OK thanks for the links; I accept the mission to make this chart for Australia's House. I'll probably be able to get to it in the next 1-2 weeks. Along the way, I'll probably modularize the code a little bit, to separate the "engine" from the country-specific part (so if you're going to delve into it to that level, it might be best to wait).
If you don't want to rely on Javascript, or use an Iframe, one option might be to just use a static screenshot linking to my page. I'm not saying this is a great (or even good) option, just one possibility. That would mean my data notes would go with the chart, without having to reprint them, or leaving them out. (I'm not sure leaving them out would be desirable -- but you may disagree; feel free to do whatever you want.)
The only non-bare-bones things it uses are: JS, D3,js, 2 CSV files for the data, some Google fonts, and 2 small CSS files. But if you include it as an Iframe all that will be handled on my server. (Actually, I just realized I'm using an Object/Embed tag, not Iframe, but I think both could work and for cross-domain, Iframe might be the way to go.)
Regarding two-party domination, I think your page makes a lot of strong points, but it all seems to be empirical. I have been hoping to find something more theoretical. The thing is, in idealized terms, IRV is basically an "N-ballot majority system" -- following Duverger's meaning when he spoke of the "double ballot majority system". So there is a pattern that comes into play with what I think of as the spoiler-effect mechanism:
1-round (plurality) ---> system tends towards a max of 2 parties
2-round (top-two) ---> system tends towards a max of 3 parties (*)
N-round (IRV) ---> no max imposed, at least on acct. of the spoiler effect mechanism (N is however many rounds are needed)
* I suppose this is debatable. But in terms of the spoiler effect, it makes sense to me. I would propose that France does have this tendency. But of course, a tendency can easily be overridden by other factors. France has several small but significant parties. In 2002, the top-two system backfired when Le Pen made it to the 2nd round, where Chirac wiped him out. That backfire is the form that the pressure of Duverger's law takes, it seems to me, in driving them towards no more than 3 parties. But that pressure is outweighed by other pressures for more parties.
I did say "idealized" above, and that's because I'm eliding the difference between IRV and the exhaustive ballot, which would be the true N-ballot system. But if that difference makes a real difference to the outcome, it's unclear to me why it should.
-Dan