Places to Argue Against IRV

[William Waugh]

Those who can stomach Facebook and are willing to argue against IRV, this might be a good place: FairVote Virginia

[NoIRV]

On Sunday, April 22, 2018 at 2:51:05 AM UTC-4, William Waugh wrote:
> Those who can stomach Facebook and are willing to argue against IRV, this might be a good place: FairVote Virginia

I will not use Facebook due to all the scandals, but here are my thoughts. You can copy and paste them into the Facebook.
Wow, this almost turned into a rant.

------

- IRV is complicated and requires upgrading software on voting machines. Score and NetApproval works on today's machines.
- http://rangevoting.org/rangeVirv.html#nasty shows (1) IRV thwarting a clear majority winner, (2) IRV is not immune to strategy or spoilers (if the A camp and B camp rank C above all others, then C wins), (3) IRV can lead to 2-party domination (either C drops out, or both A and B drop out), (4) IRV has a large risk of near ties, and (5) IRV ignores much of a user's ballot.
The eliminations are: E drops (49 votes; one less than A), then A drops (50 votes, one less than B), then C drops (100 votes, one less than B), finally D wins (by a 60-40 margin, although C is preferred to every other candidate by a much stronger margin).

About point 5: Notice that the B voters did NOT have their vote transferred to their second choice OR their third choice, as those candidates were eliminated while those 51 votes were still on B. By the time B was eliminated, the only candidate left was D, the fourth choice of those 51 voters. So next time you hear propaganda about second choices mattering under IRV, think again.

Score Voting avoids every one of these problems. The winner really depends on (1) how happy the left and right are with C, and (2) how happy C voters are with B and D. The race will be competitive, and second and third choices will truly matter. (With IRV, only a select few second choices matter, and those are biased.)

Worried about "bullet voting"?
Ok, so everyone bullet votes. C wins.
Now the DE party decides to vote DE max score, and ABC min score. D or E wins.
Now the AB party tries to retaliate. They vote C a medium score like 5/10, and C wins.
Bullet voting has been defeated.

[parker friedland]

https://www.countable.us/articles/3856-states-adopt-ranked-choice-voting

[NoIRV]

I have engaged the propagandists at the Voting System Options group.

https://groups.google.com/forum/?nomobile=true#!topic/voting-system-options/f4bvkU3s8L0

[Clay Shentrup]

On Tuesday, May 8, 2018 at 6:46:53 PM UTC-7, NoIRV wrote:

I have engaged the propagandists at the Voting System Options group.

https://groups.google.com/forum/?nomobile=true#!topic/voting-system-options/f4bvkU3s8L0

That attitude's really not going to get you anywhere. 

[Ciaran Dougherty]

I am inclined to agree; partisans will not be convinced, and the undecided won't take kindly to negativity (even if we Are right).

Better to see what can be done in your own location and get somewhere started on a cardinal method, so that we can point to it and give them proof that it works.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Center for Election Science" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to electionscience+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

[William Waugh]

Discussion between William Waugh and Linda Templin in the followup comments to the post at https://www.facebook.com/groups/1767170716870254/permalink/2105952316325424/?comment_id=2106240802963242&comment_tracking=%7B%22tn%22%3A%22R%22%7D

[Sara Wolf]

Linda got really intense the other day on another thread. Anyone know who she is?

[William Waugh]

I have a general understanding that meeting the later-no-harm constraint can be argued as undesirable. But I haven't yet learned how to articulate that argument. A Facebooker complains that Approval fails the constraint here.

"[Approval is] also no-later-harm non-compliant. If you vote for more than one candidate, your second choice may beat your first choice, depending on the unforeseeable choices of the other voters. This unfairly puts the voter into an unsolvable strategic dilemma."

[NoIRV]

"If you do NOT approve your second choice, then perhaps your third or fourth or cetera will beat your second choice. You have To decide based on how much you like the candidates."

If you are arguing against IRV then you can attack Fave Betrayal failure.