Ontolog Forum, SysSciWG, Structural Modeling,
So what is all this fuss about the relation between inquiry and signs,
as analyzed in Peirce's theories of their structure and function and
synthesized in his theory of information?
The best way I’ve found to see where the problem lies is to run through
a
series of concrete examples of the sort Peirce used to illustrate his
notions of information, inquiry, and signs, examples just complex enough
to show the interplay of main ideas.
There is an enlightening set of examples in Peirce’s early lectures on the
Logic of Science. Here is the blog post I wrote to set up their
discussion:
⁂⁂⁂
• { Information = Comprehension × Extension }
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/05/18/information-comprehension-x-extension/
Another angle from which to approach the incidence of signs and inquiry
is by way of C.S. Peirce’s “laws of information” and the corresponding
theory of information he developed from the time of his lectures on the
“Logic of Science” at Harvard University (1865) and the Lowell Institute (1866).
When it comes to the supposed reciprocity between extensions and intensions,
Peirce, of course, has another idea, and I would say a better idea, partly
because it forms the occasion for him to bring in his new-fangled notion of
“information” to mediate the otherwise static dualism between the other two.
The development of this novel idea brings Peirce to enunciate the formula:
• Information = Comprehension × Extension
Readings
========
• C.S. Peirce • Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_06/v2_06.htm
• My Notes • Information = Comprehension × Extension
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension
⁂⁂⁂
Regards,
Jon