Chicken Dilema

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Phil Uhrich

oläst,
20 okt. 2017 17:47:582017-10-20
till The Center for Election Science
After thinking on it for a while, I realized what it is I don't like about 3-2-1 voting. I think the Chicken Dilemma is a bogus criterion. It is patronizing to tell voters you really should have put this candidate second, after all they agree on so much so I am just going to make sure you don't have the chance to mess it up. It reminds me of all the Clintonites in the primary with their 'Clinton is a progressive that likes to get things done' and they voted together 95% of the time in the senate (on renaming post offices). Tell that to the citizens of Haiti and Honduras or the migrants being sold into slavery in the former african country with the highest human development index, Libya, that now has to fight of islamic extremists just so Clinton could cackle 'we came, we saw, he died' as the US regime changed somewhere around the 100'th government in the name of stopping communism, maintaining imperial hegemony, or just justifying every extremist that wants us dead. The two of them wouldn't be in the same party in any other country. Clinton would have been the most right wing leader on the world stage; she would be just as militaristic, business friendly, and oligarch serving as Obama was http://www.ianwelsh.net/could-obama-have-fixed-the-economy/ and as Trump is. Except Clinton would have received the same fawning, vacuous, press coverage Obama did; that papered over horrible policy because it would be racist/sexist to point out when an incompetent POC/women is acting incompetently.

I don't like being corralled into supporting someone I don't support. I am perfectly capable of judging the risk of letting my ideological opposite win by not supporting the so called similar candidate more. Range5 and Approval are better.

Warren D Smith

oläst,
20 okt. 2017 18:27:342017-10-20
till electio...@googlegroups.com
could you explain that in more detail? (The way you wrote your post,
you are kind of assuming the reader knows all about what you are
talking about already. But I'm the dumb reader.)

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Warren D. Smith
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Phil Uhrich

oläst,
1 nov. 2017 01:07:232017-11-01
till The Center for Election Science
Sorry for the delayed response, I was under the weather. 3-2-1 voting has rounds which encourage you not to differentiate between your most favorite (who might be less likely to win) and someone similar who might be more likely to win. I assume that is because Jamison is really a fan of avoiding the chicken dilemma. I would much prefer to ditch chicken dilemma and keep clone independance.

Jameson Quinn

oläst,
1 nov. 2017 02:24:372017-11-01
till electionsciencefoundation

  3-2-1 voting has rounds which encourage you not to differentiate between your most favorite (who might be less likely to win) and someone similar who might be more likely to win. 

I'm not sure what you mean by this. 3-2-1 is absolutely not intended to encourage the voter not to differentiate between a favorite and a compromise candidate. The intention is close to the opposite of that: to make sure that for almost all voters in almost all real-world elections, the strategic ballot is the same as the "honest" ballot where you rate your favorite as Good, other better-than-probability-weighted-average candidates as "OK", and all worse-than-average candidates as "Bad".

In order to achieve a strategic incentive to be "honest" in this sense, 3-2-1 has three tallying rounds; the first one collapses the difference between "OK" and "bad", the second one between "good" and "OK", and the third one between a 1-level distinction and a 2-level distinction. But that's just the internals of how the method works. Voters are not asked to ignore these distinctions.

3-2-1 is intended to let voters get the strategic voting power that they desire without having to rate second-best candidates at top. 

From Phil's discussion of Clinton, I see two possibilities. Let's imagine a scenario where Sanders does not have the votes to win (whether or not you think that's realistic; I think it's probably not, because Sanders probably could have won a 3-way race with a good voting method). Perhaps Phil doesn't care whether Clinton or Trump wins. In that case, 3-2-1 offers no advantages over approval for him, but also no disadvantages; he can simply rate Sanders top and the other two bottom no matter what the method is. But if Phil hates Trump more than Clinton, 3-2-1 is better than approval for him; instead of pushing him to strategically approve Clinton at the same level as Sanders, it lets him give Clinton a middle rating, and still get the same strategic power where it counts. 
 
I assume that is because Jamison is really a fan of avoiding the chicken dilemma.  I would much prefer to ditch chicken dilemma and keep clone independance.

Yes, I am a fan of avoiding CD. If you think clone independence is most important, then you can both get decent CD performance and clone independence from Condorcet-like methods. The advantage of 3-2-1 over such methods is more about "simplifying" (for instance, making it easier to present outcomes) than about CD per se.  

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