Revised asset voting
parker friedland
The election outcome in which the most voters are represented by candidates who approve of atleast 1 of the winning candidates should be selected.
Simple fix.
1. More efficiant negotion process.
2. It is harder for candidates to use strategic voting as an excuse to hide behind why they did not support or oppose a particular candidate.
I'm still not a huge fan of delegated voting methods, but I think this is an improvement from asset voting's SNTV based negotiation process.
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
I don't think that asset is here understood. As I see it, a key feature of Asset can be, if done properly, all voters know exactly what seat was elected with their vote. That is, they know whom they voted for, and if the electors transfer votes in precinct batches, only a few will be mixed, i.e., a small number of votes may have been spit between more than one elected seat.
Asset is not a contested election, it is a cooperative one, in which every voter gets one vote to count toward a quota to win a seat (and I suggest the Hare quote, not the Droop quota, and allowing some seats to go vacant until collaboration appears. Assemblies may function -- and commonly do -- with missing seats. Rule tweaks, as determined by the Assembly, can handle how to polish, perfect representation.
So seats are created when Q voters, through their chosen
electors, have agreed on that seat. Every voter (with the
exception mentioned where a precinct's votes are split) has one
seat in the Assembly. controlling, though the elector, 1/Q vote.
All seats are equal, then. If the Assembly wants to allow electors
to directly vote, under some circumstances, that's a tweak that
can be worked out, by the Assembly. Assemblies make their own
rules, that's a strong tradition.
This concept of perfect representation by free choice is unusual, most people don't think it is possible and think of Asset in ways that still assume contested elections.
(I would redefine "majority" in the Assembly to mean, except on
questions of privilege, a majority of all possible seats, so a
majority cannot be created by keeping some seats vacant, removing
a possible incentive not to find cooperation. Cooperation will
always increase voting power.) ("Questions of privilege" are
personal and only affect those actually present. I.e., "Shall we
turn up the thermostat?" "Shall we adjourn?")
The electors may use delegable proxy to efficiently suggest vote
assignments, but I would have electors be required to personally
transfer votes (and I would maintain revocability. As electors are
public voters, they are really a part of an extended
representative body, and there is no need to remove their
franchise.)
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