastburn" <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in message
news:eK2Tw.145569$_F4....@fx21.iad...

> You don't get it. Midway is the tail end of a long line of Hawaiian
> islands. The Big island will be out there in a Billion years give
> or take. It and the Alaskan islands were attacked because they
> could
> have search planes running over the north Pacific. Without it, a
> second
> attack on Pearl would have happened. We stopped it at Midway. It
> was simply a kill point on the pathway to Hawaii. They wanted to
> silence
> the warning line out there doing the watch. They were like sentries
> guarding the post. The Japanese didn't need 3 carrier groups to
> attack
> Midway - they were on the way to Hawaii. They killed every sub that
> came near them to keep the secrets.
>
> Martin

Sorry Martin, but Japan's ASW wasn't nearly as good as the Allies'.
The USS Nautilus detected their approach, evaded attacks and stayed in
the middle of the fight:
http://ww2db.com/ship_spec.php?ship_id=355

One of the admirals commanding sub fleets had participated in the
development of the Mark 14 torpedo and refused to believe it had
multiple crippling defects. The Germans had a similar issue serious
enough that they court-martialed those responsible.

-jsw

[Martin Eastburn]

I'm far more versed that you think. I didn't say ALL of the
subs were attacked and killed. They did what they could when it
showed up. They wanted the weather stations and radios in Alaska
and the deep water port if needed. Kwajalein deep to the south
and 2500 NM from Hawaii was an underwater refueling station for the
Japanese. A northern one would extend their reach and control.
The fuel dump in Alaska was worth the work.

I lived in the South Pacific and swam in their fuel oil tanks.
Used their saltwater concrete piers and saw lots of their iron in junk
piles.

Martin

[Jim Wilkins]

"Martin Eastburn" <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in message

news:f4oTw.161051$2f6.1...@fx12.iad...

> I'm far more versed that you think. I didn't say ALL of the
> subs were attacked and killed. They did what they could when it
> showed up. They wanted the weather stations and radios in Alaska
> and the deep water port if needed. Kwajalein deep to the south
> and 2500 NM from Hawaii was an underwater refueling station for the
> Japanese. A northern one would extend their reach and control.
> The fuel dump in Alaska was worth the work.
>
> I lived in the South Pacific and swam in their fuel oil tanks.
> Used their saltwater concrete piers and saw lots of their iron in
> junk piles.
>
> Martin
>

Did you play goalie for the ICBM team at Kwajalein?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Reagan_Ballistic_Missile_Defense_Test_Site

-jsw

[One Party System]

Martin Eastburn <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in news:f4oTw.161051
$2f6.1...@fx12.iad:

> underwater refueling station

Do tell. Why would they need such a thing? They controlled the area. I don't
think technology was quite up to that at the time.

[Martin Eastburn]

Yep.
I was there before they named it for Ronald Regan.

A member of our family had been on the island for almost 50 years.
The first started with the Sea Air Rescue team flying Air Boats.
Then Radar designers of several generations.

Martin

[Martin Eastburn]

It was there. It could refuel one sub at a time and the large
tanks I swam in were inland. The tops were open and the fuel was
low in the tank and very thick. Rain water added 20' of fresh water.

The center of the Kwajalein atoll contains two deep channels for
movement. The atoll was 70 miles tip to tip and was shaped like a
boomerang.

Remember they had the monster subs that carried planes on them and
were to attack Panama and attempt to take control or destroy it.

The monster subs were shown on a History channel special a few years ago.

The atoll is not only the receiving end of the Pacific Missile Range
as it was called but is a mid-pacific refueling site.

Most don't know we have large tracker ships doing ovals (several ovals)
trailing phones and using large antennas. They refuel there.

Martin

[Scout]

"Martin Eastburn" <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in message

news:f4oTw.161051$2f6.1...@fx12.iad...

> I'm far more versed that you think. I didn't say ALL of the
> subs were attacked and killed.

"They killed every sub that came near them to keep the secrets."

Would you care to revise your bullshit story sir?

[Jim Wilkins]

"Martin Eastburn" <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in message

news:2dITw.343497$hv4.2...@fx04.iad...

> Yep.
> I was there before they named it for Ronald Regan.
>
> A member of our family had been on the island for almost 50 years.
> The first started with the Sea Air Rescue team flying Air Boats.
> Then Radar designers of several generations.
>
> Martin

I know about it only because a friend was an orbital analyst at
Altair.

[Jim Wilkins]

"Martin Eastburn" <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in message
news:DmITw.179426$Op6....@fx16.iad...

> It was there. It could refuel one sub at a time and the large
> tanks I swam in were inland. The tops were open and the fuel was
> low in the tank and very thick. Rain water added 20' of fresh
> water.
>
> The center of the Kwajalein atoll contains two deep channels for
> movement. The atoll was 70 miles tip to tip and was shaped like a
> boomerang.
>
> Remember they had the monster subs that carried planes on them and
> were to attack Panama and attempt to take control or destroy it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I-400-class_submarine
Their planes were meant to attack the Panama Canal locks, but we had
prepared for air attacks with torpedo nets etc.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/panama-canal-defense.htm

> The monster subs were shown on a History channel special a few years
> ago.
>
> The atoll is not only the receiving end of the Pacific Missile Range
> as it was called but is a mid-pacific refueling site.
>
> Most don't know we have large tracker ships doing ovals (several
> ovals)
> trailing phones and using large antennas. They refuel there.
>
> Martin

http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/cobra_judy.htm

-jsw

[One Party System]

Martin Eastburn <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in

news:DmITw.179426$Op6....@fx16.iad:

> It was there. It could refuel one sub at a time and the large
> tanks I swam in were inland. The tops were open and the fuel was
> low in the tank and very thick. Rain water added 20' of fresh water.
>
> The center of the Kwajalein atoll contains two deep channels for
> movement. The atoll was 70 miles tip to tip and was shaped like a
> boomerang.
>
> Remember they had the monster subs that carried planes on them and
> were to attack Panama and attempt to take control or destroy it.
>
> The monster subs were shown on a History channel special a few years
> ago.
>

This seems unlikely. Kwajelein was taken from the Japanese in January of
1944. The I-400s wern't ready until 1945.

I'm not saying that the underwater refueling absolutely didn't happen, but
40+ years of research hasn't brought it to light for me yet. Perhaps you
misinteroeted what you found.

> The atoll is not only the receiving end of the Pacific Missile Range
> as it was called but is a mid-pacific refueling site.
>
> Most don't know we have large tracker ships doing ovals (several ovals)
> trailing phones and using large antennas. They refuel there.
>
> Martin
>
> On 4/3/2015 6:41 AM, One Party System wrote:
>> Martin Eastburn <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in news:f4oTw.161051
>> $2f6.1...@fx12.iad:
>>
>>> underwater refueling station
>>
>> Do tell. Why would they need such a thing? They controlled the area. I
>> don't think technology was quite up to that at the time.
>>
>

[One Party System]

"Scout" <me4...@vcenturylink.removeme.this2.nospam.net> wrote in
news:mfo27l$6dq$1...@dont-email.me:

>
>
> "Martin Eastburn" <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in message
> news:f4oTw.161051$2f6.1...@fx12.iad...
>> I'm far more versed that you think. I didn't say ALL of the
>> subs were attacked and killed.
>
> "They killed every sub that came near them to keep the secrets."
>
> Would you care to revise your bullshit story sir?

It was such a bizarre and over the top statement I didn't think it needed
answering.

Miracle at Midway by Prange, pretty much tells the whole story. No US subs
sunk in that engagement.

[Martin Eastburn]

Small version that went off coasts. The big ones had 25 meter
and Big baby was 35 meter antennas or there about sizes. They used them
24/7 but tasked them on Apollo landings to help track and communicate.

That was A long time ago. I was there 50 years ago!
That wiki page shows the I-400 class I was talking about. Big ones!

Martin

[Martin Eastburn]

I never said they were there, the infrastructure was
being built. And without in-route refueling the subs would
never return. I think I heard they could make a 1 way, but
if refueled twice, they were usable for more tasks.

Kinda like the war machines that was being made in Nazi factories.
They were just coming out when the war ended. Had D-Day been later
in the year or the next year, the war might have been much different.

And to clear up - the Atoll is very deep in the center - less on both
ends and has two very deep passes leading into from open sea.

The tanks were on Beji island. Up north on the East side and was used
to get away from the throngs of life but required a LCU, LCM, J-Boat
as it was far away and through open water during the trip.

The information was from the Army. The islands are still outfitted with
all sorts of war this and that.

Martin

[Martin Eastburn]

The point for the pencil head is keeping the information about
their whereabouts secret. The movies and the books all state that
planes were sent out to search for them. If a sub knew it would have
reported them. They were in fact the targets of their tubes. It was
war time already. After the engagement was started, information
on the location was sent to the subs and they went into the area
to finish off some and pick up pilots.

The ocean is very very big. In the days that radar only saw 20 some
miles or more made it bigger.

Martin

[David R. Birch]

On 4/4/2015 9:48 PM, Martin Eastburn wrote:
> I never said they were there, the infrastructure was
> being built. And without in-route refueling the subs would
> never return. I think I heard they could make a 1 way, but
> if refueled twice, they were usable for more tasks.
>
> Kinda like the war machines that was being made in Nazi factories.
> They were just coming out when the war ended. Had D-Day been later
> in the year or the next year, the war might have been much different.

Yes, they would have had as many monster tanks as they did
Me-262s...with no fuel, crews or pilots to run them. Not people you can
replace with Hitlerjugend or Volkssturm.

By the time we showed up at Normandy, the Russians had already done most
of the killing and dying. We gave the Germans another front to fail to
defend with their depleted Heer and Luftwaffe.

David

[Jim Wilkins]

"Martin Eastburn" <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in message
news:oo1Uw.175755$uD5.1...@fx02.iad...

>
> Kinda like the war machines that was being made in Nazi factories.
> They were just coming out when the war ended. Had D-Day been later
> in the year or the next year, the war might have been much
> different.

Yes, the Red Army would have captured -all- of Germany. The last time
Russia had invaded Europe they reached Paris.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Russparis.jpg

In rec.aviation.military we spent years refuting those Nazi dreams.
You don't hear about how poorly the advanced weapons they did have
performed, for example the Schnorchel U boats tried and failed to
interfere with the Normandy invasion fleet, and the Me-262 jet
couldn't even defend its own bases from Allied fighters. It needed
FW-190s for protection. When the "undetectable" Type XXI U boats
finally sortied in April and May 1945 they were massacred.

The F-102 was the ultimate Nazi jet fighter, designed by Dr. Alexander
Lippisch for the US Air Force.
http://www.airvectors.net/avf102.html
"The Convair company was very interested in Lippisch's delta-wing
concepts and came up with a concept for a delta-winged interceptor,
designated the "XP-92".

"The XF-92A was something of a disappointment, being both unreliable
and performing well below expectations, which were admittedly
inflated."

American aerodynamicists reworked the F-102 into the excellent F-106.

-jsw

[One Party System]

Martin Eastburn <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in news:oo1Uw.175755
$uD5.1...@fx02.iad:

> I never said they were there, the infrastructure was
> being built. And without in-route refueling the subs would
> never return. I think I heard they could make a 1 way, but
> if refueled twice, they were usable for more tasks.

37,500 nm miles at 14 knots.

The I-400s were projected to be able to reach Washington DC or New york and
return to Japan, unrefueled.

> Kinda like the war machines that was being made in Nazi factories.
> They were just coming out when the war ended. Had D-Day been later
> in the year or the next year, the war might have been much different.

The wonder weapons were enormous drains on resources for little practical
return. The Me-163 consumed enormous amounts of money, material and time
for a dangerous to operate point defense (at best) fighter that was beyond
vulnerable once it ran out of fuel.

The Me-262 was fast but vulnerable at takeoff and landing, not particularly
good in a turning fight and labor intensive to keep in the air. 10 hours
between tear downs for the Jumo 004 engines.

The He-162? A freaking pipe dream if ever there was one. Fast to build fast
to fly. How manuverable were they? What was the time between overhauls on
it's engines? Where were they going to get men to fly high performance
aircraft when they barely had training facilities for prop driven aircraft.
Let alone fuel and unmolested air space.

Let us not even go into the cluster foxtrot of Panzer development. The
Germans should have improved the engine transsion of the Panther and
focused on Panzer Iv and Panther hulls and the turretsd variants, Stugs and
Jagdpanthers.

Germany lost for a lot of reasons many of them political, some of them
global. By 1941 the Kreigsmarne was on it's way into the shitter. Absent a
true world wide power projection they were going anywhere. They really had
limited resources and what they had they couldn't hold onto.

Thier industrial facilities were always going to be vulnerable to air
attack. As long as Great Britian remained the great unsinkable aircraft
carrier operating off of Germany they were quite doomed.

The Germans have a knack for tactical thought, but lacked true strtegic
vision. And bullying a bunch of unprepared relatively unarmed countries
doesn't count. France lost becuase of it's own narrowness of vision. They
should have ben able to hold off the Wehrmacht.

When they came up against a determined and prepared foe, like the RAF in
the summer and fall of 1940, all the German tech couldn't beat poor
leadership.

> And to clear up - the Atoll is very deep in the center - less on both
> ends and has two very deep passes leading into from open sea.

Not relevant.

> The tanks were on Beji island. Up north on the East side and was used
> to get away from the throngs of life but required a LCU, LCM, J-Boat
> as it was far away and through open water during the trip.
>
> The information was from the Army. The islands are still outfitted with
> all sorts of war this and that.

I hate to breaj this to you but a lot of information garnerd at the time
was just wrong. It was what we interpeted the finds as. Until people could
read the documentation and clearly decypher the intent, such speculation
was at best, speculative.

There is no suggestion that I have found that suggests that the Japanese
had underwater refueling facilities for submarines.

[Gronk]

One Party System wrote:
> "Scout" <me4...@vcenturylink.removeme.this2.nospam.net> wrote in
> news:mfo27l$6dq$1...@dont-email.me:
>
>>
>>
>> "Martin Eastburn" <lion...@consolidated.net> wrote in message
>> news:f4oTw.161051$2f6.1...@fx12.iad...
>>> I'm far more versed that you think. I didn't say ALL of the
>>> subs were attacked and killed.
>>
>> "They killed every sub that came near them to keep the secrets."
>>
>> Would you care to revise your bullshit story sir?
>
> It was such a bizarre and over the top statement I didn't think it needed
> answering.
>
> Miracle at Midway by Prange, pretty much tells the whole story. No US subs
> sunk in that engagement.

See also "Shattered Sword", *the* text on Midway.

[whit3rd]

On Sunday, April 5, 2015 at 4:42:49 PM UTC-7, Gronk wrote:

> > Miracle at Midway by Prange, pretty much tells the whole story. No US subs
> > sunk in that engagement.
>
> See also "Shattered Sword", *the* text on Midway.

And top it off with _Midway_ by Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya.
Hey, now that the war's over, we can debrief both sides...