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What is the dates planned for the SHA-1 Deprecation Plan for Firefox

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tal...@gmail.com

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May 19, 2016, 12:09:58 PM5/19/16
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Hi,

I have recently seen Mozilla planning to have the cut off for SHA depreciation as early as July 1.

PFB what i found from forums :

"
We are re-evaluating when we should start rejecting all SHA-1 SSL certificates (regardless of when they were issued). As we said before, the current plan is to make this change on January 1, 2017. However, in light of recent attacks on SHA-1, we are also considering the feasibility of having a cut-off date as early as July 1, 2016."

Could you confirm the dates from which FF will be rejecting SHA-1 SSL certificates (regardless of when they were issued)

Regards,
Ajuram

jjo...@mozilla.com

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Jun 6, 2016, 5:22:24 PM6/6/16
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On Thursday, May 19, 2016 at 9:09:58 AM UTC-7, tal...@gmail.com wrote:
> Could you confirm the dates from which FF will be rejecting SHA-1 SSL certificates (regardless of when they were issued)

Hi Ajuram,

I can't speak for Richard, but I do not believe there is a firm date for rejecting all SHA-1 certs yet: The plan is still Q1 2017.

I don't imagine we'd move earlier than that unless new research on SHA-1 collisions prompts it.

J.C.

Jakob Bohm

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Jun 17, 2016, 8:46:54 AM6/17/16
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One major suggestion (based on past experience with Chrome doing it
wrong): Do not apply SHA-1 rejection to any of the following:

1. The self-signature on the root cert in a chain.

2. Cross-signatures/certs on a subject/public key combination which is
also present as a trusted root in its own right (example: GlobalSign
has long ago issued a cross-certificate where their old SHA-1 root cert
SHA-1 signed their new SHA-2 root).

3. Any situation where the server / e-mail signer / code signer
provides enough certs to form multiple trust chains and at least one
trusted chain can be formed by ignoring all the non-root SHA-1 certs
(this actually encompass cases 1 and 2 as special cases).

4. For file formats that can be signed with multiple certificates,
accept the good signature and ignore any SHA-1 signatures that might be
included for backward compatibility. This includes: Anything with a
PKCS#7/CMS signature (supports a "SET of SignerInfo"), Anything with
JAR style signatures (including .xpi files, the JAR signature format
spec allows an almost unlimited number of signature files in the .zip,
each of which is a PKCS#7/CMS signature itself), anything with
Microsoft Authenticode signatures (these are PKCS#7 but also allow
additional signatures in a special unauthenticated signature attribute).

By not rejecting these cases, servers/signers can provide alternative
signature chains that are trusted by older clients. For instance this
could be a good thing to to for the "download Firefox" page, since
people are likely to visit that using a woefully outdated browser.

Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
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s...@gmx.ch

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Jun 21, 2016, 4:33:40 PM6/21/16
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Hi

As far as I know we have the following status:

> Add a security warning to the Web Console to remind developers that
they should not be using a SHA-1 based certificates
Has already been fixed. But currently SHA-1 is only exposed in the
console, not on the lock icon so far.

> Show the “Untrusted Connection” error whenever a SHA-1 certificate
issued after January 1, 2016, is encountered in Firefox
Has been fixed and reverted. Not shipped so far (see
security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level).

> Show the “Untrusted Connection” error whenever a SHA-1 certificate is
encountered in Firefox after January 1, 2017
Has not been fixed so far, but can be enabled (see
security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level).

There was also a discussion about exposing/untrust SHA-1 certs that
expires after January 1, 2017 (see https://sha1-2017.badssl.com/).


See also:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=942515
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1183718
https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/10/20/continuing-to-phase-out-sha-1-certificates/


Regards,
Jonas


Am 17.06.2016 um 14:46 schrieb Jakob Bohm:
> On 06/06/2016 23:14, jjo...@mozilla.com wrote:
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