The FH-1100, H. Hughes and the LOH, Part Two
Bob Barbanes
When we last left the LOH competition in May, 1961, there were three
contenders: Bell, Hiller and the Hughes Tool Company. Howard Hughes had used
his considerable financial and political clout to get the Army to reconsider
his model 369 in the LOH competition, even though it needed some 30-plus
waivers to be included. That the 369 was too lightly built to meet MIL-spec
was not a significant barrier; the Army had planned on buying "off-the-shelf"
civilian helicopters anyway, and as long as Hughes got FAA certification...
So there were three initial "winners" of the LOH competition instead of what
had been intended to be two. The ultimate winner was now to become operational
in 1965. Hopefully.
In 1962 Bell, Hiller and Hughes all began construction of their respective
machines. They were to supply five examples of their design for testing and
development. The Army took delivery of the first ones in January, 1964. Some
went to Ft. Rucker, and some went to Edwards Air Force Base.
Although most of us probably assume that Bell's OH-4 was, the Hiller OH-5 was
the odds-on favorite. Army pilots liked flying it, but reportedly did not like
flying the skittish, unstable Hughes. (I personally have to wonder here if
maybe the OH-6 was just too "different" from the way typical helicopters of the
day flew). The heavy, complicated Bell OH-4 had trouble meeting performance
guarantees. So confident was everyone that Hiller had the contract sewn-up,
Fairchild Industries bought Hiller during May of 1964. On October 26th of that
year, an anonymous letter was leaked to Dean-Witter stockbrokers that Hiller
was to be announced as the sole winner of the LOH competition. Wishful
thinking, it turned out.
On October 29, 1964, the Army announced that it had <I>finally</I> (well…sort
of) made a decision on the LOH. Bell was out. Both Hiller and Hughes were now
jointly "...selected after competition to bid on this procurement." Two
winners?? Yes and no. Not really. The first and second rounds were just a
competition to compete, because now the Army decided that eventually there'd be
a <I>final</I> final (and this time we really mean it!) "winner" announced a
year later in 1965. The Army had changed the rules. Since both aircraft had
won the technical competition, the final competition would center on cost.
Uh-oh.
It had not originally been intended to be an auction, but in the end that's
exactly what it came down to. Through industrial espionage (insiders called it
"babes, booze and bribes"), the wily and resourceful Hughes was able to find
out how much Fairchild Hiller was going to bid for their ships ($29,415). This
fact was conveyed to Stan Hiller during a meeting with Hughes Vice President
(and former test pilot) Al Bayer, after Bayer had gotten fired and came to Palo
Alto looking for a job he didn't get. Hiller, irate of course, then complained
to the Army, who conducted we must assume was a most certainly thorough
investigation of itself and concluded that the Army had failed to find any
evidence of wrongdoing. (Clever how these things are worded, eh? Not that
there wasn't any wrongdoing-just that they didn't find any evidence of it.)
In the end, Hughes decided to offer the OH-6 to the Army for a reported $19,860
(a loss of nearly $11,000 per bird), severely undercutting Hiller. He knew
he'd lose money on the initial order, but would surely make it up on the
additional ships if the contract did indeed run out to 3,000 aircraft. But
even HTC V.P. and Aircraft Division General Manager Rea Hopper admitted that
the price was ridiculously, artificially low. During a Congressional Hearing
on the LOH debacle in January, 1967, Hopper admitted, "…this is not the way
people are supposed to price things, I don't think." Now <I>there's</I> an
understatement!
Although there were guidelines (Armed Services Procurement Regulations) in
place that <I>should</I> have safeguarded against allowing contractors to
accept work at an obvious loss, the Army responded favorably in May of 1965 by
ordering 714 OH-6's from Hughes. Because Viet Nam was escalating so fast, the
Army soon placed a second, separate order for 121 additional machines (ones
that were supposedly destined for the civilian market). On these, Hughes
raised the price to $55,927 each. Flabbergasted, the Army managed to negotiate
him down to $49,500. But to get the money to buy the ships, the Army had to go
to Congress. There was such an outcry over this that a Subcommittee for
Special Investigation was convened. Congress insisted the Army cancel the
order. The Army reluctantly conceded.
While the Army did was to cancel the follow-on order for the 121 ships and
invoke a clause in their original contract with Hughes that allowed them to buy
half-again as many helicopters at the original rate. Hughes found himself on
the hook for 357 <I>more</I> OH-6's at $19,860 per copy. The Aircraft Division
had never made money, and was really not prepared to manufacture helicopters so
quickly and in such quantity. In 1965 Hughes was committed to delivering 88
OH-6A's. In 1966 there were supposed to have been 168, and in 1967 there
should have been 458. At the end of 1965 Hughes had only delivered 12 ships,
seriously behind schedule. He and the Army blamed the delay on the war in Viet
Nam. Probably as good a reason as any.
But the Army still wanted...needed...those 121 additional ships. So they had
to look elsewhere. Stung by all the controversy surrounding the original
procurement, in mid-1967 they re-opened the LOH competition, initiated yet
another technical re-evaluation, and invited Bell, Hiller and Hughes to bid
again.
By this time, Fairchild Hiller president Ed Uhl had had enough. Stan Hiller,
unhappy living in Washington D.C. instead of his native California, had had
enough. Although Hiller was familiar with military procurement procedures and
didn't mind them, Uhl wasn't and did. The embittered Uhl decided to not
re-enter the FH-1100 in the LOH competition. Insiders strongly pressured him
to change his mind, but he was steadfast. His CFO, former Hiller man Jim
Drescher worked up a proposal "just in case" Uhl relented. He didn't. In
November of 1967, Fairchild Hiller said "see ya" to the military. The Palo
Alto plant had already been closed. Stan Hiller left the company.
Hughes (after a good bit of agonizing, I'm sure) entered a re-bid of $59,700.
In March of 1968 he got the bad news: Bell had underbid him with their OH-58.
Ironically, the unsubmitted bid sitting on Jim Drescher's desk at Fairchild
Hiller was lower than either Bell's or Hughes'. Or at least, that's what is
now said. (Hey, my skepticism works both ways!)
And that was pretty much that. Fairchild Hiller ended up producing 254 of the
FH-1100's. But for one reason or another the handsome ship just never
caught-on like the sexy competition from Texas (the Bell 206) did. When
FH-1100 production ceased in 1971, they closed the doors on helicopter
manufacturing for good. While the OH-6's reputation has taken on legendary
status in aviation thanks to its work in Viet Nam and beyond, it is now
estimated that Howard Hughes lost $90 million dollars in trying to acheive his
goal.
How much fact and how much fiction? Who really knows. But it makes for a
darned interesting story.
Bob Barbanes
Pensacola, Florida
Bob Barbanes
(BIG snip)
...And somehow, the very first paragraph got mangled. Here's how it was
supposed to have read:
Part Two:
<< When we last left the LOH competition in May, 1961, Howard Hughes had used
his considerable financial and political clout to get the Army to reconsider
his model 369 in the LOH competition, even though it needed some 30-plus
waivers to be included. That the 369 was too lightly built to meet MIL-spec
was not a significant barrier; the Army had planned on buying "off-the-shelf"
civilian helicopters anyway, and as long as Hughes got FAA certification... >>
Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima...oh,, never mind.
Bob
Dan & Jan Hollenbaugh
your version matches up very well with what old-timers in the business who
were involved in the procurement told me. Great job, Bob!
Dan Hollenbaugh
Bob Barbanes wrote in message
<20010812030023...@mb-fc.aol.com>...
>Part Two:
Gyroplanes
Tom
John Hairell
> Part Two:
[stuff snipped]
> In 1962 Bell, Hiller and Hughes all began construction of their respective
> machines. They were to supply five examples of their design for testing and
> development. The Army took delivery of the first ones in January, 1964. Some
> went to Ft. Rucker, and some went to Edwards Air Force Base.
Interestingly Hughes built more than 5 "prototypes". I've been trying
for years to find out how many actual pre-production airframes were
actually built.
The Army serial allocations for the LOH contenders were:
YOH-4 (Bell 206): 62-4202 to 4206
YOH-5 (Hiller FH-1100): 62-4207 to 4211
YOH-6 (Hughes 369): 62-4212 to 4216
There exist photos of both a Hiller YOH-5 and a Hughes YOH-6 marked as
62-4211.
At least one YOH-6 was destroyed in a crash during a test flight at
Twentynine Palms, and one (4212) later went to the USAF. Some
pre-production airframes were used for crash testing. It is possible
that Hughes had another pre-production YOH-6 marked as 4211 after the
Hiller entry lost out or after the Twentynine Palms crash, in which
the crew sustained 38G and walked away.
Also of interest is that the Hughes XV-9 hot-cycle aircraft used an
OH-6 cockpit section.
Wayne Mutza is writing a book on the OH-6 and we have had
conversations on the issue of the number of pre-production YOH-6
(Model 369) and production OH-6A (Model 369A) airframes. It appears
that some sort of creative accounting was going on as far as actual
production, and it is now very hard to sort out. Evidently even
ex-Hughes employees are a bit unsure.
>
> Although most of us probably assume that Bell's OH-4 was, the Hiller OH-5 was
> the odds-on favorite. Army pilots liked flying it, but reportedly did not like
> flying the skittish, unstable Hughes. (I personally have to wonder here if
> maybe the OH-6 was just too "different" from the way typical helicopters of the
> day flew).
The Hughes entry had problems with the tail design and went through a
number of tailboom and tailfeather changes before the design was
finalized. I located the hulk of a YOH-6 in 1989 and it still had the
3-foot long tailboom strakes Hughes had put on it in an effort to aid
stability. The original tailboom design was very fat and impeded
sideways movement. Also there was no vertical stabilizer above the
tailboom, just below. There many other minute differences between the
pre-production and production aircraft.
[more stuff snipped]
> In the end, Hughes decided to offer the OH-6 to the Army for a reported $19,860
> (a loss of nearly $11,000 per bird), severely undercutting Hiller. He knew
> he'd lose money on the initial order, but would surely make it up on the
> additional ships if the contract did indeed run out to 3,000 aircraft. But
> even HTC V.P. and Aircraft Division General Manager Rea Hopper admitted that
> the price was ridiculously, artificially low. During a Congressional Hearing
> on the LOH debacle in January, 1967, Hopper admitted, "…this is not the way
> people are supposed to price things, I don't think." Now <I>there's</I> an
> understatement!
>
Quoted prices were for an airframe without engine or avionics.
> Although there were guidelines (Armed Services Procurement Regulations) in
> place that <I>should</I> have safeguarded against allowing contractors to
> accept work at an obvious loss, the Army responded favorably in May of 1965 by
> ordering 714 OH-6's from Hughes. Because Viet Nam was escalating so fast, the
> Army soon placed a second, separate order for 121 additional machines (ones
> that were supposedly destined for the civilian market). On these, Hughes
> raised the price to $55,927 each. Flabbergasted, the Army managed to negotiate
> him down to $49,500. But to get the money to buy the ships, the Army had to go
> to Congress. There was such an outcry over this that a Subcommittee for
> Special Investigation was convened. Congress insisted the Army cancel the
> order. The Army reluctantly conceded.
The Army admitted that they knew that Hughes had underbid on the first
order and was losing money on every airframe. In fact they had sent
an officer to Hughes to verify that their original bid price wasn't
the result of a typographic error.
> While the Army did was to cancel the follow-on order for the 121 ships and
> invoke a clause in their original contract with Hughes that allowed them to buy
> half-again as many helicopters at the original rate. Hughes found himself on
> the hook for 357 <I>more</I> OH-6's at $19,860 per copy. The Aircraft Division
> had never made money, and was really not prepared to manufacture helicopters so
> quickly and in such quantity.
269 production had to be moved to San Diego and the Culver City plant
had to be rapidly staffed with unskilled workers who had to be trained
before OH-6 production could really get going.
> In 1965 Hughes was committed to delivering 88
> OH-6A's. In 1966 there were supposed to have been 168, and in 1967 there
> should have been 458. At the end of 1965 Hughes had only delivered 12 ships,
> seriously behind schedule. He and the Army blamed the delay on the war in Viet
> Nam. Probably as good a reason as any.
I still haven't figured out the total number of OH-6As actually built.
Sources vary, and without access to the original Army acceptance
papers it's very difficult to ascertain. None of the
publicly-published figures in various publications is accurate, and
even official Army documents vary. The only thing I can come up with
is that it's 1400+ airframes. The serial ranges of the supposedly
cancelled contract for 121 which have been publicly reported as either
never having been allocated or having been allocated to OH-58s
actually were used on OH-6s (some of the OH-6 losses in Vietnam
include those serials) and I'm in the middle of reconciling serial
histories and other data to try to make some headway on the mystery.
Another issue that is not well known is that various "three-letter"
agencies
have used both OH-6s and 500s for spooky jobs from almost the
beginning of their history and it is not in their interests to let the
public know anything about the specific procurement numbers. There's
more to this story than has come out.
[more stuff snipped]
> How much fact and how much fiction? Who really knows. But it makes for a
> darned interesting story.
>
Wayne's book on the OH-6 (now being written) should shed some light on
the murk.
Thanks for the postings, Bob.
John Hairell (guar...@erols.com)
OH-6 buff and amateur historian
Bob Barbanes
<i> >> The Army had its aircraft procurement functions taken away when the Air
Force was established. The Army Air Corps had most of the procurement
expertise and that entire part of the Army disappeared. It was felt post-war
that the Army did not have enough technical expertise to evaluate competing
aircraft designs, and responsibility for aircraft procurement for the Army was
given to the Navy and USAF. This caused all sorts of agony in Army aviation in
the 1950s - the USAF especially dragged its tail on many Army procurement
issues. The USAF also did a lot of high-level maintenance on Army aircraft in
that period and they stalled on that too. >> </i>
The details of how the armed services evolved is extremely fascinating, and
would have taken up much too much space for me to provide any of it in the two
original posts, which I felt were probably too long already.
Most people are probably aware that prior to 1941 there was no "Air Force" as
we know it today. There was the Army, the Navy and the Marines. WWII saw the
formation of the Army Air Forces, which handled most of the strategic, tactial
fighter/bomber work. Battlefield commanders needed immediate and local help,
something for which the AAF was not really well-equipped. A 1942 interservice
agreement gave the Army ground forces the ability to use <i>liason planes</i>
(small, Piper Cub-type aircraft).
In 1947, the U.S. Air Force came into being, and the Army summarily lost nearly
all of its aviation expertise. In 1948, the "Key West Accord"
set out to document and separate the missions and responsibilities of each
service. The Army was allowed to use only unarmed, light (under 5,000 pounds)
aircraft. This restriction and limitation applied to both fixed- and
rotary-winged aircraft. The new Air Force obviously did not want the Army
infringing on what they saw as <i>their</i> proprietary area.
< TONS of good stuff snipped) >
<i> >> Hughes was also very interested in a civilian spinoff of the Model
369/OH-6A, the Hughes 500. I believe that the idea was that they could make up
for the OH-6 program losses by selling a much higher priced 500 to corporate
users. >> </i>
I was going to write that back in 1961 there was no "corporate" market for
helicopters and that no one probably predicted one. Executives, if they flew
at all, slogged around in Bell 47J's at 70 mph. But the more I thought about
it, there probably <i>were</i> visionaries in the beginning of that decade who
predicted what would happen in 1966-67 and beyond. By 1961, Hiller had already
built and flown the model Ten99 (powered by a PT-6!) which they hoped would
become a "corporate" helicopter. And there were certainly those at Bell who
thought the same way. So it's not out of the realm of possibilities that there
were similar forward-looking folks at Hughes as well.
<i> << The Hughes proposal was originally seen as too far advanced for current
technology. >> </i>
Yeah, it did push the envelope compared to the "conventional thinking" about
helicopters of the day. I've always kind of felt that there were some canny,
clever, visionary people in the Army who really wanted the 369/OH-6, despite
its apparent drawbacks in its earliest form. Hughes' outside influence could
only go so far. That there were those <i>inside</i> the Army who pushed so
strongly for it is telling. I'm sure that the merits of the OH-6 were
recognized. Despite all of the behind-the-scenes shenanagins, the Army pilots
probably got the best scout ship after all. That Hughes had to kill Hiller
(corporate entity-wise) to do it was shameful and unfortunate, but
that's...well, business.
<i> >> The 250/T-63 had all sorts of problems early on, and the Army had a
backup engine design from another manufacturer in the pipeline also, but that
was later cancelled when the 250 teething problems were solved. >> </i>
Evidently, Continental Motors had a light-turbine that was called the T-65
which was ready as a back-up engine to be used in case the Allison turned out
to be not acceptable.
<i> >>Interestingly Hughes built more than 5 "prototypes". I've been trying
for years to find out how many actual pre-production airframes were actually
built. The Army serial allocations for the LOH contenders were:
>
>YOH-4 (Bell 206): 62-4202 to 4206
>YOH-5 (Hiller FH-1100): 62-4207 to 4211
>YOH-6 (Hughes 369): 62-4212 to 4216
>
>There exist photos of both a Hiller YOH-5 and a Hughes YOH-6 marked as
62-4211. >> </i>
John, according to Jay Spenser's "Vertical Challenge," the allocation serial
numbers for the first five airframes from each manufacturer were:
OH-4A: 62-4201 - 4205
OH-5A: 62-4206 - 4210
OH-6A: 62-4211 - 4215
As you say, the records are confusing at best.
<i> >>The Hughes entry had problems with the tail design and went through a
number of tailboom and tailfeather changes before the design was finalized. I
located the hulk of a YOH-6 in 1989 and it still had the 3-foot long tailboom
strakes Hughes had put on it in an effort to aid stability. The original
tailboom design was very fat and impeded sideways movement. Also there was no
vertical stabilizer above the tailboom, just below. >> </i>
Yes. One of my books has a picture of two early pre-production OH-6's flying
together...supposedly the first two for the Army, but I cannot read their
markings other than the N-number of one (N9697F- the other may very well be
N9696F, the very first OH-6 made, I think). Strangely, they look very
different from each other. One not only has a long "strake" or fin underneath
the tailboom, but it appears to be hinged and canted to the right! The other
ship does not have any "doghouse" above the cabin, does it have any engine
cowling installed, nor does it appear to have the hinged fin under the tailboom
(although it may have). Both look very much like growth versions (and at that,
only slightly) of the 269.
<i> >>Some pre-production airframes were used for crash testing. It is
possible that Hughes had another pre-production YOH-6 marked as 4211 after the
Hiller entry lost out or after the Twentynine Palms crash, in which the crew
sustained 38G and walked away. >> </i>
Oh, practicing power-recovery autos, were they? (Sorry, couldn't resist.)
<i> >>269 production had to be moved to San Diego and the Culver City plant had
to be rapidly staffed with unskilled workers who had to be trained before OH-6
production could really get going. >> </i>
Aha! So that explains the delay in getting the production line up and running.
<i> >>Wayne Mutza is writing a book on the OH-6 >> </i>
I will be very interested to read Wayne's book! I hope it comes out soon.
John, thank you so much for your additions and clarifications. The history of
helicopters is certainly fascinating (at least to me). And it's relatively
recent history, too! Yet so much of what went on is literally unknown to most
helicopter pilots, I'd imagine.
Paul Baechler wrote about Howard Hughes:
<i> >>Howard Hughes was a successful pilot and businessman, who showed no
evidence of mental problems prior to the XF-11 crash. A reasonable person would
conclude that the mental problems he suffered later were a result of brain
damage in that crash. He clearly had mental problems at the end of his life,
but to suggest that he always had them is, at best, incorrect. >> </i>
Yes Paul, and I didn't mean to imply that Hughes had been crazy all his life.
But certainly by the 1950's he had begun to suffer mental problems, that much
is evident. Whether it was caused totally from injuries suffered in the 1946
crash of the XF-11 or perhaps in part caused by the "Elvis Syndrome" of
incredible, isolating wealth is, I suppose, arguable. And by making note of
Howard Hughes' mental problems, I was in no way making fun of them. In fact,
the man suffered a sad, tragic fate.
<i> >>It has become fashionable to condemn the HK-1 without considering, or
even being aware of, the reason for its existance. The HK-1 was designed to
supply the British Isles at a time when Losses to U-boats made it doubtful that
the merchant marine could do so (in effect a long-range, far more vital Berlin
Airlift). It was a flying boat because the runways weren't there, made of wood
because there was a fear that there would be limited supplies of aluminum and
steel, and existed solely to avoid the U-boats. Of course, as events unfolded,
losses to the U-boats were cut to an acceptable level by the introduction of
advanced submarine detection equipment and aggressive anti-submarine tactics.
In retrospect, the development of the HK-1 was a waste of money, but no more so
than many other programs, e.g. the fast battleships. It was, of course,
designed before the dawn of the jet transport age; it flew before the dawn of
the jet transport age and it would be almost 20 years until a US jet transport
was capable of carrying a similar load. >> </i>
True enough. Although it must be pointed out that the HK-1 never really did
<i>fly</i> except for that brief and much publicized "test hop," and that only
came in <i>November</i> of 1947! From test-flight to "fully operational' is
not an overnight thing. So if Hughes had been designing the ship for use in
WWII it was more than a little late. And it's not like he was using exotic or
rare materials. The thing was made of wood (and plenty of it!).
Hughes had received $40 <i>Million</i> of public funds- a ton of money in the
1940's! His two big projects, the XF-11 and the HK-1 were designed, according
to Jay Spenser in his book "Vertical Challenge" as "...without regard for
military requirements." It seems that Howard was just out there, designing
stuff on his own in the hopes that the military would use it. Must have been
nice.
Howard Hughes: Successful businessman? Turned his billions into millions?
Some might contest that "successful" adjective.
Bob Barbanes
"The dignity of the craft is that it creates a fellowship."
Antoine de St. Exupery
Micbloo
>agencies
>have used both OH-6s and 500s for spooky jobs from almost the
>beginning of their history
Hehe, so-called "Black Ops".
DEA up here in the NYC area use a number of 500s for their missions.
Gerard
Dan & Jan Hollenbaugh
a historian, so I don't know the original story. I know careful research
when I see it. Thanks very much.
Dan H.
Bob Barbanes wrote in message
<20010816140927...@mb-fc.aol.com>...
Paul Baechler
(Bob Barbanes) wrote:
>I've always kind of felt that there were some canny,
>clever, visionary people in the Army who really wanted the 369/OH-6, despite
>its apparent drawbacks in its earliest form. Hughes' outside influence could
>only go so far. That there were those <i>inside</i> the Army who pushed so
>strongly for it is telling. I'm sure that the merits of the OH-6 were
>recognized. Despite all of the behind-the-scenes shenanagins, the Army pilots
>probably got the best scout ship after all.
The OH-6 inspired a rare kind of loyalty. I've seen people throw away
careers over the OH-6/OH-58 dispute, some of them years after the issue
was settled. The only other Army aircraft I've seen people feel nearly as
devoted to was the Skycrane.
--
Paul Baechler
pbae...@bellsouth.net
Dan & Jan Hollenbaugh
unparalleled in US Army aviation history. That is why the airframe still
serves in the 160th.
Dan H.
Paul Baechler wrote in message ...
John Hairell
The TRADOC history I mentioned in my previous postings goes into a
VERY detailed study of not only the Key West Accord but the many other
agreements between the Army, the USAF, and DOD. There is an entire
series of agreements in which the status of Army aviation versus USAF
responsibilities changes back and forth.
Also of interest is the book "The Army Gets an Air Force".
>
> < TONS of good stuff snipped) >
>
> <i> >> Hughes was also very interested in a civilian spinoff of the Model
> 369/OH-6A, the Hughes 500. I believe that the idea was that they could make up
> for the OH-6 program losses by selling a much higher priced 500 to corporate
> users. >> </i>
>
> I was going to write that back in 1961 there was no "corporate" market for
> helicopters and that no one probably predicted one. Executives, if they flew
> at all, slogged around in Bell 47J's at 70 mph. But the more I thought about
> it, there probably <i>were</i> visionaries in the beginning of that decade who
> predicted what would happen in 1966-67 and beyond. By 1961, Hiller had already
> built and flown the model Ten99 (powered by a PT-6!) which they hoped would
> become a "corporate" helicopter. And there were certainly those at Bell who
> thought the same way. So it's not out of the realm of possibilities that there
> were similar forward-looking folks at Hughes as well.
The Don Porter book on the OH-6 (out of print) talks a bit about
Howard Hughes' interest in both the military and civilian helicopter
market. Porter was a Hughes tech rep and details some of the early
thinking about the OH-6.
> <i> << The Hughes proposal was originally seen as too far advanced for current
> technology. >> </i>
>
> Yeah, it did push the envelope compared to the "conventional thinking" about
> helicopters of the day. I've always kind of felt that there were some canny,
> clever, visionary people in the Army who really wanted the 369/OH-6, despite
> its apparent drawbacks in its earliest form. Hughes' outside influence could
> only go so far. That there were those <i>inside</i> the Army who pushed so
> strongly for it is telling. I'm sure that the merits of the OH-6 were
> recognized. Despite all of the behind-the-scenes shenanagins, the Army pilots
> probably got the best scout ship after all. That Hughes had to kill Hiller
> (corporate entity-wise) to do it was shameful and unfortunate, but
> that's...well, business.
I agree that the Army probably ended up with the best product.
Porter's book mentions some background activity by certain people in
the Army to get the 369 in the door.
The YOH-6 had a static mast, blade straps, a V-tail, no hydraulics,
only two gear meshes in the transmission, and an engine mounted at an
angle, amongst many other things. Compared to an OH-13 or an OH-23 it
was rocket science. The evals did ding them on maintainability
though. It was hard to get to lots of things in that small package
and OH-6 techs I've talked to bitched about some of the contortions
they had to get into to work on it.
> <i> >> The 250/T-63 had all sorts of problems early on, and the Army had a
> backup engine design from another manufacturer in the pipeline also, but that
> was later cancelled when the 250 teething problems were solved. >> </i>
>
> Evidently, Continental Motors had a light-turbine that was called the T-65
> which was ready as a back-up engine to be used in case the Allison turned out
> to be not acceptable.
Yes, Continental was choice #2.
> <i> >>Interestingly Hughes built more than 5 "prototypes". I've been trying
> for years to find out how many actual pre-production airframes were actually
> built. The Army serial allocations for the LOH contenders were:
> >
> >YOH-4 (Bell 206): 62-4202 to 4206
> >YOH-5 (Hiller FH-1100): 62-4207 to 4211
> >YOH-6 (Hughes 369): 62-4212 to 4216
> >
> >There exist photos of both a Hiller YOH-5 and a Hughes YOH-6 marked as
> 62-4211. >> </i>
>
> John, according to Jay Spenser's "Vertical Challenge," the allocation serial
> numbers for the first five airframes from each manufacturer were:
>
> OH-4A: 62-4201 - 4205
> OH-5A: 62-4206 - 4210
> OH-6A: 62-4211 - 4215
>
> As you say, the records are confusing at best.
I would say that Spencer's book is in error. I have photographic
proof. There was also a 62-12624 which was a YOH-6.
> <i> >>The Hughes entry had problems with the tail design and went through a
> number of tailboom and tailfeather changes before the design was finalized. I
> located the hulk of a YOH-6 in 1989 and it still had the 3-foot long tailboom
> strakes Hughes had put on it in an effort to aid stability. The original
> tailboom design was very fat and impeded sideways movement. Also there was no
> vertical stabilizer above the tailboom, just below. >> </i>
>
> Yes. One of my books has a picture of two early pre-production OH-6's flying
> together...supposedly the first two for the Army, but I cannot read their
> markings other than the N-number of one (N9697F- the other may very well be
> N9696F, the very first OH-6 made, I think). Strangely, they look very
> different from each other. One not only has a long "strake" or fin underneath
> the tailboom, but it appears to be hinged and canted to the right! The other
> ship does not have any "doghouse" above the cabin, does it have any engine
> cowling installed, nor does it appear to have the hinged fin under the tailboom
> (although it may have). Both look very much like growth versions (and at that,
> only slightly) of the 269.
The 369 has some very 269-ish features. You can see where some of the
design comes from. And they used 269 blades. Some of the original
369 artists' concepts show wheels on the front of the skids.
N9696F was the first YOH-6A, 62-4212. N9697F was 62-4213, etc. Which
is why a YOH-6 marked as 62-4211 is such a mystery. 4212 was first
flown with no doghouse, and photos of it exist showing no engine
clamshells. It had an instrumentation package in the rear
compartment. The YOH-6 hulk I looked at also had had an
instrumentation package in the rear - the cannon plug patch panel was
still there.
On the YOH-6s if you look closely you will see that the vertical
stabilizers if present are normally mounted to the side of the boom,
not above and below the boom like in the production aircraft. They
went through many tail design changes.
> <i> >>Some pre-production airframes were used for crash testing. It is
> possible that Hughes had another pre-production YOH-6 marked as 4211 after the
> Hiller entry lost out or after the Twentynine Palms crash, in which the crew
> sustained 38G and walked away. >> </i>
>
> Oh, practicing power-recovery autos, were they? (Sorry, couldn't resist.)
>
> <i> >>269 production had to be moved to San Diego and the Culver City plant had
> to be rapidly staffed with unskilled workers who had to be trained before OH-6
> production could really get going. >> </i>
>
> Aha! So that explains the delay in getting the production line up and running.
>
> <i> >>Wayne Mutza is writing a book on the OH-6 >> </i>
>
> I will be very interested to read Wayne's book! I hope it comes out soon.
Wayne's book should be due out next year. He normally works on 10 or
12 book projects at a time so the expected dates can slip. I've made
him aware of your postings. He has tracked down some ex-Hughes people
including some higher-ups so it should prove to be interesting book.
[rest snipped]
John Hairell (guar...@erols.com)
Paul Baechler
<holle...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>You're right, Paul - there is a loyalty to the OH-6 airframe that is
>unparalleled in US Army aviation history. That is why the airframe still
>serves in the 160th.
No, it isn't. The airframe was chosen for operational reasons, not for
sentimental ones.
--
Paul Baechler
pbae...@bellsouth.net
Dan & Jan Hollenbaugh
outfit that developed the aircraft and operational techniques that were
eventually adopted by the 160th. This was back around 1980. The aircraft
that became the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior was becoming available about the same
time, and could have been chosen instead. IMHO, the guys who were starting
the development chose the OH-6 airframe as much because of their experience
with it in Vietnam as for any technical reason.
Dan H.
Paul Baechler wrote in message ...
Bob Barbanes
(Lots of cool stuff snipped!)
>Wayne Mutza is writing a book on the OH-6
>Wayne's book should be due out next year. He normally works on 10 or
>12 book projects at a time so the expected dates can slip. I've made
>him aware of your postings.
Uhh, I hope you meant that in a good way...
Bob
DanH
The LOacH is an excellent airframe. It's got the T700 engine but does
not have the weight of an OH-58A.
I've flown A/C and Delta models and have always been jealous of the OH-6
guys because they have more a power margin than the A model. I think
the personal reasons they prefered the OH-6 are backed up by the
performance of the aircraft.
On another note, the Delta came along in the '80s, but the KW wasn't
around until the late '80s to early '90s with the Prime Chance aircraft
of Taskforce 118 taking them to the Gulf with them.
DanH
--
Air Cav Reference Board
http://www.cavalrypilot.com
UNIX - Not just for vestal virgins anymore
Paul Baechler
<holle...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>I'm not sure I'd completely agree with you, Paul. I did some work with the
>outfit that developed the aircraft and operational techniques that were
>eventually adopted by the 160th. This was back around 1980. The aircraft
>that became the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior was becoming available about the same
>time, and could have been chosen instead. IMHO, the guys who were starting
>the development chose the OH-6 airframe as much because of their experience
>with it in Vietnam as for any technical reason.
The OH-6 was selected for the specisl mission role after an evaluation
that included the OH-58, prior to 1980, and was selected for specific
technical and operational reasons. Put in the simplest terms, the OH-6
could perform the required mission and the OH-58 couldn't.
--
Paul Baechler
pbae...@bellsouth.net
seantrost
My father was crew chief in Nam, served on board a OH-6 and then a C model
Uh-1. Told me he was very pissed off when the army switched to the Oh-58. Lack
of power and maneuverablilty contributed to some losses. But the biggest reason
was survability in a crash, the OH-6 woudl shed rotor and tailboom and roll like
an egg.
all the best
Sean Trost
BTW the AH-6's of TF 160 are very effective (grin).
Dan & Jan Hollenbaugh
aircraft didn't begin to appear until around 1986 or '87.
Dan H.
Paul Baechler wrote in message ...
>