Re: B-17's flew missions over wartime Europe
Eeyore
Otis Willie PIO The American War Library wrote:
> B-17's flew missions over wartime Europe
We know that already.
The RAF dropped more ordnance.
Now PISS OFF.
Graham
Scott M. Kozel
Why does everything have to be a urinating contest to you ?
Bombardier
wrote:
But with far less accuracy eapecially on their night missions. Never
forget absent friends
Arthur Kramer
B-26 "Willie The Wolf " Bombardier
Last Man Standing
www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:4A0DEE7D...@hotmail.com...
>
> Otis Willie PIO The American War Library wrote:
>
>> B-17's flew missions over wartime Europe
>
> We know that already.
>
> The RAF dropped more ordnance.
The RAF figures are Bomber Command, 955,044 long tons, Fighter
Command 3,481 long tons, Army Co-operation Command 63 long tons,
2nd Tactical Air Force, 61,838 long tons, Coastal Command 4,778
long tons, total 1,025,204 long or 1,148,228 short tons.
In addition Bomber Command dropped 33,263 long tons of mines,
Coastal Command 602 long tons.
The USAAF in the European theatre dropped 971,762 short tons
of bombs, 714,719 tons by heavy bombers, 164,187 by medium
and light bombers, 92,856 by fighter bombers.
The RAF in the Mediterranean and Middle East dropped some
160,840 long or 180,140 short tons of bombs.
In the Mediterranean theatre the USAAF dropped 582,701 short
tons of bombs, 382,075 tons by heavy bombers, 138,341 by light
and medium bombers and 61,429 by fighter bombers.
When it comes to bombs dropped on Germany, Bomber Command
dropped 657,674 long or 736,595 short tons of bombs in addition
units like 2nd TAF also bombed Germany, the USAAF dropped
641,201 short tons of bombs on Germany.
So which air force dropped more depends on the definitions used.
Overall against the European Axis the USAAF dropped more,
1,554,463 versus 1,328,368 short tons of bombs, (plus some
37,930 short tons of mines by the RAF).
If you use aircraft in the US defined European theatre the RAF
comes out ahead. And so on.
In any case the bomb tonnages should be understood to have
errors in them based on the usual incomplete records and
estimates of whether aircraft were lost before or after they
bombed their target.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Gordon
out of Germany and its Allies. Combined, we ripped the Axis apart
from the air and on the ground. It was a concerted effort and
splitting it up to argue over a few tons seems trite.
Keith Willshaw
"Gordon" <Gor...@oldboldpilots.org> wrote in message
news:235a77a5-7b64-4d0d...@k9g2000pra.googlegroups.com...
Agreed, one thing mentioned by German sources was the disruption
caused by the fact that it was a 24 hour 7 day a week campaign.
Keith
Dan
like bad planning on the part of the Nazis when they started the war.
Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired
Jim Wilkins
> ...
> That would tend to be a tad irritating to a war effort. It seems
> like bad planning on the part of the Nazis when they started the war.
>
They didn't plan on Japan dragging in America, in fact they tolerated
acts of war to avoid it.
The first:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Niblack_(DD-424)
jsw
Dan
They didn't plan on invading the UK, bailing out Italy or getting
their asses handed to them by the Soviets either.
Keith Willshaw
"Jim Wilkins" <KB1...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:9ebb7edd-6953-4df1...@w31g2000prd.googlegroups.com...
Jim I hate to be the one to break it to you but Japan did NOT
drag them in Germany was under no obligation to declare war
on the USA after Pearl Harbor and it came as a surprise to
many people (especially in Japan) when they did so.
In fact the German declaration of war makes no reference to
Japan at all. It does however mention just such breaches of
neutrality as those you mention.
http://fcit.usf.edu/HOLOCAUST/resource/document/DECWAR.htm
Japan in turn was very careful NOT to declare war on the
USSR despite the urgings of its new ally Germany to do so.
Keith
Scott M. Kozel
>
> "Gordon" <Gor...@oldboldpilots.org> wrote in message
>
> > out of Germany and its Allies. Combined, we ripped the Axis apart
> > from the air and on the ground. It was a concerted effort and
> > splitting it up to argue over a few tons seems trite.
>
> Agreed, one thing mentioned by German sources was the disruption
> caused by the fact that it was a 24 hour 7 day a week campaign.
"Around the clock" was the common term then ... today it is "24/7".
I guess the language evolved ...
frank
Yeah, I always wondered what would have happened if Hitler would have
been able to keep war from breaking out until 1944 or 45 like he
wanted to. Would he have built up the Kriegsmarine? Would there have
been a real jet equipped Luftwaffe? Or would he just economically
ruined the country and been shot? To put it bluntly, Japan was too
stupid to run anything it conquered. Something would have happened in
that side of the globe anyway.
Walt
wrote:
RAF bombing was not nearly as effective as USAAF bombing. Bomber
Command had terrible leadership. That was the reason.
Walt
Walt
Hitler apparently decided to declare war on the U.S. just based on
his intutuition. Bad move.
Had he not done so, the change in the outcome of the war is just
incalcuable.
Walt
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:1038514e-f532-46ba...@m24g2000vbp.googlegroups.com...
> RAF bombing was not nearly as effective as USAAF bombing. Bomber
> Command had terrible leadership. That was the reason.
Ah, this junk returns.
Trouble is the German raid reports indicate, when they hit, the Bomber
Command raids were more effective. They were over the target longer,
suppressing the damage control, dropped larger bombs and a higher
percentage of incendiaries, causing more destructive fires.
The day bombers in reasonable weather remained the most accurate
bombers, the European weather and the rise of radio aids meant the
average accuracy of the night and day heavy bombers ended up around
the same for the final half of the campaign, in bomb tonnages dropped
on Germany terms.
As for leadership, Walter has real problems with Arthur Harris, who
tends to be considered the RAF end of story.
Walt
wrote:
> "Walt" <Walterm...@aol.com> wrote in message
The Germans are amply on the record that the USAAF hurt them worse
than the RAF and by far.
Walt
Walt
> tends to be considered the RAF end of story.
>
> Geoffrey Sinclair
My note clearly said -Bomber Command- not the RAF.
RAF leadership -was- lacking in that Portal couldn't get Harris to
obey orders.
Walt
Keith Willshaw
> Walt
He could and did, the cessation of the Berlin campaign , the switch to
infrastructure
attacks in 1944 and then later to attacks on the oil industries are all
examples
of Harris being told what targets to bomb.
In fact from 1944 onwards target selection was made in a co-ordinated
manner by the Combined Strategic Targets Committee (CSTC).
This was staffed by appointees from the Air Ministry, the USAAF,
the Ministry of Economic Warfare and SHAEF. In September for
examples the target priorities we
First - Oil Industry
Second - Transportation Systems, Ordnance factories and depots, Industrial
Centres
Harris was not free to bomb a target just because he thought it was a
good idea, the target list was handed to him by the CSTC.
Bomber Command forces proved especially effective against many
transportation targets. Canals and railway viaducts were hard to hit
and resistant to damage by normal HE bombs. The 12,000 lb
and 22,000 lb bombs carried by RAF Lancasters could knock
down a viaduct or breach a canal with a near miss.
Similarly the attacks on the Ruhr , chiefly carried out by Bomber Command
halved German steel production.
Keith
Hal Hanig
"Keith Willshaw" <ke...@nospam.kwillshaw.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:CdEQl.163136$aj5....@newsfe16.ams2...
Does any of this really matter almost 70 years after the fact? Most of us
who were around at the time recognize that both groups made their own
invaluable contributions to dismantling and destroying Unser Adolf's
Vaterland. I'm not about to badmouth the RAF's contributions.....they did
their things and we did ours. The Germans didn't much appreciate either.
Hal
>
Paul J. Adam
> Does any of this really matter almost 70 years after the fact? Most of us
> who were around at the time recognize that both groups made their own
> invaluable contributions to dismantling and destroying Unser Adolf's
> Vaterland. I'm not about to badmouth the RAF's contributions.....they did
> their things and we did ours. The Germans didn't much appreciate either.
Hal, excuse a segue.
I was lucky enough to get to the USAF Museum a couple of weeks ago[1].
It's - naturally and fairly - US centred and heavily biased to the Air
Force, but even that heartland[3] flags up the contributions from allies
to the inevitable triumphs of US air power (as one for-example they've
got a Tornado GR.1 on display in full Granby fit, complete with JP233
bodies under its fuselage).
Why, they even accept that the USAF/USAAC accepted occasional assistance
from sworn foes such as the US Navy.
I like that approach and strive to emulate it with variable success.
A very, very good facility. My biggest regret is that I only had my
mobile phone to record the event rather than a proper camera with a
serious flashgun.
There's a certain amount of space to argue over who did what, what
worked and what didn't, and so on. But that should not distract from the
fact that in 1945, after much pain and bloodshed and suffering, two
serious sets of Bad Guys lost their wars in dramatic and final style and
the world is a better place thereby.
[1] Duxford is very good. If you're interested in US history and kit,
the USAF museum blows it into a cocked hat[2].
[2] Speaking of hats, a longtime R.A.M. contributor has a piece of
headgear exhibited there. He warned us two years ago he was donating it:
well, he may not get free admission but it's displayed in style.
[3] One serious "I'm getting old!" moment was coming through the gate at
WPAFB. As a small boy I built Airfix kits of F-15s and F-16s when they
still came with the choice of "demonstrator/test" or "first in service"
paint and decal jobs in the instructions. Now they're showing up on
poles as gate guards.
--
He thinks too much, such men are dangerous.
Jim Wilkins
The request from Japan:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411208a.html
"At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th Hitler
issued orders to the entire German navy to attack American ships
whenever and wherever they may meet them."
The declaration:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/411211d.html
The explanation:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/411211b.html
jsw
Keith Willshaw
From: "Jim Wilkins" <KB1...@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: B-17's flew missions over wartime Europe
Date: 20 May 2009 02:39
< The declaration:
< http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/411211d.html
< The explanation:
< http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/411211b.html
None of which supports the assertion that Japan dragged Germany into
war with the USA. The simple fact is that German government declared
war on the USA because of its support for British and Commonwealth
forces and the USSR. While any rational analyst would realise that
such a declaration while the army was fully occupied in Russia was
madness the leadership of the Reich had an amazing ability for
self deception. Just as they had previously thought that Britain and
the Soviet Union would collapse in the face of a German attack they
now convinced themselves that the USA would provide no real opposition.
The only effect of the attack on Pearl Harbor was on the timing,
there was NO treaty obligation on Germany to enter the war.
The other fact to remember is that Japan did not tell the German
government of its intention to declare war on the USA and
attack Pearl Harbor. The diaries of Joesph Goebbels record
the reaction of Hitler to the news on Dec 8. He declares that
with their flank now protected and the US fleet busy in the pacific
now is the ideal time to declare war on the USA.
He also makes it clear that the German government had no clear
idea of the Japanese war aims or strategy but simply sought
to take advantage of what they expected to be a US preoccupation
with the war in the pacific.
Keith
Jim Wilkins
Regardless of the uncertain reasons, a.h. did authorize hostile
actions immediately and formally declared war in a few days. We can
only guess what would have happened without Pearl Harbor, since
Roosevelt was looking for an excuse or provocation to swing the
largely anti-war US sentiment, as the Zimmerman telegram had done in
WW1.
http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/zimmermann/
"Intrepid" wrote with amusement that he had to evade the FBI in order
to meet with a representative of the President.
jsw
Geoffrey Sinclair
chooses to reply to about a line of text at a time.
"Walt" <Walte...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:10ebb035-7272-40aa...@t10g2000vbg.googlegroups.com...
> The Germans are amply on the record that the USAAF hurt them worse
> than the RAF and by far.
Walter has a group of quotes which do not seem to have changed over
the past 10 years to "prove" this. The person making the statement
is then expanded to "The Germans". The trouble is the evidence can
contradict the quotes.
Essentially Walter is about what people said, not what they did.
On May 19, 8:59 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@froggy.com.au>
wrote:
>> As for leadership, Walter has real problems with Arthur Harris, who
>> tends to be considered the RAF end of story.
> My note clearly said -Bomber Command- not the RAF.
I note the actual text was deleted and we rely on Walter declaring
yet again what has been said.
"RAF Bombing" is all RAF bombing. Then comes the leadership
claim, and note by the way below Harris is used to claim the RAF
did have poor leadership.
> RAF leadership -was- lacking in that Portal couldn't get Harris to
> obey orders.
Figures below from the Davis spreadsheet of WWII raids by the
US heavy bombers in Europe and Bomber Command.
This is all about Walter deciding Harris did not drop enough bombs
on oil targets. It ignores the actual bomb tonnages dropped for
example. The 8th Air Force dropped something like 56,964 short
tons of bombs on oil targets in 1944 and another 20,205 short tons
in 1945. Bomber Command managed 53,782 and 51,988 short tons
respectively. Given for the period May 1944 to April 1945 the 8th
Air Force dropped some 564,314 short tons of bombs (442,000
on Germany) versus Bomber Command's 687,286 short tons
(443,700 on Germany) it is a source of considerable amusement to
watch Walter claiming the 8th did the right thing and Bomber
Command did the wrong thing when it comes to oil targets.
By the way some 2,873 short tons of the 8th Air Force oil target
tonnage was dropped in the May 1944 raids, the ones that showed
the Germans were very sensitive about such raids. Bomber
Command started such raids in June 1944, and of course in the
period June to September 1944 Bomber Command was more
targeted with raids to help the invasion than on targets in Germany.
A reflection of the relative strength of the day and night air defences
of Germany, the amount of daylight in summer and the results of
the raids on France.
Then comes the fact in October 1944 all of the oil targets allocated
to Bomber Command were considered out of action, it needed to
be allocated some of the targets the 8th had been bombing. That
took a couple of weeks, Harris playing his part in the delay.
In essence it was a joint offensive, the RAF and USAAF combined
to create a very effective air force. When it came to the heavy
bomber forces the USSBS noted that both day and night bombers
were needed as each had advantages over the other.
As other examples, out of 7,377 Lancasters built some 3,458 used US
built Merlin engines, as did the 212 Australian and 1,108 Canadian
Mosquitoes, out of 7,777 Mosquitoes built, the RAF used US bombs
and of course aviation fuel was put into a common pool, Bomber
Command had some B-17 and B-24 for ECM work, all those trainer
aircraft, and so on. Lend lease is the simple summary.
The USAAF in Britain was able to start operations earlier thanks to the
existing weather, reconnaissance and air sea rescue services.
According to the US history, Logistical Support of the armies volume 1,
amount of supplies to the US forces in England supplied by the UK,
To USAAF to end July 1943, 49% of supplies and equipment,
plus more supplies via the US Army requisitions on Britain,
(1,100 aircraft, 32,000 bombs, 7,000 sets of armour, 35,000
fighter belly tanks, 43,000 jettisonable gas tanks etc. by early 1944)
To US forces In Britain June 1942 to June 1944, percentage of
supply from British, Quartermaster 63%, Engineers, 58%, Medical 49%,
Chemical Warfare 25%, signal corps 22%, USAAF 21%, ordnance
corps 4%, transport corps 3%. Total aid to end June 1944 6,799,433
measurement tons. A measurement ton is 40 cubic feet, a register ton,
as in the shipping measurement Gross Registered Tonnage is 100 cubic
feet.
The P-51.
And so on.
Walt
>
> news:10ebb035-7272-40aa...@t10g2000vbg.googlegroups.com...
>
> > The Germans are amply on the record that the USAAF hurt them worse
> > than the RAF and by far.
>
Sinclair allows:
> Walter has a group of quotes which do not seem to have changed over
> the past 10 years to "prove" this. The person making the statement
> is then expanded to "The Germans". The trouble is the evidence can
> contradict the quotes.
Why would the quotes change?
The Germans are amply on the record that the USAAF bombing hurt them
far worse than the RAF bombing did,
Walt
Walt
<ke...@nospam.kwillshaw.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> "Walt" <Walterm...@aol.com> wrote in message
>
> news:10ebb035-7272-40aa...@t10g2000vbg.googlegroups.com...
> On May 19, 8:59 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@froggy.com.au>
> wrote:
>
> >> As for leadership, Walter has real problems with Arthur Harris, who
> >> tends to be considered the RAF end of story.
>
> >> Geoffrey Sinclair
> > My note clearly said -Bomber Command- not the RAF.
> > RAF leadership -was- lacking in that Portal couldn't get Harris to
> > obey orders.
> > Walt
>
> He could and did, the cessation of the Berlin campaign , the switch to
> infrastructure
> attacks in 1944 and then later to attacks on the oil industries are all
> examples
> of Harris being told what targets to bomb.
>
Harris -avoided- hitting Oil targets as much as he dared, usually
pleading weather.
He firmly believed that hitting Oil was a waste of assets. He was
wrong.
Walt
Keith Willshaw
= Regardless of the uncertain reasons, a.h. did authorize hostile
= actions immediately and formally declared war in a few days.
Indeed although the declaration of war hardly initiated hostile
actions, two USN destroyers ahd already been torpedoed
by German U-Boats
> We can only guess what would have happened without Pearl Harbor, since
> Roosevelt was looking for an excuse or provocation to swing the
> largely anti-war US sentiment, as the Zimmerman telegram had done in
> WW1.
> http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/zimmermann/
Others would view it as Roosevelt recognising the inevitability
of war with Germany and acting to support other countries
already embroiled in the conflict. It was hardly in the interests
of the USA for the USSR to be conquered or for Britain to
become neutral or worse still a reluctant ally of an expansionist
Reich.
> "Intrepid" wrote with amusement that he had to evade the FBI in order
> to meet with a representative of the President.
Intrepid was known to tell a good story. By Dec 7 the British and
US Military staffs had been planning the joint strategy to be adopted
when the US became involved for almost a year
On the 21 December 1940 the US joint planners recommended that the
major objective of U.S. defense policy be the security of the Western
Hemisphere
and the best way to ensure this was a policyof full co-operation with the
British
Commonwealth. Until forced to enter the war, the United States should
work towards ensuring the defense and security of the approaches to the USA
In the Atlantic the chief block on German expansionism was Britain and its
navy. It was British forces that had occupied Iceland and Greenland to
forestall Germany establishing advanced bases there.
They further recommended that if forced into war with Japan, the United
States
should at the same time enter the war in the Atlantic and limit operations
in
the mid-Pacific and Far East so as "to permit prompt movement to the
Atlantic of forces fully adequate to conduct a major offensive in that
ocean."
Source Memo, CofS for WPD, 17 Jan 41, sub: White House Conf of 16
Jan 41, WPD 4175-18.
Keith
Keith Willshaw
Reality check - In May and June 1944 the RAF dropped MORE tonnage
of bombs on German oil targets than the USAAF
> He firmly believed that hitting Oil was a waste of assets. He was
> wrong.
Even if that were true it would be irrelevant, the RAF played a full
part in the war on the oil plants as shown by the US Strategic Bombing
Survey
Keith
The Great Raoul
>>
>> As for leadership, Walter has real problems with Arthur Harris, who
>> tends to be considered the RAF end of story.
>>
>> Geoffrey Sinclair
>> Remove the nb for email.
>
> The Germans are amply on the record that the USAAF hurt them worse than
> the RAF and by far.
>
> Walt
What is to be gained by playing dick size wars at this date? The fact is
that an air force through a lot of very hard work and sacrifice defeated
the Hun. Isn't that enough?
Robert Sveinson
Walt
Could you give me book titles, and page numbers, and authors
of the superiority of the USAAF over the RAF? I would sure
like to have some numbers if you have access to them.
I know that I have seen many claims just like the ones
you are telling us about, but I cannot find them. Any little bit
will help!
Robert Sveinson
Sinclair allows:
Walt
=====================================
Can you narrow down the places that I have to look in
to read about your claims?
Do you have any quotes from say....Albert Speer?
Or the records of the Todt Organisation?
The reason that I suggest the Todt Organisation
is that for the first and only time up to May 1943
that they did any work in Germany. And
they had to be moved to Germany after
the USAAF bombed and destroyed the two big dams,
causing damage.
=========================================
Keith Willshaw
"Robert Sveinson" <rsve...@mts.net> wrote in message
news:dT1Rl.28971$ho7....@newsfe10.iad...
>
> The Germans are amply on the record that the USAAF bombing hurt them
> far worse than the RAF bombing did,
>
> Walt
>
>
> =====================================
>
> Can you narrow down the places that I have to look in
> to read about your claims?
>
>
> Do you have any quotes from say....Albert Speer?
> Or the records of the Todt Organisation?
>
> The reason that I suggest the Todt Organisation
> is that for the first and only time up to May 1943
> that they did any work in Germany. And
> they had to be moved to Germany after
> the USAAF bombed and destroyed the two big dams,
> causing damage.
>
> =========================================
>
So remind me again which two dams the USAAF destroyed in 1943 ?
I know the RAF knocked out the Mohne and Eder but I must
have missed the American raid
Keith
Dan
That's what they want you to believe. The dams raid was actually
performed by USAAF B-24s in Lancaster drag in broad daylight.
guy
> >news:dT1Rl.28971$ho7....@newsfe10.iad...
> >> "Walt" <Walterm...@aol.com> wrote in message
>
> >> The Germans are amply on the record that the USAAF bombing hurt them
> >> far worse than the RAF bombing did,
>
> >> Walt
>
> >> =====================================
>
> >> Can you narrow down the places that I have to look in
> >> to read about your claims?
>
> >> Do you have any quotes from say....Albert Speer?
> >> Or the records of the Todt Organisation?
>
> >> The reason that I suggest the Todt Organisation
> >> is that for the first and only time up to May 1943
> >> that they did any work in Germany. And
> >> they had to be moved to Germany after
> >> the USAAF bombed and destroyed the two big dams,
> >> causing damage.
>
> >> =========================================
>
> > So remind me again which two dams the USAAF destroyed in 1943 ?
>
> > I know the RAF knocked out the Mohne and Eder but I must
> > have missed the American raid
>
> > Keith
>
> That's what they want you to believe. The dams raid was actually
> performed by USAAF B-24s in Lancaster drag in broad daylight.
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
The things the USAAF would do to avoid bad German press!
Guy
Walt
Bomber Command simply did not do all that it could have done in the
Oil Campaign. Harris put BC onto cities and eschewed hitting Oil
targets whenever he could.
The Germans -could- have been collapsed months earlier had BC's full
potential been properly exploited.
Harris was the weak link.
Walt
Geoffrey Sinclair
> Harris -avoided- hitting Oil targets as much as he dared, usually
> pleading weather.
Actually no. Harris made it very clear he bombed oil targets as
ordered, he expected the campaign to fail, and he was going to
make sure the planners could not claim the reason was lack of
effort by the combat units.
Hence the way Bomber Command's oil targets were all declared
out of action in October 1944.
Also note his praise of the GH aid in enabling attacks on the
smaller oil installations.
> He firmly believed that hitting Oil was a waste of assets. He was
> wrong.
Actually it is less black and white than that, he thought the coming
bad weather would give the respite needed for the Germans to
repair all the damage, so attacking cities would be more productive.
He underestimated the capacity of the allied air forces freed from
most commitments to targets in occupied territory, and the increase
in bomb lift and accuracy.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> Reality check - In May and June 1944 the RAF dropped MORE tonnage
> of bombs on German oil targets than the USAAF
According to my counts from the Richard Davis spreadsheets the bomb
tonnages in short tons on oil targets for May 1944 were 8th 2,872.9,
15th 2,448.5, Bomber Command 0. (In terms of oil targets in Germany
the figures are 2,446,6, zero and zero)
For June 1944, 8th 4,966.1, 15th 8,549.5, Bomber Command 5,922.
(In terms of oil targets in Germany the figures are 4,461.8, zero and
4,562.5)
The 15th had finally received permission to officially attack the Ploesti
refineries. For a while the 15th had been attacking the rail marshalling
yard servicing the refineries as part of the authorised transport targets
The marshalling yards were located roughly in the middle of the
refineries. The bombing of these yards had been strangely inaccurate,
more of the bombs appear to have hit the refineries that the rail lines.
Geoffrey Sinclair
none of the factual data. So nothing new here, just me enjoying the
moment.
"Walt" <Walte...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:3c223848-d630-4d9d...@l28g2000vba.googlegroups.com...
>> "Walt" <Walterm...@aol.com> wrote in message
>> news:10ebb035-7272-40aa...@t10g2000vbg.googlegroups.com...
>
>> > The Germans are amply on the record that the USAAF hurt them worse
>> > than the RAF and by far.
> Sinclair allows:
The usual Walter attempt at editorial from the start.
>> Walter has a group of quotes which do not seem to have changed over
>> the past 10 years to "prove" this. The person making the statement
>> is then expanded to "The Germans". The trouble is the evidence can
>> contradict the quotes.
> Why would the quotes change?
They do not change because Walter has learnt nothing new on the subject
in over a decade. Ignoring what does not fit does that to people.
> The Germans are amply on the record that the USAAF bombing hurt
> them far worse than the RAF bombing did,
Walter has a group of quotes which do not seem to have changed over
the past 10 years to "prove" this. The person making the statement
is then expanded to "The Germans". The trouble is the evidence can
contradict the quotes.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair
> Bomber Command simply did not do all that it could have done in the
> Oil Campaign. Harris put BC onto cities and eschewed hitting Oil
> targets whenever he could.
No.
> The Germans -could- have been collapsed months earlier had BC's full
> potential been properly exploited.
It is refreshing to see Walter has decided to drop the line, for the
moment anyway, that Bomber Command could not hit targets.
You see it works like this. Walter thinks the German oil production
system could have been stopped earlier. The last time the vital period
was defined to about September 1944.
Walter firmly believes the 8th Air Force could do no more.
Walter largely ignores the requirements of Overlord and the fact that
Eisenhower had first call on the heavy bombers, including some targets
in Germany.
So it goes like this, 8th Air force, total bomb tonnage dropped on German
targets, bomb tonnage dropped on German oil targets, percentage of effort
against German oil targets,
Jun-44 / 13120.5 / 4461.8 / 34.01
Jul-44 / 29838.3 / 6664 / 22.33
Aug-44 / 23597.4 / 6151.4 / 26.07
Sep-44 / 34818.4 / 7352 / 21.12
Total / 101374.6 / 24629.2 / 24.30
Bomber Command, same table (The three decimal places comes
from conversion of long into short tons)
Jun-44 / 5443.536 / 4562.544 / 83.82
Jul-44 / 14670.096 / 3834.544 / 26.14
Aug-44 / 16119.264 / 1852.592 / 11.49
Sep-44 / 22955.296 / 4491.2 / 19.56
Total / 59188.192 / 14740.88 / 24.91
You see under Walter's view of the world Bomber Command devoting
slightly more of its attacks on Germany to oil targets than the 8th did is
supposed to be proof Bomber Command could have done more.
However it appears the 8th Ai Force could do no more under the
Walter rules.
It makes for a good laugh, but bad history.
> Harris was the weak link.
Walter is the weak link.
In case people are wondering I am largely pulling up data from the last
5 or 10 times Walter tried to run the junk claims.
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:Uo7Rl.41520$%_2.1...@newsfe04.iad...
> The dams raid was actually performed by USAAF B-24s in Lancaster drag in
> broad daylight.
Ah, so it was early practice for the Ploesti raid, correct?
And that is why Guy Gibson was awarded the Verisimilitude Camouflage,
for such an amazing feat.
By the way the squadron used Lancaster III, with US built Merlin
engines.
Walt
Probably the best thing the RAF did after the Battle of Britain was
develop navigational and blind bombing aids for the USAAF to adapt for
daylight use. This allowed the USAAF to strike out over Europe almost
daily. It forced the GAF to come up and be killed -- a feat far
beyond the RAF with its inaccurate, poorly deployed bombers and point
defense fighters.
The RAF tried to force the GAF into decisive combat over France in
1941-42. They couldn't make the GAF fight and couldn't get favorable
results when they did fight.
Oh, and the Germans are clearly on the record that the USAAF hurt them
far worse than the RAF did.
Walt
Walt
wrote:
> "Walt" <Walterm...@aol.com> wrote in message
>
> news:ba5c5ea7-95b8-48c7...@r34g2000vba.googlegroups.com...
>
> > Bomber Command simply did not do all that it could have done in the
> > Oil Campaign. Harris put BC onto cities and eschewed hitting Oil
> > targets whenever he could.
>
> No.
>
> > The Germans -could- have been collapsed months earlier had BC's full
> > potential been properly exploited.
>
> It is refreshing to see Walter has decided to drop the line, for the
> moment anyway, that Bomber Command could not hit targets.
>
BC did achieve greater accuracy as the war progressed. It was never
as accurate as the day bombers could be.
Harris refused to put his force onto the best targets.
Walt
Walt
wrote:
> "Keith Willshaw" <ke...@nospam.kwillshaw.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>
> news:YZXQl.86250$Dx7....@newsfe20.ams2...
>
> > Reality check - In May and June 1944 the RAF dropped MORE tonnage
> > of bombs on German oil targets than the USAAF
>
> According to my counts from the Richard Davis spreadsheets the bomb
> tonnages in short tons on oil targets for May 1944 were 8th 2,872.9,
> 15th 2,448.5, Bomber Command 0. (In terms of oil targets in Germany
> the figures are 2,446,6, zero and zero)
>
That is right. Further, on just -two-days-, May 28-29, 1944, USAAF
bombers cut German synthetic oil production in -half-.
Walt
Walt
You'd think.
Walt
Robert Sveinson
Stay tuned, and don't spoil it! He has offered no opinions yet!
>
> Keith
>
Robert Sveinson
You'd think.
Walt
I can hardly wait for some one to offer some titles of books that
would appear to confirm your claims. You could of course
offer some titles and page numbers to keep this discussion going along
civil lines.
But as you have offered NOTHING but jealous babbling
you can't blame anyone for looking to you as another
ignorant ameriKKKan who is pushing his
nose into a discussion about which he KNOWS NOTHING!
You can of course some what redeem your reputation
by giving Names of books, pages in said books, or quietly
leave this field of combat with your TAIL firmly jacked
up BETWEEN YOU LEGS!
Robert Sveinson
"The Great Raoul" <gr8r...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:wfqdneeEtI91BYnX...@posted.townsendcommunicationinc...
Well in spite of the ignorant ameriKKKan additions to the discussion
I would still ask "Which airforce are you claiming to have
done very hard work and sacrifice to defeat the hun?"
>
Robert Sveinson
"Keith Willshaw" <ke...@nospam.kwillshaw.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:se7Rl.67462$M64....@newsfe26.ams2...
>
Walt should in fact be answering this question!
But he won't!
He will slink away in the dark, change his name and re-appear
with his un educated claim of ameriKKKan
superiority.
I wonder what name he will use!!!!
>
> Keith
>
Robert Sveinson
>
> Probably the best thing the RAF did after the Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain?????
What was the Battle of Britain?????
Has any one heard of this figment of some one's
imagination???
What was it??
When did it supposedly occur?
Who were involved????
Must have been the USAAF meeting the German
fighters and bombers some where around
Britain, hence the name!
Why are you starving us of all your knowledge, by only
giving us tiny little hints that should be developed
into a complete story??
You are just being selfish!
was
> develop navigational and blind bombing aids for the USAAF to adapt for
> daylight use. This allowed the USAAF to strike out over Europe almost
> daily. It forced the GAF to come up and be killed -- a feat far
> beyond the RAF with its inaccurate, poorly deployed bombers and point
> defense fighters.
And none of these magical devices have names that
you can tell us, is that right???
>
> The RAF tried to force the GAF into decisive combat over France in
> 1941-42.
Any part of France that we might be familiar with????
They couldn't make the GAF fight and couldn't get favorable
> results when they did fight.
They COULDN'T make the GAF fight................................
and COULDN'T get favourable results when (wait for it)
they did fight!
I do enjoy trying to decypher addled serntences which no doubt
some people believe to be clear and factual!
>
> Oh, and the Germans are clearly on the record that the USAAF hurt them
> far worse than the RAF did.
And these RECORDS can be
seen..................................................
Where??????
I always read what Albert Speer says about the damage caused by each
airforce, and oddly enough you haven't quoted himk once!
I wonder why!!!!
Maybe you don't know who Albert Speer was! That
is certainly believeable, because he was such a fan of
the USAAF. And you didn't know that??
>
> Walt
I wonder if this is the same "WALT" who made the most earth
shattering statement, some time ago that some of his fans
thought were war winners!!
This, or the other Walt said
"Harris was incompetent"!
\
Several times.
Robert Sveinson
"Keith Willshaw" <ke...@nospam.kwillshaw.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:se7Rl.67462$M64....@newsfe26.ams2...
>
And no-one is demanding that he withdraw his idiotic statements.
Robert Sveinson
>
> "Walt" <Walte...@aol.com> wrote in message
> news:124a3733-6c88-4a63...@b1g2000vbc.googlegroups.com...
> On May 19, 4:00 pm, "Keith Willshaw"
> <ke...@nospam.kwillshaw.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> "Walt" <Walterm...@aol.com> wrote in message
>>
>> news:10ebb035-7272-40aa...@t10g2000vbg.googlegroups.com...
>> On May 19, 8:59 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@froggy.com.au>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> As for leadership, Walter has real problems with Arthur Harris, who
>> >> tends to be considered the RAF end of story.
>>
>> >> Geoffrey Sinclair
>> > My note clearly said -Bomber Command- not the RAF.
>> > RAF leadership -was- lacking in that Portal couldn't get Harris to
>> > obey orders.
>> > Walt
>>
>>> He could and did, the cessation of the Berlin campaign , the switch to
>>> infrastructure
>>> attacks in 1944 and then later to attacks on the oil industries are all
>>> examples
>>> of Harris being told what targets to bomb.
>>>
>
>> Harris -avoided- hitting Oil targets as much as he dared, usually
>> pleading weather.
>
> Reality check - In May and June 1944 the RAF dropped MORE tonnage
> of bombs on German oil targets than the USAAF
And the mines dropped into the Danube rive by the RAF accounted for
many tons of oil being destroyed. Even more than some popular
theorys allowed!
Keith Willshaw
> Walt
Absolute bollocks. The Germans had 18 plants using the Bergius
system and another 30 or so using other processes.
The attacks on May 28th were against Leuna. A major plant to
be sure and while the raids temporarily halted production by
June 3 it was back to 75% . Six months later the 8th AF was
still attacking Leuna
Keith
Walt
'The British inflicted grievous and bloody injuries upon us' said
Milch after the
war, 'but the Americans stabbed us to the heart.'
--"Bomber Command" p. 408 by Max Hastings
"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense
shifted more and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even
though
numerically the British were still stronger than the Americans and
were undoubtedly a
great trial for for the civilian population, the American precision
raids
were of greater consequence to the war industry. They received
priority
attention over the British raids on our towns."
--"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland
'The Americans' attacks, which followed a definite system of assault
on industrial targets, were by
far the most dangerous.
It was in fact these attacks which caused the breakdown of the
German armaments industry. The attacks on the chemical industry would
have sufficed, without the impact of purely military events to render
Germany defenseless.
--Albert Speer"
--"Luftwaffe War Diaries" p. 355 by Cajus Bekker.
" 'By the narrowest of margins, the strategic air offensive failed to
smash Germany's economy by this one method of attack,' wrote the
economist Professor
Milward. 'The most successful operation of the entire Allied
strategic air warfare was against Germany's fuel supply,' wrote
Galland of the Luftwaffe. 'Looking back, it is difficult to understand
why the Allies started this undertaking so late....' Thus the Allies
threw away success when it
was already in their hands,' wrote Speer, of the slackening of the oil
offensive as far back as the summer of 1944. "Had they continued the
attacks of March and April with the same energy, we would have quickly
been at our last gasp."
--"Bomber Command" p. 389 by Max Hastings.
'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
front--it was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck
the vital
blow at German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
selective and precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in
daylight. By
careful choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of
armaments
production, and finally brought the whole German war machine to a
standstill."
--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker
"After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage",
Carl
Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There
is no
doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were negligible
as far
as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the British
attacks
on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields,
factories, and
oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."
--"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.
"The message was a statement from Hans Fay, a German test pilot who
had landed
his twin-engine ME 262 jet at an American field. Fay was quoted as
saying,
"The American Air Force has shortened the war by years as well as
decided its
outcome...Only bomber attacks during daytime have crippled and
destroyed our
industry....Bombing attacks on cities did not exert a profound
influence on
German morale. This was true even on the devastating bomb carpets."
-- "Forged In Fire" p. 480 by De Witt S. Copp
"Over Kiel we run into heavy flak from our own guns. The shooting by
the Navy
is unfortunately so good that we are considerably disorganized. I
observe the
Yank bombing. They dump their load right on the German shipyards. I
am
impressed by the precision with which those bastards bomb: it is
fantastic."
--"I Flew for the Fuhrer" by Heinz Knoke
------------------------------------------
The Germans are on the record clearly - saying that the USAAF hurt
them much worse than the RAF did.
Walt
Eeyore
Otis Willie PIO The American War Library wrote:
> B-17's flew missions over wartime Europe
Is this some new story ?
And STOP snipping everything. You're like a PEST.
Graham
Eeyore
"Scott M. Kozel" wrote:
> Eeyore <rabbitsfriendsandrelati...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > Otis Willie PIO The American War Library wrote:
> >
> > > B-17's flew missions over wartime Europe
> >
> > We know that already.
> >
> > The RAF dropped more ordnance.
> >
> > Now PISS OFF.
>
> Why does everything have to be a urinating contest to you ?
Ask that TWAT Otis who can't even make a coherent post.
Graham
Eeyore
Bombardier wrote:
> Eeyore <rabbitsfriendsandrelati...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > Otis Willie PIO The American War Library wrote:
> >
> > > B-17's flew missions over wartime Europe
> >
> > We know that already.
> >
> > The RAF dropped more ordnance.
> >
> > Now PISS OFF.
> >
> > Graham
>
> But with far less accuracy eapecially on their night missions.
Never heard of Gee, Oboe, H2S and the Pathfinders ? I have a roll of
'Window' on my desk FWIW. My Maternal Grandfather was a Wing Co. flying
Lancs.
They didn't miss Hamburg or Dresden did they ?
Graham
Eeyore
Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
> "Eeyore" <rabbitsfriend...@hotmail.com> wrote
> > Otis Willie PIO The American War Library wrote:
> >
> >> B-17's flew missions over wartime Europe
> >
> > We know that already.
> >
> > The RAF dropped more ordnance.
>
> The RAF figures are Bomber Command, 955,044 long tons, Fighter
> Command 3,481 long tons, Army Co-operation Command 63 long tons,
> 2nd Tactical Air Force, 61,838 long tons, Coastal Command 4,778
> long tons, total 1,025,204 long or 1,148,228 short tons.
>
> In addition Bomber Command dropped 33,263 long tons of mines,
> Coastal Command 602 long tons.
>
> The USAAF in the European theatre dropped 971,762 short tons
> of bombs, 714,719 tons by heavy bombers, 164,187 by medium
> and light bombers, 92,856 by fighter bombers.
>
> The RAF in the Mediterranean and Middle East dropped some
> 160,840 long or 180,140 short tons of bombs.
>
> In the Mediterranean theatre the USAAF dropped 582,701 short
> tons of bombs, 382,075 tons by heavy bombers, 138,341 by light
> and medium bombers and 61,429 by fighter bombers.
>
> When it comes to bombs dropped on Germany, Bomber Command
> dropped 657,674 long or 736,595 short tons of bombs in addition
> units like 2nd TAF also bombed Germany, the USAAF dropped
> 641,201 short tons of bombs on Germany.
>
> So which air force dropped more depends on the definitions used.
>
> Overall against the European Axis the USAAF dropped more,
> 1,554,463 versus 1,328,368 short tons of bombs, (plus some
> 37,930 short tons of mines by the RAF).
>
> If you use aircraft in the US defined European theatre the RAF
> comes out ahead. And so on.
>
> In any case the bomb tonnages should be understood to have
> errors in them based on the usual incomplete records and
> estimates of whether aircraft were lost before or after they
> bombed their target.
The Lancaster carried the heaviest bomb by a LONG way.
Graham
Eeyore
Gordon wrote:
> I prefer to think of it as "we" (Commonwealth + US) bombed the hell
> out of Germany and its Allies. Combined, we ripped the Axis apart
> from the air and on the ground. It was a concerted effort and
> splitting it up to argue over a few tons seems trite.
A B-17 couldn't even carry a 'Tallboy' though.
Graham
Eeyore
Jim Wilkins wrote:
> On May 18, 5:55 pm, Dan <B24...@aol.com> wrote:
> > ...
> > That would tend to be a tad irritating to a war effort. It seems
> > like bad planning on the part of the Nazis when they started the war.
> >
> > Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired-
>
> They didn't plan on Japan dragging in America, in fact they tolerated
> acts of war to avoid it.
> The first:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Niblack_(DD-424)
You mean ...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Niblack_(DD-424)
Graham
Eeyore
Dan wrote:
> Jim Wilkins wrote:
> > On May 18, 5:55 pm, Dan <B24...@aol.com> wrote:
> >> ...
> >> That would tend to be a tad irritating to a war effort. It seems
> >> like bad planning on the part of the Nazis when they started the war.
> >>
> >> Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired-
> >
> > They didn't plan on Japan dragging in America, in fact they tolerated
> > acts of war to avoid it.
> > The first:
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Niblack_(DD-424)
>
> They didn't plan on invading the UK, bailing out Italy or getting
> their asses handed to them by the Soviets either.
The Germans most certainly intended invading the UK. They lost the Battle of
Britain however. Did you not know that's what it was about ?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion
Had the RAF not outgunned the Luftwaffe, it's likely the Royal Navy would
have destroyed any invading fleet to splinters though.
Graham
Eeyore
Walt wrote:
> Eeyore <rabbitsfriendsandrelati...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > Otis Willie PIO The American War Library wrote:
> >
> > > B-17's flew missions over wartime Europe
> >
> > We know that already.
> >
> > The RAF dropped more ordnance.
> >
> > Now PISS OFF.
> >
> > Graham
>
> RAF bombing was not nearly as effective as USAAF bombing. Bomber
> Command had terrible leadership. That was the reason.
Oh you think your silly Norden bombsight was any good ? In the desert
with no wind maybe. The RAF had something just as good and then better
with various electronic navigation aids and the H2S terrain mapping
radar.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H2S_radar
The USAAF couldn't penetrate U-boat shelters either. And this was WAY
beyond your conventional capabilities.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Slam_bomb
Graham
Dan
vessels sufficient to take large numbers of men and equipment across the
Channel. They had all kinds of loony ideas and even started building a
few boats with aircraft engines and propellers. They never had
sufficient Ju-52 or other aircraft to drop men on the coast, let alone
tactical targets inland. In reality Sea Lion was a sketch more than a
plan. Hitler had hoped on not having to invade. As I said, the Nazis
didn't plan on invading the UK, but I suppose you can make a case Sea
Lion was somewhat of a plan.
Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired
Eeyore
Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
> The P-51. And so on.
The P-51 would never have been built but for the British Ministry of Supply.
Graham
Dan
For crying out loud, people, the two forces complimented each other.
Neither force could have done the job without the other.
Eeyore
Keith Willshaw wrote:
> So remind me again which two dams the USAAF destroyed in 1943 ?
>
> I know the RAF knocked out the Mohne and Eder but I must
> have missed the American raid
US revisionism. Like that film U-571.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U-571_(film)
" The film's plot, though a work of fiction, is partly based on real
events. It attracted criticism for two reasons: first, it was British
personnel from HMS Bulldog who first captured a naval Enigma machine, from
U-110 in the North Atlantic May 1941, before the United States entered the
war. Second, German U-boat crews were portrayed in a negative light.
The real U-571 was never involved in any such events, was not captured,
and was in fact sunk in January 1944, off Ireland, by a Short Sunderland
flying boat from No. 461 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force. "
Graham
Eeyore
Eeyore wrote:
More....
Controversies regarding content
Americanization of real historical events
The first capture of a Naval Enigma machine[2] and associated cipher keys from
a U-boat was made on May 9, 1941 by HMS Bulldog of the British Royal Navy,
commanded by Captain Joe Baker-Cresswell. The U-boat was U-110 and the
material was critical for breaking Naval Enigma. The enigma code had in fact
already been cracked by the British by the time America entered the war
following the Attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
There were some 15 captures of Naval Enigma material during World War II, all
but two by the British. The Canadian Navy captured U-774; the U.S. Navy seized
U-505 in June 1944. By this time the Allies were already reading Naval Enigma
routinely.
The film caused irritation and anger in Britain. At Prime Minister's
Questions, Tony Blair agreed with questioner Brian Jenkins MP that the film
was "an affront" to British sailors.[3] In response to a letter from Paul
Truswell, MP for the Pudsey constituency (which includes Horsforth, a town
proud of its connection with HMS Bulldog), U.S. president Bill Clinton wrote
assuring that the film's plot was only a work of fiction.[4] A written
acknowledgment does appear on-screen that the Royal Navy captured the first,
and subsequently the vast majority, of the Enigma devices.[5]
In 2006, screenwriter David Ayer admitted that U-571 distorted history and
stated that he would not do it again.[6] Ayer told BBC Radio 4's The Film
Programme that he "did not feel good" about suggesting Americans captured the
Naval Enigma cipher rather than the British:[6]
� It was a distortion...a mercenary decision...to create this parallel history
in order to drive the movie for an American audience. Both my grandparents
were officers in World War II, and I would be personally offended if somebody
distorted their achievements.
General inaccuracies
The real U-571, captained by Oberleutnant zur See Gustav L�ssow, was lost with
all hands on 28 January 1944, west of Ireland.[9] She was hit by depth
charges, dropped from a Short Sunderland Mk III flying boat, EK577, callsign
"D for Dog", belonging to No. 461 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).
The aircraft's commander, Flt Lt Richard Lucas, reported that most of the
U-boat's 52 crew managed to abandon ship, but all died from hypothermia. "D
for Dog", which was crewed partly by Royal Air Force (RAF) personnel, was
based at RAF Pembroke Dock, in Wales.
Another inaccuracy was the presence of the German destroyer in the Atlantic
Ocean, as most of the surface fleet of the Kriegsmarine never ventured that
far west, and none did so from 1942 onwards. The few exceptions were their
capital ships, such as the Admiral Graf Spee, Scharnhorst, and Bismarck.[10]
In addition, a surfaced U-boat could never engage a destroyer at point blank
range and survive, let alone escape. Although the script claimed the destroyer
could not aim her main guns at U-571 due to the extremely close range, the
destroyer could have still inflicted serious damage on U-571 with her
deck-mounted machine guns.
And it goes on and on and on.
Yeah, thanks for winning the war for us !
Graham
Eeyore
Dan wrote:
> Eeyore wrote:
> > Walt wrote:
> >> Eeyore <rabbitsfriendsandrelati...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >>> Otis Willie PIO The American War Library wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> B-17's flew missions over wartime Europe
> >>> We know that already.
> >>>
> >>> The RAF dropped more ordnance.
> >>>
> >>> Now PISS OFF.
> >>>
> >>> Graham
> >> RAF bombing was not nearly as effective as USAAF bombing. Bomber
> >> Command had terrible leadership. That was the reason.
> >
> > Oh you think your silly Norden bombsight was any good ? In the desert
> > with no wind maybe. The RAF had something just as good and then better
> > with various electronic navigation aids and the H2S terrain mapping
> > radar.
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H2S_radar
> >
> > The USAAF couldn't penetrate U-boat shelters either. And this was WAY
> > beyond your conventional capabilities.
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Slam_bomb
>
> For crying out loud, people, the two forces complimented each other.
> Neither force could have done the job without the other.
OR the Russians would have finished the Germans.
Oh and why is it that British involvement in the Far East is rarely
recognised ? I bet most Americans reckon you fought that on your own.
Graham
Eeyore
Walt wrote:
> Probably the best thing the RAF did after the Battle of Britain was
> develop navigational and blind bombing aids for the USAAF to adapt for
> daylight use.
Cite precisely.
Graham
B24...@aol.com
wrote:
The discussion was RAF/USAAF air operations over Europe. If you want
to bring the Pacific Theater into the conversation why do it in such
an inflammatory way?
Robert Sveinson
>
> > Bomber Command simply did not do all that it could have done in the
> > Oil Campaign. Harris put BC onto cities and eschewed hitting Oil
> > targets whenever he could.
>
> No.
>
> > The Germans -could- have been collapsed months earlier had BC's full
> > potential been properly exploited.
>
> It is refreshing to see Walter has decided to drop the line, for the
> moment anyway, that Bomber Command could not hit targets.
>
BC did achieve greater accuracy as the war progressed. It was never
as accurate as the day bombers could be.
Harris refused to put his force onto the best targets.
Harris WHO??????
Walt
Robert Sveinson
"Eeyore" <rabbitsfriend...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:4A15EEDF...@hotmail.com...
And for a long way!!
>
Robert Sveinson
Piss off the yanks!! The Lancaster could carry
their B-17 and the load in the B-17 from England to Berlin,
but the yanks feared going to Berlin.
They didn't like flying at night either.
Big Brave Heroes!!!
>
> Graham
>
>
Robert Sveinson
"Dan" <B24...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:hQmRl.102027$5N7....@newsfe09.iad...
We know that and you know that but the funny fellow
bragging that he is ALL American is certainly clouding the issue.
Truth from HIM is NOT expected because
he has a character flaw. Usually we try to be kind to a JACK ASS
like this one, but sooner or later he needs an education.
If you won't educate him!! We will!!
And we don't have to LIE to educate him!
Keith Willshaw
Yep so determined were they not to get into war with the USA
that they attempted to attack a US task force :)
Keith
Keith Willshaw
Well they found they had to use Gee , Oboe and H2x when they discovered
the inconvenient fact that northern europe has clouds
Keith
Jim Wilkins
wrote:
...
>
> In addition, a surfaced U-boat could never engage a destroyer at point blank
> range and survive, let alone escape. Although the script claimed the destroyer
> could not aim her main guns at U-571 due to the extremely close range, the
> destroyer could have still inflicted serious damage on U-571 with her
> deck-mounted machine guns.
>
Focus your indignation on the novel "The Enemy Below", in which the
British destroyer HMS Hecate received credit for the battle between
U405 and the American destroyer USS Borie. The movie partly corrected
the error. Both ships were too close for their main weapons so the
battle became a ramming and knife fight. Neither vessel survived.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Enemy_Below
jsw
Gordon
wrote:
Could a Lanc carry a Fat Man? I'm just curious if we are comparing
apples to oranges or the obvious winner in the category of most
powerful payload for heavy WWII bombers, and in terms of square miles
destroyed with one of the lowest lost rates - I thought it was the
B-29. What is important is that Allied air power is clearly the
single most important factor in bringing down both Germany and Japan.
All of the airmen that battled those two nations contributed in the
subjugation of an advanced technological foe commited to occupying a
large part of at least a continent. Each aircraft, from Fairey
Battles to the suicidal Douglas TBDs carried the same souls as the
more successful types that evolved to punish and hammer the Reich and
the Japanese home islands. Think of all the stories of our team
scoring heavily against the enemy, from the Dams Raid to Ploesti, the
skies over Dover and the Marianas Turkey Shoot. Each day, somewhere
we hit the enemy from the sky. I can't see how there can be any sort
of animosity between the forces that won those decisive struggles
while our armies on the ground bought back each square of ground until
the Reichstag and Tokyo were in ruins. Sheeesh - I think people need
to drink a beer and think about Stringbags, Wildcats and Hellcats,
B-26s, Mosquitos, Halifaxes and other US and Commonwealth heavy
bombers of all types - everyone fought for the same goal and hell, our
team won! What's the beef?
Gordon
wrote:
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
> > So remind me again which two dams the USAAF destroyed in 1943 ?
>
> > I know the RAF knocked out the Mohne and Eder but I must
> > have missed the American raid
>
>
> " The film's plot, though a work of fiction, is partly based on real
> events. It attracted criticism for two reasons: first, it was British
> personnel from HMS Bulldog who first captured a naval Enigma machine, from
> U-110 in the North Atlantic May 1941, before the United States entered the
> war. Second, German U-boat crews were portrayed in a negative light.
>
> The real U-571 was never involved in any such events, was not captured,
> and was in fact sunk in January 1944, off Ireland, by a Short Sunderland
> flying boat from No. 461 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force. "
>
> Graham
Good lord, pick a decent movie, would you? That was tripe and no one
reasonably could accept it was intended to be historically correct,
any more than the idiotic "Flyboys" or "Pearl Harbor". They are
nothing like "A Bridge Too Far", "Dambusters", or "Midway", which were
undoubtedly intended to portray events and actions with as much
accuracy as possible. "571" was abyssal - I mean it was not worth
renting. The actors all did parodies of characters from earlier war
movies, except with much longer hair and far less military bearing
than the guys in the those movies. I think it started with Kelly's
Heroes but I am sure there have been parodies exaggerated far beyond
571. It was just a stinker of a movie.
Gordon
Alistair Gunn
> Could a Lanc carry a Fat Man?
Going by what wonkypedia says :-
Device Weight Length Diameter
Fat Man 4.64t 3.25m 1.52m
Little Boy 4.00t 3.00m 0.70m
Grand Slam 9.98t 7.70m 1.17m
So a B1 (Special) should be able to lift a Fat Man, but there'll be even
more of it hanging out in the breeze than with a Grand Slam. OTOH, I'm
not placing any bets on whether said Lancaster would survive the blast
when/if it dropped one! (Since I suspect it would be both slower and a
lower height, and thus closer to the bang!)
--
These opinions might not even be mine ...
Let alone connected with my employer ...
Gordon
> "Eeyore" <rabbitsfriendsandrelati...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
You need to have more sex, buddy. Which RAF heavy flew over Tokyo?
Both sides did a bang up job of winning the air war. No reason to
lump us all together unless you are trying to make a positive point.
We were Allies and both of our forces combined to smash them, drove
the enemy before them, and heard the lamentations of their women. I'm
really amazed at what our combined efforts were able to do - think of
all the great battles and what they would have become without air
power. Blenheims and Beaus, A-20s, American escort fighters, all
those marks of Hurricanes and Spitfires, SBDs, even Brewsters and
Defiants all played their role on that now historical bloody stage of
three generations ago. I hope that when the lens of time closes
further, compressing what is remembered about the Second World War, or
Great Patriotic War down to something like what we now know about the
Trojan War, that what is remembered is something more positive than
this disagreement over who played more of a role in overcoming three
powerful occupying forces.
v/r Gordon
Geoffrey Sinclair
>
> Probably the best thing the RAF did after the Battle of Britain was
> develop navigational and blind bombing aids for the USAAF to adapt for
> daylight use.
Apparently Coastal Command fails to rate in Walter's world.
Then comes the Mediterranean Air Forces, which did quite well
including developing the system for ground support operations.
And so on.
You know, the real air war, not the Walter junk.
> This allowed the USAAF to strike out over Europe almost
> daily.
Reality check, try all those long range fuel tanks the British
built for the USAAF, the 8th's bombers had the same problem
as all other bombers, they needed escorts.
> It forced the GAF to come up and be killed -- a feat far
> beyond the RAF with its inaccurate, poorly deployed bombers and point
> defense fighters.
By the way we are now back at Walter's RAF could not hit
anything, which of course contradicts the only the RAF can save
the oil campaign line.
And of course it totally ignores the fact the RAF was in line for
lots of P-51s and the determining factor of bomber survival against
fighter interception is more the amount of escorts the bombers have,
not their defensive armament.
Put it another a B-17 cost, in both money and manpower in the combat units,
3.5 times that of a P-51, would the 8th have been better off instead of
2,500
heavies and 1,000 fighters, 1,500 heavies, each stripped down to say 8 50
cals so they could carry on average 1 to 2,000 pounds more bombs, with
4,500 fighters available for escort? Or even more bombs by removing
turrets?
Remembering that the losses to flak tend to be a percentage of the
aircraft entering into range of the guns.
> The RAF tried to force the GAF into decisive combat over France in
> 1941-42. They couldn't make the GAF fight and couldn't get favorable
> results when they did fight.
The RAF found itself needing to keep a large force of fighters at
home in 1941 in case the USSR was defeated. The attempts to
do anything over France failed in a big way.
A bomber force was required, largely supplied by the USAAF.
Once that arrived, and the threat of invasion grew the Germans
were forced to defend western airspace.
The Luftwaffe lost something like 2,211 fighters and all up 4,225
aircraft in the west January to November 1943, to all causes,
about 60% were combat related.
The USAAF fighters claimed 351 kills, the RAF fighters 994 kills
in the same time period, the USAAF heavy bombers claimed
3,150 kills and would have shot down around 400 to 450.
After the over claiming in 1941 and 1942 the RAF had tightened
up its criteria for awarding kills. So in January to June 1943,
the RAF fighter command allowed 249 kill claims against
Luftwaffe fighters, the true number of kills was 235, according
British Intelligence in World War II (Hinsley).
It was the fact the RAF escorts of allied bombers kept finding
Luftwaffe pilots that helped stop the USAAF fighter only
sweeps in 1943
So the RAF was doing quite nicely in 1943 and of course with
the invasion in June 1944 also found lots of Luftwaffe aircraft
to attack.
> Oh, and the Germans are clearly on the record that the USAAF hurt them
> far worse than the RAF did.
Walter prays for this before going to sleep, prayers not answered yet.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> Let's get the full efffect:
Laughter breaks will be required.
> 'The British inflicted grievous and bloody injuries upon us' said
> Milch after the war, 'but the Americans stabbed us to the heart.'
>
> --"Bomber Command" p. 408 by Max Hastings
Note by the way, the air forces are not mentioned, just the nationalities.
However with the poetic stab in the heart, it is assumed to mean the
Luftwaffe since the Red Army destroyed most of the German Army
and the RN most of the Kreigsmarine. And then only specific parts
of the Luftwaffe, given its ground attack and bomber arms were
largely deployed where the USAAF could not attack them easily.
Just ignore the facts like the Luftwaffe losses in the Battle of Britain
of so many pre war pilots had a real effect over the course of the war.
Since the Luftwaffe did not exist for about 15 years it was very short
"middle management", the sorts of roles those pre war trained people
would fill.
Think for example if then Colonel Kammhuber had been captured
by the British instead of the French in 1940.
I presume the stabbing is supposed to have been done by the B-17 with
lance attachment.
See also Milch, 23 February 1944
"Everyone should pay a visit to Berlin. It would then be realised that
experience such as we have undergone in the last few months cannot
be endured indefinitely. That is impossible. When the big cities have
been demolished it will be the turn of the smaller ones."
If Milch is right about stabs he is right about area attacks, use both or
neither quote. Remember Milch's opinion is always good in Walter's
world, like his long battle against the He219 and his many feuds
with senior Luftwaffe and aviation industry figures.
> "In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense
> shifted more and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even
> though numerically the British were still stronger than the Americans
> and were undoubtedly a great trial for for the civilian population, the
> American precision raids were of greater consequence to the war
> industry. They received priority attention over the British raids on
> our towns."
>
> --"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland
The chief of the day fighters worrying about the day battle. Just ignore
the large rise in the day and night fighter strengths which show's
Galland's words to be incorrect.
Galland, First and Last page 167
"After Hamburg in the wide circle of the political and
military command could be heard the words "The war
is lost"" One quote proves all, correct?
By the way if the day bombers did receive priority, how
come there were those diversions of day fighters into
the night fighter force in the second half of 1943?
JG300, 301 and 302 to be precise?
> 'The Americans' attacks, which followed a definite system of assault
> on industrial targets, were by far the most dangerous.
>
> It was in fact these attacks which caused the breakdown of the
> German armaments industry. The attacks on the chemical industry would
> have sufficed, without the impact of purely military events to render
> Germany defenseless.
>
> --Albert Speer"
By the way how did the US strikes cause the breakdown of the
u-boat building, tanks, steel? Given the USAAF rarely went
near them. The reality was the transport plan was the way the
allies finally started to really hurt the German economy, and
the plan required and used all types of allied air power, from
all the allies.
Speer is a favourite for the one quote proves all people, as
he has quotes for all occasions.
"It must also be stated that the now frequent night attacks are more
effective than the day raids as heavier bombs are being used and
extraordinary accuracy achieved"
Speer to Hitler 19 January 1945.
Speer was receiving reports of the bombs that hit.
Hunt for that one quote, silly isn't it?
Speer for example can be quoted to support many cases, like
by Harris,
"In Speer's opinion Bomber Commands night attacks were often the
decisive factor in putting out of action the largest and most important
of the enemy's synthetic oil plants, "owing to their greater effectiveness"
he (Speer) said "night attacks caused considerably more damage than
day raids" and these night attacks by Bomber Command were what he
(Speer) considered "more effective in their results than the day attacks
by reason of the fact that the superheavy bombs caused shattering
damage to these plants".
> --"Luftwaffe War Diaries" p. 355 by Cajus Bekker.
>
> " 'By the narrowest of margins, the strategic air offensive failed to
> smash Germany's economy by this one method of attack,' wrote the
> economist Professor
> Milward. 'The most successful operation of the entire Allied
> strategic air warfare was against Germany's fuel supply,' wrote
> Galland of the Luftwaffe. 'Looking back, it is difficult to understand
> why the Allies started this undertaking so late....' Thus the Allies
> threw away success when it
> was already in their hands,' wrote Speer, of the slackening of the oil
> offensive as far back as the summer of 1944. "Had they continued the
> attacks of March and April with the same energy, we would have quickly
> been at our last gasp."
>
> --"Bomber Command" p. 389 by Max Hastings.
Note yet again Walter's selective use of quotes, there were no oil
raids in March and April 1944, apart from the 15ths raids on
Ploesti in April. So the above quote is either wrong or talks about
1945 the raids that were going on then, which is a different topic
to the raids of mid and late 1944.
> 'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
> the hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
> industrial workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the
> soldiers at the front--it was not,as we have seen, area bombing
> by night that struck the vital blow at German survival.
>
> This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
> selective and precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in
> daylight. By careful choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks
> of armaments production, and finally brought the whole German war
> machine to a standstill."
>
> --Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker
The Luftwaffe war diaries is one of Walter's favourite books, note
the quote from page 355 which says there was no systematic
attack before May 1944, with the first attacks on oil installations.
So apparently we have to ignore all 8th Air Force raids before this
as part of the "careful choice of target", in a book which ends its
coverage in June 1944.
Walter has posted this quote many times without noting the basic
objections, like why no mention of the 15th air force, why no mention of
the 9th and 2nd tactical air force, why no mention of Bomber Command
strikes on oil and transport? How can the heavy bombers be considered
to be doing precision bombing? The 8ths target list until the oil
and transport plans were mainly the finished product factories,
the aircraft assembly plants, strikes on rubber and ball bearings
could not or were not followed up. The 8th did not strike in a
sustained way at production bottlenecks, that is key raw and semi
raw products except the oil campaign, where it provided part of
the effort along with the 15th and Bomber Command. The 8th had
a key part in this campaign in 1944, less so in 1945. Walter should
tell us all what materials the German armaments production ran
out of thanks to the 8th air force, steel?, ball bearings? what?
Instead perhaps the way the allied air forces severely damaged
the transport system in western Germany might be mentioned
as the way industrial output was hurt and the attacks on oil
firstly hurt the Luftwaffe by reducing avgas supplies and then
later went after the fuel the army and navy used.
See the book The Collapse of the German War Economy 1944-45,
Allied Airpower and the German National Railway by Mierzejewski.
It documents the decline of the German Rail system in late 1944
and early 1945 to the point where it could not even supply its own
locomotives with coal, where special derail gangs were formed
with quotas of cars to derail each day to clear congestion. Where
the German economy was collapsing, mainly due to the transportation
strikes, the canals, the railways and the oil. How the stocks were
run down and weapons that were made were stuck at the factories.
Tables give an idea of the run down in coal production. The book
makes the case the marshalling yards were the key.
See also A Forgotten Offensive: RAF Coastal Command Anti
Shipping Campaign 1940-45 by Goulter. In particular the last
chapter on the economic effects of cutting off most of the
Scandinavian iron ore trade in late 1944, it helped but the
Germans had stocks to keep going for a while. The tables give
the decline in steel production. If ever there was a sustained
strike against a vital raw material it was the anti shipping
operations against the ore ships from Narvik.
> "After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage",
> Carl Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There
> is no doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were
> negligible
> as far as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the
> British
> attacks on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields,
> factories, and oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."
>
> --"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.
Note the USSBS states it was not
the devastation of airfields and factories that caused the
problem but the run down of transportation, the links between
the factories, airfields etc. In 1945 for example repairing oil
plants could be a waste of time since the transport links to
them were so badly damaged.
Remember when in trouble look for a junior officer who tells you
that you had the most effect. Note the transport plan was apparently
a failure, as was bombing synthetic oil refineries.
Also note the attacks on
oil refineries apparently had no effect, only the depots were
hurt, and that campaign did not start until June 1944 according
to the USSBS, and by the end of September 1944 the USSBS
has the RAF, with 3,300 tons of bombs, ahead of the USAAF
with 1,600 tons. So if the depots were the key the RAF was
the one turning it, not the USAAF.
> "The message was a statement from Hans Fay, a German test pilot who
> had landed his twin-engine ME 262 jet at an American field. Fay was
> quoted as saying, "The American Air Force has shortened the war by
> years as well as decided its outcome...Only bomber attacks during
> daytime have crippled and destroyed our industry....Bombing attacks
> on cities did not exert a profound influence on
> German morale. This was true even on the devastating bomb carpets."
>
> -- "Forged In Fire" p. 480 by De Witt S. Copp
Yes a test pilot would be an economic expert, not to mention have
a major strategic insight and accurate knowledge of Luftwaffe losses.
It is fascinating to note that apparently the war was shortened by years
by the USAAF, I wonder how they Red Army is going to be delayed
that long.
In 1944 the 8th dropped 38,531.6 tons of bombs on the German
aircraft industry, production went up for most of the year, a further
12,936.6 tons on AFV industry targets, similar result. Transport
targets were the biggest strikes, 125,165.2 tons, v weapons
28,962.7 tons, oil 56,964.3 tons, targets of opportunity 10,439.8
tons, tactical targets (excluding fuel dumps) 34,529 tons, airfields
58,638.4 tons, industrial areas 25,960.1 tons (5,416.1 visually,
the rest mainly using H2X), this is out of 429,065.3 tons of bombs
dropped.
Apparently the transport strikes failed as well, since the expert
quoted above does not mention them.
> "Over Kiel we run into heavy flak from our own guns. The shooting by
> the Navy is unfortunately so good that we are considerably disorganized.
> I observe the Yank bombing. They dump their load right on the German
> shipyards. I am impressed by the precision with which those bastards
> bomb: it is fantastic."
>
> --"I Flew for the Fuhrer" by Heinz Knoke
Yes folks, the disorganised fighter formation under ground fire has pilots
watching the bombing rather than reforming or attacking the bombers.
Why, one German observer called the RAF accuracy "extraordinary."
(See the Speer quote above)
Hunt for that one quote, silly isn't it?
> The Germans are on the record clearly - saying that the USAAF hurt
> them much worse than the RAF did.
Walter has managed to find a quote from Milch, Galland, Speer, then
comes a German author, a test pilot, a fighter pilot and a survey by an
American asking for agreement the Americans did the most damage,
with the problems outlined above.
These become "The Germans".
Geoffrey Sinclair
>> tonnages in short tons on oil targets for May 1944 were 8th 2,872.9,
>> 15th 2,448.5, Bomber Command 0. (In terms of oil targets in Germany
>> the figures are 2,446,6, zero and zero)
>
> That is right. Further, on just -two-days-, May 28-29, 1944, USAAF
> bombers cut German synthetic oil production in -half-.
In case people are wondering it takes effort to remain as ignorant
as Walter is on this subject, as a result there is no time to for Walter
to learn the basic facts.
In this case tons means metric tons.
The short answer is German avgas production was halved from
5,526 to 2,743 tons per day between 28 and 30 May, that is not
the same as synthetic oil production was halved. It stayed around
the lower level until further raids by the RAF in June.
By the 19th of June, the day before the 8th Air Force resumed
raids on synthetic oil production German avgas output was 1,278
tons. The biggest 20th June raid did nothing to avgas production as
the target was Poelitz, which was still out of action from the May
raids. It was a problem the allies never solved, plants were bombed
while still under repairs, others had a few weeks of production before
being bombed again.
The low point for German avgas production in June 1944 was 632 tons
on the 22nd, it was back up to 1,268 tons on the 24th. See the 30 June
1944 Speer report to Hitler.
Synthetic fuel production again peaked in March 1944 at 380,000 tons,
April 360,000 tons, May 300,000 tons, June 120,000 tons, July 80,000
tons.
USSBS, The How and Why Air attacks crippled the
German Oil-Chemical Industry
"The Leuna versus Allied air forces bout resembled
in some ways a prize fight. The plant was knocked
down nine times but never out, and recovered rapidly
at first but more slowly as the accumulating punishment
began to tell. Its recovery capacity also slackened as
indicated by the decreasing percentages of the
recovery plans. It might be said that the plant was finally
defeated on points. To have achieved a complete
knockout the Allied air forces would have had to
destroy its recovery capacity, and they did not deliver
a sufficiently strong punch to accomplish this."
Finally the usual, the text Walter decided to ignore.
For June 1944, 8th 4,966.1, 15th 8,549.5, Bomber Command 5,922.
(In terms of oil targets in Germany the figures are 4,461.8, zero and
4,562.5)
The 15th had finally received permission to officially attack the Ploesti
refineries. For a while the 15th had been attacking the rail marshalling
yard servicing the refineries as part of the authorised transport targets
The marshalling yards were located roughly in the middle of the
refineries. The bombing of these yards had been strangely inaccurate,
more of the bombs appear to have hit the refineries that the rail lines.
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:4a155fe3$0$24373$5a62...@per-qv1-newsreader-01.iinet.net.au...
correction time.
> Hence the way Bomber Command's oil targets were all declared
> out of action in October 1944.
I read a 10th instead of an 11th month.
US Official History, Volume 3 Chapter 18, p645
"By the last of November attacks on all the RAF's
synthetic oil targets were suspended because they
were no longer operating. Whereupon ACM Portal
demanded the British share the losses the 8th had
been taking by assuming responsibility for the two
largest and most distant targets, Politz and Merseburg
Leuna. The crippling of Germany's warning system in
the west as the result of the allied victory in France and
the increased efficiency of blind bombing techniques
made such RAF missions possible, and they proved
generally successful. Indeed, Speer, subsequently
reported to Hitler that the night attacks were more
effective than the daylight missions because heavier
bombs were used and greater accuracy had been obtained."
See what you can do with just one quote? If the above is
correct it explains Bomber Command's lack of oil raids in
the last week of November, it was awaiting new targets.
Harris had knocked out all the targets he had been given,
seems like he had followed orders.
Geoffrey Sinclair
restated.
"Walt" <Walte...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:0a511d1d-ec58-407e...@g20g2000vba.googlegroups.com...
>On May 21, 10:06 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>> "Walt" <Walterm...@aol.com> wrote in message
>>
>> > The Germans -could- have been collapsed months earlier had BC's full
>> > potential been properly exploited.
>>
>> It is refreshing to see Walter has decided to drop the line, for the
>> moment anyway, that Bomber Command could not hit targets.
>>
> BC did achieve greater accuracy as the war progressed. It was never
> as accurate as the day bombers could be.
First thing, 617 squadron.
Second thing, the results of the night raids on the French marshalling
yards in 1944, they did better than the 8th AF which was why
Bomber Command was assigned so many,
Third thing, a good mission is one thing, the average counts over
the longer term, and when it came time to analyse the results of
the raids on three of the main German oil installations the night
raids were overall more accurate according to the USSBS.
> Harris refused to put his force onto the best targets.
No. Walter's repeating this does not make it so. See the figures
already posted.
The rest of this is to show what Walter cannot handle, I am
repeating the text Walter deleted.
You see it works like this. Walter thinks the German oil production
system could have been stopped earlier. The last time the vital period
was defined to about September 1944.
Walter firmly believes the 8th Air Force could do no more.
Walter largely ignores the requirements of Overlord and the fact that
Eisenhower had first call on the heavy bombers, including some targets
in Germany.
So it goes like this, 8th Air force, total bomb tonnage dropped on German
targets, bomb tonnage dropped on German oil targets, percentage of effort
against German oil targets,
Jun-44 / 13120.5 / 4461.8 / 34.01
Jul-44 / 29838.3 / 6664 / 22.33
Aug-44 / 23597.4 / 6151.4 / 26.07
Sep-44 / 34818.4 / 7352 / 21.12
Total / 101374.6 / 24629.2 / 24.30
Bomber Command, same table (The three decimal places comes
from conversion of long into short tons)
Jun-44 / 5443.536 / 4562.544 / 83.82
Jul-44 / 14670.096 / 3834.544 / 26.14
Aug-44 / 16119.264 / 1852.592 / 11.49
Sep-44 / 22955.296 / 4491.2 / 19.56
Total / 59188.192 / 14740.88 / 24.91
You see under Walter's view of the world Bomber Command devoting
slightly more of its attacks on Germany to oil targets than the 8th did is
supposed to be proof Bomber Command could have done more.
However it appears the 8th Air Force could do no more under the
Walter rules.
It makes for a good laugh, but bad history.
In case people are wondering I am largely pulling up data from the last
5 or 10 times Walter tried to run the junk claims.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>
>> In any case the bomb tonnages should be understood to have
>> errors in them based on the usual incomplete records and
>> estimates of whether aircraft were lost before or after they
>> bombed their target.
>
> The Lancaster carried the heaviest bomb by a LONG way.
If the Lancaster's reputation relies on 40 ten ton bombs dropped,
plus 2 jettisoned then it is in trouble.
Even the 835 Tallboys aimed at targets and the 44 lost on
operations does not cut it.
Gordon
wrote:
> > BC did achieve greater accuracy as the war progressed. It was never
> > as accurate as the day bombers could be.
>
> First thing, 617 squadron.
139 Jamaica. A single 4,000 lb "Cookie" that brought down 2/3rds of
Goebbels' prized Reich Propaganda Ministry. Many more examples.
Pathfinders could accomplish amazing feats of target marking, and take
a look at targets like Peenemunde - the night bombing did every bit as
much damage as the day strikes.
Bill Shatzer
> What is important is that Allied air power is clearly the
> single most important factor in bringing down both Germany and Japan.
At least in regards to Germany, the Soviet Army would beg to differ.
Ken S. Tucker
LOL. The Soviets likely dropped a hell of a lot more
ordinance on the Germans, than Yanks and Brits
combined, but they used cannons.
Ken
Walt
>
> - Show quoted text -
Yeah, U-571 was dreadful.
Walt
Walt
wrote:
> "Walt" <Walterm...@aol.com> wrote in message
>
> news:80238325-864c-4139...@j18g2000yql.googlegroups.com...
>
> > Let's get the full efffect:
>
> Laughter breaks will be required.
>
So it is your word against Milch, Speer and Galland.
Walt
Walt
Portal could not prevail upon Harris to put Bomber Command onto useful
targets, and didn't have the guts to sack him.
"Even after all their bitter experience in the early years of the war,
senior
officers were unwilling to face unacceptable realities. Dr. Noble
Frankland has
written that 'the whole belief that the bomber was revolutionary in
the sense
that it was not subject to the classical doctrines of war was
misguided', and
this should have been apparent to the Airmen by 1942."
-"Bomber Command" p. 409 by Max Hastings
"In the last quarter of 1944, 14 per cent of Harris' effort fell on
oil targets
against 53 per cent on cities, 15 per cent on transport targets, 13
per cent on
army-support operations, 5 per cent on naval targets such as U-boalt
and E-boat
pens. Between January and May 1945, 26 per cent of Harris's effort
was
directed toward oil, 37 per cent against cities. The cost of his
stubborness
to the Allied war effort at the last stage was almost certainly
grievious.
The Oil Plan will be remembered by history as one of the Alllies great
missed
opportunities of the war. Harris himself said thirty years later:
'The only serious row I ever had with Portal was about the Oil Plan.
I was
against putting everything iinto oil. It was using a sledgehammer to
crack a
nut. I remember Portal ringing me up, the only time in the war he
lost his
temper with me. I simply told him that if he didn't want me, I was
quite
prepared to go.'
Portal in his own wartime correspondence made it abundantly clear that
he was not
satisfied that Harris was wholeheartedly seeking to carry out his
orders. The
issue at stake was one of profound significance for the conduct of the
war.
The evidence is clear that Harris never conformed single-mindedly to
his
instructions, and the margin by which he failed to do so may have
been
decisive....
Portal's retreat, which greatly diminishes his stature as a director
of war,
was the negation of all that he had sought to achieve at Quebec by the
transfer
of authority from SHAEF. He had proved himself too weak to impose his
will on
the command structure he himself had created. It is hard to believe
that had
Bomber Command continued under SHAEF's orders, Tedder would have
tolerated the
same degree of defiance from Harris....Harris's behavior towards the
Air Staff
in this last phase almost certainly influenced the fact that he
received no
peerage and was offered no further employment in the coming of peace,
much more
than any notion of making him the scapegoat for Dresden. If he had
shown the
flexibility in the autumn of 1944 to acknowledge that the usefulness
of area
bombing was ended, that his force was now capable of of better and
more
important things, history might have judged him more kindly. But he
did not.
With the single-mindedness that even one of his principal advocates at
the Air
Ministry had termed obsession, he continued remorselessly with his
personal
programme for the leveling of Germany's cities until the very end."
Ibid, pp.391-92
BC could possibly have had a decisive effect, but Harris wouldn't have
it.
Walt
Walt
wrote:
> You see under Walter's view of the world Bomber Command devoting
> slightly more of its attacks on Germany to oil targets than the 8th did is
> supposed to be proof Bomber Command could have done more.
The difference is that the USAAF wanted to hit Oil targets at every
opportunity and the RAF wanted to avoid targeting Oil targets whenever
possible.
Walt
Dan
I can't say about Milch, but Galland had integrity, Speer had none.
Speer was a lying kiss up who spent every day of his post war life
trying to recreate his image. Had he been hanged at Nuremberg as he
should have been people would have had a more true image of the bastard.
bob matthews
>
> Dan wrote:
>
>> Jim Wilkins wrote:
>>> On May 18, 5:55 pm, Dan <B24...@aol.com> wrote:
>>>> ...
>>>> That would tend to be a tad irritating to a war effort. It seems
>>>> like bad planning on the part of the Nazis when they started the war.
>>>>
>>>> Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired-
>>> They didn't plan on Japan dragging in America, in fact they tolerated
>>> acts of war to avoid it.
>>> The first:
>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Niblack_(DD-424)
>> their asses handed to them by the Soviets either.
>
> The Germans most certainly intended invading the UK. They lost the Battle of
> Britain however. Did you not know that's what it was about ?
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion
>
> Had the RAF not outgunned the Luftwaffe, it's likely the Royal Navy would
> have destroyed any invading fleet to splinters though.
Probably. However, in June of 1940 the Nazis were in the habit of
victory and the British were used to defeat. Not everyone in the
British government was in favor of resistance and Churchill--the Hero of
Gallipoli--had to work hard to sell his war.
Suppose the Nazis had captured an airfield in southeast England, created
a mine-protected path through the channel and scared the bejesus out of
a British cabinet that had watched Poland, Norway, Denmark, the BeNeLux
countries, and France collapse like paper bags?
It's true that on paper the Nazi cause was hopeless, but the Poles were
expected to last for years and France had the mightiest army on the
continent.
We'll never know, but the Nazis of "kicking in the door and watching the
house collapse."
Cheers.
>
> Graham
>
Robert Sveinson
> Eeyore wrote:
>>
>> Dan wrote:
>>
>>> Jim Wilkins wrote:
>>>> On May 18, 5:55 pm, Dan <B24...@aol.com> wrote:
>>>>> ...
>>>>> That would tend to be a tad irritating to a war effort. It seems
>>>>> like bad planning on the part of the Nazis when they started the war.
>>>>>
>>>>> Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired-
>>>> They didn't plan on Japan dragging in America, in fact they tolerated
>>>> acts of war to avoid it.
>>>> The first:
>>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Niblack_(DD-424)
>>> They didn't plan on invading the UK, bailing out Italy or getting
>>> their asses handed to them by the Soviets either.
>>
>> The Germans most certainly intended invading the UK. They lost the Battle
>> of
>> Britain however. Did you not know that's what it was about ?
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion
>>
>> Had the RAF not outgunned the Luftwaffe, it's likely the Royal Navy would
>> have destroyed any invading fleet to splinters though.
>>
>>
> They didn't plan Sea Lion very well, did they?
Why do you claim that??
>They never had surface vessels sufficient to take large numbers of men and
>equipment across the Channel. They had all kinds of loony ideas and even
>started building a few boats with aircraft engines and propellers. They
>never had sufficient Ju-52 or other aircraft to drop men on the coast, let
>alone tactical targets inland. In reality Sea Lion was a sketch more than a
>plan. Hitler had hoped on not having to invade. As I said, the Nazis didn't
>plan on invading the UK, but I suppose you can make a case Sea Lion was
>somewhat of a plan.
If Hitler was hoping to invade England, and he was, does his
poor planning make the effort by the British to meet
the invasion to be totally useless??
I guess the fact that ameriKKKa was sitting back
enjoying the profits of neutrality, rather than
being involved in any effort to meet and beat
the invasion makes any effort by the British
to meet and beat the invasion to be less than
theoritical, and the theoritical to be of NO
VALUE at all because it is not an effort
using the later methods that are theoritical,
but obviously superior, because the USA
claimed to have been able to beat the
German invasion, but in reality not even
putting their superior anti invasion efforts
into play.
Robert Sveinson
>
>
> Dan wrote:
>
>> Jim Wilkins wrote:
>> > On May 18, 5:55 pm, Dan <B24...@aol.com> wrote:
>> >> ...
>> >> That would tend to be a tad irritating to a war effort. It seems
>> >> like bad planning on the part of the Nazis when they started the war.
>> >>
>> >> Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired-
>> >
>> > They didn't plan on Japan dragging in America, in fact they tolerated
>> > acts of war to avoid it.
>> > The first:
>> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Niblack_(DD-424)
>>
>> They didn't plan on invading the UK, bailing out Italy or getting
>> their asses handed to them by the Soviets either.
>
> The Germans most certainly intended invading the UK.
You are obviously dreaming. How else could the americans spout there theory
that
in spite of all the preparations done by the British
to meet an invasion by the Germans would have been totally
useless had the Germans invaded. Therefore the
Germans HAD NO INTENTION OF INVADING.
There fore the British efforts were useless!
> They lost the Battle of
> Britain however. Did you not know that's what it was about ?
Seems to me that I read a short essay about the Battle of Britain
and how the Battle was of no consequence and the RAF didn't REALLY
win the Battle. Rather I guess the Germans didn't lose the Battle,
so the RAF did not win.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion
>
I remember a short statement made by Churchill who stated that
if it appeared that the German invasion would succeed
the Royal Navy would do what had to be done
to defeat the real or phony invasion.
> Had the RAF not outgunned the Luftwaffe, it's likely the Royal Navy would
> have destroyed any invading fleet to splinters though.
Only if ameriKKKans agree that the British could have
met the invaders whether they won the fight
or lost it.
Losing it would have to have been the outcome,
because it was only the British meeting the Germans!
Remember, the fact that the Germans did not invade
was because they weren't ready, nor had any intention
of invading, proves that the British efforts at
anti invasion were of no consequence.
>
> Graham
>
Robert Sveinson
"Eeyore" <rabbitsfriend...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:4A15F0F5...@hotmail.com...
>
>
> Dan wrote:
>
>> Jim Wilkins wrote:
>> > On May 18, 5:55 pm, Dan <B24...@aol.com> wrote:
>> >> ...
>> >> That would tend to be a tad irritating to a war effort. It seems
>> >> like bad planning on the part of the Nazis when they started the war.
>> >>
>> >> Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired-
>> >
>> > They didn't plan on Japan dragging in America, in fact they tolerated
>> > acts of war to avoid it.
>> > The first:
>> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Niblack_(DD-424)
>>
>> They didn't plan on invading the UK, bailing out Italy or getting
>> their asses handed to them by the Soviets either.
>
> The Germans most certainly intended invading the UK.
One cannot denigrate the efforts of the British in 1940,
who claimed that the Germans were going to invade
England unless one claims that the invasion was a British
dream, and was NEVER going to happen!!
Does anything sound familiar??
They lost the Battle of
> Britain however. Did you not know that's what it was about ?
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion
>
> Had the RAF not outgunned the Luftwaffe, it's likely the Royal Navy would
> have destroyed any invading fleet to splinters though.
>
> Graham
>
Robert Sveinson
>>> They didn't plan on invading the UK, bailing out Italy or getting
>>> their asses handed to them by the Soviets either.
>>
>> The Germans most certainly intended invading the UK. They lost the Battle
>> of
>> Britain however. Did you not know that's what it was about ?
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion
>>
>> Had the RAF not outgunned the Luftwaffe, it's likely the Royal Navy would
>> have destroyed any invading fleet to splinters though.
>>
>> Graham
>>
> They didn't plan Sea Lion very well, did they?
See? Sea Lion really was not going to be an operation,
because the plan was not well planned. There fore defeating
the LW and the invading forces weren't really all that important or
difficult
because there NEVER WAS GOING TO BE AN INVASION!
> They never had surface
> vessels sufficient to take large numbers of men and equipment across the
> Channel.
See? The British claim to defeating the invasion is just so
much bull because the Germans apparently didn' have sufficient
forces ( in the ameriKKKan's opinion) to even think about invading
England. And that proves that there was NEVER ANY INTENTION
TO INVADE! So what were the British afraid of??
> They had all kinds of loony ideas and even started building a few boats
> with aircraft engines and propellers. They never had sufficient Ju-52 or
> other aircraft to drop men on the coast, let alone tactical targets
> inland. In reality Sea Lion was a sketch more than a plan. Hitler had
> hoped on not having to invade. As I said, the Nazis didn't plan on
> invading the UK, but I suppose you can make a case Sea Lion was somewhat
> of a plan.
See! No British heroics to stop any German invasion, because there
was NEVER any intention to invade. The Germans were just
bluffing, so there were no RAF heroics!.
Certainly no British heroics of the same quality of
ameriKKkan heroics.
Keith Willshaw
"bob matthews" <tsam...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:5vGRl.709995$yE1.326846@attbi_s21...
Lets take that one step at a time
They could probably have seized a coastal airfield like Manston
or Hawkinge BUT hanging on to it would have been an entirely
different manner. The force landed would have no heavy weapons
and no hope of resupply. There were 5 divisions available to the
British in the Kent/East Sussex area equipped with heavy artillery and
armour. Additionally the RAF had hundreds of bombers on standby
for anti-invasion duties. Recall what happened on Crete where the
Kiwi's had much fewer troops , light weapons and the Germans had
air superiority. The defenders inflicted terrible losses on the German
paratroopers.
The landing force would be rolled up in 24-48 hours IMHO.
As for laying a mine protected path across the channel, that
is fantasy. The Germans lacked the minelaying capacity and
their minelayers would not have survived the combined attack
of RN light forces and the RAF even if they existed.
But lets assume the Germans try to land an invasion force, this
is where they start dying on mass. The cruisers and destroyers
from Harwich and Portsmouth are going to be arriving within 12 hours
and the invasion barges used by the Germans were requisitioned inland
waterway craft that had speeds of 2-4 knots. Can you say Turkey Shoot ?
Lets further assume the Kriegsmarine tries to protect them. They have
1 modern battleship, 1 pocket battleship, (Deutchland), 4 cruisers,
10 destroyers, and 35 U-Boats. Against 9 Battleships, 3 fleet Aircraft
carriers,
32 Cruisers, 58 destroyers and 36 submarines. There are also the British
minefields and light forces to take into account
Keith