東海意味論研究会（9月16日：大島義和先生，Chris Tancredi先生）

[koj...@gmail.com]

メーリングリストの皆様，

9月16日（土）に下記の研究会を予定しています．

ご興味・ご関心のある方はお気軽にお越しください．

https://sites.google.com/site/semanticsworkshopintokai/home

2017年9月16日 (土) 13時30分 (13:30 ~ onwards, 10 June 2017) 

名古屋学院大学　さかえサテライト (Sakae Satellite, Nagoya Gakuin University)

中日ビル7階 (7th Floor, Chunichi Building)

http://www.ngu.jp/outline/sakae_satellite.html (map) 地図

〒460-0008　名古屋市中区栄4-1-1　中日ビル7階

栄駅下車，12番か13番出口すぐの中日ビル7階にお越しください．そこで，意味論研究会に参加する旨お伝えください．

 (Please come to the 7th Floor, Chunichi Building. Then, please let a gatekeeper know you will attend the meeting.)

        

        研究発表 (Lecture)：13:30 ~15:00

大島義和 (David Y. Oshima) 名古屋大学 (Nagoya University)

The English rise-fall-rise contour and the Japanese contrastive particle wa are synonymous

Abstract:

It has been debated in the literature (i) how the English rise-fall-rise (RFR) contour is related to the contrastive topic (CT) contour, and (ii) whether the so-called contrastive particle wa in Japanese has a semantic contribution comparable to that of the English CT contour. This paper argues that wa (in its contrastive use) is synonymous to the RFR contour rather than to the CT contour. I submit that both wa and the RFR contour are a focus alternative quantifier which induces the implicature that the logical contrary of at least one member of the relevant set of alternative propositions is compatible with the speaker's beliefs. It will be further argued that the meaning contributed by the RFR contour and contrastive wa serve the function to block the exhaustivity implicature arising from plain focus-marking, and that the conceptual link between the two uses of wa -- contrastive and thematic -- lies in their functional role to "block pragmatic information that unmarked forms would induce''.

研究発表 (Lecture)：15:15 ~ onwards 

Chris Tancredi  (Keio University)

Believing Necessary Truths and Falsities

Abstract:

The most common semantic analyses of attitude statements are based on the possible worlds analysis of Hintikka (1962). According to these analyses, for a person to believe a proposition is for that proposition to be true in every world compatible with that person’s beliefs.  This approach is well known to falter on beliefs in necessary truths and falsities.  Since necessary truths are true in all worlds, a belief in a necessary truth will always come out true.  And since necessary falsities are true in no worlds, a true belief in a necessary falsity entails that there are no worlds compatible with the believer’s beliefs, which in turn makes an attribution of any belief to that person true.  Cresswell and von Stechow (1982) overcome these problems by analyzing belief as an attitude to a structured proposition.  In this talk I will argue that a structured proposition analysis can work, but that the specific analysis of Cresswell and von Stechow fails in two ways.  First, since they allow belief to be toward any structuring of a proposition they radically underdetermine the interpretation of any attitude attribution.  Second, since they do not incorporate any notion of entailment among attitudes they allow the truth value of a sentence like “John believes it’s raining” to vary randomly with the structure associated with the proposition “it’s raining”.  I propose a new structured proposition approach that overcomes both of these limitations by restricting possible structures based on the compositional semantics of the embedded clause.  Depending on the semantics of the attitude verb, I then show how this approach can predict entailment relations among attitude statements toward a single proposition under multiple structurings.

• 懇親会 (Party)：TBD

       （気軽にご参加ください．なお，予約がありますので事前連絡をいただけますと大変助かります）

       

      概要：

• 参加は自由ですので，どなたでもいつでも気軽におこしください．学生の皆さんの参加も歓迎します。

     連絡先

       川原功司 kkoji at nufs.ac.jp