Dear Mr. Howard:
I so appreciate your writings on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, their conservatorships, and the ongoing mortgage finance reform efforts by government officials and industry operatives. Each time I come away from one of your articles, I have a better understanding of the competing forces involved in the future outcome of these two shareholder-owned enterprises.
As you and the rest of us like-minded folks know by now, the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were a convenient fraud perpetrated by the Washington-Wall Street elite using the 2008 financial crisis as the perfect curtain for their Wizard-of-Oz illusion. Neither company was undercapitalized at the time their boards were coerced into agreeing to the conservatorships. And, when the companies were finally placed into conservatorship in September 2008, not one single criterion required under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”) that authorized the appointment of a conservator, was met – not one!
Moreover, the companies were forced by government officials to record unsupportable loan loss reserves (which, as expected, never materialized) that required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to borrow large and contractually unrepayable sums of money from the U.S. Treasury. This ultimately required them to borrow additional and unnecessary funds just to pay the egregious 10%/annum interest payments required under the original Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (“SPSPA”). Incredibly, they had to pay interest on money borrowed to pay interest – until the third amendment to the SPSPA changed all that. Now they hand over nearly all their earnings to the government – UNABATED.
According to everything I’ve read, the companies “borrowed” approximately $187.5 billion but have returned in excess of approximately $265 billion – a 77.5 billion-dollar undeserved windfall for the government, over and above the money received through the U.S. Treasury’s interest payment shenanigans.
Now, almost ten years later, we have the Moelis plan. I must confess that I haven’t read the details of the plan, but I am aware from reading the opening bullet points and executive summary that it not only permits the U.S. Treasury to keep ALL its ill-gotten gains obtained through these illegal quarterly earnings transfers, but it goes on to unbelievably encourage (NOT DISCOURAGE) the U.S. Treasury from exercising its warrants in order to seize another $75 to $100 billion dollars of shareholder money. If the Moelis plan is operationalized and the government is allowed to walk away with and/or squander (and I’ll be kind because I know it’s a lot more) approximately $177.5 billion (excess repayments + warrants) of shareholder equity, without regard to the common and preferred shareholders (the true owners of the two companies), then it’s going to be yet another FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKING – and make no mistake. It. Will. Be. Challenged.
But, setting aside the unconstitutional and grovel-like aspects of the Moelis plan for a moment (and I say “grovel-like” because this plan is the perfect and bigger-than-life example of the schoolboy having to hand over his lunch money to the bully, just so the bully will relinquish the schoolboy’s things) their blueprint calls for the two companies to build a combined core capital balance of approximately $155 billion, which will help to qualify the firms for release from conservatorship under HERA. For arguments sake, I’ll assume that figure is appropriate. But I see a better way of accomplishing this goal without infringing any further upon the constitutional rights of the shareholders – including (if not particularly) the current shareholders that purchased and, thus, assumed the rights, risks, and rewards of the common and preferred shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from willing and able sellers of the companies’ shares.
First, forensic accountants need to unwind the history of the borrowings and payments made between the companies and the U.S. Treasury since September 2008, in order to eliminate the payments of interest that included borrowings based on past borrowings of interest (since in-kind payments were allowed) and not principal borrowings (even though those are based on fraudulent loan loss reserves). I suspect this will produce approximately $30 billion in overpayments to be returned to the companies. Second, FHFA needs to declare the U.S. Treasury repaid at $157.5 billion (or less, if the Honorable Director Watt is truly honorable) and, thus, the senior preferred stock fully redeemed. Third, the $77.5 billion of obvious overpayments is to be returned to the companies. And fourth, the warrants are to be extinguished, since they are no longer needed for repayment of the debt owed to the U.S. Treasury and, more importantly, the American taxpayer.
If my math is correct, that leaves approximately $47.5 billion needed to complete the “capital build.” However, the companies need to include approximately $33.3 billion in the capital build figure to retire the preferred shares at full redemption value. That brings our remaining total needed for full recapitalization to $80.8 billion. So, how do we fill our 80.8 billion-dollar hole? Through retained earnings and the issuance of new preferred shares.
According to the Moelis posse, the companies will earn approximately $15 billion per year. By the end of fiscal 2020, they will have retained approximately $60 billion. Also, Moelis & Friends estimate that the two firms can raise $25 billion through a public offering of non-cumulative preferred stock. So, where does that leave us? With a cool $4.2 billion of extra capital and no need to issue any additional common shares beyond the original, undiluted amount displayed on their balance sheets.
Surprise, surprise, surprise. The preferred shareholders rightly receive full redemption value for their stock, and the common shareholders won’t have to share the future earnings of their two companies with any new owners. It’s rather amazing what can be accomplished when one points out that the king is not wearing any clothes.
A few additional thoughts. No plan will succeed to garner the support of private equity, like me, if the government continues to behave in such a flagrantly, mean-spirited manner as it has over the last ten years towards the loyal and steadfast shareholders of America’s mortgage finance giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Moreover, the government is NOT in the business of business because of its overwhelming advantage (e.g., endless resources, perpetual existence, etc.) in the marketplace, and they have NO business trying to make a profit for the taxpayers. They need only recoup the costs of their public-interest efforts on behalf of the American taxpayers (of which I am one) – PERIOD!
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to contribute to the discussion on The Economics of Reform, and thank you for everything you’re doing to save those companies.
Best regards,
Bryndon Fisher
Thank you for your service and encouragement all these years.
But what I think matters not.
1. The press(you dont want to fight someone who gets ink by the barrel.)
2. The govt(you dont want to fight someone who literally prints or can digitize money out of thin air)
If their stance was to not honor pref contracts at the onset, I would have avoided this in July 09 after my research.
How can you say warrants are not an important part of the moelis plan? It is a very important part. Da devil disagree.
Da devil dont like da warrants either, but da devil is not going to invest pretending its illegal and wishing it will magically go away.
I would have invested in the Preferreds in 2009 and post NWS. The junior Ps are worth 20.1% of FnF. The risk rewards makes the Preferreds worth being in...go figure....devil
1. Moelis will have no credibility if it does not include the warrants. Moelis is not just a concept it is a resolution. And the one that matter that favors you and the commons the most.
2. Ackman addressses the warranrts and even said its ok for the gov to exercise them. His problem is his valuation. Its too rosy. Commons will still make good money.
3. Did not get to this one. My coffee was ready. Chances are, I disagree with it too.
Ron, its okay to listen to the birds chirp chirp...but, goober....you dont make monies off chirp chirp....
All shareholders hate the warrants....but come on....if you are a common holder, give it a rest.....warrants aint going nowhere.....only hardcore commoners or the likes bitch about it.....go figure....devil
There is also no winnable challenge to the warrants. They arw ironclad...da devil dd it....go figure...devil
Ron: A good point is a good point...no need to be word picky...one thing da devil also understand in which you lack is simple...there can be no confusion.....one word.....
......REALITY......go figure...devil
Build a strong case and go to court. I wish you the best getting them cxld.
Cancelling the warrants helps pref financially as well. Not one person has said that it would hurt us or they were opposed(that I have seen)
The difference here is odds of that occuring are quite low otherwise the common would be 10-15 right now.
If you buy lotto tickets or bet straight superfectas or pick 6, dont be surprised if your horses dont come in.
Just be glad that you will get the consolation pool $...
We face an uphill battle on all the lawsuits. Holding your breathe for a win is not advised.
Winning NWS has nothing to do with warrants. Lets make that clear. Even NWS is an uphill battle. How many lawsuits do we have that challenges warrants?
Da devil likes moelis and is okay with this reality on the ground proposal....go figure...devil
What action? That action will force congress implement do the utility quicker. It will likely for sure get the warrants exercised. You are right about redeeming the seniors. They will need to suck up the money. All that will likely be done by connverting to a utility model
@seys, a utility will not be like 2003. There will be an explicit guarantee and a new business model based on that. Insurance models will be incorprated. Reporting and structurally it will be different. Even operational language and methodology will change. Regulation will change too. Many changes...go figure...devil
Juniors and commons will make money. The question is just how much. Do your dd......and as always.....go figure.....devil
I do not disagree with your criticisms of the Moelis plan. It allows Treasury to profit hugely and improperly from two actions that were unfair (and I believe illegal) and are indefensible: the granting to itself of warrants for 79.9 percent of Fannie and Freddie’s common stock, and the payment of some $70 billion in dividends on $187 billion in senior preferred stock the companies did not need and did not ask for, but were forced to take by FHFA’s non-cash accounting entries, then were not allowed to repay by Treasury when their effects reversed. In the Moelis plan, common shareholders of the companies bear the full cost of these outrages, while holders of preferred stock could be made whole.
I certainly understand that. In my earlier writings I’d argued for either cancellation of the warrants or a significantly higher strike price for them, and also for an unwinding of the (unjustified) senior preferred stock draws in a way that greatly reduced the quarterly dividend payments credited to them.
But then I get to the question: how would these actually be made to happen? As I note in this post, you really have only two ways to get Fannie and Freddie out of conservatorship: legislation by Congress, or executive action by the administration. Since my primary goal for reform is to fix the system in a way that is best for the economy and homebuyers, I personally would not recommend going down the legislative road in the hopes that we could convince Congress to abandon the banks and get behind homebuyers, because I think the odds of success on that are too low. It’s possible that existing common shareholders of Fannie and Freddie could get a better deal with legislative reform that makes the companies vassals of the banks, but that is not something I would support.
I do support the Moelis plan—with all its faults and its grossly unfair treatment of common shareholders (of whom I am one, although I also own Fannie preferred)—because for now it’s the only plan on the table that has a chance of leading to the macro outcome I favor. The challenge is that Moelis has to have Treasury’s support to succeed, and I can’t see Treasury leaving money on the table if it elects to go that route. And the Moelis plan does have a potential silver lining. With the warrants, Treasury has an incentive to maximize the long-term value of the companies, which also benefits existing common holders. This incentive should, and I hope will, lead Treasury to support measures like ensuring that the companies are not overcapitalized in a way that reduces their efficiency (and thus their business volumes), and also to manage warrant conversion—including perhaps through a higher strike price—in a way that makes all holders’ stock price as high as possible.
I’ve seen or read a number of proposals for recapitalizing Fannie and Freddie that are better than Moelis for common shareholders, and the companies. But that’s not enough. To succeed, a particular proposal needs advocates, either in Congress or the administration, who are in a position to get it implemented. The latter is a very tough row to hoe, and without it a good proposal will remain no more than that.
https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/index
Unless Tim or Glen (most outspoken proponents of Moelis) can come up with convincing arguments, other than enriching some connected billionaires, I stay with Bryndon's arguments.
“No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated [theft], the [shareholders] in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.”