On Mon, 9 Apr 2018 19:00:15 -0700, Rudy Canoza <c...@philhendrie.con>
wrote:
> The very big news of the day: FBI agents raided the law office of
> Michael Cohen, President Donald Trump's lawyer who was involved in
> payment of $130,000 to adult performer "Stormy Daniels" for a
> nondisclosure agreement. Some reports suggest they also raided his
home.
> Recently I've been listening to the podcast Slow Burn, about
Watergate.
> There's a fascinating theme throughout it: When you're living a
> historical event, how do you know? How can you tell when a
development
> is a big deal?
> This is a big deal. It's very early on, but here's some things we
can
> already tell.
> 1. According to Cohen's own lawyer, the U.S. Attorney's Office for
the
> Southern District of New York (widely regarded within itself as
being
> the most important and prestigious U.S. Attorney's Office in the
> country) secured the search warrants for the FBI, based on a
referral
> from Robert Mueller's office. Assuming this report is correct,
that
> means that a very mainstream U.S. Attorney's Office not just
Special
> Counsel Robert Mueller's office thought that there was enough
for a
> search warrant here.
> 2. Moreover, it's not just that the office thought that there was
enough
> for a search warrant. They thought there was enough for a search
> warrant of an attorney's office for that attorney's client
> communications. That's a very fraught and extraordinary move
that
> requires multiple levels of authorization within the Department
of
> Justice. The U.S. Attorney's Manual (USAM) at Section 9-13.320
> contains the relevant policies and procedures. The highlights:
> * The feds are only supposed to raid a law firm if less
intrusive
> measures won't work. As the USAM puts it:
> In order to avoid impinging on valid attorney-client
> relationships, prosecutors are expected to take the least
> intrusive approach consistent with vigorous and effective
law
> enforcement when evidence is sought from an attorney
actively
> engaged in the practice of law. Consideration should be
given to
> obtaining information from other sources or through the use
of a
> subpoena, unless such efforts could compromise the criminal
> investigation or prosecution, or could result in the
obstruction
> or destruction of evidence, or would otherwise be
ineffective.
> * Such a search requires high-level approval. The USAM requires
such
> a search warrant to be approved by the U.S. attorney the head
of
> the office, a presidential appointee and requires
"consultation"
> with the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
This
> is not a couple of rogue AUSAs sneaking in a warrant.
> * Such a search requires an elaborate review process. The basic
rule
> is that the government may not deliberately seize, or review,
> attorney-client communications. The USAM and relevant caselaw
> therefore require the feds to set up a review process. That
> process might involve a judge reviewing the materials to
separate
> out what is privileged (or what might fall within an
exception to
> the privilege), or else set up a "dirty team" that does the
review
> but is insulated from the "clean team" running the
investigation.
> Another option is a "special master," an experienced and
qualified
> third-party attorney to do the review. Sometimes the
reviewing team
> will only be identifying and protecting privileged material.
> Sometimes the reviewing team will be preparing to seek, or to
> implement, a court ruling that the documents are not
privileged.
> (Robert Mueller is aggressive on this sort of thing; he
already
> sought and obtained a court ruling that some of Paul
Manafort's
> communications with his lawyers were not privileged because
they
> were undertaken for the purpose of fraud the so-called
"crime-fraud
> exception" to the attorney-client privilege.)
> 3. A magistrate judge signed off on this. Federal magistrate judges
> (appointed by local district judges, not by the president)
review
> search warrant applications. A magistrate judge therefore
reviewed
> this application and found probable cause that is, probable
cause to
> believe that the subject premises (Cohen's office) contains
specified
> evidence of a specified federal crime. Now, magistrate judges
> sometimes are a little too rubber-stampy for my taste (notably,
> recall the time that a magistrate judge signed off on a truly
> ludicrous gag order forbidding Reason from revealing that it
had been
> served with a subpoena for information identifying commenters).
But
> here, where the magistrate judge knew that this would become
one of
> the most scrutinized search warrant applications ever, and
because
> the nature of the warrant of an attorney's office is unusual,
you can
> expect that the magistrate judge felt pretty confident that
there was
> enough there.
> 4. The search warrant application (the lengthy narrative from the
FBI
> agent setting for the evidence) is almost certainly still under
seal,
> and even Michael Cohen doesn't get to see it (yet). But the FBI
would
> have left the warrant itself and that shows (1) the federal
criminal
> statutes they were investigating, and (2) the list of items they
> wanted to seize. Much can be learned for those. Assuming Michael
> Cohen doesn't release it, watch for it to be leaked.
> Again: This is a big deal.
> It's early times. Watch for the search warrant itself that will
show us
> what crimes they are investigating and what documents they think
are
> probative of that crime. Watch also for what Michael Cohen's
lawyers do
> in the struggle to compel arbitration with Stormy Daniels in a
federal
> court in Los Angeles the search warrant dramatically complicates
whether
> Cohen can, or should, submit to any questions in that case. Be
skeptical
> of the surge of misinformation and inaccurate legal takes that are
> certain to drop. But watch. This is historic.
>
http://reason.com/archives/2018/04/09/what-we-know-about-the-search-tru
mp-lawy
Hardly news if compared to you performing cunnilingus on Ed
Cuntdress's stank nasty crusty old cunt.