Boltzmann Brains, consciousness and the arrow of time
Hal Finney
moments need to be linked to one another, the role of causality in
consciousness, etc. I thought of an interesting puzzle about Boltzmann
Brains which offers a new twist to these questions.
As most readers are aware, Boltzmann Brains relate to an idea of Boltzmann
on how to explain the arrow of time. The laws of physics seem to be time
symmetric, yet the universe is grossly asymmetric in time. Boltzmann
proposed that if you had a universe in a maximum entropy state, say a
uniform gas, then given enough time, the gas would undergo fluctuations
to regions of lower entropy. Sometimes, purely at random, clumps of
molecules would happen to form. Even more rarely, these clumps might be
large and ordered. Given infinite time, one could even have an entire
visible-universe worth of matter clump together in an ordered fashion,
from which state it would then decay into higher entropy conditions. Life
could evolve during this decay, observe the universe around it, and find
itself in conditions much like our own.
The Boltzmann Brain is a counter-argument, suggesting that the universe
and everything else is redundant; all you need is a brain to form via
a spontaneous random fluctuation, and to hold together long enough to
engage in a few moments of conscious thought. Such a Boltzmann Brain is
far more likely to form than an entire universe, hence the vast majority
of conscious thoughts in such a model will be in Boltzmann Brains and not
in brains in large universes. If we were tempted to explain the arrow of
time in this way, we must accept that the universe is an illusion and
that we are actually Boltzmann Brains, a conclusion which most people
don't like.
Now this scenario can be criticized in many ways, but I want to emphasize
a couple of points which aren't always appreciated. The first is that the
Boltzmann scenario, whether a whole universe or just a Brain is forming,
is basically time symmetric. That means that if you saw a movie of a
Boltzmann universe forming and then decaying back to random entropy,
you would not be able to tell which way the movie was running, if it
were to be reversed. (This is an unavoidable consequence of the time
symmetry of the underlying physics.) It follows that while the universe
is moving into the low-entropy state, it must be evolving backwards. That
is, an observer from outside would see time appearing to run backwards.
Eggs would un-scramble themselves, objects would fall upwards from the
ground, ripples would converge on spots in lakes from which rocks would
then leap from the water, and so on.
At some point this time reversal effect would stop, and the universe
would then proceed to evolve back into a high entropy state, now with time
going "forwards". Now, the forward phase will not in general be an exact
mirror image of the reverse, because of slight random fluctuations and
the like, but it will be an alternate path that essentially starts with
the same initial conditions. So we will see one path backwards into the
minimum-entropy state, and another path forwards from that state. Both
paths are fully plausible histories and neither is distinguishable from
the other as far as which was reversed and which was forward, if you
ran a recording of the whole process backwards.
One might ask, what causes time to run backwards during the first half of
the Boltzmann scenario? The answer is, nothing but very, very odd luck.
Time is no more likely to continue to run backwards, or to run backwards
the same everywhere in the local fluctuation-area, than it is to start
running backwards right now in the universe around you. Nothing stops
eggs from unscrambling themselves except the unlikelihood, and the same
principle is at work during the Boltzmann time-reversal phase. It is
merely that we select, out of the infinity of time, those rare occasions
where time does in fact "happen to happen" like this, that allows us to
discuss it.
I want to emphasize that this picture of how Boltzmann fluctuations would
work is a consquence of the laws of thermodynamics, and time symmetry.
Sometimes people imagine that the fluctuation into the Boltzmann
low-entropy state is fundamentally different from the fluctuation out
of it. They accept that the fluctuation out will be similar to our own
existence, with complex events happening. But they imagine that the
fluctuation into low entropy might be much simpler, molecules simply
aggregating together into some convenient state from which the complex
fluctuation out and back to chaos can begin. While this is not impossible
and hence will happen occasionally among the infinity of fluctuations in
the Boltzmann universe, it will be rare. It will be no more common for a
"simple" fluctation-in process to occur than for a simple fluctuation-out
process. In our universe, knowing it will evolve to a chaotic heat
death, we might imagine that molecules would just fly apart into chaos,
but we know that is highly unlikely. Instead, by far the most likely
path is a complex one, full of turbulence and reactions and similar
activity. By time symmetry, exactly the same arguments apply during
the fluctation-in phase. The vast majority of Boltzmann fluctuations
that achieve a particular degree of low entropy will do so via complex,
turbulent paths which if viewed in reverse will appear to be perfectly
plausible sequences of events for a universe which is decaying from
order to disorder, like our own.
Following on to this, let us consider the nature of consciousness during
these Boltzmann excursions. Again let us focus on larger scale ones than
just Boltzmann Brains, although the same principles apply there. During
the time reversal phase, if conscious entities are present, their brains
are running backwards. They are talking backwards, walking backwards,
doing everything in reverse. They remember things that are coming in
the future, and forget everything as soon as it has happened.
The question is, is there any difference in consciousness during the
reverse and forward phases? Consider that during the forward phase, we
started with a low entropy state, and now the laws of physics are playing
out just as they do in our own universe. Everything is happening for a
reason, depending on what has happened before. Events cause memories to
appear in brains by virtue of the same causal effects which give rise
to our own memories. Hence I imagine that most would agree that brains
during the forward phase are conscious.
However, during the reverse phase, things are quite different. Brains
have memories of things that haven't happened yet. Again, one might
ask how this can be. The reason is because we stop paying attention
to fluctuations where this doesn't happen. We only focus on Boltzmann
fluctuations which take the universe into a plausible and consistent
low-entropy state, one from which things can evolve in a way that is
similar to what we see. When a brain remembers something, if that doesn't
happen, the fluctuation is inconsistent. We skip over that one and look
for one that is consistent.
In the consistent fluctuations, brain memories turn out to be correct,
purely by luck. Similarly, every internal function of the brain which
we might attribute to macroscopic-type causality, like neuron A firing
because neuron B fired, will happen instead by luck, with neuron A firing
as though neuron B is going to fire, and then neuron B just happening
to fire in precisely the anticipated way.
The point is that during the time-reversal phase, causality as we
normally think of it is absent. Subjectively-past events do not cause
subjectively-future ones; rather, subjectively-future events take place
before subjectively-past events, and it is merely through luck that things
happen in a consistent pattern. Again, if we hadn't gotten lucky so that
things work out, we wouldn't have called this a Boltzmann fluctuation of
the kind we are interested in (Boltzmann Brain or Boltzmann Universe).
By paying selective attention to only those fluctuations where things
work, we will only observe cases where luck, rather than causality,
makes things happen.
But things do happen, in the same pattern they would if causality were
active. So the question is, are brains conscious during this time? Do
the thoughts that occur during the time reversal (which recall is not
exactly the same as what happens during the forward-time phase) have
the same level of subjective reality as thoughts which occur when time
runs forward?
We can argue it either way. In favor of consciousness, the main
argument is that time is fundamentally symmetric (we assume). Hence
there is no fundamental or inherent difference between the forward and
reverse phases. The only differences are relative, with the arrow of
time pointing in opposite directions in the two phases. But within each
phase, we see events which can both be equally well described as leading
to consciousness, and therefore conscious experiences will occur in
both phases.
On the other side, many people see a role for causality in the creation
or manifestation of consciousness. And arguably, causality is different
in the two phases. In the forward phase (the part where we are returning
from a low-entropy excursion to the high-entropy static state), events
follow one another for the usual reasons, and it is correct to attribute
a role for causality just as we do in our own experience. But in the
reverse phase, it is purely by luck that things happen in a consistent
way, and only because we have an infinity of time to work with that we
are able to find sequences of events that look consistent even they arose
by simple happenstance. There is no true causality in this phase, just a
random sequence of events where we have selected a sequence that mimics
causality. And to the extent that consciousness depends on causality,
we should not say that brains during this reverse phase are conscious.
I lean towards the first interpretation, for the following reason. If
consciousness really was able to somehow distinguish the forward from
reverse phases in a Boltzmann fluctuation, it would be quite remarkable.
Given that the fundamental laws of physics are time symmetric, nothing
should be able to do that, to deduce a true "implicit" arrow of time that
goes beyond the superficial arrow of time caused by entropy differences.
The whole point of time symmetry, the very definition, is that there
should be no such implicit arrow of time. This suggestion would seem
to give consciousness a power that it should not have, allow it to do
something that is impossible.
And if the first interpretation is correct, it seems to call into question
the very nature of causality, and its posible role in consciousness. If
we are forced to attribute consciousness to sequences of events which
occur purely by luck, then causality can't play a significant role. This
is the rather surprising conclusion which I reached from these musings
on Boltzmann Brains.
Hal Finney
Brent Meeker
The present moment in quantum cosmology: challenges to the arguments for the elimination of time
Abstract: Barbour, Hawking, Misner and others have argued that time cannot play an essential role in the formulation of a quantum theory of cosmology. Here we present three challenges to their arguments, taken from works and remarks by Kauffman, Markopoulou and Newman. These can be seen to be based on two principles: that every observable in a theory of cosmology should be measurable by some observer inside the universe, and all mathematical constructions necessary to the formulation of the theory should be realizable in a finite time by a computer that fits inside the universe. We also briefly discuss how a cosmological theory could be formulated so it is in agreement with these principles.
| Comments: | This is a slightly revised version of an essay published in Time and the Instant, Robin Durie (ed.) Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000 |
| Subjects: | General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology (gr-qc) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:gr-qc/0104097v1 |
Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou
> I want to emphasize that this picture of how Boltzmann fluctuations would
> work is a consquence of the laws of thermodynamics, and time symmetry.
> Sometimes people imagine that the fluctuation into the Boltzmann
> low-entropy state is fundamentally different from the fluctuation out
> of it. They accept that the fluctuation out will be similar to our own
> existence, with complex events happening. But they imagine that the
> fluctuation into low entropy might be much simpler, molecules simply
> aggregating together into some convenient state from which the complex
> fluctuation out and back to chaos can begin. While this is not impossible
> and hence will happen occasionally among the infinity of fluctuations in
> the Boltzmann universe, it will be rare. It will be no more common for a
> "simple" fluctation-in process to occur than for a simple fluctuation-out
> process. In our universe, knowing it will evolve to a chaotic heat
> death, we might imagine that molecules would just fly apart into chaos,
> but we know that is highly unlikely. Instead, by far the most likely
> path is a complex one, full of turbulence and reactions and similar
> activity. By time symmetry, exactly the same arguments apply during
> the fluctation-in phase. The vast majority of Boltzmann fluctuations
> that achieve a particular degree of low entropy will do so via complex,
> turbulent paths which if viewed in reverse will appear to be perfectly
> plausible sequences of events for a universe which is decaying from
> order to disorder, like our own.
This is an interesting idea. I had imagined that the fluctuations in
the decreasing entropy or winding up direction would involve chaotic
aggregation of matter which would then wind down in a more organised
way, giving rise to stars and planets and so on, but as you point out
there is no reason to assume this. I am not sure why you suggest that
the winding up direction lacks causality (leading to your question
about whether it could give rise to consciousness): if all the air in
the room moved to one side because, with incredible luck, the
molecules all vibrated in the same direction for a few seconds should
this event be called acausal?
If we are conscious in winding up direction and winding up is no less
likely to occur though interesting pathways than winding down, this
would imply that at any point, we have about an equal chance of living
in the winding up as the winding down phase: we would have no way of
knowing. This would be the case whether we are ordinary brains or
Boltzmann Brains, since in either case there has to be a winding up
before the winding down can happen. A further implication is that
there will be far more observer moments in the later stages of the
universe than in the earlier stages. This is because unlikely as it is
that the universe will wind up all the way to January 1st 2009, it is
even less likely to continue winding up to 31st December 2008 (it is
far more likely of course to only wind back to a state near the heat
death end times, but there are less likely to be observers there). If
you support the ASSA, that would imply that you are near your last
moment of consciousness, since OM's later in your life have a much
higher measure than earlier ones. Under the RSSA or if you take into
account Boltzmann Brains that would not be a problem.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal
It seems to me that your reasoning illustrates well the problems with
physical supervenience and physicalism, and perhaps ASSA.
In any case the Universal Dovetailer generates all such gaz universes
generating the Boltzmann brains. Now the probability that you are
implemented by a particular Boltzmann brain is null, as it is null for
any particular. With the comp supervenience you have to "attach"
consciousness on ALL the histories going through your computational
state. It is a sort of double cone of histories.
We cannot belong to the aleph_zero Boltzmann brains state, because,
from our first person (plural) point of views we already belongs to
the 2^aleph_zero "winning" (infinite) histories. (or comp is wrong).
This is a case for RSSA indeed. I think. Bb are reduced to the "usual"
white rabbits histories, with RSSA, it seems to me.
Bruno
Brent Meeker
>
> It seems to me that your reasoning illustrates well the problems with
> physical supervenience and physicalism, and perhaps ASSA.
>
> In any case the Universal Dovetailer generates all such gaz universes
> generating the Boltzmann brains. Now the probability that you are
> implemented by a particular Boltzmann brain is null, as it is null for
> any particular. With the comp supervenience you have to "attach"
> consciousness on ALL the histories going through your computational
> state. It is a sort of double cone of histories.
seems that states of Bbs could fit into the inferred time sequence as well as
states that arose in some other way.
>
> We cannot belong to the aleph_zero Boltzmann brains state, because,
> from our first person (plural) point of views we already belongs to
> the 2^aleph_zero "winning" (infinite) histories. (or comp is wrong).
Brent
Bruno Marchal
On 01 Jan 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> It seems to me that your reasoning illustrates well the problems with
>> physical supervenience and physicalism, and perhaps ASSA.
>>
>> In any case the Universal Dovetailer generates all such gaz universes
>> generating the Boltzmann brains. Now the probability that you are
>> implemented by a particular Boltzmann brain is null, as it is null
>> for
>> any particular. With the comp supervenience you have to "attach"
>> consciousness on ALL the histories going through your computational
>> state. It is a sort of double cone of histories.
>
> Are you assuming time as fundamental here? If time is merely
> inferred then it
> seems that states of Bbs could fit into the inferred time sequence
> as well as
> states that arose in some other way.
Robinson arithmetic, or Peano.
This is enough to recognize the working of a universal dovetailer, and
the execution of all programs. It is not infered but postulate. You
can call it a digital time, or you can unravel such a dynamical
deploiment into a statical n n+1 dimensional cone (with n the
dimension of the space used by your starting universal machine (but
some have no concept of dimension, and the statical picture is more a
logical than a geometrical one). It is not "physical time", nor even
the subjective time builded by internal entities.
>
>
>>
>> We cannot belong to the aleph_zero Boltzmann brains state, because,
>> from our first person (plural) point of views we already belongs to
>> the 2^aleph_zero "winning" (infinite) histories. (or comp is wrong).
>
> I don't understand the counting measure. Why are histories order
> 2^apleph_0?
universal doevtailing procedure which dovetails on all programs but
also on all non interacting collection of programs (as all interacting
one). In particular each computation is "entangled" to dovetailing on
the reals, and infinite computations are multiplied into 2^aleph_zero
by this entanglement with the reals. Now this is a good thing because
it means that the stable histories will be those who manage that
background noise, who exploits it probably.
Our mind states are enumerable, but our histories are not.
Bruno
Günther Greindl
I have entertained quite similar musings some time ago, and this led me
to a position I called "naive materialism" NMAT some time ago on this
list - that causality does not matter, and consciousness would supervene
on the material states directly - and both backward and forward versions
would actually be "the same" from an endophysical perspective.
But the problem of these considerations is that indeed we get the BB
issue and causality loses it's role, leaving us with a quite strange
tangle of states. Considering that in a fundamental theory, time
shouldn't be a parameter chugging along, and we are still considering an
"external time" (where the cosmic perturbations are actually happening)
as opposed to the endophysical time registered by the brains in the
fluctuations, the thinking along these lines reveals itself to be even
more disappointing.
In the meantime I have come to agree with Bruno:
"It seems to me that your reasoning illustrates well the problems with
physical supervenience and physicalism, and perhaps ASSA."
supervenience on computations, and the "physical" emerging from the most
probable histories. It is a form of objective idealism, avoiding the
problems of subjective idealisms which are inimical to scientific inquiry.
In sum, BBs and perturbing universes are, I think, more evidence that
there is something wrong with materialism (and I say this having arrived
on this list being a materialist ;-).
Cheers,
Günther
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther...@univie.ac.at
Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
Thesis: http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/
Günther Greindl
I have also wanted to ask how you come to 2^aleph_zero
> Well, in part this results from the unbounded dumbness of the
> universal doevtailing procedure which dovetails on all programs but
> also on all non interacting collection of programs (as all interacting
> one).
How do you discern interacting/non-interacting programs? What do you
mean exactly with the term in regard to UD?
> In particular each computation is "entangled" to dovetailing on
> the reals,
What do you mean by this? How do the reals enter the picture?
Cheers,
Günther
Bruno Marchal
The present moment in quantum cosmology: challenges to the arguments for the elimination of timeAuthors: Lee Smolin(Submitted on 29 Apr 2001)Abstract: Barbour, Hawking, Misner and others have argued that time cannot play an essential role in the formulation of a quantum theory of cosmology. Here we present three challenges to their arguments, taken from works and remarks by Kauffman, Markopoulou and Newman. These can be seen to be based on two principles: that every observable in a theory of cosmology should be measurable by some observer inside the universe, and all mathematical constructions necessary to the formulation of the theory should be realizable in a finite time by a computer that fits inside the universe. We also briefly discuss how a cosmological theory could be formulated so it is in agreement with these principles.
Comments: This is a slightly revised version of an essay published in Time and the Instant, Robin Durie (ed.) Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000 Subjects: General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology (gr-qc) Cite as: arXiv:gr-qc/0104097v1
Bruno Marchal
On 01 Jan 2009, at 23:58, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> I have also wanted to ask how you come to 2^aleph_zero
>
>> Well, in part this results from the unbounded dumbness of the
>> universal doevtailing procedure which dovetails on all programs but
>
>> also on all non interacting collection of programs (as all
>> interacting
>> one).
>
> How do you discern interacting/non-interacting programs? What do you
> mean exactly with the term in regard to UD?
To write and implement a Universal Dovetailer, you have to fix a
universal programming language (or machine). Then the UD will generate
the list of programs P_1, P_2, P_3, ... and run them by little pieces,
let us say of one running step, and this for each program in such a
way that it dovetails on all the executions, including those who does
not stop, which we cannot avoid.
Let us assume tthat the sequence P_1, P_2, P_3, ... P_i ... is the
sequence of the zero variable programs (this changes nothing). Now a
computation, for example, the computation of P_0, will itself be a
sequence of computational steps, like
P_1^1, P_1^2, P_1^3, etc ...
To run the UD, we dovetail or zig zag on the programs and their
computational steps. Exercise: add some relevant zig zagging to the
following infinite diagram:
P_1^1, P_1^2, P_1^3, P_1^4, ...
P_2^1, P_2^2, P_2^3, P_2^4, ...
P_3^1, P_3^2, P_3^3, P_3^4, ...
P_4^1, P_4^2, P_4^3, P_4^4, ...
...
A solution: P_1^1, P_1^2, P_2^1, P_3^1, P_2^2, P_1^3, P_1^4, P_2^3,
P_3^2, P_4^1, ...
Each computational step P_i^j, of the ith program up to the jth step
is completely independent of any other computations P_k^h, when i is
different from k. Such computations do not interact. The DU, if
programmed correctly, will never let them share the memories or
interact in any way.
But for each couple (P_i, P_k) there is another program, P_h in the
(infinite but enumerable) list P_i which is a mini-dovetailer of the
pair of programs (P_i, P_k). This means P_h dovetails itself on the
execution of the two programs P_i and P_k. Indeed, trivially, the
universal dovetailer execute all the possible dovetailing, the
universal one and all the other one.
Again, the two new computations of P_i and P_k does not interact.
But that is not enough, for all couple of programs (P_i, P_k) there is
third program P_g, which you can seen as a bad or buggy dovetailer on
the pair (P_i, P_k), which will execute P_i and P_k again, but with
just one shared memory, so that progress in the running of one of them
will destroy the memory of the other. In that sense the buggy mini-
dovetailer makes P_i and P_k interact, in one way.
Given that any digital interaction process, it can be simulated by a
program, and the UD will soon or later simulate that interaction.
For another example, the UD will run all patterns of the game of life,
but also all couple of such patterns, all triples, all quadruples,
actually all finite pieces of possible "Eden garden" of possible
cellular automata.
You can actually imagine any ways of making two programs or machines
interact, soon or later the UD will generate ONE computation which
will run the interaction of those machines, yet such computation will
not interact with the proper other UD-computations. The UD will even
generate a universal buggy dovetailing computation which makes all
programs interact with each other, in all possible ways. All right?
Please ask if something is not clear. It is simpler to explain all
this with conical drawings, and the internal zig zagging.
>
>
>> In particular each computation is "entangled" to dovetailing on
>> the reals,
>
> What do you mean by this? How do the reals enter the picture?
Do you remember the iterated self-duplication experiment? Suppose I
invite you to make that experience. But your boss asked you to do some
computation P (and thus your computation looks like P^1, P^2, etc...
(the number = the steps of your computation).
So, you will do your computation and simultaneously do the iterated
self-duplication. To simplify I will assume that you do one step of
your computation at each duplication.
I duplicate you iteratively in two rooms, one with the number zero
written on the wall, the other with the number one on the wall. OK?
And during that time you make the computation (to please your boss).
So you compute P, get the first step of the computation: P^1, go to my
duplicator (where you are scanned---and this includes your "step
result" P^1----annihilated, and reconstituted in the zero-room and in
the one-room. The two of you come back, each one of you compute one
step of the computation to get P^2, and enter the duplicator again.
Both are scanned, including the P^2 step-result, and then annihilated
and reconstituted again in the two rooms. The four of you come back,
compute the third step of the computation, and enter again the
annihilator ...., the eight of you come back, compute the fourth step
of the computation, and enter the duplication again, ..... the 2^n of
you come back, compute the nth step of the computation, and enter
again in the duplicator, etc.
Now imagine your boss was a bad guy wanting to annoy you so that your
computation is infinite: he gives to you an infinite task. And, you
are not very lucky that day, because for my scientific research, I ask
you to iterate an infinite numbers of times the self-duplication
experiment.
In that case, I will say that I, with your kind help, have entangled
the infinite computation (the one that was asked by your boss) to the
reals.
The infinite self-duplication generates the reals (all the reals, and
this without naming them nor enumerating them: no contradiction with
Cantor theorem). The *you* can remember their path in the rooms. A
typical one will be, after 26 self-duplications:
11011101000011010011000101
and the "you" here will have computed 26 steps of the boss
computation, ready to compute the 27th steps and enter the duplicator
again.
You see that on each real number (well, between 0 and 1 like
0,11011101000011010011000101 ...), the construction duplicates your
boss computation on each decimal. There are 2^aleph_zero reals, so in
the limit, your infinite computation get multiplied by 2^aleph_zero.
Now all this was a computable process. The boss gave you a
computation, and the self-duplication procedure and unlimited
iteration is programmable. So such process is executed, soon or later
(well, really later!) by the UD, and this is true whatever computation
your boss decided to give to you, of course. So you see that the UD
entangles all computation with the real as possible oracles (like if
you decide to use the room data (0 or 1) in your computation. It is
again a case of interaction/non interaction. The UD realizes all
options.
Those real generations never appears in the execution of the UD, as
seen in a third person point of view where everything is countable,
but they could and actually have to play a role from the point of view
of the self-referential betting entities relatively generated by the
UD computations. This come from the fact that the first person is not
aware of the delays of reconstitution, so that the measure, which bear
on the computations, is somehow defined in the limit (cf the steps 2
and 4 of UDA).
This is our fatal destiny of universal machine: our consciousness
lives in the terrestrial neighborhood of zero (the realm of the
finite), but the measure which differentiates our stable and solid
histories is defined in the celestial neighborhood of the infinite!
Tell me if this helps,
Bruno
Günther Greindl
first of all thanks for the long answer, and yes, it was very helpful.
You described the production of all reals with a very vivid imagery; it
showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the limit_
there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to also
take into account infinite delay, we must take this limit into account
and have infinite histories going through a "state" (do I understand you
correctly?).
As to the interacting programs: do you consider them purely because they
are part of UD or do you think this is a possible way to share histories?
(I am interested in this because I find COMP very convincing, though I
am still a bit worried about solipsism).
I am also preparing a few thoughts (in a later post, but see hints
below) on how consciousness might supervene on large parts of past
causal histories, thereby also steering a bit away from solipsism
(arguing via the concept of external realism from analytic philosophy,
summarized by Putnam's "meaning is not in the head").
I also have another question (related to the above issue of solipsism):
We have considered COMP and MAT and seen that the two are not really
compatible.
But you also say that with COMP, the universe itself is not computable
(I understand why, and I agree with your reasoning as you have presented
it).
But I have one "worry": what if the subsitution level is "at the bottom"
of the universe - (for a moment drawing on materialist intuitions, the
universe in the "normal" sense and not considering infinite histories
for the moment).
If the universe is a computation, then also an individual in the
universe is part of this computation. But this individual can't be
"duplicated" because of the quantum no-cloning theorem (that is what I
mean with "at the bottom" - not above the quantum level).
Svozil for instance refers in a number of papers to the work of Moore
and Finkelstein that show, assuming we have an automaton, we would
witness complementarity.
http://tph.tuwien.ac.at/~svozil/publ/publ.html
(see for instance these overview papers:
Svozil, K. ``How real are virtual realities, how virtual is reality? The
constructive re-interpretation of physical undecidability'', Complexity,
1, 43-54 (1996).
Svozil, K. Computational Universes Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2005, 25,
845-859
Svozil, K. Physical Unknowables physics/0701163, 2007)
The results of course would also apply if we were "solipsist" automatons
and "the whole" not (so the arguments are quite compatible with varying
versions of machine conception (universe/person) ).
I am just saying that we can't know if we are "separable" from the universe.
To state it differently (and to make the connection with complementarity
and duplication):
If we assume the whole universe to be an automaton, also it's
inhabitants would be "mechanical" =effectively computable of course -
but maybe they could then not be duplicated, because, when person A were
trying to make a scan of the properties of person B, the universe as a
whole would move into different states and make complementary
observables - which _could_ be necessary for a duplication - unavailable.
This may only work if consciousness supervenes not on "isolated"
computations, but only if it is embedded in computations constructing
whole universes - but then again, we can't exclude this a priori.
And we would still have to consider many worlds, but these would then
indeed be _worlds_ and not only OMs with incoming/outgoing histories (of
course it would still seem this way from the concrete OM, but with
greatly reduced danger of white rabbits) - the laws of physics would not
emerge for OM's stranded in the UD deployment but for OM's embedded
already in highly structured computational environments - we would only
have to take into account duplications of OM's where also whole
universes are duplicated.
So, what I am getting at, wouldn't you have to modify your argument -
the reversal physics/machine psychology - insofar that not only a
substitution level exists (COMP), but that this level is "separable"
from a possible universe-machine (the possibility of which we can't
exclude at the beginning of the argument). A kind of qualified COMP, QCOMP?
Of course, the variant where the whole universe is necessary for
duplication would still be machine psychology, but at a different level
- at the universe level (classical sense again) and not at the level of
everday conception of persons. Maybe COMP with the assumption that
consciousness needs whole universes to supervene on (I don't mean that a
universe is conscious; persons, brains would be conscious, but they
would need the surrounding computations supplied by the universe to
provide "meaning") is even preferable to the view that one can duplicate
a person from _within_ a universe (because of the white rabbit problem).
Reading through my post above again, I believe that your COMP argument
also works with the above conception.
QCOMP and UNIVERSE-COMP would just be different as to what would be
possible for us in _this_ universe: for instance, QCOMP would allow
mind-uploading and teleportation and other such things in _this
universe_ (materialist intuition again); while UNIVERSE-COMP would only
allow this in Platonia, in the Universal deployment, which is
inaccessible for manipulation for us inhabitants of the rather small
(considered against Platonia) visible universe.
Best Wishes,
Günther
Stephen Paul King
Nice post! Coments soon.
Speaking of Svozil's work, please see: Cristian S. Calude, Peter H.
Hertling and Karl Svozil, ``Embedding Quantum Universes in Classical Ones'',
Foundations of Physics 29(3), 349-390 (1999) [abstract], [CrossRef
DOI:10.1023/A:1018862730956], [pdf], [pdf], [tex], [ps].
How can we derive quantum logics from purely integer (or even real
number) based logics? This paper seems to yeild a no-go theorem!
Onward!
Stephen
Bruno Marchal
Hi Günther,
Nice post! Coments soon.
Speaking of Svozil's work, please see: Cristian S. Calude, Peter H.
Hertling and Karl Svozil, ``Embedding Quantum Universes in Classical Ones'',
Foundations of Physics 29(3), 349-390 (1999) [abstract], [CrossRef
DOI:10.1023/A:1018862730956], [pdf], [pdf], [tex], [ps].
How can we derive quantum logics from purely integer (or even real
number) based logics? This paper seems to yeild a no-go theorem!
Günther Greindl
Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Nice post! Coments soon.
Thanks :-) Looking forward to the comments.
> Speaking of Svozil's work, please see: Cristian S. Calude, Peter H.
> Hertling and Karl Svozil, ``Embedding Quantum Universes in Classical Ones'',
> Foundations of Physics 29(3), 349-390 (1999) [abstract], [CrossRef
> DOI:10.1023/A:1018862730956], [pdf], [pdf], [tex], [ps].
Thanks for the tip, will have a look at it!
Best Wishes,
Günther
Bruno Marchal
Hi Bruno,
first of all thanks for the long answer, and yes, it was very helpful.
You described the production of all reals with a very vivid imagery; it
showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the limit_
there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to also
take into account infinite delay, we must take this limit into account
and have infinite histories going through a "state" (do I understand you
correctly?).
As to the interacting programs: do you consider them purely because they
are part of UD or do you think this is a possible way to share histories?
(I am interested in this because I find COMP very convincing, though I
am still a bit worried about solipsism).
I am also preparing a few thoughts (in a later post, but see hints
below) on how consciousness might supervene on large parts of past
causal histories, thereby also steering a bit away from solipsism
(arguing via the concept of external realism from analytic philosophy,
summarized by Putnam's "meaning is not in the head").
The results of course would also apply if we were "solipsist" automatons
and "the whole" not (so the arguments are quite compatible with varying
versions of machine conception (universe/person) ).
I am just saying that we can't know if we are "separable" from the universe.
To state it differently (and to make the connection with complementarity
and duplication):
If we assume the whole universe to be an automaton, also it's
inhabitants would be "mechanical" =effectively computable of course -
but maybe they could then not be duplicated, because, when person A were
trying to make a scan of the properties of person B, the universe as a
whole would move into different states and make complementary
observables - which _could_ be necessary for a duplication - unavailable.
This may only work if consciousness supervenes not on "isolated"
computations, but only if it is embedded in computations constructing
whole universes - but then again, we can't exclude this a priori.
And we would still have to consider many worlds, but these would then
indeed be _worlds_ and not only OMs with incoming/outgoing histories (of
course it would still seem this way from the concrete OM, but with
greatly reduced danger of white rabbits) - the laws of physics would not
emerge for OM's stranded in the UD deployment but for OM's embedded
already in highly structured computational environments - we would only
have to take into account duplications of OM's where also whole
universes are duplicated.
So, what I am getting at, wouldn't you have to modify your argument -
the reversal physics/machine psychology - insofar that not only a
substitution level exists (COMP), but that this level is "separable"
from a possible universe-machine (the possibility of which we can't
exclude at the beginning of the argument). A kind of qualified COMP, QCOMP?
Of course, the variant where the whole universe is necessary for
duplication would still be machine psychology, but at a different level
- at the universe level (classical sense again) and not at the level of
everday conception of persons. Maybe COMP with the assumption that
consciousness needs whole universes to supervene on (I don't mean that a
universe is conscious; persons, brains would be conscious, but they
would need the surrounding computations supplied by the universe to
provide "meaning") is even preferable to the view that one can duplicate
a person from _within_ a universe (because of the white rabbit problem).
Reading through my post above again, I believe that your COMP argument
also works with the above conception.
QCOMP and UNIVERSE-COMP would just be different as to what would be
possible for us in _this_ universe: for instance, QCOMP would allow
mind-uploading and teleportation and other such things in _this
universe_ (materialist intuition again); while UNIVERSE-COMP would only
allow this in Platonia, in the Universal deployment, which is
inaccessible for manipulation for us inhabitants of the rather small
(considered against Platonia) visible universe.
Günther Greindl
thanks for your comments, I interleave my response.
>> showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the limit_
>> there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to also
>> take into account infinite delay, we must take this limit into account
>> and have infinite histories going through a "state" (do I understand you
>> correctly?).
>
> I guess you were meaning that we have to take into account an infinity
> of arbitrary long (but finite) delays. OK.
Hmm, if we have an infinity of arbitrary long but finite delays, then I
can only see aleph_0 histories (because we never take the "step to
infinity" - we can enumerate all histories.
Only if we take the "step to infinity" (as in Cantor diagonalization,
were we presuppose the complete listing of the reals and the diagonal
does not fit "at infinity") would we get 2^aleph_0 histories - or am I
missing something here?
> I will let you elaborate on this. But note that if my consciousness
> "here and now" supervenes on "past activity",
I will elaborate, but please give me time till February, before I will
not be able to work on this.
>then the comp substitution
> level has to be very "low" indeed.
Yes, very low, that was the idea.
> You will also need a notion of "block
> universe". The comp doctor will have to be able to manipulate
> "time-lines".
No, it is only that he will have to respect "relative embeddings" -
scanning and reconsitution will only be correct regarding _this_
universe and very similar universes, but not with regard to arbitrary
computations in Platonia.
>Remember that even deep, in the sense of Bennett(*) ,
> computer state, can be copied efficiently, so that when you say that
> (*) Bennett, C. H. (1988). Logical Depth and Physical Complexity. In
> Herken, R., editor, /The Universal Turing Machine A Half-Century
> Survey/, pages 227-258. Oxford University Press.
>
Thanks for the reference, I will consider this...
>> If we assume the whole universe to be an automaton, also it's
>> inhabitants would be "mechanical" =effectively computable of course -
>> but maybe they could then not be duplicated, because, when person A were
>> trying to make a scan of the properties of person B, the universe as a
>> whole would move into different states and make complementary
>> observables - which _could_ be necessary for a duplication - unavailable.
>
>
> OK. But your level has to be really at the bottom, not only below the
> quantum level. I recall you that the no-cloning theorem does not prevent
> us to be quantum computer. Right: we cannot say yes to any doctor, yet
> UDA goes through because at the seventh step the "copy need" is
> eliminated. We need only turing emulability, because quantum states,
> although not copyable, are "preparable" (in the quantum "prepare" sense)
> in many exemplaries, and indeed the UD does doevetail on all quantum
> computations.
Agreed.
> I think that your bottom really means: my brain is the whole of reality.
In the sense that the brain state depends on the whole of reality, and
if my brain state (or anyone elses) changes then the whole universe
transitions into a new state, yes, but not in the solipsitic form.
>> This may only work if consciousness supervenes not on "isolated"
>> computations, but only if it is embedded in computations constructing
>> whole universes - but then again, we can't exclude this a priori.
>>
>> And we would still have to consider many worlds, but these would then
>> indeed be _worlds_ and not only OMs with incoming/outgoing histories (of
>> course it would still seem this way from the concrete OM, but with
>> greatly reduced danger of white rabbits) - the laws of physics would not
>> emerge for OM's stranded in the UD deployment but for OM's embedded
>> already in highly structured computational environments - we would only
>> have to take into account duplications of OM's where also whole
>> universes are duplicated.
>
>
> Hmmm.... (I guess I use "OM" in a larger sense: those worlds remain
> computable (assuming comp and "bottom-level") and, as such, are
> generated by the UD). I guess I should not!
Could you please clarify what exactly you mean with OM? Maybe this can
clear up some misunderstandings?
> Well, if the quantum laws are derived from comp, then the "platonic
> histories" are manipulable in a sense similar to the use of parallel
> universe (or superposition states) in a quantum computer. Also, the comp
> Platonia need not be greater that Sigma_1 Arithmetical truth (which is
> a tiny part of arithmetical truth, itself a tiny part of mathematical
> truth): the deployment is really just the constructives consequences of
> 0, succession, addition and multiplication. And it is big as seen and
> infered from inside, cf Hubble and ... the quantum multiverse. The
> inaccessibility for manipulation is more of the type: no one can make 17
> even, not even a God.
Agreed.
Best Wishes,
Günther
M.A.
> We need only turing emulability, because quantum states,
> although not copyable, are "preparable" (in the quantum "prepare" sense)
Bruno Marchal
thanks for your comments, I interleave my response.showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the limit_there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to alsotake into account infinite delay, we must take this limit into accountand have infinite histories going through a "state" (do I understand youcorrectly?).I guess you were meaning that we have to take into account an infinityof arbitrary long (but finite) delays. OK.
Hmm, if we have an infinity of arbitrary long but finite delays, then I
can only see aleph_0 histories (because we never take the "step to
infinity" - we can enumerate all histories.
Only if we take the "step to infinity" (as in Cantor diagonalization,
were we presuppose the complete listing of the reals and the diagonal
does not fit "at infinity") would we get 2^aleph_0 histories - or am I
missing something here?
I will let you elaborate on this. But note that if my consciousness"here and now" supervenes on "past activity",
I will elaborate, but please give me time till February, before I will
not be able to work on this.
then the comp substitutionlevel has to be very "low" indeed.
Yes, very low, that was the idea.You will also need a notion of "blockuniverse". The comp doctor will have to be able to manipulate"time-lines".
No, it is only that he will have to respect "relative embeddings" -
scanning and reconsitution will only be correct regarding _this_
universe and very similar universes, but not with regard to arbitrary
computations in Platonia.
This may only work if consciousness supervenes not on "isolated"computations, but only if it is embedded in computations constructingwhole universes - but then again, we can't exclude this a priori.And we would still have to consider many worlds, but these would thenindeed be _worlds_ and not only OMs with incoming/outgoing histories (ofcourse it would still seem this way from the concrete OM, but withgreatly reduced danger of white rabbits) - the laws of physics would notemerge for OM's stranded in the UD deployment but for OM's embeddedalready in highly structured computational environments - we would onlyhave to take into account duplications of OM's where also wholeuniverses are duplicated.Hmmm.... (I guess I use "OM" in a larger sense: those worlds remaincomputable (assuming comp and "bottom-level") and, as such, aregenerated by the UD). I guess I should not!
Could you please clarify what exactly you mean with OM? Maybe this can
clear up some misunderstandings?
Well, if the quantum laws are derived from comp, then the "platonichistories" are manipulable in a sense similar to the use of paralleluniverse (or superposition states) in a quantum computer. Also, the compPlatonia need not be greater that Sigma_1 Arithmetical truth (which isa tiny part of arithmetical truth, itself a tiny part of mathematicaltruth): the deployment is really just the constructives consequences of0, succession, addition and multiplication. And it is big as seen andinfered from inside, cf Hubble and ... the quantum multiverse. Theinaccessibility for manipulation is more of the type: no one can make 17even, not even a God.
Agreed.
Günther Greindl
> and Cantor get a contradiction from that. You assume the diagram is
> indeed a piece of an existing bijection in Platonia, or known by God.
No, you misunderstand me there - I just meant that we need to take the
step to infinity - see below.
> that you get by flipping the 0 and 1 along the diagonal of the matrix
> appearing on the right in the diagram. That sequence, thus, exists in
> Platonia, but definitely cannot belong to the list described above.
snip
> So you have to look at it, in the third person point of view as
> computations which bifurcate (or differentiate by the rule Y = II), and
> bifurcate again, and again, and again, OK?
Yes, I'm with you so far.
> And now, what you are missing. I think. It is the distinction between
> third and first person point of view. As defined in the first and second
> step of UDA (not the Theatetical one used in AUDA).
>
> Looking at the generation of the UD, or dovetailing on all computations,
> you can see the many computations being generated and you can see them
> differentiate or bifurcating all the "time", where here time is defined
> by the succession 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ... itself. If you universal base is
> two dimensional (like with the Conway Game of Life) you can see the
> deployment as a static three dimensional conic structure.
>
> Everything there, is enumerable. At each UD step, everything is even finite!
snip
> But things changes when you adopt the first person point of view, due to
> the fact that the first person point of view cannot be aware of the
> dovetailing delays, nor of the extreme multiplication and redundancy of
> the computations. And if you are OK with, well, mainly here the step 4,
> you see that the "intuitive" measure will have to be made on the union
> of all computations going through the "current" state.
Agreed.
> 0...
>
> I have already begin the generation of a continuum of binary "history":
> Indeed, all those beginning by 0. Then I write
>
> 1...
>
> So I have begin the generation of the binary sequence beginning by 1. As
> you see I am dovetailing (not universally though!).
>
> Then i generate all possible extensions, which give me two time more work.
> First the possible continuation of the one beginning by 0.
>
> 00...
>
> 01...
>
That is how I visualized it, yes.
>
> Now, if you interpret the 1 or 0 as results of a self-bifurcation in the
> UDA, then by the unawareness of delays, the first person indeterminacy
> of those "in front of a never stopping UD", where your computations are
> dovetailed, in particular on the binary infinite sequences, bears on
> set with cardinalities of continua, despite mathematically the third
> person description does not leave the enumerable.
And here is where we seem to "disagree" - but maybe only in a trivial
sense - maybe we mean the same thing actually.
I agree that everything is still enumerable from a third person point of
view, and that the "continuum" arises from a 1st person point of view,
but also only if I imagine all computations of the UD - also the ones
infinitely far away.
I am skeptical of actual infinities in the "real=physical" world (in my
1-OM in only believe in potential infinities.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potential_infinity
see Bekenstein Bound, and Seth Lloyd's work on the limits of
computation), but when we say that physics is emergent from 1st person
point of view of the third person UD, we are also aware that this UD
does not exist "in" time and space (but generates it for inside observers).
So no problem with infinities there - I only have a problem with local
physical (1-OM) infinities (as presupposed in textbook physics when
using calculus for finite volumes of spacetime)- but then again, where
they appear locally I think they are also indicative of the multiverse,
as in Max Tegmark's suggestion that natural constants could be viewed as
indexicals into the Multiverse). So, actual infinity (as opposed to
potential) is always a multiverse-feature.
To return to the question at hand: the full continuum, also from a first
person perspective, appears only when I also take into account
reconstitutions "at infinity" - because, for every finite section I
consider (however large), I only have _stubs_ of full reals - and not
all the reals.
I think a bit along the lines like when one takes an ordinal, say
"omega", and imagines that it is infinity "completed". In the same
sense, we need _completed_ infinity for a real continuum (as opposed to
only a subset) to arise. And, as the infinity is completed in Platonia,
they contribute to the measure of 1-OMs - with the power of the full
continuum.
Would you agree?
> only low levels (not necessarily the "bottom"). Also, I can sometimes
> speculate that comp could predict there is no bottom.
In what way do you think this follows from comp? Because there are
histories for every arbitrarily deep probing of "physical" reality?
> The real question is what will you think if you, "low-level"
> computationalist father have a daughter falls in love with a high-level
> computationalist?
I would only allow them to get married after he was scanned, teleported
to Mars, and returned back again ;-))
> It is a complex puzzle because although they share the same basic
> theology they will have quite different theotechnologies.
Absolutely - I agree.
> OM are Nick Bostrom's subjective "observer moment". Basically,
> momentaneous qualia of feeling to be "in space-history".
That is how I always use OM.
> I use sometimes OM in that sense, although I tend to write 1-OM for it.
> By 3-OM I mean either a computational state "of a brain or of a
> universal machine "vehiculating" that experience, that quale"
> Or, in probabilistic context, a 3-OM is identified with all its
> occurence in the UD deployment. It is the many 3-OM, corresponding to
> the same experience (qualitatively, and this exists in infinity in the
> UD deployment, quantitatively, assuming comp).
Ok - could we agree to use OM for 1-OM in the future and 3-OM for the
other variant?
Best Wishes,
Günther
Bruno Marchal
I don't understand what you mean by computations being infinitely far
away. In the UD deployment, which I will wrote UD*, all computations
begins soon or later (like all dominoes falls soon or later in the
infinite discrete dominoe-sequences). All computations reach any of
their relative computational state soon or later always after the UD
makes a finite number of steps. *Some* subcomputations can be
interpreted as dovetailing on the constructive ordinal, but they still
reach any of their computational step in finite time.
>
>
> I am skeptical of actual infinities in the "real=physical" world (in
> my
> 1-OM in only believe in potential infinities.
I recall that the "physical" world is a *first person* plural
observation, so with comp with have to expect "things behaving like if
there was actual infinities". The "physical world" is just unreal, if
we decide to say real = the ontological, in which case something is
real if it belongs to the UD*, or if its existence can be proved in
Robinson Arithmetic.
>
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potential_infinity
>
> see Bekenstein Bound, and Seth Lloyd's work on the limits of
> computation), but when we say that physics is emergent from 1st person
> point of view of the third person UD, we are also aware that this UD
> does not exist "in" time and space (but generates it for inside
> observers).
Well, the UD has existed and has run in time 1991 and space Brussels :)
UD* does not exist "in" time and space, given that with comp it is
"time and space" which *appears* from the point of view of the
observers generated by the UD. It is an open problem if we can make
sense with a notion like Bekenstein bound or just balk hole with comp.
>
>
> So no problem with infinities there - I only have a problem with local
> physical (1-OM) infinities (as presupposed in textbook physics when
> using calculus for finite volumes of spacetime)- but then again, where
> they appear locally I think they are also indicative of the
> multiverse,
> as in Max Tegmark's suggestion that natural constants could be
> viewed as
> indexicals into the Multiverse). So, actual infinity (as opposed to
> potential) is always a multiverse-feature.
I can be OK with this. But the multi-verse emerge from the collective
multiplication. It is difficult to talk on this because all talks are
done at third person point of view level, even when we talk about the
first person, and the first personal plural.
>
>
> To return to the question at hand: the full continuum, also from a
> first
> person perspective, appears only when I also take into account
> reconstitutions "at infinity" - because, for every finite section I
> consider (however large), I only have _stubs_ of full reals - and not
> all the reals.
Hmmm... The phrasing "reconstitution at infinity" does not make sense,
I think. All reconstitutions are done after a finite number of steps
of the UD. But you are right that for (the third person description)
of the first person probable experience we have to take into account
the infinite union of the computations going through the relevant
state. The reals appears here and now, because they are generated at
the limit, as a infinite union of finite computations, or finite
pieces of infinite computations.
>
>
> I think a bit along the lines like when one takes an ordinal, say
> "omega", and imagines that it is infinity "completed". In the same
> sense, we need _completed_ infinity for a real continuum (as opposed
> to
> only a subset) to arise.
OK. But it is the union which is infinite. The reconstitution can be
numbered (by a God).
> And, as the infinity is completed in Platonia,
I *prefer* not. No actual infinities in the Arithmetical Platonia.
Analytical and physical truth belongs to the epistemology. It makes
things far simpler.
>
> they contribute to the measure of 1-OMs - with the power of the full
> continuum.
Yes. But those things appears in the discourse of the Lobian Machines,
generated by the Robinson Machine (the arithmetical UD). Those machine
have to use them because they can understand that theior histories are
distributed in the whole UD*.
>
>
> Would you agree?
If my comments above makes sense.
>
>
>
>> only low levels (not necessarily the "bottom"). Also, I can sometimes
>> speculate that comp could predict there is no bottom.
>
> In what way do you think this follows from comp? Because there are
> histories for every arbitrarily deep probing of "physical" reality?
Because in the UD, between two specific computational state of a
computation, their will be an infinity of computations going through
the computational states.
>
>
>> The real question is what will you think if you, "low-level"
>> computationalist father have a daughter falls in love with a high-
>> level
>> computationalist?
>
> I would only allow them to get married after he was scanned,
> teleported
> to Mars, and returned back again ;-))
No problem for him, but what if he proposes to your daughter a wedding
travel using a high-level computational band? Your daughter, or what
you think will remain from your daughter (cf you are supposed to be
low-level mechanist) will be a high-level computationalist version of
your daughter. You are OK with that? If you are really low-level
computationalist you could think your daughter is a zombie or just
plain dead.
Among the very *high*-level computationalist some accept artificial
brain with half their current number of neurons, and some accept brain
with one neuron, and some accept brain with zero neuron ... (they
identifies themselves with *the* arithmetical universal machine).
>
>
>> It is a complex puzzle because although they share the same basic
>> theology they will have quite different theotechnologies.
>
> Absolutely - I agree.
So you are *very* tolerant with your daughter. OK. In religious
matter, this attitude is rare. Well you were joking I think :)
>
>
>> OM are Nick Bostrom's subjective "observer moment". Basically,
>> momentaneous qualia of feeling to be "in space-history".
>
> That is how I always use OM.
>
>> I use sometimes OM in that sense, although I tend to write 1-OM for
>> it.
>> By 3-OM I mean either a computational state "of a brain or of a
>> universal machine "vehiculating" that experience, that quale"
>> Or, in probabilistic context, a 3-OM is identified with all its
>> occurence in the UD deployment. It is the many 3-OM, corresponding to
>> the same experience (qualitatively, and this exists in infinity in
>> the
>> UD deployment, quantitatively, assuming comp).
>
> Ok - could we agree to use OM for 1-OM in the future and 3-OM for the
> other variant?
We agree. But in the context where I use "3-OM", I prefer to use "1-
OM", to insist on the difference and prevent that people think "OM" is
a short for "3-OM". Despite 3-OMs are finite and 1-OMs are infinite,
the confusion is easy to do.
I have to go,
Best,
Bruno
Günther Greindl
> I don't understand what you mean by computations being infinitely far
> away. In the UD deployment, which I will wrote UD*, all computations
> begins soon or later (like all dominoes falls soon or later in the
> infinite discrete dominoe-sequences). All computations reach any of
> their relative computational state soon or later always after the UD
> makes a finite number of steps.
snip
> Hmmm... The phrasing "reconstitution at infinity" does not make sense,
> I think. All reconstitutions are done after a finite number of steps
> of the UD. But you are right that for (the third person description)
> of the first person probable experience we have to take into account
> the infinite union of the computations going through the relevant
> state. The reals appears here and now, because they are generated at
> the limit, as a infinite union of finite computations, or finite
> pieces of infinite computations.
snip
> OK. But it is the union which is infinite. The reconstitution can be
> numbered (by a God).
Yes, I see we agree - my fault. I meant the infinite union of
computations - maybe "rec. at infinity" was a bit dramatic way of
speaking - the way you put it is clearer.
Cheers,
Günther