Entering passphrase on a phone is annoying

[matej....@gmail.com]

Hi,

I have read opened Github issues about sending encrypted-only e-mails, I also have read https://k9mail.github.io/2017/01/30/OpenPGP-Considerations-Part-II.html, and I perfectly understand the developer's reasoning when they decided to not allow sending encrypted-only e-mails.

But on the other side, it is very annoying for users to enter passphrase, which is in practice leading to that, that users:
- do not encrypt e-mails at all;
- use short (weak) passphrases;
- set passphrase to empty.

In each case the result is quite opposite of what developers wanted - now we have even less secure users. OK, there is another option - users on mobile phones are just moving towards Signal app use (which is not bad at all).

So my question is - is it possible to design ux in such a way, that unlocking key won't be annoying (or be at least less annoying), while e-mails sent will be encrypted and signed? I have read there has been thinking about unlock pattern, maybe there is some other option, but entering long passphrases is really not an option.

Regards,

M.

[David W. Jones]

Well, Keepass2 Android password manager allows you to unlock your already-unlocked password store using the last 4 (which is userr-customizable) characters of the passphrase. Maybe K9 could handle things similarly?

David W. Jones
gnome...@gmail.com
wandering the landscape of god
http://dancingtreefrog.com

Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail.

[Matej Kovacic]

David W. Jones je napisal(a):

> Well, Keepass2 Android password manager allows you to unlock your
> already-unlocked password store using the last 4 (which is
> userr-customizable) characters of the passphrase. Maybe K9 could handle
> things similarly?

Well, this is not so bad idea.

K9 now caches passphrase, but I don't like this idea (passwords to be
cached), because someone else can use (abuse) your key. A lot of users
do not use screen lock, or you put down your phone and screen lock is
not yet activated, or someone grabs a phone from you... and then the
attacker can read your emails or even send fake GPG signed and encrypted
mails.

Maybe there should be another setting:
- enter passphrase each time;
- enter passphrase once (until cancellation or reboot), and then cache it;
- enter passphrase once, cache it, but for unlocking cache require PIN
or pattern.

In last case, if someone grabs a phone from you while it is unlocked, he
will still need a PIN or pattern to read emails (and after some
unsuccessfull attempts, cache should be cleared).

Comments?

Regards,
M.

[David W. Jones]

Keepass2 Android locks when you switch away from it. When you switch
back, it demands either the "QuickUnlock" entry I mentioned above, or
the full passphrase (option is user configurable).

Keepass2 Android also implements its own Android keyboard and clipboard,
so other applications cannot read any passwords from the clipboard.

I don't know how any of that fits into how K9 could handle a passphrase
for encrypting emails, though.

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