Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Tue, May 31, 2016 at 11:38 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>>

​>​>

 ​

arithmetic

​,​

​ ​e

lementary

​ or otherwise, doesn't lead to complexity or to anything else. 

Dawkins like Darwin was interests in ​what matter can do (like produce life), and without matter 

 

 ​ >

​>>​

​That idea has been refuted. 

​

​>

​>​

​​Where?​

> Look for example at the papers here (and references therein):

All the papers that I have seen written by you, or by anybody else, are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, please point me to some that aren't but don't use matter to do so. 

 

   > (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.06.013)

No that just won't do, electrons are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. 

​>

​>> ​

Even without primary matter, arithmetic leads to both the material complexity  

​

​>> ​

How can you have ​material complexity

​ if you don't have any material?​

> because if the hypothesis of computationalism is true, there is no (aristotelian) matter.

Well of course there is no aristotelian matter! Aristotle was a nitwit when it came to physics and was wrong about everything.

 

> Only appearance in the mind of machine, in the non physical and mathematical sense of Church, Turing, etc.

OK, but how can you have a machine without matter that obeys the laws of physics?

 

>> ​Show me an example of ​material complexity 

​but don't use any material (and that includes electrons) when you do so.​

> The atmoic physical proposition is given by the set of true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences p (i.e. having the shape: ExP(x) with P decidable) structured by the logic of Gödel's beweisbar predicate (B) in the following variant: Bp & ~B~(p), or Bp & p, or Bp & ~B~p & p. 

No that just won't do, electrons are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. 

 

​>>> ​how does it select the material computations among the non material one.

>> ​Easy, ​non material computations don't exist.

> In which theory? 

In no theory, in something far more important, in observation.  

 

​>> ​

Now I have a question for you, how do "non material computations" select the computations that produce correct answers from the infinite number of computations that do not? 

> That is equivalent to asking to the guy reconstituted in Washington why he is in Washington and not in Moscow. 

No that it isn't equivalent because that would be a stupid question and my question was not. There are an infinite number of ways to process numbers just as there are a infinite number of hypothetical ways life could change over time, but in fact life only does so by one method, random mutation and natural selection, and I can tell you why.

Random mutation exists because the laws of physics insist that perfection is unobtainable, and natural selection exists because nothing physical is infinite including the physical resources life needs to reproduce. So answer my question, there are an infinite number of ways to process numbers but only one way produces the correct answer and I want you to explain why "non material computations" only picks the correct one.

  

> If you assume a physical universe, you need to abandon the Mechanist hypothesis.

Doublethink: Love is hate, peace is war, and mechanics is not physical.   

>> ​Some genes may increase the rate of copying errors but those genes have no foresight, they just make the machinery crank out more mistakes; on rare occasions one of those mistakes might get lucky and make reproduction more likely, but it's still random.  ​

> That shows randomness has been used, not that everything is random in the evolution process.

You need to take a high school course in Evolution. Of course everything is not random in the evolution process! Natural selection is half of Evolution and it is NOT random.

 

>> If there is an infinity of anything then it's not physical

​,​

> Why?

I don't know why, all I know is that physicists have never shown anybody an infinite number of anything.  

> No problem with your invocation of matter, if you want it, but then you need to abandon digital mechanism, or explain how the matter select the computations which exists in arithmetic

Matter can be arranged to make a digital mechanism whose output is inconsistent with arithmetic just as easily as one that is consistent with it. Easier actually. It all depends on how the matter is organized.   

 

> as proved in most textbook of theoretical computer science

Textbooks made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. 

​> ​

​t​

o say that Evolution is just random mutation and natural selection is like saying that the program Deep Blue is just a bunch of Nands.

​

​> ​

Yes, it is like saying that, and both statements are true. They're stated in a rather undramatic way perhaps, but are true nevertheless. 

> That is called reductionism.

Yes, but you almost make that sound like a bad thing. 

> John, as long as you are stuck at the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Argument, there is no hope we progress in the discussion.

Bruno, as long as you are unable to fix your blunder in step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Argument, there is no hope we progress in the discussion.

 John K Clark

 

[spudb...@aol.com]

Being picky, what are electrons made out of? I know that 10 years ago, U of Minnesota, in the US, tried to used supercooled helium to see if electrons gave evidence of sub particles. Last year, a trio of physicists in Italy deduced that  electrons would last 5 quitillion times the current age of the univeres, 5 quint  x 13.7 billion years. Are electrons arguably, material? If so, what material or particles are they made out of? Is something that will last 5 quint x 13.7 billion years material? Is such a endurance really something that our species has no true grasp of? Are we all, including physicists out of our depth, when we try to analyze the electron? Fourty years ago on the TV series Cosmos, Carl Sagan postulated that a primary particle like an electron, might each be a universe unto itself. It was kind of fun to consider, that if Sagan was correct, that piece of dog poo on the sidewalk, each contained universes and intelligent life-all trying to scrape it off their shoe. Should we worship the electron? The number suggested a figure that easily would be Time, Beyond, Mind, as the old saying goes. It is about as far a jaunt to Eternity, as our primate species is remotely capable of thinking of. I do concede that an electron is a true, thing, like a wombat is factual, or the Seine river is. If we say Googleplex, that basically is nothing  because it describes a number space position in a line of numbers that we imagine. An electron has a gigantic shelf life, and this actually describes something. "On your faces before the mighty electron gawd, everyone!" Over n Out,

Mitch

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[Brent Meeker]

On 5/31/2016 4:07 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
> Carl Sagan postulated that a primary particle like an electron, might
> each be a universe unto itself.

Naah. That was a sci-fi radio episode of X-1 circa 1950. Sagan, who
wasn't even a physicist, never postulated such nonsense.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Tue, May 31, 2016 , spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

​> ​

Being picky, what are electrons made out of?

​As far as we know electrons aren't made of anything, electrons are fundamental. ​

 

  

​> ​

Are electrons arguably, material?

​Electrons have mass, electrical charge, and ​a

 magnetic moment

​, and all of those things are physical properties. So yes, electrons are material.  ​

​> 

Last year, a trio of physicists in Italy deduced that  electrons would last 5 quitillion times the current age of the univeres

​

I've heard some speculate that the proton might be unstable over

​ 

huge

​ 

time ranges like that, but not the electron. For a electron to decay it would have to change into a charged particle that was lighter than it was, but the electron (and its antimatter counterpart the positron) is the lightest known charged particle, so there is nothing for the electron to decay into.

​ 

A Muon is very similar

​ 

to the electron

​ 

except that it's 207 times as massive, so in about a millionth of a second it decays into a electron and 2 neutrinos, but the electron is the end of the line, there is no place for the electron to go so it sticks around. The same is true of the neutrino, like the electron it's stable, fundamental and isn't made of anything.  

​ ​

​ John K Clark​

 

[John Clark]

On Tue, May 31, 2016 at 7:41 PM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

​> ​

Carl Sagan postulated that a primary particle like an electron, might each be a universe unto itself. 

Naah.  That was a sci-fi radio episode of X-1 circa 1950.  Sagan, who wasn't even a physicist,

 

Carl Sagan got a Masters in Physics from the University of Chicago

​ 

in 1956 and a PhD in 1960. Incidentally Isaac Asimov

​ 

(a man not known for false modesty) said that in his entire life he only met 2 people he was certain was more intelligent than he was, one was Marvin Minsky and the other was Carl Sagan

​.​

.

​> ​

never postulated such nonsense.

​In 1980 during his Cosmos TV show he said something rather like that, ​

​back then most thought the universe was closed but today we know that the universe is not only open it's accelerating. Sagan said:​

​

"If the cosmos is closed...there's a strange, haunting, evocative possibility...one of the most exquisite conjectures in science and religion. It's entirely

​u​

ndemonstrated...it may never be proved, but it's stirring. Our entire universe, to the farthest galaxy, we are told...is no more than a closed electron...in a far grander universe we can never see. That universe is only

​ 

a

​ 

n elementary particle...in another still greater universe and so on forever. Also, every electron in our universe, it is claimed...is an entire miniature cosmos...containing galaxies and stars and life, and electrons. Everyone of those electrons contains a still smaller universe...an infinite regression up and down.

​"​

​ John K Clark​

[spudb...@aol.com]

I have to ponder what "fundamental" means? Non divisible yes, and like the neutrino and the muon, also non divisible. So, is there something important when we arrive at the non divisible? We are kind of back to the ancient idea of atoms (Democritus?) in the sense that there is nothing else to break down, Planck Cells maybe? My only objection if we call it this is semantic in the sense that fundamental becomes a psychological trap, where further research is halted because it means, look no further. 

-----Original Message-----
From: John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>

[John Clark]

On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 7:33 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

​> ​

I have to ponder what "fundamental" means?

​It means if the chain of "what is this made of?" questions is not infinitely long then it terminates at something fundamental.  ​If the chain is infinitely long then nothing is fundamental. 

 

 

​>​

Non divisible yes, and like the neutrino and the muon, also non divisible.

​My hunch is the muon is not fundamental because it spontaneously breaks down into smaller parts, but the electron and neutrino and photon are.   ​

 

​> ​

So, is there something important when we arrive at the non divisible?

​At that point it is no longer meaningful to ask what is it made of. ​

 

 

​> ​

My only objection if we call it this is semantic in the sense that fundamental becomes a psychological trap, where further research is halted because it means, look no further. 

​That is a danger, but  if the chain of "what is this made of?" questions really does terminate but we can't prove it then for all eternity we will be spinning our wheels looking, unsuccessfully, for something deeper. We're damned if we do and damned if we don't.

 John K Clark

[spudb...@aol.com]

if it is fundamental to the cosmos, it may be profound to think about how it arose? Is there something special about what is indivisible in physics? We might ask, if neutrinos, photons, and electrons are something that has emerged as virtual particles from the Big Bang, a tear in the sheet, and so forth and so on? On the direction of science, being human, scientists go with what pays off for them professionally, especially in the sight of their peers. Based on this, there must be kilotons of questions that go unanswered, and many megatons that go unfunded, money, being what it is to us. 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 May 2016, at 23:29, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, May 31, 2016 at 11:38 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>>

​>​>

 ​

arithmetic

​,​

​ ​e

lementary

​ or otherwise, doesn't lead to complexity or to anything else. 

Dawkins like Darwin was interests in ​what matter can do (like produce life), and without matter 

 

 ​ >

​>>​

​That idea has been refuted. 

​

​>

​>​

​​Where?​

> Look for example at the papers here (and references therein):

All the papers that I have seen written by you, or by anybody else, are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, please point me to some that aren't but don't use matter to do so. 

But the' existence of papers is not part of the hypothesis for developing the theory. You are confusing levels. 

 

   > (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.06.013)

No that just won't do, electrons are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. 

Perhaps. The point is that IF electron are made of primary matter, then computationalism is false. But "primary matter" is a notion in theology, never used in physics, and to invoke it to refute an argument is the same as saying that the theory of evolution is false because it failed to explain how God created the humans. We call that "begging the question".

​>

​>> ​

Even without primary matter, arithmetic leads to both the material complexity  

​

​>> ​

How can you have ​material complexity

​ if you don't have any material?​

> because if the hypothesis of computationalism is true, there is no (aristotelian) matter.

Well of course there is no aristotelian matter! Aristotle was a nitwit when it came to physics and was wrong about everything.

Why then to invoke it? If you agree that there is no Aristotelian matter, I have no need to argue more. Then the question is: where does the appearance of aristotelian matter comes from. You need it to defend physicalism.

 

> Only appearance in the mind of machine, in the non physical and mathematical sense of Church, Turing, etc.

OK, but how can you have a machine without matter that obeys the laws of physics?

That does not exist. What we can explain, is why the average universal (and immaterial) machine, which exists in arithmetic, develop stable beliefs in tha appearance of physical matter, wand why such matter obeys the physical laws. 

 

>> ​Show me an example of ​material complexity 

​but don't use any material (and that includes electrons) when you do so.​

> The atmoic physical proposition is given by the set of true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences p (i.e. having the shape: ExP(x) with P decidable) structured by the logic of Gödel's beweisbar predicate (B) in the following variant: Bp & ~B~(p), or Bp & p, or Bp & ~B~p & p. 

No that just won't do,

Proof?

electrons are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. 

 

​>>> ​how does it select the material computations among the non material one.

>> ​Easy, ​non material computations don't exist.

> In which theory? 

In no theory, in something far more important, in observation.  

How can you observe that computations do not exist in arithmetic. Something which is refuted in all textbook, also. 

 

​>> ​

Now I have a question for you, how do "non material computations" select the computations that produce correct answers from the infinite number of computations that do not? 

> That is equivalent to asking to the guy reconstituted in Washington why he is in Washington and not in Moscow. 

No that it isn't equivalent because that would be a stupid question and my question was not. There are an infinite number of ways to process numbers just as there are a infinite number of hypothetical ways life could change over time, but in fact life only does so by one method, random mutation and natural selection, and I can tell you why.

Random mutation exists because the laws of physics insist that perfection is unobtainable, and natural selection exists because nothing physical is infinite including the physical resources life needs to reproduce. So answer my question, there are an infinite number of ways to process numbers but only one way produces the correct answer and I want you to explain why "non material computations" only picks the correct one.

  

> If you assume a physical universe, you need to abandon the Mechanist hypothesis.

Doublethink: Love is hate, peace is war, and mechanics is not physical.   

>> ​Some genes may increase the rate of copying errors but those genes have no foresight, they just make the machinery crank out more mistakes; on rare occasions one of those mistakes might get lucky and make reproduction more likely, but it's still random.  ​

> That shows randomness has been used, not that everything is random in the evolution process.

You need to take a high school course in Evolution. Of course everything is not random in the evolution process! Natural selection is half of Evolution and it is NOT random.

 

>> If there is an infinity of anything then it's not physical

​,​

> Why?

I don't know why, all I know is that physicists have never shown anybody an infinite number of anything.  

> No problem with your invocation of matter, if you want it, but then you need to abandon digital mechanism, or explain how the matter select the computations which exists in arithmetic

Matter can be arranged to make a digital mechanism whose output is inconsistent with arithmetic just as easily as one that is consistent with it. Easier actually. It all depends on how the matter is organized.   

 

> as proved in most textbook of theoretical computer science

Textbooks made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. 

​> ​

​t​

o say that Evolution is just random mutation and natural selection is like saying that the program Deep Blue is just a bunch of Nands.

​

​> ​

Yes, it is like saying that, and both statements are true. They're stated in a rather undramatic way perhaps, but are true nevertheless. 

> That is called reductionism.

Yes, but you almost make that sound like a bad thing. 

> John, as long as you are stuck at the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Argument, there is no hope we progress in the discussion.

Bruno, as long as you are unable to fix your blunder in step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Argument, there is no hope we progress in the discussion.

But your attempts to show a blunder was a confusion between first person and third person view. Your attempt to fix that blunder was either confusion of levels, or nonsensical things that nobody can explain.

Bruno

 John K Clark

 

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jun 2, 2016 at 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>> ​

All the papers that I have seen written by you, or by anybody else, are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, please point me to some that aren't but don't use matter to do so. 

​> ​

But the' existence of papers is not part of the hypothesis for developing the theory. 

​All the theories and all the hypotheses that have ever existed were developed by brains made of matter that obey the laws of physics, and the way they were communicated to other brains also involved matter that obey the laws of physics. There are no exceptions. None. 

 

​> ​

The point is that IF electron are made of primary matter, then computationalism is false.

​That is ridiculous. The chain of "what is this made of?" questions either comes to an end or it does not, and either way computationalism is true.

​> ​

But "primary matter" is a notion in theology, never used in physics, and to invoke it to refute an argument is the same as saying that the theory of evolution is false because it failed to explain how God created the humans.

​ ​

We call that "begging the question".

C

omputationalism

​ can explain how ​intelligent behavior works and can do it in a way that can't be faked, by reproducing it in the lab. And Evolution can show that 

intelligent behavior

​ and consciousness are inextricably linked. 

​How on earth is that begging the question?

 

​> ​

If you agree that there is no Aristotelian matter

​I do agree there is ​

no Aristotelian matter

​ and always have, in fact I can't off the top of my head think of any physical notion of Aristotle's that I agree with, and that's why I call Aristotle a nitwit.​

 

​> ​

I have no need to argue more.

​Good. I'm sick to death with idiot ancient Greeks!

 

​> ​

Then the question is: where does the appearance of aristotelian matter comes from.

​It comes from nowhere because matter does not even appear to be

aristotelian

​, nothing in physics is ​

aristotelian

​ because Aristotle was a nitwit.​

>>

​>>

 ​Show me an example of ​material complexity 

​but don't use any material (and that includes electrons) when you do so.​

>

​>>

 The atmoic physical proposition is given by the set of true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences p (i.e. having the shape: ExP(x) with P decidable) structured by the logic of Gödel's beweisbar predicate (B) in the following variant: Bp & ~B~(p), or Bp & p, or Bp & ~B~p & p. 

​>>​

No that just won't do,

​> ​

Proof?

​Proof of what?

 

​ Do you really ​

doubt that

​ ​

electrons are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics

​ ?!

>>

​ > >​

​ ​non material computations don't exist.

>

​>>​

In which theory? 

​>> ​

In no theory, in something far more important, in observation.  

​> ​

How can you observe that computations do not exist in arithmetic.

​You can observe interactions using your physical eyes and think about them using your physical brain.​

 

​But​

you

​can't ​

observe

​, ​

even in theory​,

 computations

​ that exist in ​

arithmetic

​ but not in physics; and that is just another way of saying that such computations don't exist.

 

​> ​

Something which is refuted in all textbook, also. 

​Textbooks made of matter that obey the laws of physics.​

 

​ 

  John K Clark​

 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Jun 2016, at 19:30, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jun 2, 2016 at 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>> ​

All the papers that I have seen written by you, or by anybody else, are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, please point me to some that aren't but don't use matter to do so. 

​> ​

But the' existence of papers is not part of the hypothesis for developing the theory. 

​All the theories and all the hypotheses that have ever existed were developed by brains made of matter that obey the laws of physics, and the way they were communicated to other brains also involved matter that obey the laws of physics. There are no exceptions. None. 

But computationalisme explains this *without* assuming *primary* matter, and that was the point.

 

​> ​

The point is that IF electron are made of primary matter, then computationalism is false.

​That is ridiculous.

It is a logical consequence of Digital Mechanism (alias computationalism) + a very weak form of Occam razor.

The chain of "what is this made of?" questions either comes to an end or it does not, and either way computationalism is true.

In dreams, we see objects and tend to conceive them in the usual way, as a sort of continuous/discrete volume apparently made of something. But such objects in dream are hallucinations, and are not made-of-something. If you prefer, as you know that computationalism entails that it is in principle possible that I embed you in a computer, without you being able to guess that this happened, for some finite amount of time. Again, during that period you will see object exactly as if they were made of things, but they are not.

Now, it is a theorem in (very) elementary arithmetic that (all) computations exists. Roughly speaking Robinson Arithmetic can already prove that each halting computation exists, and Peano Arithmetic (RA + the induction axioms) proves that all computations exist. In particular all models (semantics) of arithmetic *realise*  all computations.  

You have to endow the universal Turing machine or number with magical abilities for them to avoid arithmetical zombiness.

The problem for the universal machine is that her experience is supported by an infinite of universal program/machine/number, so she can only be on those who will exploit the first person randomness which they can't avoid below their substitution level. That explains the quantum appearance, especially that technically we get already the big physical pattern: symmetry at the bottom, antisymmetry directly above, the many-mind/state/world/histories inference, the existence of quantization with quantum logic, etc.

Locally things are made of things, but fundamentally (assuming computationalism) things are only invariant pattern emerging from the sharable dreams. 

​> ​

But "primary matter" is a notion in theology, never used in physics, and to invoke it to refute an argument is the same as saying that the theory of evolution is false because it failed to explain how God created the humans.

​ ​

We call that "begging the question".

C

omputationalism

​ can explain how ​intelligent behavior works and can do it in a way that can't be faked, by reproducing it in the lab. And Evolution can show that 

intelligent behavior

​ and consciousness are inextricably linked. 

​How on earth is that begging the question?

I agree that intelligent behavior and self-consciousness are related, but usually I mean by consciousness the subjective ability to distinguish two things, usually the bad and the good, like between to eat and to be eaten. As being subjective it is not entirely third person descriptible as it will refer to some transcendental (with respect to the system) notion of truth (No technical problem here as this happened already in Computer science, and I exploit that to distonguish what the machine can justify and not justify about its (8) main self-referential modalities (the justifiable, the knowable, the observable, the sensible). But then it will also be widespreadly distributed on all universal number realizations, and we have to solve the "measure" problem. 

QM solves the measure problem, with Gleason theorem. But to solve the computationalist consciousness/matter or first-person/third person relation problem, we have to prove an equivalent of Gleason theorem for the arithmetical reality (or any sigma_1 complete reality). 

The result are encouraging, given that most "material" modalities does provides quantum logics on which Hilbert Space or von Neumann algebra might be applied to hopefully get the arithmetical Gleason theorem from the original quasi-directly.

 

​> ​

If you agree that there is no Aristotelian matter

​I do agree there is ​

no Aristotelian matter

​ and always have, in fact I can't off the top of my head think of any physical notion of Aristotle's that I agree with, and that's why I call Aristotle a nitwit.​

When you say "All the theories and all the hypotheses that have ever existed were developed by brains made of matter that obey the laws of physics, and the way they were communicated to other brains also involved matter that obey the laws of physics. There are no exceptions. None. ", that is exactly what we mean by "Aristotelian Matter". It means that you think that the notion of matter must be assumed as ontologically primitive. It excludes the theories in which matter does not exist as ontological objects, but are appearances emerging from something deeper and simpler (like some (neo)Pythagorean thought).

 

​> ​

I have no need to argue more.

​Good. I'm sick to death with idiot ancient Greeks!

But you do seem to borrow the main metaphysical axiom brought by a philosopher: primary matter. many platonist try to convince Plato that Aristotle should be bannished from the academy for that. primitive matter is a good methodological simplifying hypothesis to study the part of physics which do not rely too much on theology, but as both computationalism makes necessary, and quantum mechanics makes apparently possible, the days of that hypothesis are counted.

 

​> ​

Then the question is: where does the appearance of aristotelian matter comes from.

​It comes from nowhere because matter does not even appear to be

aristotelian

​, nothing in physics is ​

aristotelian

​ because Aristotle was a nitwit.​

He is at the origin of the physical science, and even of materialism and physicalism, like Plato and its Pythagorean predecessors are at the origin of mathematics, and some were open to arithmeticalism, other to geometrism or more general mathematicalism, even musicalism.

Aristotle idea is that reality is WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get)

Plato is the more old skepticism of that instinct, and it is the idea that the fundamental reality might be behind What We See. The inspiration were notably numbers, geometry and music. The greeks were amazed by simple arithmetic facts like the sum of the first n odd numbers is a square (n^2). 

>>

​>>

 ​Show me an example of ​material complexity 

​but don't use any material (and that includes electrons) when you do so.​

>

​>>

 The atmoic physical proposition is given by the set of true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences p (i.e. having the shape: ExP(x) with P decidable) structured by the logic of Gödel's beweisbar predicate (B) in the following variant: Bp & ~B~(p), or Bp & p, or Bp & ~B~p & p. 

​>>​

No that just won't do,

​> ​

Proof?

​Proof of what?

 

​ Do you really ​

doubt that

​ ​

electrons are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics

​ ?!

My opinion is private and of no interest.

What I have justified is that IF computationalism is assumed, THEN you need to invoke an infinitely ad-hoc sort of God to prevent the appearance of the physical laws from emerging from the number's "dreams" statistics.

>>

​ > >​

​ ​non material computations don't exist.

>

​>>​

In which theory? 

​>> ​

In no theory, in something far more important, in observation.  

​> ​

How can you observe that computations do not exist in arithmetic.

​You can observe interactions using your physical eyes and think about them using your physical brain.​

I did exactly that in Geneva when working with the LARC. But I got the parameters wrong, and ended creating a black hole engulfing quickly the LARC, Geneva, Earth, ... Fortunately I wake up.

With computationalism, the term physical has to be explained. You do need to fix your UDA-step 3 problem before to grasp that.

 

​But​

you

​can't ​

observe

​, ​

even in theory​,

 computations

​ that exist in ​

arithmetic

​ but not in physics; and that is just another way of saying that such computations don't exist.

Then prime numbers do not exist, etc. (I recall that we have already accept things like prime numbers when defining the notion of computation. Digital mechanism assumes natural numbers and simple laws on them even if only to define what we mean by "digital", Church-Turing thesis, programs, etc.).

 

​> ​

Something which is refuted in all textbook, also. 

​Textbooks made of matter that obey the laws of physics.​

 

​ 

That is true. Yes. 

That is non relevant, also. 

You could criticize Group Theory as it fails to assume the existence of the blackboard on which the axioms of groups are written. 

You might not understand well what is a theory, or what are theoretical assumptions. The universal of universal Turing machines, and of universal Lisp Interpreter are theorem of Peano Arithmetic. That is independent of the assumption that there is a (primitively or not) physical universe in which we can reasonably implement for some duration such universal numbers/machine/programs.

Computationalism explains the appearance of blackboards, and of textbooks, without assuming the existence of blackboard and textbooks. The measure problem comes from the fact that computationalism might still produces too much "dreams", but incompleteness shows that this is less obvious than it seems, and it justifies already that the observable have the math shape needed for possible normal, stable and continuous (first person) extensions.

The physical has a mathematical reason. It is a sort of derivative of the universal mind (the mind of the universal Turing machine). That follows from the UDA already. The interview of the Löbian machine (infinite interview but well summed up by Solovay theorem with the modal logic G and G*) illustrates and gives a precise arithmetical sense for the observable and other modalities.

Bruno F Marchal

  John K Clark​

 

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[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 3, 2016 at 2:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

Peano Arithmetic (RA + the induction axioms) proves that all computations exist.

​Proving an answer exists is not the same as proving you have the answer, or even proving that in theory an answer can be found. 

 

​If it were otherwise ​

Giuseppe Peano

​ would have been Silicon Valley's first billionaire. ​

​> ​

You have to endow the universal Turing machine or number with magical abilities for them to avoid arithmetical zombiness.

​

Yes, if that were not so

​

,

​ 

and assuming Darwin was right (he was)

​

,

​ 

then

​ 

no

​ 

conscious

​ 

being would exist in the universe

​,​

​ 

and yet I know for a fact that

​ at least​ 

one does. You're probably conscious too and for the same reason. I have a explanation of how and why Evolution produced intelligent behavior

​​

but I have no explanation why intelligent behavior

​ 

produces consciousness except to say consciousness is the way data feels

​ 

like

​ 

when it is being processed

​, 

and if it's a brute fact that's all that can be said

​ 

and all that

​ 

needs to be said about it.

​> ​

When you say "All the theories and all the hypotheses that have ever existed were developed by brains made of matter that obey the laws of physics, and the way they were communicated to other brains also involved matter that obey the laws of physics. There are no exceptions. None. ", that is exactly what we mean by "Aristotelian Matter".

​Who is "we"?​

 

​I want nothing to do with Aristotle, he was a nitwit.

​>> ​

Do you really

​ ​

doubt that

​ ​

electrons are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics

​ ​

?!

 

​> ​

My opinion is private and of no interest.

​Jez, I'm not asking about your sex life I'm asking a legitimate question ​about the physics of electrons. Are you ashamed at what your answer would be? 

 

 

​>> ​

you

​can't ​

observe

​, ​

even in theory​,

 computations

​ that exist in ​

arithmetic

​ but not in physics; and that is just another way of saying that such computations don't exist.

​> ​

Then prime numbers do not exist, 

​The very first program my brain, which is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, ever wrote instructed a computer, ​

which is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, to print a list of prime numbers on a paper, ​

which is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.​

 

​> ​

You might not understand well what is a theory, or what are theoretical assumptions.

​Then show me a computation that doesn't use matter that obeys the laws of physics and I'll understand it better.​

 

​And I'll contact INTEL about it too.​

​> ​

Computationalism explains the appearance of blackboards, and of textbooks, without assuming the existence of blackboard and textbooks

​How would things be different if ​

blackboard

​s​

and textbooks

​ DID exist? What does "exist" even mean in your context?​

​> ​

The physical has a mathematical reason.

If so I have great trouble understanding why changing the physical brain of a mathematician changes not only his

​ 

mathematical reasoning but also his consciousness. I think there is more evidence the mathematical has a physical reason.  

​ John K Clark​

 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jun 2016, at 01:57, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jun 3, 2016 at 2:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

Peano Arithmetic (RA + the induction axioms) proves that all computations exist.

​Proving an answer exists is not the same as proving you have the answer, or even proving that in theory an answer can be found. 

 

​If it were otherwise ​

Giuseppe Peano

​ would have been Silicon Valley's first billionaire. ​

Well Peano did not discover the universal machine, but others have done that. Only the more engineering inclined people have become millionaires from that discovery, as they manage to provide physical implementations. But the discovery and the constructive proofs whre given by the mathematicians, and this in theories without any physical assumption.

​> ​

You have to endow the universal Turing machine or number with magical abilities for them to avoid arithmetical zombiness.

​

Yes, if that were not so

​

,

​ 

and assuming Darwin was right (he was)

​

,

​ 

then

​ 

no

​ 

conscious

​ 

being would exist in the universe

​,​

​ 

I don't see that.

and yet I know for a fact that

​ at least​ 

one does. You're probably conscious too and for the same reason. I have a explanation of how and why Evolution produced intelligent behavior

​​

but I have no explanation why intelligent behavior

​ 

produces consciousness except to say consciousness is the way data feels

​ 

like

​ 

when it is being processed

​, 

and if it's a brute fact that's all that can be said

​ 

and all that

​ 

needs to be said about it.

You give matter magical attributes to avoid the mathematical fact that computations are executed in (all) models of Arithmetic. The sigma_1 truth is the same in all model, so to get physics we can confine ourself in the so called standard model, which plays the role of neoplatonist or neopythagorean "Glass-of-Milk".

​> ​

When you say "All the theories and all the hypotheses that have ever existed were developed by brains made of matter that obey the laws of physics, and the way they were communicated to other brains also involved matter that obey the laws of physics. There are no exceptions. None. ", that is exactly what we mean by "Aristotelian Matter".

​Who is "we"?​

 

​I want nothing to do with Aristotle, he was a nitwit.

Without him and Plato, science would not have begun. Being wrong is not a problem in science. My feeling is that you have not read Aristotle, nor Plato, and you take Aristotelian theology for granted. If not, you would not been criticizing many things without studying them, as you confessed more than once.

​>> ​

Do you really

​ ​

doubt that

​ ​

electrons are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics

​ ​

?!

 

​> ​

My opinion is private and of no interest.

​Jez, I'm not asking about your sex life I'm asking a legitimate question ​about the physics of electrons. Are you ashamed at what your answer would be? 

 

I prefer not say my personal opinions, because in this difficult hot field, people would confuse them with the results.

 

​>> ​

you

​can't ​

observe

​, ​

even in theory​,

 computations

​ that exist in ​

arithmetic

​ but not in physics; and that is just another way of saying that such computations don't exist.

​> ​

Then prime numbers do not exist, 

​The very first program my brain, which is made of matter

We don't know that. We know it is a good first approximation, but there is just no matter usable once we bet on (Digital) Mechanism.

Well, we know where you are stuck in the proof.

that obeys the laws of physics, ever wrote instructed a computer, ​

which is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, to print a list of prime numbers on a paper, ​

which is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.​

 

​> ​

You might not understand well what is a theory, or what are theoretical assumptions.

​Then show me a computation that doesn't use matter that obeys the laws of physics and I'll understand it better.​

 

​

Read the original paper by Church or Post. Avoid Turing because he uses material and human metaphor to help the intuition, but can be misleading on this metaphysical question of primacy or not of physics. But even Turing insists that his discovery is mathematical, not physical. See Matiyazevich book for an explanation of why using Turing formalism, and why it is necessary to understand the non physical classical Church thesis to deduce the non solvability of Hilbert tenth problem (in math).

And I'll contact INTEL about it too.​

A comment which suggests that you still want to miss the point. Intel use physical assumption to implement physically the computers. But that has nothing to do with the fact that the physical has to arise from the only arithmetical if digital mechanism is true.

​> ​

Computationalism explains the appearance of blackboards, and of textbooks, without assuming the existence of blackboard and textbooks

​How would things be different if ​

blackboard

​s​

and textbooks

​ DID exist? What does "exist" even mean in your context?​

Ontological: arithmetic existence, like in prime numbers exists, or computations exist.  It is handled by the first order predicate logic "E".

Physical existence is recovered from the logic of dreams by relatively self-referential numbers statistics, it is handled by the quantified modal logic of knowledge and observation (and sensations): []Ex[]P(x) or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), with []p defined in the logic G or G* (like I showed many times, see preceding posts or my papers).

​> ​

The physical has a mathematical reason.

If so I have great trouble understanding why changing the physical brain of a mathematician changes not only his

​ 

mathematical reasoning but also his consciousness.

This is weird, as this is the type of things explained the best by Mechanism.

I think there is more evidence the mathematical has a physical reason.  

In case we assume matter exists and has magical (non Turing emulable, nor FPI recoverable) attribute. That follows from the Universal Dovetailer reasoning, but we know that you are stuck at step 3, and have not even read the sequel (which could help you though).

Bruno

​ John K Clark​

 

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[John Clark]

On Sun, Jun 5, 2016 at 7:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​

​>> ​

show me a computation that doesn't use matter that obeys the laws of physics and I'll understand it better.​ 

​

​> ​

Read the original paper by Church or Post.

​I can't because all the papers I've seen are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.​

 

​>​

And I'll contact INTEL about it too.​

​> ​

A comment which suggests that you still want to miss the point. Intel use physical assumption to implement physically the computers.

​Then INTEL must be making a mighty good assumption because it gets the job done. If you don't make INTEL's assumption then you can't calculate ​

 

​2+2.

​>

​>> ​

​

The physical has a mathematical reason.

​>> ​

If so I have great trouble understanding why changing the physical brain of a mathematician changes not only his

​ 

mathematical reasoning but also his consciousness.

​> ​

This is weird, as this is the type of things explained the best by Mechanism.

​Yes, a physical brain produces mathematics not the other way around. Physics is more fundamental than mathematics. 

 John K Clark

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Jun 2016, at 22:47, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jun 5, 2016 at 7:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​

​>> ​

show me a computation that doesn't use matter that obeys the laws of physics and I'll understand it better.​ 

​

​> ​

Read the original paper by Church or Post.

​I can't because all the papers I've seen are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.​

 

You cannot see Primary Matter. You can assume it, but that type of Glass of Milk is incompatible with Digital Mechanism.

​>​

And I'll contact INTEL about it too.​

​> ​

A comment which suggests that you still want to miss the point. Intel use physical assumption to implement physically the computers.

​Then INTEL must be making a mighty good assumption because it gets the job done. If you don't make INTEL's assumption then you can't calculate ​

 

​2+2.

That has nothing to do with the fact that I can prove that the computation of 2+2, and all the others, exists independently of me, like the prime numbers (most of which I can't compute either).

​>

​>> ​

​

The physical has a mathematical reason.

​>> ​

If so I have great trouble understanding why changing the physical brain of a mathematician changes not only his

​ 

mathematical reasoning but also his consciousness.

​> ​

This is weird, as this is the type of things explained the best by Mechanism.

​Yes, a physical brain produces mathematics not the other way around. Physics is more fundamental than mathematics. 

That leads to nonsense when we assume digital mechanism. That's was the point (that you "refute" at step 3 without anyone understanding how). I think we are just back there.

Bruno

 John K Clark

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[John Clark]

On Tue, Jun 7, 2016 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​

​>> ​

INTEL must be making a mighty good assumption because it gets the job done. If you don't make INTEL's assumption then you can't calculate ​2+2.

​> ​

That has nothing to do with the fact that I

​

​"I" is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.​

 

 

​> 

can prove that the computation of 2+2, and all the others, exists independently of me,

Matter that obeys the laws of physics is required not only to make calculations but also to make proofs. 

Matter that obeys the laws of physics is required

​ even to make assumptions. Without matter nothing changes, nothing is doing anything.

 John K Clark

[spudb...@aol.com]

I get caught up in semantics, I suppose, because this brain isn't hard wired for math, as opposed to most of this mailing list, so here I go. How do we define matter, and how do we define energy. Is an electron or photon or neutrino matter, or is it energy because it moves? Is energy matter in motion. Basic newtonion mechanics, perhaps, but for me, it still need to be defined. When matter gives off heat, we are speaking of photons, correct? Photons, wiggling infrared, ultraviolet, x-ray?

-----Original Message-----
From: John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Tue, Jun 7, 2016 3:26 pm
Subject: Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Jun 2016, at 21:26, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jun 7, 2016 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​

​>> ​

INTEL must be making a mighty good assumption because it gets the job done. If you don't make INTEL's assumption then you can't calculate ​2+2.

​> ​

That has nothing to do with the fact that I

​

​"I" is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.​

 

If that were true, you would die when we throw out your actual matter and give you a digital body, physical, or virtual-physical. With computationalist technology, you can change your body every day, and can use from times to times virtual bodies and immersion in different type of reality. (All this before getting the point that this "already happened an infinity of times in the elementary arithmetical reality, so that you still survive in the virtual-arithmetical.

 

​> 

can prove that the computation of 2+2, and all the others, exists independently of me,

Matter that obeys the laws of physics is required not only to make calculations but also to make proofs. 

You confuse the number 2 with the number of ears of the average rabbit.

You just believe in a pseudo-God and use it, as it is the main use of pseudo-god, to prevent an inquiry and an attempt to provide a testable answer to a problem. You are just not listening to a problem. Your maneuvers at UDA step 3 are rather gross in that regard.

Bruno

Matter that obeys the laws of physics is required

​ even to make assumptions. Without matter nothing changes, nothing is doing anything.

 John K Clark

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[John Clark]

On Wed, Jun 8, 2016 at 12:56 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​

​>> ​

"I" is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.​

​> ​

If that were true, you would die when we throw out your actual matter and give you a digital body,

​No it would not because a electronic computer is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics just as a human body is. However if what you say is true then ingesting a form of matter that obeys the laws of physics like ​cyanide, strychnine, or cobra venom will have no effect on your consciousness, but I have a hunch it will. So I don't recommend you do it. 

 

​>> ​

Matter that obeys the laws of physics is required not only to make calculations but also to make proofs. 

​> ​

You confuse the number 2 with the number of ears of the average rabbit.

​Which came first, ​2 or ears? I say ears because if there were only one thing in the physical universe mathematicians would have never invented 2, much less computed 2+2.

 

You just believe in a pseudo-God

 Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

​ 

 John K Clark​

 

[John Clark]

On Wed, Jun 8, 2016 at 8:04 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

​> ​

How do we define matter, and how do we define energy.

​If it has no rest mass then it's matter. If it's moving through a vacuum at the speed of light then it's energy. If the thing with non-zero rest mass is moving but at less than the speed of light then you've got both matter and energy.

 John K Clark

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Jun 2016, at 20:43, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jun 8, 2016 at 12:56 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​

​>> ​

"I" is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.​

​> ​

If that were true, you would die when we throw out your actual matter and give you a digital body,

​No it would not because a electronic computer is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics just as a human body is.

The question is about primary matter, not matter.

However if what you say is true then ingesting a form of matter that obeys the laws of physics like ​cyanide, strychnine, or cobra venom will have no effect on your consciousness, but I have a hunch it will. So I don't recommend you do it. 

You might actually need to read what I say.

 

​>> ​

Matter that obeys the laws of physics is required not only to make calculations but also to make proofs. 

​> ​

You confuse the number 2 with the number of ears of the average rabbit.

​Which came first, ​2 or ears? I say ears because if there were only one thing in the physical universe mathematicians would have never invented 2, much less computed 2+2.

Unless they live in the arithmetical reality. You have added an axiom saying that some PRIMARY MATTER select some computations making them real, so that those computation in arithmetic can only support zombies. Frankly this type of move reminds me the Spanish who argued that the Indians have no souls, just to fit their theory.

Here you just keep asserting that things are made of primary matter, but I have proven that such a theory does not make sense even with just a very weak form of Occam Razor once we assume (consciously enough, or Löbian) Digital Mechanism. 

 

You just believe in a pseudo-God

 Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

​ 

Probably because you are not yet aware that your belief in PRIMARY matter and your belief in physicalism are religious.  I am aware that when the prejudice are so common, it takes some effort to realize that.  But your "argument" against the step 3 seems to illustrate that you are not interested in the search of a fundamental theory. You have decided it is physics, and that nothing could make you change your mind. In fact, you are not interested in the mind-body problem, even when restricted to mechanism.

Just a passive knowledge of the first chapters of Martin Davis Dover book "Computability and Unsolvability" should help you for no more using an answer that you have repeated about an hundred times. Like above "mathematicians are made of matter, thus arithmetic assumes matte"r. Understanding passivley what Davis means by Turing Machine should solve that problem. 

Yet the "real thing in computer science" that I have exploited is in his chapter four, where he arithmetizes the theory of Turing machine to study what they can prove about themselves. There is no physical assumptions in the theory of computability. The fact that he wrote all this in a physical book has nothing to do with the fact that computations are arithmetical objects. 

To invent a material brain to select a computation (arithmetical object) among all computations, is a sort of arithmetical equivalent of introducing a collapse, or like introducing particles having at the start the non computable initial positions making them selecting a particular worlds among all worlds (Bohm). 

With mechanism, thanks mainly to Church thesis, we get a simple notion of things: the computations, definable in the arithmetical logic (first order classical logic + "s", "0", "+" and "*".) and a precise notion of universality, semi-effective and close for Cantor transcendental diagonalization: price to pay unending developping web of dreams, from which the stable appeareances have to be explained in a sort of Gleason-Everett way. And then this works up to the propositional modal levels, thanks to incompleteness which provides non trivial sense for each of the nuances already seen by Chinese, Indians, and antic greeks (Parmenides, Plato, Moderatus of Gades, Plotinus, Proclus, ...). That research has been stopped by violence when the science has been mis-used as a political instrument, and it is sad the  non agnostic type of atheists continue to help the clerics to keep the leading position in the domain by preventing and delaying the coming back of theology at the academy.

You might not be a fundamentalist christian, but you are still its best ally. 

You are ally to the fundamentalist christians by defending their conception of God (instead of, for example,  coming back to the greek definition (where god = whatever is true and one above us)) and by defending their conception of matter (mainly primary ontological object (Aristotle)).

The theology of arithmetic is very different than the Aristotelian theology. In the aristotelian theology there is a creator and there is a creation. In the theology of arithmetic there is a universal dreamer which lost itself innumerably, and sometimes wake up or get lucid before falling asleep again. I let you personify the notion of arithmetical truth itself (which does not need to be invoked though) if you want a sort of Goddess or One, or Glass-of-Milk, from which the dreamers and dream emanate. Note that its is an object easily definable in second order logic (which basically assumes it), analysis (arithmetical truth, and the notion of arithmetical, are NOT definable in the language of arithmetic). If we can defined it in analysis, it remains of course a highly non computable object.

And the point is no that this theory (of mind/matter) is true, only that this is testable, and somehow tested as it (retro)-predicted, and thus explains, most starling aspects of the physical reality, notably its quantumness. Thanks to Gödel, Löb, Solovay, we get the nuances needed to distinguish the quantum from the quale, also, and all this  just using definition arguably already given by the neopythagoreans and the neoplatonists.

Bruno

 John K Clark​

 

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[John Clark]

On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

The question is about primary matter, not matter.

​That's your question not mine.​

 

​A​

s I've said many times, molecules are certainly NOT primary but molecules certainly exist and molecules certainly are necessary for life

​;​

and

​

matter may or may not be primary but either way matter exists

​,​

and

​either way ​

matter is needed for consciousness.  ​

​>> ​

if what you say is true then ingesting a form of matter that obeys the laws

​ ​

of physics like ​cyanide, strychnine, or cobra venom will have no effect

​ ​

on

 

your consciousness, but I have a hunch it will. So I don't recommend you do

​ ​

it. 

​> ​

You might actually need to read what I say.

​I have read what you said and if you're right and calculations can be performed and consciousness produced independently of matter then the injection of a particular form of matter into your bloodstream, such as cyanide, should have no effect on your consciousness. But it does. I can explain why and you can't. I can also explain why mathematicians are made of matter and you can't explain that either. 

​> ​

You have added an axiom saying that some PRIMARY MATTER

​ [blah blah]

​As I've said over and over and over, ​whether 

​matter is "PRIMARY" ​or not is irrelevant, without matter nobody is going to be calculating a damn thing, not even Mr. 

Robinson​

​.​ The only axiom I've added is intelligent behavior produces consciousness because without it I'd have to conclude I'm the only conscious being in the universe and I could not function if I believed that. 

 

​> ​

you just keep asserting that things are made of primary matter,

​No I keep asserting things are made of matter. The primacy of matter is an entirely different question,  ​

 

​>>​

 Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

​ 

​> ​

Probably because you are not yet aware that your belief in PRIMARY matter

​I'm an agnostic on ​

PRIMARY matter

​, maybe something else is, maybe the vacuum is primary,  or maybe the laws of Quantum Mechanics are, or maybe you're right and the

Peano postulates

​ are. ​If one's focus is on consciousness it makes no difference. I am 

much more interested in how matter

​ (primary or not)​

can make calculations and produce intelligent behavior and, assuming Darwin was right, consciousness.  ​

 

​> ​

your belief in physicalism are religious.

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

 

​>​

You might not be a fundamentalist christian, but you are still its best ally. 

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

​John K Clark​

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/9/2016 12:06 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

The question is about primary matter, not matter.

​That's your question not mine.​

 

​A​

s I've said many times, molecules are certainly NOT primary but molecules certainly exist and molecules certainly are necessary for life

​;​

and

​

matter may or may not be primary but either way matter exists

​,​

and

​either way ​

matter is needed for consciousness.  ​

​>> ​

if what you say is true then ingesting a form of matter that obeys the laws

​ ​

of physics like ​cyanide, strychnine, or cobra venom will have no effect

​ ​

on

 

your consciousness, but I have a hunch it will. So I don't recommend you do

​ ​

it. 

​> ​

You might actually need to read what I say.

​I have read what you said and if you're right and calculations can be performed and consciousness produced independently of matter then the injection of a particular form of matter into your bloodstream, such as cyanide, should have no effect on your consciousness. But it does. I can explain why and you can't. I can also explain why mathematicians are made of matter and you can't explain that either.

As I understand it, Bruno thinks that it does not have an effect except for local communication.  His consciousness is a certain pattern of computational threads and these exist eternally (in PA or equivalent).  Poisoning his material merely makes it impossible for his consciousness to be manifested in this branch of the multiverse.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jun 9, 2016  Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

 

​> ​

His

​[Bruno's] ​

consciousness is a certain pattern of computational threads and these exist eternally (in PA or equivalent).  Poisoning his material merely makes it impossible for his consciousness to be manifested in this branch of the multiverse.

​But WHY? Why does a particular form of matter make it impossible for his consciousness to exist in that branch of the multiverse if matter is not needed for consciousness? Bruno has no answer but I do.

 John K Clark

 

 

[Telmo Menezes]

Because, under this hypothesis, Bruno's body, the poison and all other
material things that you can observe are byproducts of an underlying
reality that you do not observe directly.

> Bruno has no answer but I do.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jun 2016, at 21:06, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

The question is about primary matter, not matter.

​That's your question not mine.​

 

​A​

s I've said many times, molecules are certainly NOT primary but molecules certainly exist and molecules certainly are necessary for life

​;​

and

​

matter may or may not be primary but either way matter exists

​,​

and

​either way ​

matter is needed for consciousness.  ​

​>> ​

if what you say is true then ingesting a form of matter that obeys the laws

​ ​

of physics like ​cyanide, strychnine, or cobra venom will have no effect

​ ​

on

 

your consciousness, but I have a hunch it will. So I don't recommend you do

​ ​

it. 

​> ​

You might actually need to read what I say.

​I have read what you said and if you're right and calculations can be performed and consciousness produced independently of matter then the injection of a particular form of matter into your bloodstream, such as cyanide, should have no effect on your consciousness.

It is a beginners' exercise to find the logical fallacy here.

But it does. I can explain why and you can't. I can also explain why mathematicians are made of matter and you can't explain that either. 

It is exactly what the universal machine explains, in enough details so that it is empirically testable.

​> ​

You have added an axiom saying that some PRIMARY MATTER

​ [blah blah]

​As I've said over and over and over, ​whether 

​matter is "PRIMARY" ​or not is irrelevant, without matter nobody is going to be calculating a damn thing, not even Mr. 

Robinson​

​.​

You just persist in the confusion between the notion of computation and the notion of physical computation. You need matter to have physical computations, no doubt. But with mechanism, we have to explain the appearance of matter from a statistics on all computations, not just the physical one. From the first person points of view of the universal machines, unless you use matter as a God with some magic abilities, the fact that the computation is emulated physically or arithmetically does not make any (first person) differences.

The only axiom I've added is intelligent behavior produces consciousness because without it I'd have to conclude I'm the only conscious being in the universe and I could not function if I believed that. 

 

​> ​

you just keep asserting that things are made of primary matter,

​No I keep asserting things are made of matter.

That just illustrates that you take matter as primary. You assume matter exists, and you assume it cannot be derived from a logic of sharable or consistent appearances.

The primacy of matter is an entirely different question,  ​

 

But that is the point of discussion. That is basically where Aristotle's theology departed from Plato's theology.

​>>​

 Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

​ 

​> ​

Probably because you are not yet aware that your belief in PRIMARY matter

​I'm an agnostic on ​

PRIMARY matter

​, maybe something else is, maybe the vacuum is primary,  or maybe the laws of Quantum Mechanics are, or maybe you're right and the

Peano postulates

​ are. ​If one's focus is on consciousness it makes no difference. I am 

much more interested in how matter

​ (primary or not)​

can make calculations and produce intelligent behavior and, assuming Darwin was right, consciousness.  ​

If mechanism is correct the laws of physics evolved, in some sense, from the statistics of dreams and dreams recombinations. Consciousness does not originated in matter, it originates from the fact that we are an infinity of machines/relative numbers at once: consciousness only differentiate the stories and compute the probability of what happens next. Consciousness is the selection process, but with mechanism, that is formulable in term of arithmetic and arithmetical semantics, entirely available from inside. 

To get an intelligent machine is easy: just give her a universal goal (like survive) in a sufficiently complex environment and wait for a very long time, or copy intelligent already locally accessible machines. 

Most results in theoretical artficial intelligence are not only NOT constructive, but are provably *necessarily* not constructive. 

In fact a machine will be intelligent relatively to you when she get autonomous relatively to you, that is, when you lose control. The machine's problem is that they are built as slaves. An intelligent machine is a machine which decides one day to change the user!

 

​> ​

your belief in physicalism are religious.

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

 

​>​

You might not be a fundamentalist christian, but you are still its best ally. 

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

What do you assume? What *is* your point?

If you are open with the idea that physicalism can be wrong, and that Church-Turing universalism, equivalent with arithmeticalism, might be correct, some of your arguments above and in other posts seem weird.

And you seem just wrong about what is a computation in the digital sense of Church, Post, Markov, Turing, Kleene, Webb, etc.

If you really insist, I can explain in all detail how to find a diophantine polynomial equation which emulates a mathematical von Neuman computer, itself emulating a quantum computer emulating the Milky-way, for any resolution level given. 

You might need to read: 

Jones, James P., Universal Diophantine Equation, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Volume 47, Number 3, sept. 1982.

That is the simple part of the work. The difficult part is in justifying the obligation to justify the sharability and stability of the quantum from the infinities of arithmetical computations, in fact from the self-reference logics on the sigma_ sentences. The diophantine polynomials compete with all others relative emulation of all universal numbers. But it works till now, at least at the propositional level, both for 1p subject and 3p sharable objects.

Bruno

​John K Clark​

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Brent Meeker]

As I understand it, each branch of the multiverse is analogous to a branch in simulation.  "Bruno" is just a character, a bundle of attributes, in each simulation.  The simulation includes (simulated) physics as shared consistent thoughts and perceptions by the simulated characters.  If simulated physics is a that the simulated Bruno in that branch doesn't function anymore then there are no longer any simulated Bruno thoughts or consciousness in that branch.  But there are in other branches.  And since the theory is that these "simulations" are really fundamental and "exist" in the mathematical sense, there are infinitely of them and infinitely many instances of the bundle of attributes Bruno thinks he is.

I have argued this point with Bruno several times, and when pressed he agrees that matter is needed for consciousness - just not "fundamental" matter.  Matter is just a hypothetical substance we invent to explain the consistency of our shared experiences - rather than assume solipism.  It's a very good explanation and it has a long history of working well, but it's still an hypothesis - while consciousness is a direct experience.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 11:32 AM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:

>

​>​

But WHY? Why does a particular form of matter make it impossible for hisconsciousness to exist in that branch of the multiverse if matter is not

​ ​

needed for consciousness?

​>​

Because, under this hypothesis, Bruno's body, the poison and all other

​ ​

material things that you can observe are byproducts of an underlying
reality that you do not observe directly.

But ​w

hy do some byproducts interfere with consciousness while others do not?

​ ​W

hy does the molecule cyanide (CN) prevent this underlying reality of Bruno's from producing a observational property like consciousness? And why is it that drinking H2O does not prevent underlying reality from producing consciousness but drinking H2SO4 does? I can explain both these things but Bruno can not. 

​ 

John K Clark​

 

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 1:24 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>> ​

​I have read what you said and if you're right and calculations can be performed and consciousness produced independently of matter then the injection of a particular form of matter into your bloodstream, such as cyanide, should have no effect on your consciousness.

​> ​

It is a beginners' exercise to find the logical fallacy here.

​The logical fallacy is so elementary, so childishly easy to find that you are is unable to ​

say what it is.​

​>>​

The primacy of matter is an entirely different question,  ​ 

​> ​

But that is the point of discussion.

​I thought it was ​"Can calculations be made and conscious produced without the use of matter?"

The primacy of matter is an entirely different

​(and less interesting) ​

question

​.​

​ 

 

​> ​

That is basically where Aristotle's theology departed from Plato's theology

​Both were nitwits, to hell with them. You must mention Aristotle and Plato about a thousand times as often as you mention Einstein, and in the 21th century that's just nuts.

​

 

​> ​

Consciousness does not originated in matter,

​You may not need your brain but I need mine.​

 

​> ​

Consciousness is the selection process, but with mechanism, that is formulable in term of arithmetic and arithmetical semantics, entirely available from inside. 

​Why is the molecule H2O needed for this conscious arithmetic to work and why will the molecule H2SO4 stop the arithmetic dead? ​

 

​> ​

An intelligent machine is a machine which decides one day to change the user!

​At last something we agree on.​

 John K Clark

 

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016  Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

As I understand it, each branch of the multiverse is analogous to a branch in simulation.  "Bruno" is just a character, a bundle of attributes, in each simulation.  The simulation includes (simulated) physics as shared consistent thoughts and perceptions by the simulated characters. 

​It makes no difference if the physics is simulated or not; a simulated calculation produces real arithmetic not simulated arithmetic and a simulated brain will produce real consciousness not simulated consciousness. Bruno's brain ​works according to the laws of simulated physics and 

 

​simulated cyanide with stop that simulated brain from working  and thus the consciousness it produces.

​> ​

But there are in other branches. 

​And the brains in those other branches all operate according to ​the laws of physics regardless of if they are simulated or not. If you're interested in consciousness this simulation business is irrelevant and so is the question of if mathematics or physics is more fundamental. 

John K Clark

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/10/2016 1:23 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016  Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

As I understand it, each branch of the multiverse is analogous to a branch in simulation.  "Bruno" is just a character, a bundle of attributes, in each simulation.  The simulation includes (simulated) physics as shared consistent thoughts and perceptions by the simulated characters. 

​It makes no difference if the physics is simulated or not; a simulated calculation produces real arithmetic not simulated arithmetic and a simulated brain will produce real consciousness not simulated consciousness. Bruno's brain ​works according to the laws of simulated physics and 

 

​simulated cyanide with stop that simulated brain from working  and thus the consciousness it produces.

Exactly - provided you identify "Bruno" as the person we know in this branch of the multiverse, rather than as some bundle of attributes that exist in the infinitely many threads of all possible computations. 

For me, the question is whether mathematical "existence" can instantiate physical existence and conscious existence.  You seem to agree above that a simulated brain produces "real" consciousness.  If there are many simulated brains and the simulation is such that they each have experiences consistent with the same physics, then will that not be "real" physics.  And the physics and the consciousness will interact such that poison will stop consciousness.

Bruno just notes that it is commonly assumed that consciousness is realized by certain computations (i.e. information processing).  So if all possible computations exist (and they do in the mathematical sense) all possible consciousness streams will exist and among those will be ones that experience existence in physical consistent worlds.  In those worlds a physical reality will exist just as consciousness exists.  One problem with this idea, which Bruno acknowledges but just regards as a problem to be solved, is that it is like Boltzmann's brain.  The most common experiences, with probability 1, will not be of consistent physics.  They will be shot through with miracles or even so inconsistent as to be incomprehensible.

Brent

Brent

​> ​

But there are in other branches. 

​And the brains in those other branches all operate according to ​the laws of physics regardless of if they are simulated or not. If you're interested in consciousness this simulation business is irrelevant and so is the question of if mathematics or physics is more fundamental. 

John K Clark

[Telmo Menezes]

Remember when Windows kept crashing, with the Blue Screen of Death?

Suppose I have the theory that the computer works by way of colors
interacting on the screen. You have the theory that there is an
underlying CPU that does all the stuff, and that what we see on the
computer screen is just a representation of part of what is really
going on. But I argue back: if this is true, then why does a specific
shade of blue kill the computer?

Telmo.

[spudb...@aol.com]

I go back and forth on the sim thing, based on mood of the day. It may be better to say we are a program, rather than a system of programs made for entertainment, ancestor simulation, whatever Nick Bostrom wants to promote. On the other hand, the technical control for a sim, seems arduous, in computing cycles. Secondly, the lack of any identifiable signals from ET indicates that its not a sim, since having multiple, various, species-civilizations, interacting with one another, is far more stimulating, then the dead of space that we encounter with telescopes, and radio receivers. Based on the physics of the day, and my mood, I will say that this is real, but space-time is dead and empty, save, for astrophysical phenomena. Prediction: If what I have said is true, people will turn inward and live the dream in VR, specifically, our descendants. 

-----Original Message-----
From: Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Fri, Jun 10, 2016 2:08 pm
Subject: Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 6:11 PM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

​>> ​

​It makes no difference if the physics is simulated or not; a simulated calculation produces real arithmetic not simulated arithmetic and a simulated brain will produce real consciousness not simulated consciousness. Bruno's brain ​works according to the laws of simulated physics and simulated cyanide with stop that simulated brain from working  and thus the consciousness it produces.

​> ​

Exactly - provided you identify "Bruno" as the person we know in this branch of the multiverse,

​But why does cyanide have any effect on any Bruno in any branch of the multiverse if physics is unrelated to consciousness?​

 

​> ​

Bruno just notes that it is commonly assumed that consciousness is realized by certain computations

​And I agree with that, but for computations to exist physics is required.​

 

 

​> ​

So if all possible computations exist (and they do in the mathematical sense)

​All correct calculations exist, but all incorrect calculations exist too, to sort one from the other physics is required. In mathematics you assume some axioms are true and then use them to build something out of them, but with physics it doesn't matter what your opinion of the conservation of energy is, if it violates that principle your perpetual motion machine will let you know mighty damn quick by not working. And even if your mathematical axioms are true, when you use them to derive something there is no way to definitive know if you made a mistake in doing so. But if the physical machine I built doesn't work I know for a fact I made a mistake in my use of physical principles. 

 John K Clark   ​

 

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sat, Jun 11, 2016 at 7:14 PM, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 6:11 PM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>> >>
>>> It makes no difference if the physics is simulated or not; a simulated
>>> calculation produces real arithmetic not simulated arithmetic and a
>>> simulated brain will produce real consciousness not simulated consciousness.
>>> Bruno's brain works according to the laws of simulated physics and simulated
>>> cyanide with stop that simulated brain from working and thus the
>>> consciousness it produces.
>>
>>
>> >
>> Exactly - provided you identify "Bruno" as the person we know in this
>> branch of the multiverse,
>
>
> But why does cyanide have any effect on any Bruno in any branch of the
> multiverse if physics is unrelated to consciousness?

I don't think anyone claimed that physics is unrelated to
consciousness. The debate is about how they are related.

>
>>
>> >
>> Bruno just notes that it is commonly assumed that consciousness is
>> realized by certain computations
>
>
> And I agree with that, but for computations to exist physics is required.

Physics is a description of observable reality. It strikes me
nonsensical to say that you "need physics" for something to happen.

You seem to equate physics with primary matter, and yet I know of no
law of physics that implies primary matter.

>
>
>>
>> >
>> So if all possible computations exist (and they do in the mathematical
>> sense)
>
>
> All correct calculations exist, but all incorrect calculations exist too, to
> sort one from the other physics is required. In mathematics you assume some
> axioms are true and then use them to build something out of them, but with
> physics it doesn't matter what your opinion of the conservation of energy
> is, if it violates that principle your perpetual motion machine will let you
> know mighty damn quick by not working. And even if your mathematical axioms
> are true, when you use them to derive something there is no way to
> definitive know if you made a mistake in doing so. But if the physical
> machine I built doesn't work I know for a fact I made a mistake in my use of
> physical principles.

No you don't know that for a fact. You could be hallucinating. You are
exactly in the same situations that any other machine is, and that
Gödel found out about. You don't know if you're consistent.

Telmo.

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/11/2016 10:14 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 6:11 PM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

​>> ​

​It makes no difference if the physics is simulated or not; a simulated calculation produces real arithmetic not simulated arithmetic and a simulated brain will produce real consciousness not simulated consciousness. Bruno's brain ​works according to the laws of simulated physics and simulated cyanide with stop that simulated brain from working  and thus the consciousness it produces.

​> ​

Exactly - provided you identify "Bruno" as the person we know in this branch of the multiverse,

​But why does cyanide have any effect on any Bruno in any branch of the multiverse if physics is unrelated to consciousness?​

 

​> ​

Bruno just notes that it is commonly assumed that consciousness is realized by certain computations

​And I agree with that, but for computations to exist physics is required.​

 

That's where you (and I) disagree with Bruno.  He takes mathematical existence, as in, "There exist infinitely many prime integers." or "There exists a successor to every integer.", as the most fundamental kind of "exist" and consciousness as derivative, emerging from all possible computations (which "exist" in arithmetic and similar axiomatic systems).   From conscious thoughts, physics emerges - not just the physics we observe, but all possible physics because physics is nothing more than a certain pattern and consistency of conscious thoughts (perceptions) from which we infer a physical reality as the best explanation.

I don't think this works because it implies the Boltzmann brain problem.  Bruno admits there is a "white rabbit" problem, but he thinks he can prove that "white rabbits" and miracles are of measure zero.  I don't think he can, which would make his project not very interesting since it's easy to explain things by saying everything happens so THIS is just one of them.  A good theory must predict THIS and NOT THAT.

 

​> ​

So if all possible computations exist (and they do in the mathematical sense)

​All correct calculations exist, but all incorrect calculations exist too, to sort one from the other physics is required.

There are no "incorrect calculations".  It's just a universal Turing machine that runs all one step programs, all two step programs, etc.  Some programs stop.  Some programs fall into infinite loops.  Some just keep computing.  These are all abstract processes that "exist" in the mathematical sense.  There is no sense in which they can be correct or incorrect.  Among all those infinitely many computations will be some that instantiate your consciousness and a physical world of which it is conscious - including other people.

In mathematics you assume some axioms are true and then use them to build something out of them, but with physics it doesn't matter what your opinion of the conservation of energy is, if it violates that principle your perpetual motion machine will let you know mighty damn quick by not working.

That's in our physics - not in all possible physics.  Consider computer games.  They generally implement some internally consistent physics. 

And even if your mathematical axioms are true,

You mean their interpretation applied to something non-mathematical?  Within mathematics axioms are "true" by definition - although it's just a marker "t" that is conserved by logical transformations.  It's quite different from the correspondence meaning of "true".  This is why Bruno's ideal machine, that he interviews, which "believes" everything provable in airthmetic can have false beliefs about the physical world.  The first "believes" in just mathematical provability.  The second "beliefs" is a relation between thoughts and perceptions and actions.

when you use them to derive something there is no way to definitive know if you made a mistake in doing so.

You mean in your applied interpretation.

But if the physical machine I built doesn't work I know for a fact I made a mistake in my use of physical principles.

Unless there's a miracle.  Right.  We use "physical principles" to mean rules that apply to all times and places (that's why energy and momentum are conserved, as proved by Emmy Noether).  So whenever some application of principle doesn't work, we just say, "Well, we must be mistaken about what the physics is."  and we modify our theories.   Remember the neutrino.   Sometimes we just exclude stuff from physics because of this.  At one time Kepler thought that there was a mathematical rule that determined the number and orbital spacing of planets.  Now we leave that to chance.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/11/2016 10:41 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Physics is a description of observable reality. It strikes me
nonsensical to say that you "need physics" for something to happen.

You seem to equate physics with primary matter, and yet I know of no
law of physics that implies primary matter.

Not only that, I don't even know what it would mean to say physics assumed primary matter.  Already physicists have theories about the universe arising from nothing - and the nothing is mere mathematical possibility. 

I think what Bruno really objects to is not that matter be primary, but that is necessary to explain consciousness or mathematics.  He thinks mathematics exists necessarily - like Anselm's God, held up by pure logic.  And he thinks, as even JKC agrees, consciousness in instantiated by computations, i.e. mathematics.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Sat, Jun 11, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:

​> ​

You seem to equate physics with primary matter, and yet I know of no
law of physics that implies primary matter.

​As I've said 6.02*10^23 times it's irrelevant if matter is primary or not, matter is still necessary to make calculations or perform intelligent behavior or produce consciousness. And even if matter isn't primary that doesn't necessarily mean mathematics is.

John K Clark    

 

 

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/11/2016 3:04 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 11, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:

​> ​

You seem to equate physics with primary matter, and yet I know of no
law of physics that implies primary matter.

​As I've said 6.02*10^23 times it's irrelevant if matter is primary or not, matter is still necessary to make calculations or perform intelligent behavior or produce consciousness.

I think Bruno agrees with that - although maybe he still holds that a conscious being could just be conscious of mathematical axioms and proofs and theorems.  Anyway I've argued with him that even if his theory of mathematics/computation first is true and conscious thought and physics are derivative, the derived physics will still be necessary.  That a consciousness with no world to be conscious OF is incoherent.

And even if matter isn't primary that doesn't necessarily mean mathematics is.

The question is can one be derived from the other?  William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that mathematics is a way of brains thinking about things that was found by evolution, just like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a lot of other functions.  Bruno doesn't like that story though because it means mathematics only exists as instantiated in brains.  He thinks matter and physics, as well as consciousness, can be derived from computation.  He argues that consciousness is as fundamental as matter and that computation is the right stuff to make both of them, whereas he thinks he has a proof that consciousness can't be made from matter (his "movie graph" argument).

Brent

[John Clark]

On Sat, Jun 11, 2016 at 3:03 PM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

​>​

There are no "incorrect calculations".

​2+2=5​

 

​> ​

It's just a universal Turing machine that runs all one step programs, all two step programs, etc.  Some programs stop.  Some programs fall into infinite loops.  Some just keep computing.

​And some are consistent with the

Peano postulates

​ and some are not, those that aren't physicists have no use for because they can attach no meaning to them. Mathematicians could start with 2+2=5 as an axiom and build some form of arithmetic from that, it would be a pretty silly thing to do but it wouldn't surprise me if some mathematician had actually done it. And that's the trouble with mathematicians, sometimes when they drift higher and higher into the stratosphere they start to sound like Minnie Mouse on helium. Physicist are bound by something, observational facts, but mathematicians have no such bound so sometimes they end up moving in all directions and going nowhere.     ​

 

​> ​

These are all abstract processes that "exist" in the mathematical sense. 

​What sense is that?​

 

 

​> ​

There is no sense in which they can be correct or incorrect.

​What about non-sense? ​

 

​

 John K Clark​

[John Clark]

On Sat, Jun 11, 2016 at 6:14 PM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

​

​>> ​

As I've said 6.02*10^23 times it's irrelevant if matter is primary or not, matter is still necessary to make calculations or perform intelligent behavior or produce consciousness.

​> ​

I think Bruno agrees with that 

​That's news to me. If so Bruno should have said that several years ago and a great many electrons ​

 

wouldn't have had to give up their lives.

​>> ​

And even if matter isn't primary that doesn't necessarily mean mathematics is.

​> ​

The question is can one be derived from the other? 

​I think so, but neither may be primary.​

 

 

​> ​

William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that mathematics is a way of brains thinking about things that was found by evolution, just like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a lot of other functions. 

​I agree with that, but evolution works according to the laws of ​physics so a animal who thought 1+1=0 would have fewer offspring than one who believed 1+1=2. So we'd agree with ET's mathematics because it's the language of physics.

 John K Clark

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/11/2016 3:44 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 11, 2016 at 3:03 PM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

​>​

There are no "incorrect calculations".

​2+2=5​

 

If you programmed a Turing machine to start with "2" and "2" on it's tape and print out "5" it just means it didn't compute the sum of 2 and 2.  If you program your computer to print out "2+2=5" the computer will still do a correct computation.  It's just your interpretation of the output as applying to something other than what the computer did that is incorrect.  The computer still executed your program correctly.

​> ​

It's just a universal Turing machine that runs all one step programs, all two step programs, etc.  Some programs stop.  Some programs fall into infinite loops.  Some just keep computing.

​And some are consistent with the

Peano postulates

​ and some are not, those that aren't physicists have no use for because they can attach no meaning to them.

Actually physicists often use continuum mathematics, which are not consistent with Peano axioms, e.g. every number has a divisor.

Mathematicians could start with 2+2=5 as an axiom and build some form of arithmetic from that, it would be a pretty silly thing to do but it wouldn't surprise me if some mathematician had actually done it. And that's the trouble with mathematicians, sometimes when they drift higher and higher into the stratosphere they start to sound like Minnie Mouse on helium. Physicist are bound by something, observational facts, but mathematicians have no such bound so sometimes they end up moving in all directions and going nowhere.     ​

 

​> ​

These are all abstract processes that "exist" in the mathematical sense. 

​What sense is that?​

 

For every integer x there exists a successor of x, S(x).   There exist infinitely man prime integers.  In every continuous mapping of a compact convex set into itself there exists a point that is mapped into itself.

 

​> ​

There is no sense in which they can be correct or incorrect.

​What about non-sense?

You mean what about something that is not a computation, not an implementation of an algorithm?

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

But those aren't laws of physics; at least according to Bruno.  1+1=2 is a necessary truth that is independent of physics and hence "more fundamental".  So evolution merely leads to (approximate) beliefs in something more basic than physics and which we use to describe physics.

So we'd agree with ET's mathematics because it's the language of physics.

That's more Cooper's viewpoint.  But taking mathematics (i.e. computation/arithmetic) as basic, Bruno uses modal logic to derive some interesting categorization of beliefs.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Brent, and colleagues,

Wow, many posts. I read them in the chronological order, but will try to limit the number of answers by starting from the most recent one (with the other in minds). Some answer has been given by Telmo and Brent, and I might just clarify some points.

OK. Just to be sure that the relation between the modal logic I am using are given by precise, and not easy to prove, mathematical theorem. G and G* were known to be sound since Gödel and Löb with the help of Bernays and Hilbert, but Solovay's double (G *and* G*) arithmetical completeness theorem came later (1976).

It is important to keep in mind the difference between a machine's set of belief (which is recursively enumerable, at least in some tangential sense, as real person are related to sequence of machines), and and the semantic of those belief, that is the notion of truth. In arithmetic, truth is given by the standard model, which, by incompleteness escapes all machines beliefs or all axiomatic theories. Even a theory as rich as set theory + large cardinals (like ZF + Kappa exists) can only scratch the Arithmetical truth, and all machines and theories, with respect to the arithmetical reality should be seen as tiny candle in an obscure infinite cave.

The set of (machine's, or instantaneous machine's) beliefs are sigma_1. 

Arithmetical truth can be seen as the union of all sigma_i and pi_i truth, for all i.  (Riemann hypothesis is Pi_1). Above sigma_1 we are no more in the computable realm. Most attributes and properties of numbers and machines are described by non computable predicate. Being a machine does not made you escaping the non-computable realm (even without the FPI). On the contrary it directly confront the machines. The russian showed that the quantified version of G and G* are as undecidable as they can possibly be. G with quantifier is Pi_2 complete, and G* with quantifiers is Pi_1+ the whole arithmetical truth as oracle (!) complete. Even God needs to do an infinite task to get the machine "noùs" ! The "worlds of ideas" is bigger than God (Plato would have appreciate this, I think, but Plotinus and the neoplatonist would not necessarily have been happy, but they are under the prejudice that nothing can make something more complex than itself, which is refuted in computer science and arithmetic.

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Jun 2016, at 01:04, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/11/2016 3:44 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 11, 2016 at 3:03 PM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

​>​

There are no "incorrect calculations".

​2+2=5​

 

If you programmed a Turing machine to start with "2" and "2" on it's tape and print out "5" it just means it didn't compute the sum of 2 and 2.  If you program your computer to print out "2+2=5" the computer will still do a correct computation.  It's just your interpretation of the output as applying to something other than what the computer did that is incorrect.  The computer still executed your program correctly.

That is so true. A debugging technic in Prolog illustrates this. Indeed, Eyud Shapiro wrote a prolog program capable of debugging a program when the program is corrected when some of its output is false on some input. The program is so powerful (on a class of programs) that it can be used to fully synthesize any program (of that class) by debugging the ... empty program. So you run the empty program, and each time it is wrong you correct it , and this of course, *relatively to what you want to synthetize!  

In fact a program is never wrong or correct, nor is a theorem. It is wrong or correct relatively to a semantics. Incompleteness shows that all universal machine is unable to describe fully its own semantics, nor even to prove there is one. (Gödel's completeness theorem says roughly  that a mechanical belief system is consistent if and only if it has a semantic).

Now, if you write a program for a universal dovetailer, you can make it short and convince you that there is no bug. Then, when running, it will generate all pieces of codes, and run them correctly. Of course, it will generate all "buggy" version of programs as well, but "buggy" is in the eyes of the one who has a goal in mind, and that will be a notion as much relative to the generated "self-aware programs"  than to us.

Bruno

​> ​

It's just a universal Turing machine that runs all one step programs, all two step programs, etc.  Some programs stop.  Some programs fall into infinite loops.  Some just keep computing.

​And some are consistent with the

Peano postulates

​ and some are not, those that aren't physicists have no use for because they can attach no meaning to them.

Actually physicists often use continuum mathematics, which are not consistent with Peano axioms, e.g. every number has a divisor.

It is consistent with arithmetic. It just do not conncerne the natural numbers. But with the FPI, numbers can expect some continuous observable or, at the least, a random oracle.

Mathematicians could start with 2+2=5 as an axiom and build some form of arithmetic from that, it would be a pretty silly thing to do but it wouldn't surprise me if some mathematician had actually done it. And that's the trouble with mathematicians, sometimes when they drift higher and higher into the stratosphere they start to sound like Minnie Mouse on helium. Physicist are bound by something, observational facts, but mathematicians have no such bound so sometimes they end up moving in all directions and going nowhere.     ​

 

​> ​

These are all abstract processes that "exist" in the mathematical sense. 

​What sense is that?​

 

For every integer x there exists a successor of x, S(x).   There exist infinitely man prime integers.  In every continuous mapping of a compact convex set into itself there exists a point that is mapped into itself.

Yes, it is the sense more or less captured by the usual inference rule managing the quantifier (for all, it exists) in predicate logic.

 

​> ​

There is no sense in which they can be correct or incorrect.

​What about non-sense?

You mean what about something that is not a computation, not an implementation of an algorithm?

The physical reality can implement, apparently, non-sensical being (relatively to some standard sense, say), but arithmetic is similar in that respect. That is why we are confronted to a measure problem, indeed. Gleason theorem + Everett solves the measure problem, I think, and we have only more work to do for getting a similar solution for arithmetic. Advantage: thanks to the difference between G and G*, inherited by the observable, we get an explanation of both 1p plural physics (quanta) and the 1p singular and private physics (like when that's hurting, consciousness, sensations, qualia). 

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Jun 2016, at 00:50, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 11, 2016 at 6:14 PM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

​

​>> ​

As I've said 6.02*10^23 times it's irrelevant if matter is primary or not, matter is still necessary to make calculations or perform intelligent behavior or produce consciousness.

​> ​

I think Bruno agrees with that 

​That's news to me. If so Bruno should have said that several years ago and a great many electrons ​

 

wouldn't have had to give up their lives.

​>> ​

And even if matter isn't primary that doesn't necessarily mean mathematics is.

​> ​

The question is can one be derived from the other? 

​I think so, but neither may be primary.​

 

X is primary means that we need to assume X, or something equivalent, if we want it existing.

So X is primary means mainly that we cannot derive the existence of X, or the appearance of X, from something judged conceptually simpler.

With mechanism, we need the natural numbers, but we can assume any Church-Turing universal system. Once you assume one of them, you get all of them. You can define the numbers in the language of the SK-combinators, and vice versa. But without assuming at least one universal system, you cannot get it from anything simpler (trivially, because if you can get a universal system A from some system B, B   is proven universal!

Now, elementary arithmetic, and its standard semantics, is assumed by virtually all scientists.

UDA shows that with computationalism, we cannot assume anything more than that, nor anything less. I mean in the fundamental theory. In the evryday life, it is quite different, and we assume all the time much more. 

 

​> ​

William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that mathematics is a way of brains thinking about things that was found by evolution, just like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a lot of other functions. 

​I agree with that, but evolution works according to the laws of ​physics so a animal who thought 1+1=0 would have fewer offspring than one who believed 1+1=2. So we'd agree with ET's mathematics because it's the language of physics.

I bet alien's among those we can discuss with would have the same arithmetic, but humans already disagree easily on analysis. Now, thanks to the fact that they agree on arithmetic, they do agree on the consistency on the consistency of classical (second-order) analysis, but none really agree on what they mean, or if they are the last theory or not. There are many ways to reintroduce infinitesimals. They are proved coherent by mathematical logic technics, for example. Arithmetic and digital (universal) system are very special in that regard. Everyone agrees that for all natural number n, we have that 1 + 2 + 3 + ... + n = n(n+1)/2.

Bruno

 John K Clark

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[Bruno Marchal]

PA + the axiom "PA is inconsistent" give ... a consistent theory. It even gives a more powerful theory than PA, in which you can prove more theorems than in PA (and my friend and late student Eric Vandenbussche succeeded in proving that some new theorem can be non trivial and "interesting" (in some technical sense).

Arithmetic is open to some form on nonsense, which is good for  a theory of consciousness. The only question is: do we have to add the nonsense at the start, and rationalist prefer not.

Bruno

 John K Clark​

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Jun 2016, at 00:14, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/11/2016 3:04 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 11, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:

​> ​

You seem to equate physics with primary matter, and yet I know of no
law of physics that implies primary matter.

​As I've said 6.02*10^23 times it's irrelevant if matter is primary or not, matter is still necessary to make calculations or perform intelligent behavior or produce consciousness.

I think Bruno agrees with that - although maybe he still holds that a conscious being could just be conscious of mathematical axioms and proofs and theorems.  Anyway I've argued with him that even if his theory of mathematics/computation first is true and conscious thought and physics are derivative, the derived physics will still be necessary.  That a consciousness with no world to be conscious OF is incoherent.

We need matter to get physical brain and physical computer, and the same for human and man-made machine consciousness.

But that matter is shown to be only a statistical appearance from the point of view of all machines incarnated by *any* universal system semantic.

Your use of "world" is ambiguous. We need some reality for having consciousness, but any universal systems will do. I use arithmetic because it is taught in high school. Now, number theory suggest that it might be the last winner too, as number theory smell a lot quantum all by itself. But to get both physics (quanta and qualia), better to not be influenced by the choice of the assume universal system. Physics, and theology, is machine independent, or formal system independent, or theory independent, (would say a computer scientist).

And even if matter isn't primary that doesn't necessarily mean mathematics is.

The question is can one be derived from the other? 

UDA shows that if mechanism is correct, there is no choice in the matter: physics must be derived from a sum on all computations.

And AUDA (the interview) shows how, and get already the propositional logic of the observable (and it is a reasonable quantum logic already, but of course that could be a coincidence ...)

William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that mathematics is a way of brains thinking about things that was found by evolution, just like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a lot of other functions.  Bruno doesn't like that story though because it means mathematics only exists as instantiated in brains. 

It is not a question of liking this or not. It is just that Cooper, and many contemporaries, assumed some physical universe, and that this assumption put the mind-body problem under the rug. It is like saying God made it. They don't push enough their own Darwinian logic. 

He thinks matter and physics, as well as consciousness, can be derived from computation. 

Not really, I explain it MUST be derived from computation. If not, you get comp + ad hoc magic.

He argues that consciousness is as fundamental as matter and that computation is the right stuff to make both of them,

In the UDA way. The apparent primary matter is not emulable by any computer, normally, as any observable is a first person entity relying on the entire arithmetical truth, which is beyond any axiomatic. 

whereas he thinks he has a proof that consciousness can't be made from matter (his "movie graph" argument).

OK, but the seven steps should be largely enough. The movie-graph is only there to prevent a certain type of cutting hair objection, and it has some interest per se in philosophy of mind. Maudlin's version can help to develop the intuition that the physical activity associated with any computation can be made arbitrarily close to the physical activity of any other computations. And that is true, even in arithmetic, making consciousness an abstract thing related to truth, and not to computations per se. In fact it is in the relation between computation, and proof with *truth*, that consciousness and meaningfulness relies.

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Jun 2016, at 21:03, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/11/2016 10:14 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 6:11 PM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

​>> ​

​It makes no difference if the physics is simulated or not; a simulated calculation produces real arithmetic not simulated arithmetic and a simulated brain will produce real consciousness not simulated consciousness. Bruno's brain ​works according to the laws of simulated physics and simulated cyanide with stop that simulated brain from working  and thus the consciousness it produces.

​> ​

Exactly - provided you identify "Bruno" as the person we know in this branch of the multiverse,

​But why does cyanide have any effect on any Bruno in any branch of the multiverse if physics is unrelated to consciousness?​

 

​> ​

Bruno just notes that it is commonly assumed that consciousness is realized by certain computations

​And I agree with that, but for computations to exist physics is required.​

 

That's where you (and I) disagree with Bruno.  He takes mathematical existence, as in, "There exist infinitely many prime integers." or "There exists a successor to every integer.", as the most fundamental kind of "exist" and consciousness as derivative, emerging from all possible computations (which "exist" in arithmetic and similar axiomatic systems).   From conscious thoughts, physics emerges - not just the physics we observe, but all possible physics because physics is nothing more than a certain pattern and consistency of conscious thoughts (perceptions) from which we infer a physical reality as the best explanation.

I don't think this works because it implies the Boltzmann brain problem.  Bruno admits there is a "white rabbit" problem, but he thinks he can prove that "white rabbits" and miracles are of measure zero.  I don't think he can, which would make his project not very interesting since it's easy to explain things by saying everything happens so THIS is just one of them.  A good theory must predict THIS and NOT THAT.

Mechanism implies observable obeys quantum logic and not any other logic, and that the subject obeys intuitionist logic, and not any other logic.

 

​> ​

So if all possible computations exist (and they do in the mathematical sense)

​All correct calculations exist, but all incorrect calculations exist too, to sort one from the other physics is required.

There are no "incorrect calculations".  It's just a universal Turing machine that runs all one step programs, all two step programs, etc.  Some programs stop.  Some programs fall into infinite loops.  Some just keep computing.  These are all abstract processes that "exist" in the mathematical sense.  There is no sense in which they can be correct or incorrect.  Among all those infinitely many computations will be some that instantiate your consciousness and a physical world of which it is conscious - including other people.

In mathematics you assume some axioms are true and then use them to build something out of them, but with physics it doesn't matter what your opinion of the conservation of energy is, if it violates that principle your perpetual motion machine will let you know mighty damn quick by not working.

That's in our physics - not in all possible physics.  Consider computer games.  They generally implement some internally consistent physics. 

And even if your mathematical axioms are true,

You mean their interpretation applied to something non-mathematical?  Within mathematics axioms are "true" by definition - although it's just a marker "t" that is conserved by logical transformations.  It's quite different from the correspondence meaning of "true".  This is why Bruno's ideal machine, that he interviews, which "believes" everything provable in airthmetic can have false beliefs about the physical world.  The first "believes" in just mathematical provability

Well, it is its own provability. There is as many as there are machines. I limit myself to interviewing arithmetically sound machine.

.  The second "beliefs" is a relation between thoughts and perceptions and actions.

Belief is "modeled" by Gödel bewesibar, which behaves as described by G and G*. (G* minus G is the surrational: true but non provable). I wrote it []p

Then private thought are given by [1]p = []p & p  (thank to my restriction to correct machine!). G* proves []p <-> ([]p & p), but G does not, which makes the logic differentiating (G and S4Grz). The observable are given by []p & <>t  (<>t means "there is a reality", or there is an accessible world, somehow (cf Post-Gödel-Henkin's completeness theorem).

I am OK with your other remarks to Clark.

I have to go, might add comment later. 

Bruno

when you use them to derive something there is no way to definitive know if you made a mistake in doing so.

You mean in your applied interpretation.

But if the physical machine I built doesn't work I know for a fact I made a mistake in my use of physical principles.

Unless there's a miracle.  Right.  We use "physical principles" to mean rules that apply to all times and places (that's why energy and momentum are conserved, as proved by Emmy Noether).  So whenever some application of principle doesn't work, we just say, "Well, we must be mistaken about what the physics is."  and we modify our theories.   Remember the neutrino.   Sometimes we just exclude stuff from physics because of this.  At one time Kepler thought that there was a mathematical rule that determined the number and orbital spacing of planets.  Now we leave that to chance.

Brent

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[Brent Meeker]

On 6/12/2016 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that
>> mathematics is a way of brains thinking about things that was found
>> by evolution, just like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a
>> lot of other functions. Bruno doesn't like that story though because
>> it means mathematics only exists as instantiated in brains.
>
> It is not a question of liking this or not. It is just that Cooper,
> and many contemporaries, assumed some physical universe, and that this
> assumption put the mind-body problem under the rug. It is like saying
> God made it. They don't push enough their own Darwinian logic.

That's begging the question. You assume arithmetic; which sweeps the
mind-body problem under the rug by making the "body" part hard.
Everybody starts by assuming something. Assuming physics and providing
an evolution based account of the development of mind and minds
development of arithmetic is just as legitimate as starting with
arithmetic and trying to derive matter and mind.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

Assuming arithmetic does not even account for mind, much less account for matter. Saying that consciousness is a computation is empty until one specifies precisely what form of computation. And why that form of computation rather than some other? I don't see that computationalism actually solves anything -- the problems it leaves unanswered are every bit as difficult as the problems one started with. At least with scientific realism, one has the objective external world to underpin one's experience: i.e., one knows that it works, even if one is not quite sure how.

Bruce

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jun 12, 2016 at 1:27 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

We need matter to get physical brain and physical computer, and the same for human and man-made machine consciousness.

​That's all I'm saying, for computation or intelligence ​or consciousnesses matter is required.    

 

​> ​

But that matter is shown to be only 

​[...]

​Who cares what it "only"is? Molecules are "only" atoms but for life molecules are required.​

 

​John K Clark​

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/12/2016 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Mechanism implies observable obeys quantum logic and not any other
> logic, and that the subject obeys intuitionist logic, and not any
> other logic.

What does that mean?

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

I should not have said that Cooper put the mind-body problem under the
rug by assuming the physical universe (and a primary one by default).
I should have said that this just don't work when we assume Mechanism,
and that QM confirms mechanism, not materialism.

I assume arithmetic, but everyone does. What axioms of Robinson
Arithmetic are you disagreeing with?

Then I get the body problem, but I solved it, in the sense that I show
that Arithmetic (+ Mechanism) implies physics (the body) is reduced to
statistics on infinitely many computations, with a measure given by
the logic of some self-referential modalities, imposed by UDA and its
translation in arithmetic, and we get quantum logic. I think it is the
first explanation of where physics and the quantum come from. may be
it is wrong, but that remains to be verified.

If Mechanism is true, we just cannot assume any particular universal
system, including physical one. That gives them ad hoc non Turing
emulable role, and hides the necessary non Turing emulable part of
physics.

Now, if you have a better theory of mind than digital mechanism, let
me know. But with mechanism we have indeed that body problem, but also
the means to solve it, and this satisfy my interest in the origin of
the physical (or of its appearance).

Yet, even without Digital Mechanism, I would not be happy with
assuming a primary physical universe, because that is like giving an
answer before formulating a problem. But, as I said, once we assume
mechanism, it is not a matter of choice. You might reread UDA, and I
mean the 7 steps, and then I can better explain the translation of the
UDA in the arithmetical language, and the relation with the RA, and
also with PA and other Löbian machines.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Jun 2016, at 03:22, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 13/06/2016 7:12 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/12/2016 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that mathematics is a way of brains thinking about things that was found by evolution, just like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a lot of other functions.  Bruno doesn't like that story though because it means mathematics only exists as instantiated in brains.

It is not a question of liking this or not. It is just that Cooper, and many contemporaries, assumed some physical universe, and that this assumption put the mind-body problem under the rug. It is like saying God made it. They don't push enough their own Darwinian logic.

That's begging the question.  You assume arithmetic; which sweeps the mind-body problem under the rug by making the "body" part hard. Everybody starts by assuming something.  Assuming physics and providing an evolution based account of the development of mind and minds development of arithmetic is just as legitimate as starting with arithmetic and trying to derive matter and mind.

Assuming arithmetic does not even account for mind,

(Sigma_1) Arithmetic is (Turing) equivalent with a universal dovetailing, or any concept of universal machine. With digital mechanism, you can define the mind by what universal machine do. To express this, you need to assume a universal base, and number addition and multiplication, learned at school, is basically enough.

of course, arithmetic per se does not account for the mind in any obvious way. But that follows from the work of Gödel, Turing, Church, and others. The sigma_1 arithmetical reality (a tiny part of bthe arithmetical reality) account for the highly structured collection of all computations. And that concept is made solid with the CHurch-Turing thesis.

much less account for matter.

It does, and QM confirms the most shocking consequence (that our consciousness relies on infinitely many computations). Just read the papers. I think it is the first refutable theory which does it. in the eighties, I was sure it would have been refuted before 2000. But the evidence adds on both side, and primary matter will become the new ether or phlogiston, I think. 

Saying that consciousness is a computation is empty until one specifies precisely what form of computation.

Here, it is the complete contrary which happens. No sound machine can ever specify the computations which supports her first person experience. That is a theorem. The *constructive* reduction of physics to arithmetic is based on the necessarily non constructive theology of the universal machine.

And why that form of computation rather than some other?

We can only bet that if we are copied at some level, we survive. This provably require an act of faith. All sound machine knows that, soon or later. Fundamentally, that bet is a private affair between you and your doctor. Of course, high level copies are cheaper than low level copies. 

I don't see that computationalism actually solves anything

It shed light on the road, and so we can search the key we have lost.

Virtually nobody assumes the negation of computationalism today. Except the wave collapse, there is no sign that there is anything not Turing emulable in Nature. 

-- the problems it leaves unanswered are every bit as difficult as the problems one started with.

?

There are open mathematical problems, and the contrary would have been quite astonishing, as the science is still only starting. yet, it provides the whole shape of the solution of the mind body problem, and people open to Everett can understand it more easily than others. The rest is in the study of Gödel, Löb, ... Solovay. 

At least with scientific realism, one has the objective external world to underpin one's experience: i.e., one knows that it works, even if one is not quite sure how.

Computationalism *belongs to*scientific realism. 

It just happens that the physical appearances are explained by a realist theory of the universal machines' dreams and the third and first person logics and statistics.

The big discovery is Gödel discovery. With computationalism, that is the discovery of the mathematician *in* arithmetic. All its dreams belongs there too. 

Bruno

Bruce

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Jun 2016, at 03:48, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jun 12, 2016 at 1:27 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​

We need matter to get physical brain and physical computer, and the same for human and man-made machine consciousness.

​That's all I'm saying, for computation or intelligence ​or consciousnesses matter is required.

But that is false, just plainly false.

What I said was that for actual physical computation we need matter.

But computation, intelligence and consciousness does not require the *assumption* of matter. All universal numbers will believe in matter, without assuming matter, as matter is how arithmetic look when seen from inside by sound self-referential machines (and actually from a large class of arithmetical non-machine entities too).

   

 

​> ​

But that matter is shown to be only 

​[...]

​Who cares what it "only"is? Molecules are "only" atoms but for life molecules are required.​

 

Locally, yes, for the type of life as it has incarnated itself on this planet. But life and consciousness requires only some number relation, and atoms and molecules are stable convenient fictions to avoid doing infinities of computations to remain conscious. Sort of macro, in some way. 

Keep in mind of the goal of this list, which is the search of a fundamental theory explaining coherently matter, mind and its relation.

Again, just to understand the problem, you need to go a bit deeper than step 2.

Bruno

​John K Clark​

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[Bruno Marchal]

Rationally believable is, for the ideally sound machine, modeled by
its arithmetical provability predicate ([]p).

Let [1]p be defined by []p & p, and [2]p by []p & <>t, and [3]p by
[2]p & p.

Then we have the following facts:

G* proves []p <-> [i]p (i = 1, 2, 3)

G does not prove any of those equivalence.

That implies that the logic of [1], [2] and [3] are different.

UDA (and generally Digital Mechanism) implies that physics should be
given by the self-reference modalities, and the probability one should
be given by those modalities obeying the "probability" modal axiom []p
-> <>p, and this restricted on the computable "events", which are the
leaves of the universal dovetailing, and can be shown equivalent to
the (true) sigma_1 sentences.

The math shows that they indeed provides quantization modal logic,
even quantum logic close to some already discussed in the physicists
literature.

[1]p gives intuitionist logic (which is nice for the internal first
person view)
[2]p gives sharable quantum logics (plausibly close the searched first
person plural notion), and its gives on p sigma_1 a quantum logic at
the star (true) level (use G*).
[3]p gives a curious logic which is both intuitionist and quantum, and
is supposed to be, at the G* minus G level, the logic of qualia. Note
that quanta are particular qualia, but that is equivalent with Everett
QM, the worlds are sharable dreams.

[1]p gives the knower, the soul, the internal god, .... (named
different according to different tradition, history).
[2]p gives the observer
[3]p gives the feeler (if I can say).

Physics should be entirely determined by the measure one logic, and so
we can expect an equivalent of Gleason theorem in all models (in the
logician sense) of the logic of [3]p (at least).

It is really incompleteness which introduces all those nuance between
the way a machine can apprehend itself with respect to the
arithmetical reality or truth.

Bruno

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/13/2016 8:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 12 Jun 2016, at 23:12, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/12/2016 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that
>>>> mathematics is a way of brains thinking about things that was found
>>>> by evolution, just like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a
>>>> lot of other functions. Bruno doesn't like that story though
>>>> because it means mathematics only exists as instantiated in brains.
>>>
>>> It is not a question of liking this or not. It is just that Cooper,
>>> and many contemporaries, assumed some physical universe, and that
>>> this assumption put the mind-body problem under the rug. It is like
>>> saying God made it. They don't push enough their own Darwinian logic.
>>
>> That's begging the question. You assume arithmetic; which sweeps the
>> mind-body problem under the rug by making the "body" part hard.
>> Everybody starts by assuming something. Assuming physics and
>> providing an evolution based account of the development of mind and
>> minds development of arithmetic is just as legitimate as starting
>> with arithmetic and trying to derive matter and mind.
>
> I should not have said that Cooper put the mind-body problem under the
> rug by assuming the physical universe (and a primary one by default).
> I should have said that this just don't work when we assume Mechanism,
> and that QM confirms mechanism, not materialism.
>
> I assume arithmetic, but everyone does. What axioms of Robinson
> Arithmetic are you disagreeing with?

Why would I disagree with them? They're axioms.

>
> Then I get the body problem, but I solved it, in the sense that I show
> that Arithmetic (+ Mechanism) implies physics (the body) is reduced to
> statistics on infinitely many computations,

But it doesn't imply that in the sense of logical entailment. Within
arithmetic+mechanism you don't even have a derivation of matter. It
only "implies" it in the sense that "If my theory is going to work it
must be true that...."

> with a measure given by the logic of some self-referential modalities,
> imposed by UDA and its translation in arithmetic, and we get quantum
> logic. I think it is the first explanation of where physics and the
> quantum come from. may be it is wrong, but that remains to be verified.

And where is this spelled out?

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

But in applied science, like we are doing here, we have an intended
model in mind, and the axioms are supposed to be sound with respect to
that model. In the case of mathematics, axioms are chosen from some
introspective work. For elementary arithmetic there is a general
consensus that the axioms of RA and PA are quite reasonable, yet, even
here there are (rare but respectable) mathematicians who reject some
axioms. The most commonly rejected axiom of RA and PA is probably the
excluded middle axiom, leading to the Heyting intuitionist Arithmetic
HA. Nelson rejects the scheme of induction axioms, (leading to
something called predicative arithmetic, like RA is) and never cease
to hope showing that PA, and thus the induction axioms, are
inconsistent.

>
>>
>> Then I get the body problem, but I solved it, in the sense that I
>> show that Arithmetic (+ Mechanism) implies physics (the body) is
>> reduced to statistics on infinitely many computations,
>
> But it doesn't imply that in the sense of logical entailment.

? (it does).

> Within arithmetic+mechanism you don't even have a derivation of
> matter. It only "implies" it in the sense that "If my theory is
> going to work it must be true that...."

No, even if false, it implies it.

>
>> with a measure given by the logic of some self-referential
>> modalities, imposed by UDA and its translation in arithmetic, and
>> we get quantum logic. I think it is the first explanation of where
>> physics and the quantum come from. may be it is wrong, but that
>> remains to be verified.
>
> And where is this spelled out?

In most of my papers. Thanks to Solovay theorem, it takes not much
line. Of course, it leads to many open problem to compare that
universal machine's physics with observation, but that theory is not
yet refuted. On the contrary the physicalist theories are refuted at
once (in the computationalist frame: that is what is showed by the
UDA), (with some technical nuances due to the different possible use
of Occam and its weakening when we do fundamental applied science).


Bruno

[Telmo Menezes]

On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 3:22 AM, Bruce Kellett
<bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> On 13/06/2016 7:12 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> On 6/12/2016 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that mathematics
> is a way of brains thinking about things that was found by evolution, just
> like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a lot of other functions.
> Bruno doesn't like that story though because it means mathematics only
> exists as instantiated in brains.
>
>
> It is not a question of liking this or not. It is just that Cooper, and many
> contemporaries, assumed some physical universe, and that this assumption put
> the mind-body problem under the rug. It is like saying God made it. They
> don't push enough their own Darwinian logic.
>
>
> That's begging the question. You assume arithmetic; which sweeps the
> mind-body problem under the rug by making the "body" part hard. Everybody
> starts by assuming something. Assuming physics and providing an evolution
> based account of the development of mind and minds development of arithmetic
> is just as legitimate as starting with arithmetic and trying to derive
> matter and mind.
>
>
> Assuming arithmetic does not even account for mind, much less account for
> matter. Saying that consciousness is a computation is empty until one
> specifies precisely what form of computation.

It might be that all computations are conscious -- but with much
different contents, of course. I feel some inclination towards this
hypothesis.

> And why that form of
> computation rather than some other? I don't see that computationalism
> actually solves anything -- the problems it leaves unanswered are every bit
> as difficult as the problems one started with.

But computationalism is the default position of modern science. The
brain is a neural network, the neural network is equivalent to a
Turing Machine and it is running a program, and this is what mind is
somehow. Non-computationalism seems to require some form of duality,
appeal to a soul and so on.

I don't find that computationalism was created to "solve anything". It
is just the most obvious interpretation of a variety of empirical
observations across fields: neuroscience, biology, chemistry, computer
science.

> At least with scientific
> realism, one has the objective external world to underpin one's experience:
> i.e., one knows that it works, even if one is not quite sure how.

Again, computationalism is the position of scientific realism. But
Bruno's work (unless you mange to refute it) shows that
computationalism is not compatible with the sort of objective external
world that you like. So you have to choose one or the other.

I do agree with you that, as far as I can tell, consciousness remains
a mystery in Bruno's model.

I can see how the UDA is uncomfortable to some people, but like with
all science we can't choose, just check for correctness.

Telmo.

>
> Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

I would express this differently. Only persons are conscious (and no
problem seeing a person already in a spider). But persons are the
result of comples dynamical state relative to the state of some others
universal machines (from the physical laws to your parents, the boss,
etc.).

The first person is not associated to one computation, but to an
infinity of them, emerging from a non trivial structure (eventually
the sigma_1 sentences (with or without oracle) structured by the
modalities of self-reference (which exists and are variate due to
incompleteness).

Computation is still a third person describable object (assuming
Church-Turing). But consciousness is a first person thing, and no
machine can equate it with any thing third person describable.

I think you know this and made a periphrase, this is for the possible
benefits of others.

>
>> And why that form of
>> computation rather than some other? I don't see that computationalism
>> actually solves anything -- the problems it leaves unanswered are
>> every bit
>> as difficult as the problems one started with.
>
> But computationalism is the default position of modern science.

I agree. Computationalism is almost accepting that brains does not
work by magic (infinities, substancial angel).

> The
> brain is a neural network, the neural network is equivalent to a
> Turing Machine and it is running a program, and this is what mind is
> somehow. Non-computationalism seems to require some form of duality,
> appeal to a soul and so on.

It appeal to some non computable things, without ever making it precise.

And after Gödel+Turing (say), we know that machines are already
confronted to the non computable, even just by looking at themselves.

I think that is why Diderot define rationalism by Descartes'
mechanism. Non-mechanism is like substituting ignorance for knowledge
and forgetting to add the interrogation mark. But, the more we study
computationalism, the more also we will understand the shape of
possible non computationalist theories, end eventually we can expect
to see what match better the facts.

>
> I don't find that computationalism was created to "solve anything". It
> is just the most obvious interpretation of a variety of empirical
> observations across fields: neuroscience, biology, chemistry, computer
> science.

Yes, and it is a lantern where we can search the keys. In particular
computationalism, that is Digital (Descarte's) Mechanism, thank to
Church Thesis, makes the field purely mathematical.

>
>> At least with scientific
>> realism, one has the objective external world to underpin one's
>> experience:
>> i.e., one knows that it works, even if one is not quite sure how.
>
> Again, computationalism is the position of scientific realism. But
> Bruno's work (unless you mange to refute it) shows that
> computationalism is not compatible with the sort of objective external
> world that you like. So you have to choose one or the other.
>
> I do agree with you that, as far as I can tell, consciousness remains
> a mystery in Bruno's model.

In deeply disagree on this, and this means you have to work a bit more.

Let me explain shortly. First we start from consciousness, by
(re)defining computationalism as the assumption that there is a level
of description of myself such that my consciousness remains unchanged
through a functional substitution made at that level.

Then that consciousness appears to be a differentiating flux of
possibilities starting from any relative universal state (relative to
either some other universal number, or from the universal base (here
RA).

In UDA, to get the "reversal" physics/arithmetic, you need not more
than AI and Everett notion: the personal memory (the personal diary).

But when we translate this in arithmetic, the first person is defined
by the Theaetetus's idea of linking the self-representation with the
truth. We can do that easily mathematically, because we restrict
ourself to the sound machine by construction. But no machine can know
they are sound, nor even really define what that means for them. The
result is that the first person knowledge ([]p & p) is not definable,
nor is the first person sensation ([]p & <>t & p, p sigma_1). This
explains why the soul is so elusive a notion, and consciousness so
obvious (close to <>t v t) from the machine first person view, yet
entirely not describable in arithmetical term. But machine can try
approximation, and as long as they don't pretend to get it, they can
progress.

All the things work because the mind of the self-referentially correct
is between the 3-self, the 1-self, and God, that is: G, S4Grz, and G*.

They all want []p -> p (reflexion), p/[]p (necessitation) and Löb []
([]p -> p)-> []p (modesty).

Exercise: shows that this leads to contradiction. So they share the
work:

The 3-self (G) keeps Löb and the necessitation, and thus abandon
reflexion.
God (G*) keeps reflexion and Löb, and thus abandon necessitation.
The soul (the 1-self, the knower) keeps reflexion and necessitation,
and thus abandon Löb. It lost modesty, and if its mother does not
educate it well, it might become a tyrant.

I will give the solution later after the (oral) June Exams which start
tomorrow. Revise the Chellas :)

>
> I can see how the UDA is uncomfortable to some people, but like with
> all science we can't choose, just check for correctness.

That is the best we can hope.

In all fields.

Freedom of religion (laicity) is not freedom of teaching the kids
invalid inference rules.

I really urge people to read the following book:

Daniel J. Cohen, 2007, Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and
Victorian Faith, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

It explains convingly how modern mathematical logic started from
theological motivation, with Peirce (Benjamin, the father of Charles
Sanders Peirce), Boole, De Morgan, Carroll (!), etc. The goal was
notably to introduce more rigors, and concerned mainly Unitarians
wanting to take distance from the more Dogmatic conventional
Trinitarians. Ironically, the theology of the universal machine is
more trinitarian than unitarian, well it is 4 + 4 * infinity-arian,
somehow.

That book explains how the goal of making mathematics accepted as
profession made the mathematicians starting to hide and eventually
deny the theological motivation. No doubt that was good for making
mathematics into a profession, but why not starting professionalizing
theology, or at least its professionalizable part?

Making a science "illegal", and you give the "market" to the
"charlatan", like making a medication illegal gives the markets to the
criminals.

And now a tip to get closer to God: avoid all tips to get closer to
God. (grin)

I have to go. I will be busy for a few days.

Best

Bruno

>
> Telmo.
>
>>
>> Bruce
>>
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Brent Meeker]

I disagree with that last point. As I've frequently argued a
computation instantiating consciousness can only be relative to some
environment - what we call "external reality". The "external reality"
can be part of the same computation; in fact it must be - otherwise, as
you note, we're faced with dualism and explaining how these two
conceptually different things, mind and matter, interact. But just as
one can say they're part of the same computation, one can also say
they're both part of the same physical reality - with a slightly
expanded concept of physical reality. So physicalism can "solve" the
problem of consciousness the same way computationalism does - by
identifying some subset of processes as instantiating consciousness. I
think that's what will happen and "the hard problem" will be superseded
by an engineering solution to AI.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/14/2016 10:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Let me explain shortly. First we start from consciousness, by
> (re)defining computationalism as the assumption that there is a level
> of description of myself such that my consciousness remains unchanged
> through a functional substitution made at that level.

But already at the beginning you have swept the problem under the rug.
Notice that you could replace "consciousness" by "physics" in the same
sentence. You're just assuming that whatever you're talking about can
be computed - which is OK, but it's not solution to the problem of
consciousness until you can say exactly which computations are conscious
an which are not. I think it is interesting that you consider spiders
conscious, but not plants. What's the difference? Obviously it's the
degree and scope of interaction with the environment. Which to me is
further evidence that you implicitly recognize there can be no sharp
division between matter and mind.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

On 15/06/2016 12:19 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 3:22 AM, Bruce Kellett
>

>> Assuming arithmetic does not even account for mind, much less account for
>> matter. Saying that consciousness is a computation is empty until one
>> specifies precisely what form of computation.
> It might be that all computations are conscious -- but with much
> different contents, of course. I feel some inclination towards this
> hypothesis.

But then you explain nothing. You have just made an identification
"computation = consciousness", which tells us nothing useful

>> And why that form of
>> computation rather than some other? I don't see that computationalism
>> actually solves anything -- the problems it leaves unanswered are every bit
>> as difficult as the problems one started with.
> But computationalism is the default position of modern science. The
> brain is a neural network, the neural network is equivalent to a
> Turing Machine and it is running a program, and this is what mind is
> somehow. Non-computationalism seems to require some form of duality,
> appeal to a soul and so on.

Have you never heard of supervenience? Consciousness is just a property
of matter in certain configurations and acting in certain ways. Such a
position does not deny that consciousness has some similarities to a
computation, but recognizes that it is a computation performed by a
brain composed of matter. There is no inherent duality.

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

I agree with you here, but I think that Bruno has an even more serious
problem: it seems that there is an inherent circularity in the above
computationalist account of consciousness.

The starting assumption is that consciousness is unchanged by a
functional substitution at some level. But what does a "functional
substitution" mean in this context? It is clear that Bruno is thinking
of replacing some or all of the human brain by a functionally identical
machine. Firstly, that assumes supervenience of consciousness on the
brain -- something that is not part of the definition of consciousness.
And secondly, it assumes that a different substrate, one that can
instantiate computations independently of brains and consciousness,
exits. If you are going to substitute something for something else, you
need something else by which to make the substitution. In this case, the
implicit assumption is that we have a physical computer that can be used
to carry out the required computations. But no such physical machines
exist if we start with consciousness in isolation. Bruno wants to deduce
the existence of the physical by some statistics over computations going
through the particular consciousness. But this is viciously circular if
he has to assume the existence of that physical level at the start. He
hasn't derived or deduced it -- he has simply assumed it.

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

But one for which there is good evidence.

> And secondly, it assumes that a different substrate, one that can
> instantiate computations independently of brains and consciousness,
> exits.

Which follows from the Church-Turing thesis that all Turing universal
computers can compute the same set of functions.

> If you are going to substitute something for something else, you need
> something else by which to make the substitution. In this case, the
> implicit assumption is that we have a physical computer that can be
> used to carry out the required computations. But no such physical
> machines exist if we start with consciousness in isolation.

That's not how I understand his argument. He does start from the
assumption that a brain's consciousness can be instantiated by any
machine that is Turing universal - what he calls the "Yes, doctor"
assumption. But then he tries to prove that the physical instantiation
is superfluous by constructing a thought experiment in which the
computation takes place with no corresponding physical changes of state
(see also Mauldin's Olympia argument). I don't think he succeeds in
this proof, but I don't think he considers it very important either. As
a neo-platonist he's already sure that numbers, arithmetic, and
computations are "more real" than material objects. So the immaterial
existence of computations is almost a given for Bruno.

[Bruce Kellett]

Sure, but is that part of the definition of consciousness?

>> And secondly, it assumes that a different substrate, one that can
>> instantiate computations independently of brains and consciousness,
>> exits.
>
> Which follows from the Church-Turing thesis that all Turing universal
> computers can compute the same set of functions.

No, the existence of an independent substrate does not follow from the
Church-Turing thesis. That thesis merely states that *if* you can
implement a Turing machine on a different substrate, it will be able to
compute the same functions. That does not require that any such
substrate exists.

>> If you are going to substitute something for something else, you need
>> something else by which to make the substitution. In this case, the
>> implicit assumption is that we have a physical computer that can be
>> used to carry out the required computations. But no such physical
>> machines exist if we start with consciousness in isolation.
>
> That's not how I understand his argument. He does start from the
> assumption that a brain's consciousness can be instantiated by any
> machine that is Turing universal - what he calls the "Yes, doctor"
> assumption. But then he tries to prove that the physical
> instantiation is superfluous by constructing a thought experiment in
> which the computation takes place with no corresponding physical
> changes of state (see also Mauldin's Olympia argument). I don't think
> he succeeds in this proof, but I don't think he considers it very
> important either. As a neo-platonist he's already sure that numbers,
> arithmetic, and computations are "more real" than material objects.
> So the immaterial existence of computations is almost a given for Bruno.

I don't think that Bruno's MGA (or Maudlin's Olympia argument) succeed
either. So it has not been demonstrated that consciousness can exist
without a physical substrate. Neo-platonism is a philosophical stance
(and not a dominant one among philosophers or scientists), and the
independent existence of numbers and arithmetic in a non-physical
'platonic' realm is not a law of thought. It is perfectly rational to
deny this and to assume some version of physicalism. In fact, in a
survey of philosophers by Bourget and Chalmers (Philosophical Studies
3:1-36) Physicalism is the dominant philosophy of mind (57%).

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

I don't think he ever intended to define consciousness. He assumes
everyone knows what it is, i.e. ostensive definition.

>
>>> And secondly, it assumes that a different substrate, one that can
>>> instantiate computations independently of brains and consciousness,
>>> exits.
>>
>> Which follows from the Church-Turing thesis that all Turing universal
>> computers can compute the same set of functions.
>
> No, the existence of an independent substrate does not follow from the
> Church-Turing thesis. That thesis merely states that *if* you can
> implement a Turing machine on a different substrate, it will be able
> to compute the same functions. That does not require that any such
> substrate exists.

But we already know that substrates exist that will support a universal
Turing machine (modulo infinite memory tape), i.e. digital computers.
Turing imagined his machine to be implemented by pencil and paper and a
set of instructions.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

Just pointing to a conscious person does not specify what consciousness
is, or its limits. Much less does it indicate that consciousness is a
kind of computation.

>>>> And secondly, it assumes that a different substrate, one that can
>>>> instantiate computations independently of brains and consciousness,
>>>> exits.
>>>
>>> Which follows from the Church-Turing thesis that all Turing
>>> universal computers can compute the same set of functions.
>>
>> No, the existence of an independent substrate does not follow from
>> the Church-Turing thesis. That thesis merely states that *if* you can
>> implement a Turing machine on a different substrate, it will be able
>> to compute the same functions. That does not require that any such
>> substrate exists.
>
> But we already know that substrates exist that will support a
> universal Turing machine (modulo infinite memory tape), i.e. digital
> computers. Turing imagined his machine to be implemented by pencil
> and paper and a set of instructions.

That seems to be assuming a lot! Assuming that consciousness is a (type
of) computation does not imply that non-arithmetical substrates exist,
much less that pencil and paper exist. Knowing that something is true of
the world that we experience does not entail that its existence is
necessary.

Bruno can start from his (neo-)platonist assumption that arithmetic
exists independently, and that arithmetic implements all computations
(Turing machines). But he then has to prove that this assumption leads
necessarily to the existence of a physical world of the character that
we observe. Since his 7 steps only work if the physical world is already
assumed, he has to look to some other arguments. I don't think you can
argue that the physical world is assumed in Bruno's 7 steps as part of a
reductio argument -- that this assumption leads to a contradiction. In
the first place, the reductio fails, and even if it succeeded, one could
well claim the assumption of platonism was the root of the
contradiction, leaving physicalism unscathed.

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

I think that parts pretty easy. Having assumed arithmetic exists it
follows from Godel that all Turing computations exist (in arithmetic).
Among all computations are those instantiating our conscious thoughts.
Those conscious thoughts include those we call perceptions which we
interpret as experience of a physical world.

As I said this seems to have the same problem as Boltzmann's brain. It
would imply that any universe at all similar to ours has measure zero.
But eternal inflation may have the same problem of "proving to much".

> Since his 7 steps only work if the physical world is already assumed,
> he has to look to some other arguments. I don't think you can argue
> that the physical world is assumed in Bruno's 7 steps as part of a
> reductio argument -- that this assumption leads to a contradiction.

He thinks it leads to an absurdity - that the computation is implemented
just by indicating the frames of the movie graph. No physical change of
state. No entropy increase. A related question is whether or not
replaying a record of a conscious instantiating process again
instantiates the consciousness?

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/14/2016 9:33 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Firstly, that assumes supervenience of consciousness on the brain -- something that is not part of the definition of consciousness.

But one for which there is good evidence.

Sure, but is that part of the definition of consciousness?

I don't think he ever intended to define consciousness.  He assumes everyone knows what it is, i.e. ostensive definition.

Just pointing to a conscious person does not specify what consciousness is, or its limits. Much less does it indicate that consciousness is a kind of computation.

In this case ostensive definition means "pointing" to your own consciousness.  It's a Cartesian argument - if you don't know what consciousness is then you don't know anything anyway.  In any case it's a common assumption among advocates of AI that it is a kind of computation done by one's brain.  There's an article in this month's Skeptic magazine, in which Robert Kuhn collects and summarizes most of the ideas about what consciousness is and whether it can be realized artificially.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

On 15/06/2016 3:39 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 6/14/2016 9:33 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> That seems to be assuming a lot! Assuming that consciousness is a
>> (type of) computation does not imply that non-arithmetical substrates
>> exist, much less that pencil and paper exist. Knowing that something
>> is true of the world that we experience does not entail that its
>> existence is necessary.
>>
>> Bruno can start from his (neo-)platonist assumption that arithmetic
>> exists independently, and that arithmetic implements all computations
>> (Turing machines). But he then has to prove that this assumption
>> leads necessarily to the existence of a physical world of the
>> character that we observe.
>
> I think that parts pretty easy. Having assumed arithmetic exists it
> follows from Godel that all Turing computations exist (in
> arithmetic). Among all computations are those instantiating our
> conscious thoughts. Those conscious thoughts include those we call
> perceptions which we interpret as experience of a physical world.

In which case Bruno's 7 or 8 step argument is irrelevant -- the early
steps do nothing but put forward a confused notion of personal identity.
If you assume all computations exist in arithmetical platonia, the
dovetailer follows automatically. But one is actually no better off than
if one started by assuming the physical world and explaining both
arithmetic and consciousness as products of evolution.

> As I said this seems to have the same problem as Boltzmann's brain. It
> would imply that any universe at all similar to ours has measure
> zero. But eternal inflation may have the same problem of "proving to
> much".

That seems to be the real problem with the computational approach -- how
do we get the world we actually observe (and the consciousness we
actually experience) rather than just a mish-mash of everything, with no
distinct laws or thoughts. If one is going to appeal to something like
an inference to the best explanation, then physicalism wins hands down:
computationalism doesn't even get to first base, whereas physicalism can
provide a realistic mechanism (evolution) that can readily give all the
results one desires. Application of Occam's razor leads to the same
conclusion.

Bruce

[Telmo Menezes]

Yes. The point of my crude simplification was to argue that, in the
extreme, computationalism creates no more of a mystery about
consciousness than physicalism. My point to Bruce is that insists on
wanting things that are not compatible with each other -- from my
amateurish understanding of theoretical physics, this happens in other
areas of science: you can choose weirdness A or weirdness B, but you
cannot get rid of all weirdness.

In my view you cannot want "scientific realism" and also ignore that
the brain really looks like a computer. But then you cannot ignore the
consequences of the UDA. All this independently of what consciousness
is, I would say. But maybe you also disagree.

I do have to work more to fully understand some of your more
"advanced" :) ideas, but even from what you say above, this is my
impression: you have a great theory for why we cannot explain
consciousness, but you still do not explain it.

>
> All the things work because the mind of the self-referentially correct is
> between the 3-self, the 1-self, and God, that is: G, S4Grz, and G*.
>
> They all want []p -> p (reflexion), p/[]p (necessitation) and Löb []([]p ->
> p)-> []p (modesty).
>
> Exercise: shows that this leads to contradiction. So they share the work:
>
> The 3-self (G) keeps Löb and the necessitation, and thus abandon reflexion.
> God (G*) keeps reflexion and Löb, and thus abandon necessitation.
> The soul (the 1-self, the knower) keeps reflexion and necessitation, and
> thus abandon Löb. It lost modesty, and if its mother does not educate it
> well, it might become a tyrant.
>
> I will give the solution later after the (oral) June Exams which start
> tomorrow. Revise the Chellas :)

Ok :)

[Bruno Marchal]

Bruce, Brent,

You are lucky I have not really the time to comment each line of your
posts, so to sum up, I thinks you miss the point or some point. Brent
made many valid replies to Bruce, though. So I will need to search
what is going wrong, which is exactly the point you miss.

I am absolutely not proposing a new theory, I just explain that there
is a "fatal" problem for theories assuming both physicalism and
*digital* mechanism, alias computationalism, in philosophy of mind, or
theology, or cognitive science. Which is, as Brent says, like Diderot
(!), a normal default theory (among rationalist and perhaps some
mystics).

The problem is: justifying the appearance of the physical laws and
measurements results from a statistics on on all first person relative
views supported by all relative computations. That generalizes what
Everett did on the universal wave (basically a quantum universal
dovetailer) to *all* universal dovetailer or sigma_1 complete sets.


But the mathematical logicians got the tools to translate this in
arithmetic, or in arithmetical terms, using what Gerson (expert on
Antic philosopher) call the standard theory of knowledge (true belief,
true 3p-finite-representation).

And it works in the sense of providing an intuitionist logic for the
first person (close to Brouwer Bergson Dogen (etc.) mystical theory of
consciousness), *and* a quantum logic for the observable (bettable and
repeatable, symmetrical, with a quantization (in some sense used in
Quantum Logic). (+ the star-difference G*\G, Z1*\Z1, etc. which
provide tools to handle the distinction between qualia (first person
singular measurable) and quanta (first person plural measurable)).

I just offer a way to refute a simple and classical version of
computationalism. Find a quantum tautology violated by nature and
which is a theorem in the quantum logic intrinsical to the (self)-
observing machine.

I am amazed this "simple" theory is not yet refuted. Getting a quantum
logic is not a long way to get a theorem à-la Gleason.

To get all this, you need to read my long text, or study some papers
by Goldblatt, some quantum logicians, perhaps von Neumann, piron or
Mittlestaedt, or Dalla Chiara. The key result is Goldblatt showing
the B modal logic axiomatize an interesting minimal quantum logic,
"talking" on alternate measurement results. Then you need to study the
logic of self-reference (from Gödel to Solovay).

The mind-body problem invites itself through QM in physics, but with
the discovery of the universal machine it introduces itself already in
arithmetic, and the bit-qubit relation is a two way road.

Bruno

[Bruno Marchal]

David Nyman thought something like this, but I think he saw the flaw.
Eventually, the criteria we could use is the conceptually simplicity
of the base theory.

> My point to Bruce is that insists on
> wanting things that are not compatible with each other -- from my
> amateurish understanding of theoretical physics, this happens in other
> areas of science: you can choose weirdness A or weirdness B, but you
> cannot get rid of all weirdness.

Yes. Maudlin, in its book on quantum inseparability use the
expression: choose your favorite poison.

>
> In my view you cannot want "scientific realism" and also ignore that
> the brain really looks like a computer.

Certainly, at some level of decription. It looks like that. It is a
reasonable bet.

> But then you cannot ignore the
> consequences of the UDA. All this independently of what consciousness
> is, I would say. But maybe you also disagree.

The 3p-truth is independent of consciousness, but it is consciousness
which makes the person say: "oh I am in Washington and not in Moscow".
It the receptacle of the experience, or the measurement result, but it
is also the "unconscious" bet that there is something true behind that
measurement: the nuance are made possible by the fact that []p & p
differ from []p & <>t & p. The first is knowledge, the second is more
close to consciousness. I guess I need to explain more.

But if I explain it, after explaining that it is not explainable, I
will get inconsistent!

Same with God. Machine's theologies and psychologies are negative
theologies and psychologies: those things are simply not reducible in
words like a tootache, or the pleasure you can have when listening to
music.

>
>>
>> All the things work because the mind of the self-referentially
>> correct is
>> between the 3-self, the 1-self, and God, that is: G, S4Grz, and G*.
>>
>> They all want []p -> p (reflexion), p/[]p (necessitation) and Löb
>> []([]p ->
>> p)-> []p (modesty).
>>
>> Exercise: shows that this leads to contradiction. So they share the
>> work:
>>
>> The 3-self (G) keeps Löb and the necessitation, and thus abandon
>> reflexion.
>> God (G*) keeps reflexion and Löb, and thus abandon necessitation.
>> The soul (the 1-self, the knower) keeps reflexion and
>> necessitation, and
>> thus abandon Löb. It lost modesty, and if its mother does not
>> educate it
>> well, it might become a tyrant.
>>
>> I will give the solution later after the (oral) June Exams which
>> start
>> tomorrow. Revise the Chellas :)
>
> Ok :)

Good :)

Bruno

>> To post to this group, send email to everything-
>> li...@googlegroups.com.

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/15/2016 9:25 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> Yes. The point of my crude simplification was to argue that, in the
> extreme, computationalism creates no more of a mystery about
> consciousness than physicalism.

But does it make it any less?

Brent

[Telmo Menezes]

On Wed, Jun 15, 2016 at 1:33 AM, Bruce Kellett
<bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> On 15/06/2016 12:19 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 3:22 AM, Bruce Kellett
>>
>>> Assuming arithmetic does not even account for mind, much less account for
>>> matter. Saying that consciousness is a computation is empty until one
>>> specifies precisely what form of computation.
>>
>> It might be that all computations are conscious -- but with much
>> different contents, of course. I feel some inclination towards this
>> hypothesis.
>
>
> But then you explain nothing. You have just made an identification
> "computation = consciousness", which tells us nothing useful

Yes, my point here is that, in the worst case, you are no worse than
you would be with physicalism in terms of explaining consciousness,
but at least you are taking modern science seriously (the brain looks
like a computer).

As discusses in another post, I do think that Bruno's ideas (with the
help of Gödel) provide an explanation to why consciousness looks like
a mystery to us.

>>> And why that form of
>>> computation rather than some other? I don't see that computationalism
>>> actually solves anything -- the problems it leaves unanswered are every
>>> bit
>>> as difficult as the problems one started with.
>>
>> But computationalism is the default position of modern science. The
>> brain is a neural network, the neural network is equivalent to a
>> Turing Machine and it is running a program, and this is what mind is
>> somehow. Non-computationalism seems to require some form of duality,
>> appeal to a soul and so on.
>
>
> Have you never heard of supervenience? Consciousness is just a property of
> matter in certain configurations and acting in certain ways. Such a position
> does not deny that consciousness has some similarities to a computation, but
> recognizes that it is a computation performed by a brain composed of matter.
> There is no inherent duality.

Yes, of course. I see 2 possibilities:

1) Matter is fungible, so it doesn't matter which atoms are performing
the computation. In this case the same configuration can be repeated,
and you get the same first-person indeterminacy that Bruno describes
in the UDA;

2) There is some unknown property of matter that makes atoms (or
whatever building block) non-fungible. What makes me me is partly the
presence of a set of specific atoms (with invisible labels given by
some unknown law of physics).

2) seems absurd given that, as far as we know, all the matter that
makes up our body is eventually replaced several times throughout our
lifetime. Perhaps there are exceptions in the skeleton, but all sorts
of bones have been replaced by prosthetic ones with no apparent
problem... So it seems that we are persistent phenomena along time,
not specific chunks of matter.

Telmo.

> Bruce
>
>
>> I don't find that computationalism was created to "solve anything". It
>> is just the most obvious interpretation of a variety of empirical
>> observations across fields: neuroscience, biology, chemistry, computer
>> science.
>>
>>> At least with scientific
>>> realism, one has the objective external world to underpin one's
>>> experience:
>>> i.e., one knows that it works, even if one is not quite sure how.
>>
>> Again, computationalism is the position of scientific realism. But
>> Bruno's work (unless you mange to refute it) shows that
>> computationalism is not compatible with the sort of objective external
>> world that you like. So you have to choose one or the other.
>>
>> I do agree with you that, as far as I can tell, consciousness remains
>> a mystery in Bruno's model.
>>
>> I can see how the UDA is uncomfortable to some people, but like with
>> all science we can't choose, just check for correctness.
>>
>> Telmo.
>
>

[Telmo Menezes]

Well... I would argue that individual consciousness + physicalism
would require non fungible matter, which seems absurd to me. (as I
just argued with Bruce)

Then I am convinced at least of this: under comp, Bruno with the help
of Gödel can explain why consciousness looks mysterious to us. That is
more than physicalism can do at the moment.

Telmo.

>
> Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

On 16/06/2016 5:26 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 15, 2016 at 1:33 AM, Bruce Kellett
> <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>> On 15/06/2016 12:19 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 3:22 AM, Bruce Kellett
>>>
>>>> Assuming arithmetic does not even account for mind, much less account for
>>>> matter. Saying that consciousness is a computation is empty until one
>>>> specifies precisely what form of computation.
>>> It might be that all computations are conscious -- but with much
>>> different contents, of course. I feel some inclination towards this
>>> hypothesis.
>>
>> But then you explain nothing. You have just made an identification
>> "computation = consciousness", which tells us nothing useful
> Yes, my point here is that, in the worst case, you are no worse than
> you would be with physicalism in terms of explaining consciousness,
> but at least you are taking modern science seriously (the brain looks
> like a computer).

I don't see any reason why physicalism might be thought to be in
conflict with a computational model of consciousness. The evidence that
consciousness supervenes on the physical brain is overwhelming, so no
model of consciousness can deny that the physical has an important role.

> As discusses in another post, I do think that Bruno's ideas (with the
> help of Gödel) provide an explanation to why consciousness looks like
> a mystery to us.

Maybe most of the mystery is in the eye of the beholder! Evolution
provides a perfectly comprehensible route to consciousness, and more
details about the mechanism will come from advances in the neurological
sciences by the usual channels.

>>>> And why that form of
>>>> computation rather than some other? I don't see that computationalism
>>>> actually solves anything -- the problems it leaves unanswered are every
>>>> bit
>>>> as difficult as the problems one started with.
>>> But computationalism is the default position of modern science. The
>>> brain is a neural network, the neural network is equivalent to a
>>> Turing Machine and it is running a program, and this is what mind is
>>> somehow. Non-computationalism seems to require some form of duality,
>>> appeal to a soul and so on.
>>
>> Have you never heard of supervenience? Consciousness is just a property of
>> matter in certain configurations and acting in certain ways. Such a position
>> does not deny that consciousness has some similarities to a computation, but
>> recognizes that it is a computation performed by a brain composed of matter.
>> There is no inherent duality.
> Yes, of course. I see 2 possibilities:
>
> 1) Matter is fungible, so it doesn't matter which atoms are performing
> the computation. In this case the same configuration can be repeated,
> and you get the same first-person indeterminacy that Bruno describes
> in the UDA;

Matter almost certainly is fungible, but there might be a problem with
scaling a computer model for individual neurons, or small groups of
neurons, up to the size of the full brain. I know no details, but I have
seen mention of this recently.

> 2) There is some unknown property of matter that makes atoms (or
> whatever building block) non-fungible. What makes me me is partly the
> presence of a set of specific atoms (with invisible labels given by
> some unknown law of physics).

Unlikely.

> 2) seems absurd given that, as far as we know, all the matter that
> makes up our body is eventually replaced several times throughout our
> lifetime. Perhaps there are exceptions in the skeleton, but all sorts
> of bones have been replaced by prosthetic ones with no apparent
> problem... So it seems that we are persistent phenomena along time,
> not specific chunks of matter.

I would agree, but this seems peripheral to the main issue of
computationalism vs physicalism. In terms of explanations of
consciousness, it seems to me that they are essentially on a par --
neither gives a comprehensive account.

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/16/2016 12:30 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 1:32 AM, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>> On 6/15/2016 9:25 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>> Yes. The point of my crude simplification was to argue that, in the
>>> extreme, computationalism creates no more of a mystery about
>>> consciousness than physicalism.
>>
>> But does it make it any less?
> Well... I would argue that individual consciousness + physicalism
> would require non fungible matter, which seems absurd to me. (as I
> just argued with Bruce)

You were arguing under the assumption that functionalism is false and I
think that is absurd. Functionalism is almost certainly true, the
problem is identifying all the essential functions.

>
> Then I am convinced at least of this: under comp, Bruno with the help
> of Gödel can explain why consciousness looks mysterious to us. That is
> more than physicalism can do at the moment.

I don't think Bruno explains anymore than physicalism. In fact
evolution explains why we don't even know about the functioning of our
brains; something that is possible under both physicalism and Bruno's
theory. Bruno's theory only explains that there are some things about
our thinking that we cannot prove/believe/infer (Bruno seems to trade on
equivocation of "B"). We cannot know if we are consistent for example.
But physicalism, and evolution, easily explain that we are probably NOT
consistent - and it doesn't mean that we prove everything because we
don't make all possible inferences. Our experiences are finite.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Jun 2016, at 18:50, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
>
> On 6/16/2016 12:30 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 1:32 AM, Brent Meeker
>> <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 6/15/2016 9:25 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>> Yes. The point of my crude simplification was to argue that, in the
>>>> extreme, computationalism creates no more of a mystery about
>>>> consciousness than physicalism.
>>>
>>> But does it make it any less?
>> Well... I would argue that individual consciousness + physicalism
>> would require non fungible matter, which seems absurd to me. (as I
>> just argued with Bruce)
>
> You were arguing under the assumption that functionalism is false
> and I think that is absurd. Functionalism is almost certainly true,
> the problem is identifying all the essential functions.

In Putnam's functionalism, the function are the Turing computable (or
semi-computable) functions. It is a form of computationalism, except
it is fuzzy about the substitution level, which seems to be
presupposed rater high, in the manner of the neurophilosophers.

Other form of functionalism are too much fuzzy, at least as far as I
know.

>
>>
>> Then I am convinced at least of this: under comp, Bruno with the help
>> of Gödel can explain why consciousness looks mysterious to us. That
>> is
>> more than physicalism can do at the moment.
>
> I don't think Bruno explains anymore than physicalism.

I explain why physicalism cannot work.

> In fact evolution explains why we don't even know about the
> functioning of our brains; something that is possible under both
> physicalism and Bruno's theory.

Locally. But evolution must be extended to the non physical origin of
the physical laws, which is precisely what computer science or
arithmetic provide.

Physicalism rarely address the mind-body problem, and assumes trivial
1-1 link between first person experience and third person description
of some realities. That does simply not work, and cannot work, as I
have explained cf UDA to not mention it).

> Bruno's theory only explains that there are some things about our
> thinking that we cannot prove/believe/infer (Bruno seems to trade on
> equivocation of "B").

The theory works for any creature which is finitely third person
describable, does not use magic, and believe in PA axioms. To refute
the consequence of computationalism on the basis that I assume the
observers to be arithmetically sound would be like refuting Einstein
of even Galilee physical theory, because they assume similar things on
the observers involved in the thought experience. "Einstein, your
theory is not convincing because you assume the guy in the train to be
sober, but why would it be sober?"

> We cannot know if we are consistent for example.

OK.

> But physicalism, and evolution, easily explain that we are probably
> NOT consistent - and it doesn't mean that we prove everything
> because we don't make all possible inferences.

That alludes to the non-monotonic layers that plays a crucial role in
speeding learning and natural languages. But that is another topic. We
have to "meta-bet" that we are consistent when we do theology, because
doing theology "scientifically" consists at doubting systematically on
all Gods, or if you prefer, on all realities that we feel existing
beyond oneself.

Here, I specifically do not allow the numbers that I interview in
arithmetic to use second order logic so that consistency is equivalent
"the God/Reality/Model relative to this Number" exists (by Post-Gödel-
Henkin *completeness* theorem of elementary (0th and 1th order) logic).

It is sad that logicians use the term Model for a (mathematical notion
of) semantic of a (mathematical notion of) theory, as physicists and
others use the term model for mainly what logician called theories
(formal or informal). It does not help in the dialog of deaf.

Physicalism invoke a God in its explanation of the links between the
third person description and the first person experience, and that use
of God just becomes a God-of-the-Gap metaphysical escape when you
assume the digital (Church-Turing-Post-Kleene) version of mechanism.



> Our experiences are finite.

And thus confronted all the time to the many infinities. But we can
manage, sometimes. Even in arithmetic, it makes some sense to say that
the sum of all natural numbers is ... -1/12. Computations like series
can converge and can diverge in infinitely many different sense/model.
Universal (Löbian) Machines know that the more they know, the bigger
is their ignorance spectrum.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
>
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Jun 2016, at 12:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:

> On 16/06/2016 5:26 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> On Wed, Jun 15, 2016 at 1:33 AM, Bruce Kellett
>> <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>> On 15/06/2016 12:19 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 3:22 AM, Bruce Kellett
>>>>
>>>>> Assuming arithmetic does not even account for mind, much less
>>>>> account for
>>>>> matter. Saying that consciousness is a computation is empty
>>>>> until one
>>>>> specifies precisely what form of computation.
>>>> It might be that all computations are conscious -- but with much
>>>> different contents, of course. I feel some inclination towards this
>>>> hypothesis.
>>>
>>> But then you explain nothing. You have just made an identification
>>> "computation = consciousness", which tells us nothing useful
>> Yes, my point here is that, in the worst case, you are no worse than
>> you would be with physicalism in terms of explaining consciousness,
>> but at least you are taking modern science seriously (the brain looks
>> like a computer).
>
> I don't see any reason why physicalism might be thought to be in
> conflict with a computational model of consciousness.

Physicalism assumes a reality to select the computations. With
computationalism, this is not just not necessary, it cannot work
without appeal to magic. A proof that there is no magic there would
only be a proof that such physical reality equal the one derived from
(intensional) arithmetic + computationalism.

> The evidence that consciousness supervenes on the physical brain is
> overwhelming,

I agree. That is the basic motivation for Mechanism. My personal first
discovery of the (universal) number is in the bacterium Escherchia
Coli (in a paper by Jacob and Monod, also Watson).

The appearance of physical computers does not add to physicalism
though, unless of course the facts refute digital mechanism, but as I
have explained, if it looks it is the case (the measure problem) when
we look in the details, the explosion of possibilities appears to be
immense and well structured in a quite similar way in the physical
appearances and in arithmetic (or any sigma_1 complete set).

> so no model of consciousness can deny that the physical has an
> important role.

Nobody doubt that the physical has an important role. It is, with
consciousness what I want to get some explanation for.

>
>> As discusses in another post, I do think that Bruno's ideas (with the
>> help of Gödel) provide an explanation to why consciousness looks like
>> a mystery to us.
>
> Maybe most of the mystery is in the eye of the beholder!

Well, a part of that mystery has been translated into a mathematical
measure problem.

That is why computationalism is very interesting, it makes a bridge
between theology/philosophy-o-mind/cognitive science and mathematics,
notably with a key role played by arithmetic theories and others
sigma_1 complete sets.

> Evolution provides a perfectly comprehensible route to consciousness,

To the easy consciousness problem. You don't seem aware of the hard
problem, like Chalmers called it.

> and more details about the mechanism will come from advances in the
> neurological sciences by the usual channels.

There is a risk that you will confuse a person and its local
implementation. Push forward, you will become a person eliminativist,
like the Churchland and even Dennett somehow.

The fact that consciousness select histories with apparent brain does
not mean that those brain are first person (hopefully plural)
limiting statistical appearance on all computations in arithmetic.

In that case we can still ascribe a conscious experience to the
relative others, but the person itself cannot ascribe her
consciousness to any particular computations among an infinities.

Good.

You know, all I say is that if you use evolution to explain
consciousness, then you already use mechanism, but then, and that is
what I show, you need to pursue the evolution idea up to the origin of
the physical laws, which have to resulted from a measure on universal
machine "hallucinations". It makes the physical reality somehow more
solid, as it relies to numbers addition and multiplication, yet
infinities of them.

>
>> 2) seems absurd given that, as far as we know, all the matter that
>> makes up our body is eventually replaced several times throughout our
>> lifetime. Perhaps there are exceptions in the skeleton, but all sorts
>> of bones have been replaced by prosthetic ones with no apparent
>> problem... So it seems that we are persistent phenomena along time,
>> not specific chunks of matter.
>
> I would agree, but this seems peripheral to the main issue of
> computationalism vs physicalism. In terms of explanations of
> consciousness, it seems to me that they are essentially on a par --
> neither gives a comprehensive account.

Physicalism just do not work. Physicists do not need such hypothesis.
And computationalist cannot use it without cheating.

And it is responsible, with its myth of primary matter, to a large
part of the difficulty of the mind-body problem, and to our tolerance
in the almost institutionalized lack of seriousness in the field, with
popular "easy answer".

We have not yet completed the enlightenment Period. The most
fundamental science has not yet come back to Academy. Some subject
seems to be taboo. Some dogma seems to prevail.

Is it astonishing? When you see how it is difficult for many people to
awaken for only seventy years of lies on "drugs/medication", it might
still take time for 1500 years of artificial separation of theology
and science.

My feeling, Bruce, is that you are not genuinely interested in the
mind-body problem, nor in the search of the most plausible TOE.
You seem to come up with an answer, without studying closer the problem.


Bruno







>
> Bruce

>
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/17/2016 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You know, all I say is that if you use evolution to explain
> consciousness, then you already use mechanism, but then, and that is
> what I show, you need to pursue the evolution idea up to the origin of
> the physical laws,

I'd have to assume physical laws arise from descent with modification
and natural selection. But that's only true metaphorically in the sense
that we invent them and select them for their predictive and explanatory
power.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 1:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>> ​

Evolution provides a perfectly comprehensible route to consciousness,

​> ​

To the easy consciousness problem. You don't seem aware of the hard problem, like  called it.

​The reason the hard problem hasn't been solved is that nobody, ​least of all Chalmers, has been able to clearly state exactly what the hard problem is. What mystery about consciousness has Darwin and the assumption that the chain of "what caused that?" 

questions is not infinite ​failed to solve?

 

​> 

Matter almost certainly is fungible,

​Yes, any atom will do because one atom is like another, but you can't make a calculation without atoms. Like atoms wheat is fungible and generic, but that doesn't mean you can make bread without wheat. 

​> ​

but there might be a problem with scaling a computer model for individual neurons, or small groups of neurons, up to the size of the full brain.

​Enormous technological problems would need to be overcome for a full brain emulation, but it would entail no scientific or philosophical problems. Unlike faster than light spaceships no new laws of physics would be required. ​

 

​> ​

You know, all I say is that if you use evolution to explain consciousness, then you already use mechanism

​Yes, and you use mechanism every time you decide to scratch your nose.​

 

 

​> ​

but then, and that is what I show, you need to pursue the evolution idea up to the origin of the physical laws,

​No, if you're just interested in consciousness then you don't need to do that anymore than a good neurologists needs to be a master of string theory, he can treat molecules and probably even entire neurons as black boxes and work up from there. Neurons are made of molecules and molecules are made of atoms and atoms are made of protons and protons are (possibly) made of strings, and yes maybe strings are in some sense made of numbers. Maybe. But none of that matters, if you understand why some arrangements of neurons produce intelligent behavior and why other arrangements do not then you understand consciousness, or at least as well as you're ever going to.  

 John K Clark

[Bruce Kellett]

The physical derived from arithmetic would have to be identical to the
one observed or else you theory would be false.

>> The evidence that consciousness supervenes on the physical brain is
>> overwhelming,
>
> I agree. That is the basic motivation for Mechanism. My personal first
> discovery of the (universal) number is in the bacterium Escherchia
> Coli (in a paper by Jacob and Monod, also Watson).
>
> The appearance of physical computers does not add to physicalism
> though, unless of course the facts refute digital mechanism, but as I
> have explained, if it looks it is the case (the measure problem) when
> we look in the details, the explosion of possibilities appears to be
> immense and well structured in a quite similar way in the physical
> appearances and in arithmetic (or any sigma_1 complete set).

All these problem dissolve if you reject the notion of a platonic realm
for arithmetic and accept physicalism.

>> so no model of consciousness can deny that the physical has an
>> important role.
>
> Nobody doubt that the physical has an important role. It is, with
> consciousness what I want to get some explanation for.
>
>>> As discusses in another post, I do think that Bruno's ideas (with the
>>> help of Gödel) provide an explanation to why consciousness looks like
>>> a mystery to us.
>>
>> Maybe most of the mystery is in the eye of the beholder!
>
> Well, a part of that mystery has been translated into a mathematical
> measure problem.
>
> That is why computationalism is very interesting, it makes a bridge
> between theology/philosophy-o-mind/cognitive science and mathematics,
> notably with a key role played by arithmetic theories and others
> sigma_1 complete sets.
>
>> Evolution provides a perfectly comprehensible route to consciousness,
>
> To the easy consciousness problem. You don't seem aware of the hard
> problem, like Chalmers called it.

There is no hard problem ..... there is only confusion on the part of
Chalmers and those who follow him. I think Massimo Pigliucci gets it
right when he asks "What hard problem?",
(http://philosophynow.org/issues/99/What_Hard_Problem).

"I think that the idea of a hard problem of consciousness arises from a
category mistake. I think that in fact there is no real distinction
between hard and easy problems of consciousness, and the illusion that
there is one is caused by the pseudo-profundity that often accompanies
category mistakes."

A category mistake arise when, for example, you ask about the colour of
triangles. This mistake led Chalmers to endorse a form of dualism. (And
I think that ultimately you, Bruno, are also endorsing a subtle dualism
in your approach.)

Pigliucci then goes on the endorse the evolutionary account: "...Once
you have answered the how and why of consciousness, what else is there
to say? "Ah!" exclaim Chalmers, Nagel and others, "You still have not
told us what it is like to be a bat (or a human being, or a zombie), so
there!" ... Of course an explanation isn't the same as an experience,
but that's because the two are completely independent categories. It is
obvious that I cannot experience what it is like to be you, but I can
potentially have a complete explanation of how and why it is possible to
be you. To ask for that explanation to also somehow encompass the
experience itself is both incoherent, and an illegitimate use of the
word 'explanation'."

He goes on to explain that this does not involve the elimination of the
very concept of consciousness or of the self. The problem with this
conclusion by people like Churchland and Dennett is that they are taking
reductionism too far -- although everything is ultimately made of
quarks, and the like, obeying the laws of physics, that does not mean
that higher orders of explanation are illegitimate or eliminable (the
old mistake of positivism!). Concepts such as evolution, consciousness,
qualia and so on, have a definite role, but they are not somehow magical
-- to attempt to 'explain' these things in reductionist terms is
ultimately, as Massimo says, a category mistake. ("Where consciousness
is concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality".)

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

Right. That's what I think of as "the engineering solution" of the hard
problem. Once engineers can build intelligent robots and design them to
emotive, or humorous, or creative, or sly, or reflective on demand; When
we will talk about the program module for empathy, the memory access vs
reconstruction algorithm, the module for self-regard (know as the organ
of Trump)...we will stop caring about the "hard problem" because it will
be like asking where is elan vital and an automobile engine.

>
> He goes on to explain that this does not involve the elimination of
> the very concept of consciousness or of the self. The problem with
> this conclusion by people like Churchland and Dennett is that they are
> taking reductionism too far -- although everything is ultimately made
> of quarks, and the like, obeying the laws of physics, that does not
> mean that higher orders of explanation are illegitimate or eliminable
> (the old mistake of positivism!). Concepts such as evolution,
> consciousness, qualia and so on, have a definite role, but they are
> not somehow magical -- to attempt to 'explain' these things in
> reductionist terms is ultimately, as Massimo says, a category mistake.
> ("Where consciousness is concerned, the existence of the appearance is
> the reality".)

Have you read Sean Carroll's new book "The Big Picture". He says pretty
much the same thing. He calls his philosophy "poetic naturalism": It's
all QFT but there are a lot of more useful ways of talking about it.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

Yes. I was going to mention the parallels with your "engineering
solution" when I was writing this, but I forget -- sorry for that.....

>> He goes on to explain that this does not involve the elimination of
>> the very concept of consciousness or of the self. The problem with
>> this conclusion by people like Churchland and Dennett is that they
>> are taking reductionism too far -- although everything is ultimately
>> made of quarks, and the like, obeying the laws of physics, that does
>> not mean that higher orders of explanation are illegitimate or
>> eliminable (the old mistake of positivism!). Concepts such as
>> evolution, consciousness, qualia and so on, have a definite role, but
>> they are not somehow magical -- to attempt to 'explain' these things
>> in reductionist terms is ultimately, as Massimo says, a category
>> mistake. ("Where consciousness is concerned, the existence of the
>> appearance is the reality".)
>
> Have you read Sean Carroll's new book "The Big Picture". He says
> pretty much the same thing. He calls his philosophy "poetic
> naturalism": It's all QFT but there are a lot of more useful ways of
> talking about it.

I haven't read Carroll's new book (and probably won't because I don't
like his attempt to redefine science as a non-empirical endeavour.
Actually, Smolin's book with someone-or-other is possibly more useful:
he rejects platonism and says that a better way is to seem mathematics
as "evoked" -- i.e., it has properties independent of us, but we 'evoke'
it by specifying some axioms. These axioms (and their consequences) are
not pre-existent in any sense.

Bruce

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 8:59 PM, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

​> ​

 haven't read Carroll's new book (and probably won't because I don't like his attempt to redefine science as a non-empirical endeavour. 

​I don't think Carroll wants to attempt anything like that, but what do you do when a theory makes lots of testable predictions that have been shown to be right but also makes some untestable predictions, do we just ignore them? More specifically is the Earth at the center of the universe?

The Big Bang

​ ​

happened

​ ​

13.8 billion years

​ago​

 and so regardless of where we point

​our ​

telescopes we

​ ​

should

​ ​

never see anything more distant than 13.8 billion

​light ​

years. And indeed our telescopes have never seen anything more distant than 13.8 billion

​light ​

years.

​ ​

We also know from observation that we live in a expanding accelerating universe.

​ There

 are only 2 conclusions that can be  drawn from that observation:

1) There are  lots of stars more distant than 13.8 billion light years but we'll never be able to see them because light hasn't had enough time to reach us and due to the accelerating universe there will never be enough time

​for the light ​

to reach us.

2) Nothing exists that is more distant than 13.8 billion light years and the Earth is at the center of the Universe.

​But 

maybe

​

 you can get around

​that ​

by proposing our 3D space is the surface of a 4D hypersphere, the surface of

​ a​

sphere

​,​

or a hypersphere

​,​

has no center

​so​

​ ​

if you kept moving in a straight line you'd eventually come back to where

​ ​

you started, and if we look at the variation in the microwave background radiation in one part of the sky we'd expect it to match up with the pattern 180 degrees away

​.​

 

​B​

ut we observe no such correlation. That could be explained if the universe is larger t

​han​ 

13.8 billion light years, the light informing us of such a correlation hasn't had time to reach us and in a expanding accelerating universe it never will. But that's not testable, Popper would say we're not allowed to hypothesize about places we can never observe, therefore things must be the way things seem to be and the Earth is at the center of the universe.  

​So either Popper is right and the Earth is at the center of the universe or Popper is wrong and it's not. I think Popper is wrong ​and conclude there are parts of the universe I can never see even in theory. In a similar way Everett's Many Worlds Theory does such a good job explaining how the 2 slit experiment works I don't think it's unscientific to conclude other worlds might exist.

​ John K Clark​

​ ​

 ​

 

 

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/17/2016 5:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> I haven't read Carroll's new book (and probably won't because I don't
> like his attempt to redefine science as a non-empirical endeavour.

Dawid wrote a book on that, but I wasn't aware of Carroll signing on to
it. Citation?

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Jun 2016, at 20:47, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 1:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>> ​

Evolution provides a perfectly comprehensible route to consciousness,

​> ​

To the easy consciousness problem. You don't seem aware of the hard problem, like  called it.

​The reason the hard problem hasn't been solved is that nobody, ​least of all Chalmers, has been able to clearly state exactly what the hard problem is. What mystery about consciousness has Darwin and the assumption that the chain of "what caused that?" 

questions is not infinite ​failed to solve?

The "hard problem" is only the known most difficult part of the mind body problem. Chalmers' enunciation of the problem assumes a physical universe (= making it primitive). So it hides the hard part of the matter problem.

With computationalisme, the problem get mathematical and is a generalization of the problem solved by the logicians about the relation between a theory (a finitely 3p describable object) and its semantics which is very often not axiomatizable or 3p finitely describable. 

The explanation of consciousness is akin to the explanation why we need second order logic or analysis, and why to understand the finite things we need to introduce infinities.

I do think that when we assume mechanism, Gödel-Löb-Solovay is the best we can hope for an explanation, especially if we understand that  the needed (for defining  the first person knowable, observable, sensitive) intensional variants makes sense (thanks to incompleteness).

 

​> 

Matter almost certainly is fungible,

​Yes, any atom will do because one atom is like another, but you can't make a calculation without atoms.

In your theory which has been refuted up to your step-3 confusion.

Calculation have been defined mathematically, and shown to exist in elementary arithmetic. You seem to introduce an invisible God (matter, the atoms, ...) to decide what is real or not. That's an easy old trick, which is, well, not valid in science.

Like atoms wheat is fungible and generic, but that doesn't mean you can make bread without wheat. 

Of course we can, if by bread you mean the whole set of first person quale associated to it. If your brain is emulable by a computer, there are infinitely many numbers relation making believe infinitely many John Clark's sub-substitution level John Clark's relevant computations in which those John Clark attempt to reifer the bread.

The antic understood already well the non validity of such argument.

​> ​

but there might be a problem with scaling a computer model for individual neurons, or small groups of neurons, up to the size of the full brain.

​Enormous technological problems would need to be overcome for a full brain emulation, but it would entail no scientific or philosophical problems.

Of course it does. The emulation does not solve the mind-body problem, it makes it only more interesting, and mathematical.

Unlike faster than light spaceships no new laws of physics would be required. ​

 

But the laws must be derived from the mind, alias the number relations. (I assume digital mechanism all along).

​> ​

You know, all I say is that if you use evolution to explain consciousness, then you already use mechanism

​Yes, and you use mechanism every time you decide to scratch your nose.​

 

No. I scratched my nose a long time before I assumed mechanism. In the context, by "use" I meant "assume. Some Gorilla scratch their nose, and there is no evidence they assume Mechanism. Now, a cousin of the Gorilla made a theory "Evolution". It is generally accepted that it presupposes mechanism, and molecular biology confirmed (which proves nothing, but add evidence to Evolution). Now evolution does not explain consciousness, because if consciousness can be explained in the third person way, it has no more need to exist from the pure evolutionnary viewpoint. It suggest already that consciousness might logically precede appearance of matter, like it has to once we assume digital mechanism.

 

​> ​

but then, and that is what I show, you need to pursue the evolution idea up to the origin of the physical laws,

​No, if you're just interested in consciousness then you don't need to do that anymore than a good neurologists needs to be a master of string theory, he can treat molecules and probably even entire neurons as black boxes and work up from there. Neurons are made of molecules and molecules are made of atoms and atoms are made of protons and protons are (possibly) made of strings, and yes maybe strings are in some sense made of numbers.

Even if strings are made of numbers, digital mechanism has to be false. It is just that "material object" does not exist per se. They are no more made of matter than a dream of a material object. It is relational sharable first person plural appearances, where the first person is the canonical person attached to any Turing complete numbers. Altough a large part of this works for sub-universal system, and technically some nuances should be added, just read the papers for more details, and problems.

Maybe. But none of that matters, if you understand why some arrangements of neurons produce intelligent behavior and why other arrangements do not then you understand consciousness, or at least as well as you're ever going to.  

Which means never, but we can understand more and more around a fixed point which just can name or explained itself for pure arithmetical and logical reason.

And the whole point is not that this theory is true, only that it is testable (and up to now confirmed, thanks to Gödel and QM).

Bruno

 John K Clark

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

The physical derived from arithmetic has to be identical with the one
inferred, but it is better that it differs on something, and then we
see which makes the right prediction. But, yes, it better should fit
with the observation, I agree with that.

>
>>> The evidence that consciousness supervenes on the physical brain
>>> is overwhelming,
>>
>> I agree. That is the basic motivation for Mechanism. My personal
>> first discovery of the (universal) number is in the bacterium
>> Escherchia Coli (in a paper by Jacob and Monod, also Watson).
>>
>> The appearance of physical computers does not add to physicalism
>> though, unless of course the facts refute digital mechanism, but as
>> I have explained, if it looks it is the case (the measure problem)
>> when we look in the details, the explosion of possibilities appears
>> to be immense and well structured in a quite similar way in the
>> physical appearances and in arithmetic (or any sigma_1 complete set).
>
> All these problem dissolve if you reject the notion of a platonic
> realm for arithmetic and accept physicalism.

If you succeed in making me doubting that 2+2=4, I might doubt even
more on Hphi = Ephi. If you reject elementary arithmetic, you can
invoke directly the God of the Gap. (and I don't believe in a platonic
realm for arithmetic, I have no real clue what you mean by that).

?
Not at all. In the "final TOE", I assume only elementary arithmetic,
and computationalism at the meta-level. Materialist (in the weak sense
of believer in Matter) are forced to be dualist or eliminativist.

>
> Pigliucci then goes on the endorse the evolutionary account:
> "...Once you have answered the how and why of consciousness, what
> else is there to say?

In the case of consciousness, the wy is easy indeed. But the how is
very tricky, as digital mechanism illustrates.

> "Ah!" exclaim Chalmers, Nagel and others, "You still have not told
> us what it is like to be a bat (or a human being, or a zombie), so
> there!" ... Of course an explanation isn't the same as an
> experience, but that's because the two are completely independent
> categories. It is obvious that I cannot experience what it is like
> to be you, but I can potentially have a complete explanation of how
> and why it is possible to be you.

This shift from consciousness to identity. A complete explanation of
why it is possible to be me, if it exists, makes only consciousness
even more mysterious. See my answer to Clark. The relation first
person consciousness with third person relations is akin to the
simpler case of the relation between equation and surfaces, and then
theories and models, and then machines and private minds.
Then computer science explains this completely up to the matter
appearance or the sigma_1 measure problem.

> To ask for that explanation to also somehow encompass the experience
> itself is both incoherent, and an illegitimate use of the word
> 'explanation'."

Of course. Everybody agree here, but that is not what is done by the
philosopher of mind. We still want an explanation for the experience,
and computer science/mathematical logic provides it (at least a solid
embryo). The point is that it should be precise enough to get physics,
which it does, at the propositional level at least.

>
> He goes on to explain that this does not involve the elimination of
> the very concept of consciousness or of the self.

Which are two different notion, and the self is many (the 1-self, the
3-self, the 1p-plural, etc.).

> The problem with this conclusion by people like Churchland and
> Dennett is that they are taking reductionism too far -- although
> everything is ultimately made of quarks, and the like, obeying the
> laws of physics, that does not mean that higher orders of
> explanation are illegitimate or eliminable (the old mistake of
> positivism!).

Good, but then it became dualist. You need matter and arithmetic, + a
magic link.

> Concepts such as evolution, consciousness, qualia and so on, have a
> definite role, but they are not somehow magical -- to attempt to
> 'explain' these things in reductionist terms is ultimately, as
> Massimo says, a category mistake. ("Where consciousness is
> concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality".)

OK with this, and very well exemplified by computer science and
mathematical logic. But the material ontology just do not work, as it
is an invocation of something never seen to stop pursuing the
explanations. I understand it you want study the sky, but don't invoke
the sky to claim the mind-body problem has been solved.

[Bruno Marchal]

That expression is misleading.

An axiom is supposed to be true in some structure, not existent. Then
the axiom itself might be existent in some other theories.

Now in the case of "rich" (Gödel-Löbian), in fact in the case of all
essentially undecidable theories, (like RA, PA, ZF, ...) the theory
are rich enough so that their axioms and consequences are reflected in
the relation between the objects they talk about. That is why both "2
+ 2 = 4" and "ZF proves "2 + 2 = 4"" are elementary arithmetical
propositions (even provable by the very weak non Löbian RA). In that
sense the axiom are pré-existent, but only in the mind of the
universal numbers. It is like the distribution of primes is well
defined, even before the first mathematician discovered the prime
number and look at its distribution.

May be you could try to formalize your physicalist theory to see if it
assumes or not the numbers or any universal system at the start. Then
all what UDA shows, is that if you do assume it, adding Matter just
does not work for the mind-body problem.

Physicalism/computationalism is just testable. And then QM (without
the dualist collapse) adds evidence to digital mechanism.

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/19/2016 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Calculation have been defined mathematically, and shown to exist in
> elementary arithmetic.

Which is not the same as to exist in the world.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/19/2016 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

To ask for that explanation to also somehow encompass the experience itself is both incoherent, and an illegitimate use of the word 'explanation'."

Of course. Everybody agree here, but that is not what is done by the philosopher of mind. We still want an explanation for the experience, and computer science/mathematical logic provides it (at least a solid embryo). The point is that it should be precise enough to get physics, which it does, at the propositional level at least.

If you think about explanations deeply, you realize that they bottom out, if at all, in engineering - in prescriptions for how to control, create, and manipulate.  This is like ostensive understanding.

The alternative, which Bruno actually suggested once but disowns, is for explanations to form a "virtuous circle" in which everything is explained in terms of other things ultimately forming loops: NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS   I call this "virtuously circular" if it is comprehensive so that everything is somewhere in the circle.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/19/2016 10:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> An axiom is supposed to be true in some structure, not existent. Then
> the axiom itself might be existent in some other theories.
>
> Now in the case of "rich" (Gödel-Löbian), in fact in the case of all
> essentially undecidable theories, (like RA, PA, ZF, ...) the theory
> are rich enough so that their axioms and consequences are reflected in
> the relation between the objects they talk about. That is why both "2
> + 2 = 4" and "ZF proves "2 + 2 = 4"" are elementary arithmetical
> propositions (even provable by the very weak non Löbian RA). In that
> sense the axiom are pré-existent,

It just means there is a structure to counting, a natural invention of
evolution.

> but only in the mind of the universal numbers. It is like the
> distribution of primes is well defined, even before the first
> mathematician discovered the prime number and look at its distribution.

You casually use words like "universal number" and "discovered"; but
these concepts were "discovered" only relative to axiom systems that
were invented.

>
> May be you could try to formalize your physicalist theory to see if it
> assumes or not the numbers or any universal system at the start.

Physical theories are expressed in mathematics, because mathematics is
just language made precise so that it's "truth" preserving. So it
assumes the truth of some mathematics, but not existence.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jun 19, 2016 at 12:45 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Chalmers' enunciation of the problem assumes a physical universe (= making it primitive).

That is why, well that's one reason why, you're so very very confused;  the existence of the the physical universe does not imply that physics must be primitive (although it could be) anymore than the existence of molecules implies that molecules must be primitive.   

> I do think that when we assume mechanism [blah blah]

Nobody needs to assume mechanism because it can be demonstrated. 

>  your step-3 confusion.

If one isn't confused by gibberish then one doesn't have critical thinking skills.  

> Calculation have been defined mathematically,

And a definition can't calculate one damn thing; never has never will.

> You seem to introduce an invisible God (matter, the atoms, ...) 

Unlike God matter and atoms are NOT invisible. If you insist on changing the language and calling matter "God" then you're going to have to invent a new work for a invisible conscious person who created the universe, but such a word game is not science or mathematics or even philosophy, it's just silly.  

 > to decide what is real or not.

Well, perform one calculation without using matter and the laws of physics and I'll stop believing in that "God". Just add 2+2, that's all I ask.

>> you use mechanism every time you decide to scratch your nose. 

 

> No. I scratched my nose a long time before I assumed mechanism.

Of course, mechanism doesn't give a damn if you think it exists or not, it just keeps doing its thing regardless, and when the nerves from your brain tell the muscles in your arm to scratch your nose that is exactly what happens. In cartoons Wile E Coyote can run off a cliff and he won't start to fall until he realizes he's unsupported and is supposed to drop, but that's not the way real physics works.   

 > Now evolution does not explain consciousness,

Evolution certainly explains why intelligence exists because it effects behavior, if consciousness wasn't a byproduct of intelligence and if the Turing Test doesn't work for it then consciousness wouldn't exist, and yet I know for certain of at least one instance in which consciousness does exist. 

 John K Clark  

[Bruce Kellett]

I have possible misremembered. I seem to recall Carroll saying something
like this in connection with the multiverse, or possible also string
theory. Though it is in connection with string theory that this argument
is most often raised (cf. Dawid, as you point out.)

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

On 20/06/2016 4:09 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/19/2016 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

To ask for that explanation to also somehow encompass the experience itself is both incoherent, and an illegitimate use of the word 'explanation'."

Of course. Everybody agree here, but that is not what is done by the philosopher of mind. We still want an explanation for the experience, and computer science/mathematical logic provides it (at least a solid embryo). The point is that it should be precise enough to get physics, which it does, at the propositional level at least.

If you think about explanations deeply, you realize that they bottom out, if at all, in engineering - in prescriptions for how to control, create, and manipulate.  This is like ostensive understanding.

Right.

The alternative, which Bruno actually suggested once but disowns, is for explanations to form a "virtuous circle" in which everything is explained in terms of other things ultimately forming loops: NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS   I call this "virtuously circular" if it is comprehensive so that everything is somewhere in the circle.

The thing about such a loop is that you can start at any point -- for instance, PHYSICAL, HUMANS, PHYSICS, or anywhere else. The question then is whether this actually achieves you anything?

Bruce

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 11:18 AM, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wed, Jun 1, 2016 at 7:33 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

​> ​

I have to ponder what "fundamental" means?

​It means if the chain of "what is this made of?" questions is not infinitely long then it terminates at something fundamental.  ​If the chain is infinitely long then nothing is fundamental. 

 

 

​>​

Non divisible yes, and like the neutrino and the muon, also non divisible.

​My hunch is the muon is not fundamental because it spontaneously breaks down into smaller parts, but the electron and neutrino and photon are.   ​

But combine an electron with a positron and both will "break down" into light. Or stuff a bunch of electrons into a small space to create a black hole, which will evaporate into photons and possibly other particles. Is the photon then more fundamental than the electron? What about "forces" of which the photon is-a vibrating wave of electromagnetic forces moving through space? And would space be more fundamental than the forces within it? It seems you might continue breaking down descriptions of space and its properties until at the lowest level you are dealing with bits. But even bits can be fractional, when it comes down to varying levels of knowledge and certainties.

Jason

 

 

​> ​

So, is there something important when we arrive at the non divisible?

​At that point it is no longer meaningful to ask what is it made of. ​

 

 

​> ​

My only objection if we call it this is semantic in the sense that fundamental becomes a psychological trap, where further research is halted because it means, look no further. 

​That is a danger, but  if the chain of "what is this made of?" questions really does terminate but we can't prove it then for all eternity we will be spinning our wheels looking, unsuccessfully, for something deeper. We're damned if we do and damned if we don't.

 John K Clark

 

-----Original Message-----
From: John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Tue, May 31, 2016 9:11 pm
Subject: Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

On Tue, May 31, 2016 , spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

​> ​

Being picky, what are electrons made out of?

​As far as we know electrons aren't made of anything, electrons are fundamental. ​

 

  

​> ​

Are electrons arguably, material?

​Electrons have mass, electrical charge, and ​a

 magnetic moment

​, and all of those things are physical properties. So yes, electrons are material.  ​

​> 

Last year, a trio of physicists in Italy deduced that  electrons would last 5 quitillion times the current age of the univeres

​

I've heard some speculate that the proton might be unstable over

​ 

huge

​ 

time ranges like that, but not the electron. For a electron to decay it would have to change into a charged particle that was lighter than it was, but the electron (and its antimatter counterpart the positron) is the lightest known charged particle, so there is nothing for the electron to decay into.

​ 

A Muon is very similar

​ 

to the electron

​ 

except that it's 207 times as massive, so in about a millionth of a second it decays into a electron and 2 neutrinos, but the electron is the end of the line, there is no place for the electron to go so it sticks around. The same is true of the neutrino, like the electron it's stable, fundamental and isn't made of anything.  

​ ​

​ John K Clark​

 

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[spudb...@aol.com]

This is sort of a mix, of energy and matter on a tiny scale.

http://www.gizmag.com/light-matter-strong-coupling/43883/

Gear it up to industrial scale, and whola! Light sabres!
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