Qubes VM Manger Firewall tab settings design
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Patrick Schleizer
Sep 25, 2015, 11:00:51 AM9/25/15
to qubes...@googlegroups.com
Hi,
do we have documentation on the things that usually technically happen
when switching Qubes VM Manger Firewall tab settings?
Background: I am trying to find out on how bad it would be if these
settings are enabled for Whonix VMs or if these matter at all.
Cheers,
Patrick
do we have documentation on the things that usually technically happen
when switching Qubes VM Manger Firewall tab settings?
Background: I am trying to find out on how bad it would be if these
settings are enabled for Whonix VMs or if these matter at all.
Cheers,
Patrick
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Sep 25, 2015, 11:20:36 AM9/25/15
to Patrick Schleizer, qubes...@googlegroups.com
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On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 03:00:45PM +0000, Patrick Schleizer wrote:
> Hi,
>
> do we have documentation on the things that usually technically happen
> when switching Qubes VM Manger Firewall tab settings?
All that settings are in separate file - firewall.xml in the VM
directory. If the VM is running, those settings are converted to
iptables syntax and loaded into QubesDB of directly connected ProxyVM.
The `qubes-firewall` service in the ProxyVM watch for such changes and
applies the rules.
There is one side effect - enabling access to "updates proxy"
automatically turns on `yum-proxy-setup` service (hmm, this should be
renamed to `updates-proxy-setup`) to have the VM configured to actually
use the proxy.
> Background: I am trying to find out on how bad it would be if these
> settings are enabled for Whonix VMs or if these matter at all.
Since `qubes-firewall` service is disabled in Whonix Gw (it is, right?),
nothing will happen.
- --
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
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On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 03:00:45PM +0000, Patrick Schleizer wrote:
> Hi,
>
> do we have documentation on the things that usually technically happen
> when switching Qubes VM Manger Firewall tab settings?
directory. If the VM is running, those settings are converted to
iptables syntax and loaded into QubesDB of directly connected ProxyVM.
The `qubes-firewall` service in the ProxyVM watch for such changes and
applies the rules.
There is one side effect - enabling access to "updates proxy"
automatically turns on `yum-proxy-setup` service (hmm, this should be
renamed to `updates-proxy-setup`) to have the VM configured to actually
use the proxy.
> Background: I am trying to find out on how bad it would be if these
> settings are enabled for Whonix VMs or if these matter at all.
nothing will happen.
- --
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
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Patrick Schleizer
Sep 25, 2015, 12:47:14 PM9/25/15
to Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, qubes...@googlegroups.com
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki:
While we're at it.
https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-firewall.service
uses:
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
Alias=qubes-firewall.service
That allows to use
a) "sudo service qubes-whonix-firewall ..." and,
b) well as "sudo service qubes-firewall ...".
I am wondering if 'Alias=' is the right mechanism or if not better a
systemd drop-in would be more appropriate and secure [wrt to further
systemd updates]. One couldn't use b) anymore, but is it a problem?
Cheers,
Patrick
> On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 03:00:45PM +0000, Patrick Schleizer wrote:
>> Background: I am trying to find out on how bad it would be if these
>> settings are enabled for Whonix VMs or if these matter at all.
>
> Since `qubes-firewall` service is disabled in Whonix Gw (it is, right?),
> nothing will happen.
Right.
>> Background: I am trying to find out on how bad it would be if these
>> settings are enabled for Whonix VMs or if these matter at all.
>
> Since `qubes-firewall` service is disabled in Whonix Gw (it is, right?),
> nothing will happen.
While we're at it.
https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-firewall.service
uses:
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
Alias=qubes-firewall.service
That allows to use
a) "sudo service qubes-whonix-firewall ..." and,
b) well as "sudo service qubes-firewall ...".
I am wondering if 'Alias=' is the right mechanism or if not better a
systemd drop-in would be more appropriate and secure [wrt to further
systemd updates]. One couldn't use b) anymore, but is it a problem?
Cheers,
Patrick
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Sep 25, 2015, 1:03:49 PM9/25/15
to Patrick Schleizer, qubes...@googlegroups.com
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On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 04:47:07PM +0000, Patrick Schleizer wrote:
> While we're at it.
>
> https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-firewall.service
> uses:
>
> [Install]
> WantedBy=multi-user.target
> Alias=qubes-firewall.service
>
> That allows to use
> a) "sudo service qubes-whonix-firewall ..." and,
> b) well as "sudo service qubes-firewall ...".
>
> I am wondering if 'Alias=' is the right mechanism or if not better a
> systemd drop-in would be more appropriate and secure [wrt to further
> systemd updates]. One couldn't use b) anymore, but is it a problem?
I don't think that the alias here is a good one. `qubes-firewall`
> While we're at it.
>
> https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-firewall.service
> uses:
>
> [Install]
> WantedBy=multi-user.target
> Alias=qubes-firewall.service
>
> That allows to use
> a) "sudo service qubes-whonix-firewall ..." and,
> b) well as "sudo service qubes-firewall ...".
>
> I am wondering if 'Alias=' is the right mechanism or if not better a
> systemd drop-in would be more appropriate and secure [wrt to further
> systemd updates]. One couldn't use b) anymore, but is it a problem?
service has totally different purpose than `qubes-whonix-firewall`
(setting firewall according to VMs settings vs loading static firewall
rules and blocking all the access if something gone wrong). Drop-in for
disabling qubes-firewall would be better. And some preset for
`qubes-whonix-firewall.service`
- --
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
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Patrick Schleizer
Sep 25, 2015, 1:36:58 PM9/25/15
to Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, qubes...@googlegroups.com
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki:
https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/commit/ce953a964bf7c3a9038aef5371cf0d672d28af9a
(drop-in, not preseed, because Debian officially does not make use of
them yet, so I trust more in the drop-ins.)
There is another similar case. The last one in the qubes-whonix package
using 'Alias='.
https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-network.service
Maybe that it also should be replaced? For one, for consistency. Also
because 'Alias=' seems like a hack and not being the right mechanism for
that. What do you think?
Cheers,
Patrick
> On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 04:47:07PM +0000, Patrick Schleizer wrote:
>> While we're at it.
>
>> https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-firewall.service
>> uses:
>
>> [Install]
>> WantedBy=multi-user.target
>> Alias=qubes-firewall.service
>
>> That allows to use
>> a) "sudo service qubes-whonix-firewall ..." and,
>> b) well as "sudo service qubes-firewall ...".
>
>> I am wondering if 'Alias=' is the right mechanism or if not better a
>> systemd drop-in would be more appropriate and secure [wrt to further
>> systemd updates]. One couldn't use b) anymore, but is it a problem?
>
> I don't think that the alias here is a good one. `qubes-firewall`
> service has totally different purpose than `qubes-whonix-firewall`
> (setting firewall according to VMs settings vs loading static firewall
> rules and blocking all the access if something gone wrong). Drop-in for
> disabling qubes-firewall would be better. And some preset for
> `qubes-whonix-firewall.service`
Agreed. Using drop-in now.
>> While we're at it.
>
>> https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-firewall.service
>> uses:
>
>> [Install]
>> WantedBy=multi-user.target
>> Alias=qubes-firewall.service
>
>> That allows to use
>> a) "sudo service qubes-whonix-firewall ..." and,
>> b) well as "sudo service qubes-firewall ...".
>
>> I am wondering if 'Alias=' is the right mechanism or if not better a
>> systemd drop-in would be more appropriate and secure [wrt to further
>> systemd updates]. One couldn't use b) anymore, but is it a problem?
>
> I don't think that the alias here is a good one. `qubes-firewall`
> service has totally different purpose than `qubes-whonix-firewall`
> (setting firewall according to VMs settings vs loading static firewall
> rules and blocking all the access if something gone wrong). Drop-in for
> disabling qubes-firewall would be better. And some preset for
> `qubes-whonix-firewall.service`
https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/commit/ce953a964bf7c3a9038aef5371cf0d672d28af9a
(drop-in, not preseed, because Debian officially does not make use of
them yet, so I trust more in the drop-ins.)
There is another similar case. The last one in the qubes-whonix package
using 'Alias='.
https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-network.service
Maybe that it also should be replaced? For one, for consistency. Also
because 'Alias=' seems like a hack and not being the right mechanism for
that. What do you think?
Cheers,
Patrick
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Sep 25, 2015, 1:58:24 PM9/25/15
to Patrick Schleizer, qubes...@googlegroups.com
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debhelper automatic script handle that?
> There is another similar case. The last one in the qubes-whonix package
> using 'Alias='.
>
> https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-network.service
>
> Maybe that it also should be replaced? For one, for consistency. Also
> because 'Alias=' seems like a hack and not being the right mechanism for
> that. What do you think?
qubes-network.service, with the same functionality. So I'm not sure in
this case. Having Alias= means that all the dependencies would still
work (After=qubes-network.service in other services for example).
- --
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
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Patrick Schleizer
Sep 25, 2015, 2:09:56 PM9/25/15
to qubes...@googlegroups.com
So from https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Create_Workstation_AppVMs and
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Create_Gateway_ProxyVMs the part
"2. Edit ... Firewall Rules"
can be removed.
Undoubtedly some people will ask what settings they should set in Qubes
VM Manger Firewall tab or why it's no longer recommended changing these
settings.
Therefore, the technical background is now documented on the
Qubes-Whonix Dev page.
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Dev/Qubes#Qubes_VM_Manger_Firewall_Tab_Settings
Cheers,
Patrick
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Create_Gateway_ProxyVMs the part
"2. Edit ... Firewall Rules"
can be removed.
Undoubtedly some people will ask what settings they should set in Qubes
VM Manger Firewall tab or why it's no longer recommended changing these
settings.
Therefore, the technical background is now documented on the
Qubes-Whonix Dev page.
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Dev/Qubes#Qubes_VM_Manger_Firewall_Tab_Settings
Cheers,
Patrick
Patrick Schleizer
Sep 25, 2015, 2:14:31 PM9/25/15
to Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, qubes...@googlegroups.com
usual service. It will be enabled during debhelper part of
qubes-whonix.postinst maintainer script.
For users who update, the qubes-firewall.service will still be disabled
before / after they update. And after the update/reboot, the systemd
drop-in will be active to prevent starting qubes-firewall.service.
Cheers,
Patrick
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Sep 25, 2015, 2:35:20 PM9/25/15
to Patrick Schleizer, qubes...@googlegroups.com
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On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 06:09:51PM +0000, Patrick Schleizer wrote:
> So from https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Create_Workstation_AppVMs and
> https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Create_Gateway_ProxyVMs the part
>
> "2. Edit ... Firewall Rules"
>
> can be removed.
Indeed. This was needed in R2, because new DispVMs inherited only
> So from https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Create_Workstation_AppVMs and
> https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Create_Gateway_ProxyVMs the part
>
> "2. Edit ... Firewall Rules"
>
> can be removed.
firewall rules, but not the netvm setting. So without such blocking,
DispVMs started from there would have access to clearnet (more
precisely: network used by DispVMs).
> Undoubtedly some people will ask what settings they should set in Qubes
> VM Manger Firewall tab or why it's no longer recommended changing these
> settings.
when it has no effect (= used ProxyVM have no `qubes-firewall` service
enabled). If we disable `qubes-firewall` service using Services tab in
Whonix Gw (probably in addition to that drop-in), this could be detected
by Qubes Manager. Perhaps worth doing it as part of idea in "Timezone and
other deanonymizing data in QubesDB"[1] thread (service called from
template to set configure template properties). Need some more though
how to do this right.
[1]
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/20150923202203.GY2791%40mail-itl
- --
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
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